CIHM 
Microfiche 
Series 
(l\/lonographs) 


ICIMH 

Collection  de 
microfiches 
(monographies) 


Canadian  Institute  for  Historical  Microreproductions  /  Institut  canadien  de  microreproductions  historlques 


Technical  and  Bibliographic  Notes  /  Notes  techniques  et  bibliographiques 


The  Institute  has  attempted  to  obtain  the  best  original 
copy  available  for  filming.  Features  of  this  copy  which 
may  be  bibliographically  unique,  which  may  alter  any  of 
the  images  in  the  reproduction,  or  which  may 
significantly  change  the  usual  method  of  filming  are 
checked  below. 


D 


Coloured  covers  / 
Couverture  de  couleur 


I      I   Covers  damaged  / 


Couverture  endommagee 


□   Covers  restored  and/or  laminated  / 
Couverture  restaur6e  et/ou  pellicul6e 

I         Cover  title  missing  /  Le  titre  de  couverture  manque 

I Coloured  maps  /  Cartes  g6ographiques  en  couleur 

□   Coloured  ink  (i.e.  other  than  blue  or  black)  / 
Encre  de  couleur  (i.e.  autre  que  bleue  ou  noire) 

I      I   Coloured  plates  and/or  illustrations  / 


D 
D 
□ 


□ 


D 


Planches  et/ou  illustrations  en  couleur 


Bound  with  other  material  / 
Reli6  avec  d'r.utres  documents 


Only  edition  available  / 
Seule  Edition  disponible 

Tight  binding  may  cause  shadows  or  distortion  along 
interior  margin  /  La  reliure  serree  peut  causer  de 
I'ombre  ou  de  la  distorsion  le  long  de  la  marge 
interieure. 

Blank  leaves  added  during  restorations  may  appear 
within  the  text.  Whenever  possible,  these  have  been 
omitted  from  filming  /  Use  peut  que  certaines  pages 
blanches  ajoutees  lors  d'une  restauration 
apparaissent  dans  le  texte,  mais,  lorsque  cela  etait 
possible,  ces  pages  n'ont  pas  6t6  filmees. 

Additional  comments  / 
Commentaires  suppiementaires: 


L'Institut  a  microfilme  le  meiileur  exemplaire  qu'il  lui  a 
6\6  possible  de  se  procurer.  Les  details  de  cet  exem- 
plaire qui  sont  peut-6tre  uniques  du  point  de  vue  bibli- 
ographique,  qui  peuvent  modifier  una  image  reproduite, 
ou  qui  peuvent  exiger  une  modification  dans  la  m^tho- 
de  normale  de  filmage  sont  indiqu^s  ci-dessous. 

I         Coloured  pages  /  Pages  de  couleur 

I      I   Pages  damaged  /  Pages  endommag6es 


D 


Pages  restored  and/or  laminated  / 
Pages  restaur^es  et/ou  pellicul^es 


0  Pages  discoloured,  stained  or  foxed  / 
Pages  d^color^es,  tachet^es  ou  piqu^es 

I      I   Pages  detached  /  Pages  d6tach6es 

[yj   Showthrough / Transparence 

□   Quality  of  prir*  varies  / 
Quality  • 


D 


I'impression 


Includes    .  ,.^.orTwr.tary  material  / 
Comprenu  i."  r  steriel  suppl6mentaire 

Pages  wholly  or  partially  obscured  by  errata  slips, 
tissues,  etc.,  have  been  refilmed  to  ensure  the  best 
possible  image  /  Les  pages  totalement  ou 
partiellement  obscurcies  par  un  feuillet  d'errata,  une 
pelure,  etc.,  ont  6t6  filmees  a  nouveau  de  fa^on  a 
obtenir  la  meillecre  image  possible. 

Opposing  pages  with  varying  colouration  or 
discolourations  are  filmed  twice  to  ensure  the  best 
possible  image  /  Les  pages  s'opposant  ayant  des 
colorations  variables  ou  des  decolorations  sont 
film6es  deux  fois  afin  d'obtenir  la  meilleure  image 
possible. 


This  item  is  filmed  at  the  reduction  ratio  checlced  below  / 

Ce  document  est  (ilm^  au  taux  de  reduction  indique  ci-dessous. 


lOx 

14x 

18x 

22x 

26x 

30x 

.^' 

12x 


16x 


20x 


24x 


28x 


32x 


r;<a?"'-"''^"' 


The  copy  filmed  here  has  b««n  reproduced  thanks 
to  the  generosity  of: 

National   Library  of  Canada 


L'exemplaire  filmA  fut  reproduit  grace  d  la 
g^nArositA  de: 

Bibliotheque  nationale  du  Canada 


The  imeges  appearing  here  are  the  best  quality 
possible  considering  the  condition  and  legibility 
of  the  original  copy  and  in  keeping  with  the 
filming  contract  specifications. 


Original  copies  in  printed  paper  covers  are  filmed 
beginning  with  the  front  cover  ^nd  ending  on 
the  last  page  with  a  printed  or  illustrated  impres- 
sion, or  the  back  cover  when  appropriate.  All 
other  original  copies  are  filmed  beginning  on  the 
first  page  with  a  printed  or  illustrated  impres- 
sion, and  ending  on  the  last  page  with  a  printed 
or  illustrated  impression. 


The  last  recorded  frame  on  each  microfiche 
shall  contain  the  symbol  —^(meaning  "CON- 
TINUED"), or  the  symbol  V  (meening  "END"), 
whichever  applies. 

Maps,  plates,  charts,  etc.,  may  be  filmed  at 
different  reduction  ratios.  Those  too  large  to  be 
entirely  included  in  one  exposure  are  filmed 
beginning  in  the  upper  left  hand  corner,  left  to 
right  and  top  to  bottom,  as  many  frames  as 
required.  The  following  diagrams  illustrate  the 
method: 


Les  images  suivantes  ont  iti  reproduites  avec  le 
plus  grand  soin.  compte  tenu  de  la  condition  at 
de  la  nertet*  de  l'exemplaire  film*,  et  en 
conformity  avec  les  conditions  du  contrat  de 
filmage. 

Les  exemplaires  originaux  dont  la  couverture  en 
pepier  est  imprimis  sont  filmis  en  commencant 
par  le  premier  plat  et  en  terminant  soit  par  la 
derniire  page  qui  compone  une  empreinte 
d'impression  ou  d'illustration,  soit  par  le  second 
plat,  salon  le  cas.  Tous  les  autres  exemplaires 
originaux  sont  filmis  en  commencant  par  la 
premiere  page  qui  comporte  une  empreinte 
d'impression  ou  d'illustration  et  en  terminant  par 
la  derniAre  page  qui  comporte  une  telle 
empreinte. 

Un  des  symboles  suivants  apparaitra  sur  la 
derniire  image  de  cheque  microfiche,  selon  le 
cas:  le  symbols  — ^  signifie  "A  SUIVRE  ",  le 
symbole  V  signifie  "FIN". 

Les  cartes,  planches,  tableaux,  etc.,  peuvent  etre 
filmis  i  del  taux  de  reduction  diffirents. 
Lorsque  le  document  est  trop  grand  pour  etre 
reproduit  en  un  seul  cliche,  il  est  filmi  A  partir 
de  Tangle  supirieur  gauche,  de  gauche  it  droite, 
et  de  haut  en  bas,  en  prenant  le  nombre 
d'images  nicessaire.  Les  diagrammes  suivants 
illustrent  la  mithode. 


1 

2 

3 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

MICROCOPr   RESOLUTION   TEST   CHART 

(ANSI  and  ISO  TEST  CHART  No    7) 


A    d^PLIEajM^GE    In 


'6^J   tost    Mam   '--trcet 

("6;   482-   0300-Phon,  ""^^ 

("6)   ;S8  -  5989  -  Fa. 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   KNOWLEDGE 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

NBW  YORK  ■    BOSTON  •   CHICAGO  •  DALLAS 
ATLANTA  •    SAN  FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  Liiirr«D 

LONDON   •    BOMBAY  •    CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 

THE  MACMILLAN  CO.  OF  CANADA.  Ltd. 

TORONTO 


THE 


PROBLEM  OF  KNOWLEDGE 


»< 


BT 


DOUGLAS  CLYDE  MACINTOSH,   Ph.D. 

ASSISTANT  PROFESSOR  OF  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGT 
W  YALE   UMIVEBSITY 


NrtD  gorfe 

THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

1915 


Tx   I  _ 


CopTsieirr,  IMS, 

bt  the  macmillan  company. 


Set  up  and  citctrotyped.    PuMishcd  October,  191s. 


1^  ^ 
• 
} 


IfsTtgoeti  9t(m 

J.  8.  Cudhlng  Co.  —  Berwick  &  Smith  Co. 

Norwood,  Mas8.,  U.S.A. 


MT    FIRST   COHPAyiON 

JOHN  EVERETT  MACINTOSH 

WITH 

THB  GRATITUDE  AND  AFFECTION 

OF 

A  YOUNOER  BROTHER 


vt 


ACKN    AXEDGMENT, 

If  I  were  to  undertake  to  make  complete  ackno*.  •  .ent  of 
my  indebtedness  to  others  for  stimulus  and  direction  in  connec- 
tioi  -vith  the  study  of  the  problems  discussed  in  this  volume  I 
shou  d  want  to  begin  by  referring  to  my  first  teacher  of  philoso- 
ph>,  Professor  James  Ten  Broeke,  of  McMaster  University 
Toronto.  But  where  to  end  I  s).  .Id  scarcely  know.  I  shall 
therefore  mention  only  those  whom  I  have  to  thank  for  one  direct 
service  or  another  in  connection  with  the  actual  production  of  the 
present  volume. 

Through  the  kindness  of  my  former  teachers,  Professors  J  R 
Angell  and  A.  W.  Moure,  of  the  University  of  Chicago;  of  my 
colleagues,  Professors  E.  W.  Hopkins,  A.  K.  Rogers,  and  C.  A 
Bennett,  of  Vale  University ;  of  i  v  former  colleagues  in  Yale 
University,  Professor  W.  E.  Hock        (now  of  Harvard  Univer- 
sity) and  Dr.  H.  T.  Costello  ,'now  c      'olunibia  University);  and 
finally,  of  Professor  R.  B.  IVr.y,  of  Harvard  University,  and 
Professor  D.  S.  Miller,  ot   the  (Jeneral  Theological  Seminary 
New  \ork,  var  .  •  portions   .f  the  volume  have  been  read  in  the 
manuscript,  an('   •  .  a  result  not  a  few  helpful  criticisms  and 
suggestions  have  been  received.     I  am  particularly  indebted  to 
I)r.  Costello  in  connection  with  the  references  to  the  logisticians 
ui  the  last  chapter.     It  should  not  be  concluded,  however,  that 
here,  or  elsewhere  in  the  book,  any  one  except  the  author  is  to  be 
held  responsible  for  any  of  the  opinions  expressed. 

For  friendly  counsel  and  other  manifestations  of  kindly  inter- 
est  in  connection  with  the  publishing  of  the  work  I  am  grateful 
to  Dean  Shailer  Mathews,  ot  the  University  of  Chicago,  and 
Professor  E.  Hershey  Sneath,  of  Yale  University. 

(irateful  acknowledgnier  is  also  made  of  assistance  received 
from  my  friend  and  former  pupil,  Mr.  E.  W.  K.  Mould,  in  the 
preparation  of  the  manuscript  for  the  publishers ;  from  my  friend 


'  i 


Ht 


VIU 


ACKNOWLEDGMENT 


and  pupil,  Mr.  F.  W.  Shorter,  in  the  reading  of  the  proof;  and 
from  my  sister.  Miss  Anna  B,  Macintosh,  in  the  preparation  of 
the  index  of  authors. 

D.  C.   MACINTOSH. 

Breadalbane,  Ontario, 
August  31st,  1016. 


TABLE   OF  CHAPTERS 


PART 
A. 


B. 


thapterl.     Introductory:    PhUosophy   and   Its   Principal 
Problems 

I:    THE  PROBLEM    OF  IMMEDIATE  KXOW LEDGE 

THE  PROBLEM  OF  ACQUAINTANCE  (EPISTEMOLOGY 
PROPER)       

1.  A  Critique  of  Dualism [ 

Chapter  II.     Dualism  and  Avowed  Asnosticism 
Chapter  III.     Dualism  and  Attempted  Metaphysics 
Chapter  IV.    Dualism  and  Attempted  Metaphysics  (Con 

eluded) 

2.  A  Critique  of  Idealism  .... 
Chapter  V.     Mystical  and  Logical  Idealism 
Chapter  VI.     Psychological  Idealism    . 
Chapter  VII.     The  Older  Absolute  Idealism 
Chapter  VIII.    The  Newer  Absolute  Idealism 
Chapter  IX.     The  Disintegration  of  Idealism 

3.  A  Critique  of  the  Xew  Realism     . 
Chapter  X.     Antecedents  of  the  New  Realism 
Chapter  XL    The    Neo-Realistic    Doctrine   of    Secondary 

Qualities 232 

Chapter  XII.     The  Neo-Realistic  Doctrine  of  Conscioiisness 
Chapter  XIII.    The  Neo-Realistic  Doctrine  of  Relations, 

L'niversals,  and  Values 

4.  Constructive  Statement \ 

Chapter  XIV.     Critical  Monism  in  Epistemology 

PROBLEMS  OF  THE  WAYS  AND  MEANS  OF  KNOWING 
(MORPHOLOGY    OF    KNOWLEDGE,    AND    GENETIC 
LOGIC)  •        •        .        .        . 
Chapter  XV. 
Chapter  XVI 


11 

11 
11 
13 
36 

57 

72 

72 

92 

126 

154 

181 

211 

211 


269 

293 
310 
310 


The  Morphology  of  Knowledge 
The  Genesis  of  the  Apriori  . 


330 
336 
3ol 


PART 
A. 


II: 


THE   PROBLEM   OF  MEDIATE  KXOWl.EDGE 
THE  PROBLEM  OF  TRUTH    (LO(;iCAL  THEORY) 
Chapter  XVII.    A  Critique  of  Intelkctualisni      . 
Chapter  XVIIL     A  Critique  of  Anti-Intellectualism 
Chapter  XIX.     Critical  Monism  in  Logicai  Theory 
B.   THE   PROBLEM  OF   PROOF   (METHODOLOGY) 
Chapter  XX.    The  Problem  of  Scientific  Method 


307 
367 
369 
401 
4:j8 
459 
450 


ANALYTICAL  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


Introduction  (1) : 

a.   I'hilosophy  in  general  (1). 
Its  detinition  (1). 

Its  relation  to  tlie  special  sciences  (1). 
Problems  of  values  an<l  of  reality  (3). 
6.   The  Problem  of  Knowledge  (6). 

Typical  attitudes  toward  the  problem  (7)  : 

Woodbridge  (7),  J.  Wauon  (8),  Ladd  (8). 
Subdivisions  of  the  problem  (10). 

PART  I.    THE  PROBLEM  OF  IMMEDIATE  KXOWLEDGE  (11) 
""Z^^   Skk'u;:'''    •''    ACQUAINTANCE    (EPISTeI 

Introductory  definitions  (13). 

Subdivision   I.    A   Criti.iue  of  Absolute  Epistemological   Dualism 
(Ep.ste..ioloni,-al  Ouali.sm  and  Critical   Realism).      An  absolute 
auality  of  the  experienced  and  the  independently  real  (14) 
Agnosticism  logically  involved  (14). 
a.   The  agnosticism  avowed  (14). 

Locke  (a  forerunner)  (14),  Kant  (17),  P^hulze  (24) 
Hamilton  (•.>:,),  Spencer  (27),  cf.  IJradley  and  Hodg- 
son (.30),  Kiehl  (31),  Dilthey  (.-iS). 
6.   Attempted  metaphysics  ;  agnosticism  not  fully  acknowl- 
edged (30). 

(1)  Jacob!    (37),    Reinhold    (37),   Fries    (38),   Neo- 

Fnesianism  (41),  Ilerbart  (42),  Lotze  (44), 
Ladd  (50),  Pringle-l'attison  (51),  Strong  (52^ 
Lovejoy  (56).  " 

(2)  Schelling    (57),    Schopenhauer    (58),    Hartmann 

(60),  Volkelt  (63),  Cornelius  (66),  Kuelpe  (68), 
B.  Russell's  earlier  view  (70) 
Subdivision  II.   A  Critique  of  Idealistic   Absolute   Epistemological 
Monism  (Epistemological  Monism  and  Dogmatic  Idealism)      The 
view  that  (physical)  reality  is  nothing  beyond  idea,  offered  aa  a 
solution  of  the  problem  of  knowledge  (72) . 
Preliminary  djstinction.s  (7.1) 

1.   The   Integration   of  Idealism.      Development   c'   idealistic 
thought  from  simpler  to  more  composite  forms  (74). 
xi 


Ml 


ANALYTICAL  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


B 


D 


E. 


F. 


.    Mystical  Wealisiii.    The  interpretation  of  physical  reality 
as  mere  idea,  susirested  by  the  mystical  experience  (75). 
The  L'panishail  philosophers  (75),  Albertus  Magnus 
(7!»),  Eckhart  et  al.  (70),  Mrs.  Eddy  (71>). 
.   Lojiical  Idealism.     The  iiiteri>reiation  of  reality  as  the 
lojjical  idea  (the  abstract  absolute  idea,  the  absolutely 
satisfactory  predicate,  or  definition),  suggested  by  the 
dialectic  (81). 
Plato  (81). 
Mystical-Logical  Idealism.     A  dyadic  compound  of  ele- 
mental forms  of  idealism,  the  mystical  .ad  the  loeical 
(8!»). 
Plotinu-s  (89). 
I'sychological  Idealism.     The  interpretation  of  the  phys- 
ical object  as  mere  content  of  consciousness,  under  the 
influence  of  the  psychological  point  of  view  (92). 
The  logical  fallacies  involved  ('.»;!). 
o.    Undisguised  psychological  i<lealisni  : 

(1)  Berkeley  (i»7),  Hume  (it8),  J.  S.  Mill  (100), 

Clifford  (100),    Pearson   (102),   Marahall 
(103). 

(2)  Fichte  (104),  Fouill^e  (lOo). 

(3)  Lipps    (lOfi);    Vaihinger    (107),    Poincar^ 

(108). 
6.   Disguised  psychological  idealism.     (Pure  empiri- 
cism ;   immediate  empiricism  ;   the  philosophy 
of  pure  experience)  (100). 
Mach  (110),  Avcnarius   (111),  Petzoldt  (112), 
Wundt  (112).  Fullcrlon  (i:4),  Hodgson  (116)i 
James  (110).  Dewey  (117),  Mead  (118),  A.  W. 
Moore  (110),  IJawden  (119). 
Mystical-P.sychological   Idealism.     A  dyadic  compound 
of  elemental  forms  of  idealism,  the  mystical  and  the 
psychological  (120). 
Rcrgsoii  (120). 
Logical-P.sychological  Idealism.     A  dyadic  compound  of 
elemental  forms  of  idealism,  the  logical  and  the  psy- 
chological.    Reality  as  the  concrete  absolute  idea,  the 
concrete  uiii/ersal,  the  logical  within  the  p-sycholo-ical 
(120). 

The  monistic  (singularistic)  form  :  Absolute  Idealism 
(128). 

o.   The  pre-Bradleian  constructive  movement;  the 
thisis  (130). 
(1)    Intellectualistic  ab.solute  idealism.    The  ab- 
sohite  idi-a  dctirinincd  by  rational  criti- 
cism (130). 


ANALYTICAL  TAIJLE  OF  CONTENTS 


XUI 


Hegel  (130),  Stirling  and  Wallace  (131), 
J.  Caird  (134),  Green  et   al.    (134), 
E.  CaiiJ  (i:{7;,  J.  Watson  (138). 
(2)   Voluntaristic  absolute  idealism.     The  abso- 
lute idi  1  determined  by  purpose  (141). 
Koycc  (141;. 
fi.   The  Bradleiaii  criticism;  the  antithes.s  (146). 

Bradley  (14(i). 
y.  The  post-Bradleian  reconstruction    'he  synthesia 
(VA). 

(1)  Intellectualistic  absolute  idealism  (154). 

Bosamiui't  (154). 

(2)  Voluntaristic  ab^jiute  id     'ism  ,  169). 

Taylor  (li)*'). 

(3)  Mystical  ab.solute  idealism,  or 

G.  Mystical-Logical-l'sycholoRical   Idealism.    The   triadic 
compound  of  the  elemental  forms  of  idealism  (161). 
Hocking  (1«1). 
2.  The  Disintegration  of  Idealism.     Tendencies  from  the  more 
integrated  forms  of  idealism  back  to  the  more  elemental 
forms  (181). 

A.  Toward  I'ersonal  (Pluralistic)  and  Psychological  Ideal- 

ism (181). 

(1)  Monistic  Theistic  (Psychological)  Idealism  (182). 

Paulsen  (182). 

(2)  Semi-Pluralistic  Theistic  Idealism.     Lotzian  ideal- 

Ism  (184). 

(3)  Pluralisci'i  Theistic  (Psychological)  Idealism  (184). 
Leibniz  (184),  Ward  (185),  Rashdall  (187),  Schil- 
ler (18fe),  Henouvier  (188) 

(4)  Pluralistic    r.emi-Tlieistic    (Logical-Psychological) 

Idealism.     Howison  (18;)). 

(5)  Pluralistic  A,,heistic  (Logical-Psychological)  Ideal- 

ism.    McTaf;,gart  (100). 

B.  Toward  Abstract  and  Logical  Idealism  (102). 

(1)  Psycbological-positivistic  abstract  idealism  ( 
FuUerton's  earlier  view  (lit2). 

(2)  Ciitical-positivistic       (intellectualistic)       abstract 

idealism  (l!t3). 
Transition  to  this  view.    Lange  (193),  Liebmann 

(105). 
Typical  representatives.      The  Marburg  School: 

n.  Cohen,  N'atorp,  Cas.sir^r  (105). 

(3)  Critical-transcendental      (voluntaristic)     abstract 

idealism  (108). 

Windelband  (108),  Uickert  (200),  MUnsterberg 
(201),  .MUuch  (20i). 


A 


XIV 


ANALYTICAL  T.VBLE   OP  CONTENTS 


C. 


c. 


h 


(4)    Logical-transcendental  abstract  idealism  (201). 

Husiserl  (202),  Meiiiong  (20;i). 
and  B.   Partial  combination  of  Person,,    and  Abstract 

Idealism.     Uakewell  (2(H1). 
Toward  Mystical  Idealism  (208). 
Spiritual  or  Kelif;ious  Idealism.    Theoretical   idealism 
retained  for  its  supposed  spiritual  and  especially  reli- 
gious value  (208). 

Kuckeii  (208),  Boyce  Gibson  (209). 
S:   division  III.   A  Critique  of  Uealistic  Absolute  Epistemological 
Monism  (Epistemological  .Monism  and  Dogmatic  Realism).     The 
attempt  to  maintain  the  independent  reality  of  the  toUl  object  of 
experience  or  thought  (211). 

1.   Antecedents  of  the  New  Realism  (211). 

a.  Naive  realism  (212). 

b.  The  Scottish  realism  (213). 
Reid  (21.j). 

Movements  leading  to  the  new  realism  (217). 
(1)   I)i.sguised  psychological  idealism,  as  transitional  to 
physical  realism  (219). 
Hodgson  (221),  James  (222),  Bush    (224),  Dewey 

(224),  Boodin  (227),  FuUeiton  (229). 
Disguised    logical    idealism,  as   leading  to    logical 
realism  (230). 
The  New  Realism  (232). 

a.   The  neo-rea'istic  doctrine  of  secondary  qualities  (232). 
VVoodbridgj  (233),  Alexander  (234),G.  E.  Moore  (23'6), 
McGilvary  (238),  Nunn  (240),  B.  Russell  (242),  Hob^ 
house   (244),   Wolf  (24(5),  Vullerton   (247),   Boodin 
(247),  .Marvin  (248),  Spaulding  (249),  Perry  (250) 
Pitkin  (2.51),  Holt  (251),  Montague  (254). 
The  nco-realistic  doctrine  of  con.sciousness  (259). 
(1)    The  Engli.sh  School  (259). 

Influence  of  Hodgson  (259).     Hobhouse  (260),  Mc- 
Dougall  (200),  .Moore  (2(il),  Rus.sell  (262),  Alex- 
ander (262),  Stout  (264),  Wolf  (266). 
The  American  School  (266). 
Influence  of  .lames  (266).      Bush  (267),  Fullerton 

^(208). 
Woodbridjie's  introspective  view  (269). 
Views  of    Woodworth    (270)   and    Dunlap    (271), 

eritioLsed  by  Angell  (272). 
The  l)ehaviorist  view  (272).     Influence  of  Dewey 
(273).     Thorndike  (273),   .1.  B.   Watson   ('274), 
Frost     (275),     Singer    and    Woodbridge    (276). 
Criticism  by  Miller  (277). 


(2) 


6. 


(2) 


ANALYTICAL  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


XV 


Views  of  McGilvary  (277),  Boodin  (279),  Marvin 
(280),  Holt  (280),  Spaulding  (282),  Pitkin  (282), 
Perry  (28a),  Holt  (later  statement)  (28o),  Mon- 
tague (287). 
(3)   Comparison  and  general  criticism  of  views  (280). 
C.   The  neo-reaiistic  doctrine  of  relations  (29;!). 

Nunn    (293),    Ak-xan.ler   (294),    Stout  (204),   RiwseU 
(294),   Monta«ue  (296),   Holt  (296),  Marvin  (296) 
Spaulding  (297),  Pitkin  (298),  Perry  (300). 

d.  The  neo-reali.stic  doctrine  of  universals  (302). 

Relation  to  Platonisni  (302).     Views  of  several  neo- 
realists  (;502). 

e.  The  neo-reall.stic  doctrine  of  values  (306). 

Moore  (30.!),  Kassell  (;!00),  McGilvary  (307),  Alexander 

(307),  Montague  (307),  Perry  (308). 
General  statement  atid  criticism  of  the  new  reali.su.  (309) 
Subdivision  IV.  Constructive  Statement:  Critical  Realistic  Episte! 
mologica!  Monism  (Kpistemological  Monism  and  Critical  Realism  • 
Cruical  Monism  in  EpLstemology).  Normally,  the  experienced 
object  and  the  real  object  numerically  identical,  the  real  object 
existing,  with  some  of  its  .lualities  and  relations,  when  not  experi- 
enced (310).  ^ 

Prior  immediate  knowledge  the  only  explanation  of  mediate 
knowledge  (.-Ul).    Activistic  view  of  sensation  (312).     Activistic 
explanation  of  the  nature  of  con.sciousness  (314).     Activi.stic  con 
cept.on  of  causality  (3I<  ).    Approaches  to  this  point  of  view  (316) 
Argunient  for  activism  from  freedom  (317).    The  subject-matter 
of  p.sychology  (318).     Explanation  of  hallucination,  etc    (320) 
Primary  and   secondary  (jualities  and  relations  (322)       Partial 
knowledge  of  the  thing-in-itself  (.120).     Tertiary  qualities  and 
-elat,ons(120.     Values  (328).     Anticipation  of  further  problems 
(330).     Contrast  between  our  doctrine  and  the  Kantian  (331) 
Solution  of  the  problem  of  the  externality  or  internality  of  relai 
(333)  K'^^ections  on  the  status  of  epistemology  in  general 

""m'fTns"  op  ''u.'.'^f.'^''  PKOBLEMS  OF  THE  WAYS  AND 
MEANS     OF     KNOWING    (MORPHOLOGY    OF    KNOWLFnrP 
AND   GENETIC   LOGIC)    (330),  KNOWLEDGE. 

Division  B    The    Fun-lamental    Mode   of    Cognition    (Morphology    of 
Knowledge)  (330).  t"^'"8j'    oi 

Subdivision  I.  A  Critique  of  Absolute  Morphological  Dualism. 
Perception  and  conception  as  two  irreducibly  different  mc^-,  of 
cognition  (.3.30). 

Subdivision  H.  A  Critique  of  Conceptualistic  Absolute  Morpho- 
logical Monism  Pure  con.-,...n  the  only  ultimate  mode  of  cog- 
nition.   Platonism  (336).  "^ 


xvi  ANALYTICAL  TABLE  OF  CONTEXTS 

Subdivision  III.    A  Criti.iue  of  IVrcept.iaUMic  Absolute  Morphol, 
ical  Monism.     Pure  iwrception  the  u:iiy  ultimate  mode  of  coc 
tion.     BiTiison  (;i'i7). 
Subdivision  IV.    Constructive  Statement. 

Critical  I't-rceptualistic  Mon)hol,>i;io U  Monism  (Critical  Jifoni 
in  tl...  M..rpholo:ry  of  KnowU.!.;..  .     r*^reeption  the  one  tj 
ical  and  fundani"ntal  mode  of  ei>gnii!on  ,S37). 
Criticism  of  appro.\iniation.s  to  this  view  (;!.38).     Kant  (.'535 
Koyce  (Ji.'Jil),  Jame.s  (.UO).      I'nx-essfs  not  ultimati-ly  pi 
ccplual,  non-cogniiive  (341).     Co-Milne  pr.xesses  ultimate 
perceptual  (342).    Perception  in  a  c-.mplex  (343).    Introspe 
tion  (.344).     The  new  (perceptual  •    intuitionism  (340) 
Division  C.   The  Genesis  of  the  >•  Apriori  -  Element  in  Cognition  (G 
netic  Logic)  (3ol).  ^ 

Subdivision  I.  A  Critique  of  Absolute  Gen^ic  Drilism.  Absolu 
rationalism  with  reference  to  cognitive  f..^nns  and  absolute  empi 
icisin  with  reference  to  cognitive  conten:».  K.int  (3.51). 
Subdivisi,>n  II.  A  Criti^iue  of  Rationalistio  Ahsnlute  Genetic  M( 
ni.sm.  Absolute  rationalism  in  the  acovint  of  the  contents  as  we 
as  the  forms  of  cognitive  experience  (iS:;'. 

Api>roxiMiation8  to  this  view  in  Descaitrs  and    Leibniz    (352' 

t.chte  (3.-i3),  Hegel  (*J3;,  Green  (i>Ji.  H.  Cohen  et  al.  (353).' 

Subdivision  HI.    A  Criti,,ue  of  Empirical  A  I*. lute  Genetic  Monism 

Absolute  pa.s.sive  empiricisiu  in  the  accDu:-.;  ,.f  the  forms  as  well  a 

the  contents  of  cognitive  experience  (.V^{  . 

Hume  (353),  .las.  and  .1.  S.  Mill  (^;i.>i  .  Spencer  (364) 
Subdivision  IV.   Constructive  Statement:  Critical  Empirical  Geueti, 
Monism  {Criticnl  Monism  in  Genetic  L.>iic'.     An  a^tivistic  em 
pineal  account  of  the  genesis  of  the  forms  as  «ell  as  the  contenti 
of  cognitive  experience  (355). 
Approximation  to  this  view  by  James   3.55\     Three  defensible 
theories  of  the  apriori  which  wouM  make  p(«sible  a  critica 
realLstic  epistemological  monism:    ,.,)    Inheritance  of  sonit 
active  psychical  characters  empiricaliy  a^-quired  by  ancestors 
(359).    {h)  Hapid  individual  acquirement  from  experience  on 
the  basis  of  a  special  mutation  (:}.>i. .     (o  A  combination  of 
(a)  and  (h)  (35!»).    Criticism  of  extreme  aposteriorism  (363). 
Summary  (3(54). 


PART  II.     THE  PROBLEM   OF  MEDIATE  KSOWLEDGE  (.367) 

Division  A    The  Problem  of  Truth.     (Logical  TLe..rT,  or  Philosophical 

Logic)  (.)(.! ).     Introductory  (3t;H). 

Subdivision  I.   A  Critique  of  Absolute  Losica!  Doalism.    Two  irre- 

dmibly  different  criteria  and  derinitiori*  .,f  truth,  the  one  intel- 

lectuahstic,  the  other  anti-intellectualistio,  ,  «    pracfica'  (K.w) 


^wmmmBm^^^ 


J 


e  Morpholog. 
ode  of  cogni- 


'tical  Alonistn 
the  one  tyj)- 

Kant  (nSS), 
imaiely  pi-r- 
es ultimately 
I.  Introspec- 
(346). 
Ignition  CGe- 

1.  Absolute 
nlute  eiiipir- 
I). 

Cienetic  Mo- 
tents  as  well 

bniz   (352). 
t  al.  (;!53). 
tic  Monism. 
IS  as  well  as 

!)• 

ical  Genetic 
tivistic  em- 
he  contents 

;  defensible 
e  a  critical 
ce  of  some 
jf  ancestors 
^erience  on 
bination  of 
rism  (363). 


IE  (;]67). 
ilosophical 

Two  irre- 
one  intel- 
al  (Kant) 


B. 


ANALYTICAL  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  xvii 

Subdivision  II    A  Critique  of   Intellectuali«tic   Absolute   Logical 
Monism     The  criterion  and  deHnition  of  truth  purely  intellectu- 
ahstic  (identity  with  reality)  (371). 
A.   Absolute  InteUectualism  in  combination  with  EpistemoloKical 

Dualism  (371).    Locke  (371),  Leibniz  (371),  Lotze  (372), 

Lovejoy  (372),  Boyce  Gibson  (373). 
Absolute  InteUectualism  in  combination  with  Idealistic  Episte- 

mological  Monism  (374),   Hegel  (374),  J.  Watson  (375), 

Bmdey  (375),    Bosanquet   (381),   Joachim   (383),    Royce 

(384). 

C.   Absolute  InteUectualism  in  combination  with  Realistic  Episte- 
mological  Monism  (3!>1).     Aristotle  (391),  Aquinas  (391), 
McGUvary  (392),  Perry  (393),  Montague  (393),  Holt  (394). 
Marvin  (394),  Boodin  (396),  B.  Russell  (3!>6). 
"  The  Law  of  Significant  Assertion  "  (398) 
Subdivision  III.   A  Critique  of  Anti-Intellectualistic  Logical  Monism 
The  criterion  of  truth  not  discoverable  and  truth  not  definable 
mtellectualistically,  but  only  in  an  anti-intellectualistic  way  (401) 
..   Anti-conceptualism.    Truth  to  be  learned  by  reverting  to  pure 
intuition,  without  concepts  (401). 
Bergson  (401).     Cf.  James  (406). 
^.  Current  Pragmatisia  (407). 

Essential  pragmatism.    Practical  value  of  some  sort  the  crite- 

rion  of  truth  (407). 
1.  Approximations  to  essential  pragmatism  (409). 

A.  Semi-pragmatism.     Movements  in  the  direction  of 

pragmatism,  which  yet  fall  short  of  the  pragmatic 
criterion  of  truth  (410).  Peirce  (410),  Baldwin 
(411),  Boodin  (412),  Royce  (413),  Hocking  (413). 

B.  Quasi-pragmatism.    Practical  values  the  measure  of 

what,  for  practical  purposes,  and  even  in  science, 
we  are  justified  in  taking  as  truth ;  but  this  not 
necessarily  real  truth   (414).    Mach  (414),  Poin- 
car6  (414),  Vaihinger  (415),  Bergson  (416). 
Appreciation,  criticism  and  explanation  (416). 
2.   Developments  beyond  essential  pragmatism  (417). 

A.   Pseudo-pragmatism.    All  practical  value  of  ideas  or 
judgments  an  indication  or  proof  of  their  truth  (417) 
James  (418),  Schiller  (419),  the  Chicago  School" 
(420). 

Hyper-pragmatism.  Practical  value  (usefulness)  or 
the  process  of  working  (verification)  the  essential 
nature  of  the  truth  (422).  James  (422),  Schiller 
(423),  Dewey  (423),  A.  W.  Moore  (423),  Bawden 
(423),  Boodin  (423).  The  convereion  of  J.  E. 
Russell  (423). 

Criticism  and  explanation  (426). 


B. 


XVUl 


ANALYTICAL  TABLE  OP  CONTEXTS 


Further  problems  for  the  essential  praKOiatist  (431) : 
The  avoiilaiiie  of  ultra-utilitarianism   (-131),  ami 
ultra-indivi.lualism    (4;W).     The   interpretation  of 
consistency  and  the  theoretiral  interest  (435). 
Subdivision  IV.   ConsUuctivo  Btatimcnt:  Critical  I'raKmatic  Logical 
Monism  {(Jritiail  Monhm  in  Lo^i.-al  'Iheorj).     ■il„.  proximate 
genus  in  the  diiinition  ..f  truth  derived  fn.m  intellettiialism,  and 
the  differentia  of  the  siwcie.s  from  iTasmati-sm  (438). 
The  defect  of  pnsentation  and  need  of  representation  (430).    The 
criterion  of  truth  found  in  practical  identity  (functional  J.iuiva- 
lence)  of  predicate  with  suliject,  of  idea  with  reality,  or  with  fur- 
ther exiwrience  of  reality  (440).     Delinition  of  truth  according  to 
representational  pragmatisn»  (443).     The  ideal  element  in  truth 
(44(1).     The  es-sentially  human  character  of  truth  iis  deHned  (44t!). 
Further  definition  of  the  ideal  (448).    The  permanence  of  truth 
(440).     The  need  of  tran.scending  mere   representational  prag- 
matism (460).      Delinition  of  truth  according  to  revised  (intii- 
iti.mal  or  scientific)  reiwsentiUional  pragmatism  (452).     Further 
tests  of  representational  pragmatism  (455). 
Division  B.     The  Problem  of  I'roof  (Methodology)  (4r>9). 

a.  The  prol)lem  of  certainty  (450). 

b.  The  problem  of  proof  as  the  problem  of  the  production  of  logical 

certainty,  the  problem  of  scientific  method  (401). 
Subdivision  I.    A  Criticjue   of  Absolute   Methodological   Dualism. 

Deduction   and   in.luction  as  two  irreducibly  different  scientific 

methods  of  proof  (401). 
Subdivision  II.    A  Criti(iue  of  Rationalistic  Absolute  Methodological 

Monism.     Deduction  the  only  scientific  method  of  proof  (4«i2). 

a.  Pre- Kantian  rationalism.     Views  of  Descartes,  Spinoza  and 

L    ..niz  (4(52). 

b.  Rationalism   of  the   "logisticians."     Views  of    Dedekind, 

Cantor,  Frege,  Ru.s.sell,  Couturat,  Royce,  et  at.  (4(52). 

c.  The  rationalistic  dialectic.     Views  of  Hegel  and  McTa^gart 

(470). 
Subdivi.jion  III.     A  Criti.iae  of  Empirical  Absolute  Methodological 
Monism.     Induction  tiie  only  scientific  method  of  proof  (472). 
a.   I're-Kantian  empiricism.     Bacon  to  Hume  (472). 
6.   Post-Kantian  empiricism  (473).    Comte   (473),  J.  S.  Mill 
(474),  Bergson  (475). 
Subdivision  IV.    Constructive  Statement :   Critical  Empirical  Meth- 
odological  Monism.     {Critical    M„nism  in   .Methodology.)     The 
one  scientific  method  of  proof  both  inductive  and  deductive  (47(5). 
Views  of  Kant  (47(i)  and  Poincar^  (477).     Scientific  procedure 
(487)  ;  definitions  (488)  ;  assumptions  (488)  ;  empirical  data 
(400) ;    fundamental   principle   (490) ;    laws  and   inductive 
methods  (4<.»0)  ;  ihrory  (4ir.>). 
General  Conclusion.     Critical  Monism  (494). 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   KNOWLEDGE 


m^w: 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  KNOWLEDGE 


CHAPTER  I 

Introductory:    Philosophy  and  its  Principal  Problems 

Of  all  intellectual  enterprises  philosophy  is  perhaps  the 
most  difficult  to  define.  A  glance  over  the  course  of  what  is 
called  the  history  of  philosophy  reveals  not  only  a  disappoint- 
ins  transitoriness  of  solutions  and  lack  of  unanimity  among 
philosophers  as  to  methods  and  presuppositions,  but  what  is 
much  more  disconcerting,  an  almost  total  shift  from  time  to 
time  in  the  problems  themselves.  It  will  not  do,  however,  to 
conclude  at  once  that  the  grouping  together  of  the  problems 
generally  called  philosophical  has  been  purely  arbitrary. 

The  resort  to  etymology  for  purposes  of  definition  is  com- 
monly of  doubtful  wisdom;  and  yet  in  the  present  instan.-^  it 
puts  into  our  hands  a  clew  which  may  conduct  us  through  the 
maze  o  historical  transformation  to  our  desired  definition. 
The  philosopher  has  been  from  the  first,  as  his  name  proclaims 
hin  a  lover  of  wisdom;  and  philosophy  has  always  been,  in 
spite  of  those  admirably  modest  utterances  of  Pythagoras  and 
bocrates,  not  the  love  of  wisdom  simply,  but  the  best  wisdom  of 
the  luver  of  wisffooi. 

But  one  must  not  take  too  rigidly  in  this  connection  the 
distinction  between  wisdom  and  knowledge.  In  the  beginning 
the  term  philosophy"  seems  to  have  been  used  to  cover  all 
such  knowledge  as  was  not  either  the  common  possession  of 
the  community  or  the  immediate  result  of  some  special  ex- 
perience of  the  individual.  It  was  applied  to  whatever  there 
existed  of  those  organ.-ed  bodies  of  adequately  verified  knowl- 
edge, the  special  -ciences,  includhg  Mathematics.  Nor  is  it 
ver>'  long  since  tuis  broader  us.  of  the  term  was  given  up. 
hven  within  the  memory  of  persons  still  living  the  physical 
sciences  bore  the  name  of  "natural  philosophy,"  and  apparatus 
^  1 


2  THE  PROBLEM  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

employed  for  experimental  purposes  could  he  referred  to  as 
philosophical  instruments."  One  might  almost  say  that 
onsinally  philosophy  held  all  tlu>  special  science's  in  solution 
and  that  of  late  these  sci<>nces  have  been  crystallizing  out  and 
taking  on  a  relatively  independent  existence.  The  analogy  is 
somewhat  misleading,  however;  in  both  philo.sophv  and'the 
sciences  there  has  been  from  the  beginning  a  process  of  growth 
of  creative  becoming.  ' 

The  special  sciences,  which  have  been  differentiating  them- 
selves out  from  the  matrix  of  philosophy,  are  commonly  classified 
as  abstract,  descriptive,  and  normative.     Of  the.se  three  groups 
the  first  and  last  are  most  readily  understood  in  relation  to  the 
second,   the   descriptive   sciences.     These   arc   constituted   of 
generalizations  as  to  the  relations  of  qualities  and  processes  in 
experienced    objects   or   groups   of   ol)jects.     Astronomv   and 
chemistry,  biology  and  anthropology,  psychology  and  sociologv, 
will  serve  to  represent  the  class.     The  abstract  sciences,  such  as 
arithmetic,  geometry,  and  even  mechanics,  deal  with  isolated 
aspects  of  reality.     Their  laws  are  accurate,   but  essentiallv 
hypothetical;   they  state  what  would  be  verilu.l  in  experience 
if  the  ideal  conditions  which  they  a.ssume  were  ever  actualized 
The  abstractness,  however,  is  only  relative;   all  generalization 
even  such  as  occurs  in  the  descriptive  sciences,  is  more  or  less 
abstract,  and  the  propositions  of  even  the  most  abstract  .sciences 
are  descriptive-  with  certain  provisos  -  of  reality.   This  is  true 
even  where,  as  in  the  case  <  f  the  non-Euclidean  geometries,  the 
provisos  are  contrary  to  experience,  thus  making  difficult  the 
empirical  verification   of  their  conclusions.'     The  normative 
sciences,  finally,  are  made  up  of  generalizations,  selected  from 
the  results  of  the  descriptive  sciences  and  organized  into  a 
sj-stem  of  rules  for  the  realizing  of  an  end.     The  normative 
sciences  which  figure  most  largely  in  relation  to  philosophy  are 
logic,  a?sthotics,  and  ethics,  the  laws  of  which  are  rules  for  the 
realization  of  truth  (or  at  least  of  consistency,  which  is  hvpo- 
thetical  truth),  beauty,  and  moral  goodness,  respectively.    Thus 
while   the   laws   of  descriptive   sciences   are   categorical,   and 
those  of  abstract  scicnc.s  hypothetical,  the  laws  of  normative 
sciences  are  ahv.ays  cither  categorically  or  hypotheticaliy  im- 

'  See  Ch.  XX  infra. 


INTRODUCTORY  3 

perative     The  "applied  sciences"  may  be  regarded  in  general 
as  complex  and  loosely  organized  normative  sciences. 

But,  as  the  special  sciences  multiply,  what  is  to  become  of 
philosophy?  As  new  sciences  continue  to  detach  themselves 
from  the  parent  body  of  philosophy,  the  question  is  naturally 
raised  as  to  whether  it  is  not  to  be  expected  that  as  the  sciences 
increase  philosophy  .nust  decrease,  and  even  as  to  whether  in 
fact  philosophy  is  to  be  regarded  as  anything  more  than  the 
rapidly  disappearing  remainder  of  prescientific  thought''  It 
would  almost  seem  that,  to  quote  the  words  of  Windelband 
philosophy  is  like  King  Lear,  who  divided  all  his  goods  among 
his  children,  and  it  must  now  befall  him  to  be  cast  out  as  a 
neggar  upon  the  street."  » 

But  another  interpretation  of  the  present  situation  is  possible 
May  It  not  be  that  philosophy,  as  the  characteristic  wisdom  of 
the  lover  of  wisdom,  has  been  finding  out  by  a  process  of  elimina- 
tion, as  the  sciences  develop,  just  what  are  its  own  proper  and 
persistent  problems?    Is  it  not  discovering  that  its  pecuHar 
task  IS  not  to  be  a  science  —  not  even  a  "science  of  the  sciences  " 
which  would  be  simply  another  special  science,  however  im- 
portant -  but  that  its  main  business  is  to  arrive  at  a  wise 
estimate  of  the  world  we  live  in,  of  ourselves  and  our  ideas 
and  of  the  wise  man's  way  of  hving?    The  philosopher  still 
finds  much  —  perhaps  more  than  ever  —  to  occupy  his  thought 
in  questions  concerning  reality  in  its  broader  aspects    con- 
cerning hfe  and  its  ideals,  and  concerning  the  relation  between 
the.se  two,  reality  and  ideals. 

It  has  been  recently  claimed  by  the  Danish  philosopher, 
Harald  HoefTdmg,  that  the  persistent  problems  of  philosophy 
are  four :  the  problem  of  consciousness,  the  problem  of  knowl- 
edge, the  problem  of  being,  and  the  problem  of  values."  But 
these  problems  are  not  all  mutually  exclusive,  and  the  really 
u  tnnate  problems  of  philosopiiy  may  be  reduced  to  a  simpler 
classification.  The  problem  of  knowledge,  in  so  far  as  it  tran- 
scends psychology  and  logic,  belongs  to  the  problem  of  values  ■ 
It  IS  concerned  with  estimating  intellectual  value.  The  prob-' 
lem  of  consciousness  in  turn,  in  so  far  as  it  transcends  empirical 

'  Pracludicn,  4th  ed.,  1911,  Vol.  I,  p.  19. 

•  Uocffding,  The  Problem,  0/  Philosophy,  Eng.  Tr.,  New  York,  1905. 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  KNOWLEDGE 


psychology',  is  reducible  in  part  to  the  problem  of  being,  and  in 
part  to  the  problem  of  knowledge ;  it  has  to  determine  on  the 
one  hand  what,  in  general,  consciousness  is,  i.e.  what  place  it 
has  in  the  realm  of  being,  and  on  the  other  hand  what  it  is  as 
awareness,  i.e.  as  knowledge.  Manifestly,  then,  Hoeffding's 
philosophical  problems  may  be  reduced  to  the  problem  of  being 
and  the  problem  of  values,  or,  in  other  words,  to  metaphysics 
and  criticism. 

That  all  the  pr'^Mems  left  over  from  the  sciences  for  "  wis- 
dom" or  philosophy  to  deal  with  are  problems  of  either  meta- 
physics or  criticism  may  be  confirmed  by  an  examination  of 
the  historic  p-ublems  of  philosophy.  Corresponding  to  each 
of  the  normative  sciences  there  is  an  elementary  branch  of 
critical  philosophy.  Thus  philosophical  logic  discusses  the 
nature  of  the  ideal  or  value  which  the  rules  of  logic  as  a  norma- 
tive science  subserve ;  its  problem  is  that  of  the  nature  of  truth. 
Similarly  ethics  as  a  branch  of  critical  philosophy  is  concerned 
with  the  question,  What  is  moral  goodness?  And  philosoph- 
ical esthetics  with  the  problem,  What  is  beauty?  One  might 
even  go  farther  and  speak  of  the  problem  of  philosophical  eco- 
nomics, or.  What  is  wealth  ?  the  problem  of  philosophical  poli- 
tics, or.  What  is  good  government?  and  so  on  tiiroughout  the 
e.  tire  list  of  philosophical  counterparts  to  the  normative  sci- 
ei-„-:3.     They  are  all  problems  of  value. 

There  are  other  problems  of  value,  however,  besides  these 
relatively  simple  questions  as  to  the  nature  of  valid  ideals. 
There  are  the  problems  as  to  the  value  of  certain  complex 
actualities,  such  as  human  knowledge,  human  religion,  and 
human  development  in  general.  These  problems  give  rise  to 
those  branches  of  critical  philosophy  known  as  opistemology, 
the  philosophy  of  religion,  and  the  philosophy  of  history.  It  is 
characteristic  of  these  complex  branches  of  critical  philosophy, 
these  philosophical  critiques  of  phases  of  actuality,  that  on 
the  one  hand  they  make  use  of  certain  sciences,  and  on  the 
other  hand  they  are  each  intimately  related  to  metaphysics. 
Thus  opistemology,  in  so  far  as  it  is  concerned  with  investigating 
what  "knowledge"  is,  must  necessarily  make  use  of  psychology 
and  logic;  and  in  so  far  as  it  is  concerned  with  estimating 
the  worth  of  our  best  "knowledge,"  it  must  reach  a  positive 


INTRODUCTORY  6 

and  favorable  conclusion,  if  our  metaphysics  is  not  to  be  re- 
duced to  vain  imagination.    The  philosophy  of  religion  makes 
fundamental  use  of  the  history  and  psychology  of  religion  in 
solvmg  the  fundamental  problems  of  the  nature  of  the  reli- 
gious value  or  ideal  and  the  essence  of  religion.     It  also  in- 
cludes, besides  this  historico-psychological  part,  an  ethical  part 
undertakmg  to  estimate  the  moral  value  of  religion,  and  an 
epistemological  part,  dealing  with  the  value  of  religious  experi- 
ence for  knowledge,  and  especially  for  knowledge  of  a  religious 
Object.       But  if   the  epistemological   philosophy  of  religion 
should  result  m  establishing  the  va'idity  of  religious  knowledge 
a  further  development  of  the  philosophy  of  religion  would  be 
called  for,  viz.  a  metaphysical  discipline,  undertaking  to  formu- 
late our  knowledge  of  the  religiotis  Object  in  svstcmatic  unity 
with  tue  rest  of  our  metaphysical  knowledge.     The  philosophy 
ot  history  also,  while  drawing  upon  a  vast  number  of  special 
sciences,  both  descriptive  and  normative,  and  especially  upon 
descriptive  history,,  may  be  either  a  branch  of  critical  philos- 
ophy or  a  metaphysical  discipline,  or  both.      Not  only  is  it 
concerned   with  a  critique  of  progress,  the  norm  of  which  is 
made  up  of  the  ideals  established  in    the   other  branches   of 
critical  philosophy;    it  may  include  a  metaphysical  explana- 
tion of  this  progress  as  due  to  soire  theological  or  ontological 
principle,  such  as  the  will  of  Goci,  or  the  evolution   of  the 
'Absolute  Idea." 

But  while  some  philosophical  disciplines   are   thus  partly 
critical  and  partly  metaphysical,  it  would  seem  that  there  are 
over  and  above  problems  of  criticism,  no  philosophical  problems 
which  are  not  problems  of  metaphysics,  the  theory  of  being 
or  reality.     In  undertaking  to  classify  these  problems  of  being' 
there  is  still  a  good  deal  to  be  =»aid  for  the  classic  subdivisions' 
viz.  ontology,  or  the  philosophy  of  being  in  general,  and  the 
three  parts  deahng  with  particular  forms  of  being,  viz.  psy- 
chology, which,  as  a  branch  of  metaphysics,  deals  with   the 
nature  of  the  self  (soul,  mind,  spirit) ;    cosmology,  which  deals 
with  the  fundamental  nature  of  the  universe;    and  theologj- 
undertaking  to  set  forth  the  nature  of  the  religious  Object! 
Alorp  commonly  nowadays,  however,  the  problems  of  meta- 
physics are  not  grouped  together  in  this  manner,  but  stated 


I 


6 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  KNOWLEDGE 


separately,  as,  for  example,  the  problem  of  mind  and  matter, 
the  problem  of  contingency  and  order,  the  problem  of  mechan- 
ism and  teleology,  the  problem  of  the  One  and  the  many,  the 
problem  of  good  and  evil.  We  do  not  at  this  point  undertake 
to  say  whether  or  not  these  metaphysical  problems  can  be 
solved  without  any  dependence  upon  the  philosophy  of  values ; 
but  it  is  quite  evident  that,  with  the  partial  exception  of  the 
last,  they  are  not  themselves  problems  of  value,  but  problems 
of  reahty,  and  such,  moreover,  as  are  not  capable  of  being  ade- 
quately dealt  with  in  any  of  the  special  sciences,  whether 
descriptive,  normative,  or  abstract. 

In  the  present  volume  our  concern  is  simply  with  the  prob- 
lem of  knowledge.     Before  attacking  th(>  particular  problems, 
critical  and  constructive,  into    which    this    genera;    problem 
naturally   falls   apart,   a   few   introductory   remark^^    may   be 
offered.      PJpistemology,  let  it  be  frankly  admitted  at  the  out- 
set, may  be  construed  either  as  a  science  or  as  a  department  of 
critical  philosophy,  or  as  an  aggregate  of  both.     As  a  descrip- 
tive science  it  would  assume,  as  all  such  sciences  do,  the  actual- 
ity of  its  subject-matter.     Assuming,  then,  that  there  is  such 
a  thing  as  knowledge,  and  that  it  is  sufficiently  accessible  and 
distinguishable  to  be  recognized  and  described,  the  science  of 
epistemology  would  simply  undertake  to  state  the  observed 
nature  of  the  various  types  of  knowledge-process,  and  thus  to 
arrive  at  an  adequate  empirical  definition  of  knowledge.    It  would 
necessarily  make  use  of  much  of  the  materials  also  employed 
by  logic  as  a  normative  science,  and  might  even  itself  be  turned 
into  the  normative  form,  in  which  case  its  fundamental  assump- 
tion would  be  the  possibility  of  realizing  knowledge  as  an  ideal. 
As  descriptive  science  its  cjuestion  is.  What  is  knowledge?  or. 
How  do  we  know?     As  a  normative  science  its  question  would 
be.  What  must  we  do  (or  experience)  in  order  to  know?     But 
a  further  question  may  also  be  raised,  viz.,  Is  what  we  have 
and  call  our  knowledge  really  what  we  take  it  to  be?     Is  our 
"knowledge"  really  knowledge?     Is  knowledge  a  human  possi- 
bility?     Now  this  question  cannot  be  adequately  treated  by 
merely  calling  attention  to  the  fact  that  he  who  asserts  that  no 
knowledge  is  possib'e  has  ;ilready  tacitly  assumed  what  he 
expHcitly  denies  (viz.  that  some  knowledge  is  possible,  if  only 


I* 


%> 


INTRODUCTORY  7 

the  knowledge  that  knowIe(lge  is  impossible).  There  are  many 
undogmatic  agnostics  who  dosiro  to  be  reassured  that  our  best 
human  knowlodge-vulues  are  genuine  and  may  be  taken  at 
their  face  value.  What  is  called  for  is  a  branch  of  philosophical 
criticism,  the  critical  evaluation  of  knowledge-claims. 

This  critical  philosophy  of  knowledge  is  lightly  esteemed 
by  some  recent  writers.     F.  J.  E.  Woodbri.lge.  for  example, 
while  inaking  ample  room  for  the  theory  of  perception  as  an 
experimental  science,  asserts  that  the  function  of  philosophical 
epistemologj'  is  moral  and  spiritual  only;  it  can  broaden  one's 
spmtual  vision  an<l  tlius  modify  character,  but  it  can  make  no 
difference  to  our  knowledge..'     But  even  if  we  grant  that  it  is 
quite  possible  for  one  to  know  without  knowing  that  he  knows 
we  are  not  obliged  by  this  admission  to  subscribe  to  the  generali- 
zation that  our  knowledge  can  never  be  affected  by  either  our 
knowing  that  we  know  or  our  doubting  that  we  know      We 
must^not  anticipate  hce  the  outcome  of  the  discussion  upon 
which  we  are  entering,  but  if  there  is  ever  such  a  thing  as  knowl- 
edge without  the  ability  to  prove  what  one  knows,  it  would 
seem  quite  possible  that  one  who  originally  did  know  may  come 
to  doubt  his  knowledge  until  it  ceases  to  be  knowledge      If 
epistemology  can  remove  such  doubts  with  reference  to  genuine 
knowledge,  it  is  ••ahulated  to  affect  not  only  the   degree   of 
certainty,  but  ultimately  even  the  content  of  our  knowledge 

Woodbridge's  denial  of  the  knowledge-value  of  this  philos- 
ophy of  knowleilgc-values  may  be  viewed  as  a  rather  violent 
reaction  against  the  abuse  of  critical  epistemology  which  has 
been  characteristic  of  much  recent  philosophy.  For  a  genera- 
tion or  two  it  has  been  the  custom  to  saddle  upon  critical  epis- 
temology the  task  of  bearing  up  a  whole  system  of  metaphysics 
Epistemology  may  rightly  enough  pass  judgment  upon  the 
question  of  the  possibility  of  metaphysics,  but  to  prescribe  to 
metaphysics  what  must  be  its  conclusions  as  to  the  nature  of 
reality  -  this  is  another  matter,  and  does  not  so  manifestly 
he  within  the  province  of  a  theory  of  knowledge.  As  typical 
mstances  of  this  too  common  tendency  to  exploit  epistemology 
in  the  mterests  of  n  particular  uictaphysical  doctrine,  we  may 

.«  \i^'"   "*a'v;""'  Episton,olo«y  ••  i„  E,.ay.  PhUosophical  and  Psychological 
m  Uono,         WUham  J.unc.,   190H,  ..specially  pp.  140.  151-7.  1G3-0 


8 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  KNOWLEDGE 


cite  the  philosophical  arguments  of  John  Watson  and  G.  T. 
Ladd.     In  the  philosophy  of  the  former,  whose  position  fairly 
represents  the  absolute  idealism  recently  dominant  among  Brit- 
ish-American philosophers,  epistcmolugy  may  almost  be  said 
to  be  reduced  to  the  old  Platonic  exposure  of  the  self-refuting 
character  of  that  dogmatic  absolute  agnosticism  which  main- 
tains that  no  knowledge  whatever  is  possible.     Xot  only  is  the 
fact  overlooked  that  at  the  root  of  even  the  most  self-contra- 
dictory statements  of  dogmatic  agnosticism  there  is  real  un- 
certainty as  to  the  genuine  validity  of  what  we  call  our  knowl- 
edge, and  that  the  essence  of  agnosticism  lies  in  this  inexpugnable 
uncertainty  rather  than  in  the  dogmatic  denial ;   what  is  more 
to  the  point  is  the  fallacious  interpretation  of  the  denial  of  the 
universal  negative  as  justifying  the  definite  affirmative  that  the 
universe  is  intelligible.     On  this  basis  it  is  concluded  further, 
by  virtue  of  the  ambiguity  of  one  or  other  of  the  terms  "in- 
telligible" and  "rational,"  that  the  universe  is  rational  and  as 
such,  spiritual.' 

In  the  philosophy  of  Ladd  the  dependence  of  the  content  of 
metaphysics  upon   cpistemology  is  still  more  marked.     His 
epistemology  is    more  elaborately  developed    than    that   of 
Watson.     Besides  the  psychological  investigation  of  what  it  is 
to  know,  he  would  include  in  it  an  investigation  of  the  guaran- 
ties,  limits,  underlying   logical   principles,  and   metaphysical 
presuppositions  of  knowledge.^    It  is  in  undertaking  to  state 
these  "presuppositions  or  implicates"  of  knowledge  that  Ladd 
is  led  into  that  sort  of  dogmatism  which  has  invited  such  reac- 
tions, almost  equally  extreme,  as  that  of  Woodbridge  to  which 
we  have  referred.     Starting  with  the  highly  dubious  assumption 
of  a  mutually  exclusive  relationship  between  the  immediately 
experienced  and  the  independently  real,  this  writer,  in  repudi- 
ating agnosticism,  foredooms  his  theory  inevitably   (as  will 
appear  more  fully  in  the  chapters  immediatelv  following)  to  a 
dogmatism  as  absolute  but  as  unnecessary  as  that  dualism 
whose  undesirable  consequences  it  attempts  to  remedy.     "To 
know"  can  only  be,  from  this  point  of  view,  "to  make  an  onto- 


'  An  Outline  of  Phil»i>nphy,  1898.  Prx-f.,  p.  vi ;    p.  37 
Religious  Experience,  1912,  Vol.  I,  p.  74. 
•  Knowledge,  Life  and  Reality,  1909,  p.  .17. 


Tht  Interpretation  of 


!l 


INTRODUCTORY  g 

veiled  under  such  /xp  Jsions  Is^h^he  IoImTTL: 
exemplifies  the  confidence  of  human  reason  in  itsS  and  nrZ 
supposes  that  something  is  real  and  that  innumeraWe  real  sefve^ 
and  real  thmgs  are  known  to  be  existent  and  to  be  actuanv 
related  m  one  world.     What  we  immediately  experience    J 

lZ7f  tLtr;irt^^  °"'^-  ^"^  ^^-^^^^"^^  -p'erien'ce,r'the 
iiie  ot  the  self  v'lth  its  conscious  content,  no  part  of  which  can 

exist  independently  of  the  self.     Assuming  then  thaTwe  can 
know  the  independent  world  at  all,  we  must  conclude  thit  it's 
Ike  what  we  (subjectively)  experience;  it  must  be  apprehended 
n  terms  of  "a  Personal  Life."    Thus  a  metaphysicarinternt 
tation  of  the  indeperdently  real  world  is  based  upon  the  Tup." 
posed  necessity  of  a  particular  presupposition       the  theory  of 
knowledge.'     But  to  put  the  problem  of  epistemolol  thu/ 
How  IS  It  possible  to  know  what  is  beyond  my  eirwh^n  any: 
hmg,  in  order  to  be  presented  to  me,  must  enter  i^to  my  con 
ciousness  and  thus  become  a  part  of  my  mind?  is,  as  wil   be 
shown  more  fully  presently,  to  raise  an  insoluble  pr^bU     To 
suppose    hat   what  is  forever  beyond   my  subjective  ^xperi 
ence  must  be  hke  what  I  subjectively  experlnce  and  therefore 
in  the  last  analysis  a  Personal  Life,  is  simply  to  advance  I 

unsolver  Bu'tT^'  "'f  t^^'"^  '""^  epistemological  problem 
unsolved.  But  the  insoluble  epistemological  problem  is  surelv 
no  the  t.ue  one ;  it  must  surely  be  due  to  a  conf'usionTf  thought 

gettfioT  T-     *''  T''  ''  consciousness  and  the  knot: 
edge-relation.     It  is  a  problem  not  to  be  taken  seriously,  but  to 

We  would  surmise,  then,  that  while  epistemology  must  not 
bo  used  as  a  cloak  for  metaphysical  dognfatism,  thereTs  nler 
theless  place  for  a  critical  philosophy  of  knowledge  which  shall 
en  icise  wrong  ways  of  stating  the  epistemological  problem  as 
well  as  wrong  solutions  of  the  problem  vhen  rightly  stated  ^nd 
which  sha  1  also  undertake,  if  such  a  thing  shoi^d  prove  possfble 
consistently  with  intellectual  integrity,  to  vindLte  the  rus. 

' /6irf..  pp.  119-24,  154,  1.59    19Q-'>()r.     Th.nhi        l      .  ^j. 
PP.  22.  226-7.  366,  571:  ^  nL^^/^Jtr,  5^^^^^^  ''"''' 


10 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  KNOWLEDGE 


;( 


11 


I 

i 


If 


tice  of  the  natural  human  postulate  that  it  is  possible  '"  .r  us 
to  learn  to  know  reality  and  the  truth  about  it.  Without 
epistemology  we  may  know,  and  not  know  that  we  know  •  or 
we  may  not  know,  and  not  know  that  we  do  not  know  Epis- 
temology will  have  vindicated  its  right  to  exist  if  it  enables  us 
to  know  that  we  know,  when  we  do  know,  and  to  know  that  we 
do  not  know,  when  we  do  not  know. 

The  problem  of  knowledge  has  two  main  su^xii^^■.ion«    the 
problem  of  mun^-diate  knowledge  and  the  problem  of  me<'liate 
knowledge.'     The  former  is  mainly  concerned  with  the  problem 
of  acquaintance  with  reality,  which  is  the  subject-matter  of 
epistemology   proper.     The   latter,    the   problem   of  mediate 
knowledge,  includes  the  problem  of  truth  and  the  prT.bIem  of 
Its  proof.     All  three  problems  involve  the  criticism  cf  intelUxt ual 
values,  the  prol)lem  of  truth  being  the  main  content  of  logical 
theory,  or  logic  as  a  branch   of  philosophical  criticism      In 
dealing  with  the  problem  of  acquaintance,  however,  much  u>.e 
must  needs  be  made  of  the  psychology  of  perception,  while  the 
psychology  of  judgment  enters  largely  into  the  .liscus^-ion  of  the 
problem  of  truth,  and  the  psychology  of  reasoning,  as  well  as 
the  normative  science  of  logic,  into  the  problem  of  proof 

It  may  be  noted  that  corresponding  to  the  problem  r.f  knowl- 
edge in  general,  and  to  each  of  its  subordinate  problems  there 
IS  a  special  problem  of  knowledge  -  the  problem  of  the  knowl- 
edge-value of  religious  experience  and  thought.  It  seems  not 
unreasonable  to  suppose  that  an  investigation  of  thL<  special 
problem  would  prove  to  be  the  most  interesting  part  of  episte- 
mology ;  but  we  shall  not  touch  upon  it  in  this  volume     Our 

geTeral  '''""'"'  ''  '''""^'^'  ''"*''  **""  ^'''^^^"'  ""^  knowledge  in 

and  ^r^T/''"^ ■''"""'''  ^'^''"--'i""  fx'tween  -knowledge  of  arnu^u^.e" 
and     knowledge-about,"  The  Principle,  of  Psychology.  l^M.  \ol.T^  221-2. 


I 


PART  I:    THE   PROBLEM   OF   IMMEDIATE 
KNOWLEDGE 

A.     THE    PROBLEM    OF    ACQUAINTAxNCE 
(EPISTEMOLOGY    PROPER) 

1.    A  CRITIQUE  OF  DUALISM 


•m^r 


CHAPTER  II 

DUALIFM  AND  AvoWED  AGNOSTICISM 

In- cloalinK  with  tho  problem  of  immediate  acquaintance  with 
rcahty,  our  procedure  will  be  at  first  critical.  Before  attempt- 
...K  to  sot  forth  o;,r  own  view,  we  shall  undertake  an  examina- 
tion of  current  ep.sto.uological  theories.  A  theory  of  knowledge 
...ay  be  either  n.oni.stic  or  dualistic,  and  it  may  be  either  realistic 
or  Idealistic,  hpistemological  monism  is  the  doctrine  that  the 
cxpenenced  oi>ject  and  the  real  object  are,  at  the  moment  of 
pe.cept.on  numerically  one.  E pistemological  dualisnTTthl 
I Oetrme  that  the  experienced  object  and  the  real  object  a  e  at 

^a/^s/«  .»  the     octrme  that  the  real  object  can  exist  at  other 
moments  than  the  mon.ent  of  perception,  or   of  any  other 
.onsnous  expenence,  and  independently  of  any  such  experience 
hmM^g^cahrlealLs,.  is  thedoctrme  that  the  real  obiec    cat 
..ot  exKst  at  other  moments  than  the  moment  of  percept  on   "r 

'  ZL:      Tr""'T  "^"^"^'''  "^^  independentl/of  Lh 
xpc nence.     The  combmations  of  thes<>  doctrines  which  figure 
largely  in   contemporary  philosophic,  discussion  a  e  epSe- 
".oIoRical  duahsm  and  realism,  epistemological  monU  and 
•lealisn.,  and  episten.ologicaI  monism  and  realism.'     Inasmuch 
however,  as  we  shall  have  to  distinguish  sharply  our  owZ  nt 
of  v.ew,  which  .s  a  form  of  epistemological  momsm  and  rerm 
from  the  current  forms  of  that  doctrine,  we  shall  commonT; 
np  oy  ,  ,,    htly  different  terminology,     I„  distinct^oTfrom 
tl.<  view  to  be  set  forth  constructively,  which  may  be  ca  S 
nUa,    ep,.temological  monism,  the  doctrines  to  be  crit  cled 
...ay  be  designated,  respectively,  absolute  epistemologZdZ- 

V'.I.  \ni,  1911.  p    703  ^  Pf'^lo^ophy,  Psychology  and  Scientific  Methods. 

13 


14 


THE   PROBLEM  OF   K\0\VLED(iK 


ism,  idealiHtic  nbmluie  rpiMcinoloyicnl  UKinism,  and  realistic 
absolute  epintemuloyical  mmiix,,,.  This  tcritiiiioloKy  has  an  ad- 
vantaRo,  mori'ovcr,  in  that  it  iiichcalrs  nwvv  (■(.rivllly  than  th(> 
other  tho  paralh'l  rchitions  of  the  twc  types  c.f  ahsohitc  monism 
to  tho  absolute  dualisni,  and  also  to  the  critical  monism.  If  it 
should  soom  dcsiral)!c  to  avoid  the  term  "absolute"  in  the 
designations  em[)loyed,  the  distinctions  between  the  views  in 
question  mifiht  be  indicated  l)y  the  terms  i'pistemoioKical  mon- 
ism and  critical  n-alism,  epistemoIoKical  dualism  and  (critical) 
realism,  epistemological  monism  and  (dogmatic)  id«'alism,  and 
epistemological  monism  and  dogmatic  realism. 

.'b.soIute  epistemological  dualism,  then,  is  the  doctrine  "that 
perceived  objects  and  real  objects  are  never  the  same,  tliough 
the  former  may  be  representative  of  the  latter"  ;  or  more  fully, 
"that  the  perceived  object  and  the  real  object  are  at  the  mo- 
ment of  perception  numerically  two,  and  that  the  real  object 
can  exist  at  other  moments  independently  of  any  perception,"  ' 
or,  we  may  add,  of  any  other  conscious  exjM'rience. 

It  must  bo  quite  evident  that  this  absolute  dualism  cannot 
promise  much  as  a  theory  of  knowledge.  If  what  is  inunedi- 
ately  experienced  is  never  indcMcndciit  .cality  and  independent 
reality  is  therefore  never  iimnediatcly  experienced,  how  can 
the  subject  of  immediate  experience  ever  know  any  independent 
reality?  Any  ab.solute  dualism  in  ei)istemology  is  foredoomed, 
it  would  seem,  to  ngnostici.sni .  By  some  «'pistemological  dual- 
ists the  agnosticism  is  opcidy  acknowledged  and  stoutly  de- 
fended; others,  however,  .seek  to  e\a(le  this  consequence  by 
one  device  or  another.  In  the  present  chapter  we  shall  con- 
sider some  outstanding  and  typical  instances  of  an  absolute 
epistemological  duali.-im  accompanied  by  an  avowed  agnosticism. 
The  most  illus:trious  exponent  of  absolute  epistemological 
dualism  is  Immanuel  Kant.  But  in  order  to  understand  the 
historic  foundations  of  this  modern  point  of  view  we  must  go 
back  at  least  as  far  as  John  Locke.  Locke's  Essay  concerning 
Human  Understanding  embodies  the  result  of  an  inquiry  into 
"the  original,  certainty,  and  extent  of  human  knowledge,"  un- 
dertaken, the  author  informs  us,  on  the  supposition  "that  the 

■Report  of  above-mentioned  Committee,  Journal  of  Philosophy,  etc    Vol 
VIII,  1911,  p.  703. 


DUALISM  AND  AVOWED  AGNOSTICISM  15 

first  stop  tow  ;r(ls  satisfyiiiR  sovrral  inquiries  the  mind  of  man 
was  yory  apt  to  n.n  into,  was  to  take  a  survey  of  our  own  under- 
snuulitiKs.  examine  our  own  powers,  and  s..e  to  what  thinm 
they  were  a.hipte.l."  '     It  is  assumed  at  the  outset  that  "the 
ol.ject  of  the  understanding  when  a  man  thinks,"  what  the 
M.n>.    .s  e,„ployed  about  in  thinki.iK,  is  always  an  idea  in  the 
nnn,l  of  the  thu.ker.-'     It  is  suhs,.quently  argued  that  these 
Ideas,  of  wh.eh  we  are  ..nm,.,iiately  aware,  are  either  simple 
pro.h.e  s  of  tlu.  a.t.on  of  external  things  upon  the  senses,  con- 
vey,.! hy  thos,.  s,.nses  to  the  .nin.l  as  a  passive  receptacle,  or 
.'ls.>  s.ich  romhmations  of  th.-se  simple  id,,,s  as  result  from  the 
l^.tivity  of  (he  mmd  in  refieetiuK  upon  the  ideas  received  throuirh 
..'senses.'    B„t  it  must  not  he  suppose.l,  Locke  hastens  to 
ua.n  us   (hat  the  sunple  ideas  of  sensation  always  exactly  re- 
s.-.nl.le  (he  .,uaht.es  of  the  external  bodies  which  act  upon  our 
organs  of  sense.     Only  the  primary  quahties  of  bodies,  quah'ties 
hke  sohchty,  extension,  figure,  motion  or  rest,  and  number 
wlueh  are  "utterly  mseparable  from  the  body,  in  what  estate 
■so  v..    .t  be,     are  res^-mbled  by  our  ideas  of  those  qualities. 
All  colors,  sounds,  tastes,  smells,  ar„l  other  secondary  or  sensible 
ciuahfes  are  "nothing  in  the  objects  themselves,  but  poweL 
t<.  prudun-  various  sens^ttions  in  us  by  their  primary  qualities."  * 

in    > ;?; .  ^th  '  ?""'"  '"  t''  '^^'  '"^"'^^  "^  '^^'  P«'"t  "f  view 
e.I        ft       ■''  r'"'"  ?""  ^'■'  f"'"^''^"^  "f  t^*"  nature.extent,  and 
roal  ty  of  human  knowledge,  we  find  that  it  is  only  with  difficulty 
that  he  wins  even  the  appearance  of  an  escape  from  agnosticism 
He  really  has  two  definitions  of  knowledge,  one  being  the  agree- 
"H-nt  o  our  own  ideas  with  each  other,  and  the  other,  which  he 
.1  ogically  makes  a  subclass  of  the  first,  being  the  ;greement 
of  our  Ideas  with  real  existence.'     It  is  with  knowledge  L  the 
secon,l  sense  tJiat  we  are  here  concerned.     Our  knowledge  of 
rea  existence,  he  claims,  is  of  three  sorts,  vi.  :  intuitive  ofou 
ownex^tence;   demonstrative,  of  God's  existence;   and  sensi- 
tive,    of  the  existence  of  particular  external  objects  bv  that 
PJTception  and  consciousness  we  have  of  the  actual  entrance  o 
Kleas  from  them."  •     It  is  with  this  last  that  we  have  occasion 


'  Essay,  Bk.  I,  Ch.  I,  §S  2  7 

'Hk.  II.  Ch.  I. 

'  Bk.  IV,  Ch.  I,  §S  2,  7. 


'  lb.,  J  8. 

♦Bk.  II,  Ch.  VIII,  5I&-10,  15. 

«Bk.  IV,  Ch.  II,  }14:  Ch.  III. 


16 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  KNOWLEDGE 


to  deal  in  the  present  connection.     That  Locke  felt  keenly  the 
problem  as  to  the  possil)ility,  from  his  point  of  view,  of  this 
"sensitive  knowledge,"  is  apparent  from  his  own  words.     "It 
is  evident,"  he  says,   "that   the  mind  knows  not  things  im- 
mediately, hut  only  by  the  intervention  of  the  ideas  it  has  of 
them.     Our  knowledge  therefore  is  real  only  so  far  as  there  is 
a  conformity  between  our  ideas  and  the  reality  of  things." 
"But,"  he  asks,  "how  siiall  the  mind,  when  it  perceives  nothing 
but  its  own  ideas,  know  that  they  agree  with  things  them- 
selves?" '     Referring  to  "simple  ideas"  derived  from  sensa- 
tion, his  answer  is  that  since  these  are  the  product  of  things 
operating  on  the  mind  in  a  natural  way,  they  produce  therein 
"those  perceptions  which  by  the  wisdom  and  will  of  our  Maker 
they  are  ordained  and  adapted  to,"  and  thus  necessarily  "carry 
with  them  all  the  conformity  which  is  intended,  or  which  our 
state  requires."  «    C  omplex  ideas  of  substances,  being  our  own 
product,  can  only  be  known  to  be  true  when  they  arc  made  up 
of  such  simple  ideas  as  are  known  to  coexist  in  nature.     Even 
here,  then,  he  claims,  we  have  knowledge  which,  while  not 
very  extensive,  is  nevertheless  real;    our  ideas,  though  not, 
perhaps,  very  exact,  arc  yet  true  copies.'     Nevertheless  it  is 
manifestly  not  as  the  outcome  of  his  view  of  the  nature  of  the 
mmd  and  its  ideas,  but  in  spite  of  it,  and  by  reason  of  his  sound 
common  sense,  that  he  lets  either  simple  or  complex  ideas  of 
external  substances  "pass  under  the  nam"  of  'knowledge.'" 
While  "going  beyond  bare  probability."  all  assurance  as  to 
external  objects,  since,  according  to  his  theory,  it  falls  short 
of  either  intuitive  or  demonstrative  certainty,  "is  but  faith  or 
opinion."  * 

That  there  can  be  no  hnnivledgc  of  the  qualities,  or  even  of  the 
existence  of  independent  physical  bodies  on  the  basis  of  the 
complete  epistemological  dualism  and  passive  empiricism  of 
Locke's  theory  was  soon  made  evident  through  later  develop- 
ments of  English  philosophy.  Starting  out  from  the  Lockian 
view  that  all  the  materials  of  knowledge  are  pa,ssively  received 
by  the  mind  from  without  in  sensation,  Berkeley  roundly 
denied  the  necessity  of  assuming  any  independent  physical 


'  BsMii.  Bk.  IV,  Ch.  IV,  §  3. 
'  lb.,  5  12. 


■'  Ih..  §  4. 

*  Bk.  IV.  Ch.  II,  j  14;  Cha.  XI.  XV.  S  3. 


mm-m: 


"«eaf 


DUALISM  AND  AVOWED  AGNOSTICISM  17 

things  whatsoever.  Hume  in  turn  showed -as  far  as  the 
.ccpt..  n  .how  anything -that  upon  Locke's  principTes  no 
ge  ...ne  iu,o..<.,e  of  independent,  external  :.ali^  i.  ZmI 
at  .11.  TiMm.oss,ble  upon  any  system,"  he  declares  "to 
|-n..th.rou.  understanding  or  senses;  and  we  but  expose 
tluiu  .U.U,.,  ,,  -en  we  endeavor  to  justify  them."  "Careless- 
ness and  mattention  alone  can  afford  us  any  remedy  "  'This 

Hume's  problem  wa.s  inherited  by    Kant.     "I  confess  it 
fr-^y,     the    atter  writes  in  the  oft-quoted  passage  in  the 

ol-rr"  """/f"'  ''^^"Pf^y-'^'  "the  remembrance  o 
Dayu  Hume  was  the  first  thing  which  many  years  ago  inter 
up  ed  u.y  dogn^atic  shunber,  and  gave  to  iy  investTgations 
H  the  field  of  speculative  philosophy  a  quite  new  dirSn  " 
T  .„«.  orward  Kant'.s  problen.  was  how  to  conserve  a  "he 
-n.o  tune  the  good  ,n  rationalism  without  its  dogmatism  and 
the  good  m  empiricism  without  its  scepticism.     He  ne  ^Tgave 

always  to  be  deternnned  by  agreement  with  those  universal 
onus  of  rational  consciousness  which  -  as  he  contZld  to 

pnon.     fetill   to  avoid  dogmatism,  he  recognized  as  just  the 

<<  M    >ut   what   has   been  verified  within  human  experience 
H.S  chosen  philosophical  meu.ou,  by  which  dogmatism  ami 

'^'::^''T  '""'^  ;^  ■:  ^^^"'^^^'  ^^«  -^^  ^e  z 

M'uh    validity    ,s    imparted    to    empirical    judgments      His 

tl  -is"  '  ;r^.f'  '^  ^^'^^^  ""^-^^-^  from  this  pdnt 
"«•     I    IS.    n  all  Its  parts,  the  rationalistic  criticism  of  ex- 
-Kjnced   values,  intellectual,  moral,  ^thetic,  and     elig  ous 
the  Cn„ue  of  Pure  Reason  the  aim  is  to  vindicate  the 
ahdity  of  experienced  intellectual   values  by  showTng  the 

Inl  vJuef h""  """  *°  ^'^^^  '^'  ^^"dity  of  experienced 

morri         '     ^  ^''T''^  °"*  *^^'  «  P"«"  ^'^'"^nt  involved 

»'  moral  experience ;  for  a  corresponding  purpose  the  first  part 

'  A  Treatise  of  Human  Nature,  pp.  218,  268. 


18 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  KNOWLEDGE 


of  the  Critique  of  Judgment  is  concerned  with  the  a  prion  element 
in  aesthetic  experience,  while  the  second  part  of  the  same  work, 
together  with  the  volume  entitled  Religion  within  the  Limits 
of  Mere  Reason,  attempts  the  same  thing  for  the  -  alues  ex- 
perienced in  religion,  both  "natural"  and  "revealed."  In 
Kant's  critical  philosophy,  then,  as  Hans  Vaihinger  remarks, 
the  empiricism  is  rationalistic,  and  the  rationalism  empirically 
conditioned.' 

In  the  present  discussion  our  concern  is  with  this  combina- 
tion of  rationalism  and  empiricism,  in  so  far  as  it  affected  the 
problem  of  knowledge.     Here  it  was  maintained  with  the 
rationalist  as  against  the  sceptical  empiricist  that  genuine 
knowledge  is  possible  in  mathematics  and  natural  science. 
To  the  sceptic  it  was  conceded,  however,  in  opposition  to  the 
dogmatic   rationalist,   that   metaphysical    knowledge   is   im- 
possil)le.     The    possibility    of    mathematical,    scientific,  and 
metaphysical  judgments  is  explained  in  rationalistic  fashion 
as  dependent  upon  the  synthetic  activity  of  reason  with  its 
a    priori    forms,    principles,    and    fundamental    ideas.     The 
validity  of  i  athematical  and  scientific  judgments  as  knowl- 
edge is  explained  in  empirical  fashion  as  due  either  to  the  fact 
that  they  synthesize  what  is  given  in  sense-experience,  as  in 
the  natural  sciences,  or  else  to  the  circumstance  that  they  set 
forth  what,  according  to  the  inherent  constitution  of  the  per- 
ceptive and  thinking  faculties,  are  the  necessary  forms  of  all 
possible  sense-experienc(>,  as  in  geometry.     The  impo.ssibility 
of  arrivmg    at   valid  metaphysical    knowledge,   however    is 
explamed  as  due  to  the  fact  that  the  constructions  of  rational 
psychology,  cosmology,  and  theology  go  bevond  all  possible 
human  experience  and  are  therefore,  as  the  empirical  sceptic 
mamtams,  pure  dogma.      Thus  there  could  be  no  judgments 
at  ui;  without  the  activity  of  a  priori  factors.     But,  on  the 
other  hand,  these  judgments  do  not  become  knowledge  save  as 
they   embody  the   mat.-rials   of  sense-experience,  or  operate 
with  the  nec(>ssary  forms  of  all  possible  sense-experience 

On  this  side  of  his  thought  it  would  seem  that  Kant  not 
only  anticipated  Comte's  positivistic  rejection  of  meta- 
P.-.S1CS  and    Identification    of    knowledge   with    science,   but 

'  Commentar  zu  KanU  KrUik  dcr  rcincn  Vcrnunft.  1881,  p.  55. 


W^^^'^^^^d 


■•ixi! 


DUALISM  AND  AVOWED  AGNOSTICISM  19 

that   ho  placed  this  positivism  upon  a  rationalistic  as  wpII 

tionalism  with  English  empiricism  other  far-reachine  reSu 
wei.       olved.    In  a  sense  Kant  may  be  said  to  have  aken "ve 
the  subjectivism  of  the  Humian  emoiricism     Thl  ■  , 

.™.h  i„  Vaihi„«„'s  co„t™.i„„  .haTZ^s  the  rde'r'  Slj' 
^■..,.  had  been  combi„«l  with  objectivism,  el.im,„g  [„  blTbt 

atSn  T"  '°"'''°"™''  "■<"-»«  of  hama'experieno^ 

and  while  the  former  emn  ricism  in  Wo  fi„„i  e  ^^H^nwite, 

»ilh  subjectivism,  ,he  phiZph;  ofS  Za""  T'l"'" 
of  mtionalism  with  subjeetivL  •     F™  7us  17^7  ™ 

r.o=^^»:t-it;:?tL=?? 

nence  our  objects  according  to  forms  which  are  un  verLllv 
n    ossary  for  all  possible  human  experience.     It  gTves  us  a 

rtain  measure  of  consolation  in  our  subjec  >  totnow  that 
^.w,thers  are  m  the  same  predicament;  fery  liLTcot! 

Rut  it  is  especially  important  to  note  that,  on  the  basis  of 
tnis  combination  of  rationalism  with  the  subj;ctivism  of  L 
pmcism,  not  simply  the  explicit  judgment  aboi     obreTts  L  d": 
pendent  upon  an  activity  of  mind;  experience  and  al  t« 
ol.jocts,  the  world  of  nature  itself, -all ^arproduct  o    the 

those  materials  the  human  mind  constat's  r  world  S  Z^l 

'"•■'"on^tratcd.  he  claims    bv    hi       ♦  ?T'  ""^  «n.po8sible  one,  as  was 

-'""I'tedlv  true  when    hoPmn-  """  "^  ^'^"'^  ^"^""Pt-     This  is  un- 

""•  Kantian,  which  will  comhine^fr  ,       ™'  P'"'°«<'P»'y.  'different  from 


I 


20 


THE   PROBLEM  OF  KNOWLEDGE 


and  all  its  laws.  This,  then,  is  the  Copernican  revolution  in 
philosophy,  as  Kant  himself  called  it.  As  it  is  due  to  our  posi- 
tion on  the  earth  that  the  heavenlj-  bodies  seem  to  move  around 
us,  so  it  is  because  of  the  nature  of  the  a  priori  forms  of  our 
sensibility  and  understanding  that  we  Inve  a  world  of  objects 
existing  in  space  and  time,  and  go-  in  accordance  with 

uniform  laws.  Or,  in  other  words,  j ,  ,  according  to  Coperni- 
cus, it  is  the  movement  of  the  earth  in  the  solar  system  that 
accounts  for  apparent  motions  of  the  heavenly  bodies,  so  it  is 
the  activity  of  our  own  reason  in  the  world  of  the  senses  which 
accounts  for  the  way  the  world  of  nature  appears  to  us.' 

But  the  question  may  well  I)e  asked  whether  the  Kantian 
revolution  in  philosophy  was  as  scientific  and  final  as  the  Coper- 
nican revo'ution  in  astronomy.     A  truce  was  arranged  between 
rationalism  an.'  empiricism,  but  the  prospects  for  a  final  and 
satisfactory  sol.  t ion  of  the  problem  of  knowledge  were  little 
brighter  as  a  result  of  the  Kantian  criticism.     The  Humian 
scepticism    reappeannl    in    the    ultimate    agnosticism    of   the 
Kantian  system.     Even  granting  the  truth  of  Kuno  Fischer's 
contention  =  that  the  dependence  of  the  worl.l  of  nature  upon 
human  reason  was  inten<led  to  apply  only  to  man  as  the  mhjed 
not  to  man  as  the  object,  of  knowledge,  this  is  not  a  real  escape 
from  subjectivism,  but  a  mere  cloak  to  conceal  it ;  man  as  ob- 
ject of  'nowledge  includes  all  we  can  say  about  him  as  subject 
of  knowledge.     Kant's  failure  was  also  partly  obscured  by  his 
introduction  of  the  concept  of  "possible  experience,"  which 
mstead  of  independent  reality,  he  makes  the  object  of  scientific 
knowledge.     But  "  possible  experience,"  so  far  as  it  goes  beyond 
actual  experience,  is  not  reality  at  all ;  and  Kant  was  not' able 
to  .hsmiss  from  consideration  an  independent  reality,  a  "thing- 
m-itsell,"  which  coul.l  not  be  interpreted  in  terms  of  possil)le 
experience,  l)ut  which  must  be  assumed  as  the  cause  of  the 
sense-impresslons  given  to  the  mind  from  without.' 

>  See  Kuno  Fischer'.  /»,„,a.„d  Kant.  4th  od,.   1S98,  Vol.  I,  pp.  8.  9,  and 
H.  H„c.ffd,nR  s  //,,,„.,  .,/  M,d,rn  Philosophy.  Eug.  Tr.,  Vol.  II.  pp  45 -6. 
'Op.  cil.,     ->1.  II,  p.  ,-,(1. 

'Sec  for  example.  A-ri/,irfcrrn„fn  Vernunft,  1st  cd.,  p.  565;   2d  cd.   p  537- 
Vol  Tv  30-    wT"  ':■  '"'■    /"^°  '"  *^-  ^'''■""'*"-'-  "f  -^^''-'^'V  (Hariens.    n." 

vol.  IV  ,  .1U(  :    W  .if  son  s  Sn|nPtjo!w    n    ""Kl     Jh-.    i  I,  ■     ■ 

a  certain  contradtct.on  'd.^appears  if  wo  say  that  behind  phenomena  tiere  arJ 


^>^^mm&M^ 


WTJ^ma^:^ 


DUALISM  AND  AVOWED  AONOSTICISM  21 

According  to  the  principles  of  the  Kantian  criticism    this 
rcahty,  as  forever  Keyond  possible  experience    can  newr  t 

It  .,  the  object  of  a  necessary  question.     We  know  that  iTI!' 
and  yet  can  never  have  valid  knowledge  of  what  Til    tL      ' 

cntica,  but  ,„ore  pronoltit  d  TlZ;fZ"Z  T^T 
English  predecessor.     Even   Locke's   "nri,!  ,  *"* 

bcKhes  were  relegated  to  the ';!' "„,  ZTppeTrar    a l' 

Jit  o7hf  rr  °'  """'■"  '■'''''™»l°si™l  .lualisn,  and  the 

p^«:^n°of"rd:  ::Lr:fCcri.'T^'' °"'  "^  "■-  -- 

.0  ..«  Which  he  hhnself  Ippll.Tt^^r I^    fs^dT 
lcct»  of  actual  and  p„s.,ibk.  experience.     Intuition,  and  „h 

•■ii;g'"cr:t7^^^^^^^^ 

*»>.  nui 'nVn^Ttt  r  i  sXZ'b;y::;r  "-'-"■r^ 

'"'breal.   ,f  neo-Kantianism,  f.rSi:;2::i.irr,tg: 

'•  i»>  Ml,,.  h„,  .i„p,,  „„  ^h^,;™  "'„'»'"'■ "' ""  "po..ibio.,port,„„" 

•■'  noi.  bul  ,hl,b  ,,  ™H™„ii.  ;. """.,'        "I^"''  "•  "kslfcer  .xpeHenrri 

™i.ppM71.    CI.  K.  Fi3rhpr.op.c,i,.  Vol.ii,p.55|_ 


^^d^^ 


.-m.  m 


22 


THE   PROBLEM  OF   KNOWLEDGE 


in-itscif,  woro  fstaI)lis{H'(l  as  valid  philosophy,  it  would  be 
legitimate  in  dealing  with  opponents  of  idealism  to  regard  this 
neo-Kantianism  as  the  essence  of  Kantiani.-<m.  But  if  neo- 
Kantianism  is  itself,  like  other  forms  of  idealism,  as  we  shall 
maintain  (Chs.  'V-IXi,  unfcnahic,  then,  in  dealing  with  the 
idealist,  tho  good  essence  of  Kantianism  is  its  realism,  whereas, 
when  one  is  defending  monistic  realism,  the  bad  essence  of  Kan- 
tianism is  its  dualisMi  and  consequent  agnosticism. 

The  application  of  the  term  "  noumenon  "  to  the  thing-in-itself 
is  to  be  inteipreted  in  agreement  with  what  has  been  said.  The 
term  is  not  to  be  interpreted  in  the  Platonic  sense  as  signifying 
reality  known  by  pure  reason,  although  Kant  borrows  the  term 
from  Plato.  It  is  rather  to  be  taken  as  what  Plato's  noumenon 
becomes  in  the  Kantian  dualistic  epistemology,  viz.  7nere 
non-phenomenon  from  the  standpoint  of  human  knowledge,  and 
yet  what  might  l)e  known  through  intellectual  intuition  by  .some 
superhuman  mind,  .-'o  interpreted,  ii  becomes  at  once  evident 
that  the  term  "  noumenon  "  is  appropriate  to  designate  the  thing- 
m-itself,  which,  while  transcendentally  real,  is  empirically  ideal.' 
We  concludes  then,  that  Kant's  doctrine  is  an  epistemological 
dualism  so  absolute  as  to  leave  the  sphere  of  reality  and  the 
sphere  of  knowledge  coincident  at  not  a  .single  point. 

Kant  himself  made  a  veiy  notable  attempt  to  overcome  this 
agnostic  dualism,  at  least  sufficiently  for  the  neer's  of  the  moral 
life,  in  his  Critique  of  Practical  Reason.  This,  however,  was  at 
best  a  palliative  measure.  It  sought  to  relieve  one  dualism  by 
mtroducmg  another,  vi;^.  the  logical  dualism  of  two  fundamen- 

■  In  tho  sooon,!  r.lition  of  the  rriliquc  of  Pure  fi,a,on  (see  Muller-s  transla- 
tion p.  ,S!»)  K„nt  says:  -If  l,y  noun.cnon  wr  moan  a  thin.'  so  far  as  it  is  not 
an  objrct  „)  our  xc.uou.  uUuition.  a„<l  rnak-  abstraction  ..f  our  .noMo  of  intui- 
tion It  may  b.  callo,!  a  noumonon  in  a  mvutkc  sonso.  If,  however,  we  mean 
by  It  an  obj<rt  of  a  non-.rnsuou.  intuilhn.  we  .admit  thereby  a  p.Tuliar  mode  of 
...tuition,  namely  the  intellertual,  w.ueh,  however,  is  not  our  own,  nor  one  of 
M  we  can  underst.yul  ,.ven  the  possibility.  This  wouhl  be  noumenon  in  a 
positive  sense        8ee  also  .MiilUr's  translati.,n,  pp.  -00  ff.  and  541-2  ;  K.  Fiseher 

"n  Z'h  It  v"","'  t't^"  "Jo"-  ^'''■''''  ^'"  '■'■'"''■"'  P'"'«-P''.'/  of  Kant.  Vol.  I. 
PP._  18,  049;  Vol.  II,  p.  03.3;  F.  Paulsen,  Jmmanuel  Kant  (Eng.  Tr.),  p.  200. 
Riehl  seems  not  to  appreciate  sufT.eiently  Kanfs  special  use  of  the  P  atonic 
termmolo«.v.  He  says;  'The  idea  of  noumenon  is  a  practical  i.leal  concept. 
...  usi,  K  which  Kant  is  in  evident  contradiction  with  his  doctrine  of  the  un- 
Vol    II    Part  II         ,'•'"'''' "^'^"-      ^^"    liliiiosopmxrhc   hriticismus,    1S7'J, 


ymmmj-j^im^m^mnmYm  mm^m^^i 


DUALISM  AND  AVOWED  AOXOSTICISM  23 

tally  different  kinds  of  truth,  the  dualism  of  reason  and  faith  or 
f  theory  and  practice.     For  practical  purposes  we  must  ac  as' 

o;Zmt?crcLrn"tn^^ 

..n-i  ♦»,      e     """yV    .^««-     ^^till,  the  genumenesp  of  hs  realism 

practical  leason  the  primacy  over  the  pure  or  theoretical  reason 
A  thoroughgoing  application  of  this  point  of  view  throughout 
the  whole  domain  of  practical  intellection  was  not  made  prob 
ably  for  the  reason  that  it  would  have  seriously  discredfteS  ^he 

he  so-called  Copern.can  revolution   would   have  had  to   be 

ol  owed   by  a    counter-revolution,    which    might  even    have 

amounted  to  a  return  to  epistemological  monitm  and  realism 

Piagmatists.     As  it  is,  the  final  word,  so  far  as  exposition  is 
concerned,  would  seem  to  be  that  Kant  was  a  remarkaWy  con 
-stent  dualist --so  consistent,  indeed,  tL.t  he  even  v  ntures 
o  contradict  himself.     What  is  true  from  one  point  of  view 
theoretical  reason)  is  false  from  another  (pracLal  reLr) 
theoretically  we  have  not,  practically  we  have,  knowledge  of 
Hulcpendent^reality ;  not  to  have  contradicted  hims^l^It  certam 
punts  would  therefore  !.ave  been  in  Kant  a  mark  o  Tncot 
Mstency  with  his  logical  and  epistemological  dualism 
The  secret  of  the  Kantian  agnosticism  lies  in  the  will  to  be  a 

:t  d^'n  l:^T'  '''''''  '"  '"^^'^''^^'^  '-  b-"  ^i- 
covered      It  is  the  lingering  presence  of  the  Humian  sceptical 

e jneism,  which  Kant's  formal  rationaUsm  was  neve'abl 

>illy  to  overcome.     It  is  the  result  of  a  natural  suggestion  arisir.^ 

.om  insufficiently  critical  thought,  whose  fal-acTou  nes^Zy 

J  exposed  by  its  being  expressed  in  syllogistic  fashion.     EiE 

n    he  following  syllogisms  may  be  taken  as  fairly  representative 

;       e  reasoning  that  commonly  leads  to  phi.osophfcal  agnosti- 

incIulH  .r^"'u  '°  ^'  '"P^"'^"^^  °f  independent  reality 
i^  included  within  what  T  experience;  but  mere  sense-im 
pressions  which  I  do  not  know  to  be  valid  of  independerrX" 
nose  to  h"^^^^-  '"  "'"*  ^  expener..o;  therefore  what  I  sup^ 
P  li^n  whT[T''  fJ"^^P^"d^"t  reality  is  mere  sense-im- 
pression,  which  I  do  not  know  to  be  valid  of  independent  reality 


0 


24 


THK   PROBLEM  OP   KNOWLEDGE 


Again,  what  I  suppose  I  know  is  included  in  what  I  think ; 
but  what  I  merely  think  and  do  not  know  is  al^o  im  udcd  in 
what  I  think ;  therefore  what  I  suppose  I  know  i<  what  I  do 
not  know,  but  merely  think.  The  fallacy  in  both  svllopisn.s 
IS  that  of  reasoning  l)y  means  of  an  undistributed  middle  term, 
and  thorouKhjioinK  agnosticism  is  the  inevitable  n-^nh  A 
measure  of  apparent  relief  is  obtained  by  the  devii-e  to  whi4 
we  have  ahvady  referred,  the  use  of  the  abstract  c-oncept  of 
"possible  experience"  as  a  substitute  for  that  of  'Tt^ality"; 
this,  however,  simply  covers  up,  but  does  not  solve,  the  theoreti- 
cal problem.  It  a  ounts  to  the  dogged  determination  t<,  put 
up  with  the  lack  of  real  objectivity  in  ourknowltMJge  <ince  every 
other  human  being  is  obliged  to  do  the  same.  It  is  the  regarding 
of  subjectivity  as  if  it  ivere  objectivity,  simply  on  the  ground 
that  it  IS  a  necessary  and  universal  subjectivity. 

There  is  one  further  criticism  of  the  Kantian  duah^m  and 
agnosticism  which  may  well  be  mentioned  here  .ind  which 
amounts  to  the  charge  that  if  one  will  be  as  agnostic  a.-  Kant  he 
must  logically  be  more  agnostic  still.  This  was  virtually  the 
position  taken  by  (;.  E.  Schulze,  one  of  the  earliest  of  Kanfs 
critics,  who  maintaine<l  >  not  only  that  if  the  categorit^  are  not 
to  be  applied  to  things-in-themselves,  we  can  have  no  certain 
knowledge  of  the  e.xist.-nce  of  such  things.  '  ut  that  moreover 
we  can  have,  on  Kaiitiar  principles,  no  such  knowk~ige  of  the 
a  prion  conditions  of  human  experience  as  the  Kantian  criticism 
assumes  to  b,.  possibl,..     If  then-  is  knowledge  onlv  when  there 

IS  empirical  intuition,  (here  can  be  no  knowlcige  of  an  absolutelv 
a  pmn  activity;  the  suppose.l  ab.solutely  a  priori  conditions 
of  experience  .'an  never  he-  objects  of  experience  and  so  are  to 
be  regarde<l  as  unknowable  things-in-themselves  al^.  This 
seems  to  be  a  valid  rchctio  ad  nb.urdum  of  the  Kantian  combina- 
tion of  an  absolute  apriorism  with  an  absolute  metaDhvsical 
agnosticism.  One  or  the  other,  and  in  the  end  prol^hlv "both 
must  go.  *  ' 

The  influence  of  Kant  upon  the  development  of  philosophical 
doctrine  .since  his  ,lay  has  been  tremendous.  From  the  per- 
spective of  oiir  own  .lay  the  fun.lamental  divisions  of  ,he  history 
of  modern  philosophy  are  the  pre-Kantian,  the  Kantkn,'  and 

'  .■Erirsidennis,  1792. 


wmMif*^ 


DUALISM  AND  AVOWED  AGNOSTICISM  25 

the  po«t-Kantian.  The  great  bulk  of  post-Kantian  philosoDhv 
moreover,  as  perhaps  most  instructively  represe^^a  £ 
....<  er  one  or  another  of  the  three  following  gLeral  charaetS 

•luausm,  with  the  acceptance  of  its  inevitable  agnosticism  • 

nidH'  bvT'  K  •'''"'^*^^  "^^^'"^"^«'  stimulated  and  Wge™; 
Mid.  J  oy  the  Kantian  analysis  of  the  a  priori  conditionfof 
<■  j-ience,  and  claiming  to  transcend  the 'agnosticlSy 
•  nd  third,  a  development  of  the  realistic  side  of  the  Kan  an 
d ual  sm,  as  an  expression  of  the  desire  to  escape  from  KanT" 
absolute  agnosticism  as  to  independent  reality.     Each  of  the- 

The  idealistic  movement  in  its  earlier  no>,t  K«nf;      r 
Itself  as  being  just  rational  thought,  with  the  result  fh./n  f! 

Thn  I  !         .     '    ^  therefore  cannot  know  that  it  is 

Tho  philoconhv  of  s'ru-.V        ^   ^  """'"Py  ""'■  attention. 
*.re.th..„f,he  Kantian  d„a,is„,„rphe„„rlrd"hrgt 


26 


THE  PROBLKM  OP  KX()WLED(!E 


Itself.    The  philosophies  of  Reid  and  Kant ,  however,  have  about 
as  much  affinity  for  each  other  as  oil  and  water,  and  in  the 
Hamiltonian  doctrine  we  see  sometimes  the  one  innredient  and 
sometimes  the  othei-,  hut  never  a  compound  of  the  twt>.'     De- 
veloping the  Kantian  doctrine  of  the  constructive  function  of 
the  understanding  in  cognition,  Hamilton  insists  that  since  to 
think  is  to  condition  and  limit  the  object  of  thought,  and  since, 
of  course,  thotight  is  involved  in  all  human  cognition,  the  only 
knowable  obj.-cts  are  such  as  are  conditioned,  limited,  modifieil 
m  and  through  tlie  process  of  becoming  known.     Reality,  as  it 
would  be  apart  from  the  spatial,  temporal,  (lualitative,  causal, 
and  other  conditions  imposed  l)y  human  thought,  is  thus  for 
man   forever   unknowable.     The    following   stronglv   agnostic 
expressions  are  typical:    "All  qualities,  both  of  mind  and  of 
matter,  are  .  .  .  only  known    to  us  as  relations;    we   know 
nothmg  in  itself."^      "Of  things  absolutely  or  in  themselves 
.  .  .  we  know  nothing,  or  know  them  only  as  incognizable. 
All  that   we  know  is  .  .  .  phenomenal,  -  phenomenal  of  the 
unknown."  '     '•  We  may  suppose  existence  to  have  a  thousand 
modes;   but  these  thousand  modes  are  all  to  us  as  zero,  unless 
we  possess  faculties  acconunodated  to  their  apprehension.     But 
were  the  number  of  our  faculties  coextensive  with  the  modes  of 
bemg,  — had  we,  for  each  of  these  thousand  modes,  a  separate 
organ  competent  to  make  it  known  to  us, -still  would  our 
whole  knowledge  be,  as  it  is  at  present ,  only  relative.     Of  exist- 
ence absolutely  and  in  itself  we  should  then  be  as  ignorant  as  we 
are  now."  * 

But  while  we  cannot  know  ivhat  the  Absolute  or  Uncondi- 
tioned is,  that  It  IS  is  a  conviction  from  which  we  cannot  escape 
As  Reid  maintained,  the  original  pronouncements  of  conscio-is- 
ness,  underlying,  as  they  do,  all  human  thought,  must  be 
accepted  as  true;  and  one  of  these  original  pronouncements 
IS  the  inescapable  conviction  that  a  world  exists  independently 
of  consciousness.  "By  a  wonderful  revelation  we  are,  in  the 
very  consciousness  of  our  inability  to  conceive  aught  above 

i  H«mnf '**'i''!i"*^',^"''°"^'  ^'"  *°"'**  Philosophy.  1885.  p.  149. 

Hamilton,  R„M  ,  Co!l.H,r)  Writ<r^a^.  6th  ed..  1»63.  p.  905 
'  Uiscussions,  p.  COS 
*Lecturea,  lat  ed.,  I,  io3;   1874  ed.,  I,  107, 


'^^Lm^.^^:^s^m.^-r^^  j^ 


DUALISM  AND  AVOWED  AGNOSTICISM  27 

tho  rdativc  and  finite,  inspired  uitl,  a  belief  in  the  existence  of 

ft  is  duimed,  however  -  strangely  enough,  as  it  may  seem  - 
xnn-W  c,,,„o,    peri  1  :  °  1"","  r'  T'"'"""''  "™""'" 

»'»»*»  or  hnttiiTph  .  "C-Ltil?'"  1 

H..,l,,.r,    iZ'  '™"-°"''l'*'«-  flwous  dogmatism. 

ki»"val,lo,el  otCoH  „     ,"''?,'"""-«'«l  '»  maintain  the  „„. 

'«•  ««""lXt ,  tto.e  ,„™  "f'tt  "tf  ^'  '""™"'=^  ■«-"- 
■■"l<<i"ale  methods  „n„V        ?        .^^'  ""  '">"1"«'«t  and  in- 

"J.  whichi  em  neL  V     "      ;;?  ""'  "■°*'  "'  """"''^  "-d  of 
IS  emmently  accessible  to  experience  and  ]<nowable 

i'."-r,,,  l.st  H.,  I.  220-   Iv   0?*  "^    """■'"'*•  PP-  747a.  750a.  7616; 


28 


THK  PUOBLKM  OF  KXOWLEDOE 


by  the  moth(Mls  of  etnpirical  scionco.  In  Spcncor,  then,  we  seem 
able  to  truce  the  sceptieally  inclined  EnKH«h  empiricism,  the 
positivistic  reduction  of  pliilosophy  to  empirical  science,  and, 
as  mediated  by  Hamiltcdi  and  Munsel,  the  Kantian  agnosticism 
with  reference  to  ahsohite,  indepeiiih'nt  ReaUty.  In  the  light  of 
these  antecedents  it  is  easy  to  ap|)reciate  Spencer's  arrangement 
of  his  thoughts  on  the  "first  principles"  of  philosophy  under  the 
two  heads  of  "the  Unknowable"  and  the  "  Knowable." 

In  his  philosophy  of  the  I'liknowable,  Spencer  maintains 
that  the  conflict  between  science  and  religion  has  been  partly 
due  to  tin'  dogmatizing  of  scientists  beyond  the  proper  sphere 
of  science.  If  the  scientist  is  sufficiently  critical  of  his  own 
fundamental  concepts,  "he,  more  than  any  other,  truly  knows 
that  in  its  ultimate  nature  nothing  can  i)e  known."  "Ultimate 
scientific  ideas  are  all  representative  of  realities  that  cannot  be 
comprehended."  Space  and  time  are  wholly  incomprehensible. 
Takeii  objectively,  they  can  be  conceived  neither  as  entities 
nor  as  attributes  of  entities,  nor  yet  as  non-<nitities.  Taken 
sul)jectively,  they  would  be  the  mere /orm.s  of  intuition,  but  we 
have  the  direct  testimony  of  consciousness  that  they  enter  into 
the  objective  content  of  imuition.  The  case  is  similar  with  the 
concepts  of  force  and  matter.  We  must,  and  yet  we  cannot, 
think  of  matter  as  acting  on  ma,;.>r  through  empty  space. 
When  we  consider  the  concept  of  consciousness  we  are  again 
face  to  face  with  an  inscrutable  enigma.  Objective  and  sub- 
jective things  are  ahke  inscrutable  in  their  substance  and 
genesis.' 

Hut  that  human  intelligence  is  utterly  mcapable  of  knowing  the 
reality  which  exists  behind  all  appearances,  may  be  exhibited, 
continues  Spencer,  in  oth(>r  ways  besiiles  this  experimental 
testing  of  the  ultimate  ideas  of  science,  and  showing  from  the 
alternative  i:ii[)o,ssibilitics  of  thought  invariably  involved  that 
all  such  ideas  are  mere  symbols  of  the  actual,  not  cognition.s  of  it. 
The  same  conclusion  as  to  the  relativity  of  knowledge  may  be 
provetl  analytically.  An  analysis  of  the  product  of  scientific 
thought  shows  that  the  particular  is  always  explained  by  the 
more  general,  leaving  the  most  general  necessarily  inexplicable. 
An  analysis  of  the  pruccss  of  thought  .shows  that  we  know  by 

'  First  Princiiiks.  f  $  15-21. 


DIAF^ISM  AND  AVoWKD  A(!NOSTIO[SM 


29 


.li«tiMK..i.sh,nK    n.|afi„„s.    ,liff..n.ntTs,    and   .similarities;     from 
«lii<-h  It  may  he  infcmul  that  tho  Absolute,  us  that  of  which  no 
nc<vssary  relation  can  F)e  predicated,  is  unknowable.     Once 
.n...e.  the  .same  conclusion  also  follows  from  the  biological  view 
o    nun.l.     What  is  tru..  of  life  i„  ^meral  is  true  of  intellectual 
life  m  particular.     It  is  a  continuous  adjustment  of  internal 
relations  t.M.xt.rnal  ivlations  ;  .-ach  act  of  knowing  i.s  the  forma- 
tion ot  a  I.  lati.H,  in  <-on.sciou.sness  answering  to  a  relation  in  the 
environment .  s„  that  the  external  agency  it.self  is  never  what  is 
with...  .•(,ns.„,u.s„,..ss.     But  then,  all  that  is  required  for  the 
purposes  of  l.f.  is  that  the  internal  actions  sh<»uld  correspond 
u.tl.  the  e.xternal  actions  i„  their  coexist(>nces  and  sequences- 
knouirdge  of  what  th,-  things  are  in  them.selves  is  quite  un- 

Hut  what  Spencer  meai  ■  i-  -  .  simply  that  anything  beyond 
tlH'  .da  ive  ...W  /,c  unknow.....e;  he  is  equally  insi.stent  that 
".;  "Hwt  .c-liev.-  that  something  beyond  the  relative  actually 
••xists.  "In  the  very  d..nial  of  our  power  to  learn  ivhat  the 
Abs<,lute  IS,  thore  lies  hidden  the  a.ssumption  that  it  is;  and  the 
M.akn.g  of  th.s  a.s.su.nption  proves  that  the  Absolute  has  been 
pn.s..,.t  to  the  .nin.l,  not  as  a  nothing,  but  as  a  something" 
losiy  that  our  knowledge  is  limited  to  appearances  nece.ssarily 
involves  .„.  thought  of  a  Reality  of  which  they  are  the  appear- 
ances, and  the  v.-ry  demonstration  that  a  definite  consciousness 

h    .  bsoiute  IS  impossible  to  us  unavoidably  presupposes  an 

.   .  y.^  of  it.     There  is,  indeed,  as  an  indefinite 

lH.,.«l.t  orn.ed  by  he  coalescence  of  a  series  of  thoughts,  and 
..r....ng  the  basis  of  our  intelligence,  an  ever  present  sense  of 
•■a   J'xi.stc.u.e   a  nascent  consciousness  of  space,  for  instance, 

ml  hose  bounds  wnich  we  definitely  imagine,  or  of  a  cause 
'H  'nn.i  hat  cause  which  we  have  definitely  in  mind.  From  the 
|"|I-s.l,, hty  of  getting  rid  of  the  consciousness  of  an  Actuality 

M;::f  ;:t;  zsr ''--  --^^^ «-  ^-^-^-ctibie 

"  uas  soon  pointed  out,  in  criticism  of  Spencer,  that  his  doc- 
'-ne  u  an  unknowable  Reality  behind  Appearance  was  self- 
-.tra.hctory,  m  that  the  saying  what  anvthin.  is  not  alwl  s 
'"voives,  in  some  measure,  saying  what  it  is.^  Spencer  was 

'/6..  §§22-5.  «/5..  §26. 


30 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  KNOWLEDGE 


.  I 


forced  to  admit  the  justice  of  this  criticism ;  but  in  reply  he 
could  only  reiterate  his  former  contention,  that  we  cannot  say 
anything  concerning  the  non-relative  without  carrying  into  our 
propositions  meanings  connoted  by  words  moulded  on  the 
relative.'  He  was  almost  within  sight  of  the  real  solution  of 
the  problem,  however,  when  he  said,  "Unless  a  real  Non- 
Relative  or  Absolute  be  postulated,  the  Relative  itself  becomes 
absolute."  ^  Why  should  ice  not  regard  the  dislinclion  between  the 
Relative  and  the  Absolute  as  itself  relative  rather  than  absolute? 
Even  an  all-inclusive  Whole  must  necessarily  exist  in  relations  — 
to  its  parts.  There  is,  by  reason  of  the  imperfection  of  our 
knowledge,  appearance  which  is  to  be  distinguished  from  reality, 
and  thus  a  relative  which  is  not  the  absolute;  but  is  there  any 
Absolute  which  is  not  essentially  relative?  What  we  mean  to 
imply  is  not  subjectivism.  The  circumstance  of  anything's 
being  relative  does  not  mean  that  all  its  being  is  dependent  upon 
its  being  in  the  relation  of  b(  ing  known  by  a  subject.  Its 
being  absolute  may  be  relative  u.t  some  human  purpose,  but  its 
bei  ig  is  not  necessarily  r  ive  to  human  purpose.  What  it 
is,  however,  does  not  need  to  be  completely  independent  of  all 
of  its  relations.  If,  tiien,  it  has  not  been  shown  that  an  Absolute 
c:nnot  be  at  the  same  time  relative,  the  a  priori  arguments  of 
Hamilton,  Mansel,  and  Spencer  for  the  unknowableness  of  the 
Absolute  fall  to  tiie  ground. 

Before  turning  to  a  consideration  of  recent  agnostic  realism 
among  German  Kantians,  brief  reference  may  l)e  made  to  two 
English  thinkers  whose  philosophical  views  will  be  discussed 
more  fully  in  other  connections,  viz.  F.  H.  Bradley  and  S.  H. 
Hodgson.  Bradley  is  noteworthy  in  this  connection  as  having 
driven  absolute  idealism,  under  the  lash  of  logical  criticism, 
almost  to  the  verge  of  the  Spencerian  agnosticism.  His  Ab- 
solute, so  strongly  contrasted  with  all  appearances,  is  all  but 
identical  with  Spencer's  "Unknowable."  Hodgson,  with  his 
conception  of  experience  becoming  what  we  later  recognize  as 
reality,  made  an  earnest  effort  to  establish  his  metaphysics 
upon  the  ground  of  an  epistemological  monism ;  but  he  did  not 
quite  succeeil.  On  the  one  hand  he  argues  that  in  the  process 
of  consciousness  the  object  of  consciousness  is  formed,  but  on 

'  Firit  Principles,  Postscript  to  Part  I.  i  /6.,  g  20. 


DUALISM  AND  AVOWED   AGNOSTICISM 


31 


the  other  hand  he  is  forced  to  admit  that  matter,  as  we  know  it, 
has  conditions  beyond  those  of  our  own  consciousness,  and  that 
therefore  sense-data  are  evidence  of  a  reality  that  is  non-con- 
sciousness.' So  long  as  he  adheres  to  epistemological  monism, 
he  is  committed,  as  we  shall  see  (Ch.  VI),  to  what  is  virtually  a 
disguised  subjective  idealism;  so  soon  as  he  acknowledges 
reahsm,  he  lapses  into  epistemological  dualism.  He  is  thus 
forced  to  hover  perpetually  in  un.  table  equilibrium  between 
subjectivism  and  agnosticism. 

Among  contemporary  exponents  of  Kantian  doctrine  there  is 
perhaps  no  one  who  so  faithfully  clings  to  the  essentials  of  his 
master's  position  as  does  Alois  Riehl.  He  frankly  assumes 
realism  in  combination  with  an  absolute  dualism  in  epistemology 
at  the  outset,  and  adheres  to  this  point  of  view  with  remark- 
able consistency  throughout  the  entire  course  of  his  thought. 
"I  take  the  realistic  hypothesis,"  he  says,  "as  my  point 
of  departure;  I  assume  that  something  different  from  and 
independent  of  consciousness  exists."*  This  is  assumed  as 
founded  in  a  feeling  of  real  existence  other  than  appearance, 
that  cannot  be  driven  from  even  the  most  elementary  form  of 
our  conscious  life.'  But  it  is  involved  in  this  realistic  assump- 
tion that  the  objects  of  our  experience,  which  are,  as  such, 
dependent  upon  our  consciousness,  are  doubly  dependent' 
because  consciousness  is  itself  an  appearance  of  something 
beyond  it.  Objects,  then,  are  functions  of  functions,  appear- 
ances within  an  appearance.* 

Or  wo  might  proceed  the  other  way  about.  Finding  the  marks 
of  relativity  upon  both  consciousness  and  the  objects  appearing 
withm  it,  wc  would  be  compelled  to  assert  an  existence  beyond 
consciousness.  The  evidence  for  the  existence  of  relative  forms 
IS  necessarily  at  the  same  time  the  proof  of  an  existence  which 
IS  not  relative,  i.e.  of  the  Absolute.  The  idea  of  a  thing-in-itself 
i.-i  iiuii-spensable  for  one  who  does  not  wish  to  regard  his  sensuous 
presentations  as  groundless.*  This  thing-in-itself,  moreover, 
IS  quite  unknowable.    Through  the  phenomenon  of  presenta- 

'  ^Matter,"  Proceedings  of  the  Aristotelian  Society,  Vol.  II,  Part  I,  1891-2, 

•  Dcr  iihilosophiacke  Kriticiamm,  1879,  Vol.  II,  Part  I   p    18 
;/fc..  Part  II.  pp.  60-1.  •  76.,  Part  I,  p.  18. 

//' ,  Part  I,  pp.  18,  19;   Part  II,  pp.  28-9. 


HPW 


32 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  KNOWLEDGE 


tion  we  are  always  necessarily  separated  from  everything  as  it  is 
in  itself.' 

We  never  experience  or  know  the  physical  apart  from  the 
psychical,  nor  the  psychical  apart  from  the  physical.     Every 
relation  perceiveil  or  presupposed  among  things  is  primarily  a 
.elation  among  our  sensations.^    Indeed  the  thing,  as  we  know 
it,  is  a  constant  group  of  sensations.'     Physical  laws  are  funda- 
mentally laws  of  our  sense-e.xperience  —  not  mine  simply,  but 
ours ;  they  state  the  experientially  permanent  similar  conditions 
under  which  we  oi)tain  c(>rtain  sen.se-experiences.     They  give 
no  information  regarding  independent  reality,  for  our  flifferent 
sensations  are  not  signs  of  a  process  taking  place  in  the  thing-in- 
itself ;    they  are  signs  only  of  ouch  other.^     Process  and  place 
are  themselves  simply  phenomenal  and  relative.^     Atoms  are 
the  products  of  thought  abstracting  from  the  particular  con- 
ditions of  perception;   it  is  only  through  careless  thmking  that 
they  nre  regarded  as  things-in-themselves.«     Inde(>d,  although 
we  have  absolute  knowledge  that  the  thing-in-itseif  is,  we  are  left 
in  absolute  ignorance  of  what  it  is.     All  our  knowledge  of  prop- 
erties is  relative.      Properti(>s  are  dependent  upon  consciou.s- 
ness,  but  existence  is  not  dependent  upon  it ;    rather  is  con- 
sciousness dependent  upon  existen.  e.     Of  the  being  of  the  object, 
as  of  the  being  of  the  subject,  we  have  absolute  knowledge. 
Cogito  ergo  aum  et  est.     Rut  of  th(.  ol)j(.ct 's  being  object,  as  of  the 
subject's  being  subject,  our  knowledge  is  but  relative.' 

It  follows,  of  course,  that  Hiehl's  attitude  toward  science  o- 
the  one  side  and  metaphysics  on  the  other  is  what  migh     • 
described  as  critical  or  Kantian  positivism."*     Metaphysicf^     ; 
knowledge   of   ultimate   reality,   cannot    be   obtained"  by     ' 
methods  of  induction,  which  apply  to  pl.ciioniena  only.     There 
IS  no  place  for  metapiiysical  hypothi'.scs,  for  it  is  only  in  ex- 
perience that  hypotheses  can  be  verificul.     M.-taphvsical  knowl- 
edge, therefore,  can  come  only  through  pure  reason,  if  at  all. 
But  "n  examination  of  metaphysical  attempts  reveals  the  fact 
that  it  is  always  some  prominent  individual  characteristic  of 

^  Der  philosophischr  Khlicismun.  Pan  II,  p.  2<.).     ■  Ih     n   ,J0 
»;/,    n    n'  '/?...  Part  II.  ,„..  .«,  1.^1. 

lb.,  pp.  .30.  147.  150,  153.  297.  .  Cf.  op.  cU.,  Part  II.  p.  14!). 


■r-'^-'HiL' 


DCALrSM  AND  AVOWED  AGNOSTICISM 


33 


thought  or  of  experienced  reality  which  is  raised  to  the  status  of 
a  metaphysical  idea  and  made  all  dominant  in  the  system. 
Metaphysical  hypotheses,  therefore,  producing,  as  they  do,  the 
illusion  of  an  all-comprehensive  knowledge,  are  simply  opiates 
for  the  understanding.'  Metaphysical  systems  are  philosophi- 
ca.  romances ;  the  heart,  not  the  understanding,  is  their  special 
creator ;  they  belong  to  faith,  not  to  science.^  In  reality,  science 
and  a  vahd  theoretical  philosophy  are  one  and  the  same.'  In 
so  far  as  there  is  any  task  which  is  peculiarly  philosophical,  it  is 
tlic  winning  of  a  scientific  knowledge  of  scientific  knowledge 
itself.*  In  general,  the  philosophical  task  of  our  time  is  the 
elevation  of  science  itself  to  philosophy,  the  making  of  science 
philosophical  and  philosophy  scientific* 

Rich!  is  consistent,  as  we  have  admitted  ;  but,  in  assuming  a 
position  necessarily  agnostic,  he  is    undamentally  dogmatic. 
()l)vioiisly  agnosticism  is  not  to  be  accepted,  if  it  can  be  legiti- 
mately avoided  ;    and  Uiehl's  system,  however  interesting  and 
mstructive,  is  not  to  be  chosen  if  any  non-agnostic  realism 
eciually  or  more  tenable  can  be  discovered.     Moreover,  such 
assertions  as  that  the  objects  of  experience  are,  as  such,  de- 
pendent on  our  consciousness,"  and  that  things  are  constant 
groups  of  sensations,'  show  that  Riehl  is  driven  to  agnostic 
ivahsm  — as  a  substitute   for  subjective  idealism,   which  is 
undesirable,  and  for  a  r.^n-agnostic  realism,  which  is  unattain- 
able —  by  his  having  fallen  a  victim  to  the  fallacious  suggestion 
that  what  is  experienced  nuist  be  itself  experience,  that  what  is 
thought  about  can  it.self  be  nothing  but  thought.* 

Wiliieiin  Diithey,  although  making  room  for  a  philosophy 
•  •f  rcnhty,  n(>vertheless  occupies  essentially  the  same  agnostic 
pcsition  as  Riohl ;  all  theoretical  supports  of  metaphysical  con- 
struction are,  in  his  opinion,  worthless.  In  his  Einlcitung  in  die 
(■nsie.vnsscmchnften  he  indicates  his  negative  attitude  toward 
iiutaphysics,  which,  he  claims,  "does  not  overcome  the  rela- 

'  /'> ,  pp.  M-O. 
^    ^r>b,:r   wUi,u«cha/ttiche  und  nicht-wUsemchaftliche  PhUo-ophie,    1883,  pp. 

•  Ot  ,,hH.  Kril.,  Vol.  II,  Purt  11,  p.  120. 

•  I'tbrr  xiUsi-n'^ckafaichf.  ptr,,  p.  3«. 

'  Ihr  ,,hil.  Kril.,  Vol.  II,  Part  II.  p.  120 

•  /'- .  Part  I,  p.  18.  ,  /ft.,  p.  202.  .  Cf.  ,upra.  pp.  23-4. 


i  :w^fiHjr.'«'.iii'-,/ " 


34 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  KNOWLEDGE 


tivity  of  the  sphere  of  experience  "  and  "  the  subjectivity  of  the 
psychical  hfc."  >  "Epistemologyis  the  end  of  the  course  of 
nietaphysics,  ^  for  suroly  "no  one  can  even  want  to  know  how 
the  external  object  appears  when  no  one  takes  it  up  in  his  con- 
sciousness." ^  In  his  essay  entitled,  "Das  Wesen  der  Philoso- 
phic he  gives  to  philosophy  a  place  alongside  of  poetry  and 
religion  as  dealing  with  the  same  riddles  of  the  world  and  of 
life  Philosophy,  as  metaphysics,  differs  from  religion  and 
poetry,  m  that  it  attempts  to  raise  some  particular  world-view 
to  umversal  validity,«  but  its  task  is  insoluble.'    Individuality 

wT'"  rr'''  r""?'  r*'  ^'""''  "'«"™^^  ^^^  philosopher  as 
well  as  the  poet  and  the  religionist.^  Materialism,  objective 
Kieahsm,  and  the  uiealism  of  freedom  are  the  chief  forms  of  world- 

dHv :    r.rT  "'  '^r  '^  ''-""-^••-»^'-     A  restless  dialectic 
dm  s   he  thinker  on  from  one  of  these  views  to  the  other  >«     In 
the  end  only  a  personal,  heart-felt  conviction  remains  to  sun- 
pert  any  philosophical  system,-'  and  that  in  turn  is  largdy  d- 
ermined  by  the  system  of  culture  environing  the  individual  » 
When  fully  critical,  then,  philosophy  becomes  simply  wZn- 
schauungsehre    a  .iisciplme  which  is  essentially  aLn  To    the 
his  ory  of  philosophy,  and  whose  task  it  is  to  s  Jve  the  contra! 
diction  between  the  claim  of  philosophical  systems  to  unTverlal 
validity  and  the  endless  individualism  of  such  systems,  by  bring 
ing  to  ligh    the  relation  of  the  human  spirit  and  its  e;periences 
to  the  riddle  of  the  worid  and  of  life  "  ^ptnences 

J^^ZS  It', ''"'"'"""  '' '''  '^'^"'^'^  ^^"°«*-  opistemologi- 
ca  dualists,  then,  we  may  state  the  episte.nological  problem  as 

al7u:Us^''"t^''^'"^ 
in  the  I  2    f  ^  "^'l"*^•'^*•«"  ^^  «ha]l  have  to  consider  further 

n  the  light  of  a  critique  of  those  systems  which  claim  to  avoTd 
the  agnosticism  while  retaining  the  dualism."    If  it  should  tu^n 

'Pp.  513-14.  ,p  5,g 

*  Hie  Kullur  der  Gegenwart.  I   Part  VI  '  '  ^  ^^'■ 

•Pp.  5.5,  57.  rp  g,/  'P-35. 

•'Die  Typer.  eto..  p.  ,,0  u  p  '^^-^t  ."  ^u-'^  ^-ettanschauu.,,. 

"lb.,  pp.  37-0,  62.    See   Max   Fri^nh  •      '^"'.^^.''''"''' ^''ilosoplue.  p.  68. 

"  ("ha.  Ill  and  IV,  infra. 


I  ■ 


^rg^m-'^e. 


r^'^iwfr^'^v- 


DUALISM  AND  AVOWED  AGNOSTICISM  35 

out  that  agnosticism  is  necessarily  involved  in  the  dualism 
manifestly,  then,  the  dualism  itself  ought  not  to  be  accepted' 
provided  ,t  can  be  avoided  with  intellectual  honesty  and  without 
ho  necessity  of  a  still  more  undesirable  alternative.  The  prob- 
lem will  then  be  to  discover  some  better  alternative 


m 


CHAPTER    III 
Dualism  and  Attempted  Metaphysics 

Besides  the  followers  of  Kant  wlio,  liko  those  whose 
doctrines  we  have  examined  in  the  preceding  chapter,  frankly 
confess  the  af^nosticisni  which  seems  to  l)e  involved  in  the  epis- 
temolonicai  dualism,  and  those  others,  to  he  dealt  with  in  our 
critique  of  itlealism,  who  undertake  to  eliminate  the  agnosticism 
hy  cancellinR  the  thing-in-itself,  thus  denyinR  the  dualism  and 
at  the  same  time  the  realism,  tiiere  is  the  third  class  of  followers, 
who  seek  to  avoid  the  agnostic  conclusion  while  holding  on  to 
the  dualistic  premises.  .Although  assuming  that  we  never  have 
immediate  experience  of  any  reality  which  exists  independently, 
th'\y  maintain  that  the  thing-in-itself  is  not  entirely  beyond  our 
knowledge,  hut  that  we  are  in  a  position  to  know  not  only  that 
it  is,  hut  also  to  .'^ome  extent  irhdi  it  is.  This  group  may  he  sub- 
divided into  two  minor  groups.  In  one  of  these  would  be  in- 
cluded philosophers  who,  when  taken  either  individually,  or 
two  or  more  together,  represent  a  movei  lent  of  thought  begin- 
ning with  a  pronounced  realism  and  seeking  to  overcome  the 
agnosticism  of  dualism  by  proceeding  iti  th(>  direction  of  idealistic 
metaphysics.  On  the  other  hand  there  are  those  who  begin  by 
paying  their  respects  to  the  idealistic  side  of  the  Kantian 
thought,  but  then  proceed  to  develop  a  positive  doctriiie  of  the 
thing-in-itself  in  the  direction  of  non-idealistic  nietaphy.sics. 
Our  best  illustration  of  the  one  movement  will  be  found  in  the 
systems  of  Ilerbart  and  l.otze,  taken  together,  and  of  the  other 
either  in  the  transition  from  Schopenhauer  to  von  Hartmann  or 
in  that  from  Wundt  to  Kuelpe.  In  the  present  chapter  we  shall 
l)e  concerned  with  the  former  movement,  leaving  the  latter  to 
be  dealt  with  in  the  chapter  following. 

Before  entering  upon  our  examination  of  the  systems  of  Her- 
bart  and  Lotze  we  niiiy  refer  briefly  to  certain  thi!ikers  who, 
cither  in  their  criticism  or  in  their  further  development  of  the 


II 
•I 


"'^A  TWHa^-il-^^-^T  '('-SJF.:l' 


K'^'WHi^i»fyartJD»«i^r^nffB^;f%ii 


IJl  ALISM    AXD   ATTEMPTED    METAPHYSICS         37 

Katit  ian  realism,  seem  to  have  boon  fecliiiR  after  a  positive  knowl- 
<-ane  of  the  thiriK-iii-itself.     We  shall  si)eak  of  Jacohi,  Ueinhold, 
and  Fries.     Jaeohi  would  substitute  for  the  Kantian  theoretieal 
aitiiosticisni  and  claim  of  practical  knowledge  or  moral  faith 
with  refer<>nce  to  the  thins-in-itself,  a  speculative  fuitli  with 
reference  to  ultimate  reality.     H(>  was  the  first  to  attack  the 
Kantian  combination  of  realism  with  aKtiosticism.     Without  the 
realistic  postulate  of  a  causal  nexus  between  the  subject  and  a 
reality  beyond  experience,  one  could  not,  he  claimed,  enter  into 
the  Kantian  system;    but  if  one  were  to  develop  the  implica- 
tions of  that  idea  of  a  causal  nexus,  he  could  not  remain  a  Kan- 
tian.'    He  held  that  we  could  not  (Ictnonslrate  even  the  existence 
of  the  thiiiK-in-itself,  and  yet  he  regarded  it  as  a  .self-destructive 
course  to  will  to  believe  simply  what  one  needs  to  believe.     He 
advanced  the  view,  however,  that  through  a  faculty  which  at 
first  he  called  faith  as  oppo.sed  to  r(«ason,  and  later  rea.son  as 
oi)posed  to  the  understanding,  we  have  an  imnuMliate  conviction 
•  T  apprehension   of  the  suprasensible.     Formally  this   was  a 
repudiation  of  epistemological  dualism,  but   it   did  not  quite 
amount  lo  a  realistic  epistemological  monism.     Rational  faith 
nnght  be  assured  of  independent  reality,  but  the  understanding 
was  necessarily  sceptical;    and  what  was  claimed  was  not  an 
nuinediate  experience  of  ind(>pendent  reality,  but  an  immediate 
iniiviction   of  a   reality   forever   transcending   experience.     It 
amounted  to  little  more  than  a  dogmatic  declaration  of  faith. 

Heinhohrs  view  of  the  nature  of  consciousness  had  certain 
nalistic  implications  which  might  have  led  him  to  claim  positive 
kn..wledge  of  the  thing-in-it.self,  had  it  not  been  for  his  ac- 
«ci)tance  of  the  Kantian  account  of  the  "form"  and  "ma- 
t<'rials"  of  con.sciousness.  In  beginning  his  Vermch  einer 
>in„  n  Thcorlc  <lr.s  mcnscl'ichoi  Vnrslclluniisrcrmogem;-  he  claims 
•li.ii  since  l)ef,)r(-  we  canexpe<t  to  have  a  univer.sally  convincing 
i'l'iioM.phy  w(>  must  have  on(«  that  is  universally  valid,  there  is 
Mi(;t;,wt,wl  the  necessity  of  inquiring  how  universally  valid 
Iviinu ledge  is  p(.s.sible.  But  prior  to  answering  this  wo  must 
a>k  uitliin  what  limits  knowI(«dge  is  possible  at  all;  and  before 
^'•'swennsr  this  in  turn,  what  one  is  to  understand  by  knowing 
">M  th."  ability  to  know.''    This,  then,  is  the  most  fundamental 

'  iVuk,.  II,  Ml.  =1789.  .1  §§  1-5. 


•^mimmn^  -  smmhuwui 


38 


TUB   PItOBLE.M  «»F    KNOWLEDCE 


I'  i 


philosophical  problcnj,  ami  Roinhold     -..lution  of  it  is  offered 
as  "denu'iitary  philosophy."     ThL*  solution  is  to  the  effect 
that  knowi! ,:  is,  in  all  its  forms,  an  activity  of  a  suhjct  with 
rofercnco  to  an  ol.jcct,  a  presi^ntation  or  representation,  which, 
as  an  activity,  is  to  he  distinguishe-l  from  the  represent ing  sub- 
ject and  the  represented  object.'     The  Kantian  ".sensibility  " 
"understandinR,"  and  "rea.son"  are  to  Ix-  interpreted  ha  variant 
forms  of   this  representation   of  an   olgective  realiiv   by   an 
equally    real    subject.'     But    thl<    prt,nusinK    beginning    wa.s 
hindereil  from  becoming  a  |K>sitive  or  non-agnostic  realism  by 
Reinhold's  acceptance  of  the  Kantian  vi.-w  of  the  subjective 
origin  of  the  "form,"  or  "primary-  quahties"  of  objects,  and  the 
objective  origin  of  their  senstMnatenaL<,  or  ".secondary  quali- 
ties." i     Since  the  .subject  with  its  fonns  cannot  produce  the 
matter  of  the  representation  of  the  object,  ther(>  must  be  the 
so-called    thing-in-it.self   to   account    for    that    .sense-material. 
Thisthing-in-it.self,  however,  iH'ing  simply  the  cmmoi  thedataof 
sense,  is  no  more  representable  than  i<  the  rej)resenting  subject 
it.self.^     But  that  Reinhold  hims«.lf  was  not  .satisfied  with  thi.s 
agnostic  conclusion  is  shown  by  his  later  adherence  to  the  sub- 
jective idealism  of  Fichte,  then  to  Jacobi's  combination  of  epis- 
temological  dualism  with  dogmatic  n-alism,  and  finallv  to  the 
dogmatic,  rationalistic  realism  of  Banlih,  who  claimed  that  the 
i  iws  of  nature  on  t!ie  one  han.l  and  the  laws  of  the  a.s.sociation  of 
leas  in  man's  logical  thinking  on  the  other,  are  the  necessarily 
correspomliug  manifestations  of  the  one  Abs<ilute  Uea.son  which 
1.S  fun.lamental  to  both  the  objective  world  and  the  consciousness 
of  man. 

J.  F.  Fri(>s  is  another  of  th.>  earlier  followers  of  Kant  who 
might  have  d(>veloped  a  i>ositive  or  non-agnostic  critical  realism 
if  It  had  not  been  for  an  inheritiHl  element  in  his  philosophic-d' 
cr(«ed  which  made  such  an  issue  impossible.  He  adopted  the 
rationalistic  Kantian  and  pre-Kantian  dwtrine  of  a  non-intuitive 
an«l  yet  unniediatod,  and,  therefort^.  supposedlv,  absolutely 
a  pnon  vU-mvnt  in  all  our  knowknlge.  For  example,  one  knows 
a  prion  and  with  absolute  certainty  that  every  change  must 
have  a  cau.se;  this  is  not  an  intellectual  intuition,  l)ecause  it 
docs  not  come  explicitly  to  consciousness  without  reflection; 

'5  7.  «  S5  9-U.  48.  67.  77.  '  II  Ix  16,  lS-20.  4517. 


DUALISM  AND  ATTEMPTED  METAPHYSICS         39 

and  yet  the  knowlorlge  does  not  oriRinate  out  of  the  reflective 
pn.(rs,s.'  But  while  uRreeinK  with  Kant  that  such  knowIedRc 
IS  a  pnon,  Fr.es  differe<l  fron,  his  ,na.ster  in  nmintainin^  that 
these  «  pnon  orn.s  .-ouid  ...  discovered  only  a  posterion,  by 
psyeholoRical  observation  and  abstraction,  resulting  in  the  for- 
...anon  of  concepts  corresponding  to  the  a  priori  forms  of  ab- 
solute y  certain  knowledge.  Here  spaco  and  tin.e  are  included 
as  well  as  substance,  cause,  and  the  other  categories  of  Kant's 
ll^t.  Thus  the  true  critique  of  reason  would  be  one  of  the  em- 
ZrH^^frr'^  T  "^  '""''■  ""thropologj..^    As  against  the 

n       TIT"     T"""''  "^"  '"''^  '^''''  '^'  -•^'^"'^  "f  reason 
nus    not  lx»  made  an  empirical  science,  for  the  reason  that 

Nah.lity  can  be  guaranteed  only  to  the  empirical  sciences  by 

...cans  of  the  critique  of  reason.  Fries  objected  that  the  question 

aj,    o  the  possibility  of  knowledge  was  not  a  proper  theme  for 

an>     heory  or  discu.ssion  whatsoever.     The  supreme  principle 

;; Ltifrr? .  "'"""  ^"^'*^"^'"''  ^^*  ^•'"•"^^^j-  ^^  that  of 

th(  .self-trust  of  human  reason  ;    this  is  involved  in  the  critique 
t    rea.son  as  necessarily  as  in  any  other  scientific  investigation  » 

"m  !•; '  ";  "PP*^^'*'«"  ^«  Kant,  Fries  held  that  the  objective 
validity  of  experience  cannot  be  proved;  we  must  use  certain 
categories,  but  there  ,s  no  way  of  showing  further  that  we  are 
justified  in  doing  this.     He  agrees  with  Kant,  however    that 

u...an  knowledge  i.s  never  transcendent,  but'  alwa/s  purely 

""..anent,   empmcal.     We  have  no  knowledge  of  anything 

.oyond  the  sensible ;  the  a  priori  forms  are  simply  imposed  upon 

the  sense-material,  and  if  reality  is  known  at  all,  t  is  only  as  it^s 

,::.;;:  "T ^  '^'''T''-     ^^"^•^  -^^  '^^^^'y  ^^e  agreemenl  : 

n>    ate  or  discursive  knowledge  with  that  of  immediate  per- 

Pt.on,    ,t  IS  not  agreement  of  our  mediate  knowledge  with 

xi^tencc     Our  spatial,  temporal,  and  causal  concepts  give  us 

">  compoted  series;    we  never  transcend  the  relative  and 

I"     l.u.g-in-itself  IS  not  known.     Nor  are  we  to  seek  refuge  in 
I"-  -1  postulates;   the  primacy  of  the  practical  reason  Tnot 

uofM-r  das  Vprhaltnis."  etr    nn   IT-l-r.   l«i      <-»  m  i  .. 

«'fc.  })  89,  131.     Cf.  Nelson,  op.  cil.,  %\  158,  1C3,  165. 


BFKl 


40 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  KNOWLEDGE 


given  i..  sense-experience,  and  is  therefore  no  part  of  our  knowl- 
edge.* 

But  while  Kant  held  that  the  thing-in-itself  iss  simply  the  ob- 
ject of  a  necessary  question,  unknowable  save  as  wt  are  enal)led 
to  postulate  certain  l)eliefs  on  practical  grounds,  Fries  main- 
tained that  we  have  an  assured  speculative  faith  as  to  its  exist- 
ence. What  it  is,  however,  we  can  only  describ(>  in  negative 
terms.  By  negating  the  positive  categories  involved  in  our 
knowledge  of  tlie  finite,  we  arrive  at  as  many  negative  ideas  as 
there  are  positive  categories;  and  taking  all  these  together, 
we  get  the  purely  negative  idea  of  the  unlimited,  the  infinite. 
Thus,  by  simply  conceiving  the  limits  of  our  knowledge  of 
reality  transcended,  or,  in  other  words,  l)y  thinking  of  reality 
(which  we  know  under  the  necessary  limitations  impo.sed  by 
our  exix'rience)  as  w(>  do  not  know  it,  viz.  as  an  absolute  totality, 
we  arrive  at  our  speculative  faith  in  the  existence  of  the  Abso- 
lute, or  Thing-in-it.self.'- 

But  while  the  sensible  is  the  object  of  knowledge,  and  the 
suprasensible  the  object  of  faith,  Fries  adds  that  we  have  a 
feeling,  or  presentiment  (Ahndung),  of  the  manifestation  of  the 
suprasensible  in  the  sensible.  This  pn  ;';«timent  is  present  in 
both  the  aesthetic  ami  the  religious  consciousness  ;  the  beautiful 
and  the  adorable  are  taken  as  a  n-velation  of  the  infinite  in 
the  finite.  It  must  not  l)e  concluded,  however,  that  the  lan- 
guage of  art  or  of  religion  can  ever  i)e  literally  true  of  the  ,\b- 
solute.  It  is  mere  .symbol,  figure  of  speech  ;  it  describes  the 
suprasensii)le  in  terms  of  tiie  sensible.  To  regard  this  as  knowl- 
edge is  to  construct  a  mythology.  And  yet  it  is  one  and  the 
same  reality  which  is  known  by  science  as  the  finite  world  of 
phenomena,  truly  thought  of  by  speculative  faitii  as  in  itself 
unlimited  and  therefore  not  positively  conceivable,  and  repre- 
sented Htjmholicfdhj  by  religion  and  art  as  if  it  were  an  object  of 
sensuous  experience.' 

Thephilo.sophyof  Fries  thus  turnsout  to  be  thoroughly  agnostic 
with  reference  to  independent  reality.     We  cannot  even  know, 

'  Seuv  Kritik:  ||  123,  129;  Wissen,  Glaube  u-kI  Ahndung,  pp.  07  ff.,  72  ff., 
15o  ff.,   104  f.      (f.  .Ni'l.-son.  op.  cit..  §  UM-,'i. 

'  .Vcuc  Kritik,  55  123,  124,  129;    H'issen,  Glaube  und  Ahiidung,  passim. 
•  Olaubi',  W'issen  und  Ahndung. 


h    I 


DUALISM  AND  ATTEMPTED  METAPHYSICS        41 

althouRh  we  do  undoubtedly  fjelieve,  that  this  Absolute  exists. 
The  remedy  for  this  agnostic  conclusion  might  have  been  found 
in  a  certain  departure  from  the  presuppositions,  as  well  as  from 
the  method,  of  Kant      We  have  no  quarrel  with  Fries  for  using 
th,.  empirical  method  in  stH>king  to  discover  the  a  priori  element 
m  human  knowledge;  our  objection  is  to  the  presupposition  of 
both  Kan    and  Fries  that  it  is  absolutely  a  priori,  that  neither 
in  the  individual  nor  in  the  race  has  it  come  to  be  what  it  is 
VIZ.  relalircly  „  priori,  as  a  result  of  past  experience.     It  would 
n..t  h<-lp  to  suppose  that  the  a  priori  forms  had  l^een  passively 
received  by  man  from  without;  but  if  the.se  forms  of  cognition 
by  the  human  subject  have  been  actively  moulded  upon  the  in- 
<iqH.ndent  reality  of  the  environment,  their  value  for  the  knowl- 
c'lW  of  that  reality  can  be  maintained.     The  further  develop- 
ment of  this  view  belongs,  however,  to  later  chapters; '  all  we 
are  here  interested  to  maintain  is  that  every  absolute  apriorism 
of  the  (•ategor.es,  when  combined  with  a  critical  rather  than  a 
dogmatic  attitude,  lea.ls  to  agnosticism,  just  as  inevitably  as 

nl"       r     1  .^/•^•'^'!^"  ""P'""«"".  with  its  notion  of  the  complete 
pa.s.sivity  of  the  nund  m  perception.* 

A.M.mg  the  early  disciples  of  Fries  were  Schleiden,  Apelt 
and  the  theologian,  DeWette.  At  the  present  time  a  n^^ 
worthy  attempt  is  being  made,  under  the  leadership  of  Leonard 
,]:  ""^  ,^«^«"'K^n.  to  revive  the  Fricsian  philosophy.  Nel- 
son differs  from  his  chosen  master  chiefly  in  his  understanding 
•'f  the  nature  of  the  reflective  process  through  which  the  a 
pnon  elements  in  human  knowledge  are  discovered.  What  he 
ol.jocts  to  IS  the  description  of  reflection  as  a  sort  of  self-observa- 
t'on,  or  inner  experience,  by  means  of  which  intuitive  knowledge 
-s  repeated,  or  originally  obscure  consciousness  brought  to  light 
He  claims  that  Fries  virtually  reasons  that  since  we  first  be- 
|-'.H'  aware  of  our  knowledge  through  inner  perception,  we 
-mist  therefore  proceed  psychologically  in  philosophy.     Strictly 

•VIV  iiiKl  XVI,    nfra. 


:2a'^ua.- 


if-tM 


^rr. 


s^ 


f    f 


K— _ 


42 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  KN'OWLEDOB 


interpreted,  this  would  not  only  makn  metaphysics  as  w  as 
criticism  purely  psychological,  it  \vi«  <i  oven  nuke  cr  icism 
itself  unnecrssury.  True  and  false  judgments,  critical  and 
dogmatic  iiss«'rt ions,  are  all  iilil-  p-ychological.  According  to 
Nelson  the  process  of  investigat  ii  whereby  the  general  a  prinri 
demerit  in  particular  act  "f  k.iii.wle<Ige  is  diseoven  d,  while 
empirical  and  inductive,  :i.<  Frie«  mar  tams,  is  fun^'  "ertally 
logical  rather  than  purely  psychological  in  its  character,  'i 
this  way  he  would  underti' '  to  restore  soiiiethinir  of  the  Kanti,  n 
t.-aus(  aderitali.siii,  thus  to  n'lieve  the  Frit  sian  -iticism  i>f  its 
undue  psyihnlogisin.  It  is  a  i  Mlif'cation  ia  the  realistic 
direction,  a  securing  of  thi^  episteiuological  dimhsiu  of  the  sys- 
leni.as  distinguished  from  all  foim-^of  idealistic  epi-<temo1og'fal 
monism. 

Tills  Jac<>i)i,  Reinhold,  r-nd  Fries,  each  by  a  diffr     nt  jiMih, 
sousiht  escaiH?  fi'>n'  the  Kantian  agnostic  dualism       !"hey  al' 
set  out  in  the  dii;  'tion  of  a  positive    ir  non->anosi      reali;- 
whereby  it  inn.dit  b<  maintained  tl    \  kno\      dg.   of  inuep«'nde  it 
reality  is  jwssibl'        *  l'''y  all  failed    o  reach  then       d,  how  wr ; 
they  (oncided  t(»<i  lu  kI    to  Kant   at     he  outh-       an''   m  ta- 
physicai   ienosti(  i-ni  diiKS  to  them  stiil  at  their  ^.iurne       end. 
We  now  Mirn  to  t'lc  typical  reim'sentai:       of  th"  oi<ter       iical 
realism,  J.  F.  Hi     art.     While  ret.iinii  s 
niolojiical    dualism    of    ,'ii)pearance   an<l 
and  'hinji-in-itsi  If,  Herl)art  e'.ainied  to 
indeix'n'iriit  reality,  thu- relievinr  thea^; 
critical  philosophy.     Whereas  K    it  had 
gulf  between  ai>pearanc(    and  r     iity  < 
moral  consciousness,  and  Jacobi       I  I 
f)f  .speculatirr  faith,  Herbart  I         'I'li  t' 
of  the  thing-in-itself.  on  the  li;     -  of  a  ratioria!      iticism  of 
empirical  knowledge  of  phenom  tia.     His  nut    d,  he  in.-^i^ 
is  simply  to  follow  out  more  tli      uglily  the  i  ocedure  of  i 
natural  scier.  es,  correcting  the  co     ■■adictor\'  ''haracter  of  what 
is  cxperienc    *  by  positing,  back  oi  phenonu     '■  a  reality  which 


the  i\an    an  episte 
i'ality,    phenomenoi 
s  froiN  experience  t( 
H'  of  t,     earlier 

a.    'n   to  cr>        the 

/  iti  the 

or        ther 

ifculatii  ■:    '-  nowU< '  W 


is  itself  fre( 
still  conten 
antinomic 
9,nd  mul< 


•m  contradiction. 
.  worK  with  '"orn 
-fHight   we  n 
it       f  attribute    in 


Rut  V  her<       the  sciences  are 

nd  ies  that  lead  to 

ir    '<      )ace,  time,  change, 

.:icc,  as  involved  in 


,'M't  If'nt  and  in       incptif  '     ro 
((Uiifitv  an(i  PXi-^ring  i  i  chtiij^c; 


f+T 


111  , 

K-ar 


DflALlHM  AND  ATTP^MJTED    METAPHYSICS         43 

contracfiction  uiid  thus  shov     to  be  ultimately  unreal.     Phenom- 

'^l  snacf-  and   time,  it  i,i,,y  \^  arRucd,  are  both  finite  and 

fiiH!.  ,  ohuHKo  and  multipl    ity  of  ;,  tributes  involve  the  asser- 

iioi.  that  'x  thing   -an  be  uliui  it  is   lot.     Reality  must  therefore 

he    tiouftrit  of  as   iiadc  up  of  a  lame  numlxT  of  absolutely  inde- 

IwiuRs,  each  havinf?  but  one 

•  '  xternal  relations  in  an  "iri- 

le"        '-       as  distinguished   from  the  spatial-temporal 

.     pbuuniena.     What  appear    to  us  as  a  substanee  with 

•  luahtK    ...  in  reality  a  combi.    tion  of  many  independent 

H-.>        .nc  quii'ity  apiece.  t  seems  to  f>e  a  change 

•ar  n  r(       y  but  a  cha,        a  the  external  relations 

he'        e  no  rclati..!     mternal  to,  or  l>elonRing 

of,  ai        :bstance.     Coitinuity  is  but  a  false  ar^ 

ot    the  etei      iiy  and  absolutely  disc.ete.       One  <,f 

.dependent  "re  ils"  is  the  individual  human  soul      St-n- 

satioiis  and  other  "Vorstellun^ren"      e  the  forms  of  its  apjx-ar. 

ance  as  it  maintains  itself  in  its  ch     irinc  relations  with  nther 

real  beings.     The  soul  is  not  to  b< 

which  psychology  deals ;  this  la 

lore  a  result,  of  ti=  tse  represen 

product  of  the  soul.' 

But  apart  from  the  assertion  o: 

Kinging  essence,  and  changing  ro! 

ith  reference  to  independent  real, 

i.als  exist,  he  claims,   because  appearances  exist,  and  there 

cannot  be  appearances  without  there  being  something  which 

appears.     But  what  the  peculiar  quality  of  any  one  of  these  in- 

d.-pen.lent  reals  is,  we  arc  never  able  to  say.     Even  of  .he  soul 

all  we  know  IS  M.  h  it  is  one  of  the  indepen.len-  reals;  we  have 

ii..  knowledge  of  what  it  is  in  distinction  from  any  of  er  Innm 

Hut  o,.e  may  go  further-  and  say  that  even  this  slight  escape 

t.o.n  the  agnosticism  of  epistemological  dualism  is  it.self  a  mere 

-I.jX'arance,  and  not  reality.     As  has  been  often  remarked   the 

^dependent  reals  are  mere  products  of  abstraction  from  all 

i 'articular  qualities  of  phenomenal  objects,  and  as  such  residues 


nt  ned  with  the  ego  with 
•mbination,  and  there- 
ich  are  themselves  the 

hty,  simplicity,  un- 

Herbart  is  agnostic 

\Vc  know  that  these 


trarrion  vv,.  have  no  sujficient  reason   to  affirm   their 

Hauplpunkle  de-  Metcvhyaik;    AUoemeine 


'  EiuUituno  in  die  Philosophic 

•'tctajikynik. 


44 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  KNOWLEDGE 


I  ^  [I 


reality.  Horbart's  metaphysics,  in  view  of  his  admission  that 
we  have  no  direct  experience  of  reality,  is  simply  a  return  to  the 
rationalistic  dogmatism  of  the  eighteenth  century.  If  we  never 
have  any  direct  experience  of  a  reality  which  exists  indepen- 
dently of  our  experience  of  it,  we  have  no  means  of  verifying  our 
speculations  concerning  the  thing-in-itself.  To  eliminate  con- 
tradiction from  our  speculations  is  only  to  establish  hypothetical 
possibility,  not  actuality.  Any  theory  that  enters  not  in 
through  the  door  of  a  bona  fide  experience  of  reality,  but  climbs 
up  some  purely  speculative  way,  is  a  thief  and  a  robber  when  it 
takes  to  itself  the  name  of  knowledge.  We  said  that  Herbart's 
apparent  escape  from  agnosticism  was  very  limited ;  we  may 
now  say  that,  in  view  of  his  initial  absolute  duali.sm  of  reality 
and  appearance,  he  makes  no  legitimate  escape  from  agnosticism 
at  all. 

R.  H.  Lotze  will  lie  mentioned  in  another  connection  as  illus- 
trating the  transition  from  monistic  absolute  idealism  to  pluralis- 
tic personal  idealism.  But  his  fundamental  position  in  epis- 
temology  is  dualistic  realism.  His  main  philosophical  interest, 
however,  seems  to  have  l)een  metaphj'sical  rather  than  episte- 
mological.  He  is  not  concerned  to  dispute  the  main  features 
of  the  critical  philosophy,  but  he  does  not  think  it  necessary  that 
wc  should  undertake  a  critique  of  human  reason  before  venturing 
to  use  our  rational  powers  in  the  attempt  to  discover  the  nature 
of  reality.  Broadly  speaking,  his  assumptions,  his  purpose, 
and  his  method  are  those  of  Herlnirt.  Dissatisfied  with  Her- 
bart's results,  especially  with  his  valueless  view  of  existence, 
Lotze  would  do  the  work  over  again.  He  endeavors  to  overcome, 
more  fully  than  his  predecessor  was  able  to  do,  the  agnosticism 
of  episteniological  dualism,  and  at  the  some  time  to  provide 
in  his  world-view  for  the  preservation  of  the  values  of  the  spir- 
itual life.  His  method  is  neither  deduction  from  o  set  of  first 
principles,  nor  mere  empirical  investigation,  nor  even  the  formal 
adfiptioii  of  the  dialectical  procedure.  He  starts  with  the 
realism  of  the  plain  man,  revised  by  the  sciences,  and  under- 
takes by  the  method  of  first  criticising  fundam(>ntal  concepts 
and  eliminating  contradictions,  and  then  offering  analogies 
drawn  from  personal  life  as  flic  only  way  of  escape  from  agnosti- 
cism, to  "ascertain  the  impalpable  real  basis  of  the  possibility 


DUALISM  AND  ATTEMPTED   METAPHYSICS         45 

of  all  phenomena,  and  of  the  necessity  of  their  concatenation  " ' 
Our  present  interest  in  his  thought  will  centre  in  the  question 
to  what  extent  he  has  succeeded  where  Herbart  failed,  in  the 
endeavor  toavoid  th(>  besetting  agnosticism  of  absolute  ep'istemo- 
Ingical  dualism  and  to  attain  to  a  genuine  knowledge  of  the 
ii;ittne  of  reality. 

He  I)egins  by  investigating  what  we  mean  when  we  say  that 
t lungs  are.     In  opposition   to  Berkeley  he  takes  the  realistic 
view :   to  be  docs  not  mean  to  be  perceived ;   on  the  contrary 
It  means  to  exist  independently  of  the  knowing  relation.     But  in 
opF)osition  to  what  he  understands  to  be  the  contention  of  the 
M-alist  H..rbart,  he  insists  that  to  be  does  not  mean  to  exist 
m<lep..nd(.ntly  of  all  relations.     A  thing  which  neither  exists 
in  any  place  nor  at  any  time,  and  which  neither  does  nor  suffers 
anytinng,  ,s  as  if  it  were  not.     To  be  does  not  mean  to  stand 
HI  the  particular  n-lation  of  being  perceived,  but  it  does  mean 
to  stand  in  relations.^     In  opposition  to  Herbart,  again,  a  thing 
IS  not  u,  be  Identified  with  a  single  quality,  any  more  than  with 
a  sum  of  percen,  .1  .juMlities.     Qualities  are  a^scribed  to  things 
and   when   we   say  that   a  thing  some  of  whose   perceptible 
qiia  itics  have  changed  is  still  the  same  thing,  this  is  not    as 
Herbart    maintains,    a    self-contradiction;     hoivever    it    may 
acccntuat..  our  problem,  it  must  be  acknowledged  that  a  thing 
»i  a  ..mty  m  multiplicity,  a  permanent  identitv  of  e.s.sence  in 
th.>  midst  of  the  changing  qualities.'    Still,  we  must  not,  with 
Hcrl)art,  adopt  the  substantive  conception  of  the  Real  pure 
an.i  simple.     Real  is  an  adjectival  conception,  a  title  belonging 
to  everything  that  changes  in  a  regular  order.     Reality  is 
Hinply  a  form  in  which  content  actually  exists ;  it  can  be  nothing 
apart  from  content.     The  es.sence  of  the  thing  is  only  to  be 
'"'""I  in  a  law  according  to  which  its  changeable  states  are  con- 
-"■'•ted  with  each  other.     What  is  meant  is  not  a  general  law 
nor  yet  a  merely  coneeived  unity  ;  it  is  a  real  and  individual  law 
"I  a  s,.ries  of  phenomenal  changes.^    Thus  in  avoiding  the  ab- 
siractness  of  the  Herbartian  realism  Lotze  seems  on  the  verge 
"t  ahandomng  the  realistic  position  altogether. 
Mut  he  quickly  recovers  himself  and  begins  to  move  definitely 


'  ^trt<l|,hl/l,)cs.  Eng.  Tr.,  Vol.  I    p    12 
'  ll>;  §§  15-30. 


'  MrlnphuKica,  §§  1-J4 
*lb.,  JI31-0. 


46 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  KNOWLEDGE 


in  the  direction  of  spiritual  realism.  As  against  Herbarfs 
explanation  of  identity  in  the  midst  of  change  by  the  theory  or 
unalterable  elements  in  fluctuating  external  relations,  Lolze's 
view  is  that  being  is  itself  but  a  particular  form  of  becoming. 
But  if,  on  the  one  hand,  to  be  is  to  stand  in  relations,  so  that 
a  change  in  relations  means  a  change  in  the  thin-  itself;  and  if, 
on  the  other  hand,  to  be  is  to  change  in  a  definite  and' orderly 
fashion,  It  may  be  concluded  that,  if  there  are  any  existing  things 
at  all,  the  mutual  relations  in  which  they  have  their  being  are 
relations  in  orderly  correspondence  with  changes  in  other  things. 
But  since  for  becoming  the  only  sufficient  reason  is  an  efficient 
cause,  It  may  be  concluded  that  to  be,  to  stand  in  relations,  to 
change  in  orderly  correspondence  with  changes  in  other  things, 
is  to  exchange  actions.' 

^ut  "transeunt "  action,  this  interchange  of  actions  between 
independnit  things,  presents  difficulties  for  critical  thought 
and  in  the  face  of  these  difficulties  a  further  transformation 
of  the  common  view  is  suggested.     It  is  inconceivable  that  a 
state  or  event  should  detach  itself  from  one  thing,  make  its  way 
independently   to   another   thing   and   enter   into   it.*     "Im- 
manent" action,  however,  cannot  be  denied;   in  experience  of 
our  own  development  we  have  indisputable  evidence  *':;it  in 
one  and  the  same  being  the  reality  of  one  state  is  the  condcion 
of  the  realization  of  another.     May  it  not  be  that  what  appears 
to  be  transeunt  action  is  in  reality  immanent,  that  instead  of  a 
multiplicity  of  independent  things,  all  elements  are  parts  of  a 
single  real  Being?     In  view  of  the  contradiction  involved  in 
holding  that  Independent  beings  can  be  influenced  bv.  and  thus 
dependent  upon,  each  other,  this  transition  from  pluralism  to 
monism  is  set  forth  as  the  only  rational  possibility  for  our 
thought.     All  individual  beings  are  included  in  an  Absolute 
Being,  and  only  thus  are  they  able  to  act  upon  each  oth-   ' 
Now  the.se  individual  things,  it  will  be  remembered,  were  t\,uh  ' 
to  be  in  continuous  becoming,  and  yet  to  preserve  their  u    -•, 
and  identity  throughout  the  whole  process.     But  in  experien. 
we  find  but  one  being,  "the  spiritual  subject,  which  exercises 
the  wonderful  function  not  merely  of  distinguishing  sensations 
ideas,  feelings  from  itself,  but  at  the  same  time  of  knowing  them 

'  M,taphyn»,  §}  W-i,  44-5.  «  76.,  §§  55-0.  >  /6..  \\  68-71,  81. 


w-mmm. 


DUALISM  AND  ATTEMPTED  METAPHYSICS         47 

as  its  own,  as  its  states,  and  which  by  means  of  its  own  unity 
coniuH-ts  the  series  of  successive  events  in  the  compass  of 
memory. "     Hence  "if  there  are  to  be  things  with  the  properties 
w(>  (lo.nand  of  things,  they  must  be  more  than  things 
They  can  only  be  unities  if  they  oppose  themselves,  as  such  to 
the  multiplicity  of  their  states."    Two  points  are  essential, 
one,  the  existence  of  spiritual  beings  like  ourselves  .  .      feeling 
f  h,-.r  states  and  opposing  themselves  to  those  states  as  the  unity 
that  foe  s,  ...  the  other,  the  unity  of  that  Being  in  which 
these  subjects  in  turn  have  the  ground  of  their  existence,  the 
source  of  their  peculiar  nature,  and  which  is  the  true  activity 
u(  work  m  them."    Any  world  of  things  over  and  above  this  it 
IS  not  necessary  to  assume.'     Ultimately  this  one  Being  is  in- 
erpreted,  on  the  basis  of  the  analogy  of  the  human  spirit,  as 
the  personal  God  who  constantly  creates  the  mechanical  pro- 
cesses of  .\ature  for  the  realization  of  his  purposes  ^ 

Lotze's  philosophy  has  gained  many  friends,  but  more,  one 
suspects,  for  the  spiritually  satisfactory  character  of  the  results 
at  which  he  supposed  him.self  to  have  arrived  than  for  the  really 
conclusive  character  of  the  proces.ses  of  his  thought.     He  con- 
l-ded  too  much  to  Kant  ever  to  be  able  to  make  much  progress 
•"me  aphysics.   Space  is  regarded  as  purely  subjective,  a  per- 
ceived rela  ion  of  which  the  cause  is  a  changeable  "  intelligible  " 
-btit    unknowable -relation    existing    between    reahties.' 
pents  which  occur  in  the  non-spatial  real  world  cause  sensa- 
.ons  which  we  construct  into  the  purely  subjective  and  there- 
fore unreal  spatial  world,  which  is  the  only  world  directly  acces- 
s  hie  to  us.^     The  problem  then  is,  how  to  learn  the  nature  of 
tleal  world,  from  which  we  are  shut  off  by  spatial  phenomena. 
Tune  u  mustJ,e  admitted,  is  treated  with  more  respect;  while 
-  H';^.-  "f  the  totality  of  empty  time  is  regarded  as  only  a 
^^^a^i^'"'       apprehension,  there  is  a  real  succession  in- 
lv(d  in  the  operation  which  is  of  the  very  essence  of  reahty.» 
^ut    the  completely  human  subjectivity  of  all  our  knowledge" 
mT    "'"  "."^^'^i^^';!^.  i"  view  of  the  fact  that  no  mind 
uh>..h  dees  not  include  all  reality  within  itself  can  ever  gain  "a 

'  "':  ii  96-7. 


48 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  KNOWLEDOE 


It  tf 


view  of  the  objects  of  its  knowledge  as  they  would  seem  if  it 
did  not  see  them."  Our  only  refuge  is  the  confidence  of  Reason 
in  itself,  or  the  belief  that  the  all-inclusive  Reality  "has  given 
our  spirit  only  such  necessiti(>s  of  thought  as  harmonize  with  the 
world."  '  Thu>;,  like  many  another  before  him,  Lotze  has 
recourse  to  rationalistic  dogmatism  to  avoid  the  agnosticism 
logically  involv(>(l  in  epistemological  dualism ;  only,  in  this 
ca.se  what  is  claimed  is  not  that  we  know  reality  as  it  is,  but  only, 
in  effect,  that  we  do  not  know  that  what  we  have  is  not  knowl- 
edge. .\lthou,[!;h  we  can  never  know  that  we  have  knowledge 
of  an  independent  reality  which  we  never  directly  experience, 
we  can  nev-crtheless  trust  —  for  this  is  what  Lotze  seems  to 
mean  —  that  what  we  have,  and  call  our  "knowledge,"  is  either 
knowledge  or  a  satisfactory  sul)stitute  for  it.  The  fundamental 
agnosticism  of  Lotze's  position  becomes  I'vident  when  we 
examine  the  way  he  interprets  the  nature  o^  things  and  of  the 
World-CJround  by  falling  back  upon  analogy.  Assuming  that 
we  have  knowlculge  <.f  ourselves  as  spirit,  he  claims  that  we 
cannot  know  what  reality  is,  unless  we  interpret  it  as  essentially 
spirit.  What  this  means,  evidently,  is  that  we  a'-e  offered  as 
alternatives  spiritualism  and  agnosticism,  the  choice  between 
them  being  not  rationally  determined,  but  left  aibitrary.  But 
if  we  must  choose  between  spiritualism  and  agnosticism,  and 
u'e  can  not  know  which  we  niu.st  choose  in  order  to  have  the  truth, 
we  cannot  know,  manifestly,  what  reality  is.  To  leave  as  ulti- 
mate alternatives  agnostici.sm  and  any  other  position  whatso- 
ever is  to  give  the  victory  to  agnosticism. 

But  the  weakness  of  Lotze's  argument  at  this  crucial  point 
is  but  symptomatic  of  further  disorders  in  his  philosophical 
system.  Indeed  one  finds  thai  the  transitions  of  thought  upon 
which  his  argument  chiefly  depends  are  by  no  means  rationally 
necessary.  Let  us  begin  with  his  criticism  of  Herbart's  view  of 
independent  Reals.  This  he  condemns  as  self-contradictory, 
on  the  ground  that  independence  means  absence  of  all  relations, 
whereas  Herbart,  as  he  proceeds,  has  to  speak  of  the  Reals  as 
related  in  some  ways  to  each  other.  But  what  Herbart  means 
by  independence  was  surely  not  the  absence  of  all  relations, 
but  simply  the  lack  of  dependence  for  existence  upon  anything 

'  Metaphysics,  §  94. 


DUALISM  AND  ATTEMPTED  METAPHYSICS         49 

else.  Lotze's  criticism  is  valid  only  on  the  assumption  that  for 
anything  to  he  in  any  relation  is  for  that  thing  to  depend  upon 
that  relation  for  its  own  essential  nature;  or,  in  other  words, 
that  for  anything  to  be  in  any  relation  is  always  for  that  relation 
to  be  in  it.  This  doctrine  of  the  necessary  internality  of  re- 
lations, like  the  closely  related  proposition  upon  which  so  much 
is  made  to  hinge,  viz. :  "To  be  is  to  stand  in  relations,"  Lotze 
liiinself  as.sumes  upon  no  other  liasis,  apparently,  than  the  mere 
fact  that,  if  there  are  more  things  than  one,  all  things  must 
stand  in  some  relation  to  each  other.  Where  existence  is  plural, 
to  be  manifestly  involves  standing  in  relations;  but  this  does 
not  mean  that  "standing  in  relations"  is  an  adequate  definition 
of  lieing.  Furthermore,  while  what  a  thing  is  sometimes  does 
depend  to  some  extent  upon  some  particular  relation  in  which 
it  stands,  there  are  cases  where  it  does  not  so  depend.  Whether 
it  does  or  not  is  determined  by  the  practical  purpose  back  of 
the  (luestion.  If  the  relation  makes  a  difference  in  the  object 
"or  our  purposes,  it  is,  for  us,  a  relation  internal  to  the  object ; 
if  it  makes  no  difference,  it  is  external.  Apart  from  some  special 
purpose  for  which  it  makes  a  difference,  a  thing's  relations  to 
other  things,  other  than  its  relation  as  the  effect  of  a  cause,  are 
incidental,  not  essential;  external,  not  internal.  This  con- 
sideration undermines  that  particular  argument  for  metaphysical 
idealism  which  rests  upon  comlnning  with  the  doctrine  that 
to  he  is  identical  in  meaning  with  to  .stand  in  relations,  the  relic 
of  Kantian  subjectivism,  "Relations  are  the  work  of  thought." 

.\  similar  criticism  may  be  made  against  the  view  that  no 
kiiowable  reality  except  spirit  exists,  because  we  know  no  other 
reality  which  can  remain  identical  in  the  midst  of  changing 
stat(>s.  Whether  or  not  what  remains,  after  some  quality  has 
lieeii  clianged,  is  to  be  regarded  as  the  same  thing  as  existed 
lu'fore  the  change,  depends  upon  the  purpose  in  relation  to 
wliich  the  question  is  considered.  We  cannot  conclude,  there- 
lore,  from  the  presupposition  of  identity  in  the  midst  of  change, 
that  the  reality  is  spiritual,  but  only  that  it  is  being  considered 
l>y  some  conscious  being  with  reference  to  some  purpose. 

Again,  it  is  not  invariably  true  that  to  stand  in  relations  is  to 
excliange  actions.  There  are  otiier  relations  between  things 
besides  the  causal  relation  and  such  relations  as  are  established 


50 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  KNOWLEDGE 


by  thinking  the  two  things  together.  For  example,  to  cite 
an  extreme  instance,  it  surely  cannot  be  maintained  that  to 
stand  in  the  relation  of  non-interaction  is  to  exchange  actions. 

Moreover,  the  ingenious  dialectic  by  means  of  which  a  numer- 
ical ontological  monism  is  supposed  to  be  established  tlirough 
a  synthesis  of  the  empirical  actuality  of  interaction  with  its 
theoretical  inconceivability,  also  fails  to  convince.  According 
to  Lotze's  own  principle,  we  have  not,  in  metaphysics,  to  ask 
why  there  should  be  a  world  at  all,  or  how  reality  can  be  what 
it  is ;  we  hav^  to  take  it  as  it  is,  to  find  out  what  it  is.'  There 
is  mystery  in  all  ultimate  existence,  in  all  real  productivity,  all 
action,  as  well  as  in  interaction.  We  should  no  more  argue  that 
interaction  is  impossible,  because  mysterious,  than  that  there 
is  no  real  becoming,  becau.se  real  becoming  is  an  ultimate  mys- 
tery. But  with  the  disappearance  of  any  contradiction  of  the 
ultimate  reality  of  interaction,  the  synthesis  of  the  two  anti- 
thetical propositions,  viz.  Lotze's  numerical  monism,  also  falls 
to  the  ground  —  at  least  so  far  as  this  argument  is  concerned. 

We  can  scarcely  avoid  the  condu.sion,  therefore,  that  Lotze 
has  not  succeeded  in  his  attempt  to  develop  a  positive  meta- 
physic  on  the  basis  of  a  dualist ic  epistemology.  At  practically 
every  crucial  point  his  argument  is  fallacious,  or  at  least  incon- 
clusive. 

G.  T.  Ladd,  to  who.se  conception  of  epistemology  we  have 
already  referred,'  is  a  disciple  of  Lotze  whose  Lotzianism  is 
tinged  with  influences  from  the  modified  Scottish  philo.>;ophy 
of  Noah  Porter.  Con.sequcntly,  while  much  of  our  criticism 
of  Lotze  would  apply  to  the  doctrir'cs  of  Ladd,  certain  features 
of  the  latter  philosopher's  discussion  of  the  problem  of  knowl- 
edge invite  special  attention.  He  is  very  insistent  that  cogni- 
tion always  transcends  experience.'  But  his  acceptance  of  the 
Kantian  criticism  leaves  this  as.sertion  of  ontological  validity 
little  more  than  a  dogmatic  appeal  to  "consciousness,"  after 
the  manner  of  Reitl.  This  element  in  his  thought  appears  in 
the  following  quotations:  "Experience  is  .  .  .  truly  ontologi- 
cal. To  tell  how  such  experience  is  possible,  this  was  the  prob- 
lem of  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason.     But  because  its  an.swer 

'  Cf.  F.  C  S.  Schiller.  "Lotie's  Monism,"  in  Humanism,  p.  66. 

•  Ch.  I,  supra.  •  The  Philosophy  of  KnuuUJije.  pp.  325,  332,  341,  etc. 


F  5Si»*SlFWr  T!rPTl  Jfr/»  .'■WS^JifliiFW 


DUALISM  AND  ATTEMPTED  METAPHYSICS         51 

laid  all  the  emphasis  on  the  analysis  of  the  subject,  the  knower, 
and  did  not  share  the  undying  confidence  of  men  that  the  object^ 
that  which  is  known,  belongs  in  all  its  complicated  structure 
to  the  world  of  reality,  this  Critique  failed  t-  -tjsfy  the  demands 
of  conscioi>mcss."     "The  cognition  of  ti  id  of  things  by 

the  human  mind  actually  takes  place  w.  ^  passionate  and 

determined  assumption  of  a  right  to  know  .iiat  things  really 
are.  The  admission  of  this  right  extends  and  validates  our 
system  of  concepts  relating  to  things.  It  is,  therefore,  an 
assumption  of  the  highest  epistemological  value.  We  shall  return 
to  it  again."  »  But  merely  to  assert  the  fact  of  ontological 
knowledge  on  the  basiy  of  the  right  to  know,  and  in  spite  of  a 
critical  view  which  would  naturally  lead  to  ontological  agnosti- 
cism, without  showing  how  such  knowledge  is  possible,  is  dogma- 
tism. 

A.  Seth  Pringle-Pattison  is  perhaps  most  widely  known  for 
his  revolt  from  the  Hegelian  absolutism  in  the  interests  of  moral 
personality  in  God  and  man.  Each  self,  he  is  concerned  to 
maintain,  "resists  invasion";  it  is  "a  unique  existence,  which 
IS  perfectly  impervious."  ^  But  this  transition  from  monism 
to  pluralism,  while  not  necessitating  the  giving  up  of  meta- 
physical idealism,  made  it  neces.sary  to  maintain,  from  the 
standpoint  of  the  individual  subject,  an  epistemological  realism. 
H(«  maintains  that  the  m(>taphysical  dualism  of  mind  and  matter 
may  be  avoided  by  developing  in  its  stead  the  epistemological 
dualism  of  the  world  of  real  things  and  the  individual's  world 
of  consciousness.  The  special  interest  attaching  to  his  thought 
in  the  present  connection,  then,  lies  in  three  things :  the  offer 
of  epistemological  dualism  as  a  .substitute  for  metaphysical 
dualism;  the  absoluteness  of  that  epistemological  dualism; 
and  finally,  the  dogmatic  claim  to  know  reality,  notwithstand- 
ing the  absolute  dualism  of  his  theory  of  knowledge.' 

There  are  indeed  two  worlds,  says  Pringle-Pattison,  but 
they  are  not  mind  and  matter,  respectively;  the  one  is  the 
world  of  consciousness ;    the  other  the  world  of  independently 

'  A  Theory  of  Reality,  p.  8  ;   The  Philosophy  of  Knowledge,  p.  227.     The  italics 
<xrc()t  in  the  word  " right. "  are  mine.  ' 

■^firaclianism  and  Personality,   1887,  p.  216;  2d  ed.,  1893,  p.  227. 

n,.V  '■  f:  "•  j'""'^*'  "Prof'-i'sor  Pringle-Pftttison'8  Epistemological  ReaU»m," 
/  hilosophical  Review,  XX,  1911,  pp.  405-21. 


52 


TIIK    PHOBLKM   OF   KXOWLEIKJE 


real  tliiiins,  of  "fpistciiioloKical  things-in-thomso!vos."  Tho 
two  worlds  arc  iiiutuall\-  cxchisivc  The  niind  is  iiover  in 
iinnu'diato  relation  to  things.  All  objot'ts.  from  thost'  which 
are  in  immediate  contact  with  the  orjcani^m  to  the  remotest 
star,  are  completely  and  inexorably  oiit-ide  the  individual's 
world  of  consciousness.'  If  is  maintaimii.  however,  that  the 
world  of  r(>al  thinjis  is  known  to  thought:  objwts  and  subjects 
are  completely  sundered  in  cipiriitivt.  I>ut  ihey  are  related  to 
each  other  as  meinb(>rs  of  one  world,  metaphys:.  aily  siK'akinR,^ 
and  "knowledfie  points  beyond  itself  to  a  reality  whose  reprc- 
.sentation  or  symbol  it  is." '^ 

But  the  same  old  question  returns.  If  vrr.  never  have  any 
direct  expeiieiice  of  the  real  world,  how  do  v.e  know  what  it  is, 
or  even  that  it  is?  Prinjjle-Pattison  hold-  that  while  we  can 
prove  neitl'.er  the  one  nor  the  other  din-ttly.  In-cause  we  can 
never  get  behind  our  own  knowledge.*  thc-rr*  i>  nevertheless  an 
indirect  proof  to  be  found  in  the  in.stinctive  !ic-lief  of  all  mankintl 
and  the  failure  of  non-realistic  theories  to  avoid  practical  ab- 
surdity.' It  may  be  remarked,  however,  that  the  instinctive 
realistic  i)(>!ief  of  mankind  is  not  in  epistemoI<«sical  thtalism,  but 
in  a  realistic  epistemological  monism.  Moreover,  the  failure 
of  ideahsm  does  not  mean  the  establishment  of  duali^tic  realism, 
unless  this  can  be  shown  to  be  the  only  o{h»r  pos.^ible  theory 
— which,  however,  is  not  the  ca.se.  Nor  is  ilualistic  realisiii.  with 
the  agnosticism  logically  involved,  de.<>i.rablf.  if  any  essentially 
monistic  realism  can  be  found  to  admit  of  adequate  rational 
defence. 

C.  A.  Strong  has  given  us  a  detaileii  expr«>ition  of  epistemo- 
;)gical  dualism  ..tul  critical  realism,  in  c«jiiihination  with  ideal- 
ism, or  panpsychism,  in  metaphysics.  The  positioii  as  a  whole 
is  supported  by  some  new  arguments  a  sjx-cial  feature  of  tiie 
discussion  being  the  attention  givi  o  the  problems  .set  by 
physi;.logical  p.sychology.  Strong  ai  'owlciiges  indebte(hk's.s 
to  William  .lames  and  D.  S.  Miller  in  airi^-ine  at  the  con\  iction 
that  cognition  is  nothing  but  having  a  feeling  which  so  lesem- 

'  Philowphicnl  Hivinr,  I,  1S92,  pp.  .'il  t-lR. 

»/6..  I.  ISOJ,  pp.  !».-,,  .)1.!:    III.  1S94,  p.  61.  • /N..  I,  ls92,  p.  504. 

'  If).,  Ill,  j.v.it.  p.  .,!l.  Of.  Ihyihiiniam  aiut  F'travxiiiiy.  pp.  o4-o  ;  2<i  ed., 
p.  90. 

»  Philosophical  Review,  I,  pp.  507,  511-12. 


DUALISM  AND  ATTEMPTED  METAPHYSICS         53 

hlps  reality  that  we  are  enabled  to  operate  upon  it.  In  develop- 
ing further  his  theory  of  perception  and  of  cognition  in  general, 
Strong  seems  to  have  found  a  clew  in  the  nature  of  memory,' 
where  the  represented  object,  like  the  representing  image,  is 
psychical.  He  adopts  as  hi.-^  hypothesis  the  view  that  the  reality 
to  which  thought  refers  is  not  .something  different  in  nature 
from  thought  and  more  real  than  it,  but  simply  other  experience 
than  that  which  constitutes  the  reality  of  thought.'  It  then 
l)ccoir'>s  his  task  to  work  out  the  details  of  this  theory  in  the 
light  of  scientific  knowledge,  and  to  defend  it  against  objec- 
tions and  rivs'.  interpretations. 

There  is,  he  claims,  a  twofold  existence  of  the  object ;  the 
ol)jcct  of  which  I  am  immediately  conscious  cannot  be  the 
o!)jcct  which  acts  on  my  senses  and  calls  forth  the  perceptional 
brain-event ;  it  is  a  modification  of  my  own  consciousness,  and 
at  best  a  mental  duplicate  of  the  stimulus.*  The  real  object 
F)r()(luccs  an  image  in  the  brain,  an  image  which,  abstracted 
from  our  consciousness,  is  projected  into  space  as  the  physical 
object.  The  phy.sical  order,  as  made  up  of  projected  images,  is 
.symbolic  of  a  real  order,  of  which  our  sensations  are  effects 
The  real  object  is  known,  therefore,  substitutionally,  through 
flic  medium  of  its  symbol,  the  physical  object  or  projected 
image.''  This  phy.sical  object,  as  a  projected  image,  a  modifi- 
cation of  consciousness,  while  an  existence  distinct  from  the 
o!>ject  of  which  we  are  immediately  conscious,  is  still  an  object 
ni  the  same  world  ;  the  real  world  is  itself  psychical.  It  is  made 
up  of  minds  and  their  actual  and  possible  experiences.* 

Strong  tries  to  minimize  the  dualistic,  and,  therefore,  logically 
agnostic  features  of  his  epistemolog>',  by  insisting  that  it  is 
to  h-  distinguished  from  the  representative  theory  of  knowledge 
winch  holds  that  the  thing  known  primarily  in  sense-perception 
i<  tlu>  linage,  the  real  object  being  known  only  by  inference  and 

'"  -^  N-''turalisti<-  Theory  of  the  Reference  of  Thought  to  Reality."  Journal  oj 

I'"I.xT.P   221  2'  '^■*'  '"''  ^^■'''^'  "^*^°'    *^*^  ^'  ^''^  '^  "  ««'"• 

'  If/i//  the  Mind,  ete.,  pp.  172,  178. 

'  Whuthe  Mind.  et<..,  pp.  igs!  251;    "Substitutionalism"  in  Essays  .  .      i„ 
Ifonor  of  n  m.  James,  1908.  pp.  170.  etc. :   Jnurru,i  of  Philosophy,  rtr     IX    191o 

I'v  '.'mf '    ^'';,n  ■/'■■»'"•  •'''"'■'"''  "^  Philosophy,  etc..  VIII.  1911.  pp.  365  b'.\ 
l.\.  1912,  pp.  149  ff. :   Mind.  .\..S.,  XXIV.  1915.  pp.  29-36 

*  H  hu  the  Mind,  etc..  pp.  228-9;  Journal  of  Philosophy,  IX,  p.  633. 


54 


-=   »  f 


THE   PROBLEM  OP   KNOWLEDGE 


representation.     His  own  view  is  that  the  imape  is  not  primarily 
the  object  of  knowledge  at  all,  but  its  medium,  or  vehicle  •  the 
object  18  known  direetly,  althouRh  not   immediately.'     But 
when  we  get  back  of  these  verbal  distinctions,  we  find  that  what 
the  theory  amounts  to  is  that  the  real  object,  which  is  psychical 
produces  a  cerebral  image,  which,  however  dissimilar"  to  the 
real  object,  still  in  some  sense  represents  it.     This  image  how- 
ever, is  projected,  so  that  "the  image  is  taken  as  being  where 
it  IS  not  and  what  it  is  not."  «    That  is,  what  we  know  directly 
and  immediately  is  the  projected   (and,   therefore,   changed) 
cerebral  image,  which  we  call  the  physical  object;   and  this  is 
called  knowing -directly  but  mediately  and  syml>olically - 
the  real  p.sychical  object  which  produced  the  cerebral  image 
But,  we  would  remark,  to  project  a  representative  image  — 
which  is  actually  but  to  treat  it  as  if  it  had  been  projected  — 
does  not  take  away  its  representative  character,  although  it 
may  make  it  a  more  useful  repre.seiitative.     Whether  in.prove<l 
or  not  from  the  r)ractical  point  of  view,  theoretically  —  accord- 
ing to  the  logic  of  Strong's  theory  -  it  leaves  our  fancied  knowl- 
edge  doubly  removed  from  direct  cognition  of  the  real  object 
What  we  know  directly  is  a  distorted  product  of  the  object 
nothing  more.     Substitutionali.sm  does  not   offer  us  genuine 
knowledge,  but  a  substitute  for  it,  upon  which  the  trade-mark 
of  knowledge  has  been  stamp(>d.     We  would  agre.-  with  Strong 
that  what  we  have  and  use  ileserves  to  be  called  knowledge  • 
but  that  IS  becau.se  what  we  have  does  not  fall  under  his  de- 
scriptive formula.     What  he  describes  would  not  be  knowledge. 
But  even  if  Strong  were  to  concede  that  on  his  view  what 
we  ordinarily  call  knowledge  is  simply  a  practical  makeshift, 
might  he  not  be  able  at  least  to  maintain  that  the  genuine 
knowledge  of  reality  is  that  contained  in  his  metaphvsical  doc- 
trine of  things-in-them.selves  other  than  human  and  animal 
minds,  but  themselves  also  psychical  in  nature?'    He  offers 
tnree  "proofs"  of  his  doctrine,  the  co.smological,  the  physio- 
logical, and  the  evolutionary.     The  cosmological  is  to  the  effect 

IX.'  f  sTo.  ■  ■  ■  '"  ^"""^  "^  ^'"-  "''""''•  ''P-  '^^■^'    •^"""•"^  "^  Philosophy. 
'  J "urnal  of  Philosophy,  IX,  p.  599. 
»Cf.  D.  Drake.  The  Problem  of  Things-in-Thcmsdvea,  19U. 


DUALISM  AND  ATTEMPTED  METAPHYSICS         55 

that  thinKs-in-thcmselvos  n,u.t  bo  assumed  in  order  to  fill  in 
flH^  Kaps  botwocn  individual  nun.ls,  and  to  ^ivo  coherence  and 
"fHiKib.l.ty  to  our  con.-epfion  of  the  universe.'     The  "nhvsio- 
I..K..-al  proof"  i.s  to  the  effect  that  .since  our  perceptions  a^ 
physH.  oKically  conditioned,  we  are  able  to  triangulate.  a.s  u 
were,  to  thinfrs-.n-themselves  as  their  cau.ses.»    Now  we  are 
"<»t  .oncernod  to  attack  the  view  that  there  are  thin«.s-in-them. 
selves;    but^  .f  we  a,s,sume  that,  as  Strong  teaches,  no  hunTn 
-n.  over  has  had  or  can  have  imn.ediate  experience  of  "he'e 
.euhties  which  can  exist  i,.dcpendently  of  their  being  humanly 
."Xf>enonced,  the  alK,ve  arguments  for  such  independent  th^ng^ 
arc  by  no  means  conclusive.     It  might  be  that  the  whole  con- 

n"  ult"  f  M?'""""'  ''  '""'"''^''  "•''  ^''"'"'^   ".aintained,  as  a 
r<  Ml  t  of  the  mner  con.stitution  of  the  individual. 

rhe    'evolutionary  proof  i.s  used  to  support  the  view  that 

1   se  th.ngs-m-then,solves  are  psychical.     The  older  argumen 

e  li  r.;/ :irr  \  '"^"  ^^^^  -^'""^  ^nousness  is  the  only 

Hal,t>  of  vv Inch  we  have  any  immediate  knowledge,  and  there- 

o  o  our  onlj.  sample  of  what  reality  is  like,  we'cannot  have 

.•"  a  conception  of  any  reality  which  is  not  psychical.'    This 

'.f  course,  is  at  best  simply  an  alternative  to  agnasticism   and 

so  not  a  proo  .     The  evolutionary  argument,  whfch  is  advanced 

e  „;;^""f^'3;  inclusive,"  is  that  things-in-themselves  must 

t  Z.  ;    '"  '\'^'.^^l^'^'  because  individual  minds  ari.se  out 

n.t.  upon  the  presupposition  of  the  existence  of  things-in- 
^dv'  rilit"^'  P-upposition  we  found  to  be  inZi;. 
>utl>  estahlKshed,  provided  we  a.s.sume  the  validity  of  Strong's 

rT:  ;  2  r'  "^,  ""  '^^^  "°  '"^'"^^'^^^  knowldge  of  any 
real  ty  not  dependent  upon  our  own  consciousness.  More- 
over. 1   we  hold  to  creative  evolution,  the  "evolutionary  proof" 

rLl MTf '""h  '""  '^^'"^ "'  ^'^^'-  '"^-'^-^  -"^'  -y 

-L  siv  r  """  7'"^  ^"''"'  "^*  ^'  "^^  ^^"^tions  of  pre- 
viously  existing  reality,  through  men-  rearrangement  of  ele- 
mcnts  but  as  new  variations  from  it.  We  conclude,  then,  that 
strongs  presuppositions  would  compel  him  to  believe  that  our 

'  Why  the  Mind,  etc..  dd   2.5 ■>   ""IQ  »  ri         nn. 


56 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   KNOWLEDOK 


ordinary  knowletlKe  is  not  genuine,  and  that  his  own  panpsy- 
rhisiu  is  simply  an  unprowd  .speculation. 

\.  O.  I  r v  '  jy's  most  important  contributions  to  cpistcinology 
have  Ix-'  i.  hi ,  '-riticisms  of  the  ab.solute  epistenioioKicul  nioni-sni 
aid  reahsm  of  the    neo-realists.     His  own  posilion,  however, 
is    epistemoloKical    duuhsm    and    metapliy.sical    temporahstie 
i  leali.sm.     Finding  it  ea.sy,  in  opp().><ition  to  what  he  reffanls  as 
tlie  neo-reahstic  view,  to  show  that  Jviiowledj^e  is  sometimes 
mediate,  he  Koes  on  to  state  that  since  tliere  can  be  methate 
knowledRc,  there  i^  no  reason  why  knowk'dj;e  should  not  al- 
ways be  mediate.     He  feels  fnc,  therefore,  tn  hold  that  the 
existence  and  some  of  the  attributes  of  things  cm  be  known, 
although   always  only  mediately,  since   the   perceived    object 
and  the  real  object  are  always  numerically  different,  although 
they  may  be  qualitatively  identical  in  part.'      What  is  over- 
looked here  is  the  possibility  that  it  miKht  be  just  becau.^e  there 
is  such  a  thing  as  inunediate  kn()wle<lge,  that  mciliate  knowledge 
Incomes  po.ssible  at  all.     Moreover,  he  does  not    sufKciently 
canvas-  the  possibilities  in  the  way  of  a  less  extreme  n-alistic 
<pist(>moloKicaI  monism   than    that    of    the    neo-realists.     His 
ciifical  arguments,  which  are  largely  valid  as  against  the  al    ■- 
lute  ([jisteinological  monism  of  (he  new  realists,  do  tiot  nece> 
sarily  apply  to  that  critical  realistic  epistiiiiolouical  monism 
which  we  .shall  defend  in  a  later  chaptcT,^  and  which   . ould 
maintain  that   the  experienced  object   and  tiic  independ  titly 
existing  thing  may  be  HKmcrically  identical,  even   if  to  some 
extent  qiialitatirehj  different.^ 

'  Journal  of  Philosophy,  ptc,  X,  1913,  pp.  568-9.  etc. 

=  .Sco  Ch.  XIV,  irfrn. 

>  Lovrjoy  civcs  p.-issiriK  iiotior  to  tho  intorniodiatc  vi(>w.s  of  Srhuppe  and 
Wolf,  and  he  may  bp  riRlit  i-noiiKh  in  hintiiiK  that  thosp  thcorirs  pprhups  amount 
to  no  nioro  than  "a  weak  and  unfi'nal)h-  cKniproinisc."  ("On  tho  Kxistcnr-e  of 
Ideas."  Thr  Jiihns  Hniikins  Vnitcrsitu  Circuhtr,  1914,  No.  ."j,  pp.  4!1  ,52.)  Hut 
it  dors  not  follow  that  the  .same  imi^t  Ix-  true  of  nil  po..i.sil.lc  thcori<'s  of  knowl- 
odKi-  hctwcin  absolute  epistcnioloKi.  al  dualism  and  a  realistie  epi.steniolouioal 
monism  so  absolute  as  to  be  debarred  from  muking  any  distinetion  between 
appearance  aud  reality. 


t    !■ 


mmsmm^MM-i'. 


CHAPTER  IV 


Ulalism  and  Attempted  Metaphysich  (Conchtded) 

We  turn  now  to  .soiu«'  ('i)istcmological  dualists  who,  like 
those  just  considercfl,  claim  to  he  ul.lc  to  arrive  at  some  posi- 
tivc  knowledge  of  reality  which  is  not  d<-{K'ndent  upon  human 
rXfKTience,  i.ut  who,  unhk.'  them,  exhibit,  when  taken  either 
siiifrly  or  in  groups,  a  tendency  away  from  idealism,  metaphysi- 
cal as  well  as  episteiiK.lo^ical,  and  in  the  general  direction  of  a 
I  .ri-idealistic  metaphysics.  We  shall  he  interested  to  learn 
whether  th<'\  are  able,  any  more  successfully  than  those  just 
cxaminiHl,  to  overcome  the  apparently  agnostic  implications 
of  absolute  epistemolojjical  dualism. 

y>  post-Kantian  philo.sophy  one  of  the  most  con.spicuous 
examples  of"  fhis  development  is  to  be  found  in  the  philosophies 
of  Schopii!  :.,,.;  and  von  Hartmann.  But,  as  the  philo.sopher 
wiio,  perlia  .  , v  Kant,  most  influenced  .-^.hopenhj-uer,  and 
who  huiisei;  i  .:-  itr  ,  in  his  relation  to  Fich*  ■  the  mo\cment 
from  subj<'  ;-■..  ,■:>  (objectivism,  we  -liull  Iriefly  refer  to 
SchellinK.  In  reu.  iion  from  his  early  ;!n:i.  re-,  .  ..o  the  doctrines 
of  Fichte,  Schelling  deliberately  undertot  .  i  .  'break  through" 
this  cIomyI  system  of  subjective  idealism  "into  the  free  open 
field  of  objective  science,"  with  its  realistic  acceptance  of  the 
independ..i,t  existe.,>  of  the  real  world.'  Tiie  result  was  the 
working  out  of  his  /  •,  (rxopfn/  of  nature,  in  which  nature  is  viewed 
us  creative,  and  the  subj(>ctive  as  being  added  to  the  objective. 
Later,  indeed,  he  worked  out  a  trnnscendental  philosophy, 
m  which  spirit  is  the  creat  >  factor,  and  the  objective  is  repre- 
sented as  being  added  to  rli.  ubjcctive;  but  this  again  was 
taken  up  into  the  philosophy  /  identity,  according  to  which 
objective  and  subjective,  nature  and  spirit,  the  real  and  the 
id(>al,  are  fundamentally  the  same.     The  Absolute  appears  as 

'  See  Kur^o  Fischer,  Geschiehte  lier  neveren  Philosophie,  Vol.  VII,  1899,  pp. 

57 


il 


58 


THE  PROBLEM  OP   KNOWLEDGE 


nature  and  spirit,  but  in  itself  it  is  neither  the  one  nor  the  other, 
but  the  hifrher  Unity,  comprehending  both. 

Schopenhauer's  philosophy  may  be  viewed  as  a  further  separa- 
tion of  the  ideahstic  and  reaUstie  elements  of  the  Kantian  dual- 
ism, counteracted  by  a  more  or  less  dogmatic  assertion  of  iden- 
tity, after  the  manner  of  Schelling.     If  we  were  to  take  his 
doctrine  of  "  the  world  as  id^-a  "  alone,  Schopenhauer  would  have 
to  be  classed  as  an  epistemological  monist  and  idealist ;  taking 
his  doctrine  of  "the  world  as  will"  alone,  we  should  have  to  call 
him  an  epistemological  monist  and  realist;   but,  both  sides  of 
his  thought  being  taken  together,  his  doctrine  of  "the  world  as 
will  and  idea"  brings  hin)  fairly  within  epistemological  dualism 
and  realism.     His  emphasis  upon  the  idealistic  element,  how- 
ever, is  very  pronounced.     The  whole  spatial,  temporal,  caus- 
ally connected  world,  of  which  the  individual  has  experience, 
is  interpreted  as  nothing  more  than  that  individual's  idea ;   it 
is  "conditioned  through  the  s\ibject  and  exists  only  for  the  sub- 
ject." »    This  being  the  case,  theoretical  ego;sm,  or  solipsism, 
never  can  be  refuted.     But,  on  the  other  hand,  it  never  can  be 
proved;    and  on  this  ground  Schopenhauer  decides  to  ignore 
this  theoretical  po3sihility.=    The  thing-in-itself,  however,  from 
the  point  of  view  of  rational  knowledge,  is  unknowable ;  hidden 
under  the  triple  veil  of  space,  time,  and  causality,  it  never  could 
be  known  if  the  investigator  were  nothing  more  than  the  pure 
knowing  subject.     But  the  investigator  is  himself  rooted  in  the 
world.     His  body  is  given  as  idea,  an  object  among  the  ol)jrcts 
of  the  phenomenal  world  ;  and  yet  it  is  also  given  in  an  entirely 
different  way,  viz.  by  direct  apprehension,  as  will.     The  act  of 
will  and  the  movement  of  the  body  are  one  and  the  same,  given 
in  two  entirely  different  ways  —  the  former  through,  or  rather 
in,  the  most  immediate  inner  consciousness  of  each  of  us ;   the 
latter,  in  perception,  for  the  understanding.      We  each  of  us 
know  one  thing-in-itself,  viz.  our  own   self;    and   we  know  it 
as  will.' 

This,  then,  is  taken  as  the  key  to  the  metaphysical  problem. 
Since  nothing  is  conceivable  that  is  not  will  or  idea,  and  since 


'  The  World  a8  Wtil  and  Idea,  Eng.  Tr.,  Vol.  I,  pp.  3  f.     C{.  Introd., 
xxv-xxvi. 

'  ^''-  PP'  135-6.  >  Jb.,  pp.  129-30.  142,  145. 


pp. 


DUALISM  AND  ATTEMPTED  METAPHYSICS         59 

wo  can  find  nowhere  any  other  kind  of  reahty  besides  will,  we 
n^y  judge  of  all  phenomenal  objects,  and  of  the  phenom;nal 
world  as  a  whole,  after  the  analogy  of  our  own  bodies,  con- 
H».lu.g  that  the  inner  nature  of  every  physical  thing  is  the 
sam<>  as  that  m  ourselves  which  we  call  will.     In  its  inmost 

\VhoIe,  .s  will.     It  ,s  not  meant  that  in  all  things  this  will   or 
«tnv.ng,  .s  consciously  directed,  as  it  is  in  man ;  Schopenha'uer 

Titrr.  f."'""'  ""''''  ^'^*  '^"'^  «P^"-  -hich  is  directly 
and  nnmediately  known.      The  world  as  it  is  in  itself  is  will 
as  It  appears  in  perception  it  is  idea  • 

In    working   out    the    details    of   this    identity-philosophy 
Schopenhauer's  thought  runs  into  what  looks  l^e  flat  S 
contradic  ion.     On  the  one  hand  it  is  claimed  that  matter   s 
-nplv  a  human  idea,  and  on  the  other  that  thought  is  a  mere 
product  of  matter.    But  criticisms  more  fundamental  stilH  e 
o  bo  made  against  the  system.     In  the  first  place,  is  Schopen! 
hauor,  as  a  radical  Kantian,  justified  in  regarding  even  wTL 
anything  more  than  phenomenon?    In  his  later  though    h^ 
boeame  conscious  of  this  difficulty.     He  insists  that  the  knowl! 
odgo  each  of  us  has  of  his  own  willing  is  neither  percept^n 
nor  an  empty  concept,  but  he  has  to  admit  that    even   in- 
ward experience  does  not  give  us  adequate  knowledge  of  the 
ung-in-,tself^    The  act  of  will  is  only  the  closest  and  most 
W.stinct  nianifostation  of  reality;    in  it  the  thing-in-itself  an 

r;r," ':nr !''"";  \^^^^''^-^-^-™  ^p'—d  caul 

■  I't  ,  but  sti  1  not  quito  divested  of  time     In  the  end,  Scho- 

Mhauor  makes  the  agnostic  confession :   ''The  questio^  wha" 

I'at  ^vlll  ultimately  and  absolutely  is  in  itself  ...  can  never 

H>  answered,  because  becoming  known  is  itself  the  contrad^ 

ory  of  being  in  itself,  and  everything  that  is  known  is,  a-f^  h 

•  phonononaL-     Here  at  length  he  becomes  consistent,' 

'in^  lapses  into  the  Kantian  agnostic  dualism. 

But  while  ho  is  at  this  point  at  length  consistent  -  or  at 

I.  .xst  as  consist. , It  as  explicit  agnosticism  oasily  can  be  -  he  is 

;-t.  wo  would  maintain,  correct.     As  we  have  .seen   epistemo 

...cal  dualism  is  founded  on  confusion  and  defend:S'b;;:C; 

It  has  not  been  shown  to  be  necessary;  and.  in  a  later  con- 

' /6..  pp.  136.  143.  '/5..  Vol.  II.  pp.  405-8. 


60 


THE   PROBLEM   OP   KNOWLEDGE 


« 


nection  »  we  shall  set  forth  an  opposite  hypothesis,  according 
to  which  it  would  be  incorrect  to  say  that  we  can  have  no  gen- 
uine knowledge  of  independent  realities,  things-in-theniselves, 
if  you  please,  and  that  on  the  basis  of  perception  and  reflection! 
From  this  our  own  point  of  view  we  would  say  that  Schopen- 
hauer's assertion,  that  we  have  direct  knowledge  of  ourselves 
as  will,  is  in  itself  correct,  although  for  him  inconsistent.  But 
when  he  goes  on  to  assert,  ex  analogia  hominis,  and  in  order  to 
escape  from  agnosticism,  tha:  all  reality  is  will,  he  simply  lapses 
into  dogmatism.  From  his  own  presuppositions,  strictly  inter- 
preted, not  oven  the  human  individual,  much  less  every  r?al 
thing,  could  be  said  to  be  will,  any  more  than  it  could  be  said 
to  be  anything  else.  Not  in  the  philosophy  of  Schopenhauer, 
at  least,  do  we  find  epistemological  dualism  legitimately  set 
free  from  agnosticism. 

Among  those  deeply  influenced  by  Schopenhauer,  .some  have 
gone  in  the  direction  of  absolute  idealism,  as,  for  example,  F. 
Paulsen  and  P.  Deu.s.sen.  These  thinkers  are  monistic  panpsy- 
chists;  but  E.  von  Hartmann  goes  in  the  opposite  direction 
ant!  develops  a  philosophy  of  the  "Unconscious."  He  calls 
his  theory  of  knowledge  "transcendental  realism."  It  is  what 
we  have  called  absolute  epistemological  dualism,  or  epistemo- 
logical dualism  and  critical  realism,  and  is  combined  with  a 
rather  highly  J.evelop(>d  .system  of  metaphysics.  This  theory 
of  knowledge  he  regards  as  the  only  alternative  to  naive  real- 
ism on  the  on(>  side  and  subjective  idealism  on  the  other.  Naive 
realism  is  to  be  rejected,  he  holds,  for  its  failure  (o  see  that 
everything  we  can  reach  with  our  thoughts  can  always  be  only 
our  own  thoughts,  never  the  reality  lying  behind  them.  Sub- 
jective i.'.ealism  he  rejects  for  the  error  of  lenying  the  existence 
of  that  which  is  beyond  the  limit  of  thinking,  for  no  other  reason 
than  that  it  is  inaccessible  to  thought.^  The  onlv  other  pos- 
sibilities being  thus  eliminated,  tran.scendental  or  dualistie 
(>pistemoIogical  realism  is  regard(>d  as  established. 

Von  Hartmann,  however,  does  not  think  it  necessary  to 
remain  agnostic  even  on  the  basis  of  this  dualistie  epistemologv. 
Even  at  the  expense  of  contradicting  the  idealistic  side  of  Kant's 

'  Spc  fh.  XIV.  i„fra. 

'  The  Philusophu  of  the  Cnconscums,  Eng.  Tr.,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  198. 


DUALISM  AND  ATTEMPTED  METAPHY«ICS  61 
doctrine  he  sets  himself  to  develop  the  realistic  side  of  Kan- 
Z;r  r  S  r''^'  ',T'"'^^  ^^  things-in-themselt . 
«itn  hcheling  the  homogeneity  of  thought  and  its  trans- 
cendent-objeet.ve  objeet/'  as  the  only  supposition  upon  whTch 
knowledge  ,s  conceivable.^  To  account  for  this  we  must 
-•.ssu.ne  he  Identity  of  Thought  and  Being.  The  Beyond  of^n 
snous  t  „.!.ngmu.st  be  unconscious  thinking,  for  crdolreL" 

ol  e  hence,  m  so  far  as  thought  is  true,  reali  y  can  differ  frZ 
wlm  ..s  eo„s.ou.sly  thought  only  in  l>eing  un c'onscioufr '"" 
But  that  we  must  avo.d  dogmatism  in  our  transition  from 
consc.ousne.ss  to  the  Beyond,  von  Hartmann  h'm  Su  ^ 
Uemust  empby,  he  tells  ii«  "th^..,.^  ■  ■  '  ."  "'^8^^- 
from  exnerience  ••  "  tT  ,  ,'  .  ''^"^''^ssive  inductive  a.scent 
rom  txpeneiice.         The  bridge  whereby  we  mav  pa.ss  indue 

tt  t         *^:,"«'-'.'';"— "t  withu.  our  own  cons   o^nels 

talTTfT  ''  '"""  "  ''''  ''''  ^hat  in  sense-..x^r>nce 
NO  are  affected  by  son.ething  F>eyond  us;  it  is  the  brid^eof 
(ranscendent  causalitv      There  is  n  fmn         i     /  ^ 

sensafion*    on.i  fi  •  transcendent  cause  of  our 

.^(iisaiions,  and  this  cause  is  renrp«onf,.r?  ;., 
1...  fi,-, 'it  ,        V  "presented  in  our  consciousness 

b.\  the     transcendental  object  "  ^     r-iiis.,litv  ;=  fk        ,        ,^ 

t"  h,.  »ure   ,t  ,,,„l*h<..  only  ,l,o  e,M„„  „f  ,|,i„  J„.,h^i' 

"I,  .n  ,(„dl  a„|  „|,,,.,.t  of  consoioiis,,^,.'     But  by  means  of 

"« ri  I.,  us.'     f  rom  the  diversity  of  objects  percoivetl  throu,rh 

"»- .Ie...al  use  of  eatC  (wh '"  '"""'"("".""■ 

'"M/^S:  r^Sr  'r  '— ''-'^'-  «-'--.  :3d  od.  (in  Aus^e. 

■  r/uln.o„hy  of  the  rrt.v,,,.,  ,;,„„,  V„l.  m,  pp    ,9,^-9 
Tr  ,  p.'-,^'-  '""■  '"''   ^•'-  ^-""■'  ''^""-M.  o/M.  Present  in  Germany,  Eng, 

« /t  p!  04' '  ^' '"'•  !■;;:' ;;  ij  ' ^7;^^^^ ^-'"«'.-.. ..0.. i. pp. ,5-7. 

/>..  p.  00.  »/6.,  p.  ..4.  '/d.,  p.  106. 


62 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  KNOWLEDGE 


Upon  this  basis  von  Hartmann  proceeds  inductively  to  de- 
velop further  his  metaphysical  theory  of  the  Unconscious.  He 
states  his  doctrine  in  the  following  terms :  "Being  is  a  product 
of  the  non-logical  and  the  logical,  of  Will  and  Rep.-cntation. 
Its    that    Ks  posited  by  volition,  its  'what'  is  the  ideational 

'TrX  T  !'^"V^«";'«"-  It  i«  thus  not  merely  homogeneous 
with  the  Idea,  but  because  it  is  itself  Idci-,  identical  in  the 
strictest  sense  of  the  term.  But  the  Real  is  distinguished  from 
the  Ideal  by  that  which  lends  reality  to  the  Ideal,  by  the  Will 
•  .  .  The  Unconscious  is  not  the  Absolute  Subject,  but  is 
what  alone  can  become  Subject,  just  as  it  is  what  alone  can 

UncZLiouf'-*'  ''"^'^  ^'''"''  **'"'''  *'  "''^^'"^  ^"^"^^  ^^^ 
That  the  world  per  se  is  the  Unconscious,  identical  with 
the  conscious,  as  far  as  the  latter  goes,  but  going  far  beyond 
It  -  this  doctrine  von  Hartmann  finds  reenforoed  by  such  facts 
as  those  of  instinct,  the  unconscious  union  of  sensations  in 
perception,  and  the  unconscious  association  of  ideas  and  pro- 
duction of  feelmgs  and  motives.  In  his  "speculative  results  " 
however,  he  has  gone  far  l,e>-ond  the  sober  method  of  induc- 
tion which  he  professed  to  follow.  We  see  the  influence  of 
Schelling  s  Identity  philosopbv.  under  the  guidance  of  which 
Hegel  s  Absolute  Idea  and  Schopenhauer's  Absolute  Will  are 

.nT^    vvT'''7J"  '^"   ^^*^^«'"*«  ^^^'^^  t^«  attributes  are 
infinite  Will  and  finite  Idea.     The  .netaphvsic..s  of  the  Uncon- 
scious  IS  poetical,  mythological,  anrj  dogmatic,  rather  than  a 
simple    unification    of   results   *,f   scientific    induction.     With 
p^ference  to  the  usp  made  of  the  idea  of  transcendent  causality, 
.t_  may  be  said  that  this  attempt  to  attain  to  knowledge  of  the 
hing-.n-,tself  is  itself  laudable,  but  not  when  ,u^,.J,l  with  a 
thoroughgoing  ep,stemologioa!  duali..m.     If  we  have  som.  direct 
oxponenco  of  thnigs,  we  may  indeed  use  the  causal  rategorv  a^  a 
bndge  from  d.rertly  known  realities  to  causes  operatmg  beyond 
our  immediate  experience ;   but  if  we  never  have  direct  experi- 
ence ./  independent  reality,  how  can  we   know   that    it   con- 
ains  any  r.au.ses  of  our  sensations?     Von  Hartmann  -  funda- 
'nenta    error  would   seem    to   he   m   his  supposition    that  a 
duah.-t.cepistomologiral  realism  is  the  only  alternative  t„  naive 

'  Philosophy  ofU^  t-«/».mouf,  \\A   III,  pp.  200-1. 


DUALISM  AND  ATTEMPTED  METAPHYSICS        63 

realism  and  subjective  idealism.      It  will  be  our  t„-t 

have  a  readv  intimnfpH    .„       i  .  ""^  **^*'  ^  ^^ 

another  £^mT  "  ""  ™"°''"""  '  *»  P°'°«  ""« 

..^     •       u    .   '*"'-"<'<^  without  prpsuppostons"*  — i=    in   fhl 

•sense  in  which  we  have  used  the  word  dualist^c .     H.    •  ?    n 
a-ssumes  that  our  exnerienro   in  IT'  ^"^"*'*/<^-      "e  virtually 

simply  experience  of  nnr  '  ^  '*  ''  "***  *h'^"<?ht,  is 

tl.e  only  ,ci™,ifio  mo  W  „  opistemol^Tn  °'  "r"-". 
to  show  .in  rh^  ■  ipisiemoJogy,  he  claims,  is  simnlv 

Tur  wZ;  ■  '""  """'"^  '"™"«'  '»  ""''  -  «" 

rience  and  thought.     IndopH  it  w^..m  f  duality  of  expe- 

.he  opinio'  rrin^rr^Snfjtf' s ''  "'^"^' 

•.So.  article  in  ^■orJ  und  Sad    UlJ  fX''"'^''^'^-  ^''^^'^^ ''^■ 
'Er/ahrung  urul  Denken,  1886    Pt    r    rh    r      n-    ,> 

'Z>te  QueHen,  ctr.    ,  p   ,>   3  ■   of  ^f.'"'"'  "'"^  ^*''<-«".  Pt-  L  Ch.  II. 
l-m  w^  shall  have  to  deal  with  ';„      ™'"""<'  '"^  0«nte«.  pa.,i„,     This  nrotv 


64 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  KNOWLEDGE 


the  self-certainty  of  consciousness  has  been  dealt  with  •  the 
'dramatic  crisis  of  opistemology "  occurs  with  the  raising  of 
the  question  "whether  I  can  exhibit  in  my  consciousness  a 
source  of  certainty  which  allows  me  to  transcend  my  conscious- 
ness, not  of  course  actually  and  truly,  but  in  the  way  of  cer- 
tamty"=  Experience  is  subjective,  bui  thought,  with  its 
logical  necessity,  presumes  to  deal  with  the  transsubjective 

Having,  then,  as  our  undoubtedly  certain  knowledge  our 
immediate  awareness  of  the  subjective,  the  question  has  r-ome 
to  be  whether  we  have,  in  the  necessity  of  thought,  valid  medi- 
a  .awareness  of  the  transsubjective.'    A  critical  examination 
of  the  content  of  our  necessary  thought  regarding  the  subjec- 
ive  reveals,  as  involved  in  our  siinpl(>st  judgments  of  fact, 
four  minimum  propositions,  viz.  the  existence  of  other  consciou.s- 
nessos,    the   continuous  existence  of  transsubjective  entities 
the   rational   correlation   of  transsubjective  entities,   and   the 
numerical  oneness  of  the  world  of  the  senses.'^     In  the  case  of 
each  of  these  r)ropositions  the  transsubjective  validity  of  the 
neces.^ty  of  thought  must  be  recognized,  or  else  we  are  led 
into  affirming  what  is  manifest  nonsense.     And  vet  the  necessity 
of  thought  IS  itself  only  a  subjectively  experienced  necessity 
As  a  form  of  immediate  certainty  which  reaches  out  to  the 
ranssubje(tiv(.,  it  may  be  called  faith,  and  intuition;   but  the 
faith  IS  not  irrational,  and  the  intuition  is  not  in  opposition 
to  the  logical.     Rather  is  it   the  way  of  being  immediately 
conscious  which  characterizes  the  logical  itself.     So,  then  the 
necessity  of  thought  cannot  itself  b,.  proved,  but  must  be  be- 
heved.     Thought  has  the  character  of  a  .lemand,  a  postulate; 
being  it.self  only  an  in.lividual  conscious  event,  it  comes  into 
contact  with  the  transsubjective  only  by  way  of  demanding 
transsubjective  validity  for  its  content.     Of  the  fulfilment  of 

'DieQuetlrr,,.tr..    U  A-C.  « /6.,  pp.  19.  2.3. 

55  J";!;"""""  ""'  ''^"^•""'  P'-  "■  ^h.  I ;    Pt.  III.  Ch.  II ;    «,>  Quellen,  etc.. 

ourown''"'"'"- """"'"""•  ■■^'"'-^'""-  '«'-^.  P-  ^.  "The  inner  life  of  others  hke 
our  own  ...  is  a  sure  ease  of  the  thing-in-itself  " 

»  />„.  W»    e,,.      5S  ,2- If,;    ,!,  Krfahrnna  und  Darker,.  Pt.  Ill,  fh    II    A 

f.  ....,,   reher  rhr  Afo„lirhkrit  der  M,iaph,,.ik.  ISS4.  pp.  Hi    ;7    where  it  is  in 

.nuu,.,l  that  whUe  the  "absolute  and  do«n.atie  "  type  of  metaphyres  may  wel 


DUALISM  AND  ATTEMPTED  METAPHYSICS         65 

this  demand  it  can  never  be  corttin     tk-.o        u 

VnlL-nifa  «„  f  '^vii  uc  ctrtam.     1  nus  we  have  at  eneth 

Volkelts  confession  that  thought  is  "dualisticallv  broken  " 

L  i,  k  i,        j'  '    ""''•  l«™™d«l  in  mere  subiectivitv 

*■    S    crbur"  '"">■.'- '""°"-l.  -  only  in  ,h„  Uul- 
uvt  sciences,  but  in  metaphvs  cs  as  u-pII      Tr,  ti.        .  . 

anung  nnn^odiate  trans.,uhjoctive  kno;iod«e  o      he\nora,' 
1-^.  of  uiwon  with  God.  of  the  harmony  of  the  world  of "ne^ 

'•..'■\-'n:  1lT'  *""  •  '"   ''-'^    •^'-  ^'^•^'■"""'  "'^  ^-*-.  Pt.  III.  Ch.  Ill; 

"  ^^"  QiiHIrn,  etc     5  >> 

J.  •  /'-.,  {  23. 


;  h 


iif.' 


66 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  KN'OVTLEDGE 


own  life,  and  of  the  independent,  external  world,  respectively.' 
These  intuitive  certainties  are  not  to  be  taken  uncritically, 
however.  If  naive  realism  were  fully  right .  for  example,  the 
contents  of  sense-exix'rience  as  such  wouhl  have  to  tte  the  ex- 
ternal world.-  Still,  human  needs  call  for  a  l>rt»ad  philo.«*ophy, 
which  shall  draw,  not  only  upon  the  science*,  but  also  upon 
these  intuitive  sources  of  certainty.  The  more  logical  such 
a  philosophy  of  life  is,  the  nearer  it  is  to  science ;  the  more  the 
certainty  of  feeling  retires  the  scientific  way  of  knowing,  the 
closer  it  stands  to  pure  faith.  But  in  any  ca«c  it  is  only  in  its 
formal  and  negative  asjject  that  philosophy  can  l»e  regarded  as 
scientific' 

It  would  be  difficult  to  imagine  a  more  »atLsfactor\-  tieat- 
roent  of  the  problem  of  knowledge  under  the  sc'lf-imposed  limits 
of  epistemological  dualism  than  this  which  it  receives  from  Vol- 
kelt.  He  admits,  in  his  doctrine  of  intuitive  certainty,  the 
epistemological  monism  and  realism  of  our  or(iinar>-  con.scious- 
ness ;  and  yet,  as  a  critical  realist,  he  recoenixe*  the  es.sential 
dogmatism  of  this  naive  point  of  view.  He  claims,  a.s  a  criti- 
cal realist,  an  irreducible  minimum  of  valid  represtmtation  of 
the  transsubjective,  reached  through  following  out  the  neces- 
sities of  thought ;  and  yet,  as  an  epistemolo^j^al  dualist,  he  is 
consistent  enough  to  admit  that,  strictly  speaking,  we  do  not, 
even  in  the  necessity  of  thought,  possess  transsubjective  knowl- 
edge, but  simply  demand  it.  Thus  it  is  the  ver>'  ";*isfactori- 
ness  of  Volkelt's  discussion  that  reveals  tht  insatisfaturinesa 
of  the  dualism  of  his  epistemology  —  whi<  *>  i-  thus  shown  to 
be  not  "without  presuppositions."  | 

In  the  course  of  his  discussion  Volkolt  refer*  to  Hans  Corne- 
lius as  one  who  refuses  to  recognize  the  necessity  of  assuming 
transsubjective  entities,  and  who  simply  refers  instead  to  the 
experientially  known  law-abiding  channter  of  our  perceptions, 
with  its  included  meaning  that  the  contents  of  this  law  ought 
to  be  Oidered  by  the  concept  of  this  law-abiding  character.* 
In  a  later  article,  however,  Cornelius  seems  to  W  fairly  upon 
the  ground  of  a  dualistic  epistemological  realisi;i.  ■■.hich 
claims,  in  spite  of  its  dualism,  to  1h>  able  to  ovtiroii.t    the 

'  Die  Quellen,  etc.,  §  24.  »  Ih..  p.  I2-i.  '  lb..  |  25 

'  ^5.,  p.  68.  roferring  to  Cornelius  :  Einhituny  in  du  PKHstnophu ,  pp.  2.7  ff. 


DUALISM   AND  ATTEMPTED   METAPHYSICS 


67 


Kantian  agnosticism  with  reference  to  the  thing-in-itself. 
In  this  article  he  sets  himseif  the  task  of  solving  the  prob- 
lem how  through  the  impression,  which  is  apparently  in  us, 
we  can  over  know  the  thing,  which  is  something  outside 
of  us.'  It  is  gonerally  supposed  by  philosophers,  he  remarks, 
that  things-in-themselves  are  unknowable;  but,  if  tljey  are 
unknowable,  why,  he  asky,  do  we  continue  to  speak  of 
them?  = 

After  defining  ♦he  thing-in-itsclf,  in  distinction  from  the 
appearance,  as  the  thing  which  continues  to  exist  while  it  is 
not  perceived,''  he  goes  on  to  say :  "The  law  holds  good  of  the 
thing,  even  when  I  do  not  see  it,  that  if  I  will  consider  it  under 
these  conditions,  it  will  have  a  certain  appearance,  and  if  under 
those  conditions,  a  certain  different  appearance.  This  whole 
law  is  independent  of  momentary  perception,  and  so  dogmatic 
idealism  is  not  correct,  for  we  know  that  this  laio  is  true  of  the 
object  even  when  I  do  not  perceive  it."  *  What  the  natural 
sciences,  physics  and  chemistry,  for  example,  teach  about 
things,  is  a  network  of  such  laws  for  our  perceptions.  Every 
physical  and  chemical  property  of  a  thing  therefore  denotes 
a  law  for  phenomena  accessible  under  definite  conditions. 
Since,  then,  every  such  law  gives  us  knowledge  of  the  thing- 
in-itself,  the  as.sertion  that  the  thing-in-itself  is  unknowable  is  a 
mere  prejudice.* 

Now,  apart  from  the  dualist ic  presuppositions,  this  claim 
to  know  at  least  the  laws  of  the  appearances  of  things  which 
exist  independently  of  their  appearances,  may  be  accepted  as 
valid.  From  our  own  point  of  view,  even  more  than  this 
can  be  known  of  the  thing-in-itself.  But  the  question  is, 
whether,  if  all  we  ever  know  directly  is  our  own  subjective  im- 
pressions and  constructs,  we  can  ever  know  that  independent 
things  exist.  Would  it  not  be  sufficient  to  say  that  the  law  is 
what  is  true  of  the  phenomenal  object  when  it  comes  into 
existence?  In  spite  of  our  practical  conviction  that  such  things 
do  exist,  and  that  we  can  and  do  know  them,  the  theoretical 
doubt  would  remain.     This  is  not,  of  course,  a  criticism  of  the 

'  "Die  Erkcnntnis  der  Dinco  .in  sich,"  Logos.  I,  1910.  p.  362. 

>  Ih.,  p.  ,3f)4.  •  /ft.,  p.  366. 

'  lb.,  p.  369  (coniiensed  translation).  '  lb.,  pp.  J69-70. 


68 


TUB   PItOULKM   OK   K\()VVLED(iK 


»      5 
I      I 


belt  'f  of  Cornelius,  that  wo  have  kiiowlnlKc  of  the  thiriR-in- 
itsclf ;  it  is  simply  a  rritirism  of  his  fiiiidamcntal  Iheonj,  which 
would  niako  it  forever  impossible  fully  to  ji    ''y  that  belief. 

Another  ermtemporary  (ierman  ti)inker  nniains  to  bo  ron- 
sidered  here,  \'\/..  0>\  aid  Kuelpe,  who,  in  his  ni.liun  to  his 
old  master,  Wundt,  may  bo  regarded  as  represontinK  the  move- 
ment away  from  idealism  in  the  direetion  of  an  essentially  non- 
id;'alistie  metaphysii  .il  ((jnstruetion.  Wundt  ealls  his  own 
system  ideal-roalisin,'  but  what  ho  has  aeeomplisheil  does  not 
amount  to  ,t  eompletelv  haruionious  syntliesis  of  idealistic  and 
realistic  points  of  view  in  epistmoloKy.  Rather  is  it,  as  oven 
his  disciple  recognizes,  a  fluctuation  between  a  disguised 
psychological  idealism  (included  by  Kuelpe  under  positivism) 
and  the  metaphysics  of  a  reality  iM'yond  the  reach  of  human 
experience  (though  not  beyond  the  reach  of  the  rational  thought- 
processes  of  the  special  scioncos).^  Wundt,  however,  rejects 
the  supposed  thing-in-itsolf,  inacc(>ssible  to  (xiM'rionce  and 
thought,  as  a  mere  fiction.'  Metaphysics  is  not  only  po.ssible 
but  necessary,  and  must  be  a  synthesis  of  the  special  sciences, 
physical  ;md  psychological.^ 

Kuelpe  is  quite  ready  to  follow  Wundt  in  th(^  attempt  to 
make  i)hilos()|)hy  a  synthesis  of  the  sciences,'  but  he  claims  that 
one  cannot  consistently  hold  to  the  reality  of  both  immediate 
e.xperience  anil  the  transcendent  objects  of  thought.  One 
must  choose  either  a  f)ositivistie  immediate  empiricism,  in  which 
ca.se  all  motaj)hysi«'al  creation  and  aspiration  are  to  be  eon- 
domnetl  as  futile,  or  else  a  "neo-rationalism,"  which  would 
regard  immediate  e.xperience  as  being  it'clf  nothing  real,  but 
a  stepping-stone  to  reality,  as  in  the  empirical  sci(>nces.«  Kuelpe 
himself  chooses  the  latter  alternative,  tlie  transcendental 
method,^  which  takes  non-<lependenc(>  upon  the  experiencing 
subject  as  the  mark  of  objective  reality.*     In  other  wortls,  in 

'  System  dtr  Phtl'inophif,  'M  cd.,  1907,  Vol.  I,  pp.  190-7.  Further  attention 
will  be  Kivei)  to  Wiinilt's  systetn  of  thoURht  in  Ch.  VI,  infra. 

'  Kuelpe,  PhiliiHophu  of  the  Pns:n>  •n  (hrmnriy,  EiiR.  Tr.,  pp.  217-19. 

»  Sy.tte-n,  etc.,  I.  p.  S4. 

*  Die  KuHitr  tier  Grgenwnrt.  I,  vi.  p.  V.i'l :   .<jn'.cm,  etc.,  I,  p.  9. 

'  PhiloHophy  ()/  the  Present  in  Gern  u  ly.  p.  C36. 

«  lb.,  pp.  21H-19,  2.3.'>,  24h-9. 

''  Erkenntniatheorie  und  .\'aturui:.aenschnft,  1910,  p.  40.  ■  Ih..  ;  ■  13. 


Dl-ALIHM   AND  ATTEM1»TKD   METAPHYSICS         69 

this  "critical  realism  of  natural  scioncp,"  '  which  takes  the 
results  of  the  natural  sciences  as  the  pattern  of  genuine  knowl- 
(hIrc,  the  criterion  of  reality  is  neither  purely  rational  nor 
|)urely  empirical,  hut  reality  is  that  which  is  found  by  abstract- 
itif;  from  all  the  subjectivities  of  pure  experience.* 

It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  the  presuppositions  of 
Kuelpe's  epistemoloRy  arc  more  frankly  dualistic  than  Wundt's. 
lOxperiences  as  such  do  not  show  anything  of  an  external  world 
Innoiid  themselves,  he  says;  they  are  completely  shut  in  to 
themselves.*  But  thought  can  transcend  experience  and  reach 
metaphysical  reality,  not  only  by  positing  the  external  world  as 
the  cnii.se  of  our  perception,'  but  further  by  taking  the  elements 
of  sense-experience  as  representing  external  corporeal  elements. 
This  view,  that  thought  has  the  power  of  transcending  ex- 
perience, he  defends,  in  addition  to  his  reference  to  the  success 
of  tlie  natural  sciences,  negatively,  in  his  claim  that  Kant  did 
not  prove  the  forms  of  thought  to  be  of  purely  subjective  valid- 
ity.* But  it  is  not  to  the  physical  sciences  alone  that  Kuelpe 
ai)i)eals  in  support  of  his  theory  that  rational  thought,  tran- 
scending the  immediately  given,  can  di.scover  the  independent 
reality  of  which  it  is  at  once  the  effect  and  the  representation. 
Ev(>n  psychic  reality,  he  contends,  is  not  inunediately  given  in 
expiMieiice,  but  has  to  be  sought  by  rational  thought  lu-hind 
the  phenomena  of  consciousness.^  Finally,  the  non-idealistic 
clianufer  of  his  metaphysics  appears  in  his  refusal  to  commit 
himself  to  the  doctrine  that  all  reality  is  to  be  determined  after 
the  analogy  of  the  mental  life ;  the  psychical,  he  insists,  is  no 
better  known  than  the  physical." 

When  we  raise  the  question  whether  Kuelpe  has  been  suc- 
cessful in  passing,  without  dogmatism,  from  epistemological 
dualism  to  knowledge  of  the  thing-in-itself,  the  answer  must 
be  negative.  We  would  agree  tliat  the  procedure  of  the  sciences 
ought  to  i)e  taken  as  our  best  guide  into  the  field  of  metaphy.sics, 
and  tiierefore  as  our  best  guide  to  the  solution  of  the  problems 
of  epistemology ;  but  those  sciences,  when  left  to  themselves, 
do  not  assume  that  reality  is  not  presented  at  all  in  immediate 

'  lb.,  p.  22.  » lb.,  p.  .34.  «  76.,  p.  20.  «  lb.,  p.  21. 

» lb.,  p.  22.  •  Immanuel  Kant.  .3d  ed..  1912,  pp.  77-80. 

'  Philosophy  of  the  Present,  etc.,  pp.  222-35.  •  lb.,  p.  235. 


^ 


MICROCOPY    RESOLUTION   TEST   CHART 

(ANSI  and  ISO  TEST  CHART  No.  2i 


1.0 


I.I 


1.25 


>«  lips 

m 

1^  IIIIIM 

2.2 

1^ 

^ 

I:  i^ 

I:  m 

2.0 

L.      ^ 

1 

1.8 

1.4 

1.6 

^  APPLIED  IM/1GE     Inc 

r^S  Roc^>estef.    New    Voft.         '4609        uSA 

""^  C^'e)    482  -  G^OO  -  Phcne 

:^=  (716)    :rP   -    59S'3    ■   r,]. 


q\)i 


70 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  KNOWLEDGE 


1 M 


•   », 


n 


I  if.' 


:  ■■'.* 

I: 


tivP  rollV  ^""'P^  """^'^  ^°  1^"««^  that  an  objec- 

Uve  reahty  ,s  rcpm..«/.rf  in    consciousness,    without    haWn^ 
ever  been  presented  there,  is  not  made  apparent      Thrrtll 

IS  possible,  IS  allowed  to  remain  unanswered 

Bertrand  Russell,  in  his  Problems  of  Philosophy,  >  concedes 
ha   solipsism  cannot  be  strictly  proved  to  be  fdse    but  cla'ms 
hat  there  is  not  the  slightest  reason  to  suppose   that  ftl 
rue.     Moreover,  it  is  a  simpler  hypothesis  Tsuppose   tha 
there  are  external  physical  objects  to  which  ou  Xcept  on 
oT  1  nirf  f  T  '  '''''  ^^«'^-'  ^his  is  the  instinc   ve  b« 
dual  r  This   ^     y  '^''''""^'-^y  «"gg««ted  here  is  decidedfy 
aualistic.    This  dualism  seems  to  centre  in  RusspII'«  ^«„. 
of  .space,  influenced  as  that  has  been  b^the  n^^Euci  d^^^^^^ 
geometries.    While  it  is  maintained  that  L  t  me-orS^^^^^ 
events  seem  to  have  is  the  .same  as  the  time^r Th   h  ^ 
really  have,'  it  is  contended  that  we  can  know  nothing  of  vthl^ 
physical  space  in  itself  is  like,  but  only  that  the  airanlement  ' 

=3:;:=aHSE-'i::>:i 

^t.ll  dependent  unon  the  appeal  to  "instinctive  belief  ''»    And 

an  '£z^  SifiSrU'i^i^'trir  ■"  r*^"'^  ^'^-^  '^-^  --^--e 

dc.«roe  of  con.i.tonry    -m  c-x  ro,„o  f  c  "  *! '''"  '°  ^"''^  ""*•  '''^^  "  high 

wh.ch  does  not  lioop™  "o  tho  "h.,""'  """""■^'''^  •'Pi^temolorioal  monism. 
To  this  lutor  forn.  ThuIIu  Z  ZTlTTuT'  '"  *''''  ''"''''''  'I'— -■ 
tion  of  the  new  realisn.,  Chs  X  to  xiTl   ilt  "  *°  '"'''  '"^  °"'  ^"™''»»- 

«  n.  ProW.;„,  0/  Philosophy,  pp.  27,  34-5   37-8 
'''•■P-52.  V6..  pp.  49,  50.  .-/fc  ,  pp.  37-».  230. 


DUALISM  AND  ATTEMPTED  METAPHYSICS         71 

so  we  see  that  Russell,  as  a  result  of  his  approximation  to 
epistemological  dualism,  has  a  narrow  escape  from  agnosticism 
if,  indeed,  he  may  be  said  really  to  have  escaped  it  at  all. 

As  a  result,  then,  of  our  investigation  of  recent  attempts 
to  construct  a  positive  metaphysical  system  upon  the  basis  of 
an  absolutely  dualistic  epistemology,  we  must  conclude  that 
no  such  metaphysical  system  can  logically  be  regarded  as 
knowledge,  for  the  reason  that  its  verification  by  reference  to 
immediate  experience  is  impossible.  The  only  metaphysics 
possible  for  the  epistemological  dualist  is  dogmatics 


(I 


I  ra 


*\  I 


% 


m 


2.    A  CRITIQUE  OF  IDEALISM 


^haptb:r  V 


i  i 


Mystical  and  Logical  Idealism 

In  absolute  epistoinoloKical  dualisui,  which  we  have  ex- 
amined in  th;'  three  immediately  preceding  chapters,  there  is 
asserted  an  astential  or  minierieal  duality  between  what  is 
perceived  a  I  what  is  independently  real.  Corresponding  to 
the  two  sides  in  this  absolute  dualism,  the  perceptual,  or  con- 
scious, and  the  real,  respectively,  we  have  in  n^cent  and  con- 
temporary philosophy  two  forms  of  absolute  epistemological 
monism,  the  one  itlealistic  and  the  other  realistic.  The  realis- 
tic form  would  overcome  the  dualism  by  cancelling  the  i)ercep- 
tual  or  conscious  content,  holding  it  to  be  nothing  in  addition 
to  the  independent  reality.  The  idealistic  type  of  epi.stemo- 
logical  monism,  at  least  in  its  usual  forms,  would  avoid  the 
dualism  by  eliminating  the  other  term,  the  independent  reality, 
holding  the  real  object  to  be  nothing  in  addition  to  u  perceptual 
or  other  conscious  ccntc^nt,  as  such.  If  either  form  of  episte- 
mological monism  can  with  reasonableness  be  nuiintained,  it 
will  prove  a  solid  foundation  for  the  assertion  that  knowledge 
is  possil)le. 

Of  the  two  forms  of  absolute  epistemological  monism,  we 
shall  first  take  up  for  v'onsideration  the  ideahstic.  This  ideal- 
istic absolute  epistemological  monism,  or  "epistemological 
monism  and  idealism"  as  it  was  designated  in  the  recent  report 
of  the  Conunittee  on  D(>finitions  of  the  American  Philosophical 
A,s.sociation,  was  ilefined  by  that  connuittee  as  the  view  that 
"the  real  object  and  the  perceived  object  are,  at  the  moment  of 
perception,  numeiically  one,  and  the  real  object  cannot  exist 
at  otiier  moments  independently  of  any  perception." '  This 
definition  needs  to  be  supi)lemented,  however,  if  it  is  to  cover 

'  Journal  nf  Phih>.-u,,,hu.  I'ti.,  Vol.  VIll,  lUU.  p.  703. 

72 


MYSTICAL  AND   LOGICAL  IDEALISM 


73 


the  various  types  of  theoretical  idealism  in  their  epistemological 
aspect.  In  some  types  of  idealism  the  reality  is  identified 
with  the  immediate  datum  of  consciousness,  considered  as  a 
part  of  consciousness ;  but  in  other  cases  it  is  identified  with  a 
predicate,  the  result  of  an  abstraction  from  the  immediately 
given.  We  may  say,  then,  that  the  idealistic  form  of  absolute 
epistemological  monism  is  the  doctrine  that  the  real  object  and 
tlie  percept  or  an  abstract  are,  at  the  moment  of  perception  or 
of  thought,  numerically  one,  and  that  the  real  object  is  depend- 
ent for  its  existence  in  the  one  ca.se  upon  perception,  and  in  the 
other  case  (although  the  relation  is  partially  obscured)  upon 
thought. 

Before  examining  in  detail  the  principal  varieties  of  ideal- 
ism, it  may  be  well  to  intimate  that  we  have  nothing  to  say 
against,  either  practical  idealism  or  a  certain  relative  theoretical 
idealism.  By  practical  idealism  is  meant  the  view  that  there 
are  i(1e<tls  which  have  valid  authority  over  every  personal  life, 
and  which  one  mu.st  therefore  assume  to  be,  at  least  ultimately 
and  progressively,  realizable.  More  particularly,  it  is  the 
doctrine  that  the  spiritual  or  "ideal"  interests  are  properly 
ends,  and  other  interests  ultimately  mere  means  ;  that  the  ideal, 
also,  in  so  far  as  it  gains  subjective  existence,  is  a  real,  efficient 
factor  in  the  changes  which  take  place  in  the  objective  world. 
()l>viously,  if  our  customary  terminology  were  more  accurate, 
this  practical  idealism  alone  would  bear  the  name  of  ideal-ism ; 
theoretical  idealism,  the  doctrine  that  reality  is  essentially 
idea,  in  some  sense  of  the  word,  is,  strictly  speaking,  not  ideal- 
ism, but  jrfea-ism.  But  it  should  be  noted,  at  any  rate,  that 
idea-ism  (theoretical  idealism)  has  gained  much  of  its  prestige 
from  the  ideal-ism  with  which  it  is  so  often  confused,  and  whose 
name  it  bears.' 

But  we  also  mentioned  a  relative  theoretical  idealism,  as 
not  to  be  controverted  here.  By  this  designation  we  mean 
the  view  that  in  some  cases  it  happens  that  certain  qualities 
or  relations  of  real  objects  are  produced  directly  by  thought 

'  .St'o,  for  cx.iinplc.  Ladd's  Knowlrdai;  Life  and  Realiiy.  p.  54,  where,  after 
rmphasis  upon  thr  nitlity  uf  i-iuals  as  ■■spiritual  faffs  :inrl  forces."  the  remark  I* 
ailded  that  ideahsni  has  always  been  ■'the  'school'  v.'hich  has  commanded  the 
adherence  of  the  ehoi<est  spirits,  as  well  as  the  most  thoughtful  minds." 


i 

t<'       ] 

'.  .! 

1  ^* 


31^ 


74 


THE   PROBLEM  OF   KNOWLEDGE 


,;  ^1. 


It 


and  the  underlying  purpose.  Sometimes  a  thing  becomes 
what  the  purpose  and  thought  of  an  individual  or  of  a  group 
take  it  to  be,  even  although  it  does  not  possess  the  quality  or 
relation  in  question  apart  from  the  thought  and  purpose  of  the 
said  individual  or  group.  An  obvious  instance  is  tlio  giving 
of  a  name  for  the  first  time.  The  same  is  also  true  o.  valua- 
tion in  some  cases ;  an  object  often  comos  to  have  a  value  which 
is  fictitious  without  being  unreal ;  it  depends  for  its  existence 
upon  the  thought  which  thinks  it,  and  yet,  at  the  same  time, 
relatively,  to  the  individual  or  the  group  concerned,  it  is  a  real 
value  of  the  object.  The  view  which  recognizes  both  the  reality 
of  such  qualities  and  relations,  and  their  status  as  immediately 
dependent  upon  purpose  and  thought,  might  justly,  enough  be 
called  a  relative  theoretical  idealism;  and  whatever  might 
prwve  to  be  the  case  with  other  varieties  of  theoretical  idealism, 
this  at  least  could  be  defended  as  undogmatic  and  true.  It  so 
happens,  however,  that  the  name  "ideahsL  "  is  not  commonly 
applied  to  this  doctrine. 

Leaving  out  of  consideration,  then,  what  we  have  called 
practical  idealism  and  relative  idealism,  let  us  turn  to  philo- 
sophical or  theoretical  idealism,  in  the  common  acceptation 
of  the  term,  and  view  its  varieties  in  relation  to  the  problem  of 
acquaintance  with  reality.  In  undertaking  a  classification 
of  the  various  idealistic  theories  the  most  natural  procedure 
would  probably  be  to  divide  them  according  to  their  deriva- 
tion into  (1)  those  based  upon  the  subject-matter  of  judgments 
in  its  experif^nced  immediacy  as  it  enters  into  the  conscious- 
ness of  the  individual,  and  (2)  those  based  upon  the  predicate, 
the  mediating  clement.  The  idealism  of  immediacy,  however, 
includes  two  main  forms,  viz.  mystical  and  psychological 
idealism,  both  of  which  seem  to  be  based  upon  the  suggestion 
that  since  we  learn  what  objects  —  in  particular,  physical 
objects  —  are  through  immediate  mystical  or  sense-experience, 
this  their  appearance  in  immediate  experience  constitutes  the 
whole  of  tin  ir  reality.  The  idealism  whose  appeal  is  to  the 
predicate  rather  than  to  the  subject-matter  of  the  judgment, 
the  idealism  of  the  (^'ogicaD  idea,  and  thus  the  form  which  has 
a  peculiar  claim  to  be  regarded  as  idealism  proper,  may  be 
designated  logical  idealism.    It  seems  to  rest  upon  the  sugges- 


MYSTICAL  AND   LOGICAL   IDEALISM 


75 


tion  that  since  we  learn  what  objects  are  through  ideas,  predi- 
cates, things  themselves  must  be  ideas,  or  combinations  of 
ideas.  We  propose,  then,  in  entering  upon  our  critique  of  ideal- 
ism, to  begin  by  examining  these  three  elemental  types,  which, 
to  name  them  in  the  chronological  order  of  their  becoming 
historically  important,  are  mystical  idealism,  logical  ideaUsm, 
and  psychological  idealism,  respectively. 


I 


Mystical  Idealism 

Mystical  idealism  is  an  interpretation  of  the  physical  world 
with  its  contained  objects,  under  the  influence  of  suggestions 
arising  from  mystical  experience,  as  being  maya,  mere  decep- 
tive appearance,  mere  idea  in  "mortal  mind."  Since,  in  the 
more  extreme  phases  of  the  mystical  state,  through  rapt  con- 
centration of  soul  upon  the  religious  Object,  the  Absolute  One, 
distinct  consciousness  of  the  physical  environment  lapses,  this 
disappearance  of  the  material  world  is  interpreted  by  the  mystic 
as  meaning  the  unreality  of  matter,  especially  since  the  mystical 
state  is  felt  to  have  a  value  far  transcending  that  of  ordinary 
consciousness.'  This  seems  the  most  natural  explanation  of 
the  religious  philosophy  of  Yajnavalkhya  and  the  other  sages 
of  the  Hindu  Upanishads.  One  does  not  forget,  indeed,  that 
Deussen  seems  to  lold  that  Hindu  mysticism  was  a  practical 
consequence  of  the  speculative  -^taphysics  of  the  sages,  rather 
than  the  source  from  which  they  received  their  original  sugges- 
tions and  the  norm  with  reference  to  which  they  controlled 
their  speculations,^  but  his  position  is  virtually  assumed 
rather  than  proved.  He  refers  to  the  comparative  lateness 
both  of  the  Yoga  Upanishad,  containing  the  practical  instruc- 
tions for  cultivating  the  mystical  experience,  and  of  the  teach- 
ing concerning  turiya,  the  fourth,  or  mystical  state  of  the  soul ; ' 
but  this  must  not  be  taken  as  conclusive  evidence.  Technical 
instruction  for  reproducing  mystical  states  would  not  in  i.ny 
case  be  likely  to  be  committed  to  writing  until  after  the  theo- 

'  Cf.  Delacroix,  Etudes  d'histoire  tt  de  psyc'uologie  du  myaticisme,  p.  370  ;  G.  A. 
Coe,  "The  Sources  of  the  Mystical  Revelation,"  Hibbert  Journal,  VI,  1908,  pp. 
;iG3-5. 

=  P.  Deussen,  Philosophy  of  the  Upanishads,  Eng.  Tr.,  pp.  342.  383. 

"  lb.,  p.  309. 


i 


TT 


70 


THE    PROBLEM   OF    KXO\VLED(iK 


El 


logical  dogmas  suggcstcil  by  tluit  experience  had  gained  con- 
siderable prestige,  such  as  might  have  come  thrftugh  their 
being  put  into  literary  form,  as  in  the  earlier  I'panishads.'  And 
as  for  the  lateness  of  the  idea  of  the  fourth  state  {thriya),  the 
explanation  may  conceivably  be  that  the  mystical  state  was 
formerly  meant  to  be  included  in  the  third  state  of  dreamless 
sleep  {prajnn),  in  which,  while  there  is  no  consciousness  in  an 
empirical  sense,  the  self  is  not  aimiiiilated,  but  becom-s  '  nti- 
fied  with   the  one  supreme  Spirit.     The  fourth  stat*  jrs 

only  in  that  the  unification  with  the  supreme  Spirit  is-  .uized 
in  a  consciousness ;  when  the  false  knowleilge  of  the  first  two 
states  (ordinary  consciousness  and  dreams)  and  the  no  knowl- 
edge of  the  third  state  vanish,  then  the  fourth  starte  is  reached.'- 
What  this  suggests  is  that  prajna  is,  or  includes,  the  mystic 
unconsciousness,  while  turiija  is  either  the  mystic  consciousness, 
succeeding  the  condition  of  trance,  or  the  trance  itself,  inter- 
preted, in  the  light  of  later  reflection,  as  being  a  sort  of  super- 
consciousness.  In  either  case  the  idea  of  turiyn  would  be  merely 
a  later  supplement  to  a  previously  existing  doctrine  of  the  mysti- 
cal state. 

But  the  evidence  upon  which  we  mainly  rely  for  our  con- 
viction that  the  idealistic  ini'  rpretation  of  the  physical  world 
in  the  philosophy  of  the  Upanishads  was  originally  based,  at 

'  It  may  bo,  as  some  scholar.-i  {e.g.  E.  W.  Hopkins,  H.  OliJenbcriz,  Die  Leh;e 
tier  Vpnuinhnden  unit  die  Ahfange  des  Hiiddhismiix,  1111."),  pp.  M),  90)  assort,  that 
tlio  idoalistio  inny<i  doctriiio  is  not  olcarly  discovorablo  in  tho  vory  iildo.'it  of  the 
L'pauishuds.  This  would  only  brinu  the  date  of  tho  boKinnins  of  what  wo  take 
to  bo  tho  niystioal  idealism  of  those  writings  down  oloaor  to  tho  time  of  the 
umlisputed  existence  of  niysti<al  practice.  Hut  even  if  we  should  a^roo  with 
these  scholars  in  contradistincti(Mi  from  Doussen  with  reference  to  the  explicit 
teachiiiK  of  the  oldest  I'panisliads,  wo  could  still  point  out  on  the  one  hand  that 
those  earliest  philosophical  writings  contain  a  monistic  (sinRularistie)  idealism 
in  which  the  iiiiiyn  doctrine  is  at  least  implicit,  and  on  the  other  hand  that  there 
was  what  we  may  regard  as  a  crude  and  primitive  mystical  practi<'e  and  experi- 
ence in  the  shamanistie  reliKion  of  llio  seers  of  tho  late  RiR-Voda  period.  Cioorgo 
r.  Moore  says  of  tho  methods  omploy(>d  by  Hindu  mystics  for  tho  purpose  of 
inducing  trance  states,  ".Vt  a  later  time  those  methods  are  systomatised  in  the 
Yoga,  hill  in  e.s.'ientidl.f  the  iiiitlidd  iti  rery  M:  it  had  a  place  in  Uuddhism  from 
the  boKinning"  (Hi.itury  of  UeUgionti.  I,  l'.tl3,  p.  27s,  italics  mine);  but,  on 
the  basis  of  what  has  just  been  >:vid,  we  should  judge  it  probable  that  Hindu 
mysticism  was  at  least  as  early  as  Hindu  idealism,  and  that  the  latter  rests  upon 
the  former. 

'  Deussen,  op.  cit„  p.  311. 


M 


m 


MYSTICAL   AND   LOGICAL   IDEALISM 


77 


least  in  large  measure,  upon  sugKestions  derived  from  mystical 
e  .,Jorienccs,  we  find  in  the  remarkable  correspondence  between 
the    characteristic    doctrines    of    the    Upanishads   and    what 
would  be  most  naturally  suggested  by  the  psychological  fea- 
tures of  extreme  mysticism.     The  doctrine  of  the  sole  reality 
of  Brahman  would  naturally  be  suggesteil  by  the  experience 
of  rapt  mystic  contemplation,  when  all  but  the  divine  (Jne 
lapses  from  consciousness.     Moreover,  it  is  noteworthy  that 
it  is  chiefly  with  regard  to  Brahman  (originally  the  <  "-od  of  my.stic 
powerandofprai/er),  who  during  the  Brahmana  period  gradu- 
ally displaced    Prajapati  (the   Lord  of  creatcres),'  that  this 
doctrine  was  formulated.     That   Brahman   (the   Al)solute)    is 
Atman  (th.  Absolute  Self,  one's  own  true  Self)  is  a  characteristic 
doctrine  of  the  mystics;  we  are  reminded  of  Madame  Guyon, 
whose  illumination  came  as  a  consequence  of  the  suggestion 
that  God  is  to  be  sought  within  one's  own  heart  .=    The  sole 
reality  of  the  Atman  and  the  illusory  character  consequently 
to  be  ascribed  to  the  seemingly  independently  real  world  of 
appearance  are  mystical  doctrines  which  seem  to  be  at  least 
incipiently  present  in  what  scholars  take  to  be  the  oldest  of 
the  Upanishads.'       That  knowleilge  of   the  Atman  is  not  a 
means  to  emancipation  {moksha)  simply,  but  is  emancipation, 
could  hardly  have  1  -on  suggested  otherwise  than  in  a  mystical 
experience  at  onr    '  '      '        lation  and  emotional  uplift.*    In  the 
description  of  T  ./e  have  the  usual  negative  theology 

of  the  mystics;*  a.  dc  ^nrinc  of  God  as  being  in  relation  to 
the  universe  is  to  t)-  ui  derstood  as  the  result  of  accommodation 
to  the  point  of  view  of  ignorance  (ar/rfya) .«  Moreover 
the  identification  of  the  divine  One  with  the  syllable  "Om"' 
seems  almost  meaningless,  except  in  view  of  the  fact  that  con- 

'  76..  p.  86. 

«  CI.  Kathaka-upanishad,  2.  4.  1,  "The  wise  man  riRht  within  saw  the  Atman, 
Fastened  his  gaze  on  himself,  seeking  the  Eternal."  See  Deussen,  op.  e((.,  p.  S4, 
and  Sacred  Books  of  the  East,  Vol.  XV,  p.  15. 

'£.(;.  Brihndarnnuaka-uimnuhad.  2.4,  3.1-4..5;  r.  Sacred  Books  of  the  East. 
Vol.  XV,  pp.  1()H-13,  121-8.';. 

«  Brihadaranyaka-upanishad,  4.2-4  ;  v.  S.B.E.,  XV,  pp.  l.iS-81  ;  cf.  Deussen, 

op.  cit.,  pp.  344-55. 

I  Muvdakn-njianishad,  1.1.5,0:   r.  S.B.E.,  XV,  pp.  27-8. 

•  Of.  Deussen,  op.  cit.,  p.  159. 

'  Seetasvatara-upanishad,  4.18 ;  i>.  S.B.E.,  XV,  253  ;  Deussen.  op.  cit.,  p.  352. 


I, 


I     H^ 


i 

2 


■. 


78 


THE   PROBLEM   OP    KNOVVLEDOE 


n 


i  I 


centration  of  att«'ntioii  upon  tliis  yllaMe  was  useil  as  a  means 
of  inducing,  by  sclf-hypnotizution,  a  mystical  experience.  Evin 
if  sacred  associations  may  liave  l)<>en  established  in  other  ways, 
still  the  result  of  mystical  practice  and  rxperieiice  would  be  to 
bring  alxiut  a  more  intimate  relation  Ix-tween  the  syllable  and 
the  idea  of  the  (Uvine  Being.  It  seems  equally  inipo.ssihle,  apart 
from  this  reference  to  my.sticism,  to  appreciate  the  basis  of 
Yajnavalkhya's  declaration, "  Brahman  is  bliss  and  knowledge."' 
The  depreciation  of  action,  or  works,  as  "that  evil  thing,"  with 
which  tho.se  who  find  the  Atman  are  "no  longer  stained"' 
strongly  suggests  the  influence  of  a  qui<'tistie  type  of  mysticism. 
(It  is  not  denied,  of  course,  that  the  whole  karma  doctrine,  of 
which  the  passage  just  cited  seems  to  be  an  expression,  has 
other  roots  besides  this  of  mysticism.)  A  similar  significance 
should  probably  be  found  in  the  fact  that  the  ear' I'st  known 
appearance  of  asceticism  is  claimed  as  having  been  among  the 
Indian  people ;  ^  fasting  and  other  rigors,  endured  at  first 
perhaps  involuntarily,  may  have  led  at  times  to  the  mystic 
trance ;  naturally,  then,  such  practices  would  be  adopted  as  a 
voluntary  system  of  self-discipline,  looking  to  a  repetition  of  so 
highly  valued  an  experience. 

In  view,  then,  of  the  thoroughly  mystical  character  of  the 
doctrines  associated  with  early  Indian  idealism,  we  feel  war- 
ranted in  taking  the  latter  as  an  instance  of  mj'stical  idealism, 
in  the  sense  definetl.  Here,  as  elsewhere,  the  primitive  explana- 
tion of  experience  was  ontologieal,  rather  than  psychological ; 
the  Hindu  mysticism  was  a  .source,  as  well  as,  in  its  later  de- 
velopment, a  consequence  of  Hindu  philosophy.  Deussen's 
conclusion  has  not  improbably  been  influenced  by  his  very  evi- 
dent interest  in  finding  a  confirmation  of  his  own  philosophy 
in  being  able  to  think  of  it  as  worked  out,  primarily  by  the 
speculative  method,  by  the  sages  of  ancient  India,  as  well  as 
by  Parmenides  and  Plato  in  a  lent  Greece,  and  again  inde- 
pendently by  Kant  and  Schopenhauer  in  modern  Europe.* 
His  bias  is  further  shown  by  his  statement  that  the  thought 


'  Brihadaranynka-upanishad,  4.1  ;   r.  S.B.E.,  XV,  pp.  153,  157. 

'  Taiiti.riya-hrahTn(inarn,  3.12.9.S;    r.  Deu^sfli,  op.  cit,,  p.  373. 

'  Dcussen,  op.  cit.,  p.  Ci. 

•  lb.,  pp.  40-1  ;   The  System  of  the  Vedanta,  Eng.  Tr.,  pp.  47-9. 


1^    :ii 


MYSTICAL   AND   LOGICAL    IDKALISM 


79 


that  the  entire  universe  is  only  appearance,  and  not  reality, 
is  the  presumption  and  sine  qua  non  of  all  religion.' 

Among  the  mediaeval  mystics  we  mee*  with  mystical  idealism 
ipain,  and  in  some  cases  wo  may  even  see  it  in  process  of  forma- 
tion     Thus  Albertus  Magnus  writes:    "Whc.i  thou  prayest, 
shut  thy  door— i.f    the  doors  of  thy  senses.  ...       A  mind 
free  from  all  occupations  and  distractions  ...  is  in  a  manner 
transformed  into  God,  for  it  can  think  of  nothing,  and  love 
nothing,  except  God  ;  other  creatures  and  itself  it  sees  only  in  God. 
.  .  .  Do  not  think  about  the  world,  nor  about  thy  friends,  nor 
about   the  past,  present  or  future.     But  consider  thyself  to  be 
outside  of  the  world  and  (done  with  (Sod,  as  if  thy  soul  were  al- 
ready separated  from  the  body  and  had  no  longer  any  interest 
in  peace  or  war,  or  the  state  of  the  world.     Leave  thy  body  and 
fix  thy  gaze  on  the  uncreated  Light.     Let  nothing  come  between 
thee  and  God.     The  soul  in  contemplation  views  the  world  from 
afar  off."-    According  to  Eckhart,  again,  the  soul  can  know 
finite  and  material  things  only  by  creating  images  of  such  things,' 
but  the  mystic  is  one  who  "  has  renounced  all  visible  creatures."  * 
Eckhart  teaches  definitely  that  out  of  God  there  is  nothing 
but  nonentity.     The  independent  existence  of  single  oVjjects 
is  mere  appearance,  having  its  source    in    humaii    thought.* 
In  the    Theologia  Germanica,  once  more,  we  read,  "The  two 
eyes  of  the  soul  of  a  man  cannot  both  perform  their  work  at 
once  ;  but  if  the  soul  shall  see  with  the  right  eye  into  eternity, 
then  the  left  eye  must  close  itself  and  refrain  from  working,  and 
be  as  though  it  were  dead."  «    In  all  these  passages  the  'octrine 
seems  to  be  that  the  would-be  mystic  must  learn  to  treat  the 
finite  and  material  world  as  unreal,  until  it  comes  to  seem  as 
unreal  as  it  really  is. 

In  modern  times  perhaps  our  best  example  of  mystical  ideal- 
ism, whether  it  be  regarded  as  taken  over  from  traditional 


See  R.  M.  Jones,  Studies 


'  Philosophy  of  the  Upanishads,  p.  45. 

2  Ih  Adharendo  Deo,  1st  paraRraph  ;    italics  mine. 
in  Mynlical  Religion,  1909,  p.  219. 

'  Mi/.-itiKche  Schriflen.  p.  15. 

« .Strn.fhoura  Sermons. 

'  PfeilTer's  Deutsche  Mystiker,  Vol.  II,  pp.  207,  5»9 ;   see  Ueberweg's  History 
of  Philosophy,  EnR.  Tr.,  Vol.  I.  pp.  475-6. 

•  Ch.  7 ;  italics  mine. 


fi 


Ml 


in  i 


80 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   KXOWLEDOE 


sources,  or  as  originatod  out  of  mystical  experiences,'  is  to  be 
found  in  the  teachinKs  of  Mrs.  Mary  Baker  (J.  Eddy.     She 
writes:   "To  understand  that  the  E^o  is  Mind,  and  that  there 
is  but  one  Mind  .  .  .  begins  at    once   to   destroy   the   errors 
of  mortal  sense."     "Mortal  existence  is  a  dream  without  a 
dreamer."     "Rely  not  in  the  least  on  the  evidences  of  the 
senses."     "Ail  is  mind,  there  is  no  matter,  and  you  are  only 
seeing;   and   fet  liny;   your   belief."     "When   we   say,    'I    have 
burned  my  finser,'  that  is  a  correct  statement,  for  mortal  mind 
an.i  not  inatter  burns  the  finger."     "Man  is  not  sick  ;  for  mind 
is  not  sick,  and  matter  cannot  be."  "     Mrs.  Eddy  is  to  be 
credited  with  having  endeavored  to  take  ii.r  mystical  idealism 
seriously,  at  least  in  the  treatment  of  bodily  ills  as  non-existent. 
But  even  in  this  realm  she  had  to  acknowledge  limitations.     It 
is  a  surprising  lapse  in  the  direction  of  common  sense,  when 
she  writes,  "Until  the  age  advancing  admits  the  efficacy   and 
supremacy  of  mind,  it   is  better  to  leave   the  adjustment  of 
broken  bones  and  dislocations  to  a  surgeon,  while  you  are  re- 
constructing mentally,  and  preventing  inflammation  or  pro- 
tracted   confinement.  .  .  .     Mental    surgery  is    the    highest 
branch  of  metaphysical  science,  and  will  be  understood  and 
demonstrated   the   last."' 

An  elaborate  refiitation  of  mystical  idealism  is  unnecessary. 
It  rest'=  upon  no  more  stable  ''oundation  than  the  notion 
that  what  lapses  from  consciousness  in  a  special  state  ot 
mind  is  thereby  shown  to  have  been  unreal,  non-existent. 
And  in  practical  life,  as  is  notorious,  it  cannot  but  refute 
itself. 

'  Thorp  are  indications  tiict  Mrs.  Eddy's  philosophy  was  not  sompthing 
merely  takpn  ovor  from  others  or  pvolvcd  sprrr.'.ati'.  •  'y,  l>ut  that  it  was  to  some 
pxtent  rooted  in  inystioal  or  (iuasi-m\  sti<-al  e-porioncps.  When  a  ohild  she 
often  experienced  amlitory  automatisms;  she  also  tells  of  "a  soft  glow  of  in- 
pffablp  joy"  expprienced,  while  still  a  child,  in  response  to  prayer  and  accom- 
panied by  physical  healinR.  With  reference  to  her  peculiar  doctrines  the 
following  <iuotatioii  is  sicnificant :  '■When  apparently  near  the  confines  of 
the  death-valley,  I  learned  certain  truths:  that  all  real  beinu  is  the  divine 
Mind  and  i.iea,"  etc.  Her  constant  claim  was  that  the  contents  of  her  book 
came  to  her  by  "revelation."  Sep  F.  S.  Hoffman,  The  Sphere  of  Rehgton,  pp. 
!s.s-i>l(). 
'   »  Science  and  Health.  IhHl  ed.,  Vol.  I,  pp.  68,  121.  187.  189,  22<j.  233. 

•  lb.,  p.  220. 


Ill: 


MYSTICAL   AND    UHHCiiL   IDEALISM 


81 


Logical  Idenlixm 

There  is  a  second  eleinentiil  tvpe  of  ideiilistn,  which  we  may 
call  logical  idealism.  In  preliiiuiiury  fusliioii  it  may  l)e  (U-fined 
us  the  form  of  idealism  sunnested  l.y  iTtlection  upon  the  logical 
or  dialectical  process.  Its  most  important  historic  exempl'fi- 
ciition  is  to  be  found,  we  would  say,  in  the  system  of  Pluto ; 
hut  inasnmeh  as  there  has  come  to  be  some  divergence  of  opmio- 
as  to  what  Plato's  doctrine  really  was,  some  brief  indication 
of  the  interpretation  we  have  adopted  must  needs  be  offered. 

The  recent  contention  on  th(>  part  of  Paul  Natorp  and 
J.  A.  Stewart  that  Plato's  d(jctriiie  of  ideas  w..s  essentially 
methodological,  rather  than  metuphysi.  V  is  worthy  of  seri- 
ous attention.  The  topics  chosen  for  lialectical  discussion 
in  the  dialogues  indicate  that  Plato  share  J  the  fundamentally 
practicJ  and  ethical  interest  of  his  master;  but,  probably  to 
an  even  greater  degree  than  for  Socrates  himself,  the  "So- 
cratic"  method  became  to  the  pupil  an  independent  object  of 
interest.'  The  dialogues  were  manifestly  written  not  alone 
to  set  fort'u  an  ethical  and  political  doctrine,  but  also  very 
largely  as  illustrating  the  dialectical  method  of  arriving  at 
adequate  definitions. 

But  the  problem  of  vindicating  the  possibility  of  knowledge 
had  become  a  real  one,  especially  in  view  of  the  sceptical  no- 
Jons  propagated  by  the  Sophists;  and  for  Plato  the  answer 
to  the  epistemological  question,  practically  at  least,  .seems  to 
have  been  virtually  contained  in  the  metliodolopv  he  ho' 
learned  to  employ.  In  true  judgment,  and  espt.  .:'y  in  th'^ 
case  of  the  adequate  definition,  the  predicate,  as  w.  shall  sce,- 
has  value,  for  practical  purposes,  as  a  substitute  for  further 
immediate  experience  of  the  thing  of  which  it  is  predicated. 
Now  this  functional  equivalence  of  the  predicate,  or  logical  idea, 
with  the  reality  under  consideration  is  very  far  from  being  an 

.  See.  for  example,  Euthyphro.  5.  6.  11  ;  Charmides.  159  ff.  ^  ■^"f"":.  ^f  "f  ^ 
Meno,  71-3,  97-8  ;  Gorgias,  448  ff. ;  Ly.is.  212  ff. ;  Republic.  50<  .511,  o33  o96. 
l.-.Theaeietus.  ISO,  20H:    To/tou..  285 ;    La...  965.     C  •  P-  Nator,^  PWo, 

Ideenlehre;    J.  A.  Stewart,  Plato»  Doctrine  "f  ^'i''">-^^^%\^^^  4  ^ae 

XIX    1910   pp.   117-21.    (f.  .\.  E.  Taylor,  Mind.  N.S.,  V.  1896,  pp.  297-326, 

483-507  .    VI,  1897,  pp.  9-39;   XIX.  1910,  pp.  s2-97 ;   Halo,  1903. 

'  Ch.  XIX,  infra. 


f  ll 


82 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   KNOWLEDGE 


absolute  identity  of  the  two ;  and  yet  it  would  seem  that  Plato 
tended  to  confuse  the  one  with  the  other.  In  seeking  to  know 
the  reality  under  discussion,  one  was  seeking  its  true  definition 
with  the  help  of  which  it  could  be  more  adequately  known ;  it 
was  a  natural,  although  illogical,  conclusion  that  the  reality, 
the  real  nature  or  essence  of  anything,  in  just  its  definition. 
The  '"is"  of  predication  was  here  turned  into  the  "is"  of 
absolute  iilcntity.  Having  once  arrived  at  the  adequate  logi- 
cal idea,  the  absolutely  satisfactory  ami  universall}'  valid  predi- 
cate, it  was  assumeil  that  one  would  have  the  essence,  the  per- 
manent reality,  of  the  thing.  Things  coukl  be  regarded  as 
essentially  knowable,  apprehensible  by  rational  intelligence, 
since  ideas  (instead  of  being  tuicen  as  the  instrntneiits  of  knowl- 
edge, which  the\-  primarily  are)  were  set  up  as  being  the  true 
and  indeed  the  only  objects  of  knowledge,  the  reality  of  the  thing 
being  at  the  same  time  identified  with  the  "alisolute  idea"  or 
'"universal."  '  This  tloctrine  that  the  reality  is  the  (logical) 
idea,  making  it  possible,  in  spite  of  the  supposed  fact  that  only 
ideas  are  knowable,  to  hold  that  reality  is  knowable,  may  be 
called  the  Platonic,  or  logical,  itlcalism.  Briefly  put,  it  is  the 
doctrine  that  if  things  are  known,  they  must  be  what  they  are 
known  with.  viz.  ideas.  Now  this,  to  be  sure,  is  not,  as  Taylor 
observes  that  it  is  not,-  "idealism  in  the  modern  sense  of  the 
word,"  if  one  means  by  modern  idealism  (>ither  a  psychological 
idenHsm  like  that  of  Berkeley,  or  a  combination  of  logical  with 
psyt.  iiological  idealism,  such  as  we  have  in  motlern  absolute 
idealism.  Greek  philosophy  was  essentially  prepsychological, 
and  its  idealism,  if  we  may  call  it  such,  was  also  prepsycholog- 
ical. But  the  doctrine  that  reality  is  essentially  idea,  such 
stuff  as  definitions  are  made  of.  aiul  that  it  is.  as  such,  a  possible 
object  of  knowledge,  may  rightly  enough,  it  would  seem,  be 
called  a  form  of  idealism.  If  we  could  suppose  that  Plato 
noted  and  remembered  that  all  such  ideas  are  the  result  of 
abstraction,  and  that  they  have  their  true  being  in  and  for  the 
abstracting  miml,  we  shouKl  have  no  difficulty  in  classifying 
his  system  as  a  variety  of  episteinological  idealism.  If,  how- 
ever, we  are  led  to  conclude  that  the  ideas  with  which  things. 


'  Cralylui.  3>G,  439 ;   Phddo, 
»  Plato,  p.  43. 


">  ;   PhiUbus,  lo;    Tintwus,  27-ii. 


y.'LMLL' 


Tf 


•aamr^s^a^s^iF^^F 


I . 


MYSTICAL  AND   LOGICAL   IDEALISM 


83 


when  truly  known,  are  to  be  identified  are  finally  interpreted 
by  Plato  as  realities  existing  independently  of  thinking,  it  will 
be  more  difficult  to  make  the  above-mentioned  classification. 
The  difficulty  is  due  to  the  fact  that  in  this  logical  idealism, 
as  in  all  abstract  idealism,'  there  is  the  constant  tendency  to 
forget  that  the  abstract  idea  is  an  idea.  If,  however,  we  may 
be  allowed  to  correct  for  the  "abstract  idealist"  this  his  over- 
sight, we  can  without  doubt  include  his  system  under  idealistic 
epistemological  monism.  But  under  neither  of  the  two  inter- 
pretations would  there  be  any  difficulty  in  classifying  the  system 
as  an  epistemological  monism ;  in  both  cases,  during  rational 
thought  the  real  object  and  the  object  immediately  present  to 
thought  are  identical. 

But  Natorp  and  Stewart  offer  a  third  suggestion.     As  is 
done  in  the  former  of  the  two  interpretations  suggested  above, 
they  maintain  that,  for  Plato,  reality  is  idea  in  the  sense  of 
mental  construct ;   but  they  are  not  willing  to  grant  that  it  is 
au  empty  concept.     Xatorp,  perhaps  in  order  to  gain  further 
credit  for  his  own  neo-Kantian  positivistic  idealism,  reads  it 
back  into  Plato,  as  his  master,  H.  Cohen,  read  it  into  Kant. 
Stewart,  the  Plato-specialist,  become  Plato-lover  and  Plato- 
iiicalizer,  seeks  to  gain,  one  is  tempted  to  guess,  new  apprecia- 
tion for  the  object  of  his  veneration  by  showing  how  very  credit- 
able, from  modern  points  of  view,  is  the  whole  philosophical 
system  of  Plato.     Xatorp,  then,  and.  following  him.  Stewart 
agree  that  for  Plato  reality  is  a  construct  of  the  human  mind, 
but  only  in  the  |,h'  nomcnal  realm,  the  realm  of  possible  human 
experience.     Thus  whci    Xatorp  maintains  that  the  Platonic 
'•ideas"  are  '•wtrely  thr  predicates  of  scientific  judgments,"  ^ 
we  must  not  fail  to  interpret  this  as  simply  one  oi  the  premises 
in  a  train  of  reasoning  liy  which  it  is  supposed  that  Plato  taught 
the  essentials  of  what  the  neo-Kantian  believes.     The  premises 
are  the  following:    Things  are  ideas;    ideas  are  predicates; 
predicates  are  thought-constructs.     The  conclusion  is  the  neo- 
Kantian  doctrine :   Things  are  thought-constructs.     But  while 
we  would  reject  the  first  of  these  three  premises,  and  therewith 
the  conclusion,   Plato,  as  we  shall  maintain,  would  have  re- 
jected the  third ;   or,  if  not  the  third,  the  second ;    for,  while 

>  See  Ch.  IX,  infra.  '  Op.  cit.,  p.  3.51 ;  italics  mine. 


I  I 


ll  i 


^l 


84 


THE    PROBLEM    OF    KNOWLEDGE 


i?! 


i^t; 


he  hole!  that  things  are  ideas,  he  had  no  intention  of  asserting 
that  things  are  mere  thought-constructs.  Similarly  the  doc- 
trine of  the  "participation"  of  the  things  of  sense-experience 
in  the  non-sensuous.  (>ternal  ideas,  which  Plato  confesses  that 
he  lias  been  "always  and  everywhere  repeating,"  '  is  interpreted 
by  Stewart  as  meaning  that  the  perceived  object  is  "constructed 
by  the  activity  of  mental  categories."  =  " '  Particination '  is 
predication,"  he  writes  in  good  neo-Kantian  fashion,'  and 
Taylor  applauds  the  assertion.'' 

But  this  attempt  to  make  Plato  a  neo-Kantian  will  hardly  do. 
Plato  never  held  that  the  object  which  appears  to  us  in 
sense-experience  is  a  construct  of  human  mental  activity. 
What  it  would  be  true  to  say  is  that  the  ideas  which  we  predi- 
cate of  these  ol)jects  of  sense-experience  are  constructs  of 
human  thought  ;  but  even  this  seems  to  have  been  largely 
ignored  by  the  Atti<'  philosopher.  His  doctrine  was  not  that 
real  existence  is  a  montul  co)istruct,  nor  even  that  the  true  idea 
is  such  a  construct.  Real  existence  is  a  discovery,  som?thing 
discovered,  not  a  C(>ii.-<tnict ;  and  the  true  idea,  the  universal 
or  absolute  idea,  the  definition,  is  also  a  discovery,  not  a  con- 
struct. And  since  the  discovery  is  at  once  of  the  existence  and 
the  idea,  it  is  assumed  that  there  is  absolutely  no  difference 
between  the  real  existence  and  the  true  iilea.  The  fallacious 
analysis  here  is  easily  exjiosed.  As  was  intimated  above,  the 
assumption  is  that  our  knowledge  of  reality  by  means  of  an 
idea  is  simply  knowledge  of  the  ichni :  whereas  the  idea  is  not 
ns  such  the  object  but  merely  the  instrument  of  knowledge. 
But  what  we  arc^  here  especially  interested  in  emphasizing  is 
that  the  attempt  to  interpret  Plato  as  in  essential  agreement 
with  the  neo-Kantian  idealism  is.  for  the  reasons  given,  funda- 
mentally mistaken. 

Since  the  "universal  idea."  then,  is,  in  the  Platonic  sj'stem, 
not  a  construct  of  human  thought,  but  its  discovery,  it  almost 
inevital)ly  i  omes  to  be  regarded  as  a  permanent  reality,  inde- 
pendent of  human  cognition.  Alongside  of  the  Platonic  or 
logical  idealism,  the  doctiine  that  realities  are  ideas,  there 
tends  tu  dcvt-lup  a  logical  reali.sm.  the  doctrine  that  ideas,  logi- 


'  Ph  rd».  KM). 
3  lb.,  I).  77. 


'  Op.  cit..  p.  07  ;   itulirs  mine. 
*  Mind,  XIX,  1910,  p.  S-'. 


m 


MYSTICAL  AND   LOGICAL   IDEALISM 


85 


cal  entities,  are  independent  realities.     L^*  us  see,  if  we  can, 
whether  the  Plutonic  (or  logical)  idealism  gave  rise  to,  or  even 
passed  over  into,  a  Platonic  (or  logical)  realism.     In  affirming 
that  reality  is  really  a  logical  idea,  a  definition,  the  logical 
idealist  is  saying  that  reality  is  really  something  abstracted 
from  reality.     It  is  small  wonder,  then,  that  the  position  proves 
to  be  one  of  unstable  equilibrium.     Logical  idea'ism  is  a  form 
of  abstract  idealism  which  tends  to  pass  over  into  a  psychologi- 
cal idealism,'  or  else  into  logical  realism.     If  the  abstractness 
of  the  logical  idea  (as  related  to  reality)  were  consistently  recog- 
nized, with  the  consequence  of  the  identification  of  the  reality 
with  the  logical  idea  uh  it  in  in  its  mental  context,  i.e.  with  the 
definition  when  and  as  it  is  thought,  what  we  would  have  would 
be  no  longer  the  original  logical  idealism,  but  a  psychological 
idealism,  of  a  somewhat  Fichtean  or  neo-Kantian  type.     But 
such  was  not  Plato's  doctrine.     The  Platonic  logical  idealism 
could  hardly  have  been  held  if  the  philosopher  had  not  ab- 
stracted from  the  fact  that  the  logical  idea  is  itself  an  abstract, 
actually  existing  only  in  a  context  of  consciousness.     If,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  abstraction   be  taken  abstractly,  i.e.  if  the 
abstractness  of  the  idea,  with  reference  to  (what  we  call)  real 
objects,  be  abstracted  from,  we  shall  have,  in  the  doctrine  that 
all  realities  are  independently  real  ideas,  the  source  of  the  con- 
verse proposition  which,  when  logically  inferred,  is  the  doctrine 
that  some  logical  ideas  are  objective  realities;   when  illogically, 
the  doctrine  that  all  logical  ideas  are  objectively  and  indepeml- 
ently  real.     Thus  it  would  seem  to  be  a  plausible  hypothesis 
that,  by  a  process  of  double  abstraction,  Plato  was  led  from  his 
metl'    lology,  first  to  logical  idealism,  and  then,  because  of  his 
not  rr.  agnizing  what  he  had  done,  through  this  disguised  logi- 
cal idealism  to  logical  realism.' 
But  that  the  independently  real  ideas  of  Plato's  doctrme 


■1 


•  Soe  Ch.  VI,  iiifrn. 

«  Ina.s.nurh,  also,  as  this  srron.l  ahstractio  '  (f-  whirh  wc  shall  havo  oroasion 
to  refer  again,  first  in  our  diseussioii  of  the  disintegration  of  idealism  in  Ch. 
IX  and  again  in  tra<'iiiK  t\u-  antecedents  of  the  n<'W  realism,  in  Ch.  X) 
fmains  unreeognized.  it  may  be  said  that  it,  too,  is  taken  ahstraetly.  But 
since  what  we  mean  l.v  ahstrartion  in  this  conne.tion  is  Miu|.ly  not  reaiyniziny 
an  important  actual  relation,  our  criticism,  that  the  fact  of  al.straotion  is  itself 
abstracted  from,  does  not  lead  us  into  any  'indefinite  regress." 


n 


Ml 


li 

I    <{ 

I 

1 

,i 

1 

t\ 

<! 

> 

• 

til 

-       \ 

t 

>' 

n 

'  ? 

^r 

1. 

1 

i     ■{ 

• 

'^ 

86 


THE  PROBLEM   OP   KNOWLEDGE 


Mi 


khic'h 


the  form  the  t each- 


are  thoughts  of  the  d'v 
inji  < nok  in  Philo,  in  Plotiiuis,  and  in  the  earlier  inediieval 
philosophy,  must  not  be  reac'  back  into  the  thought  of  Plato 
himself.  The  opposite  mistake,  however,  seems  to  have  been 
made  by  the  recent  interpreters  to  whom  we  have  referred, 
when  they  deny  that  Plato  has  any  doctrine  of  the  metaphysi- 
cally real  existence  of  ideas.'  It  may  be  admitted  that  such 
interpreters  as  Zeller  -  and  Windelband  '  may  have  insufficiently 
appreciated  the  methodological  interest  of  Plato,  and  may 
have  attached  too  much  importance  to  the  metaphysical  aspects 
of  Plato's  thought.  One  may  even  suppose  that  Aristotle,  in 
spite  of  his  unique  opportunity  for  knowing  what  Plato  really 
thought,  in  stating  as  the  essence  of  Plato's  doctrine  that  which 
he  felt  it  essential  to  eliminate,  exaggerated  the  extent  to  which 
his  master  was  concerned  to  insist  upon  the  real  existence  of 
ideas  beyond  all  possible  human  experience.''  His  sketch  is 
perhaps  something  of  a  caricature.  .iS  interpretations  often  are. 
But  with  the  help  of  such  an  expositor  as  Gomperz,'  it  is  pos- 
sible to  understand  how  a  conclusion  v  Avh  seems  foreign  to 
our  ways  of  thinking  may  have  come  to  seem  natural  and  even 
necessary  to  the  mind  of  Plato. 

There  are  intlications,  however,  that  Plato  had  some  mis- 
givings with  regMfd  to  this  metaphj'sical  aspect  of  his  doctrine. 
By  this  we  do  not  mean  that  he  detected  any  fallacy  in  his 
processes,  but  only  that  he  gives  evidence  of  dissatisfaction  with 
the  results.  His  logical  realism  was  the  converse  of  his  logi- 
cal idealism,  and  when  the  question  is  raised  as  to  whether 
the  conversion  v.as  performed  in  a  logical  or  an  illogical  manner, 
the  answer  should  probably  be  that  it  was  not  one  or  the  other 
simply,  but  both:  at  limes  the  doctrine  seems  to  be  that  all 
universal  logical  ide.-is  are  independently  real  existences;  at 
other  times  it  seems  to  bo  that  only  some  of  such  ideas  have 
transcendent  existence.     The  explanation  undoubtedly  is  that 

1  Natorp,  op.  cit.,  pp.  ').3-4,  70  1,  7.3-',  86,  126-7.  131  ;  Stewart,  op.  cit.,  pp. 
37,  40,  O-J-.O,  S3.  Sco  Taylor.  Mind.  V,  1.S96,  p.  ,50,5;  Pinto,  p.  48;  Mind.  XIX, 
1910,  p.  93. 

-  r.'.if"  and  thf  ni.frr  .4 •-.^,•f.  "••;/,  pp.  2'27.  23.5,  247,  271-6. 

»  Hiatoni  of  Ancient  Phihmnphu.  pp.  103,  106;   History  of  Philosophy,  p.  118. 

<. ■<(■(■  Mitnphy.iic.''.  XII.  3.  1070<i.  IS  (T..  28. 

*Or<ik  Thinkers,  Eng.  Tr..  Vol.  II,  pp.  180-2;   Vol.  Hi,  pp.  4-7, 


-XSSSST 


"iffnnnffffTy 


MYSTICAL  AND   LOGICAL   IDEALISM 


87 


here  Plato's  thought  had  not  reached  a  state  of  equiUbrium, 
l)Ut  continued  to  oscillate  somewhat  between  the  two  positions. 
In  the  one  instance  the  doctrine  we  have  calle  I  logical  idealistic 
—  itself  more  than  doubtfully  founded  —  was  converted  simply 
and  illogically  as  follows:  All  realities  are  ideas;  therefore 
all  ideas  are  realities.  In  the  other  instance  the  conversion 
was  by  limitation,  and  therefore  logically,  as  :,)llows:  All  reali- 
ties are  ideas;  therefore  some  ideas  are  realities.  It  is  remark- 
able that  it  is  the  formally  logical  converse  which  is  made  the 
basis  of  the  more  extreme  and  metaphysical  doctrines  of  Plato, 
while  the  formally  illogical  converse  becomes  the  basis  of  his 
more  moderate  and  positivistic  thought.  This  is  doubtless 
because,  as  we  shall  see,  the  former  is  supported  by  semi-mysti- 
cal considerations,  while  the  latter,  the  inference  that  all  ideas 
are  realities,  is  defended  by  confining  its  explicit  application 
to  experienced  objects. 

We  shall  first  deal  with  the  doctrine  that  some  ideas  are 
eternal    and   transcendent    realities.     Besides   the    oft-quoted 
explicit  passages  in  the  Phasdrus  '  and  the  Timctus,-  there  is 
the  characteristic  doctrine  of  knowledge  as  "  reminiscence,"  » 
with  its  implication  that  both  the  soul  and  its  objects,  the  ideas, 
are  eternal.     Possibly,  as  Taylor  suggests,"  under  the  influence 
of  the  experience  and  thought  of  Socrates,  Plato  developed  the 
doctrine  that  before  birth,  as  well  as  after  death,  the  soul  con- 
stantly enjoys  the  "beatific  vision"  of  the  eternal  ideas,  and 
during  the  present  life  only  with  difficulty  recollects  (or  antici- 
pates) something  of  that  experience,  in  a  state  which  amounts, 
at  its  best,  to  a  "rapt  amazement"  or  "sort  of  ecstasy."  *     We 
see  at  this  point  how  natural  was  the  transition  from  the  philos- 
ophy of  Plato  to  the  definitely  mystical  idealism  of  Plotinus ; 
but  it  is  not  clear  that  in  the  case  of  Plato  there  was  any  dis- 
tinctly mystical  religious  experience,  or  anything  more  than 
the  contemplation  of  the  logical  ideas  until  they  became,  through 
projected  feeling,  things  of  beauty,  unique  and  unchangeable ; 
and  so,  glowing  with  that  subjective  "light  which  never  was  on 


(;:  ■ 


•-  > 


u  . 


■  247.  •  Sl-2 

»  See,  for  example.  PA.rrfo,  07 -S,  74-0 .    f /..rdrus,  249-50. 

•  Mind,  XL\.  I'.HO,  p.  !I4  ;   cf,  VarUt  Socralica,  1911,  pp.  16.  22-4.  30,  etc. 

*Ph<rdo,  72;    Ph.rdnts.  2I',»  .'>!  ;    rf.  Sumposium,  210. 


■,'-'.,tp''j^tiuatir  •?*«!H!i*.'»*fcf 


\  ''4f«"^' 


I 

I   'I 

i  ■ 


^  hi: 


n 


88 


THE   PROBLEM  OP   KNOWLEDOE 


sea  or  land,"  thoy  were 


substantiated  as  eternally  real  cxist- 


ences.i  Obviously,  however,  this  senii-niystieal  contempla- 
tion would  find  piace  only  in  the  case  of  .-^nmc  of  the  ideas,  such 
as  the  i(h'a  of  tlie  (lood,  and  its  included  ideas;  or,  in  other 
words,  the  ideas  of  th(>  "eternal  valu(>s."  This  was  the  element 
of  Platonism  that  impress(>d  itself  upon  the  religious  conscious- 
ness of  hiter  Rciicnitions,  and  that  was  retained  with  theistio  or 
pantheistic  modifications,  by  Philo,  Plofiims,  Dionysius,  and 
the  "Platojuc  realists"  of  the  middle  age-. 

But   this  semi-mystical   contemplation  of  the   Ideas  would 
give  no  support  to  the  notion  of  an  eternal  existence  of  the 
ideas  of  "hair,  mud  and  dirt."  -     And  yet  in  the  Theatetus  it  is 
taught  that  every  object  of  thought  must  exist,^  while  in  the 
Punuenidcs  we  fiiul  any  reluctance  to  Ix'lieve  that  every  object 
of  sense,  however  mean,  has  its  eternal  idea,  treated  as  evidence 
of  jihilosophical  immaturity.^     Shall  we  conclude,  then,  with 
Stewart,'*  that  Plato  is  here  simply  criticising  a  metaphysical 
doctrine  which  he  himself  never  held,  but  which  was  simply  a 
common  misinterpretation  of  his  teaching  on  the  part  of  his 
disciples,  his  own  doctrine  having  been  strictly  and  consistently 
nu'thodological?     Or,  shall   we  give  up   the  attempt  to  find 
consistency,  and  conclude,  with  Gomperz,«  that  the  Parmenides 
was  written  when  the  philosopher's  mind  was  in  a  state  of 
ferment,  and  that  it  simply  considers  a  munber  of  plausible 
ol)jections  to  his  own  theory,  without  reaching  a  conclusive 
answer  to  them  —  in  wlii;-li  case  its  doctrine  would  be  compara- 
tively negligible?     Or  shall  we  hold,  with  D.  ('..  Ritchie,'  that 
we  have  here,  in  one  of  Plato's  1  .ter  dialogues,  written  perhaps 
under  the  influence  of  tlie  young  Aristotle  himself,  an  approach 
to  the  Aristotelian  doctrine  that  ideas  have  real  existence  only 
in  minds  and  as  the  forms  of  the  things  of  sense?     Adopting 
this  third  interpretation,  we  should  be  able  to  see  how,  accord- 
ing to  Plato,  the  ideas  are  to  be  regarded  as  causes,  not  only  of 

1  Cf.  Stiwart,  ,./-.  .:i.,  Pt.  II,  opwially  pp.  139-40.  1C7,  lh4,  ISG,  194,  196. 

2  Parniciiides,  I'M). 

3  ThroaUtus,  1S9;    cf.  li, inihUc  47(i,  .')10;    oonipare  Hegel's  "The  rational  id 

rt-ul." 

*  Parmenidvs.  I'M) ;    sec  also  I.V2-0. 

'■Op.  cit..  pp.  70-SO;   cf.  Niitorp.  op.  rit. 

'(Irti'k  Thinker.-!,  Ill,  pp.  1.^)0   1.  ^  Pkito.  pp.  115-19. 


l\ 


MYSTICAL  AXD   LOGICAL   IDEALISM 


89 

knowledge,  but  of  beinR  and  essence  ;i  they  are  the  rational 
forms  of  reality,  the  itni'emiUa  in  rebus,  without  whic-h  the 
th.iigs  of  sense  could  not  exist,  but  which  are  eternally  real, 
not  constructs  of  the  activity  of  the  hi  Tian  mind.     In  this 
phase  of  his  thought  Plato  was  the  pathfinder  for  Aristotle.'^ 
But  for  our  present  interest  in  the  problem  of  acquaintance 
the  essence  of  Plato's  doctnne  is  the  Platonic,  or  logical,  or 
dialectical    idealism,  the  doctrine  that  reality  is  constituted 
of  logical  ideas,  albeit  in  systematic  relation  to  each  other,  and 
that  we  have  thus  direct  acquaintance  with  reality  in  the 
ideas  of  logical  thought.     The  fallacious  reasoning  upon  which 
this  variety  of  idealistic  absolute  epistemological  monism  is 
based  has  already  been  exposed.     It  may  be  well,  however,  to 
refer  once  more  to  the  fact  that  an  idea,  even  when  it  amounts 
to  a  definition,  is  very  far  from  being  existentially  identical 
with  that  of  which  it  is  an  adequate  idea,  or  definition.     The 
logical  idea  is  always,  as  related  to  the  reality  under  consider- 
ation, not  the  reality,  but  an  abstraction  from  it  or  from  others 
of  its  class.     In  the  psychical  context  it  is  a  reality,  a  mental 
product ;    but  in  the  objective  context  it  is  not  a  reality.     So 
then,  to  say  that  a  reaUty  is  the  logical  idea  which  may  be  predi- 
cated of  it,  is  virtually  to  say  that  the  reality  is  not  a  reah'y, 
but  an  abstraction  from  reality.     The  inexpugnable  error  of 
logical  idealism  is  abstractionism. 

Mystical-Logical  Ideali  m 
The  two  elemental  forms  of  idealism  which  we  have  already 
examined,  viz.  mystical  and  logical  idealism,  exist  in  combina- 
tion in  what  may  consequently  be  called  mystical-logical  ideal- 
ism. Of  this  first  composite  form  of  idealism  to  demand  our 
attention  the  best  historical  example  is  doubtless  the  philos- 
ophy of  Plotinus.  This  system  is  built  upon  the  Platonic 
dialectic  •'  and  mystical  religion,^  an  ecstatic  experience  which 
Plotinus  is  said  to  have  had  several  times  *  and  which  seems  to 

t  R,imhlic,r,m;    Tirurus,  r,H. 

2  It  i.s  at  this  point  thut  wo  SCO  how  plausil.U-  is  tho  noo-Kant.an  interprcta- 
li„n  ,-f  I'luto'.s  doctrine;  but,  as  we  ha,>-  alrrady  i„vi«t.-,!,  that  tho  ol.j.H-t  of 
sensc-cxporipnop  is  a  mental  coniflrucl  is  wholly  foroiRn  to  Plato's  thought. 

'  Enneadcs.  I,  iii,  3-5.  « lb.,  VI,  ix,  4,  8-11. 

'.'^ce  Porphyrins,  Vita  Plotini.  Ch.  2;j. 


W  ;' 


■.| 


^      W^MSC^"  ^ 


I 
^■v. 


M 

i  ' 
*  ■  ■ 
t  '■  ; 


M  -f  't 


«»  'i 


90 


THE   PROBLEM   OP   KNOWLEDGE 


\ 


be  given  credit  for  a  certain  phase  of  the  philosophy  in  the 
prayer  of  Plotinus  for  insight  into  the  relation  of  the  Many  to 
the  One.'  As  results  of  the  synthesis  we  have,  practically 
speaking,  two  Absolutes,  the  one  mystical  and  the  other  logical, 
and  a  double  basis  for  an  idealistic  interpretation  of  the  physi- 
cal. The  logical  Absolute  is  Intellect  {Nous),  in  which  all 
things  exist  eternally  as  the  world  of  absolute  ideas,  or  pure 
essences.^  This  interpretation  of  the  logical  Absolute  as  a 
metaphysical  reality  is  a  further  development  of  the  Platonic 
logical  reahsm.  The  mystical  Absolute,  on  the  other  hand,  is 
the  perfect  One,  the  first  Ciod,  contemplated  by  the  mystic  as 
that  with  which  his  soul  seeks  union.'  Here  we  have  mystical 
realism ;  the  Absolute  of  mystical  experience  is  affirmed  to  be 
the  ultimate  Reality.  And  yet  for  Plotinus,  fundamentally, 
these  two  Absolutes  are  one.  The  dialectician  can  get  no  nearer 
to  ultimate  Reality  than  as  far  as  Intellect,  the  world  of  rational 
forms;  the  mystic  penetrates  further  and  becomes  absorbed 
in  the  One.  There  is  nothing  in  Intellect  which  is  not,  in  some 
sense,  in  the  One ;  although  not  all  of  the  One  is  in  Intellect, 
jr  can  be  reached  by  intellection.* 

But,  more  to  our  purpose  than  this  synthesis  of  mystical  and 
logical  realism  in  the  absolutism  of  Plotinus,  is  the  way  in 
which  mystical  and  logical  idealism  are  combined  in  his  essen- 
tially idealistic  interpretation  of  physical  objects.  As  the 
realism  of  the  mystics  with  regard  tu  ihe  religious  Object  has 
commonly  been  led  to  an  idealistic  interpretation  of  physical 
objects,  and  as  the  logical  realism  of  Plato  and  his  followers 
originated  in  what  we  have  called  a  logical  idealism  in  the  inter- 
pretation of  the  things  of  experience,  so  the  combined  mysti- 
cal and  logical  realism  of  Plotinus  with  reference  to  the  Abso- 
lute on  the  one  hand  conditioned,  and  on  the  other  hand  was 
conditioned  by,  an  idealistic  interpretation  of  the  physical. 
The  One,  being  perfect,  and  tlierefore  in  want  of  nothing,  "be- 
comes, as  it  were,  overflowing,  and  the  superplenitude  of  it 
produces  something  else."  Its  first  product,  or  emanation,  is 
Intellect,  the  Absolute  of  logical  reahsm.*     Similarly  the  soul 

1  Enneades,  V.  i.  6.  '  76.,  III.  ix  ;   V,  i,  7  ;   ix,  4.  8-11 ;   VI,  ix.  2. 

»  lb..  Ill,  viii,  8.  9 ;  ix,  3  ;  V,  i.  7  ;  ii,  1  ;  VI,  ix,  4,  8-11.       *  lb.,  VI,  ix,  4. 
»/&.,  V,  i,  0;  u,  1. 


hi' 


IP 


MYSTICAL  AND   LOGICAL   IDEALISM 


91 


is  tlie  product,  by  emanation,  of  Intellect.'  The  Soul,  again, 
produces  all  animals  and  inspires  them  with  life.*  But  the 
world  is  also  an  anhnal,  comprehending  within  itself  all  ani- 
mals.' Hence  all  things  physical  depend  upon  Soul  for  their 
existence  and,  inasnmch  as  Soul  depends  upon  Intellect,  and 
Intellect  upon  the  One,  all  things  physical  depend  for  their 
existence  upon  Intellect  (or  the  absolute  idea),  as  in  logical 
idealism ;  or,  to  speak  still  more  ultimately,  they  depend,  for 
what  being  they  have,  upon  the  undifferentiated  One  of  mystical 
intuition. 

Obviously,  the  criticisms  which  are  valid  against  mystical 
and  logical  idealism  in  separation  arc  still  valid  against  the 
idealism  resulting  from  their  combination.  Neither  of  the 
elemental  types  was  incomplete  merely ;  each,  as  we  have  seen, 
was  the  result  of  positively  erroneous  suggestion.  Hence 
they  cannot  be  said  each  to  supplement  the  deficiencies  of  the 
other;  rather  does  each,  by  appearing  to  confirm  the  other, 
simply  afford  the  mystic-philosopher  a  deceptive  feeling  of 
security  in  his  twofold  error. 


1  lb..  V.  i.  7. 


«  /6..  V.  i,  2. 


»/6.   V,  ix,  9. 


I- 


iH 


isi 


? 


.lil 


CHAPTKR   VI 


V 


1 


»v, 


r  I 


!'f 


PsYCHOLociitA'-  Idealism 

Besides  mystical  and  l()j;i«'al  idealism,  there  is  a  third  ele- 
menlnl  type  of  idealistic  philosophy,  viz.  psychological  idealism. 
This  may  he  defined,  in  preliminary  fashion,  as  the  interpreta- 
tion of  the  physical  object,  under  the  influence  of  an  erroneous 
suKKC^t'o"  Jirisinp;  in  connection  with  the  psychological  point  of 
view,  as  being  essentially  idai,  in  the  psychological  sense  of  that 
word,  i.e.  as  being  simply  a  part  of  consciousness,  a  content  of 
conscious  life  which  depends  upon  consciousness  for  its  exist- 
ence. 

As  contrasted  with  the  other  elemental  forms  of  idealism, 
this  psychological  type  is  characteristically  modern.  This  is 
untloubtedly  coimected  with  the  fact  that  psychology  may  be 
said  to  be,  almost  exclusively,  a  modern  science.  Ancient  and 
mediaeval  thought  were  both  essentially  prepsychological,  the 
former  through  lack  of  consciousness  of  self  as  soul,  the  latter 
through  defect  of  sci.saific  spirit.  But  already  -vt  the  dawn  of 
modern  philosophy  we  find  a  dualism,  a  consciousness  of  prob- 
lem in  connection  with  miml  and  matter.  The  new  conscious- 
ness of  self  or  s  ul,  as  constituting  a  subjective  world  and  not 
as  a  mere  element  or  principle  of  activity  in  the  objective 
world,  was  probably  due  in  large  part  to  two  causes.  First, 
there  was  the  attention  given  in  the  Christian  religion  and  in 
mysticism  to  the  soul,  with  the  accompanying  high  estimate  of 
its  value  and  the  sense  of  momentous  importance  attaching 
to  its  different  states.  And,  secondly,  there  was,  as  seen  in  the 
Renaissance  and  the  Reformation,  as  later  in  the  Aufkliirung 
md  the  Revolution,  the  protest  of  the  individual  against  the 
established  order.  In  opposing  themselves  to  the  objective 
social  order,  men  became  more  conscious  of  themselves  as 
subjects.' 

'  Cf.  J.  Dewey,  Philosophical  Rrvicw,  XVIII,  1909,  pp.  182-3. 

92 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


93 


But,  be  the  explanation  what  it  may,  the  dunlism  of  the 
psychical  and  the  physical  was  especially  proniiiiont  in  the 
thouKht  of  the  early  niodcrn  philosophers.  Its  place  was  funda- 
mental in  the  systems  of  Descartes  and  his  iinmodiate  followers 
among  the  rationalists,  antl  in  that  of  Locke  among  the  empiri- 
cists; and  the  later  rationalists  and  empiricists  alike  busied 
themselves  with  the  problems  to  which  it  first  gave  prominence. 
These  problems  were  ;,'hieHy  two,  viz.  how  such  essentially  dif- 
ferent substances  as  body  and  mind  could  interact  on  each 
other,  and  how  mind  could  know  extra-mental  objects.  The 
earlier  solutions,  apart  from  the  Cartesian  appeal  to  a  deus  ex 
machina,  were  three  :  absolute  monism,  represented  by  Spinoza ; 
monadism,  represented  by  Leibniz ;  and,  filially,  psychological 
idealism,  of  which  Berkeley  was  the  pioneer  and  a  typical  repre- 
sentative. According  to  ab.solute  monism,  there  is  no  interac- 
tion of  substances,  since  there  is  but  one  substance ;  and  the 
test  of  cognitive  value  is  something  immanent,  viz.  rationality. 
According  to  monadism  there  is  neither  interaction  nor  im- 
mediate awareness  of  external  reality,  but  only  immanent 
action  and  cognition,  the  difficulties  of  the  view  being  relieved 
to  some  extent  by  means  of  the  dogma  of  a  pre-established 
harmony  securing  the  appearance  of  transeunt  action  and  cogni- 
tion. According  to  psychological  idealism,  there  is  no  material 
substance,  but  only  minds  with  their  ideas ;  from  this  point  of 
view,  therefore,  the  problems  of  interaction  between  mind  and 
matter  and  of  knowledge  of  external  reality  disappear  as  false 
problems.  It  is  with  this  last  philosophical  doctrine  that  we 
are  here  concerned. 

Now  it  will  be  .seen  on  examination  that  the  dialectic  culmi- 
nating in  subjective  idealism  should  by  no  means  be  regarded 
as  convincing.  Besides  the  fact  that  other  solutions  offered 
(absolutism  and  monadism)  are  no  more  fantastic  from  the 
point  of  view  of  common  sense,  there  is  the  question  whether 
philosophy  is  justified  in  taking  up  as  its  task  the  explaining 
away  of  the  appearance  of  interaction.  May  it  not  be  that 
action  and  interaction  are  ultimate  facts,  which  are  to  be 
acknowledged  rather  than  denied  and  explained  aw.iy  .as  mere 
appearance?  Can  mystery  be  eliminated  from  the  fact  of 
becoming,  even  without  the  hypothesis  of  interaction?     And 


ii 


■A 


94 


THK    PROBLEM   OP    KNOWLEDOE 


I  ■i 


'\ 


with  ivfcronce  to  knowledge  of  «'xt('rruil  n-ulity,  may  it  not  be 
tiiat  the  problem  here  arises  b«'caust'  of  a  fals«'  modi-  of  ooiu'oiv- 
iriR  the  mind,  as  a  quasi-spatial  reccfitacle,  which  ran  contain 
only  !i  '"ntal  entities,  viz.  ideas,  in  the  psycholof^iral  sense. 
.Another  view  of  mind  an<l  consciousness  mij^ht  cau.se  this 
problem  to  di.sappear  without  the  drastic  expedient  of  denying 
the  reality  of  material  objects  altogether. 

Hut  it  was  not  simply  as  the  synthesis  of  apparent  antinomies 
that  psychological  idealism  "  -  .  It  was  presented  as  the 
outcome  of  an  analysis  of  exix:icnce  such  as  is  performed  in 
tlie  most  elementaiy  psycholo^'i(  il  study,  or,  at  least,  as  a 
legitimate  inference  from  the  results  of  this  analysis.  Hence, 
as  we  have  intimated,  the  name,  pxiichohujlad  idealism.  What 
we  mean,  then,  by  psychological  idealism  is  the  doctrine  that 
things  are  ideas  in  the  mind,  or  in  consciousness;  that  they 
depend  for  their  existence  upon  their  l)eing  in  the  mind,  or  at 
least  in  the  conscious  relation  to  .some  subject.  That  this 
doctrine  is  pure  dogma  will  a|)pear  when  it  is  shown  that  the 
argument  in  support  of  it,  when  stated  as  a  formal  inference, 
cannot  be  other  than  fallacious,  and  this  because  the  original 
analysis  was  viti.ited  from  the  start  by  a  'latural  but  erroneous 
suggestion.  Man  li.td  the  |)roblem  of  accounting  for  illusion 
and  error,  the  content  of  wlii<  h  after  all  had  aome  sort  of  reality, 
for  it  was  there  in  experience.  Since  it  was  found  not  to  have 
objective  reality,  its  reality  must  l)e  ;^ubjectivc ;  its  existence, 
in  so  far  as  its  illusory  or  erroneous  features  were  concerned, 
was  dependent  upon  its  being  object  for  .some  conscious  subject. 
Thus  it  may  be  said  that  the  consciousness  of  self  and  of  the 
relation  of  objects  experienced  to  tlie  self  natu'ally  arise  to- 
gether, illu.sory  o})jects  being  subjective  in  a  twofold  sense, 
i.e.  as  dependent  upon  the  conscious  self  for  their  existence, 
and  as  rehded  to  a  self  which  is  conscious  of  thorn.  But  it  is 
noticed,  at  least  when  one  begins  tf>  psychologize,  that  all 
objects  of  which  one  is  conscious,  whether  illvsory  or  not,  are 
sul)jective,  at  least  in  the  sense  of  being  related  to  a  self  which 
is  conscious  of  them  ;  and,  further,  that  the  psychical  processes 
in  the  two  cases  of  normal  anii  iibtiortiiul  perception  arc  mainly 
the  same.  It  is  an  easy  step,  consequently,  for  unclear  think- 
ing to  conclude  that  these  objects  are  all  subjrsctive  in  the 


.11 


PSYCIIOLOGirAL  IDEALISM 


95 


nther  sense,  i.e.  that  they  are  dependint  upon  the  conscious- 
ness of  the  conscious  s«'lf  for  their  existence.  The  fallacy  may 
appear  as  one  of  erjuivocation  —  the  common  fallacy  of  "four 
terms"  — as  in  the  followiuK  sylioRism  :  What  is  subjective 
(dependent  on  !■  ''  for  existence)  is  not  externally  real,  but 
mere  idea;  all  D.'jccfs  of  which  we  are  aware  are  subjective 
(related  to  a  self  which  is  conscious  of  them) ;  therefore,  all 
objects  of  which  we  are  aware  are  not  externally  real,  but  mere 
ideas.  Or,  if  the  ecjuivocation  be  avoided,  the  fallacy  will  re- 
main as  that  of  an  "undistributed  middle  term,"  as  in  this 
syllogism:  The  unreal  objectively  is  subjective  (related  to  a 
subject)  ;  similarly,  all  of  which  one  is  conscious  is  subjective 
(related  to  a  subject) ;  therefore,  all  of  which  one  is  conscious 
is  unreal  objectively  (mere  idea).  Or,  more  simply,  psychologi- 
cal idealism  may  be  said  to  rest  upon  a  fallacious  conversion. 
F-om  the  obvious  truth  that  all  «'lements  which  depend  on 
consciousness  for  their  existence,  such  as  pains,  feelings,  desires, 
etc.,  are  in  the  subjective  relation,  i.e.  arc  objects  for  a  subject, 
it  is  inferred,  by  the  fallacious  process  of  simple  conversion, 
that  all  that  is  in  the  subjective  relation,  all  that  is  object  for  a 
subject,  is  dependent  upon  consciousness  and  this  relation  to 
consciousness  for  its  own  existence. 

This  is  the  fallacy  of  arguing  for  idealism  from  what  R.  B. 
Perry  has  called  "the  egocentric  predicament."'  We  can 
never  be  conscious  of  any  object  that  is  not  in  the  relation  of 
object  of  consciousness  to  ourselves  a.  subject  —  this  is  the 
"egocentric  predicament";  but,  as  Perry  justly  urges,  this 
fact  proves  nothing  at  all  as  to  whether  there  are  or  are  not 
other  ob/  ts  not  in  conscious  relation  to  ourselv"  or  to  any 
othe.-  s'lbject.  D.  H.  MacClregor  has  made  substantially  the 
same  point  "n  his  exposure  ot  what  he  calls  "the  great  fallacy 
of  idcilism."  He  points  out  that  what  idealism  has  proved  is 
that  ■'  eaiity  carmot  be  thought  as  existing,  independently  of 
thought,"  but  that  what  it  believes  it  ha.s  proved  is  that  "reality 
cannot  be  thought,  as  existing  independently  of  thouofht."* 
But  the  same  criticism  was  made  years  before  by  T.  H.  creen, 

'  Journal  of  Philosophy,  etc.,  VII,  1910,  pp.  5-14 ;  Present  i  hUosophical 
Tendrnciei.,  pp.  129  ff. 

•  Hibbtrl  Journal,  IV.  1906,  p.  788. 


I 

i  ■ 

I' 


■•»'■ 


96 


THE   PROBLEM  OF   KXOWLEDOE 


'  I  ." 


•■'I? 


not  against  tho  idealistic  doctrine,  hut  against  this  psycho- 
logically idealistic  unjumenl,  as  used  by  John  Caird.  The  prop- 
osition "  that  no  object  can  be  conceived  os  existing  except  in 
relation  to  a  thinking  subject,"  must  not,  he  points  out,  be 
confused  with  the  j)roposition  "that  it  cannot  exist  except  in 
that  relation."  • 

Wo  are  not  contending  that  psychological  idealism  can,  by 
such  logical  criticism  as  we  have  urged,  be  jtroved  to  be  false; 
we  simply  maintain  that  the  arguments  by  which  it  was  sup- 
posed to  be  proved  true  may  !)(>  shown,  by  this  logical  criti- 
cism, to  b(>  worthless,  so  that  there  appears  as  yet  no  good 
reason  why  a  view  so  artificial  and  so  difficult  of  adoption  in 
practice  should  be  regarded  as  true.  This  applies  to  psycho- 
logical idealism,  whether  in  its  Berkeleian  form,  where  the  self 
is  thought  of  as  a  passive  recipient,  and  perceived  objects  as 
"ideas,"  because  mere  sense-data;  or  in  the  form  in  which  it 
was  presenti'd  by  Fichte,  where  th(>  self  is  thought  of  as  crea- 
tive, and  j)erc(>ived  ol)jects  as  contents  in  consciousness,  con- 
structed by  mental  activity  (Berkeley  was  influenced  by 
Locke's  view  of  mind  as  a  tnbnln  rasa,  while  Fichte  followed 
Leibniz  and  Kant  in  emphasizing  the  self-activity  of  thought) ; 
or,  finally,  in  the  intermediate  form  of  a  psychological  or  sub- 
jective neo-Kantiariism,  m  which  the  self  is  thought  of  as  pas- 
sive with  ref(>rence  to  sensations  but  creative  with  regard  to 
relations  and  perceived  objects,  consequently  as  being  partly 
datum  and  partly  thought-construct,  but  in  both  cas-s  mere 
dependent  content  of  consciousness. 

Besides  these  Berkeleian,  Fichtean,  and  neo-Kantian  types 
of  psychological  idealism,  there  is  another  line  of  subdivision, 
which,  to  a  certain  extent,  runs  across  the  other  groups,  or  at 
least  across  the  first  and  the  last.  This  is  th(>  division  between 
what  we  may  call  the  undisguised  and  the  disguised  psycho- 
logical idealists.  The  former  have  the  courage  of  their  convic- 
tions; they  acknowledge  their  subjectivism,  emphasizing  the 
constant  subjectivity  of  objects.  The  latter,  the  di.sguised 
psychological  idealists,  seek  to  cover  up  their  .subjectivism, 
even  from  theni.selves,  by  means  of  a  d(>vice  wliidi  proves  in 
the  end   to   b(>   merely   verbal.     They   speak  of  subject   and 

'  WvrKs,  V.il.  Ill,  ISSS,  p.  144,     Cf.  p.  134  infra. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


97 


Tte-'" 


i 


object  as  being  opposite  poles  of  experience,  and  of  the  con- 
tent of  experience  as  alternating  between  subjectivity  and 
ol)jcctivity ;  normally  it  is  objective,  but  under  certain  condi- 
tions it  may  become  subjective.  Or,  as  some  prefer  to  put  it, 
originally  experience  was  neutral,  neither  subjective  nor  objec- 
tive, but  untler  certain  con<litions  subjectivity  is  introduced, 
and  with  it,  by  way  of  contrast,  objectivity.  But  the  '>xperi- 
ence  of  which  this  is  an  approximate  description,  it  should  not 
be  forgotten,  is  conscioua  experience,  the  experience  which  a 
self  has.  The  objects  of  conscious  experience  are  alway.s  sub- 
jective, in  the  sense  of  being  in  the  conscious  relation  to  a  sub- 
ject;  but  under  certain  conditions  we  pay  attention  to  this 
relation,  we  think-  of  the  objects  as  being  in  the  conscious  rela- 
tion ;  that  is,  we  make  their  subjectivity  (relatedness  to  a  sub- 
ject) an  object  of  thought.  But  this  tloes  not  make  the  original 
objects  of  consciousness  for  the  first  time  subjective  ;  as  objects 
of  consciousness  they  were  as  subjective  —  as  nmch  related  to 
a  conscious  self  —  when  thought  of  simply  as  things,  as  they 
are  now  that  we  are  thinking  of  them  as  olijcvts-thought-about. 
It  surely  will  not  be  maintained  that  the  relation  of  being 
object  for  a  subject  could  not  exist  except  as  that  relation 
itself  is  made  the  object  of  conscious  attention. 

But  whether  of  the  passive,  the  active,  or  the  intermediate 
type,  and  whether  disguised  or  undisguised,  psychological 
idealism  is,  we  shall  contend,  in  all  its  forms  a  malatly  which 
the  psychologist -philosopher  needlessly  inflicts  upon  himself; 
in  all  its  forms  it  is  an  unnatural,  unnecessary,  and  inde- 
fensible dogma.  To  further  justify  this  statement  we  must 
set  forth  in  some  detail  and  in  their  systematic  context  the 
chief  historical  and  contemporary  varieties  of  this  type  of 
itlealisni. 

The  earlier  representatives  of  psychological  idealism  are  so 
well  known  and  have  been  so  often  discussed  in  philosophical 
treatises,  that  we  may  pass  them  with  but  brief  mention.  In 
Berkeley's  doctrine  objects  are  combinations  of  "sensations 
or  ideas  imprinted  on  the  sense"  ;  they  are  the  things  we  per- 
ceive by  sense,  and  as  such  they  can  be  no  more,  it  is  claimed, 
than  our  own  ideas  or  sensations,  no  one  of  which  can  exist 
unperceived ;    their  esse  is  percipi ;   the  object  and  the  sensa- 


;S  ( 


If 
I 


u.ir 


I  1  " '  ' 

ft" 


MS 


f   * 


98 


THE    PROBLEM   OP    KNOWLEDGE 


tion  are  one  and  the  same  thing.'  Here,  obviously,  we  have  the 
result  of  the  fallacious  process  which  we  have  just  pointed  out. 
But  in  Berkeley's  system  the  existence  of  "the  perceiving  active 
being"  which  we  call  mind,  spirit,  soul,  or  self,  whetlicr  of  God 
as  the  creator  of  ideas,  or  of  man  as  their  recipient,  is  assumed. 
Its  esse  is  not  pcrcipi ;  it  is  not  any  one  of  our  ideas,  but  "a 
thing  entirely  tlistinct  from  them,  wherein  they  exist,  or, 
which  is  the  same  thing,  whereby  they  are  perceived."  -  But 
essentially  the  same  arguments  by  which  bel' T  in  an  inde- 
pendent material  reality  was  supposedly  discredited  would 
serve  to  discredit  Berkeley's  own  belief  in  a  transcendent  God 
and  substantial  humuii  souls.  A  more  thoroughgoing  psycho- 
logical idealism  would  say  of  God  and  of  souls  also  that  their 
esse  is  pcrcipi,  and  Hume  did  not  hesitate  to  take  this  further 
step. 

Hume  adopted  and  tried  to  carry  out  to  the  bitter  end  the 
central  thesis  of  psychological  idealism,  viz.  that  "nothing  is 
ever  really  present  with  the  mind  but  its  impressions  and  ideas," 
the  latter  being  defined  as  faint  images,  or  impressions  derived 
from  impressions;  but  what  he  means  here  by  "mind"  is  no 
simple  and  inunaterial  substance,  but  simply  the  successive 
impressions  and  ideas,  united  by  certain  relations,  especially 
that  of  cause  and  effect.'  We  .  we  no  idea  of  substance,  either 
material  or  mental,  he  holds,  except  a  collection  of  ideas  united 
by  the  imagination  and  given  a  particular  name.^  The  idea  of 
existence  or  external  (>xistenc(>  is  the  very  same  with  the  idea 
of  what  we  conceive  to  be  existent.  On  the  one  hand  every 
impression  or  idea  is  conceived  as  existent,  and  on  the  other 
hand  every  idea  of  existence  is  some  particular  impression  or 
idea.'^  Here  we  have  an  originally  subjective  empirical  idealism 
seeking  to  become  self-consistent  l)y  api)lying  its  doctrine  to 
the  subject  (as  object)  as  well  as  to  (other)  objects,  with  the 
result  that,  vcrbciUy,  it  ceases  to  he  subjective,  and  becomes  at 
this  point  what  has  recently  been  called  immediate  or  pure 
empiricism.     The  system  thus  points  in  the  direction  of  a  dis- 

>  "  Treatise  on  the  Principles  of  Hunmn  Knowledge."  in  Frnwr's  Selections 
from  licrkiUy,  pp.  33-6. 

»  lb.,  p.  33.  '  A  TnatUe  oj  Human  \aturc,  pp.  07,  253. 

*  lb.,  p.  16.  •  76.,  p.  66. 


liPW 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


99 


guised  psychological  idealism ;   but  it  cannot  be  said  really  to 
succeed  in  eliminating  subjectivism.     It  is  not  with  mind  as 
object,  but  with  mind  as  subject,  that  all  impressions  and 
ideas  are  present ;   and  yet  it  is  only  mind  as  object  that  can 
be  reduced,  on  Hume's  principles,  to  successive  impressions  and 
ideas ;  all  of  the  impressions  and  ideas,  without  exception,  are 
present  with  the  mind,  which  cannot,  therefore,  be  regarded  as 
one  of  those  impressions.     Hume  himself  admits  that  his  phi- 
losophy encounters  at  this  point  a  difficulty  that  seems  in- 
superable.    "All  my  hopes  vanish,"  he  writes,  "when  I  come 
to  explain  the  principles  that  unite  our  successive  perceptions 
in  our  thought  or  consciousness.     I  cannot  discover  any  theory 
which  gives  me  satisfaction  on  this  head.     In  short,  there  are 
two  principles  which  I  cannot  render  consistent ;  nor  is  it  in  my 
power  to  renounce  either  of  them,  viz.  that  all  our  distinct  per- 
ceptions are  distinct  existences,  and  that  the  mind  never  perceives 
any  real  connexion  among  distinct  existences."  '     In  other  words, 
as  a  would-be  radical  empiricist  he  does  not  know  what  to  do 
with  our  evident  knowledge  of  relations  to  which,  apparently, 
no  elements  of  sense  correspond.     His  theory  calls  for  a  dif- 
ferent sense-impression  for  every  different   relation,    because 
relations  are  to  him  simply  ideas  of  relations,  and  ideas  simply 
impressions  of  sense-impressions.     Manifestly,  then,  if  it  can 
be  shown  that  there  are  some  relations  or  ideas  of  relations  to 
which  no  impressions  correspond,  we  have  the  self-refutation 
of  passive  psychological  idealism  as  the  effect  of  the  effort  to 
be  thoroughgoing  and   consistent  in  the  application  of  the 
theory.     If,  however,  it  be  maintained,  as  by  William  James,^ 
that  there  are  feelings  of  all  relations  of  which  we  have  any 
idea,  the  question  is  still  to  be  asked  whether  such  feelings  are 
definite  enough  to  account  for  the  ideas.     As  a  matter  of  fact 
our  ideas  of  relations  are  ordinarily  much  more  definite  than 
our   immediate   feelings   of   those   relations.      Moreover,  the 
easy  identification  of  relations  and  ideas  of  relations  in  the 
Humian  system  is  explicable  only  as  it  is  found  to  rest  upon 
the    fallacious    reasoning    from    the    egocentric    predicament 
noted  above. 

•  lb.,  pp.  035-6. 

•.1  Pluralistic  Universe,  p.  280;   Essays  in  Radical  Empiricism,  pp.  41-3. 


u 


r  .>■ 


•s 
■A 


ii> 


m 


I, 

» 


Mr 

<  If 


1  !> 
f 


i   . 


100 


THK   PROBLEM   OF    KNOWLEDGE 


According  to  John  Stuart  Mill,  wo  know  and  can  know  no 
more  of  nuitorial  objects  than  the  senses  tell  us.'  What  they 
tell  us  directly  is  simply  what  our  own  sensations  are.  Rela- 
tions between  sensations  may  be  resolved  into  a  difference  in 
our  sensations.-  All  we  can  know  of  ol)jects,  directly  or  in- 
directly, is  the  sensations  which  they  actually  excite,  or  which 
we  imagine  them  exciting  in  ourselves.^  The  conception  one 
forms  of  the  world  as  it  is  at  any  moment  comprises,  along 
with  the  sensations  he  is  feeling,  a  countless  variety  of  possi- 
bilities of  sensation ;  viz.  the  whole  of  those  which  past  obser- 
vation tells  him  he  could,  under  any  supposable circumstances, 
experience  at  that  moment,  together  with  an  indefinite  and 
illimitable  multitude  of  others  which  it  is  possible  he  might 
experience  in  circumstances  unknown  to  him.*  Thus  matter 
or  external  nature  is  nothing  l)ut  the  permanent  possibility  of 
sensation,  which,  unlike  actual  sensation,  is  common  to  all 
individuals.^  The  belief  in  such  permanent  possibilities  con- 
tains all  that  is  essential  in  the  belief  in  substance.*  Real 
externality  to  us  of  anything  other  than  other  minds  is  incapable 
of  proof."  Moreover,  of  mind  itself  our  knowledge  is  entirely 
relative."  Mind,  as  Vvc  know  it,  may  be  regarded  as  nothing 
but  a  series  of  feelings,  together  with  a  permanent  possibility 
of  feeling.*  At  this  point,  however,  Mill  has  to  admit  that  he 
experiences  a  final  (hfliculty ;  in  the  case  of  mind  the  series  of 
feelings  is  aware  of  itself  as  a  series,  extending  from  the  past 
through  the  present  into  the  future.'"  This  is  essentially  the 
same  difficulty  as  Hume  encountered.  Even  if  all  objects, 
including  the  subject  in  so  far  as  it  is  object,  could  be  reduced 
to  feelings,  there  would  still  be  the  subject  to  which  these  feel- 
ings are  present  to  be  accounted  for.  Here,  again,  as  in  the 
ca.se  of  ilume,  self-refutation  in  the  end  is  the  penalty  of  fallacy 
in  (he  beginning. 

\\.  K.  Clifford  describes  the  self  as  a  stream  of  feelings  such 
that  (>ach  of  them  is  capable  of  a  faint  repetition,  and  that  when 
two  of  tliem  have  occurred  together  the  repetition  of  the  one 

'  Ati  Exnminntion  af  Sir  WiUitim  Hmiiiltou's  Philunnphy.M  ed.,  pp.  0,  7;  see 
<-sp..<-i:in.v  fh«.  II.  XI.  :im!  XII. 

^  lb.,  p.  7.  '  Ih.,  p.  S.  *  Ih.,  p.  "^2. 

<•  Ih.,  p.  227.  «  Ih.,  I).  229.  '  Ih.,  p.  232. 

»  Ih.,  p.  2;J5.  •  Ih.,  pp.  230,  238.  >•  lb.,  p.  242. 


WW^FV 


PSYCHOLOGK'AL   IDEALISM 


101 


calls  up  the  other,  accordins  to  certain  rules.*  The  object  is 
defined  as  a  set  of  changes  in  consciousness,  and  not  anything 
out  of  it,  whether  or  not  there  are  things-in-themselves  which 
are  not  objects.  The  physical  object,  whether  presented  or 
inferred,  is  always  a  part  of  one's  own  consciousness ;  but  the 
mind  of  another  can  never  be  an  object  in  my  consciousness. 
The  inferred  other  conscious  selves  arc  ejcdn,  things  thrown 
out  of  consciousness,  and  recognizetl  as  not  i)eing  a  part  of  me.* 
Clifford  then  goes  on  to  develop  his  view  in  a  way  that  antici- 
pates to  some  extent  what  we  have  called  disguised  psycho- 
logical idealism.  A  feeling  is  not  ?«y  feeling,  he  maintains, 
until  on  reflection  I  remember  it  as  my  feeling.  Thus  a  feeling 
can  exist  by  itself,  without  forming  part  of  a  consciousness. 
Such  -elementary  feeUngs,  or  eject-elements,  might  well  be  the 
true  tiungs-in-themselves.  Moreover,  a  thoroughgoing  parallel- 
ism of  the  physical  and  the  mental  is  inferred  from  "the  doc- 
trine of  evolution,"  with  its  principle  of  an  unbroken  line  of 
ascent,  which  is  supposed  to  necessitate  the  conclusion  that, 
since  consciousness  has  been  evolved,  "some  ejective  fact  or 
event  which  might  be  a  part  of  consciousness"  corresponds  to 
every  motion  of  matter.' 

This  panpsychism  is  brought  out  most  clearly  in  connection 
with  the  following  considerations.  Let  us  suppose  that  I  see 
a  man,  whom  we  will  call  A,  looking  at  a  candlestick,  which  I 
also  see.  The  candlestick  is  material,  but  this  means  simply  a 
group  of  my  sensations,  actual  and  possible.  There  is  an  image 
in  A's  brain,  representing,  i.e.  corresponding,  point  for  point,  to 
the  candlestick,  which  is  external  to  him.  This  cerebral  image, 
like  the  candlestick,  is  material ;  but  this  again  means  simply  a 
group  of  my  possible  sensations.  But  there  is  in  A's  mind  an 
image,  or  perception,  representing  the  external  reality,  and 
this  mental  image  which  A  has  is,  of  course,  nothing  but  mind- 
stuff  ;  it  is  to  be  interpreted,  not  as  my  object,  but  as  my  eject. 
But  if  A's  mental  image  of  the  candlestick  is  related  (repre- 
sentatively) to  the  externally  real  candlestick  which  he  sees,  as 
A's  (material)  cerebral  image  is  related  to  the  material  candle- 

'  "Body  and  Mind,"  Humboldt  Library  of  Science,  No.  145,  p.  10. 
•"On  the  Nature  of  T        i-in-Themselves,"  Humboldt  Library  u.'  Science, 
No.  145,  pp.  28,  29,  31.  •  "..  pp.  33,  35-6. 


i 
41 : 


n 
1 

iS 

k^m 

1 

— ^   i 

fll 


II 


si: 


f/k 


H 


,  ii  _ 


I   i 


102 


THE   PROBLEM   OF    KNOWLEDGE 


stick  which  I  sec,  then,  since  this  relation  in  the  hitter  case  is 
fundamentally  a  relation  <if  identity  of  stuff  (in  this  case, 
matter)  the  conclusion  follows  that  the  external  reality  which 
A  sees  must  l)(>  made  up  of  mind-stuff,  just  as  his  mental  image 
is.  Both  are  my  ejects.  But  both  of  my  oi)jects  (A's  cerebral 
image  and  the  candlestick  which  I  see),  ahhough  material,  are, 
as  we  have  seen,  nothing  but  (my)  mind-stuff.  "  The  universe, 
then,  consists  entirely  of  mind-stuff.  .  .  .  Matter  is  a  mental 
picture  in  which  mind-stuff  is  the  thing  represented."  ' 

In  Clifford's  system  we  have  a  psychological  idealism  resting 
upon  the  usual  incorrect  analysis  of  objects  as  sensations ;  but 
his  doctrine  is  complicated  by  the  further  application  of  the 
principle  of  psychological  idealism  to  the  reldtionn  of  the  feel- 
ings to  the  self.  Consistently  enough  for  the  psychological 
idealist  himself,  but  unwarrantably,  since  psychological  ideal- 
ism is  based  upon  a  fallacy,  it  is  assumed  that  the  relation  of 
feelings  to  a  self  which  has  them  can  exist  only  when  there  is 
consciousness  of  this  relation.  But,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  such 
feelings  are  remembered  as  my  past  feelings,  although  when 
they  were  actually  present  I  was  not  explicitly  aware  of  them  as 
7nine.  ^Moreover,  with  reference  to  the  evolutionary  argument 
for  panpsychisni  and  parallelism,  as  was  said  in  our  critique 
of  the  similar  views  of  C.  A.  Strang,  whose  philosophy  shows 
the  marks  of  Clifford's  influence,  if  we  admit  the  possibility  of 
"creative  evolution,"  the  argument  loses  most  of  its  weight. 
Clifford's  type  of  psychological  idealism  is  more  ingenious  than 
most  others,  but  it  is  no  more  demonstrative,  no  less  fallacious 
and  dogmatic,  than  those  previously  examined. 

Karl  Pearson  holds  that  "an  external  object  is  in  general  a 
construct."  lie  does  not  use  this  term  in  quite  the  Kantian 
sense,  however ;  his  affiliations  are  with  the  psychological 
idealism  of  the  older  English  empiricism.  He  means  by  "con- 
struct" "a  combination  of  immediate  with  past  or  stored  sense- 
impressions."  -  Although  ho  distinguishes  between  the  ideal 
and  the  real,  he  does  not  identify  the  ideal  with  the  unreal. 
The  ideal  is  that  which  passes  into  reality  when  its  perceptual 

'  "On  the  Nature  of  Thing8-in-Thcmsi'lves,"  Humboldt  Library  of  Science, 
N(i.  145,  pp.  30-7. 

'  The  Grammar  of  Science,  2d  ed.,  1900,  pp.  41,  04. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


103 


oquivalent  is  found ;  the  unreal  can  never  do  so.  Physical 
hypotheses  as  to  the  nature  of  matter  arc  not  unreal  bu*  ideal, 
for  they  do  not  lie  absolutely  outside  the  field  of  possible  sense- 
impressions.  The  concepts  of  the  metaphysicians,  however, 
among  which  he  includes  the  "thing-in-itself "  of  Kant  and  the 
"mind-stuff"  of  ClifTord,  are  not  ideal,  but  unreal.'  Even 
physical  science  is  a  classification  and  analysis  of  the  contents  of 
the  mind.-  The  thinker  is  like  the  clerk  in  the  central  tele- 
phone exchange,  who  projects  outside  his  office  sounds  which 
are  really  inside  the  office,  and  speaks  of  them  as  the  external 
universe.'  According  to  Pearson,  we  must  remain  absolutely 
agnostic  as  to  whether  sense-impressions  are  "  produced  "  by  un- 
knowable "  things-in-themselvcs,"  or  whether  behind  them  there 
may  not  be  something  of  their  own  nature.*  He  thus  refrains 
from  a  dogmatic  denial  of  tliings-in-themselves  ;  but  all  reality  of 
which  we  can  ever  know  that  it  exists,  he  would  interpret  after 
the  manner  of  psychological  idealism.  His  own  dogmatism  lies 
in  his  assertion  of  a  subjectivism  such  as  leaves  absolutely  no 
possibility  of  knowledge  of  any  reality  which  might  exist  in- 
dependently of  our  own  subjective  impressions  and  "  constructs." 
H.  R.  Marshall  advocates  the  "thoroughgoing  subjective 
view  .  .  .  according  to  which  the  outer  world  and  the  objects 
within  it  are  complex  systematized  concepts  which  are  within 
and  part  of  consciousness."  '-"  He  states  his  "introspective 
monism"  in  a  way  that  makes  it  virtually  solipsism.  "The 
'now'  of  consciousness,"  he  says,  "is  all  that  exists,  whether 
of  me  or  of  the  universe  fc  me." '  Consciousness  contains 
the  self  and  its  presentations.  The  presentations  are  consti- 
tuted of  the  ego  and  its  objects,  both  objects  in  the  outev  world 
and  activities  in  the  nervous  system.''  The  objective  view  is 
convenient  but  inaccurate ;  only  in  the  subjective  view, 
according  to  which  esse  is  pcrcipi,  have  we  a  true  philosophj'  of 
reaUty.8  Thus  the  natural  world  is  simply  that  part  of  the 
mental  order  which  has  "out-thereness."»  In  Marshall's  solip- 
sism we  have  the  logical  outcome  of  psychological  idealism; 
but  solipsism  has  been  so  universally  taken  as  the  reductio  ad 


:  J5 


'  lb.,  p.  41.  « lb.,  p.  52.  » lb.,  pp.  61-2.  *  lb.,  p.  68. 

»  Consciousness,  1909,  p.  10.  « lb.,  p.  2.  '  lb.,  p.  6. 

•  lb.,  pp.  9-11.  9  Soc  Journal  of  Philosophy,  etc.,  IX,  1012,  p.  106. 


^^PWff 


fn 


t    I 
I 


<'     i 


Vi 


;      ^1 


\*. 


E). 

ii 


104 


THE   PROBLEM   OP   KNOWLEDGE 


absunhnn  of  any  philosophj'  of  which  it  is  the  necessary  outcome, 
that  further  couuncnt  is  needless. 

We  shall  now  turn  to  a  consideration  of  certain  representatives 
of  a  psychological  idealism  in  which  the  subject  of  conscious- 
n(>ss  is  not  represented  as  the  passive  recipient  of  things  as 
"impressions"  or  "ideas,"  hut  the  active  creator  of  objective 
reality  within  the  sphere  of  the  conscious  life.  In  this  connec- 
tion we  think  first  of  Fichte.  In  leading  up  to  the  distinctive 
doctrines  which  he  was  concerned  firially  to  eniuiciate,  Fichte 
conunits  himself  to  the  most  subjective  type  of  psychological 
idealism  th;il  can  well  be  imagined.  Assuming  that  what  we 
do  not  iieiceivc  immediately,  we  do  not  perceive  at  all,  he  goes 
on  to  assert  that  in  all  perception  we  perceive  only  our  own  con- 
dition. Strictly  speaking,  we  do  not  immediately  perceive 
external  objects ;  we  immediately  perceiv(>  only  our  own  per- 
ceiving.' In.stead  of  saying,  then,  that  the  object  is  retl,  one 
should  say,  "I  feel  myself  affected  in  the  maimer  that  I  call 
red."  -  We  extend  our  own  sensation  through  space,  and  call 
an  independent  r(>ality  what  is  a  product  of  our  own  thought.' 
But  neither  do  Wv'  perceive  the  subject  as  an  independent  reality  ; 
our  pure  rational  activity  in  its  original  and  unchangeable  unity 
is  b(>vond  possible  perception,  and  it  would  even  seem  as  though 
intelligence  were  a  mere  product  of  thought.^  But  through 
faith  that  we  can  have  such  knowledge  as  is  necessary  for  the 
fulfilling  of  our  moral  vocation,^  we  may  posit,  as  indeed  we 
also  must,  both  Self  and  Not-self  as  valid  realities  for  thought.* 
The  object  is  dependent  for  its  being  upon  consciousness  of 
the  object,  just  as  consciousness  in  turn  is  dependent  upon 
self-consciousness  (consciousness  of  consciousness).^  Thus, 
in  Fichte's  final  jihilosophy,  the  Ego,  or  Intelligence,  or 
pure  rational  activity,  creates  in  consciousness  the  external 
world  of  experience.  It  is  an  imaginative  construct  of  the 
obstacle  which  is  posited  to  explain  the  Ego's  feeling  of  limita- 

'  "Dip  Bpstimmmig  dcs  Mcnschcn,"  1800,  Firhto's  Popular  Works.  Eng.  Tr., 
1889.  Vol.  I.  pp.  3.57-8. 

»  lb.,  p.  300;   pf.  pp.  3tls,  ptc.  '  //».,  pp.  .if.S,  399. 

'lb.,  pp.  3S3    I,  31)'.).  -■  11)..  p.  111. 

'  Variou.s  work.s  on  \V i«!i{'n.sch<ift«hhre.  /Hmsim. 

'"Zwpitp  Eiiilpituiig  in  die  WIsMMisPhiiftslphre,"  1797,  Wtrke.  Vol.  I.  pp.  458- 
63  ;  if.  Kuuo  Fisplur,  OischicliU  dir  luuvni  I'liilosuphU.  3d  ed.,  Vol.  VI,  p.  308. 


1^ 


'•msff 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


105 


tion  in  its  activity,'  and  oven  to  serve  as  a  basis  for  the  activ- 
ity of  the  ego.  "The  infinite  activity  of  the  Power  ...  is 
only  for  the  sake  of  evidencing,  in  Intuition,  the  Being  of  the 
Will."  -  Thus  Fichte's  doctrine,  although  activi.stic  and  ab- 
solutistic,  remains  to  the  end  a  type  of  subjective  psychological 
idealism.  And  in  essentials  this  subjectivism  is  virtually  as- 
sumed at  the  outset.  His  antdysis  of  experience,  as  can  readily 
l)e  seen,  is  infected  with  the  fallacy  common  to  the  other  forms 
of  psycholo;j,ical  idealism.  The  activistic  interpretation  does 
not  affect  this  fallacious  basis. 

Another  activistic  psychological  idealist  is  Alfred  Fouill^. 
His  idealistic  epistemological  monism  is  indicated  by  li.  in- 
sistence that  psychology  has  for  its  object  realities,  not  nere 
reflections  of  realities.''  Internal  and  external  phenomena  are 
held  to  differ  only  in  that  the  latter  are,  through  activities  of 
sight  and  touch,  spatial,''  and  are  commonly  view<'d  in  abstrac- 
tion from  their  relation  to  the  subject.^  Th(>  physical  is  an 
aspect  of  experience ;  it  is  inseparable  in  reality  from  the 
mental.*  Number,  ppacc,  and  movement  are  mental,  phenom- 
ena, ideas;  and  p.sychology  covers  the  whole  field  of  meta- 
physics, in  so  far  as  it  can  be  covered  at  all.^  The  dualistic 
opposition  of  a  world  of  unreal  appearances  and  a  world  of  reality 
which  does  not  appear,  is  thus  repudiated.*  Phenomena  are 
simply  a  part  of  reality,  which  reality  as  a  whole  is  a  complete 
(psychological)  experience. '  We  may  not  be  able  to  say  that 
the  Unknowable  does  not  exist,  it  is  admitted  ;  but,  it  is  claimed, 
neither  are  we  entitled  to  affirm  its  existence.  The  problem  is 
merely  one  which  ari.ses  when  we  come  to  the  limit  of  the  ex- 
perience of  the  subject." 

But,  urges  Fouillee,  mental  phenomena  —  and  all  phenomena 


'  "GrundlaKo  dcr  gosammolton  Wissonsrhiiftslohro,"  1794,  2d  cd.,  ISdl, 
WiTkr.  V',:.  T,  pp.  2(i5-70;  cf.  K.  L.  Scliaul),  Philosophical  Rtiiew,  XXII,  191,3, 
pp.  IS,  v-tO. 

'  "Die  Wissciischaftslehn!  in  ihnni  allK<iri<iinii  Uiiirisw,"  IKKI,  Wirke,  Vol. 
II.   pp.  70(1-9;    cf.   \V.   Wallace,   I'rultfidminii  In   IIkjiVx  Lofjic,   p.    I;j3. 

'  Lo  puiichiilouU-  di'ii  i:liis-forcis,  1S9;{,  p.  xiii. 

*  Ih.,  p.  xiv. 

■■'  !h  ,  !-.;>.  xv-Tcvi ;   r{.  L'nvfiiir  (!•'  In  m4t<}]}h:i~iqur,  1890,  p.  2!5j. 

'  L'uvtnir,  etc.,  p.  300. 

'  i«  psychologic,  etc.,  p.  xi ;   cf.  L'ovcnir,  etc.,  p.  302. 

•  L'avenir,  etc.,  p.  53.  »  Ih..  pp.  53-4,  278.  ">  lb.,  pp.  2S1-3, 


tj 


106 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   KNOWLEDGE 


N 

'! 


are  really  mental  —  are  not  orif;uially  ropresontatims,  but 
appetitiom.^  Every  .state  of  consciousness  is  iilea  as  including 
discernment,  and  force  as  indudinjt  preference;  moreover,  the 
faculty  of  discernment  is  only  <leveloped  with  a  view  to  choice.* 
All  psychical  force  is  therefore  ultimately  volition,'  and  psy- 
chology is  essentially  the  study  of  the  will.  Its  problem  is, 
How  d»K's  the  subject  act  ?  *  AccordiriK  to  Fouill^e,  then,  physi- 
cal objects  are  spatial  realitii>s  innnediately  di.scerned,  but 
dependent  upon  conscious  will  for  their  being  what  they  are. 
His  philo.sophy  is  thus,  like  Fichte's,  an  activistic  psychological 
idealism.  It  lacks  the  Fichtean  absolutism,  but  it  retains 
the  same  fundamental  fallacy  and  con.sequently  the  same 
dogmatic  subjectivism. 

We  now  turn  to  a  consideration  of  some  psychological  idealists 
who  have  been  strongly  influenced  by  Kant,  and  who  conse- 
quently regard  the  sul)ject  as  neither  passive  nor  active,  ex- 
clusively, in  perception,  but  both  passive  and  active.  We  shall 
first  speak  of  Theodor  Lipps,  whose  "  psychologism "  is  shown 
at  once  by  the  fact  that  he  would  make  psychology  the  funda- 
mental and  indeed  the  all-inclusive  philosophical  science.  When 
psychology  ha.  fulfilled  its  task,  it  has  done,  he  declares,  the 
work  of  logic,  of  testhetics,  of  ethics,  and  of  the  only  accessible 
metaphysics;  it  deals  with  validity  and  with  the  real  as  im- 
mediately experienced.*  Indeed,  all  presentations  are  ol>jects 
for  psychological  investigation.*  The  non-psychological  sciences 
simply  show  up  the  law-abiding  character  the  contents  of 
experience,  viewing  them  in  abstraction  li  ii  their  relation 
to  the  ego,  or  conscious  life.  Objective  and  subjective  are 
thus  simply  two  aspects  of  the  same  process.'  Lipps  is  at  con- 
siderable pains  to  interpret  the  apparently  non-<'mpirical  as 
being  what  it  is  in  and  for  the  experience  of  the  individual. 
There  are  substrates  —  things,  self,  other  selves  —  in  which  the 
more  immediate  objects  of  sense  perception,  as  well  as  those  of 
inner  an  social  experience,  inhere,  or  to  which  they  belong.* 
But   the.se  are  ultimately  interpreted,  at  least  in  the  earlier 


'  La  psijchnlogic,  rtr.,  p.  vii.  '  Ih.,  p.  x.  '  ib.  '  /v..  p.  xsvi. 

<>  Psycholooincht'  Untersuchungeri,  II,  1,  pp.  1-4,  22-7.  '  lb.,  p.  15. 

'  Ih..  p.  27;   I.  1,  p.  20;   Leilfmkn  der  Psychologie.  3d  cd.,  1909,  pp.  77,  167. 
«  Leilfadcn.  etc.,  pp.  171-2,  222. 


I    « 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


107 


thought  of  Lipps,  as  more  possi'  -s  of  rotiMcious  experience.' 
What  they  are  is  what,  they  are  immediately  felt  to  fx',  antl  in 
this  process  of  immediate  perception  the  process  of  Einfuhhing 
—  the  readinK  of  one's  subjective  feelings  into  the  object  — 
phiys  an  important  part.^  Thinking  is  regarded  as  making 
the  object  —  for  the  thinker,  of  course  —  out  of  the  contents 
of  inunediate  feehng  experience.'  But  this  constructing  activity 
of  thought  .seems  more  arl)itrary  and  in(hvi(hial  in  the  system 
of  Lipps  than  in  that  of  Kant.  According  to  the  Kantian 
doctrine,  thought  must  work,  in  univensally  necessary  ways, 
upon  a  content  who.se  temporal  as  well  as  spatial  relations 
have  already  been  established  by  "sensibility."  According  to 
Lipps,  however,  thought  can  take  a  present  content  of  a  certain 
sort  and  make  it  past  by  .so  thinking  it ;  the  past  of  which  we 
think,  it  is  contended,  is  a  part  of  present  experience.''  More- 
over, while  for  Kant  the  line  between  appearance  and  reality 
is  never  an  arbitrary  one,  but  always  definitely  fixed,  whether 
what  one  is  thinking  of  is  the  dii^^tinction  betv.een  phenomenon 
and  thing-in-itself,  or  that  between  what  is  'lot  anil  what  is 
conformable  to  the  principles  of  scientific  order,  according  to  the 
pb=lo.sophy  of  Lipps,  when  an  earlier  content  is  corrected  by  a 
later  experience  or  Einfiihliing,  it  then  becomes,  for  the  first  time, 
mere  appearance;  it  may  persist  in  being,  after  it  has  been 
corrected,  although,  of  course,  as  corrected.^  What  this  means 
is  that  even  what  on  logical  grounds  must  be  rejected  as  unreal 
must  be  accepted,  in  many  instances,  on  psychological  grounds 
as  real ;  and  there  is  no  way  of  overcoming  the  contradiction, 
because  no  place  has  been  left  for  any  metaphysics  but  psy- 
chology. Tiiis  final  contradiction  is  the  penalty  of  the  initial 
fallacy  to  which  we  have  had  occasion  so  frequently  to  refer. 

Hans  Vaihingor  has  been  deeply  influenced  by  Kant,  but  he 
develops  his  philosophy  along  the  lines  of  what  we  have  called 
psychological  idealism.  He  calls  his  doctrine  "idealistic  posi- 
tivism." Reality,  according  to  this  thinker,  is  the  immediately 
given  content  of  experience ;   but  over  against  it  are  to  be  set 

•  Leilfaden, 
and  3. 


1st  cd., 
3d  od., 


190.3,  pp.  337-8. 
222    227  "jS  • 


rf.  P?'j.  Unterauchu.iQtn,  II,  Parts 


'  Psy.  Untersnchungen.  II,  1,  pp.  13,  14; 
'  Psy.  i'n'ersuchungen.  I,  I,  pp.  43,  47. 


cf.  Leitfaden,  3d  pd.,  p.  225. 
"  Leitfadcn,  p.  236. 


M 


'i> 


in 


li 


I,- 


;i| 


108 


THK   I'UOBLEM   OF   KNOWLEDGE 


on  the  one  han.l  Injpntlus,.,  which  an-  nu'i»tal  constructs  repre- 
scntiuK  a  |)ast  cr  a  possibl.-  future  c.i.tcnt  of  cxiH-ncnco,  and 
capalilc,  tlu-rcforc,  of  verification  and  refutation;   and  on  the 
other    han.l    li<H'»is  and   hulj-jkiionx,   which  are  also  mental 
constructs  wiiich  an-  either  highly  conviiiient  or  even  uuhs- 
pensal)le  ai.ls  to  thought  and  lif.',  in  spite  (.f  the  fact  that  the 
half-fictions  contra.lict   reality   (exix'rience),  while  the  fictions 
are  not  only  contradictory  of  reality,  l.ut  self-contradictory  as 
well  '     Vaihinner's  psvcholonisni  here  makes  it  necessary  for 
him  also,  like  Lipps.  U^  jjive  the  lie  to  logi.-.     The  only  difference 
is  that  whereas  Lipps  chose  to  maintain  that  what  lojjic  has 
excluded  as  not  possil.ly  real  is  neverf.  -less  real.  VaihinKcr  has 
chosen  to  defend  the  doctrine  that  even  thounhts  which  arc 
scientificallv  as  well  as  practically  indispensable,  may  be  mere 
empty  concepts,  to  which  no  reality  corresponds.     As  a  matter 
of  fact  both  wavs  (.f  defying  Ww  are  involved,  logiailhj,  in  the 
original  fallacious  adoption  of  the  point  of  view  of  psychological 

idealism. 

.1.  H.  Poincure's  discussions  of  scientific  m(>thod  are  worked 
out  on  the  l)asis  of  a  neo-Kantian  psychological  idealism,  quite 
similar,  fundamentally,  to  that  of  Vaihinger,  or  even  of  Lipps. 
Like  them  too  he  is  forced  in  consecpience  to  confront  the  prob- 
lem  of  satisfving   the   logical   ilemands  of   scientific   thought 
without  departure  from  the  principle  that  reality  is  to  be  fouml 
within   the    limits   of    psychologically   describable   experience. 
His  way  of  dealing  with  this  difficulty  is  not  to  discount  the 
thought-constructs  in  favor  of  tie  given,  a:-  Lipps  and  Vaihinger 
both  do,  each  in  a  way  oi  hi^'  own  ;  rather  does  he  discount  the 
immediately    given    in    lavor    of    th(>    constructed.     ExH>rnal 
objects,  he  savs,  in  Kantian  fashion,  are  groups  of  sensations, 
cemented  by  a  constant  bond,  a  relation,  which  is  the  object 
itself.     These  relations,  he  claims,  are  all  we  know  of  the  object ; 
unlike  sensations  they  are  transmissible  entities,  constituted  by 
thought.     "  All  that  is  not  thought  is  pure  nothingness  ;  since  wo 
can  think  only  thought  .  .  .  to  saythere  is  something  other  than 
thought  is  therefore  an  affirmation  which  can  ha%-e  no  mean- 
ing." -     Like  Vaihinger,  \\ho>o  work,  allhuugh  written  earlier, 

•  Die  Philnsophie  des  Ah  Oh,  1911,  pp.  xiv-xvi,  21,  143-54.  et  passim. 
»  The  Value  of  Science,  Eng.  Tr.,  1907,  pp.  13S,  142. 


PSYCHOLCKUCAL   IDEALISM 


109 


was  later  in  innWinK  its  npiM-aiaiH-c,  Poincarif  diHtinRuishos  not 
(jiily  bi'twei-n  reality,  or  fa<t,  and  hypothesis,  Ijut  ..Iso  between 
liypotheses  and  other  mental  eoiistruets,  which  he  regards,  not 
as  inthspensahle  fictions,  hnt,  more  conservatively,  as  symbols 
which  are  convenient,  although  not  necessarily  true.  For  ex- 
ample, he  contends  that  the  Kuclidean  B(>ometry  is  no  truer  than 
any  ./ther;  it  is  only  more  amviriinit.^  That  Poincard  did  not 
finally  solve  the  problem  is  indicati-il  in  at  least  two  ways.  In 
the  first  place,  this  iloctrine  that  two  or  more  mutually  contra- 
dictory systems  can  Ix*  equally  true  is  more  probably  a  rcdudio 
an  absurdum  of  something  in  the  premises,  than  the  paradoxical 
profundity  its  author  evidently  takes  it  to  be.  But  in  addition 
to  this,  we  have  to  note  the  appurent  movement,  in  Poincar^'s 
later  thought,  in  the  realistic  direction.-  This  movement,  if 
maintained,  would  eventually  have  undermined  some  of  his 
most  characteristic  doctrines  ;  but  the  men  tendency  is  signifi- 
cant as  marking  the  felt  inadequacy  of  psychological  idealisni 
for  philosophical  construction,  even  in  the  hands  of  so  ingenious 
a  thinker  as  Poincar<5. 

We  shall  now  examine  some  typical  instances  of  what  we  have 
called  disguised  psychological  idealism.  Sjieaking  generally. 
It  may  be  t-nid  that  psychological  idealism  beconu's  disguised 
when  its  doctrin(>,  that  objects  depend  for  ilieii  cxistetice  upon 
their  being  experienced  as  objects,  is  applied  to  the  subject 
as  one  of  the  objects.  Then,  prior  to  self-consciousne.ss,  there 
is  no  .self;  experience  prior  to  self-consciousness  is  "pure"  or 
"neutral"  exjM'rience,  upon  their  relation  to  which  lioth  subjects 
and  objects,  both  selves  and  things,  depend  for  their  existence. 
Now  this  homeopathic  treatment  of  sul)jective  or  p.sychological 
idealism  leaves  it  the  same  thing  in  disguise.  Moreover,  this 
disguised  psychologism,  as  wo  shall  see,  is  a  halfway  house  on 
the  way  to  the  new  realism.  It  is  itself  a  transitional  form 
of  philosophy,  a  position  of  unstable  equilibrium.  If  contents, 
as  it  claims,  are  independent  of  any  relation  to  a  conscious 
subject,  it   seems  the  natural   conclusion   to  infer  that  they 

•  76.,  p.  121  :    Science  and  Hypothesis,  EnR.  Tr.,  1905,  pp.  38-0. 

-  Le  fnntvri'.distnr  act-ie>.  hj^  Poir.-r.r^,  !■•<  r-;-.-^;),  <•■'  •-:.',  1013;  rirrr.il'rex 
rmsies,  191.3,  Ch.  VI :  rf.  Journal  of  Pliilosophu.  Vol.  IX.  1912,  p.  3()S,  ami  H.  C. 
Hrown,  "The  Work  of  Henri  Poin(ar6."  Journal  of  Philosophy,  etc.,  XI,  1914, 
|.p.  231-2. 


no 


THE   PROBLEM    OF    KNOWLEDGE 


1  li 


•> 


»    i 


arc  real  iiulcpciKlctitly  of  tlu'ir  being  cxpcriciicecl.  This  view, 
however,  in  uiiich  the  psycliological  itleaUsni  is  no  longer  ap- 
phed  to  the  object,  is  tlie  position  of  the  new  reaUsni,  which  thus, 
by  virtue  of  tlie  tlioroughgoing  episteinological  monism  of  the 
two  forms  of  psycliological  ideahsm  (the  luuUsguised  and  the 
(Hsguised)  from  which  it  has  descended,  begins  as  a  thorough- 
going reahstic  episteniological  monism.  It  starts  all  over 
again  from  the  very  beginning;  its  doctiine  coincides  with  that 
tacitly  assumed  by  the  most  uncritical  naive  realist.  But  two 
wrongs  do  not  make  right.  If  we  were  justified  in  regarding 
the  original,  untlisguised  psychological  idealism  as  founded  on 
fallacy,  then  neither  pure  em])iricism  nor  the  new  realism  can 
be  regarded  as  estal)lished  simply  because  the  effects  of  the  first 
fallacious  process  have  been  covered  up  by  a  second  similarly 
fallacious  step.  The  only  sure  way  of  escaping  the  evils  of  psy- 
chologisin  is  to  retrace  one's  steps.  To  attempt  to  press  on 
through  it  to  some  more  satisfactory  ground  is  only  to  render  the 
final  inevitable  retreat  all  the  more  difficult. 

Ernst  Mach's  views  may  be  regarded  as  transitional  between 
an  undisguised  and  a  di.sgui.-ied  psychologism.  His  works  have 
attracted  a  good  deal  of  attention  as  showing  the  results  of  the 
attempt  of  a  physicist  to  express  physical  facts  and  theories  in 
the  terms  of  psychological  idealism.  Of  the  history  of  his 
thought  he  tells  us  that  at  the  age  of  fifteen  he  was  deeply 
impressed  by  Kant's  Piohgdmcna,  and  that  two  or  three  years 
later  the  superfluous  role  of  the  thing-in-itself  dawned  upon 
him.  Then  his  ego  suddenly  appeared  to  him  as  "one  coherent 
mass  of  sensations."  He  says,  "I  hatl  to  struggle  long  and 
hard  before  I  was  able  to  retain  the  new  concepts  in  my  specialty 
(physics).  .  .  .  Only  by  alternate  .studies  in  physics  and  in 
the  physiology  of  the  sen.ses  .  .  .  ha\'e  I  attained  to  any  con- 
siderable firmness  in  my  views."  '  Thus  he  came  to  view 
bodies  as  complexes  of  sensations,  the  abiding  existences  which 
they  seem  to  have  being  really  nothing  but  thought-symbols 
for  these  complexes  of  sensations.-  Molecules  and  atoms  are 
regarded,  not  as  realities  l)ehind  phenomena,  but  as  mere  means 
for  facilitating  our  dealing  with  the  facts  of  the  senses.'    So  far, 

'  Annli/fiis  of  .SV/isa(iims,  KiiR.  Tr.,  p.  23. 


» lb.,  p.  22 


'lb.,  pp.  154,  207. 


■^^IB 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


111 


\vp  arc  on  the  ground  of  undisguised  psychologism.  The  follow- 
ing doctrine,  however,  points  to  the  neutral  empiricism  which  is 
psychologism  in  disguise.  There  is  no  c  jfjt've  distinction, 
ho  says,  between  the  real  and  the  expci  u  aced.  '  In  t'iT  sensory 
sphere  everything  is  at  once  both  >hv'K'al  and  jvychical." 
"The  apparent  opposition  .  .  .  lies  ( rih  in  the  w  ly  of  con- 
sidering." •  What  we  have  here  is  thus  a  s^si^"..';  of  thought 
founded  upon  the  same  old  fallacy  of  reasoning  from  the  ego- 
cent  ric-pretlicament,  but  shown  to  be,  in  spite  of  the  partial 
disguise  of  its  subjective  idealism,  exceedingly  difficult  to  apply 
in  the  interpretation  of  physical  facts, 

Inthe  "empiriocriticism"  or  " philosophy  of  pure  experience" 
of  Richard  Avenarius"  we  have  one  of  the  earliest  and  best  illus- 
trations of  psychological  idealism  in  disguise.  The  initial 
assuaiption  is  that  nothing  exists  save  experience.  An  appear- 
ance of  r(>alism  is  given  to  th"  .system  by  the  further  assumption 
that  the  fundamental  characteristic  of  the  content  of  ex- 
perience is  space.  But  the  novel  result  of  combining  these 
two  assumptions  might  be  more  appropriately  called  materialis- 
tic idealism  or  idealistic  materialism  than  realism.  The  main 
reliance  for  the  defence  of  the  system  is  placed  in  the  exposure  of 
the  "fallacy  of  introjection"  —  a  falsification  of  natural  ex- 
perience, issuing  in  the  common  dualism  of  the  physical  and 
the  psychical.  The  process  of  introjection,  as  Avenarius  de- 
scribes it,  is  as  follows  :  Since  we  see  that  the  real  objects  which 
another  observer  sees  —  or  thinks  he  sees  —  lie  outside  of  his 
body,  assuming  that  what  he  really  .sees  —  his  perceptions  — 
must  lie  within  him,  rather  than  outside  of  him,  we  conclude 
that  he  perceives,  at  best,  the  subjective  counterparts  of  objects, 
not  the  real  external  objects  tiiemselves.  But  by  analogy  we 
must  conclude  the  y^nw  thing  about  our  own  p(»rceptions. 
Hence  dualism,  or,  r  a  alternative,  subjective  idealism,  arises. 
Avenarius  tries  to  render  consistent  what  he  regards  as  the 
original  natural  view,  by  interpreting  the  di.'^tinction  between 
things  and  thoughts  as  a  distinction  due  to  the  one  being  a 

'  /'>.,  p.  195;   2d  German  ed.  (Analuse  der  Empfinitungen),  1900,  p.  19. 

'  Kritih  riir  rciiirn  Erfnhr!ii:g.  l.SSS  90;  /):'.-  minsrklirhf  Wilfhrgi-iff,  l.SO!; 
rf.  N'.  K.  Smith,  "  Aveiuirius's  Philosophy  of  Pure  Experience,"  Mind,  N.8., 
XV,  19(K),  pp.  1.3-31.  149-GO. 


^^^^^^^V 


sm 


nsr 


112 


THE   PROBLEM  OP   KNOWLEDGE 


'II 


n 


I  i 


i 


p 


first  and  tho  other  a  socorul  exporionco  ;  and,  further,  by  reducing 
the  distinction  between  the  relative  and  absolute  points  of 
view  to  a  distinction  between  two  kinds  of  the  relative  point 
of  view.  But  it  is  easily  seen  that  his  whole  philosophy  rests 
upon  the  fallacious  inf(>rence  that,  since  it  is  only  through 
experience  that  we  can  know  that  anything  exists,  therefore 
"nothing  exists  save  (experience."  Avenarius  is  undoubtedly 
justified  in  taking;  exception  to  subjectivism  and  dualism,  and 
to  the  pnjcess  of  introjcction,  as  he  tl(>scrib(vs  it ;  but  it  remains 
to  be  seen  whether  th(>  reality  of  th(>  subject  and  the  distinction 
between  tli(>  psychical  and  the  physical  may  not  be  maintained 
without  falling  into  any  of  the  errors  against  which  he  rightly 
enough  protests. 

J.  Petzoldt,  acknowledging  the  influence  of  Mach  and  Avena- 
rius, expresses  his  own  view  as  follows:  "There  is  no  world  in 
itself,  but  only  a  world  for  us.  Its  elements  are  not  atoms  or 
any  otiier  absolute  existences,  but  'sensations'  of  color,  sound, 
touch,  space,  time,  etc.  Still,  things  are  not  purely  subjective, 
mere  appearances  in  consciousness.  On  the  contrary  we  must 
think  of  the  constituent  parts  of  our  environs  .ont,  which  are 
made  up  of  these  elements,  as  continuing  to  exist,  just  as  they 
were  during  perception,  even  when  we  no  longer  perceive  them."  ' 
This  retention  of  a  psychological  relativism  in  spite  of  the  ex- 
plicit repudiation  of  psychological  idealism  can  be  understood 
only  as  an  expression  of  the  "  philosophy  of  pure  experience," 
which,  as  we  have  seen,  is,  notwithstanding  all  protests,  nothing 
but  psychological  idealism  disguised  and  masquerading  in  the 
clothes  of  natural  realism.^ 

The  disguised  p.sychological  idealism  of  Wilhelm  Wundt, 
the  intermediate  position  of  which  between  idealism  and  realism 
is  recognized  in  the  designation  "ideal-realism,"  has  not  a 
little  in  common  with  the  doctrines  of  Avenarius.  Wundt 
regards  the  philosophy  of  Avenarius  as  the  only  consistent 
materialism,  l)ut  he  himself  would  avoid  that  conclusion  by  in- 
.•<isting,  in  Kantian  fashion,  upon  the  thought-activity  of  the  ego. 
He  differs  conspicuously  from  Kant,  however,  in  holding  that 
all  the  categori(>s  have  had  an  empincal  origin. 

'  Das  Wiilprablim  torn  Standpunkte  des  rdalitistischen  PnsUivUmua  aut,  2d  ed., 
1912,  pp.  V,  etc.  •  Set'  Ch.  X,  infra. 


I.^ 


•■  ■%■ 


'Mit-ii 


■'O-tt* 


s-l'?  "^ft 


;'uy'^ii\nfK\-^t 


^*7 


^^5?^?^ 


PSYCHOLOGIC  L  IDEALISM 


113 


A  first  examination  of  Wundt's  philosophical  system  may 
lead  to  the  imi)ression  that  his  planned  "ideal-realism"  has 
been  successfully  brought  to  realization.  It  may  seem  that 
without  abandonin<>;  the  fundamenta'  sitions  of  empirical 
idealism  he  has  included  in  his  philosophy  the  truth  of  realism. 
He  undertakes  to  retain  the  view  that  in  experience  the  object 
is  given  immediately  as  a  real  thing;  this  reality,  he  claims, 
remains  a  part  of  knowledge,  subject  to  no  correction.  For 
naive  thought,  however,  according  to  Wundt,  the  given  is  not 
something  which  is  at  once  subjectivt'  r^resentation  and  also 
object ;  it  is  only  an  object  with  such  and  such  characteristics. 
But,  becau.se  of  contradictions  between  different  perceptions 
of  the  same  object,  one  is  forced  to  take  the  (lualitative  content 
of  sensation  back  into  the  subject;  and  yet,  Wundt  insi.sts, 
this  is  necessary  only  for  the  jjarticular  case  in  which  it  occurs; 
it  is  generalized  only  by  an  arbitrary  act  of  thought.  .Still, 
knowing  is  thus  separated  from  the  object,  thinking  is  recognized 
as  subjective  activity,  and  every  given  object  is  seen  to  be  given 
in  the  subject.'  Thus  while  he  agrees  with  Avenarius  in  his 
view  of  the  original  natural  experience,  Wundt  differs  from  him 
not  only  in  his  description  of  the  process  which  accounts  for 
the  consciousness  of  self,  but  also  in  regarding  that  process  as 
valid,  at  least  to  the  extent  of  its  arriving  at  knowledge  of  the 
ego,  or  eognitively  active  subject,  really  involved  in  all  experi- 
ence of  the  world. 

We  must  maintain,  then,  that  this  apparent  realism  is  simply 
an  original  p.sychological  idealism,  such  as  we  might  expect 
would  appeal  to  a  structural  p.sychologist  like  Wundt,  but 
elaborately  accommodated  to  the  point  of  view  of  the  non- 
I)sychological  empirical  sciences  —  also  quite  as  might  be  ex- 
pected of  the  experimental  psychologist.  "The  original  unity 
of  thinking  and  knowing"  is  regardotl  as  at  the  same  time  "a 
unity  of  thinking  and  being."  "Our  presentations,"  he  goes 
on  to  .say,  "are  originally  the  objects  them.selves."  *  This 
must  not  be  taken  as  describing  reality  apart  from  its  being 
experienced,  but  the  content  of  experience  (treated  here  as  if 
there  were  no  other  way  in  which  an3-thing  could  exist)  apart 

>  System  der  Philosophic,  3d  i-d.,  1907,  Vol.  I,  pp.  78,  128-9,  etc. 
«  /6.,  pp.  78-9. 
I 


n 


1^- 


114 


THE    PROBLEM   OF    KNOWLEDGE 


I 


:•         I 


:'\ 


I 


from  any  reflective  consciousness.  The  fallacious  tlogma  of 
psychologism  is  tacitly  assumed,  and  the  supposed  escape  from 
subjectivism  is  only  formal  and  apparent.  The  view  that  the 
object  depends  for  its  existence  upon  reflective  thought  is  avoided  ; 
but  no  place  is  found  for  the  reality  of  thiuRs  which  are  not 
dependent  for  their  existence  upon  their  beinp;  Riven  in  im- 
mediate experience,  as  well  as  not  bein^j;  m(>re  products  of  re- 
flective thoufiht.  Finally,  then,  while  pr(>disposed  to  identify 
the  content  of  a  psycholo<?ically  describable  experience  with 
objective  reality,  Wundt  is  compelled,  nevertheless,  out  of 
deference  to  the  physical  sciences,  to  admit  a  i(>al  transcendence, 
resting  upon  the  unending:  character  of  the  progress  of  thought. 
Even  the  idea  of  '  possil)le  human  experience"  proves  thus 
inadequate  as  an  ultimate  category  of  reality.'  Wundt's 
cpistemological  problem,  fornuilated  as  the  pro  )lem  of  pre- 
serving objective  reality  in  spite  of  the  subjective  point  of  view 
introduced  through  the  consciousness  of  illusion  and  of  those 
non-objective  (>lements  of  experience  which  have  led  to  the 
consciousness  of  consciousness  as  such,  and  so  to  the  develop- 
ment of  the  sci(>nce  of  psychology,-  must  be  regarded  as  left  by 
him  still  awaiting  a  solution. 

The  other  more  or  less  typical  representatives  of  disguised 
psychological  idealism  whom  we  shall  inention  are  English  or 
.\merican  philosophers,  who  are  also  significant  in  other  connec- 
tions. Of  one  of  these,  G.  S.  Fullerton,  it  need  only  be  said 
at  present  that  his  System  of  Metaphysics,  publisheil  in  1904, 
expresses  a  point  of  view  intermeiliate  between  his  original 
Berkeleian  psychological  idealism  and  his  present  realistic 
position.  It  consequently  coincides  at  certain  points  with  the 
covert  or  disguised  psychologism  with  wliich  we  are  here  con- 
cerned ;  but  inasmuch  as  it  falls  into  a  certain  peculiar  abstrac- 
tioniiim,  it  will  be  more  profitably  discussed  as  representing  a 
variety  of  abstract  idealism.  We  shall  turn,  therefore,  to  a 
brief  examination  of  the  views  of  certain  other  philosophers, 
being  concerned  chiefly  with  S.  H.  Hodgson,  William  James, 
antl  John  Dewej',  all  of  whom,  like  Fullerton,  are  ali^o  significant 

'  System  d,r  Philosophir,  3d  rd.,  1907.  Vol.  I,  pp.  179,  188. 
'  Ih.,  pp.  8L'.  88,  91,  135;    cf.  Kuelpe,  Ph\losoi)hij  of  the  Present  in  Germany, 
Eng.  Tr.,  p.  200. 


^a^mSTS^ 


■STT 


^S^ySSBIS 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


115 


in  connection  with  the  transition  from  psychological  idealism 
to  the  new  realism. 

Shadwoith  H.  Hodgson  would  have  metaphysics  has.  J  upon 
a  subjective  analysis  of  experience,  without  presuppositions.' 
Kxi)erience,  he  insists,  cannot  be  transcended;  we  cannot 
think  of  matter  as  a  real  condition  without  first  thinking  of  it 
as  a  percept.-  He  rejects  metaphysical  idealism  and  all  other 
forms  of  trans-empirical  meta[)hysics,'  and  even  regards  the 
idea  of  the  thing-in-itself  as  not  objectively  valid,  but  simply 
"the  name  for  an  unrealizable  attempt  at  thinking."^  Even 
"the  bare  idea  of  Being  or  Existence,  as  the  pcrcipi  of  a  content 
of  consciousness,  is  man's  idea ;  that  there  is  a  universe  at  all 
is  a  thought  of  ours";  and  the  perception  of  this  truth  should 
prevent  us,  he  thinks,  from  attempting  to  frame  a  speculative 
theory  of  the  universe.  =^  "There  is  no  consciousness  which 
does  not  reveal  Being,  and  no  Being  which  is  not  revealed  in 
consciousness."  Even  "  unrevealed  Being "  falls  under  the 
general  notion  of  consciousness.  «  These  quotations  suggest 
an  undisguised  psychological  idealism;  but  when  it  is  re- 
membered that  Hodgson  regards  the  subject  as  an  objectifica- 
tion  of  an  abstraction,  viz.  what  is  left  of  present  experience 
when  we  abstract  from  all  present  perception  of  past  perceptions 
(objects),^  subject  and  object  are  seen  to  be  special  develop- 
ments within,  and  on  the  basis  of,  pure  experience.  But  even 
with  the  aid  of  this  disguise,  Hodgson  is  not,  as  we  have  else- 
where intimated,  able  to  realize  his  ideal  of  an  interpretation 
of  all  reality  in  terms  of  immediate  experience.'  It  is  con- 
fessed that  matter  has  real  conditions  beyond  all  immediate 
hmnan  experience,  so  that  in  the  end  ther(>  appears  the  spectre 
of  the  unknowable  thing-in-itself,  in  spite  of  the  special  pains 
taken  to  drive  it  avvay.» 

'  The  Mttaphmc  of  Experience.  1898,  Vol.  I,  p.  IS ;   Vol.  IV,  p.  368. 
'  /6.,  Vol.  IV,  pp.  20.3,  275.  '  ib.,  pp.  371-81,  etc. 

*"  Method  in  Philosophy,"  Proceedings  of  the  Aristotelian  Society,  1903-04, 
p.  11. 

'  l'>-  P-  11.  •  The  Meta-'hy.fic  of  Erperience,  Vol.  I,  p.  6. 

'Proceedings  of  the  Aristotelian   So  'ety,  1903-4,  p.  60;    The   Metaphyaic  of 
Experience,  Vol.  I,  pp.  4,  etc 

•S.^.'  f'h.    II.   x:,  -r.-., 

•  Proceedings  oj  the  Aristotelian  Society,  Vol.  II,  No.  1,  Part  I,  1891-  J4; 

No.  2,  Part  II,  1892-3,  pp.  16,  etc. 


^« 


% 


i\'tL 


'■Mr  . l^i::r^4«*iA.^*»:rr^-tt*-V'r 


'nm 


li 


.  !    i 


tii 


1 


II 


N 


M 


'i! 


116 


THE    PROBLEM    OF    KNOWLEDGE 


William  Jtitnos  saj-s  that  his  "radical  eini)iricism,"  according 
to  which  nothing;  is  to  he  admitted  as  a  fact  except  what  can 
he  experienced  at  sf)me  definite  time  by  some  experient,'  has 
more  affinities  with  natural  realism  than  with  the  idealism  of 
the  English  school  (Berkeley  and  Mill).-'  The  way  in  which 
this  comes  about  is  that  in  his  "philosophy  of  pure  experience" 
all  relations  are  reduced  to  experienced  contents  ; '  and  so  even 
the  relation  to  the  subject  or  consciousness  is  also  something 
obj(>(tive.  "The  peculiarity  of  our  experiences,  that  they  not 
only  are,  but  are  known,  which  their  'conscious'  quality  is 
invoked  to  explain,  is  better  explained  by  their  relations  — 
these  relations  themselves  being  experiences  —  to  one  another."  * 
The  sepaiation  of  pure  experience  into  consciousness  and  con- 
tent is  really  adding  to  a  portion  of  experience  in  one  context 
the  same  portion  of  experience  in  another  context.*  Thus  con- 
scious.iiss  cannot  projieily  be  said  to  exist  as  a  difTerent  .sort  of 
stutT,  or  quality  of  being,  from  material  reality;  it  is  rather 
to  be  viewed  as  a  special  (cognitive)  function  of  certain  ex- 
periential (real)  elements,  or  "a  series  of  experiences  run  to- 
gether by  certain  definite  transitions,"  or  "a  kind  of  external 
relation"  between  experiential  (real)  terms.* 

But  it  seems  difficult  to  harmonize  the  statement  that  all 
reality  must  be  experienced  by  some  cxpericnt,  whether  by  one's 
self  in  the  present  or  fi'Mu'e,  or  by  our  neighbor,  or  by  itself,^ 
with  this  doctrine  that  pure  experience  is  prior  to  the  distinc- 
tion between  the  mental  and  the  physical.  Moreover,  James 
says  that  his  viinv  does  not  preclude  the  possibilHy  of  things 
beyond  experience,"  and  he  distinguishes  physical  things  from 
facts  of  consciousness  by  .saying  that,  while  the  latter  exist  only 
once,  the  former  are  "supposed  to  be  permanent";'  but,  on 
the  other  hand,  he  not  only  expresses  the  opinion  that  "we 
should  be  wise  not  to  consider  anything  of  that  (extra-experien- 
tial) nature,  and  to  restrict  our  universe  of  discourse  to  what  is 


'  /•"s.vfii/s  in  liiulicnl  r.mpiricium,  p.  100 


«  lb.,  p.  70. 


'  Ei^xnus  in  fitidicnl  /7m;)iririsni,  p.  100  '  lb.,  p.  7b. 

'  III.,  p.  ls.'>.  ftc.  ;    Thf  Miiiiiinu  of  Truth,  Prof.aoo,  pp.  xii-xiii ;   cf.  The  Will 
til  Hi  line,  p.  li"S;    .1  I'liiriiti.'^tic  i'nii-iT.t<-,  p.  'JSO. 

* /•.'."s'li/.s  in  Uniliait  I'niiiiriciam,  p.  2."> ;    <'f.  pp.  1-.S8. 

1  /;.     t.    11-    if    I.    7.''.  •  lt>..  nn.  ,i.  sO.  125. 


-  It).,  pp.  ;J,  sO.  125. 

,,  ,,, «  lb.,  p.  2.-.n:   rf.  The  Meaning  of  Truth,  p.  xii. 

/■.'.s.fi/i/.i  iu  liadicnl  Empiricimn.  p.  127. 


■  lb.,  p.  '.) :    cf.  r'.  7.""). 
'  Ih..  pp.  HH,  ICO. 


PSYCHOLOGICAL  IDEALISM 


117 


experienced,  or"  —  note  the  convenient  ambiguity  —  "at 
least,  experiencenhlc,"  '  but  even  goes  so  far  as  to  repudiate  the 
idea  of  "a  transphenomenal  principle  of  energy."  *  Such 
evidently  conflicting  statements  argue  a  wavering  between  differ- 
ent points  of  view,  if  not  downright  confusion  ;  and  the  explana- 
tion of  the  acrobatic  movements  of  James's  thought  undoubtedly 
is  that  the  disguised  psychological  idea"  ;m,  or  philosophy  of 
pure  experience,  upon  which  he  endeavors  to  maintain  his 
balance,  is  so  unstable  a  position  that  he  is  unable  to  keep  from 
tipping  now  towards  an  vuidisguised  psychological  idealism, 
and  again  in  the  direction  of  natural,  or  even  scientific,  realism. 
According  to  Dewey's  "immediate  empiricism,"  things  are 
what  they  are  experienced  as ;  ^  but  he  is  careful  to  explain  that 
this  does  not  mean  that  they  are  nothing  but  what  they  are 
known  as ;  in  his  view  knowing  is  always  mediate,  i.e.  it  is  by 
means  of  ideas,  whicii  are  instruments  for  the  reconstruction 
of  the  experienced  environment.  Perceptions  are  selected 
elements  of  experience ;  perception  is  constituted  by  the  func- 
tional transformation  of  the  experienced  environment  under 
conditions  of  uncertain  action  (and  so  of  subjectivitj',  con- 
sciousness) into  conditions  for  determining  an  appropriate 
organic  response  {i.e.  into  conditions  of  objective  experience,  or 
reality,  again)  by  means  of  the  judgment,  or  knowing  process, 
the  reconstructive  act  of  cognitive  consciousness.  Thus  know- 
ing makes  a  change  in  things,  and  the  changed  reality  is  what 
it  is  experienced  as,  after  the  knowing  has  been  accomplished.^ 
In  other  words,  the  environment  is  pre-perceptual  experience 
(cr,  what  is  taken  to  be  the  same  thing,  its  contents).  When 
the  conditions  for  favorable  organic  response  do  not  obtain, 
experience  is  thrown  into  subjectivity ;  it  becomes  conscious ; 
ideas  are  constructed  and  employed  in  tentative  judgments. 
When  the  practically  satisfactory  idea  is  found,  the  judgment 
in  which  it  is  predicated  is  an  act  of  knowledge,  reconstructing 
certain  elements  of  experience  (or  the  environment)  into  an 

1  Quoted  by  .1.  Dewty,  New  York  Timra.  Juno  0,  1912. 

'  Essays    n  Radical  Empiricism,  pp.  1H4-5,  note  2. 

'  Influence  of  Duru-in  on  Philosophi/,  1910,  pp.  226  S. 

'  .fuurniil  of  Phiiosnphu,  VI,  1909,  p.  lit;  VIII,  lull,  pp.  ,396-7;  IX,  1912, 
p.  6,59;  "Does  Reality  Possess  Praetieal  Character?"  in  Essays  .  .  .  in  Honor 
of  William  James,  1908,  pp.  51-80 ;   Studies  in  Logical  Theory,  1903,  pp.  23-85. 


I>   1  ll 


■  f 


flffW 


^l«.-,u 


.  I- 


I' 


n 


I  ^ 


118 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   KNOWLEDGE 


object,  or  a  reality,  a  perceptual  experience  or  perception, 
selected,  in  the  numner  thus  described,  from  the  formerly  pre- 
perceptual  experience,  or  environment.  The  fact  that  the 
object  is  said  to  be  constituted  only  in  small  part  by  its  beinp 
known,  seems  to  differentiate  Dewey's  iloctrine  from  idealism; 
but  that  this  is  really  only  a  disguise  becomes  evident  when  it  is 
noticed  that  for  the  connnon  realistic  distinctions  of  reality, 
experience  and  judging,  Dewey  has  substituted  the  itlealistic 
terms,  experience,  consciousness,  and  knowing.  In  other  words, 
no  cognitive  consciousness  is  recognized  except  that  in  which 
the  judgment  is  present  as  an  explicit  act  of  predication;  no 
conscious  experience  is  recognized  except  the  experience  in 
which  contents  of  experience  are  explicitly  subjective,  as  my 
sensations,  my  feelings,  and  my  ideas;  and  no  environm>nt  is 
recognized  except  what  is  immediately  experienced,  as  if  the 
past  and  the  absent  could  have  no  reality  but  what  they  have 
as  immediately  experienced.  Further  exposition  and  criticism 
of  Dewey's  view  may  be  deferred  until  we  come  to  discuss  the 
antecedents  of  the  new  realism ; '  but  from  what  has  been  said 
it  ought  to  be  clear  that  his  system  is  properly  classified  as 
disguised  psychological  idealism. 

G.  H.  Mead,  following  Dewey,  undertakes  to  define  the 
psychical  as  a  phase  of  experience.  The  objective  is  that 
content  of  experience  with  reference  to  which  we  can  act ;  the 
subjective  is  that  with  reference  to  which  we  cannot,  or  may  not, 
or  should  not  act.  Moreover,  it  is  that  which  is  itlentified 
with  the  consciousness  of  the  individual,  as  individual.'  In 
the  unreflective  sta<'{^  the  entire  content  of  consciousness  is 
subjective  and  objeciivc  at  once.''  The  psychical  element  is 
unessential,  because  purely  individual.^  Not  all  reality  is 
psychical,  inasnmch  as  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  introject,  as 
purely  individual,  a  content  with  reference  to  which  one  was 
ready  to  act.'^  Here  we  have  a  disguised  psychological  idealism, 
evidently  developed  in  the  usual  way,  by  applying  psychological 
idealism  to  the  subject  as  object,  but  in  the  specific  way  ex- 


'  Ch.  X.  infra. 

'  "The  Definition  of  the  Psychical,"  University  of  Chicago  Decennial  Publi- 
cations, Vol.  Ill,  p.  .3. 

I  Ih.,  p.  20.  « lb.,  p.  21.  » lb.,  p.  28. 


^^ 


l^YCnOLOOlCAL   IDEALISM 


110 


cmplifiod  by  Dowpy,  viz.  by  taking  the  term  "conscious"  as 
applical  0  only  to  such  experience  as  is  explicitly  self-conscious. 
With  this  is  combined  the  tendency  to  interpret  the  objective 
as  that  which  has  place  in  social,  as  opposed  to  individual,  or 
conscious,  experience. 

A.  W.  Moore  emphasizes  this  last  point  also.  In  repelling 
the  charge  of  solipsism  and  subjectivism  he  appeals  not  to  an 
independent  physical  world,  but  to  a  social  situation,  the 
individual  consciousness  lu-ing  interpreted  as  an  organic  func- 
tion of  the  social  world.'  He  thus  gives  further  basis  for  the 
charge  that  his  pragmatist  doctrine  of  matter  is  in  accord  with 
a  not  very  well-disguised  psychological  idealism.  For  individual 
solipsism  he  substitutes  a  social  solipsism. 

H.  H.  Bawden,  another  disciple  of  Dewey,  has  set  forth 
in  liis  Principles  of  Pragmatism  the  "experience  philosophy," 
without  making  some  of  the  distinctions  recently  emphasized 
l)y  Dewey  himself,  and  without  the  emphasis  placed  by  Mead 
and  Moor(>  upon  social  tests.  He  uses  the  term  "experience "  as 
meaning  the  totality  of  things  for  a  person's  consciousness, 
the  universe  from  an  individual  point  of  view.-  "There  can 
l)e  no  sense,"  he  declares,  "in  speaking  of  reality  beyond  or 
outside  of  experience,  since  this  very  judgment  of  tran.scendence 
or  externality  itself  constitutes  the  relation  which  it  sustains  to 
experience."  This  remark,  which  is,  in  effect,  that  to  judge  a 
thing  to  be  beyond  experience  is  to  1  ng  it  within  experience, 
is  a  particularly  fine  instance  of  tin"  fallacy  of  reasoning  from 
the  "egocentric  predicament."  "Reality,"  it  is  concluded, 
"is  what  is  experienced  —  whether  actually  or  ideally,  whetner 
as  fact  or  as  possibility."^  "To-be  and  to-be-experienced 
come  to  the  same  thing.  Things  are  what  they  are  experienced 
as."*    "There  is  but  one  reality  :  the  content  of  experience."  ^ 

The  only  thing  that  saves  this  view  from  explicit  solipsism 
is  the  interpretation  of  consciousness  in  such  a  way  as  to  dis- 
guise —  albeit  but  slightly  —  the  psychological  idealism  of  the 
fundamental  position.  Consciousness  is  described  as  "a  cer- 
tain kind  of  adjustment  which  takes  place  between  two  portions 

'  Pragmatism  and  Its  Critics,  1910,  pp.  220-1. 

'  The  Principles  of  Pragmatism,  1910,  p.  52. 

•  lb.,  p.  53.  *  lb.,  p.  55.  '  76.,  p.  56. 


t 


i 


rr-^ 


.f  J; 

1 


'•t 


120 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   KNO\VLED(iE 


of  the  loiHfr.sf";'  it  is  "the  RrowinR  point  of  exporionco."  ^i 
"Sensation  ami  inia^e  are  merely  functional  phases  of  that 
intellectual  reconstruction  of  experience  which  we  call  knowl- 
edjie."  ^  "  Knowleilne  is  not  a  process  of  representing  or  refer- 
rinK  to  a  reality  lu-yond  the  act  of  knowledne ;  it  is  a  process 
Hoinjr  on  within  the  object.  .  .  Knowledge  is  the  totality  of 
the  ol)ject  or  situation  .inderMtoinfl  reconstruction."  <  In  this 
view,  which  IJawden  calls  jiraKinatic  or  functional  idealism, » 
there  can  be  objectivity  "only  in  a  functional  sense."  «  That 
part  of  my  experience  alone  is  objective  which  is  brought  clearly 
to  con.^ciousness  in  knowle<lne,  and  which  serves  as  an  instru- 
ment to  cimtrol  another  i)art."  "The  (lo<-trine  of  an  indepen- 
dent and  external  reality  must  be  given  up."  "  It  will  not  do  for 
pragmati.sts  to  complain  that  charges  of  .solii)sism  again.st  tliis 
type  of  pragmatic  idealism  are  altogetln>r  unfair. 


<     I 


I  ; 


Mystiriil-l'-i/rhoh        i!  I'lidlixtn 

We  shall  now  consid-r  a  second  of  the  dual  combinations  of 
elemental  tyi)es  of  i.lealism.  viz.  mystical-psychological  idealism, 
of  which  the  philosopliy  of  Hemi  Hi  igson  will  atTord  us  our  best 
availai)le  illustration.  We  do  not  say  that,  in  its  final  form, 
Herg.xon's  .loctriiie  is  an  iiiiiinihiiinnus  instance  of  idealism;  but 
what  we  (h)  insist  is  that  his  tinal  poitinn  has  come  to  l)e  what 
it  is  only  tl^mgh  the  use  of  certain  idealistic  presuppositions 
and  sugg<'stions.  His  philo>oi)tn(  ;d  method  is  a  psychologi- 
cally oriental  empiricism,  pu>hc<|  to  the  mystical  extreme. 
H(.\vouldhiidic;dityine\p.'rirn.viii  its  most  radical  inmiediacy. 
.\n  imm.'diate  vision  of  n-ality  thi-,  which  the  mystics 
claimed.  Heigson  wouM  make  the  only  true  metho<l  for  the 
metai)hv-iciaii.'  Negatively  tlie  method  may  be  regarded 
as  the  resolute  elimination  from  philosophy  of  all  traces  of 
logical  i.h'alism.  .\11  conceptual  constructi<in  nui.st  be  tran- 
scended if  one  would  iira-p.  in  immediati'  intuition,  the  ultimate 
nature  of  n-ality.     Thoiiniit  does  not  reveal  the  absolute;   but 

1  /,,     ,,     II, t  •  /'.      |.     it'-i  '  '■ '•      C     >'■■■  -  11.  -,1.  2bl. 

./.,,,,  J,-,:,.  /'..  I,. -■.-.:  • /'. .  p  -'.v.. 

•.S,M.  />.(n«/.«(...n  A  '.I  ""■'-0''«!/-<'/'<'     '•!  K..  ..    '/.    n,Hui,hu>i<i>it    •!     ''    morale. 
Juiiuiirv.   \'M>-1.  aiil  i:i'«     I'r  .   l'.M-'.  /«ii.iim 


f 
I    I 


I^J»S2.|4Al«t-^'3«H 


■   ..'    :.:..vUJ...>t 


PSYCHOLOOICAL   IDEALISM 


121 


rathor  falsifies  an*'  hidos  it.  Intuition,  on  thf  contrary,  is  "that 
art  of  intcUoctual  sympathy"  which  transcends  concepts,  and 
by  which  "one  transports  oi.cself  into  the  inte  '")r  of  an  object 
in  order  to  become  harmonious  with  what  is  pecuhar  to  it  alone, 
and  so,  inexpressibh-."  Indeed  ihe  intuitive  penetration  of  the 
object  is  ilescribed  as  inserting  one's  self  into  the  object's  "states 
of  mind"  (etats  d'ame),  the  being  .(h'ntified  (coincider),  for 
the  time  l)einf!;,  with  the  other.'  In  so  far  as  it  succeeds  it  is, 
in  a  sense,  as  the  mystic  has  always  claimed,  "superhuman."  - 
Before  proceeding  farther  it  maj-  be  pointed  out  that  Hergson 
already,  in  his  explanation  of  the  nature  of  his  method,  betrays 
the  fact  that  he  tacitly  assumes,  evidently  in  the  usual  fallacious 
way,  the  idealistic  interpretation  of  things,  which  one  conunonly 
finds  among  the  mystics,  and  which  is  the  essential  feature  of 
psychologistn.  In  immetliate  experience  of  anything  one  does 
not  nece.s,sarily  enter  into  it,  so  as  to  become  part  of  it  (as  mysti- 
cism assumes),  or  so  as  to  have  it  become  part  of  one's  own 
consciousness  (as  psychologism  would  have  it) ;  but  one  or  the 
other,  at  lea.st,  is  involved  in  Bergson's  descriptions  of  intuition. 
Just  how  mystical  idealism  and  psychological  idealism  are 
separately  fallacious  has  already  been  shown ;  and  there  is  no 
reason  to  suppose  that  two  fallacious  suggestions,  when  reen- 
forcing  each  other,  are  able  to  render  each  other  innocuous  and 
logically  sound. 

The  traces  of  this  fallacious  idealistic  assumption  are  dis- 
coverable as  a  confusing  factor  throughout  the  various  works 
of  this  remarkable  philosopher.  What  is  revealed  most  obvi- 
ously by  intuitive  apprehension  is  the  fact  of  duration.^  But 
this  is  interpreted  as  an  actual  persistence  of  the  past  in  the 
present.*  This  tendency  to  regard  the  persisting  memory  of 
the  past  as  the  actual  presence  of  the  past  can  be  understood 
only  if  one  remembers  that   in  psychological  idealism    it  is 


'  Ih..  traiisliition  In-  Luce,  pp.  3-0.  10;  se<>  iilso  pp.  CO,  Sl-2,  8C-"  ;  rf. 
trunshitidii  by  Huliiii',  pp.  13,  7;  iiI.sk  pp.  55-0.  09,  74. 

»  /'..  (Lii.c),  i>.  <M);    (Hulnic),  p.  77. 

'  Exmii  siir  /«s  (lonnets  immidintes  de  la  conscience,  1S89,  Eng.  Tr.,  Time  and 
Frir  Will,  U»l(l.  Ch.  II. 

•  lb.,  EnR.  Tr..  pp.  10().  101,  107,  110,  etc.  ;  rf.  La  perception  du  changement, 
UMl,  p.  .30;  rf.  W.  E.  HorkinK.  "The  SiKnificancc  of  Bergson,"  Yale  Review, 
N.S.,  Ill,  1914,  p.  313. 


,S#'.ir^ 


^tss^  ."wtr.^ 


^W 


w*4'r'^.-^^-'.- 


'H 


'   u 


•> 


:?f 


li 


122  THE   PROBLEM   OP    KN'OWLIDOE 

a.sun>e.l  that  tho  "inuno.Uate  data  of  consciousness"  aro  at 
once  parts  of  the  consciousness  an.l  the  only  P-'ble  spec  es 
of  re'litv  The  common  mystical  nusint.-rpretation  of  the 
lan.e*  in" the  n.vstical  slat.>.  of  onhnary  consciousness  of  time, 
as  heinti  an  actual  trans.vn.lence  of  tc.nporal  succession  may 
als.,  have  ha.l  s..n.e  influence  here.  I.  is  a  particular  mstance 
of  the  i.lealistic  assuM.ption  that  to  lapse  from  hem^  object  of 
consciousness  is  to  lapse  from  hem>?  real. 

But  it  is  especially  with  lier^son's  i.lealistu-  mterpreta  .on  o 
,„a(Ur  that  we  are  here  concerned.     In  .nler  to  learn  the  real 
nature  of  matter,  we  must  eli.ninate  entirely  the  a,,percept.veor 
.ncmorv  element  in  perception,  leaving  only  '-pure  P^-r-1>  '<•» 
as  an  intuition  of  pr.>scnt  reality,  ..r  n.at.er  -       t  .s  fo.t       th 
assu.ne.l  that  this  pure  p.Mvcption  ..  matter,  wluch  .>  s  ni    y 
,„,.re  of  the  sa.ne.'^     The  psyholojiu-al  uleahsn.  n.  tins  .^  un- 
.uistakahl...     Kven  the  psyholo«ical  t.-rm  '-nna^.-s      .s    used 
to<U.s<.ril.e  the  nature  of  nuttter  as  thus  mtu.t.vely  perce.  ed. 
But    it  n.av  he  objected,  Ber.son  hin.self  demes  the  .deahsm 
claiming  that   matter,  or  pmv    perception,  tl^-   aPf^-.^ite   o 
images,  is  more  than  the  idealist  calls  a  r.-presentatum  js  well  a.s 
loss  than  the  realist  calls  a  thin,.'     Hut  this  is  because  Bergson. 
psychological   idealism   is   of  the   '•.lisgu.sed      variety.     It     s 
significant   that  he  claim.-  to  fin.l   nothing  in    us  own  wo  k 
incompatible  with  the  radical  c-mpuu.sm  of  James.^     In  Is 
view  it   is  memorv  alone  which  len.ls  to  perception  its  sub- 
jectivitv  ; «  so  that  when,  as  in  pure  perception,  one  transcends 
memorv,  the  resulting  consc^iousness  would  be  no  longer  sub- 
jective"    Matter,  th.'  content  of  pure  perception,  is  not    to  he 
sure,   a   construct   ..f   intelkct   in   Bergson's  sysfm ;    there  is 
nothing  of  logieal  i.lealism  in  the  Bergsonian   V^^^^^^J^ 
ultimate  reality.     Nevertheless  matter,  as  nnmed.ately  kn      n 
an,l  identifie.1  with  that  content  of  pure  exper.er.e  in  wliub 
the  subject  is  apparently  lost   (as  =  >  mystical  -b-rP '""^ '^ 
necessarih   held  to  be  a  "kind  of  .    .isc.<.u>ness.  It  is      a 

totality  of  images."  «  "an  uninti-rrupted  series  of  instantaneous 

,  M,,i,r.  .7  .ni »•.,  IWHi;     l^"«-  T^-   »>»"■  "P'  -'>;. '•';.  •''^-  ^' '  ^"^  ^^-^• 

-J,  3  ;/,.,  rrrf.irr,  w  "i,  v>i. 

*Ib';r{.  infroduclion.  rtr.  (Lur,-).  p.  M;    (Ilulm.),  pp.  '27  S. 

^  Journal  of  PhiUm.ph,/.  VII,  1910,  p.  .-ISS-  , 

•  Matter  and  Memory,  p.  h(l.  ''>■•  P-  •^l'^- 


PSYCilOLOOICAL   IDEALISM 


123 


.•isions,"  which 


part  of  tilings  rather  than  of 


,'isions  arc 
oiirsi'lvoH."  '  HiTKson  lias  cxplicilly  rcpudJatcd  tri(!  uioa  mat 
life  traiisrcndis  cxporioiicu*,  or  that  absohite  ri^ahty  is  beyond 
th«*  most  scarchinK  cxpcnrncc.  "Life,"  he  says,  "transcends 
intcllincnce,  l)Ut  not  experience ;  and  it  apprehends  itself  ab- 
sohitely  in  an  intuition  which,  though  actually  incomplete,  can 
«o  on  compleliiiK  itself  indefinitely."  =  This  double  doctrine 
of  consciousness,  as  identitied  first  with  subjrctivo  consciousness 
and  then  witli  the  innnediate  data  of  non-sul>jective  experience, 
is  syniptoniat  ii  of  disguised  psychological  idealism,  and  accounts 
at  the  same  time  for  the  elusive  character  of  HerKson's  funda- 
mental metaphysical  intuition. 

In  fact,  there  are  in  Hernson's  doctrine  at  le;ist  five  clearly  dis- 
tin)iuishai)le  applications  of  the  ter?  .  "consciousness,"  some  if 
which  do  not  seem  to  In  iltogether  compatible  with  each  ot^i  i . 
To  l)e)iin  at  the  upjn  i  limit,  there  is  that  iiresumubly  "sup. 
Iiiiman"  consciousness,  fleeting  glimpses  of  which  are  not 
altoj^ether  unattai!ial)le  1  y  man,  viz.  Udnilion.^  Then  there  is 
the  characteristicalh'  human  form  of  consciousness,  iVi/cZ/ige/jce. 
This  w;is  originally  developed  in  connection  with  the  process  of 
adjusting  the  developing  life  to  its  material  environment,  and 
bears  conspicuous  marks  of  its  rally  history.  It  found  in  the 
spatial  form  a  convenient  symbol  of  the  naterial  reality  about 
it,  and  so  constructed  the  world  of  spatial  objects  out  of  the 
iimiuHliate  data  of  c(msciousness.  In  this  it  was  well  within 
its  rights  ;  but  it  is  incapable  of  dealing  satisfactorily  with  life, 
which  it  inevitably  tends  to  interi)ret  mechanically,  i.e.  spa- 
tiall}-.'  Here,  it  will  be  noted,  we  find  an  idealistic  and  approxi- 
mately Kantian  interpretation  of  the  physical  object  as  it  is 
for  Intelligence.  But  the  most  characteristic  form  of  animal 
consciousness  is  instinct,  which  reaches  its  highest  development 
in  tli(>  Arthropods,  and  which  is  not  to  be  viewed  as  unconscious 
iK'cause  it  is  not,  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the  term,  intelligent.' 
But  Berg.son  speaks  of  consciousness  as  eoterininous  with  life, 


'  lb.,  p.  fiO. 

'  Introduction,  etc., 


''.Journal  nf  Philonophy.  VII,  1910,  p.  .'{88. 
passim;    L'erolution  criatrice,  Eng.  Tr.,  1911,  pp.  360-1, 


•  Introdurtion.  passim:   Crentii-e  Evolution,  pp.  1,35-65,  1S6-90.  202,  206,  208, 
et  passim;   Hnrkiug,  Yale  Revieu\    X.S.,  III,  p.  315. 

*  Creative  Evolution,  pp.  135-51,  165-76,  etc. 


|:l 


.r 


■            i 

124 


THE   PROBLEM  OF   KNOWLEDOE 


and  so  opposes  it  to  inert  matter.     In  fact,  life  is  defined  as 
consciousness   usiii^   matter  for   its   purposes.     Consequently 
it  is  found  necessary  to  explain  that  in  the  vegetable  world  life 
or  consciousness  is  in  a  state  of  torpor ;  it  has  become  drowsy, 
as  it  were,  having   renounced  movement,  and  devoted   itself 
to  th(>  preparation  of  the  explosive  substances  employed  by 
animals  to  enable  thein  to  utilize  matter  in  their  movements.' 
But  even  matter  itself,  as  we  have  seen,  is  interpreted  as  "a 
kind  of  consciousness."     What  Bergson  seetns  to  mean  here  is 
that  even  inert  matter  is  consciousness  with  but  a  minimum  of 
duration  or  memory,  which  can  only  be  known  by  a  supreme 
effort  of  intiiition,  whereby  the  knower  "enters  into"  the  object, 
so  as  to  share  its  being  or  its  being  consciously  perceived.     It  is 
not  that,  in  all  forms  of  consciousness,  the  reality  of  which  there 
is  awareness  is  dependent   on  that  consciousness,  but  that, 
ultimately,  it  would  seem,  reality  as  life  can  only  be  interpreted 
as  consciousness;  it  is  inwardly  felt  duration.     Inert  matter, 
then,  is  the  same  thing  as  life,  only  its  movement  is  in  the 
opposite   direction;     it   is   life,   or   consciousness,    "unmaki: 
itself."  -    Perhaps  what  Bergson  means  is  that  inert  ni:  tur  is 
life  with  but  a  minimum  of  I'elan  vital,  so  that  it  acts  as  a  drag 
upon  the  central  Hfe  and  movemeu.,  and  even  seems  to  be 
moving  in  the  opposite  directioi\.     In  any  case,  in  this  mul- 
tiple signification  of  the  term  '"consciousness,"  especially  in 
its  application  to  vegetable  torpor  and  even  to  inert  matter 
(not  to  dwell  upon  the  more  doul)tful  case  of  instinct),  we 
have   evidence   of   Bergson's  determination  to  abide   by   the 
con.sequences  of  his  original  tacit  assumption  of  psychological 
idealism,   an   assumption   that   was   none   the   less  fallacious 
for  its  being  disguised  and  propped  up  by  means  of  certain 
concordant  l)ut  equally  fallacious  mystical  suggestions.' 

'  Crcatiie  Eiolution.  pp.  109,  111,  113-14,  12^-:r..  IHl  ;  - U(e  and  Con- 
>>A'n\Hncii,"  HMcrt  Journal,  X,  lUlM'.',  pp.  24-44. 

^Creatire  Kiulution,  pp.  245-.')  1  :    HihhrrI  Journal,  X,  p.  .37. 

'  If  this  inttrprttation  should  hnvo  to  bp  given  up,  the  only  plausible  alterna- 
tivo  left  would  seem  to  be  that  in  the  interviil  between  the  publieation  of  Maiikre 
rl  memoirc  and  the  writinR  of  L'lvohition  crmlric,'  Bergson".s  thouRht  eu£forcd 
fuiiduniental  modifie:ition  — and  tliia.  it  is  understood,  he  is  himself  unwilling  to 
iieknowledse  —  «"  th;it.  while  the  view  of  f ornii'd  nature  remains  quasi-idealistic, 
the  marks  of  idealism,  so  f.ir  as  eoneerns  the  doctrine  of  inert  matter,  would 
have  to  bo  said  to  have  at  length  disappeared. 


mn  ->- 


mA^im^  me 


PSYCHOLOGICAL   IDEALISM 


125 


Still  another  indication  of  the  untlerlying  psychological 
uleahsm  is  found  in  the  doctrine  which  Bergson  has  recently 
stated  as  follows:  "There  are  changes,  but  there  are  no  things 
which  change ;  the  change  has  no  need  of  a  support.  There  are 
movements,  but  there  are  not  necessarily  invariable  objects 
which  move;  movement  does  not  imply  a  thing  moving."' 
Here  again  we  have  simply  a  peculiarly  rigorous  apphcation 
of  the  assumption  of  psychologism,  that  reality  is  nothing  but 
the  immediate  data  of  consciousness.^ 

'  La  perception  du  changemeni,  p.  24. 

'  Inciaontally,  it  may  be  remarked  that  Bergson's  confessed  unrertainty  with 
roferen-T  to  the  religious  implications  of  his  system  is  probably  due  in  no  small 
l.art  to  his  interpretation  of  " creative  evolution"  in  a  similar  p.sychologistic 
an.i  non-substantial  sense.  He  asserts  creation,  but  fails  to  interpret  it  as  an 
activity  of  which  there  is  any  subject.  His  creative  evolution  is  not  evolution 
as  the  result  of  creative  activity,  but  simply  evolution  as  if  it  were  the  result 
ot  .Tcatiye  activity.  In  the  last  analysis  -  or  the  last  intuition,  rather  -  it  ia 
nothing  but  a  real  becoming  among  appearances  than  which  there  is  nothina 
more  real.  v..iuu 


j.rt 


I 


{■hi  I 


I 


i 

1 1 1 
>  I 


1 


If  I 


M 


V 

if  t 


^1 

iii 


i  * 
-  f 


i  ■ 


CHAPTEP   VII 

The  Older  Absolute  Idealism 

Logical-Psychalogical  Idealism 

We  spoke  of  psychological  idealism  as  the  most  modern  of 
the  elcmcnhil  types  of  iilealism  ;    hut  the  most  typical  idealism 
of  the  nineteenth  century  at  least  is  not  that  which  is  developed 
untler  the  immediate  influence  of  the  suggestions  arising  from 
the  psychological  view  of  experience;    rather  is  it  a  device 
which  has  commended  itself  as  affortling  a  way  of  escape  from 
the  subjectivism  which  besets  that  psychological  idealism.     As 
soon  as  the  hranan  mind  has  passetl  fiom  the  natural  realism 
of  ordinary  consciousness  to  the  subjective  idealism  suggested 
by  the  psychological  jjoint  of  view,  it  is  confronted  —  through 
a  confusion  of  thought,  as  we  have  seen  —  with  the  problem 
as  to  how,  where  everything  known   is  one's  own  iilea,  any 
knowledge  of  genuinely  objective   icality   is   possiljli'.     From 
this  point  of  view  the  only  possible  solution  of  the  prol)lem 
seems  to  be  found  in  an  identity  —  if  it  can  be  maintained  — 
between  objective  reality  and  the  rationr;!  idea  at  which  one 
arrives   through    the   dialectical    jirocess.     Reality,    it    is   still 
assumed,  as  in  psychological  idealism,  is  constituted  of  contents, 
constituent  elements,  of  consciousness;   but,  since  subjectivism 
is  to  be  avoided,  some  way  must  be  found  of  distinguishing 
between  reality  and  those  contents  of  consciousness  which  are 
mere  subjective  appearance.     Assuming  psychological  idealism 
to  be  valid  as  far  as  it  gf)es,  then  it  would  seem  to  be  only  on 
condition  of  objective  reality   lieing  regarded  as  constituted 
of  the  logical  within  the  psychological,  the  universally  acceptable 
leilhin  the  contents  of  conscionsness,  that  knowledge  of  objective 
reality  can  l)e  said  to  be  humanly  possible. 

In  this,  the  nineteenth  icntury'.s  mo.-,t   characteristic  form 
of  idealism,  whose  earliest  undoubted  representative,  as  well 

I'Jt) 


til 


••S? 


■P^fflB 


nv 


THE   OLDER  ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM 


127 


as  the  most  eminent  and  influential,  was  Hegel,  we  have  a 
return  to  logical  idealism  as  a  way  of  escape  from  the  subjec- 
tivism of  psychological  idealism,  without  giving  up  the  essen- 
tials of  the  latter  position.  Being  thus  a  synthesis  of  two  of  the 
elemental  types  of  idealism,  the  logical  and  the  psychological, 
it  may  he  appropriately  calle(;  logical-psychological  idealism. 
As  finding  reality  in  what  is  not  mere  private  feeling,  but  in 
that  which,  while  made  up  of  particular  experiences,  is  shot 
through  and  through  with  universally  acceptable  and  even 
necessary  ideas,  it  claims  to  be  objective,  rather  than  merely 
subjective.  In  its  simplest  form  this  "objective  idealism"  is 
the  conclusion  that  the  thesis  that  we  know  objective  reality 
which  is  there  for  every  one,  and  the  opposing  thesis  that  we 
can  never  know  anything  but  ideas,  contents,  and  parts  of 
consciousness,  cannot  both  be  true  unless  reality  is  made  up  of 
universally  acceptable  ideas.  It  has  thus  grown  up  as  a  solu- 
tion of  the  problem  of  the  possibility  of  knowledge  of  objective 
reality,  proposed  by  and  for  those  who  cannot  see  their  way 
clear  to  give  up  psychological  idealism. 

It  ought  to  be  readily  recognized  that  what  we  have  here  is 
more  flogma,  rather  than  a  valid  and  conclusive  argument. 
As  a  synthesis  of  logical  and  psychological  idealism,  it  is  still 
vitiated  by  the  already  exposed  fallacies  UHvlerlying  those  two 
elemental  forms  of  idealism.  It  is  well  to  remember  '^hat  there 
may  be  an  abuse  as  well  as  a  proper  use  of  dialectic.  At  its 
best  the  dialec'lcnl  process  is  a  part  of  empirical  analysis. 
Even  when  '  '  the  antithetical  judgments  are  inductions 

well   suppo.  experience,   unless   it   is   certain   that   the 

synthesizing  •  icnt  exhausts  all  the  possiiiilities  in  the  case, 

it  should  be  i.garded  as  in  some  degree  still  hypothetical  until 
it  has  been  empirically  verified.  Any  other  use  of  the  dialec- 
tical method  is  dogmatic.  But  when  both  of  the  propositions 
to  be  harmonized  are  dogmas  resting  upon  fallacious  reasoning, 
it  seems  the  height  of  dogmatism  to  set  forth  the  synthesis 
as  iu'ces.sarily  true.  The  procedure  in  such  a  dialectical  process 
is  exactly  parallel  logically,  if  not  morally,  to  the  telling  of 
one  lie  to  support  another.  Such,  we  would  claim,  is  the  basis 
"f  logical-psyehologiial  idealism.  It  is  a  more  than  dubious 
>^oIution  of  the  entirely  unnecessary  problem  of  how  to  avoid 


m 


1^  * 


RIP 


tr         i' 


! 


r 


{ 


y  i 


\.  ■  ( 


ll 


1 


III 


128 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   KNOWLEDGE 


scepticism,  when  one  has  made  such  a  mistake  in  analysis  as 
makes  scepticism  logically  inevitable. 

If,  however,  there  should  be  doubt  as  to  whether  modern 
objective  idealism  was  really  designed  to  extricate  the  modern 
philosopher  from  subjectivism,  especially  in  view  of  the  fact 
that  Hegel  starts  directly  with  the  concept  of  being,  without 
any  preliminary  epistemological  inquiry,  it  will  be  sufncient  to 
recall  that  the  (ierman  iilealistic  movement  from  Kant  to 
Hegel  is  to  be  regarded  as  the  working  out  of  a  way  of  escape 
from  the  Humian  sceptical  psychologism.  Indeed  the  state- 
ment may  be  ventured  that  no  modern  idealism,  however 
much  it  may  wish  to  disown  its  subjectivistic  ancestry,  can 
justly  deny  the  fact  of  that  relationship.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
subjectivism  constitutes  no  small  part  of  the  stock-in-trade 
of  the  typical  modern  idealist  ;  he  vvf  uld  find  it  hard  to  do 
business  without  if. 

Before  proceeding  further  with  our  criticism  it  will  be  well 
to  indicate  something  of  the  relation  of  objective  idealism  and 
logical-psychological  idealism,  in  their  chief  varieties,  to  each 
other.  Most  forms  of  objective  idealism  are  logical-psycho- 
logical. Objective  idealism  may  be  concrete  or  abstract.  By 
concrete  idealism  is  meant  the  doctrine  that  reality  is,  in  some 
sense  of  the  word,  idea,  actually  present  in  some  experience. 
By  abstract  idealism  is  meant  the  doctrine  that  reality  is,  in 
some  sense  of  the  word,  idea,  but  so  stated  that  the  reality  is 
not,  or  cannot  be  held  to  be,  all  actually  present  in  individual 
experiences.  In  one  of  its  forms,  as  we  shall  see,  abstract 
idealism  ceases  to  be  logical-psychological,  and  be  -)mes  simply 
logical ;  it  is  objective  without  being  subjective.  Concrete 
idealism  may  be  metaphysically  monistic  (singularistic),  hold- 
ing that  all  reality  is  essentially  idea,  present  in  one  all-inclusive 
experience;  or  pluralistic,  htjlding  that  rcalitj',  as  idea,  is 
distributed  among  many  luutuully  exclusive  and  ultimately 
real  experiences.  The  monistic  form  of  concrete  objective 
idealism  is  usually  called  "absolute  idealism";  while  the  plu- 
ralistic form  is  often  called  ''personal  idealism."  In  some  of  its 
forms  personal  idealism  ceases,  as  we  shall  see,  to  i)e  logical- 
psychological,  and  becomes  simply  |)sychological ;  it  comes  to 
be,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  many  selves,  considered 


^^■^^ 


■Pil 


m^ 


THE   OLDER  ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM 


129 


together,  no  longer  objective,  but  subjective  only.  Absolute 
idealism,  on  the  other  hand,  like  concrete  logical-psychological 
idealism  everywhere,  is  not  only  objective,  but,  in  a  sense, 
subjective  also.  Its  objectivity  it  gets  from  logical  idealism. 
Its  subjectivity  —  the  doctrine  that  the  object  can  exist  only 
for  a  subject  —  holds  with  reference  to  the  one  Absolute  Self 
(in  singularism),  or  with  reierence  to  the  many  finite  selves  (in 
pluralism),  but  not  with  reference  to  the  single  finite  self, 
for  that  would  be  solipsism ;  and  this  subjectivity  absolute 
idealism,  like  the  others,  gets  from  psychological  idealism. 
Finally,  then,  lexical-psychological  idealism  includes,  as  we 
shall  see  more  fully  in  the  sequel,  all,  or  very  nearly  all,  forms  of 
monistic  concrete  idealiswi,  and  several  varieties  both  of  abstract 
idealism  and  of  pluralistic  concrete  idealism. 

We  shall  first  consider  absolute  idealism,  or  concrete  logical- 
lixijchological  idealism,  in  its  monistic  {singidaristic)  form.  This 
monistic  form  differs  genetically  from  the  pluralistic  in  that  the 
subjectivism  with  which  logical  idealism  is  united  is  of  the 
solipsistic  type.  It  is  evolved  as  the  final  synthesis  in  a  dialec- 
tical process,  as  follows  :  First  thesis:  I  know  objective  reality. 
First  antithesis:  I  know  only  my  own  ideas.  First  synthesis, 
becoming  second  thesis:  Reality  is  constituted  of  my  own  ideas. 
Second  antithesis:  As  a  finite  knower  I  do  not  know  all  reality. 
Second  synthesis :  It  is  only  my  finite  self  whose  knowledge  of 
reality  is  limited ;  my  true  or  absolute  self  must  know  all  my 
own  ideas,  and  so  objective  reality  is  to  be  thought  of  as  the 
complete  system  of  the  ideas  of  my  true  or  Absolute  Self.  The 
process  may  be  continued  as  follows :  Third  thesis:  the  second 
syntiiesis  just  stated.  Third  antithesis:  There  are  other  finite 
selves,  of  whose  ideas  reality  is  compo.sed.  Third  synthesis,  or 
fourth  thesis:  It  is  not  the  finite  self  of  these  individuals  of  whose 
ideas  reality  is  exclusively  composed,  but  the  true  or  Absolute 
Self.  Fourth  antithe.'iis :  There  is  but  one  objective  reality  of 
which  the  different  finite  selves  have  ideas.  Fourth  synthesis: 
The  true  self  of  all  such  individuals  must  be  one  and  the  same 
.\l)solutp  Self.  In  this  dialectic  the  one  inu  vl  error  which 
vitiates  each  succeeiling  synthesis  is  the  first  antithesis,  the 
dogma  of  p.sychological  iilealism,  that  I  know  only  my  own  ideas. 

The  logical  idealism  is  explicitly  introduced  into  this  abso- 

K 


wmmm 


nm 


130 


TIIK   PROBLEM   OP   KNOWLEDGE 


!■ 


lute  idealism  by  a  process  of  thou>?ht  which  may  be  thrown 
into  overtly  dialectical  form,  as  follows:  Thenis:  I  know 
objective*  r(>ality.  Aiilithrsix:  I  am  finite,  and  only  the  ideas 
of  the  Ai)solute  Self  arc  absolute  ideas.  Synthesi.s:  Realitv  is 
the  ade<iuate  lofjical  idea,  and  adequately  criticised  or  rational 
lojcical  ideas  are  the  ideas  of  the  Absolute  Self,  so  that  in  so 
far  as  I  interpret  my  experience  by  means  of  such  ideas,  the 
il)solutc  Self  interprets  my  experience  in  me. 

But  while  this  is  the  latent  dialectic  underlyinp;  absolute 
idealism,  that  system  of  philosophy  is  generally  based  explicitly 
ui)()n  special  arguments  in  which  the  above  dialectic  is  either 
oliscuretl  or  transceniled.  In  this  propo.sed  basis  there  may  be 
an  emphasis  in  a  one-sided  and  exclusive  way  upon  rational 
t  bought -processes ;  or  there  may  be  added  an  emphasis  upon 
l)urpose  and  will ;  or,  finally,  feeling,  and  especially  religious 
feeling,  may  receive  special  emphasis.  We  would  thus  have 
three  main  types  of  absolute  idealism,  viz.  infcUcctiialistic 
absolute  idealism,  in  which  the  Ab.solute  Idea  (with  which  it  is 
maintained  Al)^;olute  Reality  is  iilentical)  is  regarded  as  dis- 
coverable through  critical  intellectual  processes;  voluntari.stic 
absolute  idealism,  in  which  the  Al)solute  Idea  is  regarded  as 
determined  by  purpose :  and  nnistical  at)solute  idealism,  in 
which  the  Absolute  Idea  is  regardetl  as  being  inunediately 
experienced  through  feeling.  We  shall  therefore  consider 
ai)solute  idealism  in  these  its  three  principal  types.  But  there 
is  another  triple  division  of  absolute  idealism  which  is  also  of 
great  importance.  After  the  oriijinal  constructive  inovcment  in 
its  intellectualistic  and  voluntaristic  forms  we  must  consider 
the  (kstructirc  movement  within  absolute  idealism,  as  represented 
by  F.  II.  Bradley,  and,  finally,  the  attempts  at  reconstruction, 
intellectualistic,  voluntaristic,  and  mystical.  In  the  present 
chapter  we  shall  deal  with  the  original  construction  and  with 
the  destructive  movement. 

Hegel's  own  philosophy,  although  of  prime  importance  here, 
has  been  so  often  exhaustively  expounded  and  discus.sed  that  it 
need  not  detain  us  long.  The  fundamental  doctrine  is  that  the 
real  is  the  rational,  not  in  the  sense  of  mere  logical  idealism 
(with  Its  identihcation  of  reality  with  the  absolute  idea  as  the 
abstract  universal),  but  in  the  sense  that,  if  being  is  interpreted, 


TSTTTrrrsTTV^r. 


■^W 


^se^f^amm' 


THE   OLDER  ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM 


131 


ifter  the  manner  of  psychological  idealism,  in  terms  of  con- 
sciousness, it  is  further  determined  by  the  principle  that  the 
real  is  the  rational  within,  the  psychical,  the  universal  {i.e.  the 
universally  accessible,  or  public)  within  the  particular  facts  of 
an}'  individual  consciousness,  the  objective  within  the  subjective 
— •  in  other  words,  the  concrete  universal.  Absolute  Reality,  in 
which  all  that  is  real  must  be  included,  is  an  absolutely  rational 
system,  in  which  all  particulars  of  conscious  experience  are 
included.  Hegel  is  commonlj'  interpreted  as  intending  to 
teach  a  monistic  metaphysic'  The  criticisms  we  would  be 
concerned  to  urge  against  this  doctrine  have  already  been 
indicated  in  the  preceding  paragraphs  of  the  present  chapter. 

After  the  philosophy  of  Hegel  himself,  the  older  English 
and  American  Hegelianism  may  be  taken  as  affording  perhaps 
the  best  availaljle  example  of  what  we  have  called  intellectual- 
istic  absolute  idealism.  J.  Hutchinson  Stirhng  and  William 
Wallace  in  Britain  and  W.  T.  Harris  in  America  confined  their 
efforts  for  the  most  part  to  an  exposition  and  defence  of  the 
Hcgeliap  system,  with  little  or  no  conscious  deviation  from  the 
doctrine  of  the  master.  Wallace,  speaking  for  Hegel  and  for 
himself,  maintains  that  knowledge  begins  in  the  immediacy 
of  sense-perception,  which  is  a  felt  totality  (or  totality  of  feel- 
ings) ;  its  further  task  is  to  raise  this  to  an  intelligible  totality 
(or  totality  of  intelligently  ordered  thoughts).  It  is  here 
assumed  that  the  contrast  of  subjective  and  objective  is  simply 
that  between  the  earlier  stage  of  immediate  feehng  and  the 
later  one  of  the  constructs  of  thought.  Neither  the  contrast 
between  feelings  and  that  which  is  felt,  nor  that  between  thoughts 
and  what  is  thought  of,  is  treated  as  anything  more  than  an 
essentially  verbal  distinction;  "ideal-realism"  or  "real-ideal- 
ism," the  "idealism  of  nature,"  and  the  "realism  of  mind"  are 
the  cardinal  points  of  Hegelian  doctrine. - 

Let  us  see  what  we  have  here,  and  what  it  presupposes  and 

'  Sep  "  Phiinompnnlogie  di-s  Geiatrs."  Wcrhr,  1S32,  Vol.  II,  pp.  73 -St,  131- 
40;  "Die  Wisspn.srhaft  dor  Logik,  II,  Die  Subjoktivo  Logik,"  Werke,  Vol.  V, 
pp.  230-.5  :  "  Enpyclopiulio  der  philosophisrhon  Wi.s.scnsphafton,  I,  Dip  Logik," 
H(tAv,  Vol.  VI,  pp.  320-21,  3S.5;  "  Enryplopadip,  III,  Dip  Philosophip  dca 
(Spi-^tps."  Wirkr.  Vol.  VII.  P.irt  II.  p.  2S3  (pf.  Rovpo.  The  Spirit  of  Modern 
Philosophii,  p.  208,  note  2),  307  ff. 

'  W.  Wallace,  Prolegomena  to  Hegel's  Logic,  pp,  190-3,  303. 


'    1 


)    I 

;•:  I  ■ 


-1 


1 


H    ^ 


132 


THE    PROBLEM   OF    KXO\VLED(JE 


•  i(l  I'f 


i 


If  14     t 

|.  f 

t 


^  .4  ■     ^ 

i 


''»i  'if  f 


,  :\ 


i 


«: 


implies.     At  first  it  would  seem  as  though  there  hail  been  >iiaply 
a  reversal  of  the  point  of  view  of  coinnion  sense ;    the  ol)jeet 
immediately  experienced  beinn  ♦aken  as  subjective,  and     "le 
ideas  or  thought-constructs  of  the  sul)ject  as  objective.     But  at 
any  rate  for  tlie  objin-t  as  merely  sensed  there  has  been  sub- 
s*'      xl  the  sense-(iualities,  and  these  are  interpreted,  after 
the  lallacious  manner  of  psychological  idealism,  as  being  mere 
sensations,  feelings,  modes  of  the  consciousness  of  a  particular 
subject.     On    ihc  other    hand    thought-constructs,  when   the 
thinking  has  been  sufficiently  critical,  seem  less  private  than 
sensations   and    feelings;     they   are   in   a   sense   transferable, 
universally  usable,  in  that  the  words  used  in  conmumication 
directly    express    these    thought-constructs,    and    only    more 
remotely  the  sensations  and  feelings.     The  thought-constructs 
are  more  universally  accessible  than  the  feelings.     Accortlingly, 
after  the  fallacious  maimer  of    logical  idealism,  but  also  in 
default  of  anything  less  dependent  upon  the  particular  subject, 
since   psychological  idealism  is  assumed,   this  universality  of 
rational   thought  is  interpreted  as  being  itself  the  e.s,s('nce  of 
objectivity.     The  thought-construct,  or '-universal,"  however, 
is  not  taken  abstractly,  but  (theoretically)  in  all  its  relations^ 
so  as  to  include,  especially,  its  relation  to  the  particulars  of 
sense;   it  is  a  universal  in  the  particular,  the  "o"  rrctc  notion  " 
or  "concrete  universal"  which  Stirling  rightly  spi  iks  of  as  "  the 
secret  of  Hegel."  •     It  is  involved  in  this  view    mt  to  think  of 
the  objects  of  sense-perception  as  capable  of  existing  either 
wholly  or  in  part,  independently  of  the  relation  to  the  inunediate 
data  of  the  consciousness  of  a  subject,  is  to  take  an  abstraction 
as  a  reality.     Of  course,  it  is  true,  as  Stirling  points  out ,2  that 
this  doctrine  of  the  "concrete  universal"  may  l)e  regarded  as 
having  l)een  "implicit"  in  the  Kantian  view  that  the  under- 
standing constructs  nature  out  of  the  immediate  data  of  .sensi- 
tive consciousness;   but  when  one  reflects  that  it  is  not  nature, 
but   at   most   our  mental   instruments  for  the  perceiving  and 
understanding  of  nature  that  the  human  mind  constructs,  it  is 
seen  that  in  referring  back  to  the  Kantian  doctrine  we  have 
simply  traced  the  confusion  and  dogmatism  l)ack  to  a  point 
nearer  its  beginnings.     Going  still  further  back,  wo  should  find 

'  The  Secret  of  Hegel,  1865,  Vol.  I.  pp.  xi.  Ixix.  «  lb.,  p.  xi. 


'LiLuit  .  Mm^mma^mm 


"HWBSWfff 


flP^IPWP 


^m 


THE   OLDER  AHSOLUTE    IDEALISM 


133 


l)chiii  '  Kant  on  the  one  hand  the  sceptical  empirical  idealism 
of  Hume,  and  bej-ond  Hume  the  doKniatic  subjective  idealism 
of  Berkeley,  and  on  the  other  hand  the  equally  —  if  not  so 
obviously  —  fallacious  logical  idealism  of  Plato. 

The  arRument  upon  v/hich  the  intelleetualistic  absolute 
idealists  generally  seem  to  depend  most  is  that  which,  first 
assuming  that  the  real  is  intelligible,  ar.d  that  the  intelligible 
is  rational,  concludes  first  that  the  real  is  rational,  and  then, 
on  the  assumption  that  the  rational  is  mental,  spiritual,  con- 
cludes further  that  the  real  is  mental,  spiritual.  Edward  Caird, 
in  his  exposition  of  Hegel's  philosophy,  expres.ses  the  argument 
in  condensed  form  as  follows:  "To  express  all  in  a  word,  'the 
real  is  the  rational  or  intelligible,'  i.e.  it  is  that  which  is  capable 
of  being  thoroughly  understood  by  the  intelligence,  just  because 
It  has  in  it  the  essential  nature  of  the  intelligence,  or  self-con- 
sciousness." '  This  argument  has  the  appearance  of  logical 
vali(lit\' ;  but  when  wo  examine  the  assumptions,  we  find  them 
highly  dogmatic.  So  far  from  being  justified  in  concluding, 
since  universal  agnosticism  is  self-refuting,  anc'  since  all  thought 
practically  assumes  the  possibility  of  knowledge,  that  therefore 
all  reality  is  intelligible,  we  are  warrant 'xl  only  in  saying  that 
■some  reality  is  intelligil)le.  The  disproe  )f  a  universal  negative 
is  no  proof  of  a  universal,  but  only  of  ,  particular  affirmative. 
The  other  assumptions,  that  the  intelligible  is  rational  and  that 
the  rational  is  mental,  or  spiritual,  are  capable  of  being  used  as 
in  the  above  argument  only  l)ecause  of  the  ainbiguity  of  the 
tcnn  "rational."  This  term  may  mean  "mental"  in  the  .sense 
of  that  pha.se  of  the  mental  which  is  constituted  by  the  fi.xed 
and  universal  forms  of  thought,  but  it  may  aloO  mean  that  in 
tlie  objective  realm  which  corresponds  to  this  phase  of  the 
mental.  This  ambiguity  it  is  which  gives  the  appearance  of 
logical  validity  to  the  latter  of  the  two  syllogisms  under  con- 
sideration. The  sense  in  which  rationality  may  be  predicated 
of  whatever  is  intelligible  is  not  the  same  as  that  in  which  it 
may  be  pretlicated  that  it  is  in  every  case  mental.  In  one  way 
or  another,   then,   the  second   syllogism  is  fallacious:   either 


II  tf 


'  ffrgr!  (RIaokwood's  Philosophical  Classics),  p.  170;  vt.  John  Watson, 
Thr  Interprrlation  of  Religious  Experience,  1912,  Vol.  I,  pp.  74-7;  Vol.  II, 
pp.  .'JS,  60,  104. 


T^^^^^jR 


■^TT 


Tt? 


m 


H 

■I 


.li 


134 


TFIE   PROBLEM   OF   KNOWLEDGE 


rafio.ial  moans  tJu-  same  ihi.iK  in  IhUI,  prcnnsos,  i  i  which 
cas,.  at  l..i.st  on,.  ,.f  th.-,n  is  .h-arly  an  uns..pp„rt,.,|  ,h,K,„a;  or 
ek;  h..  (cnn  h;;.,  .iiffcrcnf  n.<.a„inKs  in  the  two  pn-nusos  in 
which  .-as,,  the  .-onchision  .lc,H.n.ls  uf)on  the  fallacy  of  "four 
tonns.  All  that  wc  arc  n-ally  justific.1  in  con..|u(linK  is  that 
.s.m.c  n.ahty  .s  ,,^rhnp.s  n.cntal.  which  is  lc«.s  than  wc  know  with- 
out  the  armuncnt. 

There  are  son.c  in<livi,inal  variations  among  the  rcprescnta- 
t.ves  of  tins  philosophy  that  arc  of  consi,l,.ral,lc  interest  and 
.s.Kn.hcar.ce.     John  Cain!  asserts  that  to  "constitute  the  exist- 
ence of  the  outwani  worM"  wc  must  think  it  "as  existing  for 
thought    ;    wc  must   needs   presuppose  a   "<.onsciou.sncss  for 
which  and  in  which  all  ol,j,.ctive  existence  is."     He  therefore 
claims  that  to  attempt  to  conceive  of  "an  existence  which  is 
prior  to  thought"  is  "sclf-contra.lictory,  ina-smuch  as  that  very 
hmg-m-i tse  f  is  only  coiuvivable  l,y,  exists  only  for,  thought  " 
Ho  must  think  it  before  we  can  ascribe  to  it  even  an  exisfence 
outsule  of  thought."  .     Here  we  have  the  psvchologi.-al  kloaUsm 

bv  The'f  11  '"■'"  "'  '  f""'"'''^'""  f'"-  ^''-«'"te  icioalism,  supported 
by  the  fallacious  argument  from  the  "egocentric  prcliciment." 
1.  H.  Green   who  ,s  generally  regarded  as  also  a  neo-Hegclian 
remark.s  of  this  argument  of  Caird,  that  the  reader  "willT^ 
asking  from  page  to  pag...  what,  after  all,  this  thought  is  which 
seems  to  be  an.l  to  do  anything  and  evervthing.     Instead  of 
bemg  duly  directed  for  an  answer  to  an  investigation  orthe 
objective  world,  an.l  the  source  of  the  relations  which  deter- 
mine Its  content,  he  i.s  rather  put  on  the  track  of  an  introspec- 
tive inquiry  what  or  how  he  can  or  .-annot  conceive.  ^e 
wd    charge   the  author  with   confusing  ...  the  proportion 
that  a  thing  is  only  .-onceivable   by   thought  .  .      J^th   the 
proposition  that  the  thing  only  exists  for  thought;    the  prop! 
osition,   again,   that    no  object   can   be  conceL  „.s  erZlng 
cxcep    in  rela  ion  to  a  thinking  subject,  with  the  proposition 
that   It  cannot  exist   except   in   that   relation."  =     ireen  thus 
ropiu hates   the   argument    from    the   egocentric   pre  h  ament 

''that  thouZ  T'ru  "?  ^"  ''''''  ♦"  ''•^-'•♦-"  *'-  "'^^'-  of 
that  thought  which  Hegel  dc-larcs  to  be  the  reality  of  things" 


^SS^^P^M^ 


THE   OLDER  ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM  135 

.  "from  analysis  of  the  objoctivo  world,  not  from  reflection  on 
those  processt^s  of  our  intelligence  which  really  presuppose  the 
world.    ■     Ihus  while  John  CainI  and  T.  H.  Green  agreed  in 
the  end  w.th  il,.«el  that  "that  only  is  :eal  which  is  rational 
an.l  that  oiily  ,s  rati(,nal  which  is  real,"  Caird's  favorite  approach 
to  Hegehanism  as  a  whole  was  along  the  line  of  the  reality  of 
the  rational,  while  Green  maintained  that  the  only  undogmatic 
path  was  that  of  the  rationality  of  n«ality.     In  (..xamining  "the 
constituents  of  that  which  we  ac-ount  real,"  he  claimed  to 
hnd     that  they  all  imply  some  synthetic  action  which  we  only 
know  as  exercised  by  our  own  spirit."     " Is  it  not  true  of  all  of 
them,    he  asks,  "that  they  have  their  being  in  relation.s;  and 
what  other  medium  do  we  know  of  but  a  thinking  consciousness 
in  and  through  which  the  separate  can  be  united  in  that  way 
which  constitutes  a  relation?"  2 

But  when  we  examiiu-  this  positive  argument  for  absolute 
Idealism  offere<l  by  Green,  we  find  that  it  is  not  free  from  the 
fa  lac.ous  assumption  of  psychological  idealism.     To  cognize 
relations,  it  is  assumed,  is  to  construct  the  relations  thus  cog- 
nized   -  a  doctrine  which  manifestly  can  be  true  only  in  so  far 
as  tht  r.^penenced  contents  among  which  relations  are  cognized 
have  reality  only  in  and  for  consciousness,  as  parts  of  conscious- 
ness itself.     This,  of  course,  is  jisychological  idealism.     Green 
has  no  intention,  however,  of  indorsing  any  view  which  would 
leave  no  room  for  the  existence  of  any  knowable  reality  beyond 
the  consciousness  of  the  finite  subject.     He  therefore  sets  up 
again,  m  antithesis  to  the  above  thesis  that  relations  are  thought- 
constructs,    the   realistic   doctrine   that   reality   has   relations 
which  arc  not  dependent  upon  the  thought  activity  of  the  finite 
subject.     The  synthesis,  depending,  af*       ",e  manner  of  Lotze's 
argument,  upon  the  argument  from  analogy,  is  that  there  must 
be     a  spiritual  principle  in  nature"  whi-h  constitutes  the  rela- 
tions  exi.st.ng  independently  of  human  consciousness.     It  is 
the  fallaciousness  of  the  a.ssumed  ps3'chological  idealism  which 
renders  necessary  the  dogmatism  of  this  final  synthesis 

But  Green's  position  has  not  oeen  regarded  as  wholly  sound 
by  so:n^  other  members  of  the  so-called  neo-Hegelian  school 


it, 


'  lb.,  p.  144. 

*  lb.,  p.  145;   of.  Prolegomena  to  Ethics, 


13.  20,  26-9,  37.  52,  62,  70. 


Ml' 


s 


I' 


"1 


s 


:|| 


...  I 


136 


THE    PROHLKM    <)F    KNO.VLKDOK 


His  doctrim'  is  Ix-ttor  undcrst  -..d,  p,  (..(ps,  as  an  indopendont 
dovolopmcnt  from  Kantiiuiism  rliaii  u.s  an  adoption  of  HcKrliun- 
ism.  He  is  related  to  Kant  somcwliat  as  Ht  rkclcy  is  related  to 
Locke.  HaviiiK  eaneell(>d  the  Kantian  unknowable  Dimj  'in 
skh,  lie  develops  instead  the  do<-triiie  ■(  an  .lernal  Conscious- 
ness, operafiiiK  in  human  kno\vi,-(,;H  am!  activity.  I'his 
Consciousness,   however,   he   aj)pan  nu-     he  :'iites   to  identify 


.'t(,i 


iht,  manifesting 


with  the  HcL'eli.an  Al)sohit(»  Kea^o.:, 

it.self  in  nature  and  history.'  But  it  sas  .  bi,.(!v  for  his  doctrine 
that  facts  are  relations  that  Grecii  (- .is  criticis -.1.  The  view 
that  nature  is  a  fi.xed  and  unalterable  -ysi, ,,.  ..f  rriaiu.ns,  and 
that  these  relations  can  only  be  exj.la  ned  as  the  work  of  mind, 
was  attacked,  not  only  by  -uch  non-idealists  :;s  .i  J.  |{fdfour,' 
but  by  Bradley,  Ro\-ce,  Haldane,  and  others  withir.  the  school.' 
It  was  as  if,  after  the  similitude  of  I'haraoh's  dream,  he  lean 
kine  of  relations  had  devoured  the  (:i\  kiiie  of  quali'  ..  only  to 
remain  at  last  as  lean  and  ill-favored  as  ev<'r. 

Hut  ( '.reen  is  not  the  only  member  of  this  .school  who  has  come 
perilously  near  to  allowinu  the  ob.i<.(tive  absc.Iute  idealism  to 
disintejirate  into  a  subjective  psy,  i k, logical  idralism.  or  into 
a  petition  which  oscillate-^  between  such  a  .su[)jectivis!  •  and  a 
sort  of  abstractionism.     ,1.  H.  Muirhead,  '"or  example,      rites 
as  follows:   "When  I  .say,  'What  a  lot  of  buttercups,'  what  I 
mean  by  buttercups  is  a  .sy-teni  of  jud^mients  which  I  .■,in  ready 
to  make  in  reference  to  a  parfimilar  object,  judgment^  wliich  1 
am  prepared  to  make  becau>.    1   have  already  mad.    them."* 
D.  G.  Ititehie  goes  ciite  as  far  wiicn,  after 's;iyinjr  th   r   the 
reality  of  things  is  'wiiat  we  ought  to  think  of  them."  he  goes 
on  to  as.sert  :    "Facts  are  theori.'s.  .  .  .     Sunrise  is  a  theorv, 
now  discarded;   the  reality  is  the  rotation  of  the  e.irth:   and 
yet  we  are  in  the  habit  of  speahing  as  if  sunrise  were  the 
reality  ...nd   the   rotation   of  the   earth    the   theory."*     Now 
whether  it  be  a.s.'^erted   that   nature  is  a    -vstem  of  mentallv 
constituted  relations,  or  a  sy.stem  of  judgnn-nts,  or  a  sum-total 

'Or  ihe  differ.n-.o  Intwo.-n  lUo  pliilosaphi,,,!  vu-ws  of  K.lward  C'uird  ar«i 
1.  H.  Green,  see  article  },y  J„l,i,  Wat.s,,,,,  Phil...oplnral  Revuw,  XVIII  19<.tl 
pspeeiiilly  pp.  Kil   _'. 

'See.  e.,j..  R.  H    HnMr,ne,  Thr  Pulh:r-:y  U>  lUal;.,.  i;k.  Ill,  Ch.  Ill 

*  Mind,  N.S.,  Vol.  V.  ISOfi,  p.  .'J12. 

*  Darwin  and  Ihyd,  with  Ollur  I'hiUsoiihicil  -,  is93,  pp.  s7,  91. 


THE   <  LDKIl  ABs(jLUTE    IDKALlSNf 


137 


of  valiil  th.orica,  th<  ultx  analv.«is  and  dogmatism  must  be 
pul^nf  to  ever}  unbi;:  -sed  miiid  The  fu.  is  that  tbo  idfili&tic 
"intuition"  that  "tl.r.gs  an-  i  ,  dits  h:  ^  dirlafed  the  i.  suits 
of  th(>  analysis  of  vxixnvim>, ;,  1;  Ir.,  i  1„  so  "  do<'l.  .red  "  r.  .orts 
ufoxmTionoeareu«'dinsiippor'  „.  thooridn;!  idealistic  d.  /ma. 
Edward  Caird  and  Jo;  .,  Wats^ .n  arc  an  nuy  '  \te  Ixjst  an^  ost 
typ"ai  !.|m>sen^'ne<  of  a  i  ur.  !\  iir  ■lltn  nmlinti-  -.hsolute 
lucuhMM      What  i  tr  latt(     snys         ho  f( -nu  r    ->  tr  .oth : 

thcyncv.rw  n-eriafho".     ivict    h     la*  tn     'ni     rso  , 
and  Iha    iis  •    tionduy  can  be  provi    ."  '  -ordinr 

thi'   ontoIoL.    d    arKiuiient    ...  is    unp 
thai  highest  uru.v  of  ihou^'   ?  and  U  .iir  v 

iiul   -ccks  A- 

al  u 

aird 

to  e;! 


presupposes   a.s    ifs  FH-iiinii 


exi 

aP 


|., 


■  r  K 


idealism  is  regai 
arKUinent.     In  ai:     l„ 
object  are  neecss        .    rei 
distiMsciiishe.'   fron       ich        ■., 
■u-rnor     m    her  (uii   lia\  ■  p   xlt 
n-duce  the  sui     -t  to  a    ■<;•€  object 


nuional 
I  Caird 
-ion  of 
-led 
Tl 
ologit 
suiijoct  am. 
uid  necessarily 
presupposes  the  other, 
'he  other;    we  cannot 
iioug  other  objects  nor  the 


'ng  (■ 

■  'S 

fh(  I 


:)ha-<  in  'he  life  of     le  subject.     We  are  there- 

<<-k  -<      '  all-fnil,       -ig  vmity;    binding  in  one 

ty,  to  the  idea  of  which 

luct'       is  the  absolute,  all- 


km, 


it    )f  t       doctrine  free  from 


object  to  a  nu 
fore  forced  to 
all  hviiii:  and    ill  k 
Wf  ha  e  been    hu    dialectit 
compr    Hndinti  Kcason  or 
But        evoii  ;his  c.ireful  f 

logma  :  '  '  it  t.  .  that  :ill  liought  presupposes  the  "unity 
f  thoupin  ai  i  toeing"  the  .^  se  in  which  idealism  interprets 
*"^  P'  '  '  Pf'  'i  thai  object  (interpreted  as  any  real 
hm-i)  -iihj,       ar.       necessarily  related  to  each  cthpr"? 

Of  .-our-      h.    ..bj,       as  tfxt  which  is  presented  to  a  sj:;ject, 

1^  n.cessi.  .f,  l  to  tl:      abjoot  ;  but  from  this  "egocentric 

TCdicamei.  ihingcaii  J.     And  finally,  is  the  Hege- 

•in  .\b.so!iiie    he  ouhj  cone.  nvh  can  conceivably  .synthesize 

juxtapos«.d  things  and  thuiKers?    Even  in  the  moderate 

t^^    tement.-     f  Edward  C'aird,  then,  we  find  dogmatism  and 

evideij.  (■  of       lective  analysis. 

ophical  Retiew.  XVIII,  1900.  p.  161. 
Critical  Philosophy  of  Kant,  '  s.sg,  Vol.  n,  pp.  i2r{.  128. 
'  Evolution  of  lieligion.  2il  eri.,   .  -9A.  Vol.  I,  pp.  64~S. 


m 


\''h 


138 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   KNOWLEDGE 


•II 


Much  the  same  thing  may  be  said  of  Watson.  For  an  authori- 
tative and  consistent  exposition  of  the  orthodox  British  Hegelian- 
ism  one  cannot  do  better  than  have  recourse  to  the  works  of  this 
philosopher,  and  the  following  passage  is  especially  illuminating 
from  this  point  of  view.  "Nature,  or  the  so-called  'external' 
world,  is  not  external  to  mind,  but  only  'external'  in  the  sense 
that  it  consists  of  objects  outside  of  one  another  spatially,  or 
of  events  external  to  one  another  in  the  sense  of  being  discrete 
and  'marching  single  in  an  endless  file.'  We  are,  therefore, 
just  as  directly  conscious  of  matter  as  of  mind.  Moreover,  the 
external  or  material  world  is  not  given  to  us  in  our  sensations ; 
for  sensations  in  their  singleness  are  not  knowledge:  only  when 
they  are  ordered  and  combined  under  the  forms  of  perception 
and  thought  have  we  any  experience  of  nature.  Now  these 
forms  do  not,  like  sensation,  vary  with  each  individual  and 
change  upon  us  from  moment  to  moment ;  they  are  identical 
in  all  men.  Thus  we  all  construct  an  extprnal  world  which, 
vary  as  it  may  in  its  sensible  aspects,  is  fundamentally  the 
same  in  this  sense,  that  it  consists  of  objects  in  space  and  events 
in  time,  all  of  which  are  connected  together  by  the  bond  of 
natural  causation.  This  is  the  world  which  it  is  the  business 
of  the  sciences  to  survey  and  reduce  to  specific  laws."  ' 

Here  again  we  see  the  identification  of  subjectivity  with 
the  sense-elements  of  the  experience  of  the  individual,  while 
objectivity  is  regarded  as  the  product  of  the  union  of  these 
data  of  sense  with  the  mental  elements  common  to  all  minds. 
But  is  not  the  resulting  "object"  .still  essentially  subjective? 
Such  constructed  objects  may  be  similar  enough  in  different 
individual  experiences  for  a  certain  ''universality"  to  attach 
to  such  perceptual  experience;  but  it  ca?i  never  amount  to 
objectivity  in  the  sen.-.'  of  reality  existing  piior  to  and  inde- 
pendently of  the  knowing  relation.  As  Watson  liim.self  say.s, 
from  his  point  of  view  "it  is  not  true  that  facts  are  independent 
of  the  individual  subject  in  so  far  as  he  is  a  rational  intelligence."  * 
What  Watson  does  here  is  what  the  typical  objective  idealist 
(if  not  an  epistemological  dualist  and  therefore  merely  meta- 
physical idealist)  always  does;    he  substitutes  subjective  uni- 

'  The  Philnsophical  Basin  nf  Religion,  1907,  pp.  7G-7. 

•  The  Interpretation  of  Religious  Experience,  191;i,  Vol.  II,  p.  60. 


IC^-^'il: 


THE   OLDER  ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM  139 

yersality,  universality-in-subjectivity,  for  true  objectivity. 
(For  simplicity  we  view  Watson's  philosophy  here  at  a  certain 
stage  in  its  dialectical  unfoldinfi :  we  abstract  from  the  meta- 
physical monism.  Strictly,  what  we  ascribe  to  him  here  is 
what  he  would  have  to  say,  finally,  'f  it  were  not  for  his  monism.) 
It  IS  an  ancient  obsei  vation  that  "i.isery  likes  company,"  but 
a  numerical  multiplication  of  an  essentially  subjective  experi- 
ence like  simple  multiplication  in  any  other  situation,  can 
hardly  be  said  to  change  the  character  of  the  unit  multiplied 
That  our  interpretation  of  the  philosopher's  thought  is  not 
unfair  is  indicated  by  the  later  statement,  "To  say  that  this 
world  acts  upon  our  minds  is  the  same  as  saying  that  a  world 
which  exists  only  by  the  activity  of  our^  minds  is  the  cause 
of  that  activity."  = 

What  then  becomes  of  the  objective  idealist's  supposed 
escape  from  subjective  idealisi .  by  means  of  the  postulate 
that  wo  are  capable  of  knowing  Reality  as  it  actually  is"'» 
One  or  other  of  two  issues  is  possible.  Either  ilic  appeal  to  the 
possibility  of  knowledge  turns  out  to  be  a  mere  apology  for  the 
high-handed  procedure  involved  in  pa.ssing  off  for  real  objec- 
tivity certain  common  features  in  the  subjectivity  in  which 
human  and  all  conceivable  experience  is  necessarily  involved  • 
or  -  and  this  is  the  horn  of  the  dilemma  whir-h  Watson  chooses 
-starting  from  "the  principle  that  there  is  one  intelligible 
universe  and  one  kind  of  intelligence,"*  one  is  forced  to  conclude 
that  there  is  but  one  real  mind  or  experience,  the  only  objec- 
tivity being  dependence  for  existence  upon  being  known  by  the 
one  and  only  mind. 

But,  we  would  say,  if  the  philosopher  chooses  to  enter  upon 
this  path,  let  him  have  the  courage  of  his  convictions  and  follow 
It  to  the  bitter  end.  Let  him  accept  the  solipsism  of  the  Ab- 
solute,  and  the  absolutely  illusory  character  of  his  own  individ- 
uality, as  of  all  other  plurality  -  a  conclusion  which  few  ab- 
solute idealists  outside  of  India  are  consistent  enough  to  draw 
or  frank  enough  to  acknowledge.     Assuredly,  then,  the  objective 

>  Italios  hero  arc  mine.  .  The  Philosophical  Basis  of  Religion,  p.  81. 

J.  Watson,  An  Outline  of  Philotophu.  1S9.S,  Prrfare   p   vi 

Vol  'iVrr'wf"'  ■'"'"*■  .  '^'  ^'"  ^'"'■'•'"•'•""""'  "/  fi^l'Oious  Experience, 
vol.  1.  p.  74.  V\at.son  .»  misp.p.ously  mluctant.  as  shown  hy  the  context  of  the 
passage  quoted,  to  adnnt  that  the  onenew  of  the  universe  is  an  a,,u«.pnon 


Hi 

if 


1   , 


'1 

'i 


^  n 


w 


HI 


vj^ 


140 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   KNOWLEDGE 


idealist  may  be  charged  witli  failure  to  keep  his  promises :  we 
bargained  for  bread,  but  he  ostentatiously  presents  us  with  a 
stone ;  we  desiroil  to  be  assured  of  the  possibility  of  knowing  a 
reality  whose  existence  did  not  ilepend  upon  our  awareness  of 
it,  and  he  has  answered  us  l)j-  a  virtual  denial  that  we  ourselves 
as  finite  individuals  have  any  real  existence.  Such  seems  to  be 
the  penalty  awaiting  those  who  step  aside  from  the  true  highway 
of  knowledge  into  the  devious  by-paths  of  subjectivism  and 
maintain  their  course  in  stubborn  inn-opentance. 

It  may  be  instructive  to  examine  further  the  argument  by 
means  of  which  this  representative  Hegelian  defends  the  exist- 
ence of  the  one  Absolute  Minii.  It  will  be  seen  that  what  is 
called  necessary  implication  is  really  dogmatism  based  upon 
equivocation.  "An  intelligible  system,"  it  is  asserted,  "neces- 
sarily implies  an  intelligence  that  is  capable  of  graspiny  the 
system."  '  "Intelligible"  in  the  course  of  this  senten( c  changes 
its  meaning  from  possessing  the  objective  conditions  for  being 
known,  to  possessing  all  conditions  for  being  known,  subjective  as 
well  as  objective.  Similarly  "  intelligence  "  changes  in  meaning  — 
as  one  sees  from  the  context,  the  Absolute  being  finally  meant  — 
from  that  which  can  know  i^omething  of  an  intelligible  system  to 
that  which  co"  know  the  system  as  a  whole,  if  "intelligible" 
had  originally  been  taken  in  the  second  of  its  two  meanings, 
and  "intelligence"  limited  to  the  first  of  the  two  meanings 
given  to  it,  the  argument  would  violate  no  logical  principle. 
It  would  be  an  entirely  ".'curate  interpretation  of  the  meaning 
of  a  proposition,  however  useless  for  the  purposes  of  the  ab- 
solute idealist.  The  appearance  of  demonstration  of  tl  c  exist- 
ence of  the  Ab.solute  Mind  depends  upon  the  double  equivocation 
just  pointed  f)ut.  The  original  postulate  of  "an  intelligible 
system"  is  supported  by  arguing  that  "if  there  exists  any 
intelligence  whatever,  the  universe  must  be  intelligible."  - 
This  may  he  allowed  to  stand  if  appeal  is  made  to  experience, 
with  its  immediate  awareness  of  the  identity  of  the  experience 
in  which  we  know  something  and  the  experience  in  which 
something  is  known  by  us,  and  to  the  reflective  knowledge  that 
the  conditions  of  the  possibility  of  the  one  are  the  conditions 

*  The  Interpretation  of  Religious  Experience,  Vol.  I,  p.  74  ;   italics  mine. 
»/6. 


I    I 


^4W>W^' 


THE   OLDER  ABSO1.UTE   IDEALISM  141 

of  the  possibility  of  the  oth.^r.     By  means  of  a  similar  appeal  to 
empirical  mtuition,  we  Pud  that  we  may  admit  the  further  postu- 
late that  any  intelligence  which  "knows  the  universe  to  be  in- 
telhgible     -must  be  capable  of  knowing  that  it  knows  the 
universe  to  be  intelligible."     And  so,  with  the  help  of  an  appeal 
to  intuition  which  ultimately  rests  on  experience,  and  yet  de- 
pending of  necessity  upon  the  equivocation  noted  above   it  is 
cor  eluded   that   "our    self-consciousness  .  .  .  implies    a'  self- 
conscious  intelligence  that  comprehends  within  itself  all  modes 
of  personal  consciousness."  >     After  the  manner  of  medieval 
scholasticism  at  its  worst,  specious  arguments  are  called  in  to 
give  the  appearance  of  rational  demonstration  to  what  remains 
in  its  essential  nature  an  experience-contradicting  dogma 

Another  direction  from  that  taken  by  the  intellcctualistic 
absolute  idealists  is  what  we  may  call  voluntaristic  absolute 
ideahsm      Whereas  in  the  intellcctualistic  type  the  absolute 
Idea  with  which  reality  is  identified  is  regarded  as  being  deter- 
mined   simply    by   rational   processes  of  intellection,   in  this 
voluntaristic  type  the  ahsolute  idea  is  regarded  as  being  de- 
termined primarily  by  purpose  rather  than  bv  critical  thought 
alone.     The  most  eminent  exponent,  at  least  recently,  of  this 
variant  form  of  the     :  .er  absolute  idealism  is  Josiah  Royce 
At  first  thought  it  may  seem  entirely  proper  to  include  a  con- 
sideration of  Fichte's  system  of  thought  in  this  connection,  in 
view  both  of  the  voluntarism  of  his  ideahsm  and  of  the  intro- 
duction of  the  notion  of  the  Absolute  Subject ;  but  inasmuch  as 
he  can  hardly  be  said  to  have  introduced  what  we  have  called 
logical  idealism  into  his  activistic  or  voluntaristic  psychological 
idealism,  or  really  to  have  made  good  his  escape  from  subjective 
to  objective  idealism,  we  choose  not  to  include  at  this  point 
any  further  examination  of  his  doctrine,  but  to  confine  ourselves 

to  a  brief  exposition  a    .     '^que  of  Royce's  voluntaristic  ab- 
solute  idealism. 

Koyco's  philosophy  ma„  ;,e  regarded  as  essentially  an  attempt 
to  develop  the  very  modest,  undogmatic  theoretical  idealism 
which  we  have  called  "relative  idealism"  into  an  all-com- 
prehenduig  absolute  idealism,  and  that  for  the  solution  of  the 
modern  epistemological  problem  which  has  arisen  out  of  psy- 

'  76.,  pp.  74-0. 


^:' 


f 


t 


WV: 


A- 


L^! 


0    ? 


'i1 

41 


142 


THE   r.cOSLEM   OF   KXOWLEDOE 


chologism.  It  is  tru(>  that  an  important  factor  in  the  develop- 
ment of  Roycc's  i;*ul()sophy  has  been  the  discovery  of  a  capri- 
cious and  irrational  olenieiit  in  reality,  a  discovery  which  serves 
to  differentiate  his  philosophy  from  intellectualistic  absolute 
idealism,  with  its  assumption  that  reality,  without  remainder, 
is  intelliKil^le,  and  in  connection  with  which  discovery,  as  in 
the  case  of  his  voluntarism,  he  acknowledges  the  influence 
of  Schopenhauer.'  But  the  main  foundation  of  Royce's  con- 
structive philosophical  work  seems  to  be,  after  the  psychological 
idealism  everywhere  presupiwsed,  the  generally  admitted  fact 
that  our  ideas  are  determined,  to  begin  with,  at  least,  by  our 
purposes.  But  while,  according  to  "relative  idealism,"  the  idea 
determines  the  selection  of  the  reality  tr  Ue  considered,  and  also, 
within  very  narroiv  limits,  may  be  said  to  enter  into  and  beconie 
a  part  of  that  reality  for  the  particular  purpose  concerned,^  in 
Royce's  philosophy  on  the  other  hand  all  reality  is  viewed  as 
constituted,  in  the  last  analysis,  by  purpose.  And  yet,  as  we 
shall  presently  see  more  clearly,  it  is  the  underlying  psychological 
or  subjective  idealism  which  makes  it  impossi'^le,  logically,  to 
stop  vith  relative  idealism,  and  leads  on  to  an  idealism  in  every 
respect  absolute. 

To  this  conclusion  Royce  leads  up  by  a  dialectical  process 
starting,  in  the  most  important  form  of  his  argument,  from  the 
antinomy  which  seems  to  exist  between  what  he  calls  the 
internal  and  the  external  meaning  of  ideas.  By  "  internal  mean- 
ing" is  meant  purpose,  "in  so  far  as  it  gets  a  present  conscious 
embodiment  in  the  contents  and  in  the  form  of  the  complex 
state  called  the  idea."  By  "external  meaning"  is  meant 
"reference  (of  ideas)  beyond  theaselves  to  objects."  '  Or,  in 
other  words,  the  internal  meaning  of  my  idea  is  what  I  call 
my  purpose ;  it  is  what  I  mean  in  so  far  as  I  am  aware  of  my 
purpose.  The  external  meaning,  on  the  other  hand,  is  the  total 
redity  which  I  come  to  know  as  the  realization  of  my  purpose, 
the  reality  which  I  meant.  The  antinomy  lies  in  the  twofold 
and  apparently  self-contradictory  character  of  the  meaning  of 

'  The  Spirit  of  MuJvnt  Phituxupliy,  1>>'J2,  pp.  2G1   4  ,    The  Problem  of  Chris- 
tianity.  1913,  Vol.  I,  p.  xii. 

*  .Soo  di.scu.ssion  of  "tcrti.iry  riualitii's"  in  f"h.  XIV,  i-  'ro. 
>  The  World  and  the  Indiiidual,  Vol.  1,  IMKt,  pp.  Jj-O. 


\u 


^mm 


m 


wmm 


THE  OLDER  ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM 


143 


meaning.  At  one  time  it  seems  to  be  a  mere  content  in  some 
one's  mind ;  at  another  time  it  appears  as  the  subject-matter 
for  an  unlimited  number  of  judgments.* 

The  solution  of  this  antinomy  is  stated  as  follows;  "Now 
the  obvious  way  of  stating  the  whole  sense  of  these  facts  is  to 
point  out  that  what  the  idea  always  aims  to  find  in  its  object 
is  nothing  whatever  but  the  idea's  own  conscious  purpose  or 
will,  embodied  in  some  more  determinate  form  than  the  idea 
by  itself  alone  at  this  instant  consciously  possesses.  When  I 
have  an  idea  of  the  world,  my  idea  is  a  will,  and  the  world  of 
my  idea  is  simply  my  own  will  itself  determinately  embodied."  * 
That  is  to  say,  the  external  meaning  is  simply  identical  with  the 
internal  meaning ;  the  thing  meant  —  in  spite  of  any  appearance 
to  the  contrary  —  is  conscious  purpose  regarded  as  completely 
determined.  "The  complete  content  of  the  idea's  own  purpose 
is  the  only  object  of  which  the  idea  can  ever  take  note."  ' 
Stated  more  generally,  the  conclusion  's  that  "what  is,  or  what 
is  real,  is  as  such  the  complete  embodiment,  in  individual  form 
and  in  final  fulfilment,  of  the  internal  meaning  of  finite  ideas."  * 
The  object  of  any  idea  is  "an  individual  life,  present  as  a  whole, 
Mum  simul.  .  .  .  This  life  is  at  once  a  system  of  facts,  and  the 
fulfilment  of  whatever  purpose  any  finite  idea,  in  so  far  as  it 
is  true  to  its  own  meaning,  already  fragmentarily  embodies. 
This  life  is  the  completed  will,  as  well  as  the  completed  ex- 
perience, corresponding  to  the  will  and  experience  of  any  one 
finite  idea.  ...  To  be,  in  the  final  sense,  nieans  to  be  just  such 
a  life,  complete,  present  to  experience,  and  conclusive  of  the 
search  for  perfection  which  every  finite  idea  in  its  own  measure 
undertakes  whenever  it  seeks  for  any  object."  * 

Now  the  gist  of  this  argument  may  be  put  as  follows :  What 
I  mean  (internal  meaning)  is  my  idea,  purpose,  plan  of  action. 
Reality  is  what  I  mean  (external  meaning).  Therefore,  reality 
is  my  idea,  purpose,  plan  of  action.  Manifestly  it  is  a  case  of 
the  fallacy  of  "four  terms,"  unless  in  some  way  internal  and 
external  meaning  can  be  absolutely  identified.  But  in  view 
of  the  underlying  psychological  ideahsm,  and  by  the  introduc- 
tion of  metaphysical  monism,  which  identifies  my  real  self  with 


rl 


'  lb.,  pp.  320-4. 
*  lb.,  p.  339. 


« lb.,  p.  327. 


•  lb.,  p.  329. 

•  lb.,  pp.  341-2. 


ftm 


mm 


Mi^H 


■'%i 


!« 


m 


»l 


% 


'l^ 


I 


Mil 
\\' 

i 

•ii 


m 


ir  ' 

•jlil 

?5f 


{ 

";■ 

1 

fi 

dl 

144 


THE   PROBLEM   OP   KNOWLEDGE 


the  Absolute  Self,  it  becomes  possible  to  make  this  identification. 
Reality,  then,  is  what  I  mean,  my  idea  or  purpose,  as  it  is  for  my 
Absolute  Self.     But  this  is  to  escape  fallacy  at  the  expense  of 
assuming  the  dogmas  of  m-^taphysical  monism  (singularism) 
and  psychological  idealism.     From  Royce\-  own  point  of  view, 
it  should  be  noted,  the  argument  is  not  fallacious;  assuming  a 
monistic    or    solipsistic     psychological    idealism,    everything 
"external"  is  internal,  and  so  "external  meaning"  is  internal 
meaning.     This  psychological  idealism,  however,  is  itself  fal- 
lacious, and  is  here  in  union  with  the  (also  fallacious)  logical 
idealism  involved  in  the  proposition,  ReaUty  is  my  idea  or  purpose. 
This  philosophical  doctrine  which  Royce  offers  as  a  synthesis 
of  mysticism  or  subjective  empiricism,  and  dualistic  realism, 
more  conclusive  than  any  that  "critical  rationalism"  by  itself 
is  able  to  accompli-'^h,  may  be  similarly  reached  from  many 
different  starting-points,  as  we  learn  from  an  examination  of 
the  various  work?  of  this  philosopher.     Taking  as  his  thesis 
the  proposition  that  there  is  a  whole  truth  —  a  proposition  such 
that  to  deny  it  is  to  assume  it '  —  he  sets  over  against  it  the  an- 
tithesis that  for  any  reality  to  be  represented  in  judgments,  as  the 
ideal  of  truth  demands,  an  infinite  series  of  judgments  would 
be  required.     But  such  a  system  could  never  be  complete, 
while  the  reality  of  complete  truth  is  a  necessary  presupposition 
of  all  judgment.     The  one  synthesizing  concept  —  since  realism 
is  rejected  and  psychological  idealism  is  presupposed  —  is  found 
in  the  idea  of  a  total  rational  system,  or  absolute  experience, 
in  which  the  infinite  is  actual  as  a  "self-representative  system."  * 
Even  to  a.'isert  the  possibility  of  error,  or  the  fact  of  one's 
ignorance,  assumes  the  reality  of  truth,  and  therefore  involves 
the  same  conclusion.^    The  same  final  synthesis  is  involved  in 
affirming  the  reality  of  the  self/  or  of  individuality,'  and  even 
in  willing  the  good."     What  the  self  is,  or  what  any  individual 

'  The  Philosophy  of  Loyally.  1908,  p,  345. 

'  William  Jamea  and  Other  Essays,  1911,  Essay  IV;    The  Philosophy  of  Loy- 
alty, Lect.  VII :    The  World  and  the  Individual,  Vol.  I,  Supplementary  Essay. 

•  The.  Religious  Aspect  of  Philosophy.  liS9.5.  Ch.  XI :    The  Conception  of  God, 
1897,  pp.  15-44;    The  Sources  of  Religious  Insight.  1912,  pp.  105-116. 

•  Studies  of  Good  and  Evil,  1H9H,  Ph.  VI. 

•  The  Conception  of  Immortality,  1900,  pa.f.iim. 

•  William  Jamei  and  Other  Essays,  1912,  Essay  V. 


THE  OLDER  ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM 


145 


is,  or  what  the  good  which  is  willed  really  is,  can  be  completely 
shown,  in  time,  only  in  an  unending  series ;  as  real,  therefore, 
each  of  these  involves  a  time-transcending  but  time-including 
absolute  system  or  experience,  in  which  what  we  mean  is  eter- 
nally real.  Finally,  in  hi.s  recent  lectures  on  Christianity,  Royco 
presents  his  argument  in  yet  another  form.  Two  oarsmen 
believe  themselves  to  be  in  one  and  the  same  boat,  although  this 
is  not  a  direct  perception,  according  to  Royce,  but  an  interpre- 
tation. Assuming  the  truth  of  psychological  idealism  we  should 
have  to  admit  this ;  the  contents  of  the  perceptual  consciousness 
of  the  two  men  are  not  fully  identical  qualitatively,  much  less 
numerically.  The  interpretation  put  upon  their  experiences 
by  the  two  men,  viz.  that  they  are  in  the  same  boat,  cannot  be 
true  from  this  (subjective-idealistic)  point  of  view,  unless  there 
is  an  absolute,  all-inclusive  experience,  in  which  what  is  per- 
ceived by  the  men  only  fragmentarily  is  experienced  with  all 
its  relations,  totum  simul,  as  an  infinite  totality.*  Thus  for 
Royce  all  dialectical  paths  lead  to  the  Absolute,  a  realization 
of  all  possible  meaning,  a  unity  of  all  that  is  or  can  be  meant, 
in  a  single  concrete  experience. 

Royce's  system,  by  whatever  argument  it  may  be  defended, 
is  vulnerable,  both  in  its  process  and  in  its  conclusion.  If,  instead 
of  invoking  the  Absolute  to  save  him  from  the  infinite  regress, 
Royce  had  learned  from  the  pragmatist  that  the  true  and  the 
good,  and  even  the  self  and  other  individuals,  can  be  defined 
sufficiently  for  such  human  purposes  as  ought  to  be  considered, 
he  would  have  been  saved  from  the  necessity  of  giving  his  ad- 
herence to  the  self-contradictory  2  notion  of  an  actual  infinite 
total  of  definite  qualities  and  relations. 

But  the  fons  et  origo  mali  in  all  of  the  above  arguments  is, 
let  it  be  repeated,  the  fallacious  and  dogmatic  assumption  of 
psychological  idealism.  What  do  I  really  mean  when  I  assert 
that  there  is  something  of  which  I  am  ignorant  ?  Is  it,  as  some 
would  say,'  either  my  own,  or  some  one's  future  experience,  or, 
as  Royce  asserts,  a  present,  or  better,  super-temporal  experience 
of  the  Absolute?  Why  future  in  the  one  case?  And  why 
experience  in  the  other  case?     Is  not  all  we  can  say  without 


!?  I 


'  The  Problem  of  Christianitu.  Vol.  II,  pp.  241-.'?. 
*E.g.  Dewey,  Journal  of  Philonoithu,  ctr..  Vol.  IV, 


'  See  pp.  462-70,  infra. 
1907,  p.  202. 


'mm  ^m 


I 


146 


THE  PROBLEM   OF    KNOWLEDGE 


ts 


h  ! 


St 
■;     J  I'' 

I:        ^•'* 


1 


*ii: 


dl 


i^^ 


^ 


dogmatism  simply  that  it  is  a  present  realiUj  of  which  I  or  some 
one  else  may  perhaps  have  a  future  experience,  and  of  which 
whatever  "Absolute"  there  may  be  ground  for  positing  may, 
only  possibly,  have  experience  at  present?  The  further  asser- 
tions can  only  be  made  on  the  basis  of  psychological  idealism. 

But  even  apart  from  any  criticism  of  psychological  idealism, 
or  of  the  notion  of  an  actual  infinite,  the  charge  is  frequently 
made  against  the  older  absolute  idealism,  whether  intellectualis- 
tic  or  voluntaristic,  that  it  can  be  shown  to  be  self-refuting, 
in  the  the  elements  of  finite  experience  are  what  they  are  in 
some  measure  by  reason  of  the  finiteness  of  the  experience,  so 
that  their  inclusion,  without  modification,  in  an  infinite  or  ab- 
solute experience  is,  in  the  nature  of  things,  impossible.  This 
criticism,  as  against  Roycc,  has  been  well  put  by  A.  K.  Rogers, 
who  writes:  "What  can  the  duplication  of  thought  and  ex- 
perience be  like  for  an  Absolute  Being?  I  think  of  things  only 
because  direct  experience  is  impossible  for  the  time.  .  .  .  Irlow 
can  we  make  our  ignorance  a  part  of  an  all-inclusive  experience 
without  denying  its  existence  (.or  changing  it)?  Can  I  feel 
baffled  and  see  the  solution  in  the  same  experience?  Is  my 
feeUng  of  ignorance  identical  with  God  s  consciousness  of  ig- 
norance? If  so,  we  must  accept  an  Absolute  that  grows  in 
knowledge.  ...  If  not,  there  are  two  facts,  only  one  of  which 
is  the  experience  of  the  Absolute;  for  my  feeling  of  ignorance 
dominates  my  consciousness,  and  cannot  dominate  God's."  ' 
Or,  as  Bosanquet  remarks,  if  the  later  occurrences  modify 
the  earlier  occurrences,  the  events  cannot  remain,  in  actual 
content,  within  a  larger  span  of  conscior--ness,  what  they  were 
or  could  be  within  a  shorter.- 

But  these  last  criticisms  are  but  repetitions,  essentially,  of 
certain  phases  of  the  self-refutation  of  the  older  absolute  idealism 
accomplished  once  for  all  by  F.  H.  Bradley,  chiefly  in  his 
Appearance  and  Reality.  Absolut"  idealism,  having  always 
wielded  the  sword  of  intellectual  criticism,  seems  to  have  been 
doomed  to  perish,  at  least  in  its  older  forms,  by  that  self-same 

'  "  Professor  Roycc  and  Monism."  philusuphical  lU-victv,  XII,  1903,  pp.  47  ff. 
Cf.  A.  Aliotta,  The  Idmlistic  Reaction  against  Science,  Eug.  Tr.,  1914,  pp.  259- 
65;  A.  E.  Taylor,  Mind.  N.S.,  XXI.  1912,  pp-  .'540-1, 

'  The  Principle  of  Individuntitu  and  Value,  1912,  pp.  387-8. 


TW 


TE^^rKTTmTT 


■CT^f^rem 


wp 


THE  OLDER  ABSOLUTE  IDEALISM 


147 


sword.  It  has  found,  in  Bradley,  one  of  its  most  formidable 
foes  within  its  own  household.  In  view,  then,  of  this  fact,  and 
of  the  attempts  which,  as  we  shall  see,  have  recently  been  made 
to  reconstruct  an  absolute  idealism  in  spite  of  the  havoc  wrought 
by  this  critic,  we  may  perhaps  most  instructively  classify  all 
types  of  Anglo-American  absolute  idealism  under  three  main 
heads,  viz.  the  pre-Bradleian  construction,  the  Bradleian  de- 
struction, and  the  post-Bradleian  reconstruction.  We  must 
now  consider  the  second  of  these,  the  antithesis  in  the  dialectic 
of  modern  absolutism. 

Bradley  started  as  an  adherent  of  the  orthodox  absolute 
idealism.'  He  proposed  to  take  seriously  the  conclusion, 
"inherited  from  others,"  -  that  reality  is  a  single  e.xperience,  in 
which  all  realities  with  all  their  appearances  are  included.  In 
trying  to  think  this  through,  however,  he  comes  to  the  conclusion 
that  it  is  a  self-contradictory  notion  that  such  an  experience 
can  be  ordered  according  to  the  principles  of  reason. 

Of  fundamental  importance  here  is  Bradley's  judgment  ( !) 
that  all  judgment  is  essentially  fallacious,  in  that  it  "attributes 
to  a  subject  something  other  than  itself,  and  which  the  subject 
is  not."  '  Thought  can  never,  however  complete,  be  quite  the 
same  as  reality.*  Being  abstract,  relational,  discursive,  it 
can  never  be  the  same  even  as  the  lower  and  less  inclusive  im- 
mediacy and  all-togethcrness  of  individual  human  experience. 
He  thus  reaffirms,  in  effect,  in  his  latest  utterances  the  well- 
known  conclusion  of  im  early  work:  "Unless  thought  stands 
for  something  that  falls  beyond  mere  intelligence,  if  'thinking' 
is  not  used  with  some  strange  implication  that  never  was  part 
of  the  meaning  of  the  word,  a  lingering  scruple  still  forbids 
us  to  believe  tliat  reality  can  ever  be  purely  rational.  It  may 
come  from  a  failure  in  my  metaphysics  or  from  a  weakness  of 
the  flesh  which  continues  with  me,  but  the  notion  that  existence 
"ould  be  the  same  as  the  understanding  strikes  us  as  cold  and 
ghostlike  and  as  the  dreariest  materialism.  That  the  glory  of 
this  world  in  the  end  is  appearance  leaves  the  world  more 
glorious,  if  we  feel  it  is  a  show  of  some  fuller  splendor;   but 


n 


ifi- 

1:1 


I' 


i« 


'  See  Ethical  Studies,  1876.       '  Essays  on  Truth  and  Reality,  1914,  p.  246. 

•  Appearance  and  Reality,  1st  ed.,  1893,  2d  ed.,  1897,  p.  57. 

♦  lb.,  p.  554  ;  cf.  Essays  on  Truth  and  Reality,  1914,  pp.  230-3. 


BF 


SPWS? 


war. 


148 


THE   PUOBLEM   OK    KNOWLEDGE 


IM, 

1 

1       ■    i 

■•i  ■,  i; 

i"  > 

:i 

It 


'I 


■il 


the  sensuous  curtain  is  a  (iopoption  and  a  cheat,  if  it  hides  some 
colorless  movement  of  atoms,  some  spectral  woof  of  impal- 
pable abstractions,  or  imcarthly  ballet  of  bloodless  categories. 
Though  dragged  to  such  conclusions,  \vc  cannot  embrace  them. 
Our  principles  may  be  true,  but  they  arc  not  reality.  They  no 
more  make  that  whole  which  commands  our  attention  than  .some 
shredded  dissection  of  human  tatters  t.s  that  warm  and  breath- 
ing beauty  of  flesh  which  our  hearts  found  delightful."  ' 

Not  only,  then,  it  is  claimed,  can  thought  not  be  identical 
with  human  experience ;  far  less  can  it  be  identified  with  the  all- 
inclusive  experience,  for,  as  compared  with  this,  even  im- 
mediate human  experience  itself  is  infected  with  unreality. 
For  example,  reality  caui'.ot  be  said  to  be  made  up  of  substances 
which  have  (lualities,  for  we  do  not  know  what  a  substance  is. 
Il  is  not  the  ijualities,  nor  is  it  anything,  so  far  as  we  can  know, 
behind  the  qualities.-  Neither  can  we  regard  reality  as  made 
up  of  qualities  in  relations.  Qualities  are  never  found  without 
relations,  and  cannot  be  conceived  as  existing  without  them; 
and  yet,  qualities  with  relations  are  no  more  intelligible.  Tlie 
qualities  cannot  be  wholly  resolved  into  relations,  nor  can  any 
quality  be  found  so  simpl(>  that  it  is  not  made  what  it  is  to 
some  extent  by  some  of  its  relations.  Similarly  of  relations: 
without  their  terms  they  are  nothing;  but  even  with  their 
terms  they  are  unintelligible.  If  the  relation  is  nothing  to 
the  (jualitics,  they  are  not  related  ;  the  relation  is  a  nonentity. 
If,  however,  the  relation  is  something  to  the  terms,  there  is  a 
relation  between  the  relation  and  the  term  ;  and  so  on  in  unend- 
ing regress.''  And  so  of  primary  and  secondary  qualities,*  space 
and  time,*  motion  and  change,"  causation,^  activity,*  and  the 
self.'  The  difficulty  is  especially  great  in  connection  with 
error.  It  cannot,  exactly  as  it  is  exiwrienced  by  the  person  in 
error,  belong  to  the  all-including  unitary  experience,  in  the 
light  of  whiih  all  error  is  corrected  ;  and  yet  the  error  is  a  fact  and 
so  cannot  hv  exclurled  from  reality.'"  Even  a  suggestion  which 
Bradley  finds  useful  in  accommodating  his  metaphysics  to 
common  sense,  \  iz.  that  there  are  degrees  of  reality,  is  not  ab- 


'  Principles  of  LoQ'r,  188.3,  p.  553. 
'/6.,  Ch.  in.  'h.,  Ch.  I. 

'  lb.,  Ch.  \  ■  «  ih.,  Ch.  VII. 


'  Appi'irance  atnl  Reality,  2d  cd.,  Ch.  II. 
'/6.,  CI     IV.  '  Ih..  Ch.  v. 

« lb.,  Cli~.  IX,  X.         i"  lb.,  Ch.  XVI. 


■j 


THE  OLDER  ABSOLUTE    IDEALIHM 


149 


solutely  tru«? ;  everything  either  is,  or  is  not,  absolutely  real.' 
And  yet  appearances  exist,  and  whatever  exists  must  belong 
to  reality ;  -  but  they  cannot  exist  in  the  experience  of  the 
Absolute  exactly  as  thoy  exist  in  ours,  because  different  experi- 
ences are  from  time  to  time  discrepant  with  each  other.' 

In  the  end,  therefore,  while  retaining  the  idea  of  Reality, 
or  the  Absolute,  as  a  single,  all-inclusive,  and  perfectly  harmoni- 
ous experience,  Bradley  concludes  that  we  can  have  only  a 
vague  iilea  of  its  nature.  It  is  not  perse 'lal,  but  super-personal ; 
not  moral,  but  super-moral ;  not  rational,  but  super-rational. 
Critical  rationalism,  the  only  method  we  can  use,  is  futile,  so 
far  as  any  detailed  positive  knowledge  of  the  Absolute  Experi- 
ence is  concerned.  The  only  method  that  would  be  adequate, 
viz.  immediate  or  mystical  intuition,  we  cannot  use;  that  is 
for  the  Absolute  alone.  Absolute  idealism,  then,  in  the  strict 
sense  of  the  term,  is  given  up.  Ideas  and  reason  having  only 
human  and  relative  value,  idealism  becomes  a  misnomer.* 
Absolutism  remains,  but  it  is  such  as  might  be  called  absolute 
empiricism,  or  absolute  immediatistn.  One  might  even  say 
that  Bradky's  view  is  a  negative  or  agno.stic  mystical  ab- 
solutism ;  reality,  knowable  in  any  case  only  by  mystical 
intuition,  is  held  to  be  for  man  essentially  unknowable. 

As  a  polemic  against  orthodox  absolute  idealism  Bradley's 
criticism  was  highly  successful.  The  main  ''riticisms  to  be 
directed  against  his  own  position  are  perhaps  two,  viz.  first, 
that  he  is  ovor-sceptical  as  regards  the  power  of  the  human 
understanding  to  make  a  true  judgment  —  a  question  which 
will  be  taken  up  in  our  discussion  of  the  problrtn  of  truth ;  and, 
secondly,  that  he  is  dogmatic  in  retaining  wl  t  he  does  of  the 
absolute  idealism  which  his  criticism  has  shown  to  be  self- 
refuting.  In  fact,  Bradley  seems  not  to  have  completely  realized 
how  far-reaching  are  the  logical  consequences  of  his  argument. 
The  absolute  idealism  which  he  criticises  started  with  the 
postulate  that  reality  is  rational,  and,  in  order  to  defend  this, 
was  led  by  a  dialectical  process  to  conclude  that  reality  is  a 
single  all-inclusive  experience.  Bradley,  originally  accepting 
the  current  idealism,  comes  finally  to  see  that  if  reality  is  a  single 


'  lb.,  Ch.  XXIV. 
»/6.,  pp.  241,  511. 


»  lb.,  pp.  132,  140. 

•  See  Appearance  and  Reality,  p.  647. 


» •  ' 


■  If 


I 


[  ^1 


'■■r—    ;  1 


if 


150 


THK  PHOULKM   Ob'   KNOWLI.IMJE 


all-inclusivo  cxiiorionro,  i'  caniiot  he  nitionnl,  int<*lIinil)lo.' 
F.  ('.  S.  Schilk-r  holds  that  an  all-inclu^iv*  consfious  cvpfricnce 
rould  only  1m-  roRardod  as  "morbidly  dissociated,  •  ( '  jn  down- 
linlit  mad."  " 

LoKirally  con  Icrcd,  then,  the  situation  is  this  :  either  reality 
is  a  siniilc  all-inclusive  cvpciience,  and  therefore  not  intelliKJIilo  ; 
or  reality  is  not  a  single  all-inclusive  expeiience,  in  which  case  it 
may  be  conceived  either  as  rational  or  as  not  rational.  Hradley 
chooses  the  first  of  the  major  alternatives,  that  reality  is  a  sinRh' 
super-rational  exiH'rienee ;  but  unless  a  sufficient  reason  is 
given  for  this  choice,  it  is  essentially  dogmatic.  The  oidy 
approach  to  a  reason  for  rejecting  the  view  that  reality  is  not  a 
single  experience  is  that  oin'  of  the  two  possible  ways  of  inter- 
preting this  view  wouhl  re(iuin>  one  to  hold  that  there  can  be 
true  judgnieiits,  a  conclusion  which  Bradley  imagines  cannot  l)e 
maintaineil,  because  the  prediiat(>  is  never  absolutely  identical 
with  the  subject.  But  if  a  judgment,  to  be  true,  need  not  have 
an  absdliitr  identity  between  the  subject  and  the  predicate, 
Bradley's  objection  falls  to  the  ground,  inul  the  view  that  ren  ty 
is  essentially  intelligible,  but  not  all  one  xju'riencc,  is  seen  to 
be  admissible.  Hut  even  with  Bradley's  strange  prejudice 
against  judgments,  why  should  he  not  choose  the  view  that 
reality  is  not  all  one  (wperience,  instead  of  this  iloctrine  which 
he  "inherited  from  others'"?  Indeed  this  wouhl  have  been  a 
more  defensible  course  than  to  retain,  as  he  did,  a  conclusion, 
the  original  basis  of  which  he  had  just  destroyed.  But,  of 
course,  with  his  theory  that  th<?  judgment  is  never  possibly 
true,  Bradley  would  not  be  justified  in  holding  to  his  view; 
and  for  the  same  reason  neither  is  he  justified  in  judging  his  own 
theory  to  be  true.  As  a  critic  points  out,  "the  very  fact  that 
this  conclusion  is  arrived  at  by  judgments,  which  both  by  Mr. 
Bradley's  own  methods  and  his  own  acknowledgement  are 
self-contradictory,  is  of  itself  quite  sufficient  both  to  invalidate 
it  and  to  make  his  systt^n  self-refuting."  ■''  What  Firndley  him- 
self says  is  that  "in  the  end  no  possible  truth  is  quite  true." 
Thus,  while  claiming  that  his  view  is  ultimate  for  intellect, 

'  Appearand  and  Heatity,  p.  554. 

^Jimrnnl  of  Pliitdsophy,  .'tc.  Vol.  Ill,  I'lOO,  p.  4S2. 

»  E.  G.  Spauldiug,  Philusophical  Htiicw,  Vol.  XIX,  1910,  p.  631. 


•  vuy 


■■/i.v 


^ 


99BSR 


THE  OLDKR   A»s<»LUTK    IDEALISM 


151 


and  that  any  ;  itertiativo  fiior<>  inconcpival)l<\  n<>  has  to  confess 
that  cvon  what  is  for  u.s  absolute  trutli  is  iUHCssarily  orroneous.' 
And  so,  while  Bradley  is  to  Ik*  credited  with  rev -altnK  the 
iiiitenahlHty  of  monistic  or  aUMoUife  ichvUism  on  rational  Krouiids, 
we  are  entitled  to  condeitin  his  "wn  metaphysics  as  beiiis;  not 
only  ddKmatic,  hut,  for  om  witli  ius  presu{)i)<»sitioni4  as  to  jfidR- 
nients,  logically  untenable. 

It  should  not  he  iinaKined,  howcvei  !iat  either  the  incon- 
sistency of  Bradley's  metai  -liysics  with  his  doctrine  of  th*-  judg- 
ment, or  the  untenability  ..f  the  latter  nullifies  the  value  of  his 
criticism  of  absolute  idealism.  That  criticism  has  sufficient 
foundation  in  the  discrepancy  shown  to  exist  t>etwecn  many 
of  the  various  existent  app«-aranc>  s  which  reality  presents  in 
difTerent  human  expeiiefjccs.  in  showing  that  the  older  ab- 
solute idealism  is  irrational,  and  thercr<>re  not  valid,  he  has  per- 
formed his  major  sci  ice,  and  one  which  is  not  afTected  by 
what  he  has  to  say  about  his  own  view. 

But  it  is  important  to  note  that  Bradl(>y's  sceptical  conclusion 
does  not  necessarily  hold  for  one  wl  presuppositions  are 

difTerent.  Bradle.\  in  presupposfig  the  duftri  c  of  absolute 
idealism,  that  all  rea.ty  is  included  in  one  con.-,  .  ■  xrH'rience 
and  is  identical  with  liiat  experience,  necessai  i,  ,Tr  iroses 
at  the  same  tini  ■  that  doctrim  s  presuppositioi.-  vi  p.  cho- 
logical  idealism  ;  iid  logical  idealism.  The  lof?'  ;-!  .."sm  is 
eliminated  in  the  end  ;  reality,  it  h  assumed,  isnotwhui  is  illogi- 
cal, self-v'outradictory;  but,  it  is  finally  concluded,  neither  is 
it  what  is  logical.  It  is  not  even  known  by  moans  of,  much  less 
made  up  of,  logical  ideas.  Rather  is  it  immediate  content  of 
one  all-inclusive  conscious  experience,  nothing  more,  '-^.w  it 
is  noteworthy  that  it  is  in  connection  with  the  initial  c  i -bina- 
tion  of  metaphysical  monism  with  psychological  and  logical 
idealism  that  the  princip  d  difficulties  Bradley  mentions  with 
regard  to  substances,  qualities,  relations,  and  the  rest,  presen' 
themselves.  Following  t  lie  initial  form  of  the  thought,  we  hav", 
in  eflfect,  the  following  argumen*.  Relations  are  constituted 
by  the  thought  which  perceives  or  knows  them.  There  can 
therefore  be  as  many  relations  between  relations  as  can  be 
thought  —  in  other  words,  an  unend  i ng  serie.-;.    But  if  relations, 

'  Op.  cit.,  pp.  542-7 


152 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  KNOWLEDGE 


|i'4" 


lit    X 


l   ' 


as  they  seem  to  be,  are  real,  independently  of  human  thought, 
there  must  be  as  many  in  reality  (the  Absolute  Experience) 
as  could  be  constituted  by  thought  in  an  unending  series  of 
mental  acts  —  in  other  words,  an  actual  infinite  number,  which 
is  self-contradictory.'  Now  the  obvious  thing  to  do  here  is  to 
retrace  one's  steps,  in  order  to  find  where  one  went  so  badly 
astray  as  finally  to  be  led  into  the  self-contradiction.  It  would 
be  found  that  if  the  fallacious  doctrines  of  idealism  had  been 
avoided,  the  self-contradictory  conclusion  would  never  have 
been  forced  upon  the  thinker.  But  Brrdley  does  not  choose 
to  part  with  his  idealistic  presuppositions  just  yet,  V-ut  to 
give  up  instead  the  common-sen  je  doctrine  that  relations  are 
real  independently  of  finite  thought.  Reahty,  then,  it  is  con- 
cluded, is  non-relational,  and  therefore  also  non-rational.  Thus 
the  logical  idealism  drops  out  of  Bradley's  absolutism  finally. 
But  it  has  been  assumed  all  along  that  reality  is  not  irrational, 
self-contradictory.  Bradley,  therefore,  since  he  refuses  to 
retrace  his  stops  again,  goes  on  to  overcome  this  opposition 
between  the  assumption  that  reality  is  not  irrational  and  the 
conclusion  that  reality  is  not  rational,  by  postulating  the  super- 
rationality  of  reality.  If,  however,  when  first  forced  to  letrace 
his  steps,  Bradley  had  eliminated  the  fallacious  idealism  from 
his  premises,  and  had  thus  been  led  to  regard  relations,  not  as 
thought-products  (except  in  the  case  of  tertiary  relations),* 
but  as  phases  of  reality  of  which  there  may  be  immediate  ex- 
periences, or  of  which  ideas  (thought-products)  may  be  formed, 
he  would  have  found  nothing  contradictory  in  supposing  them 
to  be  either  presented  in  the  experience  or  represented  in  the 
thought  of  the  most  comprehensive  consciousness  which  really 
is.  Such  an  experience,  however,  would  not  be  identical  with 
reality,  nor  would  it  necessarily  include  all  possible  experiences 
of  reality.  It  may  be  thought  of  as  including  only  such  ap- 
pearances of  reality  as  are  necessary  for  the  realizing  of  certain 
superhuman  purposes.  But  whether  such  a  superhuman 
experience  exists  or  not  is  another  question;  it  is  not  under 
debate  in  this  volume. 

And  what  is  true  of  relations  is  true  of  other  elements  of  human 
experience  relegated  by  Bradley  to  the  realm  of  mere  appearance, 

>  See  pp.  462-70,  in/ni.  =  See  Ch.  XIV,  infra. 


I    I 


THE  OLDER  ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM 


153 


because  of  the  contradiction  involved  in  the  "infinite  regress." 
This  unending  regress  is  primarily  due  not  to  the  attempt  to 
state  the  one  Absolute  Experience  in  terms  of  human  thought, 
but  to  the  attempt  to  state  all  reality  as  mere  contents  of  one 
conscious  experience.  From  an  essentially  reahstic  and  moder- 
ately pragmatic  point  of  view  there  can  be  not  only  a  true  and 
adequate  representation  of  experience  in  judgment,  but  an  ade- 
quate experience  and  representation  of  reality  without  the  un- 
ending regress.  If,  then,  a  realistic  point  of  view  were  once 
established,  Bradley's  baffling  paradoxes  would  largely  dis- 
appear; and  with  the  adoption  of  an  essentially  pragmatic 
criterion  of  truth,  such  of  them  as  might  still  threaten  would 
be  easily  and  happily  avoided. 


i   J 


;f 


m 


I 


V 


"I 

1      t 


I" 


■^? 


1.  * 


i 


J! 


CHAPTER  VIII 

The  Newer  Absolute  Idealism 

In  the  wake  of  Bradley's  destructive  criticism  of  the  older 
absolute  idealism  there  have  appeared  several  attempted  re- 
constructions of  that  philosophy,  of  which  those  of  Bernard 
Bosanquet,  A.  E.  Taylor,  and  W.  E.  Hocking  may  be  taken  as 
fairly  representative.  They  embody  the  intellectualistic,  the 
voluntaristio,  and  the  mystical  emphasis,  respectively.  The 
first  two  explicitly  take  account  of  Bradley's  work  and  give 
quite  favorable  consideration  to  some  of  his  most  characteristic 
views.  They  claim,  however,  that,  beyond  what  is  retained  by 
Bradley,  certain  of  the  most  essential  elements  of  absolute 
idealism  proper  can  find  place  in  tiic  new  construction.  The 
third  of  the  three  philosophers  mentioned  has  probably  been 
influenced  by  Royce  more  than  by  Bradley ;  and  yet  his  phi- 
losophy stands  in  a  peculiarly  interesting  relation  to  that  of  t  he 
English  philosopher.  While  Bradley  maintains  that  the  only 
conceivable  knowledge  of  Absolute  Reality  would  have  to  be  an 
immediate  or  mystical  intuition,  which,  however,  he  regards 
as  humanly  inaccessible,  Hocking  claims  that  this  intuition 
of  the  Whole  is  in  principle  present  in  all  human  consciousness, 
ajid  especially  in  the  religious  experience  of  the  mystic.  Royce's 
voluntaristic  philosophy,  although  given  to  the  world  in  its 
more  finished  form  later  than  the  first  publication  of  Bradley's 
Appearance  and  Reality,  and  although  itself  a  newer  absolute 
idealism,  as  -ompared  with  the  intellectuahstic  type,  has 
nevertheless  been  regarded  here  as  pre-Bradleian,  inasmuch 
as  it  does  not  take  jeriously  the  difliculties  raised  by  Bradley 
against  the  possibility  of  a  conscious  experience  whi  n  is  ra- 
tional and  at  the  same  time  inclusive  of  all  finite  experiences 
without  modification. 

Among  the  different  attempts  to  rehabilitate  absolute  ideal- 
ism, the  one  which  keeps  closest  to  Bradley's  own  position  is 

154 


\m 


THE  NEWER  ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM 


155 


that  of  Bosanquet.  Not  only  does  he  emphasize  with  Bradley 
the  rational  criterion  of  non-contradiction  as  a  test  of  reality 
as  distinguished  from  appearance ;  he  also  accepts  the  negative 
results  of  the  Bradleian  criticism  of  the  "thing,"  the  "self," 
and  of  the  moral  and  religious  consciousness,  takes  over  the 
doctrine  of  degrees  of  reality,  and  even  expresses  amazement 
at  the  unfavorable  reception  accorded  to  Bradley's  doctrines 
by  philosophers  generally.'  Unlike  Bradley,  however,  Bosan- 
quet emphasizes  the  positive  residue  of  idealistic  doctrine  which 
seems  still  tenable,  and  undertakes  to  develop  this  residue  into 
a  sane  and  sufF.c-  nt  philosophy  of  rcality.- 

Bosanquet  is  more  favorable  than  is  Bradley  to  the  Hegelian 
principle  th.it  the  real  is  the  rational.  Unlike  Green  and  others, 
who  put  their  emphasis  upon  the  predicate,  maintaining  that 
the  real  is  the  ratiorial,  in  the  sense  of  being  what  it  docs  not 
seem  to  be,  viz.  constituted  of  thought-relations,  Bosanquet 
places  his  emphasis  upon  the  subject,  insisting  that  it  is  reality 
that  is  rational.  In  other  words,  it  is  the  actual  —  the  absolute 
reality  which  is  everything  and  with  which  we  are  in  immediate 
relation  in  experience  —  which  is  rational,  at  least  in  the  sense 
of  being  free  from  all  self-contradiction.^  This  realistic  ten- 
dency in  Bosanquet's  thought  finds  especially  congenial  the 
Hegelian  notion  of  the  "concrete  universal,"  which,  it  is  in- 
sisted, means  the  self-complete  and  harmonious  individual, 
discoverable  through  rational  criticism  of  what  is  given  in 
experience.  Of  course  our  fragi  .ontarj^  experience  has  to  be 
supplemented  by  thought,  which  is  able  to  trace  out  the  reality 
in  so  far  as  it  transcends  what  is  actually  given.*  As  distinct 
from  generality,  which  is  sameness  in  spite  of  the  other,  and 
whose  test  is  the  number  of  subjects  which  can  share  a  predicate, 
universality  is  sameness  l)y  means  of  the  other,  and  its  test  is 
the  number  of  predicates  which  can  be  attached  to  the  srbject. 

cf.  p.  40. 


.57: 


'  The  Principle  of  Inditiduality  and  Value,  1912,  p. 

« Ih.,  p.  30. 

'  lb.,  pp.  27,  41,  51,  37s.  "It  is  possible,"  the  author  signifirantly  obsprves 
on  p.  39,  "that  thosp  philosophors  may  prove  .o  hold  the  more  suiial.lp  lan- 
guage who  deny  that  thought  ran  ever  be  one  with  the  real.  But  at  any  rate, 
we  are  bound  to  follow  thought  .  .  .  towards  ...  a  fuller  perfection  in  the 
certainty  that  if  it  is  itself  a  vani.sliing  form,  it  will  point  us  the  way  to  what  lies 
beyond,  and  when  necessary,  introtluce  us  to  ita  nature." 

*  lb.,  pp.  55.  257-8. 


■*.^,\ 


■:  ^1 


m 


156 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  KNOWLEDGE 


m 


, 


'  i 


ni 


The  true  embodiment  of  the  logical  universal  is  not  an  abstrac- 
tion,  but  an  individual,  a  self-complete  world.     Ultimately, 
inde(Hl,  it  is  the  Individual,  a  world  whose  members  are  worlds.* 
But  the  system  is  not  so  free  from  the  fallacious  ideahstic 
analysis  and  consequent  confusions  as  might  be  supposed  from 
these    leanings    toward    realistic    forms    of    expression.     The 
fundamental  view  is  that  reality  is  experience ;  *    truth  means 
nothing  differe./  from  reality ; »  since  the  subject  of  all  predica- 
tion is  Reality,  and  since  there  are  no  ideas  which  do  not  qualify 
this  subject,  "it  follows  that  the  truth  of  the  ontological  argu- 
ment is  conceded  in  principle";*    on  the  one  hand  "nature 
.  .  .  exists  only  through  the  finite  mind," «  and  matter,  taken 
as  indopendem    non-psychical    existence,   is    a  substantiated 
abstraction,*  while  on  the  other  hand,  thinking  is  in  essence 
simply  a  change  in  a  being  or  content,  viz.  its  passing  beyond 
itself,'  and  inwardness  is  to  be  interpreted  as  meaning  simply 
inseparable  continuity.'    "  .\11  objects  of  the  mind,"  it  is  roundly 
declared,    "are   psychical.     But  some   are   physical   as   well; 
that  is,  .some  entf-r  into  a  determinate  context  of  reactions,  which 
forms  a  special  part  of  the  psychical  world,  which  m-  call  the 
physical  world  and  contnLst  with  the  psychical.     But  this  is  an 
abstraction,  for  the  physical  world  can  never,  in  the  last  resort, 
put  off  its  psychical  chara'>tf  r.     A  tree  is  beautiful  and  green  and 
tall.    All  these  qualiti*^  are,  as  presentations,  necessarily  psychi- 
cal ;  but  the  tallnoss  at  least,  as  a  character  of  a  thing  in  space, 
is  certainly  physical.     \nd  this  is  probably  the  true  line  of  de- 
marcation.    They  are  all.  as  we  said,  p.sychical  ab  initio  m 
presentations.     But  (jua  (ii-termined  by  a  construction  of  ol>- 
jects  in  space  they  all  (including  'physical'  beauty)   become 
physical  also.      Then   they   are   relatively   opposable   to  the 
psychical.     But  not  more  than  relatively.     For,  taking  as  the 
test  of  psychical  n.iture  the  bing  destroyed  if  the  percipient 
mind  were  destroyed,  it  is  plain  ttiat  in  «  degree,  though  only  in 
a  degree,  presentations  remain  psychK}*]  wt  only  as  pure  pres- 
entations, but  (>V('n  as  qualicies  of  spatial  objects.     Thf  .sub- 
jective mind,  which  has  perc.  i'-ed  .md  which  conceives  them, 


'  The  Principle  of  Individuality  and  Value.  191-'.  pp.  ."J?,  68.         «  Ih., 
'  '■''     P-  ^^-  '  "j-  P-  «<»•  »  Ih..  vp.  .'J59.  371 

*lb..  V  73.  nb..  p.  60.  >!),..  pp.  73-7. 


p.  39. 


iMi 


mmm 


^^^^^^S'H 


THE  NEWER  ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM 


157 


being  destroyed,  their  existence  would  certainly  be  pro  tanto 
diminished,  though  not  necessarily  annihilated.  A  physical 
object  f  vt.'^t  at  least  be  capable  of  becoming  psychical  at  any 
moment.     If  not,  it  .so  far  has  not  full  existence."  ' 

What  we  have  here  is  not  the  mere  outcome  of  a  faulty  analysis, 
with  its  ignoring  of  the  difference  between  the  object  known 
tiirough  perception  and  thought,  and  the  .sense-  and  thought- 
elements  through  which  it  is  known  ;  we  have  an  apergu  carefully 
preserved  for  its  convenience  in  making  the  transition  from  the 
preliminary  realistic  interpretation  of  experience''  to  the  view 
that  the  Individual  which  is  the  Whole  is  a  single  all-inclusive 
and  absolutely  self-consistent  experienced  The  concept  of 
subject,  while  not  ulUmateUj  true,  is  valid  as  a  iflibstitute  for  that 
of  substance.^  But  while  holding  that  the  Individual  is  mind,* 
we  must  not  fall  into  the  snare  of  pluralism,  a  temptation  to 
which  we  are  especiallj'  exposed  because  of  the  ineradicable 
superstition  that  finite  rinds  are  substances."  We  must 
remember  that  the  true  nature  of  mind  is  a  world  of  experience.' 
Things  are  not  mind-deixMident,  but  mind-component.*  In- 
stead of  pluralism  fiosanquet  (^tTers  multiplicism,  .'he  view  that 
there  are  various  levels  of  experience,  each  possessing  its  peculiar 
range  and  area,«  the  highest  being  the  Absolute  Experience 
which  is  identical  with  Absolute  Reality.'" 

This  "multiplicism,"  which  corresponds  to  iJradley's  doctrine 
of  degrees  of  reality,  it;  the  conelu.sion  to  which  Bosanquet  is 
driven  l>y  his  acceptance  of  the  main  results  of  the  Bradleian 
criticism,  together  with  his  dc^termination  to  cling  to  Hegelian- 


•  lb.,  p.  :ifA.         2  Cf.  Thp  Dixliiiclion  bftwecn  Mind  and  Its  Objects,  1913. 

»  Thr  Prinriple  nf  Ituiniduality  and  Value.  \,p.  56.  .38fi,  <  Jb.,  p.  284. 

<■  Ih  ,  p.  L'Mi.  « Ih..  pp.  ;172  .{  '  lb.,  p.  2»7. 

■  Thj'  IHnlifflion  hetirrrn  Mind  and  It-i  Objects,  p.  42. 

»  f'ri/iriftli  af  Indii  i/lualilii  and  Value,  p.  87.'1. 

'"  111  The  Value  anit  Destiny  of  the  Indiiidual,  191.3,  pp.  59-60,  Bosanquet 
ofrpr"  u  <lialo"ti<al  ur(tuniont  for  a  ofrtaiii  phase  of  thif  view,  as  follows : 
The.-:i.t  "What  we  call  individual  finiti'  bcitiRs  are  kept  apart  by  difTereiipfs 
of  qualny  •  f  fcflinR  and  also  hy  the  reeiproeal  shortconiings  of  the  eoiitent  of 
which  thii  .re  <  (imposed.  Those  differences  of  rmality,  and  these  shortcominRs. 
ar»'  -tften  ii<  id  to  lie  the  secret  of  individuality,  the  secret  by  which  I  am  myself 
and  iK>t  au'/fher.  J)ecause  I  have  not  his  immediate  f.elinR,  and  do  not  compre- 
hend hi.s  (uiiiuiHcs  within  mi'ie."  Autitheais :  "When  1  most  fall  short  of 
othiT.s,  and  nni  most  in  disord  of  fcelin(j  (|uality  with  them,  I  am  also  leaat 
myself."     Synthenii.    "  We  do  not  experience  ourselves  a>  \vc  really  ar  ." 


:V 


f, 

r 

«> 

!; 

M 

\ 

^; 

": 

■I. 

t 

1 

»,!, 


f  I  I 


M 


158 


THK   PUOBLEM  OP   KNOWLEDGE 


ism,  rather  than  to  adopt  a  bona  fide  realism.  But  that  it  is 
solf-rofutiiig,  by  Bosanquet's  own  principle  of  non-contradie- 
tion,  can  be  readily  shown.  There  is  inconsistency,  on  the  very 
face  of  it,  with  the  monistic  fact  that  all  experience  is  ultimately 
one  experience.  The  appearances  which  constitute  the  contents 
of  the  lower  levels  of  (xperience  are  at  least  psychically  real. 
Acconiinp;  to  Bosanquet  they  arc  both  included  in  the  Ab- 
solute Experience,  l)ccaus(>  they  are  real,  and  at  the  same  time 
excluiled  therefrom,  as  mutually  conflicting  appearances. 
An  attempt  is  made  to  cover  up  this  contradiction  by  appealing 
to  the  way  in  which  the  elements  of  our  experience  are  trans- 
muted by  every  change  of  work  and  of  scene ;  so,  it  is  claimed, 
the  experiences  of  conscious  units  are  transmuted,  reenforced, 
and  rearranged  by  entrance  into  the  fuller  and  more  extended 
experience  of  the  Absolute.'  Hence  "there  is  .lo  reason  for 
making  ...  the  transmutation  of  experience  in  accordance 
witii  the  law  of  non-contradiction  ...  a  fundamental  diffi- 
culty when  we  come  to  deal  with  fundamental  reality.  .  .  . 
Tlie  Absolute  is  simply  the  high-water  mark  of  fluctuations  in 
experience,  of  which,  in  generf^l,  we  are  daily  and  normally 


aware 


"  2 


But  in  criticism  of  this  it  may  be  pointed  out  that 
there  is  a  difference  between  the  two  cases  which  destroys  all 
the  value  of  the  analogy.     The  finite  mind  does  not  retain  the 
past  inadequate  experience  along  with  the  present  more  adequate 
one;  the  latter  is  a  substitute,  which  cancels  the  former.     The 
Absulute,  however,  as  all-inclusive  experience,  must  retain  both 
human  experiences,  the  earlier  experience  with  the  inadequate 
api>'  arance  which  i?  its  content,  and  the  later  experience  with 
Its  more  ailequate  appearance  which  cancels  and  banishes  the 
foraier.     In  other  words,  when  the  appearance  of  an  object 
changes,  there  is  a  sul)stitution  of  one  experience  for  another, 
and  the  former  experience  is  gone  beyond  recall;  even  apart 
from  tile  lapse  o^  time,  it  is  an  experience  which  could  no  longer 
.'xi.st  along  with  the  other.     But  still,  as  an  experience,  it  was  as 
really  existent  as  the  later  one,  and  so  would  have  to  be  included 
along  with  the  other  in  an  all-indusive  Absolute  p:xperience. 
Bosanquet  is  right  as  against  Ruyce,  when  he  contends  that  the 
inclusion  together  (»f  the  two  experiences  would  modify  the  earlier 
'  The  Principle  of  Individuality  ana  Value,  up.  372-3.        '  lb.,  p|..  377-8. 


THE   NEWER  ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM 


159 


one ; '  but  as  against  Bosanquet  himself  it  must  be  urged  that 
the  whole  reality  of  an  experience  is  in  its  actuality,  and  when  this 
is  "transmuted"  it  is  no  longer  reaUty,  but  a  departure  from  it. 
On  this  showing  the  Absolute,  as  inclusive  of  all  reality,  could 
not  be  an  experience  and  nothing  more.  Hence  we  feel  justified 
in  regarding  Bosanquet's  rehabilitation  of  absolu'.,^  idealism  as 
revealing  only  the  more  plainly  how  complete  has  been  the 
wreck  made  of  that  once  respectable  philosophy  by  the  Brad- 
leian  criticism.  If  the  Absolute,  as  Reality,  were  recognized  as 
itself  not  a  mere  experience,  however  unified,  but  as  a  reality 
of  which,  while  we  have  inadequate  experiences,  some  Being 
may  have  an  adequate  experience,  then  might  our  philosopher 
be  permitted  to  say,  "We  experience  the  Absolute  better  than 
we  experience  anything  else,  because  ...  we  experience  the 
Absolute  in  everything ":  ^  but  so  long  as  the  fundamental 
dogma  of  idealism,  that  reality  is  idea  or  experience,  is  retained, 
a  finally  self-consistent  philosophy  seems  unattainable. 

A.  E.  Taylor  has  been  deeply  influenced  by  Bradley's  ra- 
tionalistic critique  of  rationalistic  or  intellectualistic  ab.solute 
idealism,  and  he  retains  the  Bradleian  emphasis  upon  the 
rational  criterion,  "Reality  is  not  self-contradictory";'  but 
like  Bosanquet  he  seeks  to  save  as  much  as  possible  from  the 
general  wreck,  and  like  Royce  he  has  recourse  to,  and  makes 
fundamental,  the  concept  of  purpose.  Indeed,  for  our  present 
purposes  Taylor's  system  may  be  regarded  as  essentially  a 
synthesis  of  the  views  of  Bradley  and  Royce,  and  yet  he  makes 
his  appeal  to  purpose  with  a  difference.  Royi  always  main- 
tains that  reality,  even  in  its  most  "external"  aspects,  is  what  is 
meant  or  purposed ;  for  Taylor,  reality,  at  least  at  the  outset 
of  the  investigation,  is  simply  that  with  which  our  purposes  are 
everywhere  confronted,  that  "of  which  all  purposes,  each  in  its 
own  way,  must  take  account."  *  Thus  while  Royce  identifies 
reality  with  the  idea,  the  predicate  of  our  judgment,  Taylor 
identifies  it  with  the  subject  of  our  judgment,  as  he  interprets 
it,  viz.  with  the  bare  immediacy  of  psychical  experience.  "The 
real  is  experience,  and  nothing  but  experience,  .nnd  experience 

■  lb.,  pp.  387-8.  «  lb.,  p.  378. 

»  Elemrnti  nf  Metaphysics,  1907,  Bk.  !,  Ch.  II,  §  1. 
*Ib.,  Bk    II,  Ch.  I,  §i  1  3. 


, 


-vr- 


U 


a 


■  i  i> 


m 


il 


* 


^i  ^ 


I- 


160 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   KNOWLEDGE 


consists  of  psyrliical  matter  of  fact."  '  And  so,  while  Royce 
is  led  to  the  conception  of  an  alk'mbracing  rational  order,  really, 
if  only  fragment arily,  accessible  to  finite  thought,  Taylor 
gravitates  away  from  the  logical  toward  a  one-sided  psychologi- 
cal form  of  absolute  Idealism,  and  even  in  the  direction  of  a 
mystical  philosophy  =  of  the  Absolute  as  "an  individual  ex- 
perience which  apprehends  the  totality  of  existence  as  the  har- 
monious eml)odiment  of  a  single  'purpose,'"  to  which  the 
nearest  analogue  presented  by  our  own  life  is  to  \w  found  in 
"  the  satisfietl  insight  of  personal  love."  »  Taylor  does  not  make 
much  headway  in  the  direction  of  mystical  knowledge,  however, 
and  as  a  conse(iuence  he  remains  largely  agnostic.^  At  best 
he  stands  upon  a  mountain  top  in  the  wilderness  of  comparative 
agnosticism,  and  sees  only  from  afar  the  promised  land  of  mysti- 
cal insight  which  he  himself  may  not  enter.  And  as  the  sug- 
gestion of  the  mysticism  was  associated  with  the  idea  of 
reality  as  that  which  immediately  confronts  our  purpose,  so 
the  agnosticism  is  associated  with  the  idea  of  reality  as  the  reali- 
zation of  purpose.  The  Absolute  is  therefore  regarded  as  "the 
final  realization  of  our  intellectual  and  practical  needs,"  which 
"cannot  possess  either  thought  or  will  a.s  such."  * 

The  main  criticisms  passed  upon  Bradley  are  also  valid  as 
against  this  view  of  Taylor.  The  contradiction  in  the  idea  of  an 
all-experience,  or  all-reality-including  experience,  which  does 
not  include  all  experience  or  reality  r/.s  it  is  actually  experienced, 
is  only  thinly  veiled  by  the  illegitimate  notion  of  "degrees 
of  reahty."  «  If  reality  is  "immediate  psychical  fact,"  all  "ap- 
pearances" are  erjually  real.  The  "original  .^in"  of  Taylor's 
philosophy  is  the  same  "trail  of  the  serpent"  of  subjectivism, 
or  psychological  idealism,  which  is  over  all  the  concrete  idealists' 
be  they  never  so  "objective."  Taylor  thinks  he  gets  rid  of 
subjectivism  by  means  of  Avenarius's  exposure  of  the  "psy- 
chological fallacy  of  iiitrojection"  ;  ^  but  this  simply  liberates 
from  the  language  of  sul)je(tivism  by  denying  the  reality  of 

'  Elemmtx  n/  Metaphysics,  1907,  Bk.  I,  f'h.  II,  §  4. 


» lb..  Bk.  IV,  Ch.  VI 

•See  Mind,  \.H.,  Vol.  X.XII,  1(U;},  p.  i:iii 
lOOl.rhs.  VII  and  VIII. 

''  Elrm  ntx  of  Metaphi/.fics,  Hk.  IV,  Ch.  VI    55  1    '> 
*lb.,  Bk.  II,  C!,    III.  '/'/,,  '^k.'ll 


'  Ih..  Bk.  II,  Ph.  I,  §  J. 

But  pf .  The  Prublem  of  Conduct, 

Ch.  I,  S  8. 


i'y 


THE  NEWER  ABSOT.UTE   IDEALISM 


161 


the  self,  and  this  it  dm-s  on  the  'lasis  of  what  is,  after  all,  merely 
an  exposure  of  the  fallacy  underlynip  the  rise  of  a/«/.se  idea  of  the 
seh  and  of  consciousness.  Taylor  himself  virtually  acknowl- 
edges the  psychologisin  when  he  states  that  his  view  of  reality 
and  experience  is  practically  that  of  Berkeley,  save  that  it  lays 
stress  on  "the  purposive  and  selective  aspect  of  experience."' 
Another  dainaKinp;  acknowledgment  is  the  statement,  "Meta- 
physics adds  nothing  to  our  information,  and  yields  no  fresh 
springs  of  action."  - 

Taylor's  system  as  a  whole  may  be  regarfied  as  a  synthesi-s 
of  three  fundamental  doctrines,  viz.  psychological  idealism, 
voluntarism,  and  metaphysical  monism.  Of  these  three  factors 
the  only  one  which  ought  to  be  rejected  without  qualification 
is  the  psychological  idealism.  This  psychologism,  to  be  sure, 
infects  both  the  voluntarism  and  the  monism.  On  the  one  hand 
it  transforms  the  voluntarism  from  the  doctrine  that  what  we 
experience  depends  ultimately,  at  least  generally  speaking, 
upon  purpose,  into  the  doctrine  that  what  is  real  depends 
upon  the  purposes  underlying  its  cognition.  On  the  other 
hand  it  changes  metaphysical  monism  from  the  doctrine  that 
reality  is  in  some  .sense  one  organic  whole,  into  the  doctrine 
that  reality  is  one  experience.  We  would  maintain  that  volun- 
tarism, as  applied  not  to  what  is  real  but  to  what  is  experience, 
and  a  nioderate  or  critical  in«  taphysical  monism,  apart  from 
the  cont.iminating  influence  of  psj-chological  idealism,  are 
both  higlily  cK'fensible  doctrines.  These  two  of  themselves, 
however,  without  psychological  ideahsm,  would  never  lead  to 
absolute  ideali.sm. 


1^1 


Mystical-Logical-Psychological  Idealism 

Each  of  the  various  forms  of  absolute  idealism  hitherto 
examined  may  be  regarded  as  implicitly  or  explicitly  an  at- 
tempted synthesis,  on  a  monistic  basis,  of  the  p.syehological 
and  logical  types  of  idealism.  We  have  still  to  examine  a  system 
in  whic!)  there  is  attempted,  although  perhaps  not  altogether 
consciously,  ;i  .synthesis  of  all  three  elemental  types,  the  psycho- 
logical, the  1(  .;ical,  and  the  mystical,  and  which  may  therefore 

'  lb,  Uk.  II,  Ch.  I,  5  6.  »  76.,  Bk.  IV.  Ch.  VI,  S  3. 

u 


^1 

i 

i 

■-  - 


M 


?''? 


I'; 


k    \ 

If    1 


< 


I'- 


ll *■ 


^| 


liiif 


u 


I  ■• 


A 


■ 


16J 


THt:   PROBLKM  OF    KNdWLEDOE 


Im«  called  a  niystical-loKii-ai-psychoIoKical  iupaliflm.  As  such 
it  18  also  a  synthesis  of  the  (  -sentials,  from  its  own  point  of 
view,  of  the  three  dual  eoiiil)inafi()ns  of  the  elemental  ty[H>s  of 
idealism,  as  represented  hy  Plofiniis,  HeKel.aiid  Mr-rKsoil.  But 
what  we  are  here  esiweially  interested  in  |)ointintJ  out  is  that  the 
result  is  a  thirtl  uiiiiri  tyrn-  of  absolute  idealism,  the  mystieal,  as 
contrasted  with  the  intellectualistic  and  th(>  voluntarisli<  tvpcs 
already  discussed.  Intellectualistic  absolute  idealism,  as  we 
saw,  attached  itself  fo  HcKel ;  the  voluntaristic  variety,  whih- 
not  departiiiK  from  the  main  positions  of  HcKelianism,  repro- 
duc(>d  certain  features  of  the  philosophy  of  Fichte ;  the  philos- 
opher whose  system  we  are  alxiiit  to  examine,  while  retaining 
inuch()f  Hegelian  intrllcctualism  and  not  entirely  excluding 
the  Kichtean  voluntarism,  adds  to  these  a  mystical  element, 
remindinn  us  of  a  certain  |)hase  of  the  thought  of  Schelling,  only 
that  in  this  later  philosophy  the  mysticism  is  given  a  large  place 
in  the  fouwhtinii  of  the  (>ntire  structure.  The  result  of  this  in- 
troduction of  the  mystical  element  is  to  produce  an  empirical 
tlevelopment  of  absolutism. 

W.  E.  Hocking,  the  philosopher  to  vvhoni  we  refer,  holds  that 
intellectualistic  or  rationalistic  idealism,  with  its  doctrine  that 
whatever  is  is  rational,  is  no;  so  nmch  mistaken  as  incomplete, 
and  therefore  unsatisfactory.  Although  furnishing  the  philo^ 
sopiiical  frauKWoik  uf  a  religion  of  reason,  it  fails  to  do  the  work 
of  religion.'  Voluntaristic  idealism,  also,  with  its  question, 
"What  kind  of  world  would  best  satisfy  the  requirements  of 
our  wills?"  gives  .M.me  important  hints  of  what  we  have  to 
expect  of  reality,  and  yet  it  can  never  detciimiK  in  this  way 
alone  what  kind  of  world  we,  in  reality,  have;-  the  universe 
fulfils  mv  vill,  bill  it  is  not  definable  as  the  fulfilment  of  my 
will ;  independent  reality  is  prior  to  our  ideals,  and,  to  be  known, 
requires  us  to  be  pa.ssively  receptive  before  we  cin  actively 
select  what  is  nec(>ssary  for  the  realization  of  our  purpose." 
Hence  mysticism  as  "a  practice  of  union  with  fknl,  together 
with  th;  theory  of  that  pra(  tice"  is  ofTered  as  at  once  a  supple- 
ment and  a  support  to  the  existii.g  forms  of  absolute  idealism.* 
According  to  the  intellectualistic  absolute  idealists  from  Hegel 

'  The  Meai'D'o  of  God  in  Humnn  Eiperitnce,  1912,  pp.  vi-xi. 

«  lb.,  p.  l.if..  « lb.,  pp.  \m-2.  '  lb.,  pp.  vi,  xviiii  xix. 


:"^- 


THE  NEWER  ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM 


103 


to  Bosanquot,  the  " Absolute  Idea,"  or  "Concrete  Universal," 
is  discoverable  through  critical  thought.  In  the  opinion  of 
''oyre  and  the  voluntaristic  idealists  it  is  discoverable  through 
ii  (hliniticjii  and  rationalization  of  purpose.  But  for  Hocking, 
as  a  mystical  idealist,  the  Absolute  Idea,  or  Concrete  Universal, 
is  experienced  in  an  innnediate  intuition. 

There  is  a  sort  of  negative  mysticism  in  the  philosophy  of 
Bradley,  -according  to  whom  Absolute  Ueality,  while  not  ade- 
(juately  knowable  by  the  only  method  available  to  us,  viz. 
rational  criticism,  is  to  be  thought  of  as  self-known  in  the  Ab- 
solute Experience  by  an  innnediate  intuition,  comparable  only 
to  the  mystical  vision  or  to  each  human  self's  immediate  aware- 
ness of  a  fragment  of  the  realm  of  appearance.  But  while 
Bradley,  as  we  have  intimated,  can  only  dindy  view  the  prom- 
ised land  from  afar,  Hocking,  Joshua-like,  would  lead  us  boldly 
in,  claiming  tiiat  with  ''  feeling"  as  "a  way  of  knowing  objects 
\v  th  one's  Whole-idea"  we  are  well  able  to  enter  into  our  prom- 
iseii  possession.'  Psychological  or  subjective  idealism  having 
been  already  .set  up  over  against  natural  realism,  and  objective 
idealism  having  been  framed  by  the  bringing  in  of  logical  ideal- 
ism to  be  at  once  a  support  and  a  correction  of  subjective 
idealism,  my.sticism,  with  its  mystical  idealism  in  particular, 
is  here  brought  in  to  perform  a  similar  service  in  turn  for  objec- 
tive idealism.  "A  non-realism  in  regard  to  the  surface  of 
Nature"  is  accredited  by  the  mystically-supported  "Super- 
natural. Realism,"  or  "Social  ReaUsm,"  or  "more  truly  .  .  . 
Realism  of  the  Absolute  —  not  far  removed  from  Absolute 
Idealism,"  to  which  that  preliminary  non-realism  is  held  to 
be  "the  only  way."  ^ 

The  question  of  immediate  interest  is  whether  this  fusion  of 
the  three  elemental  types  of  idealism,  which,  taken  separately, 
are,  as  we  have  .seen,  necessarily  either  fallacious  or  purely 
dogmatic,  will  result  in  an  elimination  or  an  accentuation  of 
the  fallaciousness  and  dogmatism.  As  one  examines  the 
mystical  absolute  idealism  resulting  from  this  new  synthesis, 
he  discovers  that  it  is  not  left  without  further  reasoning  in  its 
support,  but  is  made  to  rest  upon  an  ingenious  dialectical  argu- 
ment, which  supports,  and  is  at  the  same  time  supported  by, 

'  It).,  I).  129;    cf.  pp.  282-90.  « lb.,  p.  290. 


-  ■ 

I    • 


MICROCOPY    RESOLUTION    TEST  CHART 

(ANSI  and  ISO  TEST  CHART  No.  2l 


1.0 


I.I 


2.5 
2.2 

2.0 
1.8 


^     APPLIED  IN4/1GE     Inc 


'6b J  fa^t  Ma.n  'jfpe' 

•^(.icheslef ,  Nei*  rorh    U609   ■  SA 

.'^6)  482  -  CJOO  -  Phone 

(''6)  288  -  5989  -  -'a. 


9U 


164 


THE  PROBLEM   OF   KKOWLEDGE 


1 .1.' 


'    ,ij 


C) 


.  i 


ill 


what  is  presented  as  the  result  of  an  analysis  of  immediate, 
mystical  cognition.  In  order  to  answer  the  question  as  to 
whether  in  this  form  also  absolute  idealism  is  imduly  do<;matic, 
we  shall  have  to  examine  both  the  dialectic  anil  the  appeal  to 
mystical  intuition. 

The  general  path  pursued  by  the  dialectic  may  hv  indicated 
as  follows :  In  sense-experience  I  hav^e  an  immediate  knowledge 
of  external  Nature ;  but  this  would  not  be  possible  if  I  had  not 
always  at  the  same  time  an  inunediate  knowledgr  of  other 
mind ;  therefore  I  have  such  knowledge.  But  this  immediate 
knowledge  of  other  mind  would  not  be  possible  if  I  had  not 
knowledge  of  other  mind  as  wholly  creative  in  its  knowing,  i.e. 
of  Absolute  jMind,  or  God  ;  therefore  I  have  such  knowledge  of 
God.  Examining  this  argument  more  closely,  we  find  a  transition 
from  natural  reahsm  to  subjective  ideahsm,  thence  to  an  ob- 
jective personal  —  though  not  necessarily  pluralistic  —  ideahsm, 
and  thence,  finally,  to  what  is,  in  its  interpretation  of  the  physical 
world,  absolute  idealism.  Our  task,  then,  will  include,  in  the  first 
place,  an  investigation  of  the  question  whether  the  transition 
at  every  step  of  the  dialectic  is  legitimate  and  undogmatic, 
apart  from  any  appeal  to  mysticism ;  and  in  the  second  place 
an  examination  of  the  recourse  to  mystical  intuition,  in  order  to 
discover  whether  it  removes  or  only  aggravates  the  dogmatism 
of  the  system  as  a  whole. 

The  philosophy  begins,  then,  upon  the  ground  of  natural 
realism.  It  is  admitted  that  we  find  Nature  ready  made,  and 
obstinate  in  its  independence.  Hocking  makes  no  distinction 
in  this  connection  between  primary  and  secondary  qualities, 
unless  it  be  to  grant  even  greater  objectivity  to  sensation  than 
to  relation.'  But  the  position  thus  tentatively  assumed  is  a 
dogmatic  realism ;  as  we  shall  maintain  in  a  later  chapter,  a 
more  critical  realism  would  recognize  that  while  in  practical  life 
we  find  it  necessary  to  assume  the  independent  existence  of 
physical  energy  undergoing  transformation  in  space  and  time, 
we  are  not  similarly  required  to  posit  the  independence  of  color 
and  other  secondary  qualities ;  we  simply  do  .so  through  an 
uncritical  process  of  association.  If  dogmatism  in  a  philosophy 
is  an  evil,  then  this  adoption  of  a  dogrn.itic  r.ather  th.an  .a  more 

'  The  Meaning  of  Godin  Human  Experience.  1912,  pp.  282-6. 


THE  NEWER  ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM 


165 


critical  realism  as  his  starting-point  is  the  fons  et  origo  mali 
in  Hocking's  dialectical  system.  No  universally  necessary 
conclusion  can  bo  drawn  by  means  of  the  most  rigidly  careful 
dialectic,  if  the  thesis  with  which  it  begins  is  an  unnecessary 
dogma.  If  it  should  be  said,  by  way  of  rejoinder,  that  the 
intention  is  not  to  assume  more  than  that  the  sense-qualities 
perceived  are  not  dependent  on  the  self,  the  distinct  question 
as  to  the  actual  mode  of  their  existence  being  left  in  abeyance 
until  the  final  stage  of  the  dialectic,  our  reply  would  be  that 
that  is  the  very  element  in  natural  realism  to  which,  as  will  be 
seen  from  our  critique  of  the  new  realism  and  our  own  con- 
structive statement,  we  most  object.  The  belief  is  very  common, 
we  grant ;  but  for  all  that,  in  view  of  the  various  puzzles  which 
emerge  in  connection  with  the  study  of  sense-perception,  normal 
and  abnormal,  it  is  none  the  less  dogmatic' 

The  weakness  of  his  initial  thesis  seems  to  be  felt  by  the  authc.r, 
for  he  elsewhere  appeals  to  immediate  feeling  for  its  support. 
He  makes  plain  his  agreement  with  Fechner  in  the  latter's 
choice  of  the  natura'  man's  "Day-view"  of  the  world  —  the 
view  that  the  world  is  constant!;  ,  even  when  unseen  by  any 
finite  percipient,  clothed  with  all  the  colors  and  other  sense- 
qualities  which  it  has  for  normal  man  in  broad  daylight  — 
simply  because  he  feels  that  "it  must  be  so"  ;  and  his  rejection, 
for  a  corresponding  reason,  of  the  opposite  "Night-view."* 

The  second  step  in  the  dialectic,  the  first  antithetical  propo- 
sition, is  lightly  touched  upon.  That  subjective  idealism  is  a 
position  relatively  justified  is  conceded  rather  than  contended. 
That  "physical  experience  ...  is  not  so  external  but  that  it 
can  at  any  moment  be  conceived  internal  to  me"  is  accepted 
as  something  on  which  "idealism  has  sufficiently  enlarged."' 
But  as  Hocking  clearly  recognizes,  this  subjective  idealism  is  a 
necessary  step  in  the  dialectic  pathway  leading  from  "our 
natural  realism"  to  "realism  absolute."  The  dogmatism  in  this 
position,  however,  is  clearly  seen  when  one  substitutes  for  the 
ambiguous  expression  "physical  experience"  the  term  which 
expresses  what  is  really  meant,   viz.  physical  reality.     That 

'  Sec  especially  Ch.  XI,  infra,  and  Ch.  XIII,  last  paragraph. 
•  The  Meaning  of  God  in  Human  Experience,  1P12,  pp.  465-73. 
» lb.,  p.  284. 


^4 


f 


h 


1G6 


THE  PROBLEM   OP   KNOWLEDGE 


,r'. 


physical  reality  is  "interna'  to  me"  cannot,  as  has  been  suffi- 
ciently shown  in  our  cri  c,  le  of  psychological  ideahsm,  be 
asserted  as  even  relatively  true  without  an  unwarranted  degree 
of  dogmatism. 

Instead  of  going  directly  from  subjective  idealism,  or  soUp- 
sism,  to  absolute  monism,  or  "sohpsism  of  the  Absolute," 
as  is  done  l)y  Royco,  Hocking  effects  the  synthesis  between 
"o  ir  natural  reaUsm"  and  subjective  idealism  by  asserting 
our  immediate  awareness  of  "other  mind."  '  He  has  ap- 
parently made  a  gain  over  Royce  at  this  point,  inasmuch  as  it 
seeiMS  less  dogmatic  to  assert  the  existence  and  our  im- 
mediate awareness  of  other  mind  than  it  is  to  claim  that  any 
apparently  limited  mind  is  in  reality  not  only  unlimited  but  the 
one  and  only  mind.  But  unless  Hocking's  dialectic  comes  to 
the  same  thing  in  the  end,  it  should  be  noted  that  we  have  here 
two  different  syntheses,  each  claiming  to  be  logically  necessary, 
and  therefore  the  only  posi^ible  one.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  how- 
ever, Hocking's  dialectic  may  be  viewed  as  presenting  some- 
what easier  transitions  toward  essentially  the  same  conclusion, 
broadly  speaking,  as  that  reached  more  directly  by  Royce.  It 
may  be  granted,  then,  that  if  natural  realism  and  subjective 
idealism  are  both,  as  far  as  they  go,  valid  —  i.e.  if  what  they 
need  is  only  supplementation,  not  correction  —  Hocking's 
sj-nthesis  in  the  doctrine  of  immediate  knowledge  of  other 
mind  is  well  estal)lished.  We  must  agree  with  him  in  his  con- 
clusion, provided  we  have  already  admitted  the  original  thesis 
and  antithesis.  But  are  we  intellectually  justified  in  granting 
him  this  initial  advantage?  On  the  contrary,  we  would  claim 
that,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  both  the  thesis  and  the  antithesis, 
both  natural  realism  and  subjective  idealism,  are  not  simply 
inadequate  and  in  need  of  supplementation  in  the  course  of 
the  ensuing  dialectic  ;  they  are,  as  we  have  alread>  seen  in  the 
case  of  subjective  idealism,  and  as  we  shall  see  in  the  case  of 
natural  realism,  open  to  more  serious  objection.  It  is  often 
supposed  that  one  must  accept  either  natural  realism  or  subjec- 
tive idealism,  l)ut  that  to  accept  the  one  is  to  reject  i  c  other. 
Hocking,  as  we  have  seen,  accepts  them  both,  and  out  of  the 
apparent  contradiction  between    them  develops  his  dialectic. 

'  The  Mianiity  of  God  in  Human  Experience,  1912,  p.  287. 


THE  NEWER  ABSOLUTE  IDEALISM 


167 


In  our  opinion,  however,  of  these  supp<  -  jd  alternatives  we 
should  accept  neither.  There  is,  as  we  shall  see  in  due  time,  a 
third  possibility,  by  means  of  which  we  may  avoid  the  natural 
dogmatism  of  the  one  without  falling  into  the  sophisticated 
absurdity  of  the  other.' 

(If  it  be  claimed,  in  support  of  Hocking's  argument,  that  in 
the  dialectic  both  natural  realism  and  subjective  idealism, 
being  aufaehoben,  are  nrt  carried  over  into  the  synthesis,  but 
are  left  behind,  the  answer  is  that  in  that  case  the  synthesis 
would  be  a  mere  hypothesis  until  verified.  And  if  it  be  pointed 
out  that  religious  mysticism  is  offered  as  a  source  of  verification 
for  the  final  synthesis,  here  the  answer  is  that  even  if  reli(;ious 
mysticism  be  regarded  as  valid  for  establishing  th(>  reality  of 
God,  it  by  no  means  follows  that  it  is  valid  for  establishing  the 
reality  of  the  "Absolute"  of  absolute  idealism.  But  nothing 
hss  than  the  establishing  of  that  "  Absolute  "  as  real  could  give 
the  required  support  to  what  we  mean  by  the  essential  thing  in 
natural  realism  and  in  subjective  idealism,  respectively.) 

It  is  a  notable  admission,  moreover,  when  Hocking  tells  us 
that  it  was  "like  a  shock"  that  this  idea  of  the  immediate 
awareness  of  other  mind  first  came  to  him.^  "That  nature  is 
always  present  to  experience  as  known  by  an  Other"  is  admit- 
tedly a  "strange  assertion,"  and  by  itself  "unconvincing."' 
When  seen  in  the  Hght  of  its  further  inescapable  implications, 
it  is  felt  to  be  "a  great  deal  to  claim."  *  What  supports,  then, 
in  addition  to  the  supposed  dialectical  proof  just  rejected,  are 
brought  forward  to  relieve  the  seeming  dogmatism? 

The  ultimate  and  one  really  important  intuitional  or  empir- 
ical support  —  and  it  is  one  upon  which  much  reliance  is  placed 
—  is  the  religious  experience  of  the  mystic.     But  there  are 

'  We  do  not  mean  to  say  that  if  natural  realism  and  subjective  idealism  were 
to  be  analyied  into  the  separate  beliefs  held  by  the  natur:.l  realist  and  the  sub- 
jeetive  idealist,  as  such  respectively,  we  should  be  unable  to  accept  any  of  them, 
or  that  the  philosopher  under  consideration  would  accept  all  of  them.  For  the 
purposes  of  our  discussion  at  this  point  the  essenlial  thing  in  natural  realism  is 
the  belief  that  secondary  qualities  exist  independently  of  (are  not  produced  by)  the 
sensing  aelinty  of  any  human  subject ;  and  the  essential  thing  in  subjective  idealism 
is  the  belief  that  in  their  primary  qualities  objects  are  thought-constructs,  dependent 
fr.r  their  eris'enee  upon  the  "  relating  "  activity  of  the  thinking  sulked. 

•  The  Meaning  of  God  in  Human  Experience,  1912,  p.  265. 

•  lb.,  p.  278.  t  lb.,  p.  294. 


i    i 


'I 

I 

If 


•if 


ha 


m 


' 


I'; 


f 


,  i 


,v 


168 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  KNOWLEDGE 


several  minor  supports,  one  of  which  is  an  inference  from  a 
report  of  analysis  of  social  experience.  "I  am  in  thj-  soul. 
These  things  around  me  are  in  thy  expf  lence.  They  are 
thy  own ;  when  I  touch  them  and  move  them  I  change 
thee.  When  I  look  on  them  I  see  what  thou  seest ;  when 
I  listen  I  hear  what  thou  hean  I  am  in  the  great  Room 
of  thy  soul ;  and  I  experience  thy  very  experience."  '  Here 
it  would  seem  that,  owing  to  the  failure  to  develop  a  critical 
realism  (such  as  we  shall  defend  in  a  later  chapter)  instead 
of  the  natural  realism  rendered  untenable  by  psychology,  it  is 
assumed  that  as  two  persons  have  inunetliate  perceptual  knowl- 
edge of  a  certain  object,  ;  nd  as  the  object  is  not  two,  but  one, 
they  must  each  be  in  the  soul  of  the  other,  or  both  in  the  same 
soul,  as  in  a  "  room."  If  now  we  get  rid  of  this  spatial  concep- 
tion of  consciousness,  and  view  all  conscious  process  as  a  crea- 
tive activity  cf  the  self,  through  which  even  the  sense-quaUties 
of  the  object  are  pn  luced,  though  not  the  physical  energy 
undergoing  transformation  in  space  and  time,  it  becomes  dear 
that  two  minds  can,  similarly  and  sinmltaneously,  immediately 
experience  the  same  thing,  without  these  minds  interpenetrat- 
ing each  other.  Each  simply  clothes  one  and  the  same  physical 
object  with  similar  sense-qualities,  only  each  does  it  for  himself 
alone.  On  Hocking's  view  as  above  expressed,  if  we  were  to 
take  it  at  all  literally,  and  in  conjunction  with  his  doctrine  of 
the  non-dependence  of  secondary  quahties  of  physical  objects 
upon  the  sensing  subject,  it  would  be  difficult  to  explain  how 
it  is  that  when  I  view  a  colored  object  which  is  being  perceived 
at  the  same  time  by  a  color-blind  person,  I  see  it  not  at  all 
diffeiently  from  the  way  in  which  it  presents  itself  when  I 
view  it  with  another  person  of  normal  visual  powers.  In  the 
former  case  at  least  it  is  not  true  that  "I  experience  thy  very 
experience." 

We  may  also  note,  in  the  discussion  of  supports  offered  for 
the  doctrire  of  an  immediate  awareness  of  the  experience  of 
other  mind,  what  is  said,  albeit  rather  incidentally,  of  sometliing 
approaching  mystical  intuition  in  social  experience.  "  Love  and 
sympathy  we  often  think  of  as  feeling,  in  direct  contrast  to  idea. 
It  is  clear,  however,  that  they  are  both  cognizances  of  another, 

'  The  Mianina  of  God  in  Human  Eipcrimcf,  1012,  pp.  265-0. 


THE   NEWER  ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM 


169 


do  in  some  way  make  the  leap  between  my  soul  and  the  soul  of 
some  one  not-mysolf ,  intend  to  put  me  in  veritable  rapport  with 
what  thought  is  passing  there,  the  very  tour  deforce  of  objectiv- 
ity." '  Here  we  have  a  semi-mystical  appeal  to  the  cognitive 
nature  of  feeling.  "  Sympathy  is  objectivity  of  mind,  and  objec- 
tivity of  mind  is  knowing."  *  In  fact,  all  feeling,  it  is  claimed, 
is  a  way  of  knowing  objects.  "All  positive  feeling  .  .  . 
reaches  its  terminus  in  knowledge.  All  feeling  means  to  instate 
some  experience  which  is  essentially  cognitive ;  it  is  idea- 
apart-from-its-object  tending  to  become  idea-in-presence-of- 
its-object,  which  is  'cognizance,'  or  experiential  knowledge."' 
Even  pleasure  is  "'  a  mode  of  being  aware  of  the  world."  ^  This 
broad  statement  as  to  the  cognitive  value  of  feeling  is  made 
chiefly  in  order  to  prepare  the  way  for  the  defence  of  the  cogni- 
tive value  of  religious  mysticism.  "  It  is  not  alone  the  specifically 
religious  feeling  with  which  the  religious  idea  is  bound  up," 
it  is  claimed ;  although,  it  is  added,  "  religion  is  the  regioa 
where  fact  and  value  coincide,  where  there  is  no  idea  apart 
from  feeling,  as  there  is  no  feeling  apart  from  idea."  * 

This  doctrine  of  the  universal  cognitive  value  of  feeling 
contains  an  important,  but  easily  exaggerated,  truth.  It  is 
a  well-known  fact  that  the  judgment  of  sympathetic  intui- 
tion is  often  mistaken;   and  yet  one's  feelings  often  prove  to 


'  lb.,  »    '35. 

'  lb.  Of  course  it  would  be  equivocation  to  infer  from  this  that  sympathy 
is  knowing.  If  the  statements  are  to  be  taken  as  universally  acceptable, 
the  first  "iibjectivity"  must  be  held  to  be  less  objective  than  the  second.  The 
one  means  directed  toward  reality;   the  other,  grasping  reali'y. 

'lb.,  PI.  67-8.  *76.,  p.  12N. 

*  lb.,  pp.  1.3fi-7.  It  would  be  easy,  in  thus  selecting  and  grouping  together 
the  references  to  cognition  through  feeling,  to  give  a  wrong  impression  of  the 
system  under  consideration.  It  must  not  be  supposed  that  Hocking's  intention 
has  been  to  use  the  appeal  to  mere  feeling,  as  has  been  so  often  dime  by  re- 
ligious writers,  as  a  way  of  evading  the  cognitive  puzzles  of  religious  creeds. 
His  contention  is  that  an  appeal  to  feeling  do  's  not  cscnpe  theoretical  problems, 
simply  because  feeling  is  itself  a  function  of  ),i&uf(ht  or  idea.  He  has  aimed  to 
show  that  howeviT  much  feeling  may  be  in'.olved  in  religion,  we  are  bound  to 
base  our  n-lig  )n  on  metaphysics,  i.e.  on  a  cognitive  relation  to  reality.  It 
must  not  be  forgotten  that  his  philosophical  doctrine  is  not  a  bare  mystical 
idealism,  but  a  mystical  idealism  subjected  to  the  requirements  of  a  pretty 
rigidly  critical  I'^gical-psychological  idealism.  He  has  aimed  to  add  rational 
thought  to  religious  feeling,  as  well  as  to  improve  the  content  and  certainty  of 
dialectical  philosophy  by  introducing  the  appeal  to  religious  intuition.    And 


tli 


n 


I   '!'    '^ 


? 

!,_ 

It 

1 

{ 

1 

( 

1 

> 

.  I 


I 


1'  f 


i> 


170 


THE   PROBLEM   OF    KNOWLEDGE 


have  been  his  host  guide.  In  the  Ught  of  the  psycholor  '  of 
emotion  the  reason  for  this  is  clear.'  In  a  certain  situation  a 
certain  action  led,  let  us  say,  to  a  .satisfactory  experl  :nce;  and 
so  an  a.»<sociation  has  been  cstaolished  for  the  subject  between 
that  situation,  that  action,  and  that  experience.  A  similar 
(largely  identical)  situation  recurs.  Because  of  the  a.ssociation 
established  there  is  a  tendency  to  repeat  the  same  action.  If 
the  impulse  to  act  is  inhibited  from  'imediate  full  expression, 
an  emotional  state  will  be  induced  '  "lich  the  satisfactoriness 
of  the  original  experience  will  be  r  rented  by  a  pleasant  feel- 
ing-tone, readily  interpreted  as  meaning  the  safeness  of  the 
action  to  which  one  is  impelled.  Now,  becau.se  of  a  certain 
probabilify  that  because  a  certain  action  resulted  satisfactorily 
in  a  previous  situation,  a  .sitnilnr  action  will  result  satisfactorily 
in  a  similar  situation,  feeling  is  often  a  most  useful  guide. 
But  it  cannot  be  said  to  be  infallible ;  at  the  best  it  is  a  source 
of  suggestion  of  working  hypotheses;  the  final  court  <jf  appeal 
must  ever  be  the  immediate  experience  resulting  from  acting 
on  such  hypotheses.  In  a  word,  feeling  represents  past  ex- 
perience; it  is,  roughly  speaking,  an  incipient  reproduction  of 
past  experience ;  hence,  in  .so  far  as  the  future  is  to  be  like  the 
past,  feeling  is  a  good  guide.  In  so  far,  however,  as  the  future 
is  not  to  be  like  the  past,  feeling  is  not  a  good  guide,  and  in  no 
wise  is  it  to  be  regarderl  as  infallible.  Hence  the  appeal  to 
the  undoubted  value  of  sympathy  for  mutual  understanding  is 
far  from  sufficing  to  establish  the  fact  of  sympathy  as  a  reason 
for  asserting  true  knowledge  of  one  mind  by  another  in  any 
particular  instance ;  much  less  does  it  prove  that  there  is  any 
immediate  mutual  knowledge  between  two  .sympathetic  minds. 
We  do  not  mean  to  say  that  Hocking  would  hold  to  the  view 
that  there  is  any  such  direct  or  at  all  infallible  awareness  of  the 

while  he  enters  with  syinpathctie  undorstandinR  into  the  motives  which  have  led 
to  the  "religion  of  feeling,"  with  its  "  retirement  of  the  intellect  "  (th.,  Ch.  IV), 
he  hastens  to  state  that  he  is  "  not  wholly  in  accord  with  the  conclusion  to 
which  these  tendencies  have  led,"  and  that  he  doubts  if  we  "  find  substance 
enough  in  a  religion  of  feeling."  Pointing  out  that  "  religion  has  never  as  yet 
been  able  to  take  itself  as  a  matter  of  feeling,"  he  expresses  the  view  that  there 
is  "  somi-  natural  necessity  whereby  religion  must  try  to  put  itself  into  terms  of 
thought  ..r,.i  t(<  put  its  thought  fortnionl "  (ih.,  pp.  m-7,  etc  ). 

'See  .1    Dewey,  "The  Significance  of  Emotions,"  Psychological  Review,  II, 
1895,  pp.  13  £f. 


THE   NEWER  ABSOLUTE    IDEALISM 


171 


'.f\ 


content  of  one's  fellow-mortars  mind  through  sympathy ;  but, 
without  this,  the  reference  to  the  cognitive  nature  of  sympathy 
can  afford  the  first  synthesis  in  his  dialectic  —  as  he  would 
perhaps  admit  —  an  only  iasignificant  support.  And  yet,  where 
feeling  does  work  cognitively,  we  would  say,  it  comes  to  be 
practically  immediate,  an  intuition  similar  to  that  of  immediate 
perception,  although  much  more  likely  to  be  mistaken. 

But  the  most  important  support  offered  for  this  doctrine  of 
our  immediate  awareness  ot  (the  content  of)  other  mind  is  the 
argument  that  the  idea  of  a  social  experience  involves  the  actu- 
ality of  such  experience '  —  in  other  words,  the  ontological  argu- 
ment for  other  mind.  What  Hocking  evidently  intends  to  say 
here  is  not  merely  that  the  idea  depends  upon  a  prior  ex- 
perience,* although  that  is  admitted  to  be  true;'  what  he 
means  is  that  just  as  normally  "my  idea  of  myself  is  at  the 
same  time  an  experience  of  myself,"  so  "my  idea  of  Other  Mind 
is  at  the  same  time  an  experience  of  Other  Mind."  *  "The 
idea  of  a  social  experience  would  not  be  possible,  unless  such 
an  experience  were  actual."  *  "In  any  sense  in  which  I  can 
imagine,  or  think,  or  conceive  an  experience  of  Other  Mind,  in 
that  same  sense  I  have  an  experience  of  Other  Mind,  apart 
from  which  I  should  have  no  such  idea."  *  Manifestly,  then, 
+his  ground  we  have  immediate  awareness  of  other  mind, 
e  undoubtedly  have  the  idea  of  other  mind. 

r<'it  in  order  to  enter  into  this  doctrine  with  any  degree  of 
sympathetic  understanding  we  must  bear  in  mind  Hocking's 
psychologically  idealistic  presuppositions.  If,  as  he  holds,  the 
object  is  idea,^  and  if  an  idea  is  "a  piece  of  one's  mind,"  *  then 
the  object  as  I  know  it  is  an  organic  part  of  my  mind,  and  the 
object  as  other  mind  knows  it  is  an  organic  part  of  other  mind. 
So  then,  if  other  mind  perceives  an  object  which  I  perceive,  we 
each  perceive  an  organic  part  of  the  mind  of  the  other ;  we  each 
have  immediate  inner  experience  of  other  mind,  i.e.  of  its  con- 

>  Hockim?.  op.  cit.,  p.  274.  »  76.,  p.  277.  »  76.,  p.  162. 

*76..  p.  278.  '76.,  p.  274.  'lb. 

'  Hocking  recognizes,  as  being  at  least  relatively  valid,  the  distinction  between 
objects  and  ideas,  when  he  says  an  ideals  "what  we  think  tvith,  not  what  we 
think  of"  (ib.,  p.  79)  ;  but  like  others  who  accept  psychological  idealism  as  essen- 
tially valid,  ho  seems  not  to  take  absolutely  enough  this  important  distinction. 

»Ib.,  p.  79. 


fi 


'ft 


i 


i  ^ 


172 


THE   PROBLEM   OP   KNOWLEDGE 


also. 


experience 
ie<l,  we  have  at  the  same  time  a  synthesis 
subjpt'tive  ideaUsm,  and  a  bjisis  for  al)- 


tent,  and  so,  from  this  point  of  view,  of  it 
And  this  once  established,  we  have  at  the  san 
of  i.atural  reaUsm  ;md 
solute  idealism. 

But  bo'^idcs  depending  upon  the  dogma  of  p.sychological  ideal- 
ism, this  conclusion  requires  the  presuppo.sition  that  we  know 
that  other  mind  exists  and  |)erceives  the  objects  which  we  per- 
ceive. How  do  we  know,  especially  if  we  adopt  jisychological 
idealism,  that  solipsism  is  not  true  ?  Is  the  idea  of  other  mind 
anything  more  than  a  mere  "paper  curreiuy"  idea?'  It  is  to 
supply  this  link  in  the  tlialectical  chain  that  Hocking  introtluccs 
his  ontological  argument  for  othei-  mind.  We  certainly  have 
the  idea  of  a  social  experience  in  connection  with  our  perception 
of  objects,  but  what  is  required  is  that  this  idea  of  other  mind 
perceiving  what  we  perceive  sh(  -  aid  lie  t  ransformed  into  knowl- 
edge. Hocking  would  argue  here  that  if  a  .solipsist  were  to 
deny  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  a  veritable  stK'ial  experience, 
he  would  at  the  same  time  Ije  making  use  of  the  idea  of  a 
social  experience,  thereby  virtually  refuting  himself,  sin'fe  the 
idea  of  a  social  experience  is  so  unique  that  it  could  never 
have  been  derived  otherwise  than  from  an  actual  social  ex- 
perience. 

Now  suppose  we  grant  the  truth  of  this  perhaps  somewhat 
dogmatic  assertion,  that  the  idea  of  social  experience  could  not 
have  arisen  without  the  experience,  and  therefore  the  reality,  of 
social  experience ;  it  seems  certain  enough  that  it  did  not  arise 
without  the  experience.  Even  so,  this  does  not  necessarily 
mean  an  immediate  inner  experience  of  other  mind,  such  as 
alone  would  satisfy  the  demands  of  Hocking's  dialectic.  It  is 
true  enough,  we  would  contend,  that  we  have  a  more  or  le.ss 
intuitive  (practically  immediate)  awareness  of  the  presence  of 
other  mind  vithin  a  complex  of  perceived  objects,  made  up  of 
an  other  •  icting  organism  and  its  objects ;  and  upon  such 
social  experience  we  have  built  up  our  idea  of  other  mind.  But 
we  have  no  reason  to  claim  an  immediate  experience  of  other 
mind's  immediate  experience  of  its  objects.  Moreover,  do  we 
not  sometimes  have  the  idea  (and  knowledge  of  the  existence) 
of  other  mind,  without  having  "at  the  same  time"  an  experience 

'  The  Aleaning  of  God  in  Human  Experience,  p.  278. 


THE  NKWEIl  ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM 


173 


of  other  mind  ?  It  is  of  course  true  that  we  cannot  have  an 
idea  of  ourselves  without  having  at  the  same  time  an  experience 
of  ourselves  (as  thinking) ;  but  we  can  and  often  do  think  of 
other  mind  without  Ixnng  able  to  assert  the  prcNonce  of  other 
mind.  Thus,  when  sui)jected  to  revision,  thf  entire  special 
significance  which  Hocking  seemed  to  himself  to  find  in  the 
fact  of  social  exfM'rience  at  once  disappears. 

But  let  us  proceed  to  an  examination  of  the  further  progress 
of  the  dialectic.     Let  it  be  assumed  that  in  all  experience  o^ 
physical  objects  we  have  immediate  knowledge  of  other  mind. 
The  next  important  step  in  the  argument  is  the  setting  up  of 
the  antithesis  that  apparently  it  cannot  be  other  mind  which 
we  inwardly  know  in  our  own  experience,  because  we  are  all 
empirical  knowers ; '  all  finite  experiencing  subjects  are  alike 
passive  to  some  extent  in  their  experience;    in  thinking  the 
same  object  they  construct  and  use  (practically  speaking)  the 
same  ideas,  the  same  predicates ;  and  so  to  that  extent  they  have 
(not    numerically,    but    qualitatively)     the   same   experience. 
But  the  empirical  subject-matter  of  judgment   is  passively 
received  by  all  human  knowers.     How  can  we  be  sure  that  we 
share  the  same  experience  with  other  mind  in  that  which  we 
passively  receive?     Indeed,  it  passive  there,  must  we  not  be 
isolated  from  other  mind  ?  ^    Any  self  includes  only  that  which 
it  creates,  and  it  creates  only  that  which  it  comprehends.     Cur 
ideas,  or  preilicates,  and  our  empirically  given  subject-matter 
are  united  in  one  and  the  same  object,  so  that  if  our  experience 
of  the  given  element  is  isolated,    -ur  experience  of  the  object 
must  be  isolated  also.      This  conclusion  can  be  avoided,  or, 
in  other  words,  the  thesis,  as  thus  fai  developed,  ca.  be  main- 
tained only  if  "the  objectivity  of  nature"  can  be  regarded  as 
"an    intentional    communication    of   a    Sell   wholly  active."^ 
The  synthesis  follows:    "God  is  immediately  known,  and  per- 
manently know:    as  the  Other  Mind  which,  in  creating  Nature 
is  also  creating  mi ."  *    This,  then,  enables  one  to  maintain  the 
previous  synthesis  as  valid.     "  It  is  through  the  knowledge  of 
God  that  I  am  able  to  know  men."  «    Thus,  it  is  claimed,  in  our 
dialectical  search  for  other  mind,  we  come,  "a,s  by  surprise," 


^    * 


I**  I 


'  lb.,  p.  294. 
'  lb.,  p.  295. 


*  lb.,  p.  297. 


•  lb.,  p.  298. 


t;-,I 


H 


'  H 


n 


174 


THE   PROBLEM   OP   KNOWLEDGE 


upon  the  oxporiciico  of  the  Alwoluto,  or  God,  as  Other  Mind.' 
But  not  as  merclif  other.  Clod  i.s  other  than  ine  and  also  other 
than  my  fellow-others;  but  since  "the  Self  includes  and  is 
with  its  objects,  in  so  far  as  it  comprehends  them,  or  is  creating 
them,"  "(lod  then  actually  does  include  me,  in  .so  far  as  I  am 
de{x>ndent  upon  him  ;  (Km's  likewise  include  those  feUow-Others, 
in  so  far  as  they  also  are  his  created  work."  -  This,  then,  is  the 
final  synthesis  —  "  Realism  of  the  Absolute  —  not  far  removed 
from  Absolute  Idealism." '  It  is  absolute  idealism  in  its  inter- 
pretation of  the  physical. 

Now  this  "surprisjjiir"  outcome  of  the  dialectic  loses  much 
of  its  impressiveness  wfien  we  remember  the  more  than  dubious 
character  of  the  immediately  preceding  thesis,  for  the  defence 
of  which  this  final  synthesis  has  seemed  necessary.  In  view  of 
the  fact  that  we  finite  minds  are  empirical  knowers,  we  would 
grant  that  absolute  idealism  must  be  true,  //we  have  immediate 
"inner"  experience  of  other  mind;  and  that  it  must  be  true 
that  we  have  such  experience  if  natural  realism  and  subjective 
idealism  are  both  true.  But  that  either  natural  realism  or 
subjective  idealism  is  true,  we  have  found  no  reason  to  believe. 
It  is  not  surprising,  then,  that  Hocking  seeks  to  give  his  final 
synthesis  some  further  support.  He  employs  here  again,  as  in 
the  defeni  ^  of  the  thesis  that  we  immediately  experience  other 
mind,  the  double  appeal,  first  to  the  possibility  of  inferring  the 
experience,  and  therefore  the  reality,  from  the  idea ;  and,  second, 
to  the  cognitive  value  of  the  feeling  experience.  The  former  is, 
in  the  present  connection,  the  "ontological  argument";  the 
latter,  the  appeal  to  mystical  assurance  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
however,  these  two  arguments  are  presented  as  mutually  com- 
plementary ;  they  tend  to  merge,  the  one  with  the  other.  What 
Hocking  tries  to  sliov/  is  that  tlie  idea  of  God,  like  the  idea  of 
other  mind,  "nas  .something  unique  about  it,  which  forbids  the 
supposition  that  it  is  a  'mere  idea. ' "  *  "The  tru(>  iilea  of  God 
is  not  one  which  can  leave  out  either  Nature  or  myself ;  if  my 
idea  of  God  is  real,  it  is  real  in  experience."  *  An  ontological 
argument  may  be  stated  in  proof  of  the  existence  of  Self,  or 
Other  Mind,  or  Nature,  because  each  of  these  is  reality  experi- 


'  The  ^f  inning  of  God  in  Human  Experience,  p.  301 


s/6 


•J98. 


*  H„  p.  290. 


«  lb.,  p.  :im. 


*Ib.,  p  313. 


n^^^aJr** 


THE  NEWER  ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM 


175 


onced.  Similarly  the  pxistenw  of  uml,  an  the  Whole  whitu 
iiichules  Self,  Nature,  and  Other  Min<l,  can  be  proved  by  the 
arKUiiieni  :  I  have  an  idea  of  CJod,  therefore  I  have  an  experi- 
ence of  Clod.' 

Hoeking  rejects  all  arRiinients  for  the  existence  of  God, 
except  the  ontological  arKUinent,  as  futile,  ^n  idealistic  fashion 
lie  declares  "  It  is  aome  leap  from  idea  to  r  ity  ihat  constitutes 
the  <  ssential  .  .  .  movement  of  the  min  'o  God.  .  .  .  The 
ontological  arRuiaent  ...  is  the  only  ,/roof  of  God.'  -  To 
say  "Because  the  world  is,  God  is,"  he  regards  as  dogmatizing 
overmuch.  Hather  are  we  to  say,  ultimately,  "Because  the 
world  is  not,  ( iod  i'  "  '  Beginning  as  a  realist,  and  claiming  to 
find  the  physical  w.  itl  unreal,  he  takes  refuge,  like  the  mystic, 
in  the  reality  of  G.  ..  Here  we  are  reminded  at  once  of  Hegel 
and  the  mystics.  Hegel's  ontological  argument  -  in  lx>  under- 
.stood  only  in  connection  with  his  dialectic.  Starting  with  the 
reality  of  concrete  experi(  nee,  he  finds  in  the  concept  of  Being 
the  most  fundatnental  category  involved  in  its  interpretation. 
Then,  finally,  claiming  to  have  i-hown  by  means  of  his  dialectical 
logic  that  experienced  Being  must  be  interpreted  ultimately 
as  Abisolute  Spirit  (and  .so,  as  God),  he  is  able  to  tuin  about  and 
say  that  whatever  else  may  be  affirmed  of  thi  Absolute,  we 
may  at  least  affirm  its  being;  tne  AKsolute,  c  od,  is.  But 
the  Reality  here  asserted,  it  is  to  be  rem'^nibere  s  the  "Con- 
crete Universal,"  the  Absolute  Idea  whicn  ii-.ludes  all  the  par- 
ticularity of  immediate  experience,  and  .'lom  which,  of  course, 
concrete  existence  can  be  i  >"ly  dedu  tr.  Hocking's  onto- 
logical argument  has  close  afl  "jcions  with  the  Hegelian;  but 
the  differences  are  important.  Not  onh'  is  there  a  large  meas- 
ure of  originality  in  the  underlying  dialectic,  which  proceeds 
from  totality  to  spiritual  unity,  from  reality  as  a  whole,  or  the 
"Whole-idea,"  to  other  mind  as  Absolute  Creative  Spirit; 
what  is  more  important  for  our  present  purpose  is  the  way  in 
which  the  work  of  Hegel  is  carried  further  in  the  transferring 
of  the  ontological  argument  from  its  formerly  purely  a  priori  to  a 
distinctly  empirical  basis.  God  must  be  discovered  in  experi- 
ence, he  claims.  "No  proof  of  God  "an  be  deductive.  .  .  . 
The  ontological  argument  in  its  true  form  is  a  report  of  experi- 

'  lb.,  p.  314.  » lb.,  pp.  306-7.  >  lb.,  p.  312. 


'B 


I? 
I' 


ir^^^-^-^n'i 


176 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   KNOWLEDGE 


u.  ;: 


cnco."  '  The  procoduro  is  briefly  as  follows :  There  are  some  ideas 
which  we  could  fK^'er  have  had  without  having  had  an  experience, 
at  least  in  the  form  of  an  intuitive  feeling  of  the  presence,  of  the 
realities  of  which  (hey  are  the  ideas.  With  the  application  of 
this  proposition  to  the  world,  to  self,  and  to  other  mind,  we  have 
already  dealt.  Similarly,  we  could  never  have  had  the  idea 
of  Reality  as  a  Whole,  if  we  had  not  had  an  intuitive  aware- 
ness or  feelinp;  of  the  presence  of  Reality  as  a  Whole.  In  fact, 
the  most  primitive  intuition  of  the  infant  co  ciousness  is 
the  Whole  Idea,  the  feeling  of  the  presence  of  Reality  as  a 
Whole.  Ultimately,  so  it  is  claimed,  we  know  that  the  world 
and  self  and  other  mind  are  real,  because  we  know  that  the 
Whole  is  real ;  and  we  know  this  because  we  have  experienced, 
and  do  now  experience,  the  Whole ;  we  have  felt  and  feel  its 
presence.^ 

Now  this  most  primitive  and  fundamental  of  all  intuitions, 
the  intuition  of  the  Whole,  is  the  essential  thing,  it  is  claimed, 
in  the  religious  experience  of  the  mystic.  The  religious  mystic 
is  the  individual  whose  specialty  is  the  return  from  conscious- 
ness of  the  parts  to  consciousness  of  the  Whole.'  This  con- 
sciousness is  the  essence  of  worship,  and  it  is  for  this  that  the 
mystic  seeks  solitude  and  detachment  from  all  particular  things 
and  persons.  From  the  idea  of  the  religious  object,  then,  from 
the  idea  of  Absolute  Reality,  Reality  as  a  Whole,  one  can 
affirm  its  existence,  because  the  idea  itself  is  possible  only  through 
an  experience  —  or,  as  Hocking  would  apparently  say,  as  an 
experience  —  which  is  the  experience,  or  immediate  feeling, 
of  the  presence  of  Reality  as  a  Whole. 

The  same  general  argument  is  also  stated  in  a  form  that 
reminds  one  more  distinctly  of  Hegel  and  Bradley.  We  criti- 
cise our  ideas  (experiences)  by  means  of  others  which  we  regard 
as  more  adequate.  This  must  mean  that  there  are  always  ideas, 
or  there  is  at  least  one  idea,  which  we  regard  as  ultimate  and 
beyond  criticism.  Such  is  the  idea  of  the  Whole.  We  criticise 
partial  views  by  means  of  the  idea  of  the  Whole,  and  beyond  this 
Whole-view  there  is  nothing  by  means  of  which  we  may  criticise 
it.     It  must  therefore  be  regarded  as  the  reality ;    that  which 

'  The  Meaning  of  Ond  in  Human  Erperienee,  p.  312. 

«  fb..  pp.  94-9,  2.3:5,  .313-16,  408-11,  etc.  » 76.,  pp.  406-12. 


THE  NEWER  ABSOLUTE  IDEALISM 


177 


cannot  be  criticised  must  bo  so;  an<l  the  Whole  is  therefore 
that  which  undoubtedly  exists.  What  the  content  of  this 
Whole  is,  is  determined,  as  wc  have  seen,  by  the  dialectic. 

But  not,  it  would  seem,  by  the  dialectic  alone.     The  Whole- 
idea,  or  Whole-view,  is  the  content  of  the  mystic's  experience ; 
and  certain  definite  suggestions  come  from  the  mystical  experi- 
ence as  to  the  nature  of  that  Whole,  or  religious  Object.     For- 
tunately for  the  ideaust— or  is  it  unfortunately?  —  several 
of  the  most  characteristic  ideas  of  idealism  seem  to  be  confirmed 
in  the  characteristic  experience  of  the  mystic.     Hocking  recog- 
nizes some  of  the  suggestions  of  the  mystical  experience  as 
erroneous.     "The  mystic,"  he  says,  "in  reporting  what  he  has 
experienced,  has  attril)uted  to  the  objects  of  his  experience 
some  qualities  which  belong  rather  to  his  own  inner  state." 
"Is  it  not  more  probable,"  he  asks,  "that  those  words,  'one, 
immediate,  ineffable,'  which  describe  the  Reality  of  the  nega- 
tive metaphysics,  are  in  their  first  intention  descriptions  of  the 
mystic's  inner  experience?     May  it  not  be  that  those  nega- 
tions which  have  passed  for  metaphysical  definitions  are  in 
their  original  meaning  rather  confessions  of  mental  obstruc- 
tion and  difficulty,  than  assertions  about  the  Absolute?     There 
is  a  wide  difference  between  saying,  '  My  experience  of  Reality 
is  ineffable'   (passing  my  present   powers  of  comprehension), 
and  saying,  'ReaUty  is  ineffable'  (without  predicates)."  '    This 
is  good  criticism  as  far  as  it  goes,  but  it  ought  to  be  applied 
further.     There  is  equal  justification   for  the  view   that  the 
relative  unreality  or  merely  ideal  existence  of  the  physical 
and  the  finite,  as  well  as  the  absolute  perfection  and  timeless- 
ness  and  practically  undifferentiated  divinity  of  the  Whole, 
together  with  other  features  of  absolute  idealism  which  seem 
to  be  confirmed  by  the  mystical  experi'^nce,  are  mistaken  appli- 
cations to  the  object  of  what  is  simply  a  transient  modification 
of  the  subject.2     It  cannot  be  maintained  that  Hocking's  atti- 
tude toward  religious  mysticism  is  other  than  highly  critical; 
and  yet  he  fails  to  rule  out  these  characteristic  suggestions  of 
extreme  mysticism,  in  spite  of  their  being  at  variance  with 

>  lb.,  pp.  352-4. 

»  See  G.  A.  Coc,  "The  Sources  of  the  Mystical  Revelation,"  Hibbert  Journal, 
VI.  1908,  pp.  359-72. 
N 


178 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  KNOWLEDGE 


i     I.': 


ordinary  consoious  experienne,  and  the  reason  is  doubtless  that 
they  agree  so  well  with  the  doctrines  of  absolute  idealism. 

But  even  apart  from  the  objections  to  be  urged  against  the 
way  in  which  mysticism  is  appealed  to  in  support  of  absolute 
idealism,  there  is  room  for  a  Siill  more  fundamental  criticism 
with  regard  to  the  estimate  placed  upon  mysticism  in  Hock- 
ing's philosophy  of  religion ;  and  this  criticism  is  not  without 
its  bearing  upon  the  idealistic  theory  here  offered  as  resting 
upon  a  mystical  basis.  Religious  experience  tends  to  be  identi- 
fied almost  exclusively  with  the  mystical  phase  of  that  experi- 
ence. It  is  recognized  that  adoration  or  worship  is  not  the 
whole  of  life,  that  the  necessities  of  practical  life  require  that 
one  should  turn  from  contemplation  of  the  Whole  to  particular 
adjustments  to  the  parts,  and  even  that  the  practical  life  is 
greatly  enriched  as  a  result  of  the  mystical  experience ;  but  it 
ought  to  be  more  fully  recognized  that  religious  adjustment 
has  place  in  this  practical  phase  of  life  as  truly  ;is  in  the  life  of 
contemplation.  Hocking  calls  attenvion  to  the  normal  alterna- 
tion between  work  and  worship,  but  he  gives  the  impression 
that  the  mere  will  to  worship  is  sufficient  by  itself  as  a  norma- 
tive principle  to  control  this  alternation.  This,  however,  is 
manifestly  a  one-sided  principle  ;  it  will  produce  and  regulate 
only  the  movement  from  work  to  worship.  For  the  movement 
from  worship  to  work,  instinct  and  the  natural  necessities  of 
life  have  not  always  proved  a  sufficient  guiile.  The  history  of 
mysticism,  especially  in  its  quietistic  and  ascetic  manifestations, 
shows  the  necessity  of  the  will  to  worship  being  explicitly  offset 
by  the  will  to  do  a  worthy  work. 

Indeed  our  contention  would  be  that,  so  far  from  the  dis- 
tinctly mystical  experience  being  the  only  phase  of  religious 
experience,  it  is  not  even  its  primary  phase.  Religion  is  pri- 
marily an  adjustment  to  the  religious  Object  for  practical  ends. 
Religious  experience  is  primarily  the  practical  experience  im- 
mediately resulting  from  this  adjustment.  The  mystical 
contemplation  of  the  religious  Object  to  which  a  practical 
adjustment  has  been  successfully  made  is  itself  a  religious  experi- 
ence, but  it  is.  origin.ally,  .at  le.ast,  a  seconflary  experience,  as 
compared  with  that  of  practical  religion.  To  be  sure,  mystical 
religion  may  come  to  be  more  highly  regarded  than  practical 


Tx-'E   NEWER  ABSOLUTE   IDEALISM 


179 


religion,  and  that  wiu  justice,  especially  in  the  case  of  the  less 
rational  relieions.  Moreover,  without  some  measure  of  mysti- 
cal contemplation,  religion  will  never  come  to  have  any  great 
practical  value.  But  practical  religion  is  bound  to  develop  in 
rationality,  unless  it  is  bound  to  disappear;  and  it  is  this  ra- 
tional, practical  religion  which,  if  it  can  retain  its  vitaUty,  is  of 
the  greatest  value,  we  wou.d  maintain,  for  re'lgious  knowledge. 
We  know  svhat  the  religious  Object  is,  if  we  can  know  it  at  all, 
primarily  by  observing  what  that  Object  does  when  successful 
adjustment  to  it  is  made  for  some  practical  end.  The  results 
of  rational  and  successful  practical  religion  will  be  able  to 
endure  the  test  of  mystical  contemplation;  but,  as  we  have 
seen,  what  is  suggested  in  the  more  extreme  manifestations  of 
mysticism  will  not  always  stand  the  test  of  criticism  from  the 
non-mystical  but  practical  point  of  view. 

We  are  not  concerned,  then,  to  dispute  the  thesis  that  the 
idea  of  God,  as  it  now  exists  in  religion  at  its  best,  has  come 
from  an  experience  of  God,  and  that  since  our  experience  of 
God  involves  the  rea'ity  of  God,  we  can  assert  the  existence  of 
God  on  the  basis  of  the  best  available  idea  of  God.  That  if 
there  is  any  conclusive  argument  for  the  existence  of  God,  it  is 
the  empirical  argument,  we  would  not  for  a  moment  deny. 
His  position  is  not  necessarily  untenable,  so  far  as  we  can  say, 
who  claims  to  know  that  God  exists,  because  he  is  conscious  of 
having  had  personal  experience  of  the  divine  Reality.  And  if 
what  Hocking  means  is  that  when  we  have  the  right  idea  of 
God  we  shall  know  that  God  exists,  because  we  cannot  have 
the  right  idea  of  God  except  as  it  is  based  upon  and  legitimately 
derived  from  a  genuiiu>  experience  of  God,  we  would  concede 
that  his  position  may  very  well  be  not  only  tenable,  but  inclu- 
sive of  the  most  important  insight  that  can  come  to  the  philos- 
opher of  religion. 

But  this  is  simply  the  empirical  argument ;  to  call  it  the 
ontological  argument  is  likely  to  cause  confusion.  Probably  it 
is  because  our  philosopher  still  clings  to  the  belief  that  the  true 
idea  of  God  can  be  obtained  by  way  of  an  idealistic  interpre- 
tation of  the  physical  world  apart  from  the  confirmation  of 
this  idea  in  the  distinctly  religious  —  or,  as  he  would  say,  the 
mystical  —  experience,  that  he  seeks  to  assimilate  his  thought 


•'  'I 


I 


k 


:j  ]  ! 


'  J 


ij '  i  '. 


180 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   KNOWLEDGE 


to  the  classical  ontological  argument.  But  if  the  empirical 
theistic  argument  he  based  priumrihf  upon  practical  rather  than 
upon  tl.T  more  extremely  mystical  religious  experience,  it  will 
be  found  to  give  no  support  to  the  idealistic  interpretation  of 
the  physical  world.  Indeed  it  may  even  be  claimed  that  by 
the  same  sort  of  practical  test  the  physical  object,  like  the  reli- 
gious, is  found  to  be  real. 

This  empirical  development  of  absolutism  which  we  have  been 
examining  has  undoulitedly  resulted  in  a  remarkable  .system  '"f 
idealism,  and  one  whose  general  human  appeal  is  unusually 
powerful.  Indeed,  as  the  synthesis  of  mystical,  logical,  and  p.sy- 
chological  idealism,  and  as  the  representative  of  absolute  idealism 
undertaking  to  do  full  justice  to  intellectualism,  voluntarism, 
and  mysticism,  Hocking's  philo-sophy  n)ay  be  regarded  as,  in 
principle,  the  consummation  of  the  idealistic  way  of  thinking. 
But,  just  because  of  its  catholic  inclusion  of  many  variant  forms 
of  this  doctri:;o,  it  is  peculiarly  exposed  to  attack.  The  fallacies 
and  ilogmatism  of  each  elemental  type  of  thought  included  are 
largely  discoverab)    still  in  the  final  composite  system.' 

'  In  this  rlisrussion  of  HorkiiiR's  idoalism  I  havp  inrludpd,  without  the  use 
of  quotation  niark.x,  sonic  e.xrorptiJ  from  my  article  entitled,  "HockinK's  Phi- 
lo.'ophy  of  Relision  :  An  Eniiiirieal  Development  of  Absolutism,"  in  the  Phil- 
osophical Review,  XXIII,  1914,  pp.  27-47. 


,   -if 


■VmBBP 


CHAPTER  IX 
The  Disintegration  of  Idealism 


I 


1)1 


Absolute  idealism,  especially  in  the  form  just  examined 
in  which  it  undertakes  to  unite  all  the  elemental  types  of 
idealistic  thought,  may  well  be  regarded  as  the  most  highly 
integrated  and  consuii.inate  form  of  idealism.  But  it  '.n 
scarcely  be  denied  that  the  general  system  of  absolute  idealism 
has  long  been  showing  signs  of  disintegration.  In  Germany, 
indeed,  it  had  all  but  disappeared  a  generation  or  less  after  the 
death  of  Hegel.  Among  English-speaking  peoples  the  criti- 
cisms of  Bradley  and  others  have  had  their  effect.  Apart  from 
the  attem-pts  at  reconstruction  considered  in  the  preceding 
chapter,  attempts  which  must  be  regarded  as  unsuccessful,  a 
very  large  proportion  cf  recent  and  contemporary  idealistic 
thought  in  Europe  and  America  has  been  following  other  lines 
than  those  of  the  classic  absolutism.  In  general,  there  ca.i  be 
detected  three  different  tendencies,  one  a  movement,  chieflj 
of  pluralistic  or  "personal  idealism,"  tending  to  culminate  in 
psychological  or  subjective  idealism;  anot.*ier  what  may  be 
called  abstract  idealism,  leading  finally  in  certain  instances  to  a 
restoration  of  logical  idealism ;  and  a  third,  which  may  be 
called  spiritual  or  religious  idealism,  and  .,'iich  tends  to  retain 
little  more  of  philosophical  idealism  than  was  originally  sug- 
gested by  mystical  modes  of  thought.  This  movement,  or 
those  movements,  therefore,  being  a  departure  from  the  highly 
integrated  absolute  idealism,  and  tending  in  the  direction  of 
the  separate  elemental  types  again,  we  have  chosen  to  charac- 
terize as  the  disintegration  of  idealism. 

We  shall  first  examine  the  trend  away  from  absolute  ideal- 
ism (monistic  logicul-psychclogical  idealism),  through  various 
forms  of  "personal  idealism"  and  approaches  thereto,  in  the 
general  direction  of  psychological  or  subjective  idealism.  The 
various  views  to  be  considered  we  shall  group  under  the  fol- 

181 


PR9H 


fiSP 


'vPl 

Fn 

*It 

t    1 ' 

\ 

1 

1  ,\ 

'  |; 

; : 

r» 

tl: 

i  r 

■,!   - 

1 

.;: 

< 

'.1  i 

-, 

v'     1 

'  *i 

y  ' 

■ 

M  1 

,^ 

»« 

,i 

*'     ^ 

1* 

: 

^f 

! 

i  1 

182 


THE    PROBLEM   OP    KNOWLEDGE 


lowing  heads:  monistic  thcistie  idealism,  semi-pluralistic 
theistic  idealism,  pluralistic  theistic  idealism,  pluralistic  semi- 
theistic  idealism,  and  pluralistic  atheistic  idealism.  The 
elimination  of  logical  idealism,  it  may  be  remarked  at  once,  is 
not  increasingly  conspicuous  throughout  these  divisions  taken 
in  the  above  order ;  on  the  contrary  it  is  most  evident  in  the 
first  and  the  third.  It  should  also  be  explained  that  while 
some  of  the  philosc  )hers  to  be  mentioned  in  this  section  have 
also  been  dealt  with  under  dualistic  epistemological  realism, 
this  is  because  of  the  fact  that  a  position  which  regards  physical 
reality  as  having  no  existence  beyond  the  consciousness  of  the 
whole  number  of  finite  souls  or  soul-Uke  individuals,  may  never- 
theless permit  a  realistic  emphasis  upon  the  independent  reality 
of  the  physical  from  the  standpoint  of  each  finite  individual. 

As  an  example  of  monistic  theistic  idealism  which  has  de- 
parted from  the  t\'pical  absolute  idealism  by  the  practical 
elimination  of  the  element  of  logical  idealism,  we  shall  cite  the 
philosophy  of  Friedrich  Paulsen.  As  compared  with  those  of 
the  group  next  to  be  examined,  Paulsen  is  more  nearly  a  purely 
psychological  idealist,  but  not  so  nearly  a  ]  uralist.  We  may 
think  of  him  as  starting  with  a  Humian  empiricism  and  p^-ycho- 
logical  idealism.  With  Mill  he  niduces  the  physical  to  a  per- 
manent possibility  of  sensation.  With  Kant  he  recognizes  the 
a  priori  element  in  our  knowledge,  but  this  is  not  regarded  as 
giving  us  universally  valid  propositions.'  To  the  idealistic 
epistemological  monism  is  opposed  that  indefinite  rea'ism  of 
our  practical  knowledge,  which  saves  us  from  solipsism.  The 
super-indiv.dual  reality  is  interpreted  as  psj'chical,  however;^ 
first,  with  Spinoza  and  Fechner,  it  is  held  that  there  is  a  universal 
parallelism  of  the  physical  and  the  psychical,  and  then,  the 
physical  beirg  everywhere  regarded  as  mere  phenomenon, 
Paulsen  arrives  at  a  panpsychism,  fundamentally  similar  to 
that  of  Leibniz.''  Like  Schopenhauer  and  Lotze  he  claims  that 
we  get  a  clew  to  the  nature  of  all  reality  from  our  own  inner  life, 
and  like  the  former  he  inclines  to  voluntarism,  as  against  intcl- 
lectualism.*  But,  following  Lotze  in  his  doctrine  of  the  im- 
possibility of  interaction,  Paulsen  likewise  arrives  at  a  monistic 

■  Introduction  to  Philo/inphu,  Eng.  Tr.,  2d  i-d.,  1907,  pp.  3as,  416. 
« lb.,  p.  91.  » lb.,  pp.  02  ff.  *  lb.,  pp.  113-20. 


THE  DISINTEGRATION  OP  IDEALISM 


183 


v. 


conclusion,'  which,  however,  he  takes  more  seriously  than  did 
Lotze.  He  frankly  adopts  pantheism  as  his  religious  point  of 
view.^  The  result  is  a  philosophy  which  reacts  from  Lotze 
toward  absolute  idealism,  and  from  absolute  idealism  toward 
Hume.''  In  criticism  of  Paulsen's  doctrine  it  will  be  sufficient 
to  call  attention  once  more  to  the  inconceivability  of  all  psychical 
realities  and  their  phenomenal  contents  being  included,  without 
modification,  in  one  conscious  experience.  The  elimination  of  the 
element  of  logical  idealism  simply  leaves  this  fundamental  weak- 
ness of  a  metaphysically  monistic  psychologism  all  the  more 
manifest. 

Before  turning  to  a  consideration  of  particular  systems  of 
idealistic  philosophy  which  are  more  or  less  definitely  pluralistic 
in  character,  some  remarks  on  the  nature  and  basis  of  pluralistic 
idealism  in  general  may  be  offered.  Monistic  or  absolute 
idealism  may,  as  has  been  intimated,  be  viewed  as.  the  result 
of  a  synthesis  of  either  natural  realism  or  logical  idealism  on 
the  one  side  and  a  solipsistic,  or  at  least  a  non-plurahstic,  sub- 
jectivism on  the  other.  Pluralistic  or  personal  idealism,  in 
its  various  forn.s,  may  similarly  be  regarded  as  resulting  from 
a  synthesis  of  either  dualistic  critical  i  talism  or  logical  idealism 
on  the  one  side,  and  a  pluralistic,  or  at  least  non-solipsistic, 
subjectivism  on  the  other. 

A  tj'pical  dialectical  development  in  its  bare  outline  is  the 
following  :  We  krow  reality ;  we  know  only  ideas ;  therefore, 
reality  is  constituted  of  ideas.  Now  this  .synthesis  may  be 
interpreted  in  either  monistic  (at  first  solipsistic)  fashion,  as  we 
have  already  seen ;  or  in  several  ways  which  lead  to  different 
types  of  pluralism,  as  follows :  (a)  Reality  is  made  up  of  dif- 
ferent systems  of  ideas;  we  know  reality;  therefore,  reality 
is  constituted  of  our  systems  of  uieas.  {b)  Reality  is  one  sys- 
tem of  ideas ;  we  know  reality ;  therefore,  reality  is  our  system 
of  itleas.  (c)  Reality  is  made  up  of  different  systems  of  ideas ; 
we  know  realit}',  but  not  even  total  humanity  knows  it  com- 
pletely ;  therefore  reality  is  constituted  of  ideas  in  God's  con- 
sciousness, as  well  as  in  ours,  whether  or  not  there  is  any  over- 


>  lb.,  pp.  210-17.  -^  76..  p^.  -..--43. 

'  .\  good  monograph  on  Paulsen  is  Paul  Fritzach's  Friedrich  Paulsens  phxlo- 
sophischer  Standpunkt,  Leipzig,  1910. 


^■1 


in, 


fs 


' ;,  '. 


■■Hi 


I 


■i  1 ' 


4*  I 

■  s 


184 


THE  PROBLEM  OF   KNOWLEDGE 


lapping  or  partial  identification  of  God's  consciousness  and 
ours.  Tills  last  view  would  cover  both  semi-pluralistic  and 
pluralistic  theistic  idealism.  The  second  coincides,  as  we  shall 
see,  with  pluralistic  semi-theistic  iilealism ;  and  the  first,  inter- 
preted as  excluding  any  necessity  of  transcending  the  human, 
with  pluralistic  atheistic  idealism. 

Semi-pluralistic  theistic  idealism  is  best  represented  by 
Lotze  and  his  followers,  although  these  thinkers  are  rather  more 
appropriately  classified  as  dualistic  realists  than  as  epistemo- 
logically  monistic  idealists.  From  the  point  of  view  of  the 
individual  subject,  the  doctrine  is  a  realistic  and  dualistic 
one,  but  in  relation  to  the  whole  number  of  selves  and  "self- 
like" beings,  the  physical  world  is  construed  in  idealistic  fashion ; 
the  world  of  nature  in  space  and  time  is  interpreted  as  thought- 
construct.  Moreover,  the  idealistic  phase  of  the  philosophy 
is  accentuated  by  the  metaphysical  monism,  according  to  which, 
as  we  have  seen  above,  in  order  to  avoid  the  supposed  absurdity 
of  interaction  all  beings  are  held  to  be  parts  of  the  one  Ultimate 
Reality,  or  "World-Ground,"  interpreted  after  the  analogy  of 
the  human  conscious  self.  Anil  yet,  in  order  to  maintain  suffi- 
cient human  freedom  for  the  purposes  of  moral  responsibility, 
a  certain  independence  of  human  selves,  in  relation  to  the  Abso- 
lute, is  affirmed.  Thus  the  metaphysical  monism  is  not  made 
thoroughgoing,  but  amounts  to  a  s«mi-pluralism.  The  World- 
Ground,  however,  is  identified  with  the  God  of  religion.  The 
criticisms  of  this  view  have  been  indicated  'n  connection  with 
the  discussion  in  the  third  chapter  above. 

If  we  were  concerned  to  discuss  at  all  completely  the  most 
important  historical  representatives  of  each  of  the  divisions  of 
idealistic  philosophy  here  recognized,  we  should  be  obliged  to 
give  careful  consideration  to  the  system  of  Leibniz  in  connec- 
tion with  pluralistic  theistic  idealism.  As  we  are  primarily 
interested,  however,  in  the  criticism  of  views  held  by  contem- 
porary thinkers,  or  that  have  been  very  recently  held  and  that 
have  not  been  so  repeatedly  criticised  as  have  the  pre-Kantian 
philosophers,  we  shall  touch  but  lightly  upon  the  pluralism  and 
theism  of  this  well-known  philosophy  of  monads.  Like  the 
philosophy  of  Lotze,  who  was  his  follower  to  some  extent,  the 
system  of  Leibniz  seems  at  once  a  dualistic  realism  (in  relation 


THE   DISINTEGRATION  OF   IDEALISM 


185 


to  the  individual)  and  an  idealistic  epistemological  monism 
with  reference  to  the  physical  (in  relation  to  the  more  or  less 
fully  conscious  monads).  The  theism  and  creationism,  how- 
ever, which  Leibniz  thought  necessary  to  account  for  the 
appearance  (supposedly  false)  of  interaction,  are  themselves 
incompatible  with  this  same  extremely  pluralistic  dogma  of 
non-interaction. 

We  shall  also  pass  by  with  bare  mention  in  this  connection 
the  philosophy  of  A.  Seth  Pringle-Pattison,  whose  Hegelianism 
and  Personality  was  early  influential  in  leading  English  ideal- 
ists away  from  the  metaphysical  monism  of  absolute  idealism 
in  the  direction  of  the  pluralism  of  personal  idealism.  His 
system  as  a  whole  is  more  appropriately  considered,  as  above, 
in  connection  with  epistemological  dualism  and  realism.  As 
a  very  good  illustration  of  pluralistic  theistic  idealism,  how- 
ever, we  may  take  up  for  somewhat  detailed  notice  the  system 
of  James  Ward,  a  philosopher  who  has  been  deeply  influenced 
by  Lotze,  but  who  has  not  adhered  so  closely  to  his  master's 
procedure  and  conclubions  as  have  many  of  Lotze's  disciples  in 
England  and  especially  in  America. 

The  earlier  of  Ward's  two  main  philosophical  works  is  an 
attack  upon  naturalism  from  the  point  of  view  of  psychological 
idealism.  From  the  standpoint  of  naturalism  the  world  of 
things  felt  and  seen  is  epiphenomenal,  the  real  world  being  a 
world  of  material  atoms  and  physical  forces.  But  while  admit- 
ting the  phenomenal  character  of  the  physical  world  of  immedi- 
ate experience.  Ward  claims  that  the  supposed  actualities  of  the 
physicist  are  simply  conceptions,  "thoughts  and  not  things, 
ideas  existing  solely  for  the  minds  of  physicists."  His  main 
insistence,  however,  is  that  phenomenal  reality,  like  concept- 
construction,  presupposes  minds  that  perceive  it,  and  from 
which  it  cannot  be  separated.  "An  experience  that  is  not 
owned  is  a  contradiction."  •  Thus  Ward  succeeds  in  the  effort 
to  maintain  an  epistemological  monism,  but  it  is  at  the  cost  of 
entangling  himself  in  the  meshes  of  a  psychological  or  subjective 
i  .ealism  from  which  he  is  never  able  fully  to  extricate  himself. 

But  what  he  is  really  concerned  to  get  rid  of  is  the  dualism 
of  mind  and  matter,  out  of  which,  as  it  seems  to  him,  agnosticism 
•  Naturaltim  and  Agnoalicism,  1899,  Vol.  II,  pp.  100-11. 


186 


THR   PROBLEM   OF   KXOWLEDOB 


I 


X'i 


\.    )i '{ 


has  arisen.  Ho  undertakes  to  show  that  this  tUiaHsm  is  the 
outcome  of  two  fallacious  processes  of  reasoning.  In  the  first 
place,  through  iiitersuhjective  intercourse  the  false  notion  of  a 
transsubjective  object  arises.  What  is  independent  of  L,  M, 
and  N  individually  is  fallaciously  hupposod,  says  Ward,  to  be 
for  that  reason  independent  of  them  collectively.  Thus  physics 
arises,  treating  objects  as  "transsubjective,"  existing  apart 
from  all  experiencing  subjects.  But  the  truth  is  that  we  can- 
not conceive  an  object  as  existing  apart  from  all  subjects, 
without  conceiving  it;  and  this,  according  to  Ward,  implies  that 
it  cannot  exist  apart  from  a  thinking  or  experiencing  subject.' 
The  realistic  interpretation  of  the  entities  of  physics  arrived 
at  by  the  process  of  thought  criticised  by  Ward  would  indeed  be 
fallaciously  based  if  the  argument  v/ere  taken  as  conclusive  by 
itself ;  but  it  might  very  well  be  true,  for  all  that.  And  as  for 
Ward's  own  argument  for  idealism,  it  is  a  clear  case  of  the  fal- 
lacy of  rea.soning  from  the  egocentric  predicament.  But  the 
second  fallacy  underlying  dualism  according  to  Ward  is  the 
fallacy  of  introjection  as  detected  and  described  by  Avenarius.' 
This  leads  to  the  psychological  point  of  view  as  dealing  with 
"inner"  states,  as  opposed  to  the  external  things  of  the  physical 
world. 

Instead  of  any  such  dualism  of  mental  and  material.  Ward 
otfers  spiritualistic  monisn^  The  true  problem,  he  claims,  is 
not  how  two  mind^  can  know  one  object,  but  how  each  of  two 
minds  comes  to  think  of  certain  objects  of  its  own  experience  as 
identical  with  those  of  the  other's  experience.  This  is  accom- 
plished, it  is  claimed,  by  each  individual  making  a  distinction 
between  his  individual  (unshared)  experience  and  his  "univer- 
sal" experience,  the  like  of  which  exists  for  others  also.  The 
subject  of  this  "universal"  experience  and  that  of  those  experi- 
ences which  are  purely  individual  are  nevertheless  one  and  the 
same  subject.'  But  in  criticism  of  this  it  is  to  be  pointed  out 
that  there  is  more  in  what  we  call  physical  reality  than  belongs 
to  universal  immediate  experience.  And  if  we  remember  the 
fallacious  character  of  the  inference  of  idealism  from  the  ego- 
centric predicament,  wc  .shall  be  unable  to  infer  that  all  that 

'  Naturalism  and  AgnosHcism,  1899,  Vol.  II,  p.  171. 

«  76..  p.  172 ;   V.  Ch.  VI,  supra.  » lb.,  p.  197. 


THE    DISINTEORATION   OP   IDEALISM 


187 


can  bo  mediately  {'xporicnccd,  thought  of,  is  dependent  upon 
the  subject  and  the  process  of  thought. 

But  what  is  thus  far  simply  a  strongly  pluralistic  personal 
idealism,  highly  subjective  in  its  doctrine  of  the  physical  world, 
is  mcMlified  by  the  introduction  of  theism,  not  only  as  something 
desired  for  its  own  sake,  but  also  as  a  means  of  relieving  the 
pluralism  and  subjectivism  of  the  system.'  The  world  is  now 
viewed  as  the  object  of  God's  experience.  This  theism,  it 
should  l)e  noted,  is  not  regarded  as  demonstrable;  the  l)est 
that  can  be  done  is  to  show  that  it  is  a  rational  faith.  Thus 
we  have  a  less  aggravated  dogmatism  than  that  displayed  by 
some  idealists;  and  yet  it  is  dogmatic  from  the  outset  in 
affirming,  on  the  basis  of  a  fallacious  inference,  that  there 
can  l)c  no  physical  reality,  save  as  object  for  an  experiencing 
subject. 

Hastings  Rashdall  regards  as  valid  the  process  of  thought 
by  which  one  arrives  at  psychological  idealism.  Solipsism  is 
avoided  by  the  doctrine  of  a  plurality  of  selves,  in  dependence 
upon  which  things  exist.  The  necessity  of  supposing,  on  the 
basis  of  geology,  for  example,  that  things  have  existed  when 
there  was  no  human  self  on  which  they  might  depend,  proves 
that  there  must  be  some  other  conscious  Being,  presumably 
God,  for  whom  and  in  dependence  upon  whom  they  had  and 
continue  to  have  their  existence.  Thus,  it  is  claimed,  theism 
rests  upon  idealism,  and  the  relation  of  God  to  man  is  conceived 
to  be  that  of  Creator  to  creature.*  And  so  the  neces^  ly  of  the 
idea  of  God,  or  some  such  idea,  in  order  to  get  one  out  of  the 
more  obvious  difficulties  of  an  unnecessary  subjectivism,  is 
made,  strangely  enough,  a  proof  of  the  existence  of  God  !  What 
we  have  here  is  eviden-tly,  in  essentials,  a  return  to  Berkeleian 
psychological  idealism,  and  further  evidence  that  the  move- 
ment from  absolute  idealism  to  personal  idealism  is  part  of 
the  process  of  the  disintegration  of  idealism  into  its  elements. 
Indeed  it  sounds  like  a  confession,  although  not  intended  as 
such,  when  the  author  says,  "  It  is  for  the  most  part  only  by  a 
considerable  course  of  habituation,  extending  over  some  years, 

•  The  Realm  of  Ends,  1911,  passim. 

• "  Personulily,  Human  and  Divinp,"  in  Personal  Idealism,  edited  by  H. 
Sturt,  1902 ;   Philoa,  phy  and  Religion,  1910,  Chs.  I  and  II. 


i:ii'! 


M^ 


rl 


J 


^!-.^^ 


w\ 


;  1  i 


^4 


\i 


'  it 


188 


THE   PROBLEM  OF   KNO\VLED(iK 


that  a  man  succccd.s  in  thinking;  himsolf  into  the  idealistic  view 
of  the  universe."  ' 

The  "  humanism "  of  F.  (".  S.  Schiller,  whieh  he  calls  the 
true  idealism  and  the  true  realism,  is  after  all  simply  personal 
idealism  falliiift  back  into  a  quite  extreme  form  of  psycholoRism. 
The  position  is  definetl  as  "merely  the  perception  that  the 
philosophic  prohlcin  concerns  human  beings  striving  to  com- 
prehend a  w "M  of  human  experience  by  the  resources  of  human 
minds."'  i  does  not  deny  what  is  [wpularly  described  a.s 
the  external  world.  ...  It  insists  only  that  the  'external 
world'  of  realism  is  still  depender.t  on  human  experience."' 
Common-sense  realism,  or  pragmatic  realism,  as  Schiller  .says 
it  may  l>e  called,  is  indorsed  in  view  of  its  working  for  almost 
every  purpose.*  But  its  pragmatic  a.ssertions  must  not,  we  are 
reminded,  be  taken  as  metaphysical  dogmas.'  The  reality 
we  predicate  is  never  "extra-mental," "  and  realism  as  a  cierual 
that  exiH'rience  and  reality  belong  together  is  a  metaphysic  for 
which  there  neither  is  nor  can  be  any  possible  evidence.'  And 
so,  while  Schiller  says,  on  occasion,  that  we  are  not  the  sole  agents 
in  the  world,'*  and  that  while  reality  is  experience,  it  is  not 
limited  to  uur  experience,"  he  does  not  logically  escape  solipsism. 
The  real  world,  he  asserts,  is  a  selection  from  the  totality  if 
existence,  t  hat  is,  from  the  whole  of  the  self's  experience.'"  And 
more  recently  he  has  made  such  statements  ^s  the  following : 
"There  is  nothing  theoretically  absurd  or  untenable  about 
solipsism.  ...  It  is  more  consistent  than  the  vulgar  view 
that  interprets  solipsistically  dreams  alone.  But  the  solipsist 
would  have  to  adapt  his  theory  to  his  practice.  .  .  .  A  solipsism 
so  conceived  would  seem  to  be  harmless.  It  would  make  no 
practical  difference."  " 

Charles  Renouvier,  while  a  theistic  personal  ideali.st,  and 
a  creationist,  did  not,  as  iloes  Ilashdall,  make  his  theism  depend 
upon  his  idealism.'-  Of  the  two  contrary  hypotheses,  creation 
and  an  infinite  succession  of  unoriginated  phenomena,  he 
choo.ses  the  former  on  the  ground  that  the  latter  involves  the 

'  Philosophy  and  Rdigion,  p.  19.  '  Studies  in  Humanism,  1907,  p.  12. 

•  /6.,  p.  Vi.  *  lb.,  p.  459.         » lb.,  p.  461.  '  lb.,  p.  4S2. 

'  lb.,  p.  483.         » lb.,  p.  446.         »  lb.,  pp.  463^.         •»  lb.,  pp.  470,  484. 
"  Mind,  N  ".,  XVIII,  1909,  p.  182.         '»/.»■  personnalisme,  1903,  passim. 


^m^ 


THK    DISIN'TEOIIATION   OF   IDEALISM 


189 


self-contradictory  notion  of  an  actual  infinite.  The  hypothesis 
of  creation,  it  is  held,  calls  for  i\  creative  will  and  personality. 
Uenouvier  then  turns  to  the  problem  of  knowledge,  and  fall- 
iiiK  a  victim  to  the  ftdlacy  of  reasoning  from  the  egocentric  pre- 
dicament, claims  that  an  absolutely  subjective  idealism,  while 
practically  inadmis'^ible,  is  logically  irrefutable.  We  escape, 
and  are  able  to  affirm  the  reality  of  the  exteriuxl  world  only  as  a 
belief  and  moral  postulate.  But  even  this  belief  and  this  i)ostu- 
late,  as  thought,  are  relative,  and  do  not  take  us  beyond  a 
purely  phenomenal  nature  of  things.  All  things  then  must  be 
regarded  as  always  existing  only  as  objects  for  jwrsonalities. 
In  this  personal  idealism  we  have  a  return  to  the  most  subjective 
type  of  psychological  idealism. 

But  personal  idealism  is  not  necessarily  theistic.  It  can  be 
frankly  athei.stic,  or  transitional  between  theism  and  a  non- 
thei.stic  position.  As  representing  this  pluralistic,  semi-theistic 
idealism,  or  personal  idealism  with  a  vanishing  theism,  we  may 
cite  the  philosophy  of  G.  H.  Howison.  In  this  thinker's  judg- 
ment all  existence  is  made  up  of  minds,  together  with  the  items 
and  order  of  their  experience.'  On  the  principle  that  the  real 
is  the  rational  and  the  rational  is  the  real,  the  existence  of  the 
spirit  is  to  be  identified  with  its  self-definition  in  rational 
thought.  Here,  it  will  be  noted,  we  have  strongh-  present  the 
element  of  logical  idealism,  in  comliination  with  t  .  psychologi- 
cal idealism.  Matter  is  experience,  arising  from  the  reaction 
of  primal  freedoni  upon  the  negating  limit,  or  "check,"  and 
organized  by  a  priori  mind.  The  self,  then,  defines  it.self,  us 
different  from  everv  other  self,  including  the  Supreme  Instance, 
or  r.od.  .'  Hence,  it  is  inferre  :,  the  self,  other  selves,  and  God, 
exist.  Or,  more  explicitly,  the  idea  of  every  self  and  the  idea 
of  God  are  m.separably  connected,  so  that  if  any  self  exists,  then 
God  must  exist-  But  the  .self  necessarily  defines  itself  as  the 
free  cause  of  its  own  conscious  acts ;  therefore  it  must  be  not 
only  free,  but  uncreateil ;  for  that  which  is  created  cannot  be 
free.  (This  follows  from  the  abf  '  jte  determinism  of  Howi- 
son's  rationalistic  idealism.     But  o"e  might  raise  the  question 

'  The  Limits  of  Evolution  and  Other  Essays,  1901,  passim,    ^i.  also  "Commenta 
by  Professor  Ilowisoa"  in  Royco's  The  Conception  of  Ood,  1897,  pp.  81-128. 
»  The  Limits  of  Evolution,  p.  359. 


f 


J'h.'.^% 


I 


HV 


190 


THE   PROBLEM  OP  KNOWLEDGE 


'  i- 


Mi's 


'  i, '.  -. 


1 


;i 


\t 


-  >  h 


whether  even  a  spirit  whose  life  was  absolutely  predetermined 
could  be  regarded  as  free,  whether  created  or  not.) 

In  this  view,  however,  apart  from  the  obvious  rationalistic 
dogmatism  of  proceeding  from  a  priori  definition  to  the  asser- 
tion of  fact,  what  we  have  is  not  a  genuine  theism.  God  is 
defined  as  the  Perfect  Being,  the  supreme  instance  in  the  repub- 
lic of  God,  but  the  God  of  this  system  is  not  the  God  of  practical 
religion.  He  does  nothing  for  finite  spirits.  It  is  maintained 
that  while,  as  the  ideal  Being,  he  is  the  final  cause  of  every- 
thing, he  is  the  efficient  cause  of  nothing.  But  why,  we  would 
ask,  should  one  be  concerned  to  affirm  that  such  a  God  is  an 
ideal  being  ?  Would  not  an  ideal  answer  the  purposes  quite  as 
well?  Thus  the  theism  appears  to  be,  in  this  philosophy,  a 
vanishing  quantity. 

The  one  further  form  of  personal  idealism  demanding  our 
attention  is  the  pluralistic  atheistic  idealism  of  which  J.  M.  E. 
McTaggart  is  perhaps  the  best  representative.  McTaggart 
claims  to  be  the  true  follower  and  interpreter  of  the  philosophy 
of  Hegel.'  Starting  with  the  concept  and  experienced  fact  of 
being,  he  claims  to  be  al)lc  to  arrive,  by  a  purely  a  priori  dia- 
lectical process,  at  a  final  metaphysical  knowledge  of  the  Abso- 
lute, not  as  one  timeless  Individual,  but  as  a  society  of  eternal 
individual  persons.  The  last  stop  in  this  dialectic  is  the  transi- 
tion from  the  concept  of  life  to  that  of  (social)  consciousness. 
Life  is  that  the  whole  of  which  is  in  each  part,  while  at  the 
same  time  it  is  the  whole  of  which  they  are  the  parts.  To 
solve  this  antithesis,  it  is  necessary  to  go  beyond  material 
reality  and  to  introduce  the  concept  of  consciousness  in  its 
social  aspect.  If  A,  B,  and  C  are  individuals  who  know  each 
other,  then  A,  as  conscious  of  the  whole  group,  contains  A,  B, 
and  C  ;  and  the  same  is  true  of  each  of  the  others.  Hence 
"Being"  must  ultimately  be  interpreted,  according  to  McTag- 
gart, as  a  society  of  mutually  known  and  knowing  persons. 

In  criticising  this  philosophy  we  must  first  attack  the  argu- 
ment by  which  it  is  supported,  and  then  show  the  difficulties 
inherent  in  the  view  itself.  In  the  first  place  the  concept  of 
life  is  incorrectly  apprehended.     It  is  life  as  a  formative  prin- 

'  Studies  in  Hegelian  Cosmology,  1901 ;  Commentary  on  Hegel's  Logic,  1910, 
especially  §§  10-18. 


THE   DISINTEGRATION   OF   IDEALISM 


191 


ciple  which  acts  or  "is  present"  in  each  part  of  the  living 
organism;  but  it  is  the  whole  living  organism  which  includes 
the  various  parts.  Here  there  is  no  unresolved  antithesis  to 
drive  one  on  to  a  higher  category.  There  is  also  a  confusion 
in  the  explication  of  the  concept  of  social  consciousness.  In 
consciousness  of  a  social  whole  by  one  of  its  parts,  it  is  not  the 
whole  as  a  reality  that  is  in  the  part,  but  an  idea  or  representa- 
tion of  the  whole  which  is  "in"  the  consciousness  of  one  of  the 
parts.  Thus  we  see  that  not  only  is  there  no  dialectical  problem 
in  connection  with  life,  but  even  if  there  were,  the  concept  of 
social  consciousness  would  not  be  its  solution.  And  indeed  it 
may  be  objected  against  McTaggart's  whole  dialectical  pro- 
cedure, that  in  refusing  to  depend  upon  experience  for  the 
development  of  either  the  antitheses  or  the  higher  syntheses  he 
forfeits  the  logical  right  to  call  his  system  a  philosophy  of 
reality.  That  he  should  have  fallen  a  victim  to  abstractionism, 
or  fallacy,  or  dogmatism,  was  inevitable ;  that  he  has  wholly 
escaped  any  one  of  thoin  appears  doubtful. 

But  objectiotis  may  be  urged  against  McTaggart's  pluralis- 
tic idealism  itself.  If  reality  as  a  whole  is  a  society  of  un- 
created and  eternal  selves,  in  whose  consciousness  material 
reality  exists  as  ideas,  or  thought-created  content,  what  kind 
of  existence  has  what  is  not  known  by  any  of  these  persons?  ' 
McTaggart  seems  to  have  at  first  been  inclined  to  favor,  but 
finally  to  have  rejected,  the  idea  that  every  mind,  as  a  timeless 
noumenon,  is  omniscient.  But  in  order  that  the  world  of 
science  extending  beyond  the  consciousness  of  any  of  the 
society  of  human  selves  should  not  be  regarded  as  a  delusion, 
while,  on  the  other  hand,  a  realistic  view  is  avoided,  McTag- 
gart is  now  understood  to  favor  the  view  that  human  selves 
are  not  the  only  fundamental  differentiations  of  the  Absolute 
Society ;  there  are  other  self-like  l)eings  which  are  also  eternal 
members  of  the  social  whole,  and  for  whose  consciousness,  pre- 
sumably, matter  exists  more  or  less  explicitly  as  idea.  But, 
even  from  the  idealistic  point  of  view,  as  Rashdall  points  out,* 
the  sole  recommendation  of  this  philosophy  is  that  it  makes 
possible  an  idealism  without  theism,  while  from  the  point  of 
view  of  the  critic  of  idealism  it  affords  a  further  evidence  of  the 


'  Cf.  H.  Rashdall,  PhUosophy  and  Religion,  pp.  123  ff. 


»  75.,  p.  126. 


wmm 


mm§. 


192 


THE  PROBLEM  OP   KNOWLEDGiT 


H 


disintegrated  state  of  contemporary  idealism.  In  order  to 
avoid  a  confession  of  the  inherent  subjectivism  of  personal 
idealism,  one  must  either  posit  the  mind  of  God  as  a  carry-all 
for  things  as  ideas,  or  oscillate  in  a  way  to  be  described  later, 
between  subjectivism  and  abstractionism,  or  else  attribute 
individual  consciousness  to  a  sufficient  number  of  beings  to  have 
immediate  awareness  of  all  the  reality  which  physical  science 
is  obliged  to  postulate.  It  surely  looks  as  if  the  dialectic  of 
idealistic  thought  were  a  dial -ctic  of  error.  Its  first  erroneous 
inference  places  it  in  a  false  position,  which  can  be  defended 
only  by  further  assumptions  which  make  the  system  as  a  whole 
m(  re  and  more  dogmata-  as  it  proceeds.  As  for  theism,  it 
maj'  surely  be  regarded  as  a  defensible  position  that  it  finds  its 
truest  foundation  in  religious  experience,  and  does  not  either 
stand  or  fall  with  idealism. 

But  besides  this  personal  idealism,  with  its  tendency  to 
return  to  elemental  psychological  idealism,  there  are  in  con- 
temporary idealism  several  varieties  of  doctrine  which  may  be 
grouped  together  under  the  designation  ab.stract  idealism,  and 
most  of  which  tend  toward  a  return  to  the  elemental  type 
which  we  called  logical  idealism.  By  abstract  idealism  in 
general  we  mean  the  definition  of  reality,  especially  physical 
reality,  in  :^rms  of  iilea  in  some  sense  of  that  word,  but  in 
such  a  way  .hat  its  being  both  real  and  idea  depends  upon 
some  condition  which  either  is  not,  or  is  not  known  to  be, 
actual.  Of  this  abstract  idealism  we  shall  consider  four  main 
varieties,  viz.  the  psychological-positivistic,  the  critical-posi- 
tivistic,  the  critical-transcendental,  and  the  logical-transcend- 
ental. The  significance  of  these  expressions  will  be  shown  in 
connection  with  (he  exposition  and  critique  of  the  particular 
systems  selected  for  examination. 

Let  us  consider  first  the  psychological-positivistic  type  of 
abstract  idealism,  as  represented  by  the  views  of  G.  S.  Fuller- 
ton  in  1904.  The  word  "existence"  according  to  this  philos?- 
opher,  has  more  than  one  meaning;  it  may  refer  to  intuitive 
presence  in  consciousness,  or  to  presence  in  a  .siystem  of  experi- 
ences, potential  or  actual.'  Thus  the  unperceived  table  exists 
in  a  system  of  potential  experiences.     But  what,  it  may  be 

•  A  System  of  Metapliysics,  1U04,  pp.  122-3. 


THE   DISINTEGRATION   OF   IDEALISM 


193 


asked,  is  the  present  actuality  of  a  potential  experience? 
What  we  have  here  is  very  evidently  an  abstract  psychological 
idealism.  We  arc  asked  to  accept  the  dognu-.  of  the  present 
existence  of  an  experience  which  is  not  at  present,  strictly 
speaking,  an  experience  at  all.  In  essential  agreement  with 
Fullerton's  doctrine  is  Paulsen's  statement  that  the  physical 
sciences  deal  with  the  world  of  possible  percepts,  which  differ 
from  actual  percepts  in  that  they  are  permanent,  and  subject 
to  the  laws  of  the  physical  sciences.' 

As    representing    the    critical-positivistic    type    of   abstract 
idealism  we  shall  take  the  school  of  H.  Cohen ;   but,  as  repre- 
senting the  transition  from  the  Kantian  dualism  to  this  form 
of  abstract  idealism,  we  shall  first  deal  with  the  neo-Kantians, 
F.  A.  Lango  and  Otto  Liebmann.     Ever  since  the  beginning  of 
the  "Back  to  Kunt"  movement,  in  which,  while  Liebmann 
was  perhaps  the  most  typical  representative,  Lange  was  prob- 
ably the  most  influential,  there  has  been  a  strong  tendency  to 
emphasize  the  idealistic  elements  of  Kant's  own  doctrine,  and 
to  treat  the  dualistic  and  agnostic  features  of  his  philosophy 
as  entirely  secondary  and  unessential.     Lange  concedes  to  the 
materialist  that  all  that  takes  place  in  the  material  world,  in- 
cluding brain-processes  and  outward  actions  of  men  and  ani- 
mals, is  to  be  scientifically  explained  according  to  the  principles 
of  mechanics;    but  he  urges  that  if  our  S'  f'^  it  ions  and  ideas 
are  to  be  viewed  as  products  of  material  processes,  it  must  at 
the  same  time  be  remembered  that  these  and  all  other  material 
processes  can   ultimately  be   interpreted  only   as  objects  of 
consciousness,  dependent  ever,  as  to  what  they  are,  ''pon  the 
activity  of  thought  according  to  its  o  priori  principles.^     Lange 
claims  to  have  changed  his  views  under  the  influence  of  H. 
Cohen,  thus  coming  to  regard  the  thing-in-itself  as  a  mere 
idea  of  a  limit  to  human  experience.'     He  does  not,  however, 
consistently  follow  out  this  non-dualistic  epistemology.     In- 
deed, throughout  the  greater  part  of  his  discussion,  he  remains 
simply  a  very  agnostic  epistemological  dualist.     He  says  we 
do  not  know  whether  the  thing-in-itself  exists  or  not*  — in 

1  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  Eng.  Tr.,  pp.  375-«. 

« History  of  Materialism.  1865,  Eng.  Tr.,  Vol.  II,  pp.  227,  etc. 

•  /6.,  Vol.  II,  pp.  216,  234.  *  If>.,  II,  p.  217. 


rJ3»I!niy'<KT3 


^^^?^^^^^^!^^^^^^^ 


194 


THE   PROBLEM  OF   KNOWLEDGE 


*     i  1 


ti; 


i"l    ii 


itself  a  departure  from  Cohen's  doctrine  —  but  in  the  main  he 
seems  to  assume  that  it  does  exist,  being  concerned  only  to 
deny  knowledge  of  what  it  is.  Thus  he  says  the  whole  objec- 
tive world  is  not  absolute  objectivity,  but  only  objectivity  for 
men  and  similar  beings,  while  behind  the  phenomenal  world 
the  absolute  nature  of  things,  the  thing-in-itself,  is  veiled  in 
impenetrable  darkness.'  Perhaps  the  most  decisive  passage, 
however,  is  that  in  which  Lange  says  that  we  do  not  know 
even  ounselves  as  we  are  in  ourselves,  but  only  as  we  appear  to 
ourselves ;  -  reality  can  scarcely  be  denied  to  the  knowing  self. 
And  yet  Lange  seems  also  at  several  points  in  his  discussion 
to  be  actually  on  the  side  of  non-dualistic  or  idealistic  neo- 
Kantianism.  The  declaration  that  while  delusive  appearance 
is  mere  phenomenon  for  the  individual,  reality  is  also  simply 
phenomenon  for  the  species,^  suggests  an  easy  transition  from 
agnostic  realism  to  an  idealistic  monistic  epistemology.  The 
fact  is,  or  seems  to  be,  that  Lange  carries  his  agnosticism  so 
far  that  from  time  to  time  he  turns  about  upon  the  reahty 
previously  set  up  in  opposition  to  appearance,  and  reduces  it  to 
the  mere  idea  by  means  of  which  it  was  posited.  Thus  he 
declares  that  the  last  cause  of  all  phenomena  is  unknown,  and 
that  the  very  idea  of  it  is  due  to  the  purely  subjective  antith- 
esis between  sense  and  a  priori  thought.''  Precisely  because 
we  recognize  the  phenomenal  world  as  a  product  of  our  organi- 
zation, we  must  be  able,  he  contends,  to  assume  a  world  inde- 
pendent of  our  forms  of  knowledge ;  and  yet  this  assumption, 
he  holds,  is  merely  the  ultimate  consequence  of  the  use  of  the 
understanding  in  judging  of  what  is  given  us.^  Indeed,  even 
the  Kantian  distinction  between  phenomenon  and  thing-in- 
itself,  Lange  finally  maintains,  may  be  simply  a  product  of 
our  mental  organization.*  According  to  this  logical  culmina- 
tion of  critical  agnosticism,  it  becomes  doubtful  whether  or  not 
we  should  accept  as  valid  the  fundamental  principle  of  that 
critical  agnosticispi  itself  —  a  beautiful  instance  of  a  philoso- 

'  History  of  Materialism,  1865,  Eng.  Tr..  II,  p.  156.  Cf.  "Our  things  arc 
differiMit  from  things  in  themaelvea,"  p.  188.  and  also  pp.  218,  224,  232,  234. 

'  Ih,  II.  pp.  230-1.  » lb..  Vol.  in,  p.  336. 

« lb..  Vol.  II,  p.  218.  lb.,  II,  p.  227. 

•  See  EUiscn,  Biographie  Lange' s,  pp.  258  ff.,  referred  to  by  H&ffding,  A  Brief 
History  of  Modern  Philrz.,i)hy,  Eng.  Tr.,  p.  290. 


■H"fW 


THE   DISINTEGRATION   OF   IDEALISM 


195 


phy's  self-refutation.  In  any  case,  however,  whether  as  duahst 
or  as  idealistic  monist,  Lange's  opposition  to  realistic  episte- 
mological  monism  is  unmistakable.  "A  reality,"  he  says, 
"such  as  man  imagines  to  himself,  and  as  he  yearns  after 
when  this  imagination  is  dispelled,  an  existence  absolutely 
fixed  and  independent  of  us  while  it  is  yet  known  by  us  — 
such  a  reaUty  does  not  and  cannot  exist."  ' 

Otto  Licbmann  is  more  clear-cut  than  Lange  in  his  rejec- 
tion of  the  Kantian  epistemological  dualism,  but  he  does  not 
make  so  explicit  as  do  Cohen  and  his  followers  those  implica- 
tions of  neo-Kantianism  which  convict  it  of  abstractionism. 
He  contends^  that  Fichte's  "Absolute  Ego,"  Schelling's  "Ab- 
solute,"  and  Hegel's  "Absolute  Spirit"  or  "Absolute  Reason,''^ 
as  truly  as  the  "independent  reals"  of  Herbart  and  the  "Will" 
of  Schopenhauer,  are  all  simply  disguised  forms  of  the  Kantian 
thing-in-itself,  which  in  all  its  forms  and  under  all  its  dis- 
guises is  to  be  rejected  as  the  product  of  a  vain  attempt  on  the 
part  of  the  abstract  intellect  to  think  the  unthinkable,  and 
thereby  to  find  the  answer  to  an  unanswerable  question.     We 
must  return,  he  claims,  from  all  post-Kantian  metaphysics  of 
the  transcendent  to  the  position  of  Kant,  climinatmg  only 
Kant's  erroneous  notion  of  the  thing-in-itself,  as  being  not 
even  so  much  as  an  empty  concept,  but  absolutely  no  concept 
at  all      It  is  hke  what  a  knife  would  be,  which  lacked  both  blade 
and  handle.     It  is  like  that  of  which  Luther  said  that  we  ought 
not  to  know  it  and  therefore  ought  not  to  wish  to  know  it. 

It  would  not  be  diflScult  to  show  that  the  implications  of 
Liebmann's  idealism  would  lead  toward  an  abstract  view  of 
the  content  of  the  Kantian  "possible  experience."  This  is 
brought  out  with  sufficient  clearness  in  the  works  of  the  "Mar- 
burg School"  —  H.  Cohen,  P.  Natorp,  E.  Cassirer,  and  others 
—  the  members  of  which  differ  from  Liebmann  perhaps  most 
conspicuously  in  contending  that,  when  Kant's  own  doctrine 
is  correctly  interpreted,  the  thing-in-itself  is  seen  to  be  simply 
a  mark  placed  upor  the  limit  of  human  experience  and  knowl- 
edge The  aim  of  these  neo-Kantians  of  the  Marburg  school 
hvs  been  to  develop  the  Kantian  critique  of  pure  reason  into  a 

'  Op.  cU.,  Vol.  Ill   p.  330.  . 

»KantunddU    .     .onen.  first  published  in  1 S65 ;  republished  in  1912. 


mfiFmvwmmmimmmmm^. 


196 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   KNOWLEDGE 


I 


^1 
1 


^  ,i: 


•I'l  '• 


■  it 


■jifJi  ' 

'    ;  ••  ■  i 


rationalistic,  but  positivistic  rather  than  metaphysical,  philos- 
ophy o."  reality.  To  this  end  the  Kantian  distinction  lietwoen 
pure  intuition  and  pure  thought  has  to  be  obliterated. 
"Givenness"  is  to  i^e  interpret etl  as  produced  in  'oto  by  a  priori 
thought,  on  the  ground  that  "so  far  as  we  recognize  particu- 
larity, it  must  be  producible  in  pure  thought."  '  The  central 
task  of  the  critical  philosophj-  being,  according  to  thesi  iiter- 
preters,  the  proof  of  the  objective  validity  of  our  a  priori  knowl- 
edge,'- it  is  clear  that  the  Kantian  doctrine  of  the  unknowable 
"thing-in-itself"  must  be  relieved  of  its  agnostic  implications. 
This  is  accomplished  when  one  remembers  that  that  thing-in- 
itself  is  itself  a  thought-construct,  representing  symbolically  the 
limits  of  scientific  observation  and  knowledge.''  Thus  it  is 
claimed  that  philosophy  lays  the  basis  for  the  objective  validity 
of  the  exact  sciences.''  Moreover,  an  approximately  Hegelian, 
although  ostensibly  anti-metaphysical,  result  is  obtained  by 
way  of  an  essentially  Kantian  critical  nuthod.'' 

This  rationalistic  positivism  achieves  the  appearance  of 
simplicity  l)v  the  obliteration  of  troublesome,  but  important, 
distinctions.  This  is  true  not  only  in  the  reduction  of  the 
"given"  to  the  level  of  that  which  is  constructed  by  a  priori 
thought.  Cassirer  goes  further  and  regards  the  distinction 
between  "hie."  and  hypothesis  as  illusory."  Consciousness 
and  its  object  are  reported  as  essentially  similar,'  but  it  must 
not  be  supposed  that  this  means  a  lapse  into  psychologism. 
What  we  have  is  logism  rather;  the  object  is  ii  its  entirety  a 
thought-construct,  and  the  subject,  or  consciousness,  or  science, 
is  also  simply  a  reconstruction,  or  more  comprehensive  con- 
struction of  the  same  object.*     Indeed,  psychology,  for  this 


ri    t 


'  H.  Oohen,  Logik  dcr  rcincn  Erkcnntnia,   1902,  p.    1 14.      Cf.   Natorp,  Di 
logischen  Grundtagen  rler  exnkten  Winsfnschiiflcn,  1010,  and  Cassirer,  Drts  Erkennt- 
nisproblem.  Vol.  II,  p.  ,5.5.5,  whore  this  eharaeteri.stie  .statement  o>ours :    "The 
original  separation  of  intuition  and  concept  disappears  more  and  more  into  a 
purely  logical  correlation." 

'  Cassirer,  op.  cit.,  II,  p.  .5S9.  '  lb.,  pp.  59S,  003-7,  012. 

•  Cohen,  op.  cit.,  p.  ,51 1  ;    Natorp,  np.  ril.,  pasaim. 

'See  E.  von  .Aster,  "  Neukantiani.smus  und  HcRelianismua"  in  Milnchener 
phiio.'iophUche  Abhaiulluityen,  1912,  uuil  Nalurp,  Kant  und  die  Marburgtr  Schule, 
1912. 

•  Substanzbegriff  und  Funkliomtbegriff,  Ch.  6.  '/6. 

•  Cohen,  op.  cit.,  p.  366,  etc. 


THE   DISINTEGRATION  OF   IDEALISM 


197 


school,  consists  in  the  reconstruction  of  the  mental  out  of  its 
products,  logic,  ethics,  and  lesthetics.'  Thus  it  can  be  claimed 
with  a  certain  illusory  show  of  reason,  that  this  neo-Kantian 
positivistic  idealism  is  at  the  same  time  the  true  realism.* 
We  would  maintain,  however,  that  the  appearance  of  realism 
—  or  the  actual  realism  of  an  abstract  sort  —  is  simply  duo  to 
the  abstract  character  of  the  idealism.  Reality  is  interpreted 
as  a  rationally  organized  totality  of  experience  —  the  world  of 
science  viewed  as  the  product  of  a  priori  thought  —  a  total 
world  of  experience,  however,  which  needs  not  to  be  con- 
sciously experienced  in  order  to  exist.  This  is  not  realism, 
however  closely  it  may  resemble  it  in  certain  of  its  doctrines; 
it  is  abstract  idealism.  We  are  asked  to  believe  in  a  world 
which  is,  in  its  entirety  and  everywhere,  product  of  thought  in 
general,  and  which  may  nevertheless  exist  apart  from  the 
thought  or  experience  of  any  particular  thinker.  Nai  j  in- 
terprets a  concrete  realistic  view  such  as  would  n>gard  objects 
as  existing  independently  of  "the  subjectivity  of  knowledge," 
as  due  to  a  false  but  necessary  abstraction.'  Without  attempt- 
ing here  to  justify  the  realistic  view,  it  may  be  remarked  that  it 
is  surely  a  less  violent  abstraction  —  if  abstraction  it  is  —  to 
holil  that  things  maj'  exist  apart  from  knowledge  than  to  main- 
tain on  the  one  hand  that  things  cannot  exist  apart  from 
knowledge,  and  on  the  other  hand  that  the  world  of  knowl- 
edge may  exist  apart  from  any  actual  knovver.  Since,  apart 
from  the  Hegelian  Absolute  Consciousness,  the  conditions  can- 
not be  fulfilled  ior  all  of  the  objects  in  the  neo-Kantian  "  world  of 
experience  "  being  actually  experienced,  we  have  in  this  doc- 
trine what  amounts  to  saying  that  that  is  to  be  thought  of  as 
idea  which  nevertheless  cannot  be  idea — the  characteristic  mark 
of  abstract  idealism.  The  resemblance  to  the  Platonic  abstract 
or  logical  idealism  and  realism  is  at  this  point  so  close  that  it 
is  not  surprising  that  Natorp,  as  we  have  seen,  undertakes  to 
interpret  Plato  as  having  been,  virtually,  a  neo-Kantian.  But 
the  difference  is  mainly  this,  that  while  the  neo-Kantian  is  a 

'  Natorp,  Einleitung  in  die  Pnychologie;  Objeckt  und  Methode  dcr  Psychologic; 
see  O.  Kwald,  Philosophical  Review,  XXIII,  1914.  pp.  629-32. 

•  Cohen,  op.  cit..  p.  511. 

>"Ueher  ohjektive  und  subjektive  BeRrundung  der  Erkenntnis,"  Philos- 
ophische  MonaUhefte,  XXIII,  1887,  pp.  267,  269. 


P^ 


198 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   KNOWLEDGE 


.1  • 


.iii 


% 


concrete  or  logical-psychologic?  1  idealist  with  reference  to  what 
is  actually  experienced,  and  an  abstract  or  logical  idealist  (and 
therefore,  when  this  abstract  or  logical  idealism  is  itself  ab- 
stracted from,  taken  abstractly,  an  abstract  or  logical  realist) 
only  with  reference  to  what  is  not  directly  experienced,  Plato 
was  a  logical  idealist  (and  by  a  further  abstraction,  a  logical 
realist)  with  reference  to  all  reality,  including  what  is  within 
the  direct  or  immediate  experience  of  the  individual. 

The  abstract  idealists  to  be  considered  next  are  the  critical 
transcendcntalists.  These  are  the  members  of  what  is  some- 
times called  the  Freiburg  school,  Wilhelm  Windelband,  Hein- 
rich  Rickert,  and  Hugo  Munsterberg.  As  distinguished  from  the 
Marburg  school,  with  whose  neo-Kantianism,  so  far  as  concerns 
the  world  of  science  and  common  experience,  they  are  in  essen- 
tial agreement,  they  find  reality  also,  in  some  sense  of  the  word, 
in  an  eternal  ideal  world  which  transcends  the  empirical  world 
of  positive  science.  Their  attitude,  moreover,  is  rather  more  vol- 
untaristic  than  that  of  the  Marburg  school ;  it  is  not  so  narrowly 
intellcctualistic.  They  regard  knowledge  as  ultimately  the  real- 
ization of  an  ideal  rather  than  a  simple  intellectual  fact. 

Windelband  especially  does  not  differ  greatly  from  the  Mar- 
burg school.  Metaphysics  as  a  science  of  the  ultimate  grounds 
of  reality  he  stigmatizes  as  an  "Unding."  '  Philosophy  fulfils 
its  legitimate  mission  when  it  becomes  "a  critical  science  of 
universally  valid  values."  ■  There  are  certain  evaluations 
which  have  absolute  validity,  even  if  they  do  not  receive  any 
recognition.'  Philosophy  is  the  science  of  "consciousness  in 
general,"  a  system  of  norms  which  are  objectively  valid,  al- 
though only  partially  realized.''  Thus,  while  science  deals  with 
the  given,  philosophy's  peculiar  realm  is  t!ie  required  {Auf- 
gcgebene)  ;  -  in  other  words,  it  deals  with  that  which  is  eternally 
valid  as  an  ideal  to  be  progressively  realized.  Logic,  ethics, 
and  esthetics,  then,  are  the  only  fundamental  philo-sophical 
sciences ;  they  deal  with  the  nature  of  the  true,  the  good,  and 
the  beautiful  as  eternally  valid  ideals.*     But  not  only  does 


'  Praludicn.  ith  cd.,  1911,  Vol.  I,  p.  10. 


=  Ih.,  p.  29. 


>  !b.,  p.  37. 


« lb.,  p.  46.  »  Einleitung  in  die  Philo.fophie,  1914,  Ch.  I. 

'  "  Principles  of  Logic,"  in  Windelband  and  Ruge's  Encyclopedia  of  the  Philo- 
sophic  Sciences,  Vol.  I,  1913,  p.  9. 


^^PP" 


THE   DISINTEGRATION  OP  IDEALISM 


199 


philosophy  concern  itself  with  the  ideal ;   it  is  itself  as  yet  an 
ideal,  not  yet  fully  made  actual  anywhere.* 

Windelband's  philosophy  involves  at  least  that  type  of 
abstract  idealism  which  we  have  just  found  in  the  more  posi- 
tivistic  neo-Kantians.  On  the  one  hand,  the  natural  world  of 
which  the  geologist  and  the  astronomer  speak  is  interpreted  as 
a  construct  of  human  thought.  "The  world  which  we  experi- 
ence is  our  deed."  =  This  looks  like  subjectivism ;  but  on  the 
other  hand  the  positivistic  abstractionism  is  seen  in  the  doctrine 
that,  although  the  data  of  sense-perception  are  only  presenta- 
tions, or  ideas  —  i.e.  have  no  existence  but  psychical  existence,' 
—  and  although,  as  intimatetl  ah  ve,  the  totality  of  reality  is 
so  unknowable  as  to  render  metiii-liysics  a  vain  attempt,  abso- 
lute reality  is  not  qualitatively  other  than  the  being  we  know, 
but  simply  the  whole  of  which  our  presentations  or  ideas  are 
parts.  We  postulate  an  ultimate  unifying  inner  connection 
of  all  reality.^  Here  the  implication  seems  to  be  that  reality 
includes  presentations  or  ideas  that  are  not  presented  to,  or 
thought  by,  any  subjects  whatsoever  —  a  clear  case  of  abstract 
idealism. 

But,  in  addition  to  this,  Windelband  at  times  comes  peri- 
lously near  to  substantiating  the  "world  of  spiritual  values,"' » 
although  he  is  on  his  guard  against  such  metaphysical  dogma- 
tism.' In  the  religious  consciousness  the  true,  the  good,  and 
the  beautiful  are  said  to  be  experienced  as  transcendent  reality.^ 
In  other  words,  religion  postulates  as  real  the  totality  of  all 
rational  values  experienced  in  an  absolute  unity,  although  this 
can  be  grasped  by  none  of  the  forms  of  our  consciousness.* 
It  is  maintained,  we  must  admit,  that  all  that  we  can  grasp  of 
the  transcendent  is  that  which  ought  to  be.»  But  this  is  spoken 
of  as  the  "higher  reality,"  the  true  thing-in-itself,  something 
not  known,  and  yet,  it  is  asserted,  experienceable  as  a  tran- 
scendent inner  reality  in  our  consciousness  of  the  ideal.  In  the 
consciousness  of  the  eternal  a  universally  valid,  super-individual 
somewhat  makes  its  appearance  in  the  deeps  of  our  life;   the 


1  Prahuiien,  I,  p.  46. 

»  Encyclopedia,  etc.,  p.  62.         *  lb.,  p.  65. 
•  Einleitung  in  die  Philosophie,  Ch.  I. 
« lb.,  p.  266. 


« lb..  Vol.  II,  p.  260. 
s  Praludien,  Vol.  II,  p.  21. 
'  Praludien,  Vol.  II.  p.  282. 
•  lb.,  p.  318. 


■ff^B^R 


wiaii 


200 


TlIK    IMtOBLEM    OF    KNOWLEDOK 


^i' 


i  = 


\:m 

Ifi; 


i 

^f  -r 

s 

■  * 

} 

i' 

■\ 

'■'  1 

Mf  1 

1  1 

■     ■ 

S  f^ ' 

.   '. 

S'i 

1 

lU 

,*!  ■ 

[f^ 

1     i 

la 

If 

1    ,1 

|K 

J  '  :■ 

B' 

If.  \ 

eternal  comes  into  our  temporal  existenee.'  Here  the  ideal 
seems  to  he  treated  as  an  eternal  and  transcendent  reality,  and 
yet  as  not  present  explicitly  and  completely,  in  any  conscious- 
ness. But  to  assert  the  extra-psychical  reality  of  an  ideal,  as 
such,  is  manifestly  to  he  ^U'lty  <>f  ahstractionism.  It  treats 
the  same  entity  as  ideal  and  as  real  under  conditioas  such  that 
not  all  of  the  reality  can  he  actually  an  ideal.  Moreover,  it 
overlooks  the  fact  that  when  any  itkal  is  actually  set  up,  it  can- 
not, as  ideal,  he  rationally  regarded  as  transcendently,  or  other- 
wise than  psycholoKically,  a  reality. 

Itickert  carries  further  this  ascription  of  some  .sort  of  tran- 
scendent and  independent  reality  to  the  ideal.  He  recognizes 
suhjective  idealism  as  relatively  valid,-  and  finds  ohjectivity 
not  in  heing,  hut  in  what  universally  ought  to  he.  The  univer- 
sal necessity  of  scientific  consciousness,  the  Milsscn,  is  not 
enough  to  raise  the  structure  of  the  understanding  into  ohjec- 
tivity ;  that  can  come  only  from  the  necessity  of  a  universal 
moral  ohligation  (Sollen).^  The  truth  of  all  judgments,  even 
judgments  of  existence,  consists  in  this  universal  value.*  This 
"ought"  is  ultimate.  We  can  go  no  further  than  to  say  the 
judgment  ought  to  take  place,  not  hecau.se  it  says  what  really 
is,  hut  hecause  it  ought  to  take  place.*  To  deny  the  "ought" 
leads  to  contradiction.'  This  "ought,"  acknowledged  in 
judgments,  then,  is  the  only  possihle  ohject  of  knowledge.^ 
There  is  no  meaning  in  as-  ning  a  reality  "hehind"  represen- 
tations.* But  this  "  oug,  which  is  the  ohject  of  knowledge 
must  he  independent  of  the  suhject  in  the  fullest  .sense;  it  is 
valid  whether  recognized  hy  any  one,  or  not ;  a  transcendent 
"ought"  is  therefore  the  ohject  of  knowledge.'* 

Now  it  oiifiht  to  he  recognized  hy  Rickert  and  others  that 
while  this  logical  "ought"  is  independent  of  the  circumstance 
as  to  whether  any  particular  person  who  may  he  selected  is 
actually  judging  or  not,  it  is  hy  no  means  independent  of  the 
circumstance  that  a  judgment  is  called  for  in  a  certain  situa- 
tion, and  is  either  heing  made  or  to  he  made.     The  Sollen  in- 

'  Priiludun,  Vol.  II,  pp.  .•n9-22. 

«  Der  (liutmtnnd  dvr  ErkenntnU,  1904,  p.  56,  cf.  p.  163. 

•  lb.,  pp.  114-15.  «  //..,  p.  117.  «  76.,  pp.  18,  19. 

•/6.,  p.  US.  'lb.,  p.  122.  *Ib.,  p.  123.  »/6.,  p.  125. 


mfm^nf^: 


THE   DI8IXTEG RATION  OP   IDEALISM 


201 


dependen  ni/  mind  is  an  abstraction  ;  the  Sein  indejiendent 

Li  any  mind  is  not  necessarily  so.  The  truth  is  what  ought  to 
l)e  recognized  l)y  any  one  maJiinR  a  judKinent  under  certain 
circumstances  and  for  certain  purposes,  whether,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  any  one  does  recoRnize  it  or  m)t.  The  "ouRht"  is 
hypothetical,  continRent  on  the  existence  of  minds  and  also 
on  there  beinn  a  prior  "ought, "  the  oMigation  (itself  hypo- 
thetical or  categorical)  to  make  any  judgment  at  all  in  the 
given  situation.  Apart  from  mind  and  will  there  can  be  no 
"ought,"  and  to  assume  that  there  can  be  is  to  be  guilty  of 
abstractionism. 

Miinsterberg  seems  to  have  reacted  against  the  abstractness 
of  Rickert's  transcendental  Sollcn.  it  is  preferable  to  the 
Mussen  of  science,  but  the  ultimate  category  for  objectivity  ia 
neither  Scin,  nor  MuNsen,  nor  Sollen,  but  Wollen.^  In  view  of 
the  eternal  validity  of  ideal  values,  it  is  inferred  that  an  over- 
individual  Will  wills  the  world  its  a  causally  related  order,  and 
impos(>s  its  own  ideal  standards  upon  every  rational  agent  and 
experient.  In  this  vie"-  ')f  the  Ultimate  Object  as  Will  and  not 
Being  —  as  that  which  is  not,  and  yet  which  acts  =  —  we  have 
another  clear  instance  of  abstractionism,  against  which  criti- 
cisms, es.sentially  similar  to  those  urged  a^-iinst  Windelband 
and  Rickert,  are  to  bo  regarded  as  valid. 

In  Fritz  Munch's  recent  publication,  entitled  Erlebnis  und 
Geltung,  still  another  ultimate  category  of  objectivity  is  offered, 
viz.  Gelten  (import).  This  view,  involving  <'ie  reduction  of 
existence  to  meaning,  or  logical  validity,  wmlc  parallel  with 
the  views  of  Rickert  and  Munsterberg,  establishes,  by  virtue 
of  its  emphasis  upon  the  logical,  close  affiliation.s  both  with  the 
philosophy  of  the  Marburg  school  and  with  that  of  the  logi- 
cal transcendentalists  to  be  examined  forthwith.  The  vicious 
abstractionism  involved  in  reducing  being  to  import,  the  that 
to  the  ivhat,  is  so  extreme  that  criticism  seems  superfluous.' 

The  fourth  type  of  abstract  idealism  we  called  logical- 
transcendental.     In  its  more  characteristic  forms  it  is  in  large 


'  The  Ehmnl  V'rj?r,-s  lf>n<3.  p   55  ♦  Ih.,  pp.  399.  400.  etc. 

'  Erlrbnis  und  Gtlliing:  Einc  syat.  matischr  Untersttchung  znr  Transzendentnl- 
philosophic  als  Wdtanschauunu.  191,3.  pp.  26-7,  36,  177  ff.,  184-8,  etc.;  see 
O.  Ewald,  Philusophkal  Review,  XXIII,  1914,  pp.  622-4. 


202 


THE   PUOBLEM   OF   KNOWLEDGE 


I'i 


fi 


part  approximately  a  rpturn  to  the  logical  idealism  of  Plato, 
and  shows  a  distinct  tondency  to  pass  over,  like  the  thought  of 
Plato,  into  loRJcal  realism.  Logical  idealism,  by  reason  of  its 
abstractionism,  is  :in  unstable  doctrine.  If  the  abstraction 
involved  were  consistently  recognized,  the  logical  idealism 
would  pass  over  into  psychological  idealism,  of  either  the 
Fiehtean  or  the  neo-Kantian  type.  But  when,  on  the  con- 
trary, the  abstraction  is  taken  abstractly,  i.e.  when  the  ab- 
stractness  is  abstracted  from,  the  basis  is  laid  for  the  doctrine 
that  some  (or  all)  logical  ideas  arc  objective  realities ;  indeed, 
such  a  disguised  logical  idealism  already  practically  amounts  to 
logical  realism. 

A  good  representative  of  the  movement  toward  this  logical- 
transcendental  form  of  abstract  idealism  is  E.  Husserl.  He 
would  have  us  understand  by  "object"  that  which  the  act 
of  judging  inUnd.s,  whether  it  is  real  or  unreal,  fictitious  or 
utterly  absurfl.'  It  is  something  which  is  never  coniaineil 
within  the  act  of  judging  itself,  but  always  tran.scends  it.' 
Even  though  the  object  be  a  fiction,  it  is  fun<lamentally  dif- 
ferent from  my  act.*  Objects  may  be  perceived,  but  they  are 
never  experienced.  The  world  can  never  be  experience  of  one 
thinking;  it  is  the  intended  object.*  In  this  we  nave  Hus- 
serl's  polemic  .vgainst  psychologism  and  advocacy  of  logism  in 
its  stead.  To  be  meant,  it  is  insisted,  is  not  to  be  psychically 
real.* 

Husserl's  "  universal  objects "  are  comparable  to  Plato's 
"ideas."  The  whole  human  race  and  all  thinking  beings  might 
disapp'  r,  it  is  maintained,  and  yet  the  Kingdom  of  eternal 
ideas  would  remain  eternal  and  unchangeable.*  This  sounds 
Platonic,  and  yet  there  are  differences  between  Husserl's 
logical  transcendentalism  and  the  logical  idealism  and  realism 
of  Plato.  Husserl's  "objects"  or  "ideas"  are  more  explicitly 
non-psychological  than  Plato's  "ideas,"  and  yet  at  the  same 
time  they  include  both  real  and  unreal  objects.     It  may  be 

^  Logische  Vntersuchungen,  1900,  1901,  Vol.  II,  p.  353.  A  second  edition 
appeared  in  1913,  but  except  where  otherwise  indicated  our  references  are  to  the 
earlier  edition 

»/6.,  Ch.  V.  55  2,  14.  20.  >/6.,p.  387. 

• /6.,  pp.  327,  .365.  *Ib..  passim.     See  2d  ed.,  II,  p.  133. 

'  Logiache  Vntersuchungen,  Vol.  II,  pp.  101,  132-6,  140,  387. 


THE   D18IXTEO RATION   OP  IDEALISM 


203 


qupstionod  whether  Husserl,  in  spite  of  his  vigorous  repudiation 
of  any  metaphysical  hypo:.:atizing  of  his  "  ui.iversul  objects,"' 
has  really  escaped  this  dangi-r  us  completely  as  he  imagines.* 
Of  course  he  intends  to  keep  ele^r  of  all  such  entanglements. 
He  is  careful  to  make  it  clear  that  ho  U8»"s  "essence"  as  a  log- 
ical rather  than  a  metaphysical  categorj'/  and  overtly  regards 
th(>  object  {(Icgcnstand)  not  as  anything  metaphysically  real, 
hut  only  as  a  purely  logical,  intentional  unity,  a  subject  of 
possil)le  predicates.^  But  his  per.sistent  refusal  to  recogniz;' 
that  thee  "ideas"  or  "objects"  have  been  arrived  at  by  any 
process  of  abstracting  from  what  has  been  experienced,  and  his 
insistence  upon  his  transcendence  theory  instead,  we  may  regard 
as  showing  very  obviously  that  he  has  not  only  substituted  an 
abstract,  logical  idea  for  the  ostensibly  real  things  which  enter 
into  our  experience,  and  so  has  fallen  into  the  error  of  logical 
idealinrn ;  but  in  refusing  again  to  recognize  that  he  has  made 
this  abstraction,  he  has  abstracted  from  the  abstraction  so  far  as 
to  have  placed  himself  at  least  on  the  vergt;  of  logical  realism  as 
well.  » 

Another  who  may  be  regarded  as  a  logical  transcendentalist  is 
A.  Meinong,  whose  "  Gegenstandstheorie  "  has  of  late  years  been 
attracting  much  attention.-  For  Meinong  philosophy  is  funda- 
mentally the  scienc3  of  the  possible  objects  of  thought.  These 
objects  {Gegemtdnde)  include,  besides  objects  proper  (Objekle), 
"objectives,"  i.e.  predications,  such  as  "the  shortest  distance 
between  two  points"  or  "that  grass  is  green."  Thus  every 
judgment  or  supposal  {Annahme)  has  an  indirect  object  (what 
is  judged  about  —  really  what  is  ordinarily  called  the  subject)  and 
an  objective  (what  is  jwlged  or  supposed) ;  and  of  course  the 
objective  of  one  judgment  or  supposal  may  become  the  indirect 

>/b..  2dod..  II,  p.  101. 

»  Cf.  R.  KroniT,  ZnUchrift  Jur  Philosophie,  Vol.  134,  1909,  pp.  249  ff. 

'  Idem  zu  Hntr  reinen  PhUnomi-nolugie  und  phanomenologische  Philosophie, 
1913,  pp.  10,  U,  etc. 

«Cf.  H.  Lanz,  Das  Problem  der  Gegenatdndlichkeit  in  der  modernen  Logik, 
1912,  p.  SO. 

»  Uiber  .Annahmen,  1902  ;  2d  od.,  1910  ;  "  UobtT GcRenstandsthcoriu  "  in  Unter- 
suchungen  zur  Gegenstandstheorie  und  Psuchohgie.  1904;  i'tber  Vrteilsgcfuhle, 
1905;  Ueber  die  Erfahrungsgrundlagen  unseres  Wissens.  1906;  Ueber  die  titdiung 
der  Gegenstandstheorie  im  System  der  Wissensdiaftcn,  1907;  Abhandlungen  zur 
Erkenntnistheorie  und  Gegenstandstheorie,  1913. 


20 1 


Till-;    l'I{OIiLEM    OF    KXOWLEDGE 


.  V 


ill 


\i 


object  of  another,  a-^  in  the  judgment,  "It  is  certain  that 
grass  is  gr(>en."  Tlic  existence  of  any  object,  i.e.  that  it  exists, 
is  always  an  objective ;  mtkI  so  it  may  be  said  that  wiiat  is  de- 
sired or  enjoyed  is  never  an  object,  but  abvays  an  objective. 
Obviously,  objectives  do  not  exist,  are  not  real;  but  if  they  arc 
true,  they  arc,  or  "sul)sist  "  {hMclicu),  as  objects  of  a  higher 
order.  They  transcend  not  only  the  realm  of  experience,  but 
the  realm  of  existence  itself.  Some  ol)jects  may  exist ;  but 
others,  abstractions  and  propositions,  can  only  subsist,  while  still 
others,  "  impossible  ol)jects,"  such  as  the  celebrated  "  rouml 
square,"  neither  e.xist  nor  subsist.  Thus,  it  is  claimed,  "  Gegen- 
standstheorie"  is  a  much  broader  philosophical  discipline  than 
metaphysics  and  includes  the  latter;  it  proceeds  a  priori,  while 
the  proper  metaphysical  procedure  is  a  posteriori.  Its  one 
branch  which  has  been  at  all  highly  develop(>d  hitherto  is  math- 
ematics; but  the  need  for  other  branches  being  developed  is 
shown  by  the  fact  that  there  are  still  many  "  homeless  objects," 
i.e.  (1)  objects  which  have  no  place  as  objects  of  investigation  in 
any  of  the  recognized  sciences,  e.g.  sensorial  contents  (colors, 
etc.),  which  are  neitlier  physical  nor  psy(;hological  objects  of  in- 
vestigation, besides  the  (2)  "impossible  objects  "  and  (3)  objec- 
tives already  mentioned. 

Now  it  is  this  making  metaphysics  a  division  of  "  Gegen- 
.standsthecjrie,"  this  considering  of  existence  as  simply  a  ,s;>cc(V.y 
of  being,  this  substitution  of  ideal  "  superiora  "  for  existent 
things,  that  i-;  the  mark  of  abstractionism  which  attracts  our 
attention  in  this  particular  system,  and  which  may  be  taken  to 
indicate  at  once  an  abstract  logical  realism,  and  that  of  which 
it  is  th(>  simple  converse,  an  abstract  logical  idealism.  We  should 
have  no  hesitation  in  classing  Meinoiig  as  a  logical  realiM,  were 
it  not  that  he  speaks  of  his  abstractions  as  not  existing,  not  be- 
ing real,  but  as  simply  suhsiMimj  as  "superiora,"  ideal  objects 
of  a  higher  order,  their  existence  as  alwtracfions  in  the  mind 
l)eing  dismissed  as  "  pseudo-existence."  »  But  when  we  find  ex- 
istence itself  taken  as  an  "objective"  simply,^  we  see  that  the 

'  Ueher  die  Erfahrunomundlagen,  otc,  dp.  55  ff. :   Uvhvr  dlr  Hl.llutm  Pfo.   dd 
97,  100.  ^^ 

«Cf.  alsothf  pssay  by  R.  .\initk^.<l..T,  a  disciple  of  M,  itioiiK,  in  Untersuchungm, 
etc. 


THE    DISINTEGRATION   OP   IDEALISM 


205 


i 


escape  from  logical  realism  is  merely  verbal,  while  the  fact  of 
the  abstract  logical  idealism  becomes  indisputable. 

Now  we  have  no  .f-iection  to  urge  against  the  main  content 
of  this  so-call    !  "<, egoist  .;:^'lstheorie."     Let  the  philosopher 
busy  himself  v   th  the  iiiv  'sti,'  tion  of  "  impossible  objects,''  if 
he  will,  and  in  ^^r  "ight'^iiiug  ^ut  his  thinking  in  connection  with 
such  paradoxes  a.  .»;it   '  t^.-re  are  objects  of  which  it  is  true  to 
say  that  there  are  no  such  objects."'     Only,  we  would  msist, 
let  it  be  recognized  that  "  Gegonstandstheori(«  "  deals  with  ab- 
stractions; and  if  the  concrete  existences  of  metaphysics  are 
to  be  interpreted  from  the  point  of  view  of  "  Gegenstandstheorie," 
it  is  nothing  but  fair  that  its  abstract  entities  should  be  reinter- 
preted in  terms  of  metaphysics,  and  "subsistence"  reduced 
either  to  existence  in  certain  relations,  but  indc^pcndently  of 
mind,  or  to  simple  non-existence  independently  of  mind,  which 
would  mean,  of  course,  existence  only  in  dependence  upon  the 
conscious  process  in  and  by  which  it  was  thought.     Only  in  this 
way  can  th  jse  paradoxes  be  solved,  into  which  "  Gegenstands- 
theorie "  is  bound  to  run,  such  as  that  there  are  objects  which 
are  not,  i.e.  which  do  not  even  subsist.     "  Gegenstandstheorie," 
attempting  to  solve  this  puzzle,  can  only  seek  to  discover  some 
new  Seinsobjektiv  which  would  be  neither  "  that  it  exists  "  nor 
"  that  it  subsists."     But  metaphysics  makes  short  work  of  the 
paradox  by  simply  pointing  out  that  the  first  "are"  means 
"  exist  as  thought-construct  in  mind,"  while  the  second  means 
"exist  independently  of    the  thought  which  thinks  them." 
Thus  to  subordinate  "Gegenstandstheorie"  to  metaphysics  is 
fatal  at  once  to  those  twin  forms  ot   abstractionism,  logical 
realism  and  logical  idealism.     We  would  admit,  to  be  sure,  that 
the  way  in  which  Meinong   makes  the  existent  or  reality  a 
species  of  being  (other  forms  of  which,  besides  the  possibly  ex- 
istent, are  the  merely  subsistent  and  the  absurd  or  impossible) 
obscures  the  logical  realism,  since  it  makes  it  possible  to  avoiil 
saying  that  these  impressible  and  merely  subsistent  objects,  and 
especially  these  objectives,  are  real  (in  the  sense  of  exist)  ;  the 
logical  realism,  although  prominent,  is  disguised.     The  logical 
idealism,  on  the  contrary,  while  less  consvicnous,  is  more  un- 
disguised.    Logic  and  metaphysics  are  not  identified,  as  with 

•  Unteraurhungcn,  etc.,  p.  9. 


i 
I 


'Hi  f  ■'."»'(*«.  ■'•,*■ 


t"  h 


'  t:|3 


if  I,: 


i  f 


J'-' 

Mi! 


,#. 


h:: 


;'i!:l! 


' 


206 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   KNOWLEDGE 


Hegel ;  rather  is  it  that  the  former  usurps  the  throne  rightfully 
belonging  to  the  latter.  Reality  is  not  the  concrete  universal, 
as  with  Hegel ;  rather  i.s  it  for  Meinong,  ever  since  he  emerged 
from  his  early  "  psycliologism,"  i  essentially  constituted,  as  are 
all  other  "objects,"  of  abstract  universals." 

Before  passing  to  a  brief  consideration  of  the  third  general 
type  of  idealistic  thought  resulting  from  the  disintegration  of 
idealism  in  its  more  highly  composite  forms,  it  may  be  well  to 
refer  to  the  philosophy  of  C.  M.  Bakewell,  which  partakes  of 
the  nature  of  both  of  the  types  already  examined  in  this  chap- 
ter. Influenced  on  the  one  hand  by  Howison's  pluralism,  and 
on  the  other  hand  by  Platonic  and  neo-Kantian  ideaUsm, 
Bakewell  seems  cla.ssifiable  either  as  a  personal  ideahst  or  as  a 
representative  of  what  we  have  called  abstract  idealism.  The 
interesting  question  is  whether  or  not  the  two  views  are  really 
compatible  with  each  other.  If  not  incompatible,  their  union 
might  possibly  arrest,  for  some  time  at  least,  the  disintegration 
of  idealism. 

In  undertaking  to  defend  idealism  against  realistic  attacks 
Bakewell  repudiates  ps^-chological  idealism,  with  its  "unfor- 
Uinate  phrase,"  esse  est  percipi,  as  not  being  the  true  idealism. 
"Ideas,"  he  insists,  "are  not  mental  phenomena."  It  is  true 
enough  that  the  object  taken  as  the  "thing-as-immediately- 
apprehended"  is  "tantahzingly  subjective,"  but  objectivity  is 
a  "character  which  the  impression  acquires  in  being  thought." » 
Here  we  see  the  characteristically  modern  introduction  of  logi- 
cal idealism  into  psychological  idealism  in  order  to  transform 
subjective  idealism  into  an  idealism  that  shall  do  full  justice 
to  objectivity.  "The  solid  rock  of  fact  dissolves  into  the 
shifting  sands  of  sense,"  only,  it  is  held,  "in  so  far  as  [logical] 
ideas  are  extruded."  The  real  is,  as  the  Greeks  contended, 
the  "  idea  "  ;  it  .s  meaning  fulfilled.''  By  means  of  the  "  idea," 
then,  experience  is  made  universal,  public,  objective.     Reality 

•With  Hussorrs  polemic  -igainst  the  "  Psychologisten,"  Meinong  is  in  full 
sympathy.     &oe  Ahhandlungm,  pp.  501  ff. 

.^!!^'7:'  ^"^''1  '".''■^'  ''^  '"•'"^'""''d  h'^'-''  a.s  having  fallen,  apparently,  into  an 
abstract  logical  uleal.sm,  with  its  .iccompanying  logical  realism.    See  p.  .304,  infra 
509   5,1       ""  ""''  ^^^^^■"  Philosophical  R,,,.^,  Vol.  XVIII,  idOy,  pp.  505. 
♦/6.,  pp.  511-12. 


THE   DISINTEGRATION  OF  IDEALISM 


207 


is  universal  experience;  but  universal  experience  is  not  my 
experience,  nor  the  sum  of  all  our  experiences.  It  includes  all 
possible  experiences,  and  all  experiences  that  once  were,  but 
no  longer  are,  ible  experiences.     What  idealism  contends 

is  that  this  total  experiential  context  is  real.  And  yet  this 
experience  is  not,  and  never  could  be,  for  any  subject,  an 
experienced  fact.  The  concept  of  experience  is  transcendent 
of  experience.  It  includes,  for  example,  all  that  happened  on 
this  planet  before  there  were  any  minds  to  experience  it.' 

Here  then  we  seem  to  have  an  oscillation  between  an  idealism 
which  is  concrete  but  subjective  and  an  idealism  which  is 
objective  but  abstract,  between  my  experience  which  is  not  the 
objective  reality  and  an  objective  or  universal  "experience," 
most  of  which  is  not  experienced.  As  Bakewell  himself 
observes,  "all  of  a  sudden  this  experience  which  seemed  so 
objective  flashes  forth  ...  as  something  highly  subjective. 
It  is  just  as  when  gazing  steadily  at  an  intaglio  it  may  suddenly 
jump  forth  into  relief."  "Experience"  sometimes  means 
"private,  individual,  subjective,  all  my  own;  and  anon,  the 
objective  common  world  of  facts."  -  "When  one  find?  ""ne's  self 
in  this  condition,  one  must  run  for  the  other  fellow  ar  orrow 
his  vision  to  assure  one's  self  that  one  has  not  been  di  iming. 
Or  else  one  must  collect  one's  self,"  and  get  "  the  immediate 
experience  in  its  larger  experiential  context." ' 

The  orthodox  modern  idealistic  way  out  of  this  oscillation 
between  subjectivity  and  abstract  objectivity,  by  introducing 
an  all-experiencing  Absolute,  Bakewell  refuses  to  take.  He 
speaks  of  the  "impartial  spectator"  to  whom  we  refer  objec- 
tive experience.  Reality  is  experience  as  it  would  be  to  an 
impartial  observer ;  but  this  impartial  observer  is  a  fiction,  he 
is  my  own  other.''  The  only  real  transcendent  being  is  the  free 
inner  life  of  my  fellow-men  ;  reality  is  the  idea,  carried  up  into 
the  ideal,  the  joint  creation  of  many  minds.* 

This  type  of  idealism  seems  at  first  to  occupy  a  highly  de- 

>  "On  the  MeaninK  of  Truth,"  Philosophical  Rerietr,  XVII,  1908,  pp.  585-«i. 
'"The  Problem  of  Transcendence,"  Philosophical  Review,  XX,  1911,  p.  125. 
»/6. 

'lb.,  p.  126. 

•  "The  Ugly  Infinite  and  Good-for-NothiDg  Absolute,"  Phiiosophkal  Retieu), 
XVI,  1907,  p.  143. 


208 


THE   PROBLEM   OP   KNOWLEDGE 


:    i       i.   ', 


fciisibli'  position.  When  attack  is  made  against  tho  subjec- 
tivity of  porsorial  idealism,  recourse  is  had  to  the  objectivity 
and  universality  of  tlie  structures  of  rational  thought.  When 
the  structures  of  universal  thought  are  attacked  as  abstrac- 
tions, then  return  is  possib'e  to  the  concretenes'  ■"  personal 
experience.     But   neither  of  the  two  position^  oied  thus 

alternately  by  means  of  a  sort  of  undergrounc.  passage  is  by 
itself  imjiregnable.  If  one  refuses  to  accept  a  realistic  view, 
but  makes  "experience"  in  some  non-absolutistic  sense  his 
ultimate  metaphysical  category,  he  must  choose  between  "my 
experience"  (subjectivism)  and  unexperienced  "experience" 
(abstraetioni.sm),  or  else  keep  perpetually  hovering  between 
the  two  positions.  We  have  no  thought  of  questioning  the 
good  faith  of  the  philosopher  who.se  views  we  are  considering ; 
but  it  may  be  n>marked  tl.  it  all  determined  idealists  would  do 
wi.sely  to  note  the  tactical  advantages  of  some  such  alternating 
occupation  of  different  positions  during  this  time  of  general 
retreat  of  the  forces  of  idealism.  In  any  case,  what  makes 
the  view  criticised  especially  significant  at  this  point  in  our  dis- 
cussion is  the  fact  that  it  consists  in  holding  together  in  some- 
what loose  juxtaposition  two  of  the  elements  into  which  modern 
idealism  has  disintegrated,  viz.  subjective,  psychological  ideal- 
ism on  the  one  hand  and  abstract,  logical  idealism  on  the  other. 
The  third  element,  the  mystical  or  religious  idealism,  is  allowed 
to  lapse,  apparently  as  being  of  no  philosophical  value. 

There  is  one  remaining  type  of  idealism  which  may  be  re- 
garded as  an  outcome  of  the  disintegration  of  absolute  idealism 
into  its  original  elements.  It  is  the  spiritual  or  religious  ideal- 
ism to  which  many  cling  for  its  supposed  religious  and  moral 
value.  It  is  an  approach  to  the  original  mystical  idealism, 
although  not  a  return  to  it.  It  may  be  regarded  as  a  relic  of 
the  original  mystical  basis  of  idealism.  Of  this  type  of  thought 
Rudolf  Eucken  and  his  English  disciple,  W.  R.  Boyce  Gibson, 
may  be  taken  as  furnishing  an  illustration. 

Eucken  carefully  distinguishes  his  "new  idealism"  from 
"immanental  idealism,"  that  intellectualistic  idealism  which 
would  obliterate  spiritual  distinctions  and  reduce  all  to  degrees 
of  rationality.  But  even  this  n'jected  form  of  idealism  is  appre- 
ciated   for   its   emphasis   upon    inwardness,   in   opposition   to 


THE   DISINTEGRATION   OP   IDEALISM 


209 


naturalism.'     Euckcn  docs  not  stop  to  make  explicit  correction 
of  the  logical  errors  of  the  subjectivism  with  which  this  "in- 
wardness" is  associated.     There  is  simply  a  consciousness  of 
the  disparity  between  ordinary  idealism  and  the  philosophy  of 
the  spiritual  life,  and  so  the  term  "idealism"  is  discounted  as 
an  "outworn  expression."     What  we  would  inquire,  however, 
is  whether  what  Eucken  is  really  interested  in  is  not  spiritual 
realism;   and  if  so,  whether  such  a  philo.sophy  is  really  so  in- 
compatible with  physical  realism  as  Euckcn  seems  to  suppose. 
Boyce  Gibson,  under  the  influence  of  English  absolute  and 
personal  ideali-sm,  as  well  as  under  the  spell  of  Eucken 's  spiritual 
philosophy,  commits  himself  more  fully  to  idealism  than  does 
his  master.     He  calls  his  own  position  "radically  idealistic." - 
Moreover,  he  does  not  hesitate  to  describe  his  own  view,  which 
he  takes  to  be  that  of  Eucken  also,  as  "religious  idealism." 
Indeed,  there  is  a  distinct  suggestion  of  mysticism  as  the  source 
of  the  philosophy  in  question.     "Fruition,  the  intimate  realiza- 
tion of  God's  presence  .  .  .  authorizes   the   conviction,"   he 
claims,  "that  God  is  with  us,"  and  forms,  in  his  opinion,  the 
very  essence  of  Eucken's  philosophy  of  life'    The  whole  re- 
ligious life  is  interpreted  as  a  participation  in  the  life  of  God ;  * 
and  inasmuch  as  all  spiritual  life  is  interpreted  as  "a  religious 
endeavor  —  a  striving  with  God  for  the  realization  of  a  God- 
Heaven  or  Spiritual  Worlil,"  »  we  can  see  how  there  is  sug- 
gested the  importance  of  retaining,  at  least  in  its  "spiritual" 
essentials,  that  philosophy  which  has  been  most  insistent  upon 
the  "union  of  the  human  and  the  divine."'    There  is  prac- 
tically nothing  left,  strictly  speaking,  of  either  psychological 
or  logical  idealism;    only  the  mystical  element  remains,  and 
but  a  residue  of  that.     The  result  is  a  philosophical  view  which, 
at  least  until  the  knowledge-value  of  religious  experience  has 
been  philosophically  vindicated,  must  appear  to  the  philosopher, 
whether  he  be  realist  or  idealist,  as  utterly  dogmatic. 

In  view,  then,  of  the  considerations  which  have  been  urged 

1  C:  ■iatianily  and  the  New  Idealism,  Eng.  Tr.,  1909 ;  The  Meaning  and  Value 
of  Life  Eng.  Tr.,  1910,  pp.  11-18,  130-38  ;  Life's  Basis  and  Life's  Ideal,  Eng.  Tr., 
1911,  pp.  15-22,  99  ff. ,  Main  Currents  of  Modem  Thought.  Eng.  Tr  ,  1012,  pp. 
99-115. 

'God  With  Us,  1909,  p.  161.  '  lb.,  PP.  xiv,  xvi. 

*Ib.,  p.  .n3.  *Ib.,  p.  108.  *Ib. 


I'  * 


■u  •  ;  i 


i 


H,' 


ft; 


'If 


1M,^ 


^i 


210 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   KNOWLEDGE 


against  itlcalLstie  cpistonioloKy  in  its  various  forms,  we  would 
claim  that  the  bunion  of  proof,  which  has  been  so  cheerfully 
taken  up  by  the  idealists  themselves,  still  rests  upon  their 
shoulders  as  an  undischarRcd  obligation.  In  each  of  its  ele- 
mental types  and  in  all  of  their  possible  combinations,  it  has 
been  found  artificial,  fallacious,  and  dogmatic.  It  is  not  to  be 
accepted,  even  as  a  way  of  escape  from  agnosticism,  if  any 
more  natural  and  rational  course  can  be  discovered. 


t      I 


'*i 


I   t    I 


:( 


,  :  r,  \^ 


«  , 


3.    A  CRITIQUE  OF  THE  NEW  REALISM 


CHAPTER  X 


Antecedents  of  the  New  Realism 


We  have  now  exaininod  critically  both  realistic  epistemo- 
logical  dualism  and  idealistic  epistcmological  monism,  with 
the  result  that  both  are  shown  to  be  unsatisfactory  as  theories 
of  knowledge.  We  must  next  turn  to  realistic  epistemological 
monism,  our  definition  of  which  may  be  taken  from  the  report 
of  the  Committee  on  Definitions  of  the  1911  meeting  of  the 
American  Philosophical  Association.  "  Epistemological  monism 
and  realism"  is  there  defined  as  the  view  "thit  perceived 
objects  are  sometimes  real  and  sometimes  not  real ;  and  real 
objects  are  sometimes  perceived  and  sometimes  not  perceived"  ; 
or,  perhaps  more  characteristically,  "that  the  real  object  and 
the  perceived  object  are  at  the  moment  of  perception  numeri- 
cally one,  and  that  the  real  object  may  exist  at  other  moments 
apart  from  any  perception."  * 

But  before  proceeding  further  it  may  be  well  to  indicate 
that  within  epistemological  monism  and  realism  it  is  important 
to  make  a  further  subdivision,  distinguishing  between  what 
wo  may  call  dogmatic  *  realism,  or  realistic  absolute  monism  in 
epistemology,  in  which  it  is  held  that  "secondary"  or  sense- 
qualities  are  independent  of  relation  to  a  sensing  subject,  and 
on  the  other  hand,  critical  realism,  or  critical  realistic  monism 
in  epistemology,  in  which  it  is  held  that  secondary  qualities 
are  dependent  upon  that  relation  for  their  existence.  That 
critical  realism  is  compatible  with  epistemologi.al  monism  will 
be  maintained  in  the  constructive  part  of  our  discussion  of 
"the  problem  of  acquaintance";    for  the  present  we  shall  be 

'Jmtmal  of  Philosophy,  etc..  Vol.  VIII,  1911,  p.  70.3. 

•Thp  justification  of  this  epithet,  which  at  lctt.«t  one  of  the  nco-realists  hns 
"xplicitly  invited,  will  appear  as  we  proceed.    See,  especially,  p.  309,  in/ra. 

211 


212 


THE   PROBLEM   OP   KXOWLEDC.E 


ty 


'! 


■it' 


coiHTrnod  with  n-alistic  al)solu((>  cpistonioIoKical  monism,  or 
opistcmological  monism  and  do^nnatic  roalism,  of  which  point 
of  View  the  best  ilhjstration  is  to  ho  found  in  the  "now  roaUsm" 
of  oontompoiaiy  ICnglish  and  Am(>iioan  philosophical  thought. 
It  manifestly  intends  to  dofond  not  only  tho  numerical  identity 
of  the  real  object  and  the  object  perceivo(i,  Init  also,  as  far  as 
possible,  their  qimlilnthc  identity.  Its  ideal,  as  intimated,  is 
an  absolute  epistemolofiical  monism  of  tho  realistic  type.  In 
the  present  chapter  we  shall  deal  only  with  the  antecedents 
of  this  now  roalism,  including  under  this  caption,  first,  naive 
roalism  an.l  t!i.>  '•natural  reaL.m"  or  "philosophy  of  common 
son.so"  of  the  Scottish  .school,  and  thereafter,  the  disguised 
forms  of  psycholouMcal  and  logical  idealism,  which  may  bo 
regarded  as  transitional  forms  be;\\oon  psychological  and  logical 
idealism  proper  and  corresponding  phases  „f  the  new  realism. 

Concerning  naive  realism  not  much  needs  to  bo  said  in  this 
connection.     Meaning  by  this  term  tho  view  of  ind(>pendcnt 
reality  taken  by  tiio  non-philosophical  "plain  man,"  it  should 
be  pointed  out  that  it  is  not  a  <lofinitelv  formulated  doctrine 
but  rather  a  practical  attitu.Ie.     It  involves,  in  the  first  pla.-o' 
viewing  the  object  as  if  it  permanently  pos.sos.sod,  whether  per- 
ceived  ()r   not,   tho  qunliti.-s.   secondary  as  well   as  primary, 
which  It  has  under  normal  or  usual  conditions  of  ob^.   vation' 
Under  unusual   conditions  of  obseuation,   however,   some  of 
these  suppos..dly   permanent   qualiti.'s  niav   not   appear,   and 
others  incompatible  with  th<>m  may  oven  appear  in  their  place 
as  in  the  case  <.f  tho  at)parent  bon<i  in  the  straight  stick  partly 
i.:imer.sed  in  water,  or  in  tliat  of  the  darker  shade  of  objects 
seen  in  dim  light.     Thos,<  unusual  appearances  are  not  regard(>d 
as  permanent  c,uaiities  of  tho  independent  object,  but  as  mere 
appearances,  from  which  one  can  ju.lge  what  tho  true  quality 
really  is.     Rut  ,f  the  question  bo  raised  as  to  tho  justification 
for  supposing,  on  th..  on(>  hand,  that  tho  more  usual  appearance 
IS  id(.ntical  with  what  the  object  really  is  (whether  perceived 
or  not,  and  even  with  what  it  is  when  percoive.l  and  appearing 
difTorontly).  and  for  supposing,  on  tho  other  hand,  that  unusual 
appearances  whidi  are  incompatible  with  the  usual  ones  arc 
not  real  qualities  of  th,-  object  at  all,  then,  in  the  very  raising 
of  tho  question  tho  realism,  if  it  is  retained  at  all,  ceases  at 


ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE   NEW   REALISM 


213 


once  to  be  naivp,  iukI  l)op;iiis  to  bo  philosophical.  It  should 
i)c  said  further,  however,  that  the  naive  realist  does  not  always 
notu-e  that  qualities  which  he  regards  as  independently  real 
are  mutuallj*  incompatible,  for  the  reason,  it  may  be,  that 
both  appearances  are  almost  equally  common,  as,  for  example, 
the  rising  inflection  of  the  whistle  of  the  locomotive  when  it  is 
approaching,  and  the  falling  inflection  when  it  is  .eceding. 
This  means  t  lat  at  different  times  our  naive  realist  would 
assert  the  independent  reality  (involving,  logically,  the  exis- 
tential concurrence)  of  qualities  which  a  moment's  reflection 
would  show  to  be  incompatible  with  each  other.  The  explana- 
tion of  this  is  that  "naive  realism  does  not  bother  itself  to  carry 
any  idea  about  with  it  that  is  not  essential  for  practice."  ' 

In  the  Scottish  "philosophy  of  common  sense,"  or  "natural 
realism,"  we  have  the  attempt  to  defend  philo.sophically,  as 
far  as  possible,  naive  points  of  view.  The  real  founder  and 
most  typical  representative  of  the  school  was  Thomas  Reid. 
First  led  to  suspect  the  subjectivistic  and  dualistic  "principles 
commonly  received  among  philosophers"  (especially  Locke 
and  his  followers)  by  the  conclusions  drawn  therefrom  by 
Hume  in  his  Treatise  of  Human  Nature,- he  attempted  to  return 
to  the  naive  convictions  of  the  plain  man,  especially  as  they 
are  embodied  in  common  language,  and  to  exhibit  these  in 
organized  form  and  defend  them  as  philosophically  respectable. 
His  main  objec*  of  attack  is  what  he  calls  the  "doctrine  of 
ideas,"  viz.  th(  dualistic  or  representative  theory  of  knowledge, 
the  theory  that  in  all  cognition,  even  in  perception,  what  we 
know  directly  is  never  the  independ(>nt  object  itself,  but  always 
only  a  mental  content,  produced  by  *he  knower  to  represent 
that  independent  object,  and  coming  between  the  mind  and 
the  material  object  supposed  to  be  perceived.  No  solid  proof, 
ho  claims,  has  ever  been  advanced  of  the  existence  of  ideas ; 
they  are  a  mere  fiction  and  hypothesis  contrived  to  solve  the 
phenomena  of  the  human  understanding ;  and  yet  they  do  not 
at  all  answer  this  end,  but  give  rise  to  paradoxes  and  scepticism.' 

'  D.  S.  Miller.  "Xalvc  Realism;  What  is  It?"  in  Essays  ...  in  Honor  of 
William  James.  190S,  p.  2'->H. 

'  Hiid's  Collected  Wrilings,  edited  by  Hamilton,  p.  91. 

•  An  In^iHiry  into  the  Hiimnn  Mind,  Collected  Writings,  106a;  cf.  127a,  141b- 
142b;  On  the  Intellectual  Powers,  ib.,  302b. 


214 


THE    PROBLEM   OF   KNOWLEDGE 


?: 


Now  in  Ins  opix.sitio.i  f„  tlu-  (l..ctrii.(>  of  u  purely  roproson- 
tativc  pmrption  and  in  maintaining  the  possil>iiitv  and  actuality 
of  nnmodiatc  perception,  Hei.j  was,  we  would  claim,  on  the  right 
track.     But    his   nood    int.'iitions   were   not    very   successfully 
carried  out.     In  the  first  ,)lace  he  undoubtedly  carried  his  re- 
action apainst  "idea.s"  much  too  far.     H,>  claim.;  that  in  nu-mory 
and  in  thouRht  of  the  future  or  of  a  di.sfant  object,  the  original 
e.xperience,  the  possible  future  eyent,  and   the  absent  obj.Tt 
arc  all  known,   not   mcliately,   through  images  or  ideas,  but 
nnmcdiately.'     A  moment's  consideration  of  the  fact  ofVrro- 
neous  thought  ought  to  haye  taught  him  that  these  processes 
are  mediate,  or  repivsentational ;    the  object   thought  of  not 
being  ind(>pendently  real,  it  must  be  something  whi<-h  d,>pends 
upon  the  thought-process  for  such  reality  as  it  h;is  •    in  other 
words,  ,t  must  b,.  mere  "idea."     But   a  thought   which  rcas 
erroneous,  may,  when  repeated  at  a  later  time,  be  now  true 
by  virtue  of  a  change-  in  indepen.lent  reality  without  any  essen- 
tial Chan,       vithin  the  thought  itself.     In  such  a  case    if  the 
earlier  in.     -diate  object  of  thought   was  an   i.lea,   the  later 
immediate  object  of  thought  must  be  an  "idea"  also  — al- 
though, of  course,  it  need  not  be  thought  of  as  an  idea  •    it  is 
only  Its  mediate  object  which  is  a  thing.     (To  be  more  explicit 
wo  know  the  thing,  but  mcliatcly,  by  means  of  an  idea,  which 
we  know  immediately,  although  wo  do  not  neces.sarilv  make  it 
a  subject-matter  concerning  which  we  judge.)     Reid's  doctrine 
of  an  unmodiatod  awareness  in  all  cognition  is  thus  an  easily 
refuted  dogma. 

Heid  goes  far  towarri  the  view  (to  be  defended  later  in  this 
book)    that   consciousness  is  p.sychical   activity.     For   instance 
he  says  that  in  sensation  the  distinction  between  the  act  and  the 
object  IS  merely  grammati.-al,  while  in  perception  the  distinc- 
tion is  not  grammatical  only,  but  also  real.^    That  he  fails 
however,  to  .see  that  it  is  a  crealire  activity,  and  so  is  unable  to 
arrive  at  any  clear  view  on  this  point,  is  evident  from  the  way 
m  which  he  deals  with  objects  (jf  imagination.     These,  he  claims 
must  be  ol)jects  distinct  from  the  operation  of  the  mind  concer.n- 

•  Inquiry,  Collected  Writinga,  lS.3a. 


ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE   NEW   REALISM 


215 


ing  thorn;  the  iniafriimtion  (iiuaKiniiiK)  of  a  centaur  is  one 
thing,  and  the  centaur  imagined,  with  its  various  (lualitics,  is 
another.'  Here  he  seems  i  the  way  to  teach  some  sort  of 
inrh'pendent  reaUty  in  imaginary  objects,  doubtless  for  the 
reason,  as  it  nuist  have  seemed  to  him,  that  if  conscious  activity 
were  regard<'d  as  '-reative  of  its  object  ii\  imagination,  it  ought 
logically  to  Ix"  siniilarly  regarded  in  perception,  and  this  would 
have  been  fatal  to  natural  realism.  His  glimpse  of  the  impor- 
tant doctrine  of  consciousness  as  psychical  activity  consequently 
remained  largely  unfruitful. 

But  Ueid  is  also  to  be  criticised  in  connection  with  his  doctrine 
of  perception.  His  treatment  of  the  different  senses  is  incon- 
sistent. In  color-vision  the  color-quality  is  said  to  be  inde- 
pendently real,  while  in  the  perception  of  smell  the  external 
reality  is  merely  the  effluvia,  the  quality  being  a  quality  of  the 
sensation,  i.e.  of  a  mental  act.  Similirly,  when  a  pain  is  felt 
in  any  part  of  the  body,  the  pain  is  not  an  extra-mental  reality, 
but  a  sensation  or  feeling.^  We  have  no  quarrel  with  the  inter- 
pretation of  sensation  as  a  psychical  activity,  but  if  it  is  to  be 
regarded  as  productive  of  the  .sense-quality  in  the  case  of  smell 
and  pain,  there  seems  no  logical  reason  for  denying  that  it  does 
the  same  in  the  case  of  color-vision.  Hence  Reid's  doctrine  of 
the  external  and  independent  reality  of  color-qualities  seems 
purely  dogmatic.  Dogmatic,  we  would  say,  becau.so,  while  the 
physical  scientist  has  to  posit  the  primary  qualities  of  bodies  — 
or  other  qualities  corresponding  to  them,  point  by  point  —  in 
order  to  be  able  to  formulate  the  laws  of  his  science,  he  finds  no 
reason  to  assume  the  independent  existence  of  color-qualities  at 
all.  But  Reid  goes  further,  and  speaks  of  the  changing  color-ap- 
pearances of  an  object  as  "ideas,"  produced  by  the  unchanging 
objective  color.'  Now  there  is  no  universal  principle  by  the  ap- 
plication of  which  he  can  make  this  discrimination  ;  the  shade 
which  is  taken  as  objectively  real  depends  upon  the  purely  acci- 
dental fact  of  the  intensity  of  the  light  in  which  the  object  is  cus- 
tomarily viewed,  and  the  whole  distinction  is  therefore  dogmatic. 

i  Intellectual  Powers,  ib.,  292b.  3S5a,   298b,  373a,  374b;    see  Hamilton's 
comments,  ib.,  813. 

« Inquiry,  ib.,  137a,  b,  1 14a,  183a  ;  Intellectual  Powers,  ib.,  318-20. 
*  Inquiry,  ib.,  137b-138b. 


216 


THE   PROBLEM  OP   KNOWLEDGE 


it  I 


I-    'I I 


i) 
■( 


But  once  more,  as  Flaiiiiltoii  has  v,>ry  fullv  poinfcd  out,' 
Held  IS  a.iistautly  oscillating  hctwccu  flic  doctrines  of  imiiicdi- 
atc  and  nidiatc  |HTccpf  ion.     hi  spite  <,f  fiis  intended  iinmediat- 
ism  he  sjM'aks  of  our  sensations  as  the  si^is  of  external  objects, 
the  mind  passing  inunediatcly  —  eilhcr  hy  original  principles 
of  our  constitution,  or  hy  custom,  or  hy  reason i ng  —  from 'the 
sensation  or  appearance  of  the  sign  to  the  conception  and  belief 
of  the   thing  siKnified.=     Even   extension   and   other   primary 
qualities  are  said  to  U-  (jualities  smjycsUd  to  us  hy  the  sensation 
of  touch.'    The  explanation  of  this  oscillation,   which  is  so 
balfluiK  to  the  interpreter,  .seems  to  lie  in  the  fact  that  Ileid 
was  remarkably  consistent  in  the  attempt  to  follow  th(«  u-sagcs 
of  common  lanKuaK<«  as  a  Kuiding  star  to  the  desired  haven  of  u 
philo.sophy  of  common  sense.     But  inasmuch  as  common  lan- 
Ruage  uses  many  prepsychological  notions  aad  occupies  various 
mutually  inconsistent  points  of  view,  the  guiding  star  proves 
to  be  in  the  end  a  will-o'-the-wisp,   leading  our  philosopher 
whither  no  di.scieet  thinker  will  care  to  follow  hiru. 

But,  besides  developing  this  presentationisin  which  we  have 
just  examined,  Ueid  formulated  an  intellectual  intuitionism, 
which  has  been  carried  to  great  lengih-  by  the  later  adherents 
of  the  Scottish  .school,  notably  by  James  McCosh*  and  Noah 
Porter.*  He  not  only  speaks  of  judgments  ex  -essing  the 
o.Mstence  of  what  is  perceived  as  being  "originaran.j  natural 
judgments"  which  are  "a  part  of  that  furniture  which  Nature 
hath  given  to  the  human  understanding,"  and  also  as  being  "the 
inspiration  of  the  Almighty";*  he  .speaks  in  the  .same  way  of 
these  "axioms,"  '•fir.t  principles,"  "principles  of  .-ommon 
sense,"  "common  notions,"  or  "self-evident  truths,"  for  which 
he  claims  the  universal  consent  of  mankind.'  Of  fhe.se  he  gives 
a  formidable  but  confessedly  incomplete  list,  beginning  with  the 

1892!^pi?  Se^J.""'  "'""'""•  ''^^'^'    ^''  ^  ^  ^"'**'''  ''^^  P^<^°'0P^y  of  Reid. 
^  Inquinj,  ih.,         v;   ef.  122a. 

ihil  fh".  R^'!,-  *■  ,  ^'"''"'f '"'  ^""•'^«'  if>-  PP-  '""S  B  It  is  in  ,.a.s8.-,ges  Buch  as 
this  that  Reid  s  sulatautiMham  romes  to  expression.  Most  noo-n-alists  are  too 
posU.v.st.c  to  be  able  to  a^ree  with  the  earlier  thinker  at  this  point,  and  «-era 
co.«er,„en.ly  to  h:.ve  achieved  :wnnr.  nv.a.lic;  >.pi.t.nioiogy. 

•  The  Intuitions  «/  the  Mind,  M  ed.,  1«72. 

»  The  Human  Intdkct,  1868,  Part  I'v. 

'  Invuiry,  ib.,  209.  -  Intellectual  I'ou-r,.  ih.,  425,  434,  456. 


ANTECEDENTS  OP  THE   NEW  REALISM 


217 


affirmation  of  "th»>  existence  of  everything  of  which  I  am  con- 
scious," ami  ending  with  tlie  |)roposition  "that  design  and 
intelligence  in  the  cause  may  Ix-  inferred,  with  certainty,  from 
marks  or  signs  «)f  it  in  the  effect."  '  Now  it  is  Ueid's  doctrine 
that  these  self-evident  truths  are  deriv<-d,  not  f mm  experience 
hut  from  "common  sense,"  or  "judgment,"  and  that  they 
have  an  authority  which  is  also  independent  of  exporipncc* 
But  this  position,  in  the  light  of  genetic  and  instriunental  logic, 
is  easily  seen  to  Ik'  uns(  ieiitific  tind  dogmatic.  In  fact,  it  has 
long  sinc(!  been  discredited,  and  needs  not  to  ho  elaborately  criti- 
cised here. 

Th<>  new  form  of  epistemological  monism  and  reali.sm  which 
has  sprung  up  within  recent  years  —  the  .so-called  new  realism 
—  includes  air  .''g  its  adherents  a  c;  -isiderable  number  of 
Kiiili.sh  and  American  philosophers.  •;  '"  the  English  new 
nalists  may  be  mentioned  L.  T.  Hob..  (who  may  be  re- 

garded as  in  some  "-espects  a  forerunner,  but  in  other  respects 
a  representative  oi  the  movement),  Bertrand  Ilu.ssell,  G.  E. 
Moore,  S.  Alexander,  T.  P.  Nunn,  A.  Wolf,  and,  as  a  recent 
convert,  C.  V.  Stout.  Among  the  Americans  .some  of  those 
most  prominently  as.sociated  with  the  new  philosophy  are  F.  J. 
E.  Woodbridge,  C.  8.  Fullerton,  E.  B.  McGilvary,  and  six 
others  who  have  coll  borated  in  the  interest  of  the  movement, 
viz.  R.  B.  Perry,  \V.  P.  Montague,  E.  B.  Holt,  W.  T.  Marvin, 
\V.  B.  Pitkin,  and  E.  G.  Spaulding.  Others  occupy  transitional 
positions  between  oMer  views  and  the  new  realism,  and  a  large 
number  of  psychologists  have  adopted  a  view  of  consciousness 
which  brings  them  naturally  into  consideration  in  connection 
with  this  philosophical  group. 

The  factors  which  have  entered  into  the  genesis  of  this  neo- 
realism  are  very  many.  First  of  all  may  be  mentioned  the 
influence  of  the  positive  sciences.  Their  definite  and  univer- 
sally acceptable  results  have  contrasted  strongly  with  the 
chaos  of  conflicting  individual  opinions  on  most  phiIoso{)hical 
prol)lems.  It  was  sugg(>sted  that  the  realistic  attitude  adopted, 
"naively"  or  tentatively,  by  these  .sciences  was  perhaps  truer 
than  that  of  the  critical  or  idealistic  philosophy  which  under- 
took to  furnish  a  more  adequate  "ultimate"  point  of  view. 

>/6..  441  61.  »/6..  116,  425. 


i  - 


*l^ 


218 


THE  PROBLEM  OP   KNOWLEDGE 


r 


M 


In  the  later  stages  of  the  movement,  of  the  sciences,  psychology 
at  the  one  extremo  and  pure  mathematics  at  the  other  have 
been  strongly  influential.  Certain  metaphysical  problems 
have  p(>rsiste(l  in  making  themselves  felt  in  connection  with 
psychological  theory.  These  have  grown  largely  out  of  the 
fact  that  there  seemed  to  be  an  overlapping  of  the  fields  of 
p.sychology  and  the  physical  sciences.  When  the  psychologist 
undertook  to  investigate  the  "content  of  consciousness"  he 
was  dealing  in  large  part  with  the  same  material  with  which 
the  physicist  was  concerned.  The  problem  as  to  the  field 
of  psychology,  and  so,  ultimately,  as  to  the  nature  of  con- 
sciousness, demanded  attention.  In  connection  with  the 
influence  of  mathematics,  Bertrand  Russell's  name  is  the 
one  of  chief  importance.  As  we  shall  see,  certain  of  the  most 
characteristic  doctrines  of  the  more  extreme  neo-rcalists 
(among  whom  most  of  the  six  "programmists"  already  alluded 
to  would  have  to  be  included)  are  due  to  f!ie  carrying  over  of 
the  methods  of  pure  mathematics  into  the  ueld  of  logic,  and  so 
into  the  bordei  land  of  philosophy. 

But  more  internal  influences  'lave  been  at  work  in  recent 
philosophical  thought,  which  must  be  considered  if  the  genesis 
of  the  new  realism  is  to  l)e  explained.  Of  these,  the  evident 
disintegration  of  absolute  idealism  has  been  one  of  the  most 
potent,  .\fter  Bradley's  destructive  work  from  within  the 
main  presuppositions  of  the  system  itself,  everything  seemed 
to  invite  to  a  ren.-w.il  of  the  attempt  to  develop  a  realistic 
philosophy,  such  as  was  undertaken  in  sober  and  fairly  critical 
fashion  by  L.  T.  Hobhouse.  But  apparently  the  more  general 
course  of  philosopiiical  tiiought  was  from  absolute  idealism  to 
realism  by  way  of  personal  idealism  and  pragmatism.  The 
criticisms  made  by  tli(\se  philosophies  against  the  orthodox 
British  and  American  neo-IIcgelianism  were  accepte<l  as  largely 
valid ;  but  the  tendency  of  personal  idealism  and  pragmatism, 
especially  of  the  type  represented  by  F.  C.  S.  Schiller,  (o  rettirn 
to  subjective  idealism,  was  felt  to  be  a  retrograde  movement  in 
philosophy.  G.  F.  Stout,  for  example,  at  first  deeply  influenced 
by  the  pluralistic  idealism  of  Janus  Ward,  and  himself  one  of  the 
personal  idealists,  finally  identified  himself  with  the  realistic 
movement.     Locally  influential  also  was  the  panpsychism  of 


ANTECEDENTS  OP  THE  NEW  REALISM 


219 


C.  A.  Strong's  Why  the  Mind  Has  a  Body,  in  opposition  to 
which  F.  J.  E.  Woodbridge  and  other  Columbia  University 
l)hilosophcrs  developed  further  their  realistic  tendencies. 

But  probably  the  best  way  of  understanding  the  genesis  of 
the  new  realism  is  to  view  it  as  the  joint  product  of  a  further 
disguise  of  disguised  psychological  idealism  on  the  one  hand 
and  disguised  logical  idealism  on  the  othcr.^  The  original 
relation  to  psychology  is  thus  represented  on  (he  one  side,  and 
tlie  relation  to  mathematics  on  the  other.  Of  these  two  tran- 
sitional philosophies  as  antecedents  of  the  new  realism  we  shall 
(leal  first  with  disguised  psychological  idealism.  What  we 
would  contend  is  that  the  new  realism  is  separated  from  its 
pet  aversion,  subjective  idealism,  by  the  "half-way  house"  of 
radical  or  immediate  empiricism.  This  "experience  philos- 
ophy" of  which  Mach,  Avenarius,  Wundt,  Hodgson,  James, 
and  Dewey  may  be  taken  as  representative,  is  essentially  transi- 
tional between  the  older  and  undisguised  psychological  idealism 
on  the  one  hand,  and  that  type  of  realistic  epistemological  mon- 
isui  which  calls  itself  the  new  realism  on  the  other.  This 
l)ecomes  evident  when  it  is  remembered  that  the  e.ssence  of 
that  older  or  overt  psychological  idealism  is  the  doctrine  that 
the  object  is  entirely  dependent  for  its  existence  upon  the  psy- 
chical subject,  and  that  the  ideal  of  the  new  realism  is  to  be 
able  to  maintain  that  the  objects  of  which  we  have  experience 
are  entirely  independent  of  their  being  experienced  by  any 
subject.  The  natural  transition  between  these  opposite  posi- 
tions is  the  view  called  variously  empiriocriticism,  and  pure, 
or  radical,  or  immediate  empiricism,  and  which  we  have  called 
disguised  psychological  idealisn.,  according  to  which  the  object 
is  dependent  upon  experience,  but  not  upon  the  subject,  ina.s- 
niuch  as  the  subject,  equally  with  the  ol)ject,  i.s  dependent  upon 
and  derived  from  a  pre-subjective  experience.  In  the  first 
instance,  as  we  have  already  seen,"  immediate  empiricism  arose 
as  a  peculiarly  thoroughgoing  application  of  the  principle  of 
psychological  idealism  —  its  application,  that  is,  to  the  subject 
as  well  as  to  the  object.     If  being  depends  upon  being  consciously 


•For  PKplnnatinn,  m'o.  in  connection  with  the   remainder  of  this  chapter, 
pp.  109-10,  aiul  84-5  above. 
'  Ch.  \'l,  supra. 


^     'ff.\'^'Vk  mi:i.-.-^'C---x'   1  •asiS*'-'rr»Pi*i&T.-ic'y 


r,-*-: 


220 


THE  PROBLEM  OP   KNOWLEDGE 


I  >< 


;■ 


; 


h 


If 


experienced  (as  object),  the  being  of  the  subject,  as  well  as  the 
being  of  the  o})ject,  depends  upon  its  being  consciously  experi- 
enced (as  object).     In  pure  empiricism  the  problem  of  tracing 
the  genesis  of  self-consciousness  becomes,  as  is  seen  conspicuously 
in  the  writings  of  Avenarius,  Wundt,  and  G.  H.  Mead,  the 
problem  .  "  the  genesis  of  the  self.     But  it  is  only  a  short  step 
from  this  to  saying  that  since  subject  and  object  alike  are 
dependent  for  their  being  upon  their  being  experienced,  the 
object  is  not  dependent  upon  its  being  experienced  by  a  previ- 
ously existing  subject,  especially  as  self-consciousness  seems 
to  be  later  in  being  developed  than  consciousness  of  things. 
Thus  by  easy  steps  we  have  the  transition  from  the  doctrine 
that  consciousness  creates  its  entire  content  to  the  equally 
extreme  view  that  consciousness  creates  no  part  whatever  of  its 
content.     To  resume,  when  the  principle  of  psychological  ideal- 
ism (the  doctrine  that  being  depends  upon  being  consciously 
experienced)  is  applied  to  objects,  not  including  the  subject, 
the  result  is  undisguised  psychological  idealism.     When  this 
principle  of  psychological  idealism  is  applied  to  the  subject 
(as  object)  as  well  as  to  other  objects,  we  have  the  philosophy  of 
pure    experience,    or    disguised    psychological    idealism.     But 
when  the  same  principle  is  applied  to  tb"  subject  alone,  the 
result  is  the  new  realism  in  its  most  es.sential  features.     The 
new  realism  may  thus  be  regarded  as  the  supposed  cure  of  the 
intellectual  disease  of  psychological  idealism  by  its  homeopathic 
treatment.     The  question  which  must  be  raised  is  whether  the 
cure  is  genuine,  or  whether  it  has  been  simply  an  obscuring  of 
the  original  symptoms. 

But  this  doctrine  of  the  genesis  of  the  new  realism  is  so  im- 
portant for  the  understanding  of  contemporary  epistemological 
parties  that  it  will  be  well  to  dwell  upon  it  at  some  length. 
The  influence  of  such  continental  writers  as  Mach,  Avenarius, 
and  Wundt  is  traceal)le  in  the  views  of  several  of  the  English 
and  Americnn  new  realists; '  l)ut  the  prophets  of  pure  empiri- 

■  On  the  aisKuisod  psyrholoRiral  idoalism  of  these  thinkers,  see  Ch.  VI, 
above.  On  the  influence  of  Mach,  see  R.  H.  Perry,  Prcucnt  Philo.wphical  Ten- 
dencicK.  p.  310.  On  .\venarius.  see  W.  T.  Hush,  .lr.rmri«.s  and  (he  Standpoint 
of  Pure  Eiprrirrire,  1<K)."),  and  N.  K.  Smith,  Avenarius  and  llie  Thilosophy  of 
Pure  Experi..nce,"  Afind,  N.S.,  Vol.  XV,  lOOO,  pp.  ViM.  140-60,  N.  K.  Smith, 
influenced  by  BerKSon  ua  well  as  by  Avenarius,  seems  to  be  somewhere  on  the 


ANTECEDENTS  OP  THE  NEW  REALISM 


221 


cism  who  have  had  the  greatest  honor  among  the  new  realists 
seem  to  have  been  those  of  their  own  country.  Many  American 
realists  acknowledge  the  decisive  influence  of  William  James 
or  of  John  Dewey,  and  what  James  and  Dewey  have  been  to 
American  thought,  Shadworth  Hodgson,  president  of  the  Aristo- 
telian Society  for  many  years  from  the  time  of  its  organization,  ' 
seems  to  have  been  to  several  of  the  members  of  that  organiza- 
tion, out  of  whose  discussions  English  new  realism  may  be  said 
to  have  arisen. 

Hotlgson  set  out  to  develop  a  non-idealistic  epistemological 
monism.  In  order  to  get  rid  of  "the  great  German  fog-genera- 
tor, the  Ding  an  sich,"  '  he  started,  like  Hume,  from  "an  analy- 
sis of  consciousness  without  assumptions,"  "a  subjective  analy- 
sis of  what  is  actually  experienced."  ^  Thereupon  he  seeks  to 
d(.  full  justice  to  the  objectivity  of  the  naive  point  of  view,  not 
by  adding  logical  to  psychological  idealism,  t.  .  was  done  by  the 
Hegelians,  with  "such  vapory  catchwords  as  The  Real  is  the 
Ratitmnl,  and  the  Rational  is  tfie  Real" ;'  but  by  finding  what 
objectivity  and  independent  reality  are  in  immediate  experi- 
ence, or  "face-to-face  perception."*  As  a  result  of  this  he 
goes  a  long  way  in  the  direction  of  a  realistic  epistemological 
monism,  often  using  language  which  almost  seems  to  require 
interpretation  from  that  point  of  view.  "All  consciousness," 
he  says,  "reveals  Being,"  *  and  Matter,  which,  in  the  context 
of  consciousness,  has  reality  oi..y  as  a  percept,  has  reality  also 
in  the  world  of  real  existence.'  What  this  object  of  conscious- 
ness is  "known  as,  or  what  it  is  in  consciousness"  ^  is  "  a  reality 
independent  of  the  existence  of  a  perceiving  consciousness,  and 
irrespective  of  the  fact  of  its  being  perceived  by  consciousness 

w.iy  from  a  philosophy  of  puro  expcricnro  to  a  monistic  realism.  Sec  article 
piititlcd,  "Subjectivism  and  Realism  in  Modern  Philosophy,"  Philosophical  Re- 
tiiw.  XVII.  1908,  pp.  138-48.  On  Wundt,  see  (i.  .S.  FuUerton,  in  Philosophical 
lieiitw,  XVIII,  1909,  pp.  319-31,  and  C.  H.  Judd's  "Radical  Empiricism  and 
Wundt's  Philosophy,"  Journal  of  Philosophy,  etc.,  Vol.  II,  1905,  pp.  169-76. 

'  Proceedings  of  the  Aristotelian  Societu,  1st  series.  Vol.  II,  No.  1,  Part  I, 
1.S91   2,  p.  7. 

»  The  Melnphysic  of  Experience,' IH9»,  Vol.  I,  pp.  18-19;  Proc.  Ariatot.  Soc., 
1903-4,  pp.  3,  .53,  r>(i. 

>  lb..  1891-2.  p.  4.  *  The  Metaphysic  of  Experience.  Vol.  I,  p.  29. 

'  Proc.  Ariatot.  Soc,  1891-2,  p.  52 ;   Metaphysic  of  Experience,  I,  p.  6. 

*Pruc.  Aristot.  Soc..  1891-2.  p.  7.  '  Mind,  N.S.,  Vol.  VI.  1897,  p.  236. 


^aasc^T.  x'sof?7EE»;a?*r*a^' 


iS'iiTrtfii 


m 


3 

^  t 


'i  ' 


i» 


!♦ 


*:i 


222 


THE   PROBLEM  OF   KNOWLEDGE 


or  not."  '  The  key,  such  as  it  is,  to  this  is  found  in  the  state- 
ment that  the  subject  of  consciousness  is  itself  real  only  in 
solf-consciousnoss ;  it  is  an  object ification  of  abstract  conscious- 
ness or  thought.*  The  doctrine  is  interpreted  in  realistic  fashion 
by  G.  E.  Moore,  as  meaning  "that  consciousness  is  in  no  sense 
a  constituent  of  reality,"  i.c.  in  other  words,  that  consciousness 
is  a  purely  external  relation  ;  ^  and  distinct  traces  of  Hodgson's 
influence  are  discoverable  in  the  realistic  doctrines  of  Moore 
himself,  as  also  of  Alexander,  Russell,  Stout,  and  others.  Hodg- 
son's seeming  realism,  however,  is  not  beyond  the  limits  of  pure 
empiricism,  or  a  veiled  psychologism.  The  idea  of  existence 
apart  from  knowledge  is  dismissed  as  a  "mirage,"  a  "common 
sense  prejudice."  *  What  is  meant  by  independent  reality, 
or  the  only  independent  reality  which  we  can  know,  is  the  con- 
tent of  the  just  previous  presentation  as  it  is  receding  into  the 
past  and  is  re  )rcscnted  by  the  present  perception.  To  be  per- 
ceived as  past  perception  is  to  be  perceived  as  object.*  By 
using  as  his  device  this  definition,  which  is  intended  to  state  what 
independent  reality  is  known  as,  it  is  claimed  that  there  is  no 
departure  from  tlie  principle  that  "all  Being  is  revealed  in 
consciousness,"  ^  nor  even  from  the  view  that  "there  is  nothing 
but  consciousness  in  the  univer.'ie "  ; '  the  world  has  been  con- 
structed "out  of  our  inner  consciousness."*  Hodgson's  posi- 
tion is  thus  really  psychological  idealism ;  but  it  was  early 
disgi'ised  as  a  metaphysic  of  pure  experience,  and  when  the 
fact  of  this  disguise  is  itself  forgotten  or  disguised,  some  of  its 
most  characteristic  expressions  may  easily  pass,  as  we  have  seen, 
for  the  doctrine  now  known  as  realistic  epistemological  monism. 
William  James  was  gn .  tly  influenced  by  Hodgson's  immedi- 
ate empiricism.  He  frequently  refers  with  warm  approval  to 
the  doctrine  that  realities  are  only  what  they  are  ''known  as."  ' 

1  I'roc.  Ari.flol.  Sue.  1K91-2,  p.  12. 

'  Miliiphij.iic  "f  Eipcruticc.  I,  pp.  4,  etc. ;  sec  H.  W.  Carr,  ".Shadworth  Hollo- 
Ray  Hodcson,"  in  MimI,  N.S.,  X.XI,  l'.M2,  p.  4kO. 

'  Ih.,  N.S.,  VI,  ISitT,  p.  L':{f».  *  Miuiiihj/sic  of  Eriierience,  Vol.  I.  p.  17. 

'  Thr  Phil(>!«ii>hij(if  Uijhdiuii,  l.sTS,  Vol.  I,  p.  24^  ;  TItc  Metaphysic  of  Eipiri- 
cncc.  Vol.  I,  p.  .'54;  Pntc.  Aristol.  Soc,  19();t  4,  p.  (iO ;  cf.  H.  W.  Carr,  loc.  cit., 
p.  47S. 

'Proc.  Ari^!„l.  Sui..  V-'M   2,  p.  .)2.  •  /'>.,  ],.  57.  «  /•">.,  p   5.H, 

*  Prnamniism,  p.  50;  The  Mianing  of  Truth,  p.  43;  Eaaaya  i"  Radical  Em- 
piricism, p.  27. 


ANTECEDENTS  OF  THE   NEW   REALISM 


223 


He  accepts  the  view  that  it  is  only  when  the  percept  is  viewed 
retrospectively  that  it  is  either  subjective  or  objective,  or  both 
at  once,  though  in  different  relations.'  James,  also,  like 
Hodgson,  is  able  to  use  much  of  the  language  of  realistic  epis- 
tomological  monism.  "Radical  empiricism,"  he  declares,  "has 
more  affinities  with  natural  realism  than  with  the  views  of 
Borkt.vy  or  of  Mill."  "Our  minds  meet  in  a  world  of  objects 
which  they  share  in  common,  which  would  still  be  there,  if  one 
or  several  of  the  minds  were  destroyed."^  "Every  kind  of 
thing  experienced  must  somewhere  be  real."  '  A  solution  of  the 
puzzle  as  to  how  one  identical  room  can  be  both  in  outer  space 
anil  in  a  person's  mind  is  offered  in  the  explanation  that  the 
s;in  "  object  is  counted  twice  over,  once  in  the  biography  of  the 
person,  and  again  in  the  history  of  the  house  of  which  the  room 
is  a  part.^  Moreover,  consciousness  is  regarded  as  a  mere 
abstract  term  which  connotes  a  kind  of  external  relation." 
It  is  no  wonder  that  James  is  acknowledged  by  some  of  the 
younger  neo-reaUsts  (Montague,  Perry,  Holt)  as  having  led 
them  at  least  to  the  borders  of  the  land  of  which  they  now  claim 
to  have  achieved  possession.  And  yet  that  James  himself  did 
not  enter  into  the  promised  land  of  neo-realism  is  sufficiently 
evident  from  a  number  of  expressions,  which  show  at  the  same 
time  that,  like  Moses  again,  his  final  resting-place,  whether 
agnostic  dualism  or  a  covertly  idealistic  epistemological  monism, 
is  left  somewhat  uncertain.  Trans-perceptual  reahty  need  not 
be  denied,  he  claims;*  "things  of  an  unexpcrienceable  nature 
may  exist  ad  libitum"  ;  ^  but  "the  whole  agnostic  controversy" 
may  be  gotten  rid  of  "by  refusing  to  entertain  the  hypothesis 
of  trans-empirical  reality  at  all."  *  This  contains  a  suggestion 
of  agnostic  dualism  escaped  only  by  the  will-not-to-beheve  in 
the  form  of  the  will-not-to-think.  But  James's  more  charac- 
teristic doctrine  comes  to  the  surface  in  his  statement  that  while 
"we  can  continue  to  think  of  an  existing  beyond  ...  it  must  of 
course  always  be  of  an  experiential  nature.  If  not  a  future 
experience  of  one's  self  or  one's  neighbor  ...  it  must  be  an 

'  E.-:.i<ujs  in  Radical  Empiricism,  p.  130.  '  lb.,  pp.  76,  79-80;   cf.  p.  40. 

•'  Ih.,  p.  KM).  •  lb.,  pp.  r.'-H.  » lb.,  p.  Ub. 

"  lb.,  p.  250.  '  The  Meaning  of  Truth,  Pref.,  p.  xii. 

"  Esmy:i  in  Radical  Empiricism,  p.  195. 


4»- :•!  ■ic-'jawsr  "'■KSL  "s; 


u^. 


■sr 


.i>*T»c«s-«r'-Tr^ 


;^rfKi*-:  t 


224 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   KNOWLEDHE 


I   i 


experience  for  itself,"  as  is  maintained  by  the  p^npsy^hists.' 
"  Everything  real  must  be  experienceable  somev.  iieic.  *  Wher- 
ever there  are  real  relations  they  must  be  felt  as  "matters  of 
direct  particular  experience,"'  and  wherever  there  are  real 
creative  activities,  they  must  be  immediately  lived.* 

W.  T.  Bush,  influenced  by  Avenarias  and  James  on  the  one 
hand  and  by  Woodbridge  on  the  other,*  remains  in  a  somewhat 
transitional  position  between  immediate  empiricism  and  the  new 
realism.  Like  the  typical  new  realist,  he  regards  all  the  con- 
tent of  expeiience  as  objective,  and  like  some  of  them  defines 
consciousness  as  that  objective  content  which  is  directly  acces- 
sible to  but  one  observer."  When  attention  is  not  directed  to 
such  contents,  but  to  others  generally  accessible,  there  is  no 
consciousness.'  There  is  no  "experience"  save  "empirical 
fact  ...  the  empirical  aggregate  thus  far  envisaged."  *  But 
he  is  reluctant  to  have  this  view  called  realism,'  and  seems  to 
distrust  the  new  realism  as  holding  to  some  sort  of  substance- 
doctrine.'" 

John  Dewey  regards  James's  radical  empiricism,  according 
to  which  a  content  in  one  context  is  physical  and  in  another 
context  psychical,  consciousness,  as  the  most  significant  part 
of  his  philosophical  doctrine."  He  him.self  has  developed  a 
very  similar  theory,  which  he  calls  immediate  empiricism. 
Like  Hodgson  and  James  he  claims  that  the  philosopher  has 
to  analyze  the  content  of  immediate  experien<^o;  philosophy 
is  not  metaphysics,  but  a  purely  positive  science  of  phenomena. •' 
The  postulate  of  immediate  empiricism  is  that  things  are  what 

'  Essays  in  Radical  Empiricism,  pp.  Kh-9.  '  Ih.,  p.  160. 

•  The  Menninu  »/  Truth,  p.  xii.  •  E^nys  in  Radical  Empiricism,  p.  IHI. 

•  Atenarius  and  Ihr  .Standpoint  nf  Pure  Experii  nc<-,  pp.  72  .1. 
'lb.,  pp.  7,5-7;    .lournal  of  Philmophy.  c-tc.  III.  lOOCi.  p.   »."). 

'  Journal  of  Philosophy.  IV,  1007,  p.  420.  '  Ih.,  VI,  p.  181. 

•  Ih.  '"  lb.,  X,  p.  OGS.  "  AVm-  Y'ork  Times.  June  9,  1912. 

"  The  Influence  of  Darwin  on  Philosophy,  p.  303.  Since  writinK  thi.s,  I  under- 
stand, Dewey  has  made  the  .statement  that  i)hilo«oi)hy  has  to  choose  between 
bcinR  poor  seienro  and  bein(!  simply  somethinR  essentially  akin  to  literature. 
His  latest  statement  on  the  .subject,  however,  i.s  to  the  effect  that  "one  way  of 
conccivinK  the  problem  of  metaphysical  inquiry  as  distiiu  t  from  that  of  the 
special  .sciences. "  ia  "  a  wav  which  settles  up.in  the  nutre  idtimate  traits  of  the  world 
as  definiuK  its  subject  matter,  but  which  frees  these  traits  from  confusion  with 
ultimate  origins  and  ultimate  ends."  Journal  of  Philosophy,  XII,  1015,  p.  345; 
italics  mine. 


ANTECEDENTS  OP  THE  NEW  REALISM 


225 


they  arc  experienced  as  —  not,  as  Hodgson  put  it,  what  they 
are  known  as ;  for  this,  according  to  Dewey,  is  the  fallacious 
root  of  all  the  idealisms.'  Although  it  is  claimed  that  inune- 
(liate  empiricism  is  a  methodological  guide  and  not  a  principle 
from  which  any  hut  some  negative  philosophical  results  can  be 
deduced,-  it  is  offered  as  a  way  of  showing  the  unteiiability  of 
not  only  all  the  idealisms,  but  of  epistcmological  dualism  and 
of  presentative  realism  or  any  other  type  of  realistic  doctrine 
save  naive  realism.^ 

This  pragmatic  realism  Dewey  is  able  to  uphold  only  by 
virtue  of  his  p<H'uliar  hard  and  fast  distinction  between  experi- 
ence, i>erceptual  or  pre-|)erceptual,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the 
mental  or  conscious,  and  cognition,  on  the  other.  He  repu- 
diates the  idea  that  experience  is  necessarily  psychological.* 
•'When  the  realist  conceives  the  perceptual  occurrence  as  a 
case  of  knowledge  or  of  presentation  to  a  mind  or  knower,  he 
lets  the  nose  of  the  idealist  camel  into  the  tent."*  In  other 
words,  if  perception  is  knowledge,  or  presentation  to  a  knower, 
and  a  thing  is  what  it  is  perceived  (known)  as,  and  nothing 
more,  reality  is  nothing  but  contents  of  consciousness  —  the 
idealistic  doctrine.  On  the  contrary  Dewe>-  claims  to  hold 
to  the  naive  realistic  view,  according  to  which  noises,  lights, 
etc.,  are  thought  of  neither  as  mental  existences  (ideaUsm) 
nor  as  things  known  (presentative  realism),  but  as  just  things. 
It  no  more  occurs  to  the  "plain  man,"  he  says,  to  think  that 
things  are  in  relation  to  mind  than  to  think  that  they  are 
mental.  In  fact,  his  attitude  ti)  them  an  things  involves  their 
not  being  in  relation  to  mind.''  Now  it  seems  clear  that  at 
this  point  Dewey  has  made  a  dogmatic  negative  application 
of  the  postulate  of  immediate  empiricism  in  its  idealistic  form. 
He  has  assumed  that  because  the  thing  is  not  consciously 
experienced,  or  thought  of,  h.s  presented  to  one's  self,  it  is 
therefore  not  .so  presented.  This  is  a  negative  application  of 
tiie  'psychologist's  fallacy  "  ;  it  assumes  that  a  thing  is  not,  in 
its  existence  independently  of  cognition,  what  it  is  not  in  and 

!  r*,-  fr.fi'ifncr  ■-./  Pir'rir,  r.r,  Philr.=,>phy,  pp.  'jaT-S.  «  !h.,  pp.  23S-9. 

*  Journal  of  Philosophy,  II.  1905,  pp.  324-0. 

«  Philosophical  Keritu;  XVI,  1907,  p.  422. 

»  Journal  of  Philosophy,  VIII,  lUU.  p.  :J96.  •  lb.,  p.  397. 


mm 


226 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   KNOWLEDGE 


for  cognitive  conscioiisiu'ss.  That  tliis  !s  what  Dowey  means 
to  say  is  supported  hy  the  sluteiueiit  elsewhere  that  the  psy- 
chologist orings  states  of  coiisciousin  ss  into  existence.'  The 
plain  man  ceases  to  he  a  naive  realist  in  Dewey's  sense  of  that 
term  as  soon  as  he  is  asked  wh(>ther  he  was  aware  of  the  ob- 
jects when  they  were  first  perceived,  Ix^fore  he  was  aware  of 
any  awareness.  But  there  is  surely  no  justification  for  the 
assertion  that  there  is  no  knowing  when  there  is  no  knowing  of 
the  knowing,  unless  it  he  the  gen(>ral  principle  of  idealism,  that 
there  is  nothing  but  what  is  known  and  is  constituted  in  being 
known.  Of  course  Dewey  dot>s  not  make  the  general  statement 
of  the  idealistic  principle.  He  simply  employs  the  idealistic 
way  of  thinking  in  this  one  instance,  on  the  principle,  one  would 
think,  that  in  committing  the  idealistic  transgression  "once 
doesn't  count."  This  means,  then,  that  Dewey  is  able  to 
avoid  idealism  and  retain  what  he  calls  pragmatic  or  naive 
realism,  only  by  making  a  surreptitious  use  of  idealism.  Elim- 
inate the  idealism  explicitly  from  the  premi.ses,  and  yet  you 
find  it  cropping  out  unmistakably  in  the  conclusion. 

But  Dewey's  philosophy  has  been  an  influential  factor  to- 
ward realistic  epistemological  monism,  largely  because  some 
of  his  followers  have  followed  him  afar  off,  and  have  not  re- 
tained his  view  of  ordiii:  .  perception  as  non-cognitive.  With 
this  omission  tliey  are  .1  le  to  take  his  pragmatic  realism  as  a 
bona  fide  presentative  realism.  This  is  true  of  such  expres- 
sions as  that  "to  exist  is  not  to  be  identified  with  the  status  of 
a  cognized  something,"  -  that  things  need  not  always  be  known,' 
and  especially  his  whole  doctrine  of  an  ol)jectivc  situation  prior 
to  consciousness,*  and  the  view  that  "knowing  .  .  .  happens 
to  things  in  the  natural  course  of  their  career."  * 

We  nmst  conclude,  then,  that  since  Dewey's  philosophy  is 
not  a  realism,  save  at  the  expense  of  a  fallacy,  he  has  not 
really  succeeded  in  being  anything  but  a  disguised  psycho- 
logical iilealist.  What  he  does,  in  applying  the  principle  of 
subjective  idealism  in  onler  to  hide  his  subjective  idealism, 
makes  so  much  noise  that  we  cannot  hear  what  he  says,  when 

'  Influence  of  Darwin,  p.  IMS.  ■  Journal  nf  PUiloxophy,  VI,  1909,  p.  19. 

'  /').,  VII,  1910.  p.  .554.  •  SIikHi^  in  Loaicnl  Theory,  1903,  passim, 

i  Journal  of  Philosophy,  VIII,  1911,  p.  554. 


STTl 


"ST 


•«BPf!BBf^i!!^H? 


ANTECEDENTS  OP  THE  NEW   REALISM 


227 


he  disavows  idealism.  As  we  have  seen,  it  is  only  by  first 
tacitly  assumiiiK  a  negative  immediate  empiricism  (which 
means  subjective  idealism  applied  at  least  once)  that  he  is 
aide  to  achieve  the  appearance  of  having  established  a  position 
which  is  neither  subjective  idealism  nor  dualism  nor  presenta- 
tivc  realism.  And  furthermore,  there  are  statements  which 
mark  him  off  clearly  »  nough  as  no  realist.  For  instance,  "that 
things  and  relations  have  existerice  and  significance  apart  from 
the  particular  conditions  under  which  they  come  into  experi- 
ence," he  rejects  as  "the  static  standpoint."'  Again,  "the 
quality  of  transition-towards,  change-in-the-dircction-of  .  .  . 
cannot  be  included  in  the  statement  of  reality  qua  earlier,  but 
is  only  apprehended  or  realized  in  experience."  "^  The  agree- 
ment of  ideas  with  facts  is  the  agreement  or  "correspondence 
l)etween  the  purpose,  plan,  and  its  own  execution,  fulfilment,"' 
or,  in  other  words,  an  agreement  of  an  idea  with  a  content  of 
immediate  experience,  and  never  with  a  reality  independent 
of  experience.  And  finally,  "as  long  as  the  conclusion  remains 
unchallenged,  so  long  the  object  is  as  the  conclusion  describes 
it."*  Zcillner's  lines  "are  divergent"  when  experienced  as 
divergent,  and  parallel  only  when  experienced  as  parallel.* 
This  doctrine  that  he  object  is  what  we  seem  to  find  it,  or 
even  what  we  think  t ,  so  long  as  it  seems  so,  or  so  long  as  we 
think  it  is  so,  reveals  the  trail  of  the  subjectivistic  —  or,  we 
might  even  say,  solipsistic  —  serpent. 

Dewey's  immediatism  end  pragmatic  realism  have  been 
especially  influential  in  shaping  the  realistic  thought  of  E.  B. 
McGilvary  and  apparently  of  J.  E.  Boodin,  as  well  as  notice- 
ably also  in  the  case  of  both  W.  P.  Montague  and  W.  B.  Pitkin. 
Of  these,  Boodin  demands  special  attention  at  this  point, 
because,  while  his  doctrines  are  more  like  those  of  James  than 
like  Dewey's,  his  philosophy  may  be  regarded  as  transitional 
between  the  systems  of  James  and  Dewey  on  the  one  hand 
and  the  more  typical  neo-realists  on  the  other.  He  calls  his 
philosophical  position  pragmatic  realism,  but  he  means  by 
this  a  more  bona  fide  realism  than  that  which  Dewey  calls  by 
the  same  name.     He  maintains  that  the  pragm.itic  method 

'  Influence  of  Darwin,  p.  260.  '  JnurnnI  of  Philosophu.  III.  1906,  p.  255. 

'  lb.,  IV,  1907,  p.  202.        *  lb.,  VI,  1909,  p.  17.         » lb.,  II.  1905,  p.  397. 


Wn 


BinH 


n 

n 


t 


■    I 


i 


,   • 


l\: 


r^|f 


' 


228 


THE  PROBLEM   OP   KNOWLEDOE 


has  been  lost  in  the  subj(>ctiviF,;n  of  its  advocates.'  Realism 
he  defines  as  meaning  "the  reference  to  an  object  existing  be- 
yond the  apperceptive  unity  of  momentary  individual  con- 
sciousness, and  that  the  object  can  make  a  difference  to  this 
consciousness  so  as  to  be  known."  *  While  Dewey  maktss  the 
objectivity  of  a  whole  content  of  perceptual  experience  depend 
upon  its  exercise  of  the  function  of  control,'  Boodin  holds  that 
experience  is  insufficient  as  an  account  of  reality,*  and  that  it 
is  an  independently  existing  universe  which  is  differentiated 
with  reference  to  our  purposive  attitudes.*  Instead  of  Hodg- 
son's and  James's  expression  "known  as,"  and  Dewey's  "ex- 
perienced as,"  he  says  that  individual  things  are,  indepen- 
denthj  of  our  consciousness  or  experience,  what  they  are  per- 
ceived as,  and  indefinitely  more,  they  are  what  they  must  be 
taken  as  when  we  do  take  account  of  them  in  the  realization  of 
our  purposes.  Our  purposes  are  indispensable  for  the  signifi- 
cant differentiation  of  the  world,  but  there  are  limits  in  the 
nature  of  independent  reality  which  check  an  arbitrary  selec- 
tion of  that  which  is  to  be  regarded  as  an  individual  thing.* 
Now  this  seems  to  be  genuine  realism  of  a  highly  discriminat- 
ing and  defensible  variety;  but  there  are  some  passages  in 
Boodin's  writings  which  "give  us  pause."  For  example,  he 
has  called  his  view  empirical  idealism,  and  has  said  that  ob- 
jects presuppose  creative  purpose,  and  can  become  objects 
only  for  a  will ;  that  reality  is  not  complete  without  possible 
perception,  as  well  as  perception ;  that  reals  beyond  our  own 
consciousness  are  ejects,  objects  of  thought  or  purposive  will ; 
that  reality  is  knowable  only  so  far  as  it  is  itself  conceptual, 
and  we  .share  its  inner  meaning.'  Again  he  says:  "Qualities 
are  objective  just  in  so  far  as  we  must  take  them  as  objective. 
If  they  do  not  help  us  to  identify  an  object,  they  can  no  longer 
be  ccH^d  qualities.  They  must  be  reckoned  on  the  side  of 
value."  *  This  becomes  significant  if  viewed  in  connection 
with  his  doctrine  that  values  depend  upon  the  will,  and  so 

•  Journal  of  Philomphu,  IV,  1907,  p.  281. 

»  Truth  and  Rralily,  1011,  p.  2,51.  'Studies  in  Logical  Theory,  p.  76. 

'Journal  of  l'hdo.ioi>hii,  V,  lUdS,  p.  ;il)7.  '  //*.,  IV,  p.  uZo;  IX,  p.  0. 

•  If}..  IX,  1012,  pp.  .">  14  ;    Truth  and  Rralilu.  W-  262-7. 
^  Journal  of  Philomphu.  IV,  1007,  pp.  .5;{8-41. 
'Philosophical  Review,  XX,  1911,  p.  .395. 


..sxm 


ANTECEDENTS  OP  THE   NEW   REALISM 


229 


upon  conspiousness,  for  thoir  pxistonro.'  If  we  view  these 
statements  in  connection  with  other  passages  in  which  it  is 
maintained  that  consciousness  constitutes  no  properties,  makes 
no  difference  to  reality,  save  the  difference  of  awareness,' 
we  seem  to  find  the  unimeiliKihle  or  self-contradictory  dc  "trine 
that  qualities  which  existed  as  such  indept^udently  of  any 
experience  or  consciousness  of  ours,  do  not  exist  as  qualities, 
if  they  do  not  further  our  practical  purposes.  The  contradic- 
tion is  psychologically  explained,  but  not  logically  removed, 
Ky  the  remark  that  things  can  have  a  double  location,  in  their 
own  existential  contexts  and  in  our  contexts  of  significance ;  * 
for  the  statement,  "Qualities  are  objective  just  in  so  far  as  we 
must  take  them  as  objective"  is  either  a  frank  expression  of 
subjectivism,  or  else  the  first  "objective"  means  existent  in 
their  own  contexts,  independently  of  our  contexts  of  signifi- 
cance. There  are  only  two  ways  for  Boodin  to  remove  the 
contradiction;  either  to  return  to  Dewey's  di.sguised  psycho- 
lotjical  idealism  with  its  negative  psychologist's  fallacy,  or  to 
be  more  careful  in  the  particular  aspects  of  reality  he  makes 
dependent  upon  human  purpose. 

(1.  S.  Fullerton  is  interesting  as  exemplifying  in  his  writings 
of  1904,  1908,  and  1912  the  transition  from  an  idealistic  to  a 
realistic  epistemological  monism.*  In  his  System  of  Metaphysics, 
he  is  still,  as  we  have  seen,  on  the  ground  of  a  modified  Berkelei- 
anism.  The  real  world,  by  which  he  means  the  world  of  the 
scientist,  he  characterizes  as  a  complex  construction  of  .sensa- 
tions and  imagined  .sensations,  and  so  as  existing  in  consciou.s- 
ness.*  The  reality  of  the  not-experienced  is  affirmed,  but  it 
is  explained  that  this  is  only  legitimate  when  understood  as 
resting  upon  a  convenient  ab.straction.  .\ctually  it  has  a  place 
in  that  system  of  e:  -'  ^nces,  mine  or  another's,  past,  present, 
or  future,  actual  or  po.ssible,  which  we  construct  and  treat  as 
if  it  were  all  present  at  one  time  in  one  actual  experience.* 
This,  of  course,  is  simply  a  disgui.sed  psychological  idealism, 
or  an  abstract  idealism  of  the  psychological  positivistic  type.^ 


•  !h  .  p.  402:   -/..•irnn/  of  PkiloHopkii.  V.  1008.  pp.  22r>-R. 

'  lb.,  V,  1908.  pp.  22(>,  2:52-.3.         '  Philimophienl  Rrriiw,  XX,  1911,  p.  401. 
«  1904.  '  System  of  Mclaphusicx,  PP-  lOS-17.  157,  37o. 

•  lb.,  pp.  117-23.  '  V.  Chs.  VI,  IX.  supra. 


m 


.)'  ^ 


■|ii 


■.5' 


i! 


i 


n 


'I,  u 


H! 


230 


TMK    PROBLEM   OP    KNOWLEDGE 


In  the  ( -say  li  Mtl<<l  "  Thf  New  Realism,"'  iMillt'rton  lu.ikcs 
some  lunhly  (Ictiiisihlc  assntioiis,  which  nt'Vcrtht'lesH  leave  hi^ 
exact  iK)sitioii  \mlti>iiu>u,H.  There  seems  to  lie  nothing  in  the 
essay  which  coulil  not  be  accepted  eiilier  by  llu>  thoniiighdoiu^j 
ncoreaUst  oi  '  .  ni\\  iinme(hate  eini'in<'ist  whose  fundii  lental 
idealism  w.r-  .  ^  !i  <i  ouph  "Msmii-.Hl.  In  his  recent  work. 
Th'-  W'orlil  M  <  /  '■"(•  In  howevi  r,  anti  in  his  latest  ::  fides,  he  is 
unainbinu(Ui>i\  nn  fi,.'  ■  .leof  a  realistic  epistemolofiical  moniam 
The  p<>rcei^'<  i  ol>jeet,  .  eeoiidary  (lualif'es  and  all.  he  holds 
to  be  asobje'-ive  ;iii(i  e  aorii:  !  as  atoms  and  eli  on^;-  and 
the  [K>rcept.  he  ass«>!  <  -    uia}"  c  ase,  but  the  object  iK»rsist.* 

If  the  (iue:-!iun  be  raisfl  as  to  why  in  (lerman  with  we 
nariiis  and  Wundt  a-  vmn,  liati  fnifiirieists,  a  similar  schoo' of 
realistic  epistemolonical  ni  >nists  his  not  been  di  velop«'d.  the 
answer  is  to  be  found  chiefly  in  the  influence  of  KinJ.  Kuelpe, 
for  instanci  .  who  took  hi-  uint  (■■■'  deparMue  • 'om  Wundt, 
has  developed  a  realistic  ana  rationalist!  p  liosopiiy  according 
to  which  independent  reality  is  not  immediately  but  only 
mediately  known.  Here  the  influenc  of  t  Kantian  a  -io- 
rism  has  operated  to  close  the  thoroujii  0  any  moia.stic 

realism. 

It  may  be  remai':od  in  passing  that  tii ;  fact  of  the  genesis 
of  the  new  realism  from  subjectiv.  idealise  fhrouirh  immediate 
empiricism  doubtless  accounts  for  the  coi,  tatit  poleiinc  of  he 
realists  against  .subjective  idealism,  and  also  for  their  easy 
victory  over  this  opponent.  From  the  time  of  (i.  E.  Moore's 
Refutalion  «»/  I(hni>.sm.'  mosi  n.  -rcnlists  have  under' a.  i  to 
expose  the  fallacies  of  idealism,  f^eiicrally  identified  wit'  sub- 
jective idealism;  but  none  have  been  more  suceessf'  than 
R.  B.  Perry,  whose  exposure  of  th(>  fallacy  of  inferring  i  i  disui 
from  the  fact  of  the  ego'entric  predicament  we  havi  intidy 
noticed. 

Before  closing  "  Uis  chapter  w<'  must  refer  to  the  othe;  main 
factor  ii\  the  prod  ictioi:  of  ihe  new  rcii  <m  viz.  disguised  !c;d 
idealism.     As  we  have  >e<>n,  loj^ica'     lealism  is  a  form  v,    il>- 

/j'o.mt;, ii<  tionnr  ■-.;  Wu  Jantr     iOOS. 

»  n..    H-.rW  Hr  Lirr  /n.  l!)!-  IHO,   .  Kl. 

*  Jnurtinl  of  Philomiphn.  X.  "'9. 
<   '.^       /.  X..>^..  XII.  O.'tol.. 


ANTKCEDENTB    OF       II fc    NEW    RRALIS  -I 


231 


sir:!  i<)nis»in,  i'  is  tho  .loctrhu-  that  iiulciMTulcnt  realirv  is 
till  A-n,  >  '  wfi:it  \Vf  know  only  us  un  altstiactioii  om  reality. 
Tl  -  position  1  )W<'V'  I  -  itn>  uf  niintaf'lr  equilil)ii  nu.  If  tho 
al»iia<-ti(>n  were  al  a>  (-ou.sHtciUly  rccoRnizcd,  tip  !<»!.  al 
idialisin  wo  .M  pa.--  mcr  into  |p-y('hoi()t:ical  idcaliMii,  of  ithcr 
1  Fi(liti>an  or  a  iuhi-K  'utiiiii  tyj>o.  Bu  if,  as  usually  liappens, 
ilic  at)stracti.  n  is  ahi^'rac'  (1  from,  ta!  ab-tra'  ly,  he  result 
.1  (iiseuiso  1   'meal     lean-in,  w^iich   by  an  almost        vi?able 


pie 


>ijt  falij«»ou8 
(1,    ti'ii,     that     '  u   'ver>ii 
pt;u    !ii!f    the   tv.  .    pr- 
roaliMii  ii  s  been    >rori! 
treat  men     "f  psyeiird"  n. 
ment   <r   [i -^ 


.1, 


pa'hi'    tl 

'uuui    ■t>gi( 
•he  fsc"! 
'ho  foHaer 


sin 

or 
ihr 
h 


>n\tr-ion  nes  logieal  realism,  the 

•  1   jiities.     Thus  M   wouli!   a|)- 

lal    :>»■'      SMS    by   which    th'       e\v 

;iv^  !i,  first    the  homoDo,      '^ic 

"!)  11(1        ond,  the  hoi     *■■— 

(»         e  one  haii<'      ib- 

"cn  ;'  thesh        t.     Ontheoiher 

t    :        isni   t'.as  lu'c       liken  abstractly; 

ictini     aas  ii  "cn  abstr  icted  from. 

•d  psychological  idealism)  is  int'-rpn 

H'ts  from  the  (iri>i;inal  psyeholonieal 


lien 
(1  in 
i.-al- 

ic.-- 


are 

■if 


sucii  a  way  a*! 

ism     '(  the  am  -/  i>ic  object,  and  the  latter  (disj^ui 

i      lU^m)    by    '  lacious   simple   conversion.     The 
fi      i.  and  Hi        w'reali.sm  in  its  hrst  (rude  form  it- 
Tl      iffi    t  dis'zuised  logical  ideali.sm  is  seen 

ill  those  i>ts'      >  have  been  deeply  influenced  hs 

niatieal  of  w     iii  the  leader  is  Bertrand  Russell. 

"vicinoi  u  -      >  ..•Kiii>t!iii<i-th<'orie"  promises  to  be  incrt'asiintly  iuflucuttol  lu 
tli        'uru  div     ipment  uf  the  new  rcaliam. 


■  1 . 


•  it 


t' 


','t^ 


I'U  i 


J  ■ 


'  If 


CHAPTER  XI 
The  Neo-Realistic  Doctrine  of  Secondary  Qualities 

The  original  idea  of  the  new  realists  seotns  to  have  been  to 
arrive  at  an  absolute  monism  in  epistemology  by  the  opposite 
route  to  that  taken  by  the  idealists.  As  the  idealistic  abso- 
lute monists  had  said  in  effect,  There  are  no  things,  but  only 
ideas,  so  these  would-be  nudist ic  absolute  monists  have  wanted 
to  be  able  to  say,  There  are  no  ideas,  images  or  what  not,  but 
only  things.  In  absolute  epistemological  monism  and  in 
that  alone,  it  was  felt  l)y  both  extremists,  lay  the  only  logical 
solution  of  the  problem  of  knowledge.  Man  can  know  ideas, 
and  if  reality  is  nothing  but  idea,  man  can  know  it,  thought 
the  idealist.  If  we  can  maintain  that  there  are  no  ideas, 
images,  or  other  mental  constructs,  to  come  between  us  and 
reality,  then,  thought  the  original  new  realist,  the  knowledge 
problem  disappears,  becau.se  in  all  our  conscious  Ufe  we  are 
in  inunediate  cognitive  relation  with  independently  existing 
things.  Let  us  see  whether  the  neo-realist  has  been  able  to 
carry  out  his  ambitious  progranmie  of  establishing  a  realistic 
absolute  monism  in  epistemology. 

Perhaps  the  most  characteristic  doctrine  of  the  new  realism, 
and  that  whicli  reveals  most  clearly  the  original  intention  to 
be  a  realistic  absolute  monism,  is  that  of  the  external  and 
indepenilent  reality  of  "secondary"  or  sense-qualities.  In- 
dependent reality  of  tlu-  primary  qualities  is  of  course  included 
or  presupposed.  Ideally  tlie  neo-realist  ought  to  affirm  the 
independent  objectivity  of  all  sense-qualities  ever  experienced 
under  any  circumstances,  however  special ;  but  at  this  point 
there  arises  a  differentiation  among  the  members  of  the  school. 
Some,  while  explicitly  maintaining  that  at  least  some  sense- 
qualities  are  in«lependently  real,  are  cither  non-committai  or 
have  expressed  themselves  ambiguously  on  the  (luestion  as 
to  whether  or  not  ail  sense-qua! it ies  ever  experienced  are  to  be 

232 


NEO-REALISTIC    DOCTRINE  OP  QUALITIES        233 


similarly  interpreted.  Others  again  have  held  that  only  some 
of  the  sense-qualities  experienced  are  independently  real; 
while,  finally,  a  faithful  few  have  the  boldness  to  maintain, 
apparently  or  even  explicitly,  that  absolutely  all  sense-qualities 
ever  experienced  have  full  independent  reality,  as  well  as  many 
others  which  havi  .lever  been  experienced.  This  whole  prob- 
lem becomes  most  acute  in  connection  with  the  question  of 
hallucinations  and  other  deceptions  of  the  senses,  and  several 
members  of  the  new  school  frankly  acknowledge  difficulty  at 
this  point.  Because  of  the  crucial  importance  of  this  matter,  a 
somewhat  detailed  examination  of  the  various  attitudes  taken 
and  explanations  offered  seems  desirable. 

F.  J.  E.  Woodbridge  holds  "that  consciousness  and  knowl- 
edge do  actually  disclose  to  us  that  which  is  in  no  way  depend- 
ent on  consciousness  or  knowledge  for  its  existence  or  char- 
acter," and  }-^pes  this  upon  the  alleged  fact  that  although 
objects  need  to  be  in  consciousness  for  us  to  know  what  they 
are,  what  they  are  is  never  ''ound  to  be  dependent  upon  their 
being  in  consciousness,  because  "in  consciousness,"  applying 
equally  to  all  known  objects,  is  not  a  means  of  distinguishing 
them  from  each  other.'  But  this  argument  is  manifestly 
unsound.  Why  should  it  be  assumed  that  there  is  only  one 
kind  of  consciousness?  If,  as  we  shall  see,  "consciousness" 
may  be  interpretetl  as  a  general  term  for  several  specifically 
different  sorts  of  psychical  activity,  it  is  quite  conceivable  that 
some  of  the  discovered  differences  between  objects  may  be 
due  to  these  different  kinds  of  psychical  activity.  But  Wood- 
bridge,  unable  to  see  in  consciousness  anything  but  a  relation 
which  remains  absolutely  uniform  in  all  instances,  feels  justified 
in  asserting  that  "things  sail  into  it  [consciousness]  and  out 
again  without  any^  break  in  the  continuity  of  their  being."  ' 
The  only  difference  between  primary  and  secondary  qualities 
is  that  the  latter  "require  the  intervention  of  some  special 
structure  [presumably  an  organism  with  special  sense-organs] 
if  their  appropriate  causality  is  to  be  effective."  *  Reality  is 
always  "precisely  what  it  appears  to  be.""    We  are  never 

'  Journal  of  Philosophy,  II,  1005,  pp.  122-3.  '  Italics  mine. 

'Journal  of  Philosophy,  VII,  l(»l(l,  p.  410.  <  Ih..  VI,  1909,  p.  453. 

•/6.,  X,  1"13,  p.  14  ;   rf.  Philosophical  Review,  XII,  1903,  p.  369, 


234 


THE   PROBLEM   OF    KNOWLEDGE 


>i 


*i; 


i 


mistaken  in  taking  appearances  as  reality,  but  only  in  acting 
in  certain  unfortunate  ways  in  view  of  certain  appearances.' 
Things  are  different  under  different  conditions  of  relation  to 
other  physical  things,  including  different  media  with  different 
powers  of  refraction,  diffen^nt  retinas  or  the  same  retina  in 
different  conditions  at  different  times,  etc. ;  hut  the  particular 
qualities  of  things  are  not  different  according  as  they  are  or 
are  not  known,  or  "in  consciousness."  =  Both  the  color- 
blind and  the  normal  perceive  the  thing  as  it  is  —  under  dif- 
ferent physiological  conditions.'  A  thing  is  neither  pll  of  its 
appearances  combiiuHl,  nor  any  one  of  them  exchisively,  but 
"every  one  of  them  in  every  instance  which  can  be  defined."  * 

Now  according  to  these  last  statements  tlie  above  distinc- 
tion which  Woodbridge  makes  between  primary  and  secondary 
qualities  is  seen  to  be  i  adequate.  If  r.  thing  is  not  all  of  its 
appearances  comi)ined,  but  only  each  'it  its  own  time  and  under 
its  own  special  conditions,  then  not  only  is  the  "effectiveness" 
of  the  "  appropriate  causality  "  of  .secondary  quaUties  depend- 
ent upon  the  object  being  in  a  certain  relation  to  sense-organs 
of  a  certain  sort ;  the  very  existence  of  those  secondary  qualities 
is  likewise  thus  depend'^nt.  At  this  juncture,  then.  Wood- 
bridge,  besides  being  faced  with  the  necessity  of  withdrawing  a 
former  statement,  if  he  would  claim  con.sistency,  is  confronted 
with  the  dilemma  of  having  to  choose  between  a  realism  so 
critical  as  to  refrain  from  ascribing  independent  reality  to  any 
s  '.se-quality,  and  an  extreme  pluralism  such  as  ha3  recently 
been  developed  by  Bert  rand  Russell.  The  former  alternative 
would  lead  him,  we  believe,  in  t!.(^  right  direction.  The  other 
alternative,  that  of  utter  |)luralisni,  will  be  considered  when 
we  come  to  examine  the  views  of  Russell. 

The  realism  of  S.  Alexander,  like  that  of  Woodbridge,  is 
fundamentally  dogmatic  and  leads  him  unavoidably  in  the 
direction  of  what  is  practically  the  same  self-contradiction. 
He  holds  to  tlu"  reality  and  activity  of  mind,  but  claims  that  it 
produces  nothing  but  the  knowledge-rcZafion  between  itself  and 


•  Journal  f^f  Ph'!>^=nph:j.  X.  \9V',.  pp  7.  V. 

•  "  Percrption  and  Lpi-stemoloRy,"  in  Essays 
ions.  pp.  IM-r,. 

•  Journal  of  Philosophy,  X,  1913.  p.  13. 


'  !b..  pp.  7,  8,  9.  000. 
.  in  Honor  of  William  James, 


L..tJWWl 


.M.-'\'. 


NEO-REALISTIC    DOCTRINE    OF    QUALITIES        235 

its  content,  and  the  dislocation  of  elements  occurring  in  illusory 
or  crrop»;ous  experience.  In  reaction  against  the  idealistic 
presupposition  that  what  one  apprehends  must  be  dependent 
f(i'  its  existence  on  his  mind,  he  goes  to  the  other  extreme  and 
interprets  the  fact  of  experience,  defined  as  the  eompresence  of 
mind  and  an  object  which  is  not  mind,  as  meaning  not  only 
tluit  the  percept  is  never  anything  but  the  independently  real 
physical  thing  perceived,  but  that  even  images  and  judgments 
are  to  be  classed,  not  as  peculiarly  mental,  but  as  fully  physical.' 
For  example,  the  dream-apparition  is  spatial,  and  has  other 
physical  properties  quite  as  much  as  has  the  normal  percept. 
Primary  qualities,  or  the  categories  of  things,  differ  from  .sec- 
ondary qualities  only  in  that  they  are  qualities  of  ourselves  as 
well  as  of  things,  whereas  the  latter  are  qualities  of  things 
only.  Image  and  percept  are  the  same  physical  object  in 
different  forms.  Illusory  and  erroneous  elements  in  any 
appearance  are  introduced  into  that  particular  collocation  by 
mind,  but  these  elements  introduced  are  always  non-mental 
and  independenth-  real.  Mental  activitj*  may  dislocate  the 
real  object  from  its  place  in  things  and  refer  it  to  a  context  to 
•vmch  it  does  not  belong.  For  instance,  when  I  fancj'  a  horse's 
body  and  complete  it  with  a  man's  head,  the  head  exists  in 
•i'-tj',  but  not  upon  a  horse's  body.  Or,  when  a  hot  metal 
touches  a  "cold  spot"  on  one's  skin,  it  is  the  coldness  of  a 
cold  thing  which  he  feels,  though  not  the  coldness  of  the  me.al.* 
But  there  is  very  evidently  an  inconsistency  here.  If  I  put  a 
real  man's  head  upon  a  real  horse's  body,  then  there  is  a  real 
ol)ject  with  a  man's  head  and  a  horse's  body.  If  the  centaur 
is  not  real,  its  head  is  not  real,  nor  is  its  body.  But  this  incon- 
sistency is  ignored  by  Alexander,  who  cheerfully  maintains 
on  the  one  hand  that  error  arises  not  from  unreality,  but  from 
misdescription,'  and  on  the  other  hand  that  when  an  object 
i-<  1"  differently,  it  is  different  and  looks  different,  and  3'et 
it;  ;  :.i  »ality  is  the  continuous  totality  of  its  partial  appear- 
ani.  -  ach  of  which  is  also  independently  real.*  It  seems 
impossible  to  reconcile  these  statements  with  each  other.     If 


antes, 


'  Mind.  N  «.,  XXI,  1912,  p.  2. 

*lh.,  p.  IS;   Proc.  Arinlnt.  Soc,  1909-10,  pp.  16-24. 

*PToe.  Arutot.  Soc.,  1909-10,  p.  25.  •  lb.,  pp.  33.  34. 


fiW? 


rsK 


90 


236 


TUB   PROBLEM   OP   KNOWLEDGE 


. 


if 


tlic  real  object  is  the  totality  of  its  different  appearances,  and 
tii;  TO  is  illusion  in  some  of  its  appearances,  so  that  these  appear- 
ances are  not,  as  collocations,  real,  then  the  "real  object"  is 
not  fully  real.  The  other  self-refutation  of  Alexander's  system 
we  have  already  noted  in  the  specific  instance  of  the  centaur; 
but,  stated  in  general  terms,  it  is  the  argument  that  if,  as  is 
supposed,  an  appearance  is  an  actual,  though  mentally  pro- 
duced, collocation  of  real  elements,  it  can  never  be  unreal, 
which,  however,  is  asserted  in  the  case  of  illusory  appearances. 
Or,  conversely,  if  the  illusory  appearance,  as  a  collocation  of 
elements,  is  unreal,  the  elements  of  that  collocation  must  also  be 
unreal,  and  it  becomes  untrue  to  say  that  error  is  not  due  to 
unreality,  both  of  which  conclusions  are  contrary  to  our  phi- 
losopher's previous  supposition. 

Ci.  E.  Moore's  position  is  similar  to  that  of  Alexander,  but 
it  is  stated  with  greater  caution.  Deeper  than  his  positive 
arguments  for  realisin  is  his  rejection  of  the  basing  of  an  argu- 
ment for  idealism  upon  a  confusion  of  sensation  with  sense- 
content.  The  sensation  of  blue,  he  insists,  is  an  awareness  of 
blue,  and  the  awareness  of  blue  is  not  itself  blue.  To  say, 
with  the  idealist,  that  "Blue  exists"  is  identical  in  meaning 
with  "Blue  +  consciousness  exists"  is  a  self-contradiction. 
VVe  can  and  must  conceive  the  existence  of  blue  as  something 
quite  distinct  from  the  existence  of  the  sensation,  so  that  blue 
might  possibly  exist,  and  yet  the  sensation  of  blue  not  exist.' 
This  does  not  carry  one  so  far,  however,  as  Moore  seems  to 
think.  He  dogmatically  assumes  that  sensation  is  nothing  but 
bare  awareness,  whereas,  if  it  should  turn  out  to  be  a  productive 
psychical  activity,  it  might  be  maintained  that  blue  exists  only 
when  then  is  sensation  of  blue,  without  falling  into  any  con- 
fusion of  the  sense-quality  with  the  fjualities  of  sensation 
(sensing).  Moore,  however,  hccaune  he  does  not  consider  this 
possibility  with  reference  to  consciousness,  combines  the  highly 
defensible  proposition  that  unless  we  know  things  as  they  are 
in  themselves,  we  have  no  knowledge  at  all,  with  the  sufficiently 
obvious  proposition  that  not  only  time,  space,  and  causality, 
but  colors  and  sounds  also  are  things  of  which  we  are  aware, 
and  from  this  synthesis  evolves  the  unnecessary  dogma  that 

'  "The  Refutation  of  Idealism,"  Mind,  N.S.,  XII,  1903,  pp.  445-9. 


N'EO-REALISTIC   DOCTRINE   OP  QUALITIES       237 


sounds  and  colors  exist  independently  of  our  sensations  (aware- 
ness) of  them.' 

But  besides  basing  his  realism  upon  his  critique  of  idealism 
iind  the  rejection  of  agnosticism,  Moore  has  a  constructive 
■irgument.  This  is  to  the  effect  that  if  we  have  any  good 
reason  for  believing  in  the  existence  of  perceptions  in  other 
minds,  we  have  just  as  good  reason  for  believing  in  the  inde- 
pendent existence  of  "sense-contents."  It  is  natural  to  sup- 
jjose  that  the  speaker  would  not  see  his  audience  listening,  if 
his  audience  did  not  hear  him  speaking.  But  this  natural 
supposition  would  be  ungrounded  if  there  were  not  some  sense- 
qualities,  some  sounds  and  colors,  existing  independently  of 
awareness  of  them;  because  otherwise  each  subject  would  be 
aware  of  nothing  but  its  own  perceptual  awareness,  and  mere 
self-observation  can  give  no  basis  for  affirming  the  existence  of 
other  selves.*  Now  this  argument,  in  so  far  as  it  is  valid,  would 
go  to  prove  that  if  other  minds  exist,  some  other  objects,  such 
as  can  be  perceived,  also  exist.  But  to  affirm  that  these  _  ther 
objects  must  be  sense-qualities  is  dogmatic ;  especially  when  we 
remember  that  sensation  needs  not  to  be  interpreted  as  a  bare 
awareness,  but  may  be  viewed  as  a  productive  psychical  activity. 
Moreover,  while  Moore  closes  his  discussion  with  the  studiously 
modest  assertion  that,  if  we  are  to  have  good  reason  for  believing 
in  the  existence  of  other  persons,  some  of  the  sensible  qualities 
which  we  perceive  must  really  exist  in  the  places  in  which  we 
perceive  them,  and  that  therefore  there  are  grounds  for  sus- 
pense of  judgment  as  to  whether  wha,t  we  see  does  not  really 
exist,'  he  is  evidently  prepared  to  go  much  further.  He  de- 
fends the  view  that  two  different  colors,  both  independently 
real,  may  occupy  the  same  space  at  the  same  time.*  This  is 
apparently  intended  to  open  the  way  for  the  thesis  that  all 
sensible  qualities,  even  those  seen  in  hallucinatory  experience 
or  by  the  color-blind,  are  independently  real.  But  is  the  posi- 
tion tenable?  One  and  the  same  person  may  perceive  different 
colors  in  the  same  space  at  different  times,  and  different  persons 


1 » i 

-1 


'  Proc.  Aristot.  Soc,  1003  4,  pp.  136,  110. 

'"The  Nature  and  Reality  of  Objects  of  Perception,"  Proe.  Aristot.  Soe., 
1905-6,  pp.  68-122. 

« lb.,  pp.  125.  127.  « lb.,  p.  125. 


i      ■■. 


fill 


my 


^i 


\'. 


i>V 


n\ 


it 


''»il 

!i!ii 


t    » 


238 


THE    PROBLEM   OK.  KNOWLEDGE 


may  porceive  different  colors  in  the  same  space  at  the  same 
time ;  but  no  one  person  has  ever  perceived  two  different  colors 
occupying  the  same  space  at  the  same  time,  nor  can  one  imag- 
ine such  a  possibility.  Why,  then,  should  we  suppose  that 
what  ^as  never  been  p(Tceived  and  cannot  be  imagined  to  be 
perceptible  exists  as  .m  independent  reality,  especially  in  view 
of  the  possibility  of  interpreting  sensation  (sensing)  as  produc- 
tive activity,  and  thus  removing  all  motive  for  such  a  supposi- 
tion? 

E.  B.  McGilvary's  realism  is  the  result  of  a  reaction,  largely 
under  the  influence  of  James  and  Dewey,'  from  his  former 
Hegelianism.-  In  returning  to  realism  he  rejects  the  dualistio 
variety;'  but,  accepting  the  ei)istc>mological  monism  of  im- 
mediate empiricism  as  valid,  although  he  tends  to  identify  this 
immediatism  somewhat  too  closely  *  with  the  oliler  psychologi- 
cal idealism,  he  regards  it  as  valuable  in  that  it  paves  the  way 
for  a  monistic  type  of  realism.-^  James's  psychology  he  criti- 
cises as  confusing  thought  and  its  ol)ject ;  "  in  opposition  to 
this  he  himself  stresses  the  unportant  observation  that  the  ob- 
ject of  consciousness  is  not  necessarily,  as  such,  a  state  of  con- 
sciousness.' In  his  "  Prolegomena  to  a  Tentative  Realism  "  *  he 
argues  that  since  the  red  which  I  sometimes  see  is  observed 
by  my  friend  to  exist  at  times  when  I  ai^i  not  conscious  of  it, 
it  is  a  perfectly  possible  feat  of  thought  to  regard  red  as  capable 
of  existence  independenth-  of  all  consciousness.'-'  It  is  quite 
conceivable  that  it  should  exist  when  unperceived,  without 
having  to  e.xist  double  when  perceived.'"  "If  .scmiim  is  sense 
datum,  then  why  may  not  sensibile  be  sense  dandum?  And  why 
m'ly  not  such  a  dnndum  exist  l)efore  it  becomes  a  ddliim,  much 
as  a  toy  which  I  buy  a  week  before  Christmas  exists  as  a  dandiDii 
till  Christmas  Eve,  when  it  becomes  a  datum f  This  change 
from  dandum  to  datum  does  not  make  the  toy  any  more  real."  " 
Instead  of  possibility  of  perception  being  the  meaning  of  reality, 

'  Jnurnnl  of  Philosophij.  IV,  1907,  p.  091. 

'See  Minil.  N.S.,  VII,  ls98,  .ind  X,  1901. 

*  Jnurnnl  nf  Phi loKo phi/,  IV,  19(17,  pp.  4'>2-S.  .591-2,  599-601. 

'  .Sif  lJ(\vi>  ill  I'iiiiiixiiiihiriil  iiirinr,  XVI,  ii«)7,  pp.  419-22. 

»  Philosophical  firrinr,  XVI,  1907,  pp.  2ii(')-H-4,  422-,'J. 

'Jnurnnl  of  Philnxophy,  IV.  1907,  p.  229.  "  Ih.,  pp.  4,5.3-4. 

»  lb.,  pp.  449-58.         »  /6.,  pp.  449,50.  i«  lb.,  p.  152.         "  lb.,  p.  458. 


NEO-REAL18TIC   DOCTRINE   OF  QUALITIES        239 


that  possibility  is  more  obviously  taken  as  depending  upon  a 
reality  whifh  might  be  perceived  if  the  conditions  wore  favor- 
al)l('.'  Finally,  McGilvary  ventures  to  claim  that  realism  is 
proved  by  the  fart  that  objects  are  temporally  independent  of 
the  awareness  of  them.-  He  feels  obliged  to  admit,  however. 
that  not  (ill  <iualities  perceived  can  be  regarded  as  numerically 
identical  with  the  actual  qualities.'  At  the  s.ame  time  he  claimh 
tliat  th(  pragmatic  method  is  adequate  to  eliminate  all  illusory 

ilcIIKMltS.* 

More  recently,  as  if  he  had  conceded  too  much,  McGilvary 
has  definitely  taken  up  the  problem  of  illusion,  hallucination, 
and  kindred  iiiienomena,  with  the  object,  apparently,  of  show- 
ing that  all  secondary  qualities  may  conceivably  lie  independent 
of  awareness  of  tliem.  The  phenomena  of  color-blindness  are 
explained  by  suggesting  that  consciousness  is  a  unique  selective 
relation,  which,  in  this  case,  omits  certain  qualities  of  the 
external  object.*  "Deceptions"  of  the  senses  are  realistically 
interpretable,  if  we  hold  that  not  all  space-occupying  objects 
are  space-monopolizing.  There  is  no  sufficient  reason  for  deny- 
ing that  the  different  colors  .seen  in  the  same  place  at  the  same 
time  by  different  observers  are  both  independently  real.*  The 
difficulty  encountered  in  the  temporal  difference  between  the 
perceived  and  the  real  star  is  glo.ssed  over  by  means  of  a  verbal 
distinction.  The  observer's  body  and  the  star  are  to  be  re- 
garded as  contemporary  but  not  simultaneous,  contemporaneity 
being  defined  as  synchronousness  within  the  same  durational 
unit,  whatever  that  unit  may  be,  e.g.  within  the  same  day,  or 
year,  or  century.^  Rut  the  difficulties  involved  in  the  theory  of 
the  independent  existence  of  .sen.se-qualities  are  .so  real  that 
MeCiilvary  is  constrained  to  acknowledge  the  "tentative" 
character  of  his  realistic  doctrine.  Idealism  is  not  demon- 
strably false,  he  says,  but  it  is  not  justified  in  claiming  to  be  the 
only  tenable  or  moral  theory ;  and  similarly,  realism  is  not 
demonstrably  true,  but  it  is  a  promising  hypothesis  whose 
difficulties  are  disappearing.' 


1    i 
I 

i 


V\ 


f\ 


*  i 


'  Ih.,  p.  592.  =  It,.,  [).  000.                     '  It).,  p.  CS4. 

*  lb.,  p.  092.  =  PhUosophiail  Rtnieu;  XXI,  1912,  p.  171. 

•  lb.,  pp.  101-6  ;  of.  Moore,  supra,  and  our  criticism  of  tho  view. 
'  /6.,  p.  170.  » Ih.,  p.  \r>:i. 


240 


THE  PROBLEM   OP   KNOWLEDGE 


But  even  this  modest  assort iort  is,  it  would  seem,  too  optimis- 
tic. McGilvary  is  very  far  from  having  satisfactorily  cleared 
up  all  the  difficulties  which  beset  a  realistic  absolute  epistemo- 
logical  monism.*  He  once  appealed,  as  we  have  seen,  to  the 
pragmatic  test  in  this  connection ;  to  pragmatism  then  let  him 
go.  Why  should  we  seek  to  reinstate  hallucinatory  elements 
as  independently  real,  when  they  have  already  l)ecn  rejected 
by  common  sense  on  practical  grounds?  But  the  pragmatic 
method  cuts  deeper  still.  Not  only  are  there  experienced 
sense-qualities  whose  independent  existence  we  cannot  do  with ; 
there  are  no  sense-qualities  whose  independent  existence  we 
cannot  do  without.  Physical  continuity  and  causality  are 
sufficiently  provided  for  on  the  theory  of  the  independent 
reality  of  primary  qualities  and  relations.  In  view,  therefore, 
of  the  practical  identity,  psychologically  speaking,  of  the 
normally  perceived  and  the  hallucinatory  st^nse-quality,  it 
seems  uncritical  to  cling  to  the  theory  of  the  independent  exist- 
ence of  only  some  of  the  secondary  qualities. 

The  extreme  development  of  the  neo-realistic  doctrine  of 
secondary  qualities  is  to  be  found  in  an  article  by  T.  Percy 
Nunn  -  and  in  the  most  recent  phases  of  Bertrand  Russell's 
philosophy.'  Nuim  explains  the  origin  of  the  belief  in  what 
he  calls  "psychical  sensations"  as  due  to  the  pragmatic  consid- 
eration of  economy  in  the  number  of  the  qualities  of  common 
bodies,  and  the  plausible  assumption  that  since  some  of  my 
experiences  (pleasures,  memories,  etc.)  are  shared  by  me  alone, 
the  same  is  true  of  all  experiences.*  His  own  view  is  that  "sen- 
sations," as  representative  mental  entities,  need  not  be  postu- 
lated. Both  prin  '•y  and  sccon.lr^ry  qualities  of  bodies  exist 
in  them,  whether  any  one's  senses  perceive  them  or  no,  and 
exist  as  perceived.*  The  superiority  of  the  primary  qualities 
is  due  simply  to  the  readiness  with  which  their  detern  tions 
are  measurable,  the  same  being  true  only  of  temperatur.'  mong 
secondarj'  \Tjialities.*     Whatever  the  conditions  of  perc;  ptual 

'  See  A.  O.  Lovejoy,  Journal  of  Philosophy.  X,  1913,  pp.  32-43. 

•  ".\re  Secondary  Qualitir^a  Independent  of  Perception?"  Proc.  Ariatot.  Soe., 
I'j0f)-10. 

'  Our  KnowMge  of  Ihe  External  World  as  a  Field  for  Scientific  Method  in  Phi- 
loaophu,  1914,  pp.  0.3-120. 

*  Proc.  Aristot.  Soc.,  1909-10,  pp.  199-201.       •  lb.,  pp.  191-2.      •  lb.,  p.  217. 


NEO-REALISTIC  DOCTRINE  OP  QUALITIES       241 

selection  of  qualities  may  be,  these  conditions  never  affect  the 
character  of  the  qualities  perceived.'  The  difference  to  the 
object  observed  made  by  looking  through  a  special  glass  is 
observable  only  at  the  eye-piece;  but  those  special  qualities, 
equally  with  all  the  others  ever  experienced,  exist  whether 
perceived  or  not.'  The  buttercup  actually  owns  as  "coordinate 
substantive  features"  all  the  colors  that  may  be  presented  under 
different  conditions.'  All  the  diverse  sounds  of  the  whistle 
of  a  moving  motor-car  whi'*h  may  be  heard  by  persons  in  dif- 
ferent positions  are  emitted  by  the  whistle,  the  thing  that  is 
really  sounding  being  the  air  in  each  place  where  a  sound  is,  or 
might  be,  heard.*  All  the  hotnesses,  of  indefinite  numl)er, 
perceived  or  perceivable,  around  a  body  of  high  temperature, 
different  as  they  may  be  according  as  the  previous  state  of  one's 
l)ody  is  different,  are  actually  owned  by  the  hot  thing  and  dis- 
posed spatially  about  it.'  The  straight  staff  which  appears 
bent  in  a  pool  is  both  straight  and  bent,  whether  perceived  or 
not.*  What  is  needed,  it  is  claimed,  is  a  wider  conception  of 
the  "thing  "7 

In  appreciation  of  this  theory,  it  may  be  said  that  it  is  valu- 
able as  showing  the  results  of  a  courageous  attempt  to  carry 
out  in  the  mo»t  rigorous  fashion  the  fundamental  idea  of  the 
new  realism,  viz.  that  of  an  absolute  epistemological  monism 
without  idealism,  with  its  corollary,  the  absolute  externality 
of  the  conscious  relation.*  In  adverse  criticism  it  must  be 
urged,  however,  that  inasmuch  as  Nunn  holds  to  the  reality 
and  activity  of  the  psychical  subject,  his  theory  of  secondary 
(jualitif's  violates  both  the  principle  of  parsimony  and  its  cor- 
rective, the  principle  of  pragmatism  and  common  sense.  It 
would  be  more  in  accord  with  both  science  and  common  sense 
—  as  will  be  shown  more  fully  in  the  later  discussion  —  to 
regard  all  secondary  qualities  as  psychical  products.  More- 
over, Nunn  has  to  acknowledge  that  for  the  problem  of  error 
and  illusion  he  can  find  no  satisfactory  solution.*  In  referring 
to  sense-experiences  which  seem  to  guarantee  the  existence 
of  what  can  be  proved   not   to  exist,   he  naively  remarks, 

>  lb.,  pp.  192,  193.  »  lb.,  p.  206.  •  lb.,  p.  203. 

*  lb.,  p.  204.  >  Ih.,  pp.  206-6.  •  lb.,  p.  209. 

'  /6..  p.  206.       •  See  Ch.  XIII.  infra.       •  Proc.  ArUtot.  Soc.,  1909-10, p.  207. 


I  m 


L'42 


THE   PROBLEM  OP   KNOWLEDGE 


ii 


k 


illl! 


"Why  error  is  'permitted'  is  a  problem  no  philosophy  has 
sol-ed."  > 

Bert  rand  Russell  has  very  recently  so  modified  his  philo- 
sophical position  that  whereas  formerly  he  could  scarcely  l)e 
culled  one  of  the  new  realists  so  far  as  his  doctrine  of  the  quali- 
ties of  matter  was  concerned,  he  is  now  as  much  a  neo-realist 
as  Perc}'  Xunn,  and  has  worked  up  his  doctrines  into  a  much 
more  fully  integrated  system.  This  channe  has  taken  place 
since  the  publication  of  his  book,  The  Problems  of  Philosophy, 
in  1912.  In  that  book  he  expres.se(l  himself  to  the  effect  that 
what  the  senses  immediately  tell  us  is  !>ot  the  truth  about  the 
object  as  it  is  apart  from  us,  but  only  the  truth  about  certain 
sense-data,  which,  so  far  as  we  can  see,  are  not  independent 
objects,  but  depend  upon  the  relations  between  us  and  the 
object.  Thus  what  we  directly  .see  and  feel  is  merely  "appear- 
ance," which  we  believe  to  be  a  sign  of  some  "  reality  "  behind.* 
Ill  a  sense  we  can  never  prove  external  reality,  but  there  is  no 
reason  for  supposing  solipsism  true ;  we  feel  the  need  of  a  physi- 
cal object  to  Ijc  the  same  object  for  dilTen  i!t  jx'ople ;  we  have 
an  instinctive  belief  in  an  external  world,  and  the  simplest 
hypothesis  is  to  suppose  there  exists  a  world  of  independent 
physical  objects.''  But  while  following  instinctive  l)elief  and 
common-sense  metaphysics  with  regard  to  the  proposition  that 
a  physical  world  exists,  Russell  could  find  no  way  of  reaching 
the  physical  object  and  the  physical  space  of  physics,  except 
by  an  inference  which  l(>ft  their  nature  unknown  and  only 
certain  of  their  logical  relations  discoverable.  "We  can  know 
nothing,"  he  had  to  confess,  "of  what  piiysical  .'^pace  is  like 
in  itself."  *  The  idea  that  independent  reality  has  some 
medium  color,  he  rejected  as  groundless,  although  admitting 
that  he  could  not  refute  the  doctrine.* 

But  Russell  now  claims  that  since  the  writing  of  the  Prob- 
lems of  Philosophy  he  has  made  the  discovery  that  the  physi- 
cal object  and  the  physical  space  of  physics  can  be  constructed 
as  series  of  classes  of  sense-data  and  sensihilia  —  the  latter  being 
particulars  analogous  to  sense-tlata,  but  no*  actually  perceived. 
TIk'  immediate  ilata  of  sense  are  now  regarded  as  ab.solutely 

'  Proc.  Arislot       -c,  1909-10,  pp.  210-11.  '  The  Problems  of  Philosophy, 

pp.  23-4.  »  lb.,  pp.  27  :i7.  *  lb.,  p.  49.  »  lb.,  p.  55. 


-".^,  .1..  ■■■i--.-»  J't^'i  'i. 


NEO-REALI8TIC   i)OCTRINE   OP  QUALITIES        243 


real  as  they  appear  to  us ;  they  are  not  mental,  but  physical, 
the  ultimate  suliject -matter  of  physics.  The  common  sense 
notion  of  fairly  permanent  things,  recognized  as  being  a  con- 
struction, not  a  datum,  is  now  rejected  as  "the  metaphysics 
of  savages."  By  the  use,  it  is  claimed,  of  "Occam's  razor," 
the  inferred  entities  of  common  .sense  are  replaced  by  com- 
pounds, or  classes,  or  series  of  sense-data  and  sen.sibilia.  The 
"momentary  state  of  a  thing"  is  a  correlated  set  of  aspects, 
perceived  or  unperceiveil.  Places  are  constituted  by  relations 
to  surrounding  object >,  and  an\'  particular  location  may  be 
(Icfmed  as  a  perspective  where  two  series  of  perspectives  meet. 
An  instant  is  a  class  or  jrroup  of  events  all  simultaneous  with 
each  other,  but  not  with  anything  else.  Thus  Russell  is  now 
at  one  with  the  boldest  of  the  neo-realists  in  declaring  that  the 
whole  world  of  wliat  are  to  us  sense-data  and  sensibilia  might 
he  exactly  as  it  is  if  thtTf  were  no  minds.' 

The  main  criticism  to  l)e  made  against  Russell's  philosophy 
at  this  point  is  that  he  has  swung  from  an  absolute  dualism  to 
an  absolute  monism  in  epistemology,  because  he  saw  no  other 
way  of  escape  from  an  almost  total  agnosticism  with  reference 
to  the  physical  world.  The  desperateness  of  his  former  condi- 
tion is  reflected  in  the  desperate  remedy  to  which  he  has  had 
recourse,  cutting  himself  off  absolutely  from  common  sense, 
fi)r  which  offence  he  salves  his  conscience  by  applying  to  the 
common  sense  view  the  epithet,  "metaphysics  of  savages." 
It  would  seem  as  though  metaph.\  <ical  doctrines  which  were 
first  learned  in  the  immemorial  pa-t,  and  have  stood  the  test 
of  practice  ever  since,  are,  if"  fhey  can  be  shown  to  be  logically 
tenable,  to  say  the  least,  ccond  to  none  in  respectability. 
What  we  shall  maintain  in  a  later  connection  is  that  a  critical 
monism  is  possible  within  the  limits  of  a  realistic  epistemology, 
wliich  is  truer  to  theprincipleof  parsimony  than  Russell's  extreme 
pluralism,  with  its  multiplication  adindefinitum,  of  "sensibilia," 
and  which  is  also  in  full  accord  with  a  scientifically  informed 
conmion  sense.  If  this  our  contention  can  be  shown  to  be  valid, 
Russell's  "discovery"  cannot  be  more  than  a  second  best. 

I  Our  Knowledge  of  the  External  World  as  a  Field  for  Scientific  Method  in  Phi- 
Inrnphi).  1914,  Leoturps  III  and  IV  :  rf.  "  The  Relation  of  Sense-Data  to  Physics,", 
Scientia.  Vol.  XVI.  No.  XXXVI,  July,  1914. 


244 


TUK   PH')BLEM   OP   KNOWLEDGE; 


li-r- 


^^ 


Hi 


HMp<'rfifi;illy  confjidprod,  Ruasoll's  now  doctrine  sv'pms  to  havp 
the  merit  of  being  it  least  able  to  get  rid  of  the  hitherto  in- 
soluble probicn.  (as  it  h^--  .•>•  med  from  the  point  of  view  of 
reali-tie  absolute  epi.stemological  monism)  of  how  the  apparent 
perception  of  unreal  objects,  as  in  hallucination,  is  to  be  ac- 
counted for.  "Wliat  is  called  the  luireality  of  an  immediate 
object,"  he  says,  "  must  always  be  the  unreality  of  some  other 
object  inferred  from  the  immediate  object  and  descrilx'd  by 
reference  to  it."'  In  other  words,  hallucinations  and  illusions 
are  really  ca.ses  of  the  erroneous  interpretation  of  reality  ("  sensi- 
bilia")  exiM'rienced.  But  this  solution  of  the  problem  is  more 
apparent  than  real.  Besides  what  has  just  been  said  as  to  its 
violation  of  the  principle  of  parsimony,  Russell's  theory,  it  may 
be  added,  would  cancel  not  a  single  instiince  of  what  may  be 
called,  in  ;•  broad  sense  of  the  term,  an  experience  of  the  unreal ; 
and  the  problem  of  error,  now  numerically  aggravated,  still 
awaits  a  solution.  At  this  point,  it  would  seem,  Ilus.sell  can  go 
on  in  one  or  the  other  of  two  dire(;tions.  Either  he  can  do  as 
Holt  has  done  and  affirm  the  self-contradictory  nature  of  reality, 
or  else  he  can  devi  'op  further  his  insight  that  error  is  "  not  an 
instance  of  a  dual  relation  "  (in  the  .sense  in  which  valid  knowledge 
is) .  This  latter  course  is  the  one,  in  our  opinion,  which  he  ought 
to  take  ;  but  it  would  lead  him  to  posit,  first  in  the  case  of  error, 
but  thereafter  in  other  cases  also,  a  creative  psychical  activity. 
But  Russell's  acknowledgment  of  the  "  mental "  character  of  the 
subject  of  acquaintance  ought  to  make  it  comparatively  easy 
for  him  to  accept  this  view.  And  having  once  adopted  the 
hypothesis  of  a  creative  psychical  activity,  he  would  find  that 
its  application  to  "sensation"  would  immediately  open  up  the 
way  for  an  episteraologically  monistic  reali-  n,  without  the 
necessity  of  positing  the  independent  reality  of  a  single  sense- 
quality.* 

Woodbridge  and  Alexander,  Nunn  and  Russell,  are  very 
uncompromising  in  their  realistic  interpretation  of  secondary 
(iualities.  There  are  other  realistic  episteinological  monists 
who.se  position,  whether  more  defensible  or  not,  is  more  moder- 
ate.    We  hiiali  refer  to  the  views  of  two  of  these,  viz.  L.  T.  Hob- 

'  MonUt,  XXIV.  1914.  p.  589 ;  cf.  Out  Knowledge  of  the  Ezternal  World,  pp.  85  tl. 
'SecCh.  XIV,  in/ra. 


NEO-i  EALISTIC    DOCTRINF   OF  QUALITIBS        245 


r 


hoiis«>  ar  I  A.  Wolf.  Hohhoiix*'  was  one  of  tU<'  carlu'st  of  thi' 
writers  wlio  may  with  fairn«'a.<  !«•  clawsed  an  l^^^longing  to  the 
now  realiatic  school,  and  he  has  writt4>n  with  fix^&t  sobriety 
of  jiulKnic!"  and  cogeiit'y  of  argument.  His  doctrine  of  the 
s('nse-<juahfiea  <>•  ouject.s,  however,  is  nuv  of  the  least  satis- 
factory parts  of  his  great  work,  The  Thetrry  of  Knmdedge}  He 
recognizes  that  not  all  8en^H''-(lualitie8  can  lie  regarcted  as  in  je- 
pcnilent  exialciicea  wit!out  contradiction,  and  so  explains  the 
rejected  ones  as  due  lo  )ine  re!ictif)n  of  our  nervous  organiza- 
tion on  a  given  physical  agent."  *  This  explanation  he  would 
a|)ply  not  only  tr)  illusions,  hut  to  some  at  least  among  the 
secondary  iiualities,  such  as  the  sensed-<iuality  of  heat.  In  the 
case  of  feeling  also,  esse  is  perciin.^  But  Hobhouse  refuses  to 
n  (lard  all  secondary  qualities  as  dependent  upon  perception. 
Failing  i  >  ideniv  that  we  were  created  as  a  joke,  to  be  "  taken 
in,"  he  declares :  "  So  far  as  my  perceptions  tolerate  and  support 
one  another,  I  take  them  as  correct  in  fact ;  and  if  the  synthesis 
of  these  perceptions  involves  me  in  the  tx?lief  that  the  facts  they 
repijrt  are  external  to  my  consciousness,  I  accept  their  evidence." 
The  one  test  is  that  ul  "consilience."  Hobhouse  here  illus- 
ti.'es  his  position  by  reference  ,     the  rise  in  pitch  of  the  shriek 


of  :i    ocomotive  as  it  rushes  tt 
in  its  pitch  as  heard  by  a  per 
the  platform.     "Here,"  he  sa' 
rectified  at  one  stroke  by  a  si' 


"~  -^ne  observer,  and  the  fall 

cat     i"g  at  the  other  end  of 

'  '.     a  discrepancy  which  is 

'.■   Ii-  ''iction  from  the  theo.y 


of  sound  .  .  .  leading  ...  us  to  hoid  .  .  .  that  the  pitii  m 
fact  remains  con.stant  If  the  whole  mass  of  our  percept  ^ui. 
were  systematized  after  this  fashion,  the  corrected  v\lucs  which 
they  would  give  would  be  the  irue  exter'uil  order."  * 

But  this  selection,  while  it  may  se.  •  :  to  have,  when  supei- 
ficially  considered,  a  certain  pragmaiiv^  ju.stification,  is  mani- 
festly, from  the  standpoint  of  cpistemological  theory,  quite 
arbitrary.  There  is  neither  physical  nor  psychological  basis 
for  the  selection  of  any  particular  shade  of  t  buttercup  from 
noonday  sunlight  to  twilight,  or  the  sound  oi  t'^e  whistle  as 
heard  by  the  eriiine-driver  or  by  either  one  of  l^  bystanders, 
:is  tlie  one  real,  independently  existent  color  or  sound  of  the 

'1896.  »  The  Theory  of  Knowledge,  p.  525. 

« lb.,  pp.  .-..'5.  534-5.  « lb.,  pp.  5.30-1. 


tr 


246 


THE   PROBLEM   OP   KNOWLEDGE 


II  :r 


■A 


object.  And  if,  as  we  shall  maintain,  another  theory  is  avail- 
able which  would  make  any  such  selection  unnecessary,  even 
Hobhouse's  moderate  and  mediating  position  will  have  to  be 
rejected  like  the  others  as  untenable. 

A.  Wolf  feels  the  need  of  moderating  the  extreme  views  of 
Alexander  and  Moore,  although  he  is  in  fundamental  sympathy 
with  their  point  of  view.  He  undertakes  "to  defend  natural 
rcc^lism  as  far  as  possible."  '  He  has  little  faith  in  the  efficacy 
of  Descartes's  method  of  doubt.  "Doubt  everything  and  you 
may  as  well  doubt  whether  you  are  really  doubting."  "Per- 
ception," he  admits,  "is  not  always  true,  nor  does  it  give  us  the 
whole  truth,  but  from  it  we  start  and  by  it  we  are  guided  ;  and 
unless  we  rely  on  the  guidance  of  normal  perception,  the  very 
ground  of  knowledge  is  removed  from  under  our  feet."  *  It  is 
simply  because  some  human  experiences  have  not  been  normal. 
Wolf  points  out,  that  natural  realism  has  ever  been  questioned.' 
The  obvious  suggestion,  then,  is  that  we  retain  our  natural 
realism,  or  real  prescntationism,  for  normal  perception,  while 
another  explanation  —  representationism  —  is  adopted  for  the 
abnormal  experiences.  I'lie  former  would  explain  the  fact  of 
knowledge ;  the  latter,  the  fact  of  error.^  Moreover,  representa- 
tion is  a  fact  in  all  ca.ses  of  memory  and  imagination,'  so  that 
it  seems  to  Wolf  only  a  sligiit  theoretical  extension  of  the  field 
of  a  function  which  we  already  know  to  be  real  in  other  cases. 

Now  the  troul)le  with  this  view,  as  will  appear  more  fully 
when  we  examine  its  account  of  consciousness,  is  that  it  insists 
upon  setting  up  an  absolute  difference  of  relationship  (of  the 
content  of  experience  to  ihe  subject)  where  psychological  science 
finds  an  essential  identity.  In  so  far  as  we  have  not  already 
adequately  criticised  this  point  of  view  in  our  criticism  of  Hob- 
house,  we  will  endeaAor  to  do  so  when  we  come  to  speak  of 
Wolf's  theory  of  consciousness.  For  the  present  we  may  simply 
indorse  the  suggestion,  offered  in  non-conunittal  fashion  liy 
A.  O.  Lovejoy,  that  Wolf's  position  is  "a  weak  and  untenable 
compromise  between  two  more  extreme  doctrines."  * 

'"Natural  Realism  and  Present  Tcudcnrips  in  Philotophy,"  Proc.  Aristol. 
Soc..  190H-0,  p.  140. 

»  Ih.,  p.  148.  '  lb.,  [>.  I.")!).  <  Ih..  I).  171.  5  11).,  p.  ir,2. 

*"0n  the  Existence  of  Ideas,"  Johns  Hni/kins  Vnivcraity  Circular,  1914, 
No.  3,  p.  52. 


NEO-REALISTIC  DOCTRINE  OP  QUALITIES       247 


r«j# 


Ainong  the  other  new  realists  we  find  nothing  appreciably 
lictter  on  the  subject  of  secondary  qualities  and  abnormal 
perception  than  in  those  whose  views  we  have  examined.  In 
fact  their  treatment  is  on  the  whole  less  satisfactory,  in  that  the 
problem  is  either  not  piven  serious  and  conclusive  treatment, 
or  is  dealt  with  in  rather  ambiguous  fashion.  Fullerton,  for 
example,  after  censuring  Locke  for  having  "scraped  the  world" 
l):ire  of  all  its  colors,  sounds,  odors,  and  tastes,'  asserts  that  these 
"  so-called  secondary  qualities  of  bodies  do  belong  to  the  bodies, 
as  they  seem  to."  *  The  physical  must  be  treated  as  physical 
only,  and  not  transmuted  into  something  mental.'  Now  Ful- 
lerton is  right  enough  in  holding  that  the  "sense-qualities"  are 
(lualities  of  the  physical  object,  and  not  of  the  "sensation"  or  of 
the  mind ;  but  that  is  not  quite  the  question.  Do  these  quali- 
ties belong  to  the  oliject  when  it  is  not  perceived,  or  only  when 
and  as  perceived?  Fullerton  seems  to  assume  that  since  the 
qualities  "belong"  to  the  object  when  it  is  perceived,  they 
belong  to  it  permanently  —  except  as  it  may  be  changed  physi- 
cally, not  psychically.  .\t  any  rate  this  is  his  position ;  *  but 
the  special  difficulties  it  encounters  in  all  cases  of  perceptual 
error  are  practically  ignored.  He  seems  to  think  it  sufficient 
to  remark  that  some  single  experiences  are  misleading  to  men 
(if  a  certain  stage  of  the  development  of  their  experience  of  the 
world,*  and  that  language  is  not  adjusted  to  what  present  them- 
selves in  the  experience  of  men  generally  as  exceptional  phe- 
nomena." But  the  crucial  question  for  the  neo-realist  at  this 
point  is  how  qualities  of  who.se  conprcsenc?  in  the  thing  no 
one  has  ever  had  or  could  conceivably  have  an  experience,  be- 
cause .>f  their  mutually  exclusive  character,  can  actually  inhere 
^-ilnultaneously  in  the  independent  object. 

J.  E.  Boodin's  deliverance  on  the  status  of  secondary  quali- 
ties furnishes  a  good  illrstration  of  the  incompatibility  of 
realism  with  pragmatism  as  a  theory  of  reality.  (That  there  is  an 
essential  element  in  pragmatism  as  a  theory  of  truth  which  is 
not  incompatible  with  realism,  we  shall  attempt  to  show  later.) 
He  says  that  qualities  must  be  taken  as  objective,  if  they  enable 


I'    ] 


m 


'  The  WurU  We  Lice  In,  p.  l.«).  «  /6..  |i    146.  »  lb.,  p.  126. 

*  C'f.  Journal  of  Philosophy,  \,  1913,  pp.  59,  0-'.  440. 

'  The  World  Wc  Line  In,  p.  IGO.  •  lb.,  p.  162. 


t 


If; 


pi     ' 


■i>; 


.!  .  ■ 


if' 
li 

! 


>'. 


i; 


4 


I  ' 


248 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  KNOWLEDGE 


us  to  identify  and  predict  the  things  with  which  we  must  deal ; 
and  inasmuch  as  the  so-called  secondary  qualities  may  be  fully 
as  important  in  this  as  the  primary,  as  when  the  odor  of  a  gas 
may  be  the  means  of  its  identification,  such  secondary  qualities 
must  be  taken  as  objective.  If  they  do  not  help  us  in  such 
identification,  they  are  not  to  be  regarded  as  qualities  of  the 
object.  Qualities  are  objective  just  in  so  far  as  we  must  take 
them  so.'  Now  if  l)y  "objective  '  Boodin  means  independently 
real,  it  is  clear  enough  that  objective  qualitie.->  cannot  be  made 
any  more  or  less  so  by  the  way  in  which  we  take  them.  If, 
however,  "  objective  "  is  intended  to  mean  simply  functioning  as 
object  within  a  toUd  content  which  ix  dependent  upon  being  experi- 
enced, then  Boodin  is  at  this  point  no  realist  at  all,  but  a  dis- 
guised psychological  idealist,  as  most  of  the  pragmatists  are. 

When  we  come  to  examine  the  views  of  the  six  "program- 
mists,"  who  have  come  to  be  regarded  as  the  special  sponsors 
and  apologists  of  the  neo-realistic  movement,  we  find  their 
treatment  of  the  problem  of  secondary  qualities  peculiarly  un- 
satisfying. In  the  introductory  es.say  of  their  recent  joint 
pubiicatum,  Thi  \ew  Retdiam,  a  chapter  which  is  given  out  as 
expressing  the  opinions  common  to  all  six  of  the  collaborators,  we 
read  the  stntemci:!  that  sensible  qualities  are  among  the  simple 
constituents  of  the  presumably  independently  real  world.* 
But  when  we  come  to  look  fc^r  an  adecjuate  defence  of  this  thesis 
in  the  light  of  the  various  "exceptional  phenomena"  and 
abnormalities  of  perception,  we  are  (loomed  to  disappointment. 
Some  of  them  (Marvin  and  Spaulding)  seem  to  have  little  further 
to  say  on  the  subjeci ;  others  (Perry  and  Montague)  acknowl- 
edge that  there  is  liere  a  still  unsolved  problem  (although  the 
former  depreciates  its  importance  for  the  new  realism) ;  while 
those  who  address  themselves  most  .seriously  to  the  task  pro- 
duce an  ambiguous  and  unsatisfactory  result. 

Marvin  is  evidently  not  greatly  interested  in  the  problem. 
He  contents  himself  vvitli  arguing  that  although  secondary 
qualities  are  not  so  ubitiuitous  as  primary  qualities,  they  are 
not  necessarily  subjective  on  tl  it  account,'  and  that  if  second- 

'  Philoaophical  Review,  XX,  1911,  pp.  395-7. 
•  The  New  Healmm.  1912,  p.  .iri. 

'  An  Introdii  -Hon  to  SyatirtuUic  Phduaonhy,  1903  ;  Bce  Journal  of  Philosophy, 
I.  1914,  p.  133. 


NEO-REALISTIC  DOCTRINE   OP  QUALITIES        249 

ary  qualities  were  mental  and  not  physical,  the  science  of  physics 
would  almost  have  to  be  abandoned,  as  the  major  part  of  its 
subject-matter  would  be  taken  from  it.*  With  reference  to 
this  argument  it  only  needs  to  be  said  that  if  "subjective"  and 
"mental"  mean  applying  to  the  subject  or  mind,  Marvin's 
latter  statement  is  not  strong  enough ;  for  if  no  objects  were 
ever  clothed  with  sense-qualities,  no  primary  quahties  could 
ever  be  discovered.  On  the  other  hand,  if  "subjective"  and 
"mental"  mean  no  more  than  produced  by  the  subject  or  mind, 
it  may  be  held  that  secondary  qualities  arc  locate*'  by  the  sub- 
i""t  in  the  object,  in  which  case  physics  would  still  l)e  possible, 
aiui  Marvin's  argument  would  have  no  validity  whatever.  That 
the  common-sense  theory  with  reference  to  certain  primary 
riualities  of  things  is  logically  fundamental  to  physics  we  would 
hdkl  to  be  true  (Ernst  Mach  and  others  to  the  contrary  notwith- 
standing). But  it  seems  purely  dogmatic  to  say  the  same 
thing  with  reference  to  secondary  qiialities,  for  reference  to 
such  qualities  can  all  be  eliminated  from  physical  science ;  and 
probably  most  modern  physicists  have,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
accepted  the  view  that  sense-tiualities  are  dependent  upon 
perception. 

With  reference  to  the  special  difficulties  of  the  neo-realistic 
dogma  as  to  secondary  finalities,  Spaulding  has  had  practically 
nothing  to  say.  His  treatment  of  hallucinations  has  been,  if 
we  remember  correctly,  confined  to  drawing  from  the  actuahty 
(if  such  incorrect  perceptions  the  inference  that  the  content  of 
th<'  act  of  perception  is  never  to  be  identified  with  the  content 
of  the  object  of  perception.-  This  rather  obvious  observation 
may  Ix"  used,  as  Spaulding  pomts  out,  to  support  the  realistic 
view  that  objects  exist  independently  of  the  perception  of  th<?m. 
lint  in  its  chief  significance  it  seems,  one  is  almost  inclined  to 
think,  to  be  an  attempt  to  throw  dust  in  the  air,  so  as  to  obscure 
(he  weakness  of  the  neo-realistic  position  at  this  point.  The 
significant  tiling  about  hallucinations  is  that  there  is  more  in 
1  hem  than  an  act  of  perception  ;  there  is  an  object,  and  the  only 
notable  difference  between  iiallucinatioii  and  correct  percep- 
tion is  a  diffeience,  not  in  the  content  of  ti>e  act  of  perception 

'A  First  Book  in  Metaphysics,  V.n2.  p.  19.<. 
^  Journal  of  PhUosopky,  III,  I'JOO,  pp.  314  5. 


QHHI 


'^'^ 


'^ 


I 


e 


250 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   KNOWLEDGE 


in  the  two  casos,  but  in  the  content  of  the  object.  Indeed,  as 
we  hav(>  already  noted  more  than  once,  the  crux  of  the  problem 
lies  just  in  the  fact  that  the  content  of  the  act  of  perception  in 
the  two  cases  is  [)ra('tic'illy  identical,  while  the  con  crt  of  the 
objects  shows  such  a  discrepancy,  when  adequately  examined, 
that  they  cannot  both  be  accounted  parts  of  the  independently 
existing  world.  Thus,  when  the  dust  is  allowed  to  settle,  we 
see  that  perceived  but  unreal  object  which  is  so  ominous  a  por- 
tent for  the  nco-realist. 

R.  B.  Perry  claims  that  color  is  itself  neither  physical  nor 
psychical.  In  its  relation  to  the  source  of  light,  it  is  physical ; 
in  its  relation  to  the  retina,  it  is  psychical.'  It  becomes  sub- 
jective when  it  is  responded  to  selectively,  so  that  it  enters  into 
a  mental  complex.^  Whether  this  mental  complex  of  which 
color  is  a  term  is  dependent  upon  consciousness  or  not,  color 
itself  is  independent  of  consciousness.^ 

In  these  statements  Perry  seems  to  be  scarcely  self-<'onsist- 
ent.     If  it  is  color  in  its  relation  to  the  source  of  light,  i.e.  in 
the  physical  complex,  that  is  indepenrlently  real,  i.e.  real  inde- 
pendently of  any  relation  to  the  retina,  how  can  it  be  said 
that  color  itself  is  neither  physical  nor  psychical?     Ought  not 
the  neo-realist  to  say  that  r<4nr  is  always  physical  and  some- 
times psychical  (related  to  i<-nsitive  organism,  conscious  sub- 
ject, or  what  not)?     On  this  whole  inatter  of  secondary  quali- 
ties in  relation  to  perception  and  esp^'cially  (.n  the  problem  of 
hallucination  and  illusion.  Perry's  utterances  show  that,  unlike 
most  of  his  collaboratinK  friend-    he  ha^  strangely  failed  to  ap- 
preciate how  fundamental  this  question  is  in  relation  to  what 
ho   is   concerned  to  defiwl.     He   claims  that    these  problems 
of  p)erception   are   not   any   clearer  on   n    (ian-idealistic    basis 
than   f)n  a  paii-objectivistic   basin,   and  that    tb'    ptoblem   of 
perception  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  comparative  merits  of 
realism  and  i(!ruli>iii  '     On   the  contrary  we  hold,  and  we  will 
try  to  show,  that  these  problems  of  peneption  .ire  crucial  for 
th*"  question  of  idi'ttkf*m  and  realism.     They  mv  the  rock  upon 
which  the  bark  n(  neo-realisn>  is  bound  to  split       Vo  realism 
can  be  finally  satisfactory  until  it  has  found  a  fav<;iablc  adjust- 

'  Prrwnt  Pl,ilw:>i>hirnl  TendrnrlfH,  p.  ;ilO.  '  Ih     1>     iH 

'  Thi  .V.  »!  RcuUsm,  p.  VZh         '  Journe^  >/  Philosophy,  X,  Ulia,  pp.  4«)l-2. 


NEO-REALISTIC   DOCTRINE  OP  QUALITIES        251 

ment  to  these  stubborn  facts  of  varj'ing  sonse-qualities.  illu- 
sions, and  kindred  contents  of  perception. 

W.  B.  Pitkin  agrees  with  Holt  and  Montague  that  the  prob- 
lem of  error  in  all  its  forms  is  a  crucial  one  for  the  new  realism, 
as  for  every  other  tiieory  of  cognition.'  He  hmiself  follows 
Alexander  and  Nunn  in  the  extreme  view  that  the  contents  of 
hallucinatory  and  illusory  experience  are  quite  independent  of 
cognition.''  Thej'  are  simply  very  intricate  instances  of  objects 
in  complex  physical  relations.''  This  is  courageous  and  con- 
sistent, and  the  only  way  but  one  *  by  which  the  realist  can  keep 
the  fact  of  error  and  hallucination  from  driving  him  into  duaHsm. 
But  it  may  well  be  questioned  whether  dualism  itself,  with  its 
agnostic  implications,  is  not  to  be  chosen  in  preference  to  this 
pan-objectivism ;  whether  the  neo-realist 's  boldness  is  not  sus- 
piciously like  bravado,  and  whether  the  position  he  has  taken 
is  not  in  reality  the  reductio  ad  absxirdum  of  his  philosophy. 
Assuming  that  everything  which  functions  as  object  of  aware- 
ness, error  included,  must  exist  irdependentlyof  the  awareness, 
the  consistent  neo-realist  is  led  to  the  virtual  denial  that  there 
ever  is  or  can  be  any  perceptual  or  other  form  of  error.  Accord- 
ing to  the  new  realism,  therefore,  idealism  and  dualism  both 
;irc,  and  yet  cannot  \n\  erroneous.  In  other  words,  the  new 
realism  is  a  self-refuting  system. 

E.  B.  Holt  has  been  strongly  influenced  by  the  radical  em- 
piricism of  William  James,*  and  the  empiriocriti  ism  of  Avena- 
rius.«  He  has  undertaken  to  give  a  distinctly  and  unequivo- 
cally realistic  turn  to  this  philosophy  cf  pure  experience,  so 
tliat  he  may  be  regarded  as  representing  the  movement  from  a 
tlisgm.'ied  pan-subjectivism,  or  pan-psychicnl  view,  to  a  dis- 
(luiml  pan-objectivism,  or  pan-physical  \ic\v.  He  holds  that 
!ho  world  is  not  made  up  of  hidden  stutT,  called  "matter'';' 
Imt  out  of  neutral  utiiff,  which  is  neither  mental  nor  plivsical, 
neither  subjective  nor  objective,  but  which  may  bei^ime  either. 
It  includes  whatever  one  happens  to  meet  with,  and  includes 
it  just  as  it  is  In  "pure"  experience.*     Everything  that  is,  is 

'  The  Xew  Realuom,  p.  458.  » lb.,  p.  461. 

=  Ih.,  pp.  4fi.1,  467.  *  Sep  Ch.  Xn'.  infra. 

'  Tlie  Concept  of  Consciounne!:-',  1914,  Prcf.,  p.  xiii,  etc. 

•  lb.,  pp.  2.  77,  etc.         '  lb.,  pp.  122  rj.         •  Ih..  p.  122  und  Ch.  VIII. 


mm 


mm 


ipnp 


252 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  KNOWLEDGE 


V  i 


hi 


.'"  I  -i  ■ 


';  ^t 


1,1 


and  is  as  it  is.*  The  mental  arises  when  the  nervous  system 
selectively  describes,  in  the  neutral  realm  of  beitig,  a  content  to 
which  it  responds.  It  is  thas  a  part  of  the  neutral  stuff  of  pure 
experience,  in  a  special  relation  to  a  bodily  function.* 

There  is  no  very  sharply  definctl  theory  of  reality,  however. 
The  remark  is  passed  that  it  is  something  within  all  that  is,' 
and  from  the  discussion  as  a  whole  *  one  gathers  t'.iat  neutral 
being — which  is  defined  as  constituted  of  purely  logical  or 
conceptual  entities,  "  propositioas,"  the  timelessly  subsistent 
content  of  all  actual  and  conceivably  possib'.e  thinking  —  is  re- 
garded as  including  the  real  (experienceable)  and  the  unreal, 
or  merely  logical,  and  that  the  real,  in  turn,  is  supposed  to 
include — or  better,  in  different  contexts,  to  he,  respectively — the 
physical  and  the  psychical.  But  it  is  only  the  unreal,  not  the 
real,  that  Holt  explicitly  and  clearly  defines  as  a  species  of  being ; 
and  it  is  onlj  the  mental,  not  the  physical,  that  he  explicitly  and 
clearly  defines  as  a  sp(»cies  of  the  real.  In  view  of  this  failure  to 
give  us  a  clear  and  unequivocal  theory  of  reality,  and  of  the  re- 
jection also  of  the  ordinary  notion  of  matter,  together  with  the 
assertion  that  things  with  all  their  primary  and  secondary 
qualities  exist  prior  to  the  rise  of  the  psychical,*  the  practical 
upshot  is  that  the  "neutral  stuff,"  or  being,  tends  to  coincide 
with  the  real,  and  the  real  with  the  physical,  the  mental  being 
simply,  one  might  almost  say,  being  (or  the  real,  or  even  the 
physical),  in  a  special  sort  of  relation.  The  same  interpretation 
is  suggested  in  the  remark  that  "perhaps  reality  is  some  very 
comprehensive  system  of  terms  in  relation";*  and  the  same 
virtual  identification  of  being  with  reality  and  the  physical 
also  comes  out,  although  more  strikingly,  in  the  attempt  made 
to  explain  all  sen.se-qualities  —  not  only  without  adequate 
empirical  corroboration,  but  even  in  defiance  of  one  of  our  most 
elementary  and  indisputable  discriminations  —  as  complex 
pro(hi('ts  whose  ultimate  constituents  are  ncrvou,^  shocks.'' 

'  The  \ew  Realium,  p.  .359. 

'  The  Concept  «/  Consciousness,  Ch.  IX  and  pp.  213,  338. 

•  76.,  pp.  .3,1,  .338-9.  *  Ih.,  pnssim;    The  \cw  Realitm,  pp.  303-73. 
'  The  Concept  of  Consciousness,  pp.  134,  110,  153. 

•  The  Xcw  Realism,  p.  366. 

'76.,  pp.  313-30,  .351-4;    The  Concept  of  Consciousness,  p.  213.     The  ten- 
dency tn  identify  the  "neutral'*  with  the  physical  is  more  marked  in  Holt'^ 


NEO-REALISTIC    DCK'TRIXE    OP   QUALITIES        253 

But  in  view  of  the  fundamental  theory  that  all  contents  of 
consciousness,  and  more,  exist  prior  to  conscious  experience, 
ill  the  world  of  neutral  stuff,  the  problem  of  the  place  of  illusory 
experience  in  a  realistic  world  is  so  obvious  a  difficulty  that 
Holt  is  forced  to  take  it  up  seriously,  and  his  treatment  of  this 
sul)ject  is  by  no  means  lackinp;  in  boldness.  The  logical  con- 
clusion from  his  premises  —  a  conclusion  which  most  would 
regard  as  the  raludio  ad  ahmrdam  of  his  position  —  he  boldly 
takes  up  as  a  part  of  his  theory,  defending  the  view  that  all 
errors,  contradictions,  and  untruths  exist  in  the  neutral  realm 
of  being,  and  so,  in  the  objective  world,  independently  of  their 
existence  in  tlie  mind.'  In  order  to  render  this  necessary  con- 
clusion plausible,  a  number  of  considerations  are  advanced. 
It  is  admitted  that  there  can  be  no  contradiction  between  mere 
lerim,  or  physical  objects,  but  only  between  propositions.* 
There  must  exist,  then,  in  the  neutral  realm,  all  propositions, 
contradictory  or  not,  which  can  possibly  enter  into  coascious- 
ness.  Here,  especially.  Holt  finds  use  for  Royce's  doctrine  of  the 
conceptual  nature  of  the  universe,  although,  of  course,  he  inter- 
prets it  in  a  realistic  rather  than  an  idealistic  scns'^ '  All  cases 
of  collision,  interference,  combining  and  separating  disease 
and  death,  are  interpreted  as  cases  in  which  there  i-,  a  lo:!;ical 
contradiction  to  somc^  principle  of  motion.''  Error,  then,  ile- 
fined  as  the  being  together  in  kuowlahjc  of  contradictory  prop- 
ositions,'^ is,  it  would  seem,  just  what  ought  to  lie  expected, 
when  reality  contains  so  many  contradictions,  indeed,  error 
turns  out  to  be  a  necessary  element  in  valid  knowledge!  Is 
this  a  conseque!  c  of  "the  renaissance  of  logic"  which  the 
author  hails  with  such  enthusiasm?  * 

In  Holt's  discussion  of  illusory  experience  some  appearance 

issay  in  The  Sew  Renlii^m  than  in  The  Concept  af  Conscioui<nc»s :  a  significant 
(vi  when  it  13  rcmcnibcrcd  that  the  fornuT,  while  putili^shcd  before  the  latter 
'.vtis  iKit  written  until  some  yeara  after  thi'  other  hail  been  eonipleted.  Signs  of 
•till  further  prog/ess  in  the  materialist  din  otion  are  to  be  found  in  the  paper, 
•■  Response  and  Cognition."  in  whirii  it  is  admitted  that  "the  several  pre.sent- 
iliy  tendeueies  to  resolve  the  subj  etive  category  of  soul-substaiioi'  into  objective 
nlations,  all  fake  their  origin  in  the  contentions  of  the  eighteenth-century 
materialists"  (Jmirnnl  of  Philosophy.  XII,  191.5,  p.  407). 

'  The  Concept  of  Consc'oiisiic^x.  p.  2()0 ;    The  .\eiv  Realism,  pp.  303  fT. 

'  The  Concept  of  C'jnscioii'ine.-'n.  \>\).  2f).'i-4.  »  lb..  Pr,!  .  p.  xiii. 

*  lb  ,  p.  277.  '  lb.,  p    J70.  •  Ih..  Ch.  I. 


'W 


254 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   KNOWLEDGE 


■|;{ 


of  relief  from  his  difficulties  is  gained  by  the  introduction  of 
certain  characteristic  devices.  Hallucination,  it  is  suggested, 
takes  place  when  the  nervous  system  generates  within  itself 
nerve-currents  of  frequency  similar  to  those  set  up  from  with- 
out,' so  that  the  appearance  of  the  sense-qtiality  is  explained 
when  it  is  remembered  that  all  sense-quulities  are  just  various 
combinations  of  nervous  shocks !  The  objects  of  hallucination, 
however,  we  are  informed,  are  not  in  "real  space,"  but  in  a  space 
liko  mirror-space,  and  equally  objective.-  Thus  they  need  not 
be  regarded  as  unreal ; '  although  the  reason  for  this  is  not  so 
clear  as  we  could  wish,  especially  when  we  read  not  only  that 
there  are  objects  which  are  unreal,*  but  that  even  some  per- 
ceived things  are  unreal.^ 

Thus  Holt's  special  brand  of  the  new  realism  seems,  we  may 
perhaps  be  pardoned  for  observing,  one  of  the  most  amazing 
displays  of  wilful  philosophizing  that  has  been  witnessed  in 
recent  years.  If  it  were  presented  somewhat  as  non-Euclidean 
geometries  are  presented,  as  the  working  out  of  tht.  implica- 
tions of  a  false  or  at  least  doubtful  a.ssumption  (in  this  case. 
Holt's  definition  of  consciousness),  it  wouKl  be  less  objection- 
able ;  but  as  it  is,  the  only  excuse  would  seem  to  be  that  the 
author  could  not  think  of  any  self-consistent  position  between 
a  completely  dualistic  representationalism  and  the  most  thor- 
oughgoing denial  that  there  is  any  such  thing  as  representa- 
tional knowledge.  If  he  had  been  able  to  think  of  any  other 
way  of  avoiding  the  idea  that  secondary  qualities  an  "sensed 
within  our  skulls,"  *  or  any  way  of  :-i'einf.';  how  they  could  be 
"on  the  objects"  without  existing  prio?-  to  and  independently 
of  consciousness  of  them,  he  'vould  have  ceased  to  wonder, 
perhaps,  at  the  "impertinence"^  and  "effrontery"'  of  physi- 
cal .scientists  in  speaking  of  the  movement  of  masses  in  time 
and  space  as  more  independently  real  thnn  colors,  sounds, 
tastes,  and  odors,  and  would  probably  l.av(>  spared  himself 
the  un;ivailing  labor  he  has  so  abundantly  bestowed  upon  an 
impossible  task. 

W.  P.  Montague,  although  accepting  the  new  realism  at  his 


'  The  Xew  Reati«m,  pp.  '.io2-?l. 

»  76.,  p.  367.  *  Ih. 

'  The  Cunccpt  of  Consciouancii^,  i>.  137. 


■  lb.,  pp.  3.i4,  3M. 

>/.'>.  II.  3.^. 

'  lb..  V    133.  *Ib. 


P    1 38. 


NEO-REALISTIC  DOCTRINE  OF  QUALITIES        255 


own  (Ipfinition  of  ro.ilism  jva"thp  doctrine  that  the  same  ob- 
jects known  by  some  one  may  continue  to  exist  when  not  known 
by  any  one,"  '  is  not  to  Ix*  regarded  as  a  quite  typical  neo- 
rcalist.  When  it  comes  to  the  matter  of  secondary  (|ualities  espe- 
cially he  falters  where  the  others  firmly  tread.  But  his  view  is 
none  the  less  interesting  and  imjiortant  on  that  account,  and  his 
reasons  for  deviating  so  far  from  his  associates  arc  not  a  little 
instructive.  In  a  critical  article,  published  in  IWH,  on  the 
cpistemol')Kical  views  of  H.  B.  Alexander  and  C.  A.  Strong,  he 
agrees  with  the  former  that  the  perceived  object  is  externally 
real,  and  wit',  the  latter  that  it  i.s  within  the  psychophysical 
organism.^  He  refuses  to  accept  what  he  calls  naive  realism, 
or  the  "telepathic  view"  of  Alexander,  because  of  the  diffi- 
culties connected  with  the  transcendence  of  space  and  time 
which  would  be  involved,  he  claims,  in  the  direct  perception 
of  such  objects  as  the  fixed  stars,  anil  for  the  additional  reason 
that  since  the  object  perceived  is  the  same  in  the  true  and  in 
the  illusive  perception,  and  yet  the  extra-organic  circumstance  is 
different,  it  follows  that  the  object  directly  perceived  cannot  be 
the  object  external  to  the  organism,  but  only  the  projection  or 
"shadow"  which  it  easts  upon  the  organism  (in  the  brain).* 
Later  he  criticises  the  new  realism  as  being  too  nearly  identical 
with  naive  or  natural  realism.  It  must  be  amended,  he  claims, 
s<»  as  to  make  it  compatible  with  the  universal  phenomenon  of 
error,  and  with  the  mechanism  of  perception.*  The  dogmatism 
of  monistic  realism  in  tending  to  identify  .seeming  with  being 
must  be  corrected  in  the  light  of  such  phenomena  as  dreams, 
spatial  and  temporal  aberration,  etc.*  The  realist  mast  learn 
;o  apply  more  widely  the  principle  which  he  already  em- 
ploys in  interpreting  pleasures  as  having  no  independent  ex- 
istence.* 

But  while  admitting  that  the  perceived  and  the  real  may  not. 
lie  numerically  identical,  Montague  cherishes  the  conviction 
that  qualitatively  they  are  similar,^  and  possibly  iflentical,  even 
if  not  necessarily  ,so.*     It  is  an  unwarranted  claim,  that  the 


» Ih.,  I,  1904.  p.  300. 
*  Ih.,  IX,  1912,  p.  46. 


'  Journal  of  Philosophy,  VI,  1909,  p.  460. 

>  lb.,  p.  296;   cf.  IV,  1907,  p.  .383. 

'76.,  IV,  1907.  p.  37S;   IX,  1912,  pp.  .39-41. 

•  Ih.,  VI,  1909,  p.  461.  '  Ih..  IV,  1907,  p.  378. 

» lb.,  IV,  1907,  p.  382 ;    Philosophical  Revieu.  XXIII,  1914,  p.  62. 


mmfm 


mmim 


256 


TUB  PROBI.KM   OF   KNOWLEDGE 


h^y 


intl  pendent  objortivity  of  secondary  qualities  is  unimaRina- 
blc'  The  intorpn-tation  of  those  ruiiihties  as  purely  sub- 
jective i>  a  donma  iiuulequately  based  upor  'lo  two  facts  that 
secondary  (lualities  h.ive  no  value  for  predutive  <>r  mechanical 
science,  and  tluit  tli.  ■  are  more  closely  associatrd  than  pri- 
mary qualities  with  the  feelings,  which  are  admittedly  subjec- 
tive.' On  the  scientifically  respectable  assumption  that  the 
extra-organic  causes  of  central  states  are  most  probably  the 
events  which  would  have  most  simply  caused  the  states,  it 
may  be  supposed  that  the  sense-qualities  of  the  perceived  pro- 
jection in  the  brain  are  also  pret?nt  in  the  extra-organic  object, 
its  cause.  This  speculation  is  not  at  present  fully  verified, 
so  that  the  problem  of  the  external  reality  of  secondary 
qualities  cannot  be  said  as  yet  to  be  solved ;  but  it  is  not 
inconceivable  that  if  our  knowledge  of  the  primary  energies 
in  bodies  and  in  cerebral  tracts  were  more  exact,  we  might 
have  their  discovered  identity  as  a  further  basis  for  the  in- 
ference. In  any  case,  the  possibility  of  error  would  l)e  ex- 
plained by  the  facts  that  the  simplest  cause  is  not  always 
the  actual  cause,  and  that  an  effect  may  be  counteracted  by 
some  other  cause.' 

This  view  Montague  has  expounded,  in  his  various  articles, 
in  considerable  detnil.  The  qualities  of  the  perceived  object 
(which  is  really  in  the  brain,  though  virtually  in  extra-organic 
space) ''  he  regards  a,s  being  dependent  upon  the  relation  of  the 
extra-organic  object  to  the  brain.''  This,  of  course,  is  meant 
to  apply  to  normal  perception  only,  as  hallucinatory  experi- 
ences must  depend  upon  something  else,  since  the  supposed 
external  object  is  not  real.  On  the  basis  of  continued  experi- 
ence we  divide  the  (lualities  of  the  perceived  object  into  those 
which  are  compossible,  and  which  may  therefore  be  thought 
of  as  belonging  to  the  thing-in-itself,  and  on  the  other  hand 
those  which  are  not  compossil)le  with  .such  as  have  been  selected 
as  valid,  anfl  so  must  be  regarded  as  qualities  which  the  per- 
ceived   (rcall\-    cerebral,    but    virtually   extra-organic,    because 

*  Journal  of  Philosophy,  I,  1904.  p.  298.  «  lb.,  p.  299. 

a  The  Xew  RinltHm.  pp.  2Sf.-7,  209  .  .I'lurrxil  of  Philosophy,  IV,  1907,  p.  378; 
Pkilomphicnl  Hninr,  XXIII.  1914,  p.  •>4. 

*  Philosophical  Review,  XXIII,  1914,  p.  62. 

*  Journal  of  Philoaophy,  II,  1906,  p.  315. 


NEO-REALISTIC  DOCTRINE  OP  QUALITIES       257 


virtually  projoctod)  object  has  l)ecausc  of  the  influence  upon 
llu'  brain  of  s^oincthinK  other  than  the  real  extra-organic  object. 
In  other  words,  thest-  latter  tiualities  are  to  \w  regarded  as 
mere  appearanees,  vvhi<"h  lose  whatever  reality  they  had  with 
the  vanishing  of  the  fM-reeption.'  The  meaning  here  seems 
clearly  to  l)e  that  the  only  objects  of  perception  are  the  "simu- 
lacra of  extra-cerebral  objects"  contained  by  the  brain,'  but 
(icrceived  as  virtually  extra-organic,  or  projected,  i.e.  perceived 
(IN  (/  tiiey  were  where  they  are  not.  This  aeeins  to  be  a  posi- 
tion very  closely  approximating  epistemoh)gical  dualism,  and 
logically  involving  agnosticism  with  reference  to  all  beyond 
projected  cerebral  simulacra.  If  the  sinuilacra  were  such  as 
could  Ik!  actually  projected,  it  would  seem  too  much  to  say 
that  we  have  any  experience  of  the  physical,  even  of  the  ccre- 
liral  simulacra  themselves;  moreover,  since  "we  could  not 
infer  the  physical  unless  we  experienced  the  physical," '  the 
result  would  Iw  absolute  dualism  and  complete  agnosticism 
with  reference  to  physical  reality  (and  therefore,  according  to 
Montague's  own  view,  agnosticism  with  reference  to  all  reality). 
But  what  Montague  means  is  that  the  simulacra  ar?  physical, 
and  that  the  act  of  projection  is  "not  an  actual  act,"  but  "a 
virtual  act"  ;  "the  world  we  perceive  is  (not  indeed  an  actual 
hut)  a  virtual  or  potential  reprojection  of  the  effects  which  the 
world  projects  upon  us."  *  In  this  case,  since  the  cerebral 
simulacrum  is  not  actually  projected,  we  may  perhaps  be 
allowed  to  say  that  we  perceive  a  part  of  the  physical,  viz. 
a  part  of  the  cerebral ;  but  even  so,  remembering  that  there  is 
IK)  actual  projection,  we  would  be,  to  use  Montague's  own 
language,  "reduced  to  the  wretched  status  of  an  intra-cranial 
solipsist."  For  — let  his  words  be  repeated  —  "if  we  cannot 
^'ct  beyond  our  own  brains  in  imnuHliatc  perception,  we  cannot 
Sict  be3'ond  them  at  all."  ^  According  to  his  own  statement, 
tliis  physiological  solipsism  can  be  avoided  only  by  accepting 
his  special  theory  of  consciousness,'  and  to  an  examination  of 
that  theory  we  must  turn  in  a  later  connection;    but  unless 

« lb.,  IV,  1907.  p.  383 ;   V,  1908,  pp.  211-12. 

*  Philnsophieal  Review,  XXIII,  1914,  p.  61. 

*  Journal  of  I'hilomphu,  I,  1904.  p.  294. 

*  Philosophical  Review,  XXIII,  1914,  p.  62. 
'76.,  p.  01.  *Ib. 


mtm 


MICROCOPY    RESOlUTK>N    TEST   CHART 

lANSI  and  ISO  TEST  CHART  No,  2! 


1.0 


I.I 


1.25 


;-  Ilia 


ii 


36 

40 


1.4 


2.5 
2.2 

2.0 
1.8 

1.6 


A     /APPLIED  IM/1GE     he 


16^3    £u5t    Mjir-    Stree* 
Rochester.   New    '•'o'*'         '46 
C:^'6)    *S;       0.500  -  Pnor.e 


258 


THE   PROBLEM   OP   KNOWLEDGE 


ho  should  make  good  his  case  at  this  second  trial,  we  must 
regretfully  see  him  remanded  to  his  narrow  "  intra-cranial " 
prison,  from  which  his  only  possible  escape  must  be  merely 
verbal,  that  is,  to  use  his  own  term,  virtual,  and  not  actual. 
In  such  a  case  his  monistic  or  "new"  realism,  one  might  also 
say,  would  be  merely  virtual,  and  not  actual. 


■,^ ' 


CHAPTER  XII 

The  Neo-Realistic  Doctrine  op  Consciousness 

The  intimate  relation  between  the  neo-realistio  doctrine  of 
secondary  qualities  and  the  views  held  by  the  new  realists  as 
to  the  nature  of  consciousness  is  well  indicated  in  the  words  of 
Montague:  "As  long  as  the  secondary  qualities  are  accepted 
as  objectively  [i.e.  what  we  would  call  independently]  real, 
there  is  no  temptation  to  regard  consciousness  as  anything  but 
a  relation."  '  In  dealing  with  the  theories  of  consciousness 
which  are  current  in  the  English  and  Ai  lerican  neo-rcalistic 
schools,  it  may  be  well  to  note  that  although  the  doctrine  of 
the  independent  reality  of  secondary  qualities  may  often  be 
found  ostensibly  resting  upon  the  view  that  consciousness  is 
an  "external"  lation,  the  actual  dependence  is  probably  in 
the  main  :n  the  opposite  direction. 

We  shall  turn  our  attention  first  to  the  English  school. 
Here  it  seems  easy  to  detect  the  influence  of  the  distinctions 
made  by  Shadworth  Hodgson  in  his  first  presidential  address 
as  first  president  of  the  Aristotelian  Society  in  1887.  In  answer- 
ing negatively  the  question,  "Is  mind  synonymous  with  con- 
sciousness?" he  indorsed  (although  from  the  standpoint  of 
the  philosophy  of  pure  experience,  i.e.  disgui-sed  psychological 
idealism,  rather  than  from  that  of  natural  realism)  the  distinc- 
tions involved  in  the  common-sense  assumption  that  conscious- 
ness is  some  one's  consciousness  of  something.  Res  cogitans, 
cogifotio,  and  cogitata  must,  he  insisted,  be  carefully  and  con- 
stantly distinguished.  As  against  the  contusing  idealistic 
i<l(>ntification  of  knowing  with  knower,  he  maintained  that 
mind  is  a  subject  of  attributes,  and  consciousness  an  attribute 
of  that  subject,  a  knowing  and  not  a  knower.^  In  later  ad- 
dresses he  characterizes  mind  as  that  which  we  perceive  as  the 

'  Jtmmal  vf  Philosophy.  II,  1905,  p  315. 

»  Proc.  Aristol.  Soc.  1887-8,  pp.  0,  7,  2.3, 

2.")9 


260 


THE   PROBLEM  OF   KNOWLEDGE 


,n. 


I  *' 


■     -i 


i: 


subject  of  consciousness,  and  matter  as  that  which  we  perceive 
as  the  object  of  ct  'iousness.'  This  sujigested  total  identi- 
fication of  matter  ith  the  object  of  consciousness,  and  of  the 
object  of  consciousness  with  matter,  reveals  on  the  one  hand 
the  lack  of  a  bona  fide  realism  in  Hodgson's  own  philosophj'. 
(He  indorses  the  view  that  not  only  does  all  consciousness 
reveal  Being,  but  that  all  Being  is  revealed  in  consciousness.-) 
But  on  the  other  hand  the  identification  referred  to  seems  to 
explain  the  direction  taken  by  the  later  studies  of  the  English 
new  realists,  in  which  the  problem  is  as  to  what  consciousness 
can  be,  if  the  object  of  consciousness  is  always  in  its  entirety 
independentlj'  real. 

What  seems  to  us  the  most  defensible  feature  of  Hodgson's 
doctrine  of  consciousness,  viz.  the  distinction  between  con- 
sciousness and  its  subject  (mind)  on  the  one  hand,  and  its 
object  on  the  other,  reappears  in  realistic  form  in  the  writings 
of  L.  T.  Hobhouse  and  W.  McDougall.  The  former  speaks 
of  perception  as  an  act  of  consciousness  referring  to  the  object 
perceived,  so  that,  as  such,  it  is  the  mind's  own  creation.  The 
perception,  or  assertion,  as  mental  event,  is  to  be  distinguished, 
according  to  Hobhouse,  from  the  content,  as  fact  perceived  or 
asserted.'  McDougall,  in  his  work  entitled  Body  and  Mind: 
A  Histonj  and  Defense  of  Animism,*  describes  "the  soul"  in  a 
way  that  seems  most  obviously  to  imply  an  essentially  identical 
view  of  consciousness.  A  soul,  he  says,  is  "a  being  that  pos- 
sesses, or  is,  the  sum  of  definite  capacities  for  psychical  activity 
and  psycho-physical  interaction,  of  which  the  most  funda- 
mental are  (1)  the  capacity  of  producing,  in  response  to  certain 
physical  stimuli  (the  sensory  processes  of  the  brain)  the  whole 
range  of  sensation  qualities  in  their  whole  range  of  intensities  ;  (2) 
the  capacity  of  responding  to  certain  sensation-complexes  with 
the  production  of  meanings ;  .  .  .  (3)  the  capacity  of  respond- 
ing to  these  sensations  and  these  meanings  with  feeling  and 
conation  or  effort,  under  the  spur  of  which  further  meanings 
may  be  brought  to  consciousness  in  accordance  with  the  laws 
of  reproduction  of  similars  and  of  reasoning ;  ( ■  the  capacity  of 
reacting  upon  the  brain-processes  to  modify  tiieir  course  in  a 


'  Proc.  Anxl„t.  Sne..  lSOl-2.  p.   l. 

■'  The  Thcoru  of  Knowledge,  ISOO,  pp.  .5.31-4. 


2   lb.,  p.  52 
M911. 


XKO-REALISTIC  DOCTRINE  OF  CONSCIOUSNESS     261 


way  which  we  cannot  dearly  define,  but  which  we  may  pro- 
visionally conceive  as  a  process  of  ^u  'ance  by  which  streams 
of  nervous  enerjiy  may  be  concentrated  in  a  way  that  antago- 
nizes the  tendency  of  all  physical  energy  to  dissipation  and  deg- 
radation." '  But  neither  Hobhouse  nor  McDougall  develops 
much  further  the  implications  of  this  general  position ;  indeed, 
the  latter  seems  in  a  later  work  -  to  be  tending  in  the  direction 
of  the  more  typically  neo-realistic  doctrine  of  the  behaviorist 
psychologists.  "Consciousness,"  he  says,  "is  an  activity  of 
some  being  which,  in  all  cases  of  which  we  have  positive  knowl- 
edge, is  a  material  organism,  but  to  which  we  may  conven- 
iently give  the  general  name,  subject."  '  To  an  examination  of 
this  later  view  we  shall  therefore  have  to  return  in  another 
connection. 

The  typical  English  neo-realistic  view  of  consciousness  is 
l>est  found  in  the  writings  of  G.  E.  Moore,  B.  Russell,  S. 
Alexander,  and  T.  P.  Nunn.  Moore's  first  utterances  on  the 
subject  show  him  already  beginning  to  develop  Hodgson's 
doctrine  in  the  realistic  direction.  Experience,  as  a  kind  of  cog- 
nition, stands,  he  claims,  for  a  double  fact,  viz.  a  mental  state, 
and  that  of  which  this  mental  slate  is  cognizant.^  He  evi- 
dently holds,  however,  that  it  would  be  absurd  to  suppose 
tliat  the  mind  could  give  properties  to  things.'  The  problem 
then  comes  to  be  what  consciousness  is,  if  it  does  nothing  to 
its  ol)ject.  Sensation,  it  is  averred,  is  "a  case  of  knowing,  or 
being  aware  of,  or  experiencing  something."  *  To  be  awai  of 
the  sensation  is  not  to  be  aware  of  its  content,  but  to  be  aware 
(if  the  awareness  of  a  sense-content.''  But,  it  is  confessed, 
" wluMi  we  try  to  introspect  the  sensation  of  blue,  all  we  can  s»e 
is  the  blue ;  the  other  element  is  as  if  it  were  diaphanous."  * 
But  since  it  is  insisted  that  the  observation  of  a  perception  of 
red  is  altogether  different  from  the  perception  of  red,'  the 
problem  becomes  acute  as  to  just  whai  consciousness,  which 
has  been  supposed  to  be  the  special  "subject-matter  of  psychol- 
ogy," really  is.     Moore  seems  to  remain  in  doubt  as  to  whether 


'  liody  and  Mind,  p.  3fi5. 
'  Op.  cit..  p.  00. 
■■  //).,  1!H),{-1,  p.  lUo. 
'76.  •  76,,  p.  450. 


»  PKycholoQu:    Thr  Study  of  Behavior,  1912. 
*  Proc.  Aristot.  Sor.,  1902-3,  p.  82. 
"  Mimt,  N.S.,  XII,  VMY.i,  p.  44'J. 
*Proc.  Aristot.  Soc,  1905-6,  p.  104. 


i    * 


I,-* 


262 


THE  PROBLEM  OF   KNOWLEDGE 


the  mind  itself,  as  the  subject  of  mental  acts,  or  any  objective 
contents  of  mental  activities,  even  sense-data,  should  be  in- 
cluded in  the  subject-matter  of  psychology.'  He  would  include 
without  hesitation,  however,  as  undoubtedly  mental  or  psychical 
entities,  all  mental  acts,  all  qualities  distinguishing  mental  acts 
from  each  other,  and  all  ollections  of  mental  acts.-  As  criteria 
of  the  mental  the  followiuj;  are  offered  :  it  must  be  an  act  of  con- 
sciousness ;  it  must  belong  to  some  person,  or  mind  ;  and,  finally, 
it  must,  perhaps,  be  directly  known  to  one  person  only.' 

There  is  much  that  is  suggestive  in  this  view  of  Moore's, 
and  not  a  little  that  will  be  retained  in  the  view  to  be  defended 
in  a  later  chapt"-;  but  it  must  be  evident  that,  although 
consciousness  may  very  well  be  mental  or  psychical  activity, 
it  is  difficult  to  conceive  how  any  activity  can  either  be  "diaph- 
anous" or  exist  without  producing  any  change  in  any  of  the 
qualities  of  the  object  toward  which  it  is  directed.  Little 
wonder,  then,  that  at  least  a  tendency  should  be  manifested, 
to  include  w.  hin  the  subject-matter  of  psychology,  although 
inconsistently,  more  than  this  neutral  sort  of  entity  to  which 
consciousness  has  been  reduced. 

Russell  has  thus  far  had  comparatively  little  to  say  about 
consciousness,  but  he  accepts  the  gcnerc'  realistic  doctrines 
that  knowing  is  a  relation  which  is  external  to  its  object,*  and 
that  only  the  mental  act,  and  not  the  thing  apprehended,  is 
conscious.*  Similarly,  Nunn  subscribes  to  the  view  that  in 
perception  there  is  no  psychical  intermediary  "on  the  object 
side"  between  the  subject  and  the  independently  real  thing.* 

More  elaborate  attention  to  the  nature  of  consciousness  is 
found  in  Alexander's  articles ;  but  whether  he  has  succeeded 
thereby  in  throwing  further  light  upon  the  problem  may  well 
be  doubted.  He  adopts  the  view  that  con.sciousness  is  mental 
activity,  conation,  which  differs  in  different  cases  only  in  its 
direction  toward  different  objects  of  perception  or  thought.' 


'  Proc.  Aristo'.  Soc.  1909-10.  pp.  51-7.  '  Ih..  pp.  36-51. 

;  lb.  *  Journal  of  Philosophy,  VIII,  191 1,  pp.  l.'.O-OO. 

'  Problems  of  Philomiihij,  p.  05.  Aoquaint.tnco.  arrortliiiK  tii  HussoU,  is  a  dual 
relation  bctwoon  a  .sulijoot  and  an  objcpt,  whirh  neid  not  have  nny  rommunily  of 
nature.  Tlif  =ilbjn."t  i"^  "  n'."iit^i!,"  uhilc  th<'  ohjcrt  is  nnt  kmnvii  t:)  he  mental, 
except  in  intro.spcetion  (Muniat,  XXIV,  1914,  p.  1 ;  ef.  pp.  4  and  435-53). 

'Proc.  Ari.-<lot.  Soc,  1909-10,  p.  202.  '  76.,  1907-S,  pp.  216,  219-22. 


NEO-REAHSTIC   DOCTRINE  OF  CONSCIOUSNESS     263 


Later  he  acknowledges  that  this  mental  activity  is  accompanied 
l)y  feeling,  and  this,  like  memory  (the  existence  of  the  past),' 
(Mior  and  imagination,  is,  he  confesses,  an  unsolved  problem 
from  his  point  of  view.'  Still  later  it  is  admitted  that  con- 
sciousness, or  knowing,  not  only  is  accompanied  by  feeling 
and  varies  in  direction,  but  also  that  it  varies  in  intensity  and 
complexity.'  Still,  we  would  remark,  if  this  is  all  that  con- 
sciousness is,  it  is  difficult  to  understand  how  there  can  be  in 
"acts  of  consciousness"  enough  subject-matter  for  the  science 
of  psychology,^  and  on  the  other  hand  how  the  object  can  be 
"saturated"  and  even  "vitiated"  by  suggestions  and  infer- 
ences —  "elements  introduced  into  it  by  the  mind."  ^ 

But  Alexander  has  other  thoughts  concerning  the  nature  of 
consciousness.  Mind  consists  of  mental  activity,  which,  he 
asserts,  is  located  in  the  body ;  it  is  a  not  purely  physiological 
function  of  the  body,*  a  fortunate  functional  variation  in  the 
course  of  evolution,  through  which  we  are  enabled  to  learn 
the  characters  of  things.'  But  the  identification  of  mind 
with  body  is  carried  still  further.  "We  are  directly  aware," 
we  read  in  a  recent  article,  "that  our  mind  and  body  are 
one  thing,  because  we  experience  them  in  the  same  place."  * 
Suitably  to  this  conception  of  mind  as  a  physical  thing,  there 
is  the  definition  of  consciousness,  or  knowing,  or  having  experi- 
ence, as  the  mere  "  comprescnce,"  or  togetherness,  of  two  things, 
one  of  which  is,  and  the  other  of  which  is  not,  a  mind,  i.e.  a 
houj   with  the  empircal  character  of  being  conscious.*    This 

'Later  this  is  explained  (?)  by  the  dogma  that  memory  "renews  the  past 
roiK  ition,"  ib.,  1910-11,  p.  21. 

!  Ih.,  1907-8,  pp.  251,  254;  ih.,  190S-9,  p.  6. 

'  lb.,  1910-11,  p.  18.  «  lb.,  p.  7.  '  lb.,  1909-10.  pp.  19.  28. 

'  lb.,  1907-8,  pp.  223-4;   ib.,  1909-10,  p.  6. 

■  Mind,  X.S.,  XXI,  1912,  p.  17. 

'  lb.,  p.  8;  cf.  Proc.  Arislol.  Soc,  1910-11,  p.  17.  A  rather  important 
siili'light  upon  Alexander's  position  here  is  found  in  the  following  sentence: 
"111  iiiy  own  case  mental  activity,  especially  in  thinking  ...  is  accompanied 
\>y  marked  movements  of  the  eyes,  wh  ch  arc  apt  to  change  their  position  with 
each  change  of  the  thought,  and  whosi  n.ovcments,  in  fact,  I  use  as  a  means  <  ' 
dircctinc  thought  in  different  directions  and  controlling  it"  {Proc.  Arintot. 
Soc,  19(  -8,  p.  210).  He  tells  us  that  in  all  his  mental  conditions  ho  is  aware 
of  movements  in  different  directions  (ib.,  p.  219)  ;  and  finally  ht  speaks  of  this 
iliiotiun  of  the  cvud  as  "iiuntid  direction,"  and  the  only  thing  to  distinguish 
mic  thouKht-process  from  another  (ib.,  p.  220). 

»  Mind,  N.S.,  XXI,  1912,  pp.  2,  318. 


»,•!' 


« 


'(T-r- 


264 


Tllh    illOBLE.M    OF    KNOWLEDGE 


,:m,- 


lu 


'if 


'I  !i 


« ; 


;liii, 


is  manifestly  a  circular  definition  ;  to  define  consciousness  as  the 
relation  characteristic  of  a  conscious  body  with  .'in  her  object 
is  not  to  define  it  at  all.  A  similar  fault  characteriises  the  state- 
ment, "  knowlcdRc  of  an  external  tiling  .  .  .  .s  the  (hins  itself 
in  the  various  ways  in  which  it  reveals  itself  to  the  mind."  • 

G.  F.  Stout,  a  recent  convert  to  English  neo-realism,  has 
furnished,  apparently  without  fully  realizing  it,  what  may  be 
regarded  either  as  a  rcduciio  ad  ahsiirdum  of  the  doctrine  that 
consciousness  is  a  piu-ely  ext'  'al  relation,  so  far  as  the  object 
is  concerned,  or  else  as  th'  ithesis  to  the  thesis  that  con- 
sciousness is  a  relation,  Ir  .,ig  of  necessity  to  the  synthetic 
judgtnent  that  consciousness  is  a  productire  activity.  In  his 
paper  entitled  "  The  Object  of  Thought  and  Real  Being  "  -  writ- 
ten under  the  spell  of  Meinong's  "Gegenstandstheorie,"  he  dis- 
cusses the  implications  of  the  innocent-looking  jMoposition 
that  "whenever  we  think  of  anything  we  think  of  its  having  a 
being  which  does  not  merely  consist  in  its  being  thought  of." ' 
"It  seems  to  involve  an  absurdity,"  he  continues,  "to  suppose 
that  what  I  think  of  has  no  being  except  the  being  thought  of. 
For  how  can  the  being  of  anything  be  merely  constituted  by  its 
being  related  to  something  else?"  Indeed,  "when  I  believe, 
or  disbelieve,  or  suppose,  that  a  centaur  actually  exists,  I  must 
tliink  of  its  actually  existing."*  In  no  case  is  "the  possible 
severance  of  what  really  is  and  what  is  thought  "  to  be  admitted.* 
Generalities,  alternative  possibilities,  and  even  non-being  (de- 
fined as  otherness),  since  they  are  objects  of  thought,  are  real 
independently  of  thought.* 

Now,  in  order  to  defend  himself  again-st  the  charge  of  having 
reduced  his  own  realism  to  absurdity,  Stout  would  probably  fall 
back  upon  Meinong's  and  Russell's  distinction  between  existence 
and  "subsistence."  But  in  the  paper  itself  practical'."  no  use 
is  made  of  this  distinction.  The  discussion  throughout  is  in 
terms  of  what  "  really  is."  Here  Stout  is  like  jNIontague,  who 
says  that  all  relations,  including  consciousness  as  a  relation, 
presuppose  that  their  terms  exist;''  and  like  M.  R.  Cohen,  who 
regards  the  distinction  between  eyistence  and  subsistence  as 


-  Proc.  ArUtot.  Soc.  1910-11.  p.  19. 

»  lb.,  p.  187.  *  Ih.  '  Ih..  p.  188. 

'  Journal  of  Philosophy,  II,  1905,  p.  313. 


5  Ih.,  1910-11. 

•  76.,  pp.  192,  198-9. 


KEO-UEALISTIC   DOCTRINE  OF  CONSCIOUSNESS      265 

"  merely  a  temporary  or  provisional  makeshift,"  for  which  he 
would  substitute  the  idea  of  a  non-mental  and  non-physical  ex- 
igence} But,  from  our  point  of  view,*  it  is  not  necessary,  ulti- 
inalehj,  to  interpret  "subsistence"  otherwise  than  in  terms  either 
of  existence,  physical  or  mental  {i.e.  as  mind  or  as  depending  on 
mind),  on  the  one  hand,  or  of  non-<>xistence  on  the  other. 
Nothing  "  really  is,"  or  has  "  real  being,"  save  what  exists  and  as 
it  exists,  whether  physically,  or  mentally,  or  in  some  other  form 
of  existence,  if  there  b*  any  other,  —  and  we  have  no  right  to  say 
tlierc  is  any  other,  until  it  has  been  empirically  discovered.' 
Similarly  "  generalities "  exist,  but  only  in  particular  things 
which  exist,  or  as  abstract  ideas  in  existent  minds.  "Alterna- 
tive possibilities  "  again,  except  in  the  case  of  what  depends  upon 
free,  i.e.  not  completely  predetermined,  activity,  is  to  be  reduced 
cither  to  existence  or  to  non-existence,  present,  past,  or  future, 
by  overcoming  our  ignorance.  And  even  in  the  case  of  what 
depends  upon  not  completely  predetermined  action,  we  need 
no  other  categories,  ultimately,  besides  time,  existence  and  non- 
existence ;  only,  until  the  action  has  taken  place,  no  one  can  tell 
which  category  to  employ  in  certain  cases,  whether  that  of 
(future)  existence  or  that  of  (future)  non-existence. 

From  our  point  of  view,  then,  the  moral  of  Stout's  train  of 
reasoning  ought  to  be  clear.  If  consciousness  is  a  mere  external 
relation  of  one  existent  object  to  another,  so  that  the  object  of 
consciousness   is   necessarily   existent   independently   of   edn- 

'  /'>.,  X,  1913.  p.  199;  XI,  1914,  p.  626. 

2  Cf.  pp.  84-8,  202-6,  2,31,  aupra,  and  pp.  302-6,  infra. 

'  A.  Wolf's  remarks  on  the  "explicit  use  of  terms"  in  order  to  avoid  confusion 
are  very  much  to  the  point.  "There  is  only  one  world  of  reality,"  he  says,  "and 
wh.-itever  is  real  is  in  it.  What  docs  not  exist  in  the  real  world  does  not  exist  at 
•ill.  A  material  object  cannot  exist  as  a  mental  process,  nor  can  a  mental  pro- 
cess l>e  a  material  object.  To  s.iy  that  a  centaur  exists  in  intellectu  is  simply  to 
use  the  word  centaur  elliptically  instead  of  '  the  idea  of  a  centaur.'  Similarly 
to  assert  the  existence  of  a  centaur  '  in  the  world  of  mythology,  is  to  use  the 
weird  centaur  in.stead  of  '  an  account  of  a  centaur.'  .  .  .  Existing  ideas  of  a 
thiriK,  or  existing  accounts  of  a  thing,  all  these  are  as  such  real  enough ;  but 
their  reality  is  a  very  different  thing  from  the  reality  of  the  thing  itself.  If  the 
tliiiiK  itself  is  not  real,  then  no  real  ideas  of  it,  no  real  descriptions  of  it  can  as 
.Mich  make  it  real.  But  in  that  case  to  speak  of  it  as  having  logical  existenci\  or 
cmpiriad  existence  in  .sonje  other  than  the  real  world,  is  simply  a  mysterious  way 
iif  u.s.scrtiu,^  the  reality  not  of  the  thiiig  iu  question,  but  of  something  quite  dif- 
ferent "(T/ie  Existential  Import  of  Categorical  Predication:  Stitdiea  in  Logic, 
1905,  p.  48;  cf.  p.  160). 


.;3 


266 


THE   PROBLEM    OP   KNOWLEDGE 


.4- 


HI 


sciousness,  then  wo  cannot  tliink  of  anything  which  does  not 
exist  independently  of  our  thinking  of  it.  But  this  is  absurd  ; 
wherefore  consciousness  cannot  be  a  mere  external  relation, 
so  far  as  the  object  is  concerned  ;  it  must  be  to  some  extent  a 
productive  activity,  so  that  it  can  be  a  relation  to  that  which 
depends  upon  itself  (eonsciousness)  for  its  existence.  But,  in 
any  case,  from  any  point  of  view.  Stout's  doctrine  is  involved 
in  unavoidable  final  self-contradiction.  Non-being,  defined  as 
other  than  all  that  is  real,  would  have  to  be  regarded  by  him  as 
real.  Here  we  have  again  the  paradoxical  "  impossible  objects," 
with  regard  to  which  Meinong  ami  Russell  are  unable  to  come 
to  agreement. 

The  idea  of  a  productive  or  creative  psychical  activity,  to 
which  Stout  ought  to  have  been  led  by  the  dialectic  of  his  thought, 
had  already  been  given  a  partial,  but  insufficient,  applica- 
tion by  A.  Wolf.  In  criticism  of  Alexander's  doctrine  that 
the  self  is  made  up  of  transparent  acts  of  consciousness, 
conation  without  qualitative  differences,  he  urges  that  this 
view  is  applicable  only  in  the  case  of  normal  perception.  With 
regard  to  imagination,  memory,  and  abnormal  r>erception,  it  is 
suggested  that  the  repref^entative  theory  be  applied ;  here  con- 
sciousness is  a  content-process,  i.e.  an  activity  in  which  both 
process  and  content  are  mental,  an  activity  that  has  in  it 
something  of  the  nature  of  production,  creation,  and,  at  the 
very  least,  distortion.*  This  is  moving  in  the  light  direction, 
but  it  affords  no  point  of  stable  equilibrium.  The  conscious 
processes  in  normal  perception  and  in  hallucination  are,  as 
processes  (apart  from  their  antecedents  on  the  one  hand  and 
their  independent  objects  on  the  other,  neither  of  which  are 
parts  of  the  processes  in  question),  essentially  identical  in  kind. 
If  there  is  creativeness  in  the  one,  there  is  creativeness  in  the 
other ;  if  there  is  none  in  the  one,  there  is  none  in  the  other. 

"""he  point  of  transition  from  the  English  neo-realistic  doc- 
'..ne  of  consciousness  to  the  more  extreme  view  characteri..tic 
of  the  American  School  is  nowhere  better  expressed  than  by 
WiUiam  James  in  his  almost  epoch-making  essay,  "  Does 
Consciousness  Exist?"  "I  believe,"  he  says,  referring  to 
G.  E.  Moore's  doctrine  of  consciousness  as  a  diaphanous  activ- 


«  Proc.  Arvitot.  Soc,  1008-9,  pp.  164-5,  169-71. 


NEO-REALISTir  DOCTRINE  OP  CONSCIOUSNESS     267 


ity,  "  that  '  consciousness,'  when  once  it  hiis  evaporated  to  this 
estate  of  pure  diaphaneity,  is  on  tiie  point  of  disappearing 
altogether.  It  is  the  name  of  a  nonentity,  and  has  no  right 
to  a  place  among  first  principles.  Those  who  still  cling  '<^  it 
are  clinging  to  a  mere  echo,  the  faint  rumor  left  behind  by  the 
disappearing  'sou''  upon  the  air  of  philosophy."  '  As  a  radi- 
cal empiricist  he  hoUls  that  "knowing  can  easily  be  explained 
as  a  particular  sort  of  relation  towards  one  another  into  which 
portions  of  pure  experience  may  enter.  The  relation  it.self  is 
a  part  of  pure  experience;  one  of  its  'terms'  becomes  the  sub- 
ject or  bearer  of  the  knowledge,  the  knower,  the  other  becomes 
the  object  known."  -  Thus  while  consciousness  is  not  an  en- 
tity, it  is  a  function  discharged  by  certain  eletients  of  pure 
experience  with  reference  to  others,'  and  is  therefore  to  be 
regarded  as  a  relation  between  these  two  elements  of  experi- 
ence, purely  external  so  far  as  the  objective  or  represented  ex- 
perience is  concerned.''  Now  James  is  right  enough,  we  may 
concede,  in  maintaining  that  this  is  what  consciousness  would 
!)(■  in  a  world  of  pure  experience;  but  it  is  another  question 
whether  the  formula  will  still  hold  when  the  world  of  pure 
experience  is  translated  into  a  realistic  world,  existing  inde- 
pendently of  its  being  known  or  experienced.  This,  however, 
is  what  the  American  ueo-realists  have  tried  to  maintain. 

W.  T.  Bush,  who,  as  we  have  seen,  occupies  a  somewhat 
transitional  point  of  view,  indorses  James's  "dropping  of  con- 
sciousness as  a  metaphysical  concept."  '  His  own  solution  of 
the  problem  of  consciousness  is  that  consciousness  is  that 
content  of  pure  experience  vhich  is  the  essentially  private  and 
unsharable  experience  of  one  person.*  But  this  is  a  plausible 
suggestion  only  until  one  begins  to  divide  un  the  contents  of 
pure  experience  into  the  conscious  and  the  non-conscious. 
Pleasure  and  pain  and  all  organic  feelings,  including  kin- 
asthetic  sensations,  would  presumably  l)e  within  conscious- 
ness, wl"'e  colors  and  soimds  would  be  in  the  non-conscious 
realm ;   but  what  about  the  taste  of  a  particular  morsel  on  the 

'  Journal  of  Philo.;oi>hy,  I,  liM>4,  p.  477  ;   E'<!<nijs  in  Radical  Empiricism,  p.  2. 
'  Exsdijs  in  Radical  Empiricism,  p.  4.  '  Ih.,  p.  3.  *  76.,  pp.  23,  25. 

-  AitnariHs  ahfi  the  Stindpinnt  of  Pure  Erprricnrr,  p.  7'i-  rf.  Es'niy-t  .  .  .  in 
Honor  of  William  James,  1908,  p.  102  ;   Journal  of  Philosophy,  X,  1913,  p.  534. 
'  Acviuirius  atid  the  Standpoint  of  Pure  Experience,  pp.  75,  77. 


'if 


It 


,;i! 


1^ 


268 


THE    PROBLEM   OP   KNOWLEDOK 


.n 


f' 


tongue  of  soriH'  imiividiuil?  Is  that  not  unsluirahlc ?  But  is 
it  pctinissihlc  to  draw  any  rinul  Vmv  throuKli  wiisc'-contcnts, 
marking  otT  the  ohjcctivc  from  the  suhji'ctive?  If  there  were 
but  one  color-blind  ixTson,  his  visual  cxiM'rience  would  Ix*  un- 
sharahle.  Would  it  on  that  at-count  be  a  conncioti.s  exjH'ri- 
encc?  And  then  if  a  second  c()I(ir-l)Iind  person  should  come  into 
existence,  would  tlie  visual  exiM-rience  f>f  the  first  one  suddeidy 
cease  to  be  conscious?  The  only  basis  upon  which  the  validity 
of  such  an  accidentally  shifting  line  of  division  could  be  justified 
would  be  the  frank  admission  that  there  is  no  distinction  of 
essential  importance  between  the  conscious  and  the  unconscious. 
Cm.  S.  lu'lerton,  taking  his  writings  as  a  whole,  is  also  transi- 
tional between  immediate  empiricism  and  the  new  realism. 
In  his  Syxtem  of  Metaphynics  he  saj's,  as  the  pure  empiricist 
naturally  would,  that  one's  consciousness  of  th<>  world  and  the 
world  of  which  he  is  conscious,  both  exist,  as  symbol  and  thing 
symbolized,  irithin  consciousness.  The  real  external  world,  the 
thing  symbolized,  is  a  complex  of  conscious  elements ;  and 
consciousness,  the  symbol,  is  a  compound  of  sensational  and 
imaginary  elements,  the  latter  largely  predominating.'  The 
self  is  not  a  substantial  sub^•tratunl  of  conscious  states,  but  a 
content  of  conscious  experience."  A  few  years  later  we  find 
Fullcrton  defending  the  conunon-sense  iloctrine  of  the  eject, 
arguing  that  while  each  of  us  knows  directly  his  own  thoughts 
and  feelings,  he  is  not  conscious  in  the  same  way  of  the  thoughts 
and  feelings  of  others,  and  that  it  is  by  the  bridge  of  an  analogi- 
cal argument  that  he  is  conducted  to  them.^  This  seems  to 
be  transitional  between  the  disguised  psychological  idealism 
of  the  System  of  Metaphysics  nd  the  new  realism  of  The  World 
We  Live  In.  Consciousness  is  being  eliminated  from  the  basis 
of  all  reality,  by  being  interpreted  in  terms  of  the  eject.  Sub- 
scquenily  we  find  that  while  the  external  world  is  still  spoken 
of  ambiguously  as  phenomenon,  it  is  niiarded  as  external  to 
and  independent  of  consciousness.  Minds,  it  is  maintained, 
are  phenomena  also,'  although  there  seems  to  be  no  dear  state- 
ment as  to  just  what  are  the  criteria  of  the  mental  status  of 


'  Sustem  of  MetaphusicH.  1904.  pp.  114-15. 

*  Journal  nf  Philoxojihji,  IV,  1!)()7.  pp.  ,506-7. 

*  The  WorU  We  Liic  In,  1912,  pp.  Ho-C,  153,  156. 


» lb.,  p.  280. 


NEO-REALI8TIC  DOCTRINE  OP  CONSCIOUSNESS     269 


any  phenomenon,  except  that  lontal  phenomena  are  ac- 
cituntcd  for  by  takinR  into  consideration  what  happens  to  the 
body,"  while  "in  the  case  of  physical  phenomena  the  relation 
to  sense  is  ignored."  '  We  can  scarcely  \yc  said,  therefore,  to 
have  a  definition  of  consciousness  from  FuUerton ;  but  in  so 
far  us  there  are  indications  of  one,  it  vould  seem  to  be  that 
consciousness  is  either  that  part  of  the  ntents  of  the  phenom- 
inal  world  which  depends  for  its  e>  U  i\ce  upon  something 
which  happens  in  the  nervous  systen  jr  else  that  part  whose 
(l(|u>ndence  upon  such  events  is  not  ignored,  or  else  again,  pf 
imiMssibile,  both !  Whether  the  line  between  the  physical  and 
the  mental  is  fixed  or  shifting,  or  whether  it  is  in  some  inscru- 
tai)k'  way  both.  '  not  made  to  appear.  And  the  reason  prob- 
al»ly  is  that  he  'lo  tries  to  be  a  realist  without  giving  up  im- 
mediate empiricism,  is  confronted,  in  the  problem  of  the  nature 
of  consciousness,  with  one  of  several  probk  .s  that  admit  of 
no  solution  from  his  point,  or  points,  of  view. 

Among  American  nco-realists  probably  no  one  has  given 
more  attention  to  the  problem  of  consciousness  than  F.  J.  E. 
Woodbridge.  What  looks  like  a  key  to  the  history  of  his 
tliiiiking  on  this  subject  is  to  be  found  in  his  essay,  "Percep- 
tion and  Epistemology."  If  the  world  is  "made  only  of  the 
stuff  of  consciousness,  then,"  he  writes,  "c  ciousness  is  the 
kind  of  stuff  that  may  be  condensed  into  a  i  p  of  sugar  with 
which  to  sweeten  coffee."  ^  This,  o/  course,  is  expressive  of 
Woodbridge's  strong  reaction  agaii..,;  idealism;  but  it  is  a 
significant  fact  that  in  th'  nd  he  hi..  v^!f  defines  consciousness 
in  terms  of  the  physical  i  •:3.  He  lu.3  persistently  stood  for 
the  application  of  the  method  of  the  empirical  sciences  to  the 
problems  of  consciousness  and  knowledge ; '  but  his  report  of 
results  is  that  when  we  introspect  we  never  find  anything  but 
things  in  certain  relations  to  each  other.*  Knowing,  or  con- 
sciousness, then,  since  it  is  not  discovered  as  a  thing,  although 
liclonging  with  things  in  the  physical  order,'  is  to  be  defined 
as  a  real  relation  between  things.'     It  is  a  purely  external  rela- 


'  Ih.,  p.  117.  'Essays 

'  Ih.,  pp.  140,  1.57,  166. 
'76.,  II,  1905,  pp.  119-20. 
'Philosophical  Revi'w,  XII,  1903,  p.  374 
125. 


.  .  in  Honor  of  William  James,  pp.  160-1. 
*  Journal  of  Philosophv,  X.  1913.  p.  608. 


m 


Journal  of  Philosophy,  II,  1905, 


270 


THE   PROBLEM  OF  KNOWLEDGE 


tion,  making  no  difference  to  its  object ; '  a  relation  of  together- 
ness, at  least.'-  In  consciousness  there  is  representation,  but 
it  is  the  representation  of  things  by  each  other.'  But,  defining 
more  olosely,  this  external  relation,  which  consciousness  or 
awareness  is,  is  the  relation  of  meaning,  or  implication,  existing 
intermittently  between  the  objects  of  experience.^  But  has 
not  the  empirical  investigator  here  allowed  the  object  of  in- 
vestigation, consciousness,  to  slip,  as  it  were,  through  his 
fingers?  Do  we  not  constantly  mak  the  distinction  between 
meaning  and  consciousness  of  meaning?  Woodbridge's  defini- 
tion of  consciousness  does  not  allow  for  this  distinction,  which 
is  a  perfectly  valid  and  necessary  one,  especially  from  the  realistic 
point  of  view. 

Woodbridge  has  suggested  another  definition  of  conscious- 
ness, from  the  point  of  view  of  external  observation  rather 
than  from  that  of  introspection.  Before  entering  upon  that, 
however,  it  will  be  convenient  to  mention  !iore,  rather  than 
later,  some  recent  psychological  theories  which  have  seemed  in 
close  accord  with  such  realistic  doctrines  as  that  of  Wood- 
bridge  when  he  says  that  introspection  reveals  nothing  but 
things.  This  doctrine  suggests  two  consequences  for  psy- 
chology. The  one  is  that  images,  or  mental  duplicates  of 
things,  are  not  to  be  looked  for  as  necessarily  and  invariably 
conditioning  conscious  processes.  The  other  is  that  intro- 
spection has  been  greatly  overrated  as  a  source  of  psychological 
information.  The  former  view  is  represented  by  R.  S.  Wood- 
worth's  article,  "Imageless  Thought";  '  the  latter,  by  Knight 
Dunlap's  papers,  "The  Case  against  Introspection,"'  and 
"Images  and  Ideas."'    Woodworth  asserts  that  "meaning  is 

'  Science.  N.S.,  XX,  1904,  p.  59S ;  Jorrnal  of  Philosophy,  VII,  1910,  p.  416; 
Philosophical  Reriew.  XXI,  1912,  pp.  0,37,  639. 

'  Journal  of  Philosophy,  II,  1905,  p.  120;  "  The  Problem  of  Consciousness," 
in  Studies  in  Philosophy  and  Psychology  (Garman  Commemoration  Volume), 
1906,  p.  155. 

'Journal  of  Philosophy,  II.  1905,  pp.  121-2:  note  the  influence  of  Willi.im 
James  here,  with  the  ch.ir.icteristic  difference  duo  to  the  transition  from  pure 
empiricism  to  realism. 

'  Carman  Commemoration  Volume,  pp.  159,  160-2,  164  ;  Psychological  Revieis, 
XV.  190**.  pp.  .3Q7-S  :   Jti^trna!  nf  PhUnsr.pkn,  VI,  1909,  p.  449. 

^Journal  of  Philosophy,  III,  1906.  pp.  701-M. 

•  Psychological  Review.  \l\.  1912.  pp.  404-12. 

'  The  Johns  Hopkins  L'niiersity  Circular,  No.  3,  March,  1014. 


NEO-REALISTIC  DOCTRINE  OF  CONSCIOUSNESS     271 


not  felt  as  the  relation  between  an  image  and  an  object,  but 
as  the  thought  of  the  object.  .  .  .  The  thought  of  the  object  is 
not  the  image,  for  the  image  may  change  while  the  same  object 
is  thought  of."  '  He  claims,  moreover,  that  imageless  thought 
is  an  apparent  fact  of  introspection.^  E.  L.  Thorndike  supports 
liini  in  this:  because  "we  can  will  acts,  images  of  whose  resi- 
dent sensations  are  unobtainable,  .  .  .  pragmatically  .  .  .  the 
image  is  an  irrelevant  factor."  '  But  while  Woodworth  claims 
that  introspection  shows  that  there  can  be  thought  without 
images,  Dunlap  declares  that  there  is  not  the  slightest  evidence 
for  the  reality  of  introspection  in  the  observation  of  conscious- 
ness. "Knowing  there  certainly  is;  known,  the  knowing  cer- 
tainly is  not."  What  is  supposed  to  be  introspection,  the 
observation  of  the  process  of  observing,  he  insists  is  really  only 
the  observation  of  certain  muscular,  visceral,  and  other  sensa- 
tions.* In  his  later  article  he  takes  the  ground  that  attention 
to  the  direct  content  of  thought  reveals  not  images,  but  only 
muscle-sensations.'  Understood  as  this  consciousness  of  muscle- 
sensations,  then,  there  is  an  important  place  in  psychology  for 
"introspection."  • 

We  shall  have  to  deal  in  a  later  connection  with  the  place 
of  imagery  in  thought,  and  with  the  possibility  of  introspection, 
but  it  may  be  remarked  at  once  that  this  discounting  of  the 
reality  and  value  of  images  and  introspection  has  naturally  been 
regarded  as  a  minimizing  of  the  distinctly  psychical,  a  tendency 
to  reduce  it  to  the  merely  physical.  Still,  with  regard  to  Dun- 
lap's  report  on  introspection,  much  of  what  he  says  may  be 
accepted  readily  enough  :  we  shall  ourselves  contend  that  con- 
sriousness  is  an  activity  which  is  not  apprehended  in  any  case 
as  a  psychical  (or  psychically  produced)  element  revealed  by 
introspection,  but  only  in  a  complex  of  muscular  and  other 
"sensations,"  and  represented,  or  at  least  representable,  by  some 


^1 


i    1 


'  Journal  of  Philosophy,  III,  1906,  p.  707.  «  76.,  p.  702. 

'  lb.,  IV,  1907,  pp.  40-2.         ♦  Psychological  Review.  XIX,  1912,  pp.  410-12. 

^  Johns  Hopkins  University  Circular,  No.  .3.  1914,  np.  35-6.  Cf.  S.  Alex- 
ander's report  concerning  his  own  sense  of  direction  of  the  eyes  (v.  supra)  and 
that  of  William  James  concerning  breathing  as  the  only  content  of  thought  or 
■■.-.n.^ciousness  revealed  through  introspection.  Journal  of  Philosophy,  I,  1904, 
p.  491. 

'Johns  Hopkins  Universitu  Circular,  No.  3,  1914,  p.  41. 


.1 


1 


:i 


i      f 


:f; 


:j  1 


i 


I  - 


i 
I; 


I 


272 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  KNOWLEDGE 


idea,  into  which  visual,  auditory,  verbal,  or  other  imagery  enters. 
And  in  opposition  to  the  views  of  Woodworth  and  Thorndike 
on  imagery  and  thought,  J.  R.  Angell  expresses  the  view  that 
thought-processes  are  often  carried  on  by  verbal  imagery  so 
highly  schematized,  compressed,  and  automatized  as  to  escape 
identification.*  Moreover,  after  examining  the  data  upon  which 
the  existence  of  "imageless  thought"  is  based,  he  denies  that 
any  real  evidence  has  been  produced  for  the  initiation  or  con- 
trol of  voluntary  movement  entirely  without  sensory  or  imaginal 
supervision.''  But,  be  that  as  it  may,  it  is  highly  significant 
that  Woodworth  has  now  come  out  with  a  paper  entitled,  "  A 
Revision  of  Imageless  Thought,"'  in  which,  while  the  existence 
of  imageless  thought  is  reaflirmed,  a  different  interpretation  of 
the  alleged  phenomenon  is  offered,  and  one  that  runs  counter 
to  the  prepossessions  of  the  more  typical  American  neo-realists 
and  behavioristn.  Woodworth  calls  nis  present  view  the 
"  mental  reaction  theory,"  or  "  perceptual  reaction  theory,"  the 
basic  idea  of  which  is  "  that  a  percept  is  an  inner  reaction  to 
sensation."  Following  sensation  after  an  interval  too  short  to 
be  detected  introspectively,  there  comes  this  mental  or  percep- 
tual reaction,  adding  new  conscious  content  "  which  catmot  be 
analyzed  into  elementary  sensations,"  but  which  is  the  basis  of 
the  awareness  of  all  that  is  afterwards  recalled,  including  those 
"  more  remote  relations  and  meanings,"  which,  in  the  later  ex- 
perience, "  furnish  the  content  of  '  imageless  thought.'  "* 

But  besides  the  method  of  introspection,  psychology  has 
long  been  using  external  observational  methods,  and  we  must 
notice  in  this  connection  the  view  of  consciousness  taken,  and 
the  estimate  placed  upon  this  phase  of  psychologic  '  investi- 
gation by  some  philosophers  and  psychologists  wau  have 
adopted,  explicitly  or  implicitly,  the  neo-realistic  position. 
The  reference  here  is  to  those  philosophers  {e.g.  E.  A.  Singer 
and  F.  J.  E.  Woodbridge)  and  psychologists  (e.g.  E.  L.  Thorn- 
dike,  J.  B.  Watson,  and  E.  P.  Frost)  who  identify,  or  tend  to 
identify,  consciousness,  as  subject-matter  of  psychology,  with 
human  and  animal  behavior.  But  other  names  may  be  men- 
tioned, of  those  who  have  contributed  in  important  w.ays  to 

'  Psuchological  Review,  XVIII,  1911,  pp.  312-13.  '  lb.,  p.  320, 

'  lb.,  XXII,  1915,  pp.  1-27.  *  lb.,  pp.  22-27. 


i 


NEO-REALISTIC  DOCTRINE  OF  CONSCIOUSNESS     273 

the  developiiient  of  this  point  of  view.  One  potent  influence 
(especially  in  givlag  direction  to  the  investigations  and  theories 
of  J.  B.  Watson,  one  of  the  most  extreme  representatives  of  the 
behaviorist  doctrines)  has  been  the  combined  immediate  em- 
piricism and  inst  rumen  talism  of  Dewey,  together  with  the 
functional  psychology  represented  by  Angell,  which  also  grew 
up  under  Dewey's  influence.  In  some  recent  articles  Dewey 
has  expressed  more  explicitly  than  befo»e  (although  the  Cali- 
fornia address  of  1899  should  be  remembered  ')  the  views  con- 
cerning consciousness  which  are  implied  in  his  logical  doctrine. 
In  his  essay  in  the  Columbia  volume  in  honor  of  William  James, 
he  maintains  that  the  action  of  what  is  called  "consciousness" 
consists  in  certain  organic  releases  in  the  way  of  behavior.* 
Later,  in  commenting  upon  this,  he  explains  that  he  meant 
that  "consciousness"  is  an  adjective  of  behavior,  a  quality 
attaching  to  it  under  certain  conditions.  Behavior  may  be 
instinctive,  habitual,  or  conscious.  Apart  from  behavior 
consciousness  is  a  mere  abstraction,  just  as  redness  is  an  ab- 
straction apart  from  some  red  object.'  J.  R.  Angell,  in  his 
paper  on  "Behavior  as  a  Category  of  Psychology,"*  while 
objecting  pertinently,  as  we  shall  see,  to  the  extreme  doctrines 
which  have  recently  been  advanced  in  the  name  of  behaviorism, 
acknowledges  that  he  has  been  conducting  his  work  as  a  psy- 
chologist from  a  point  of  view  which  would  make  entirely 
<'asy,  and  even  seemingly  worth  while,  the  shift  of  emphasis 
involved  in  making  psychology  primarily  the  study  of  be- 
havior." 

E.  L.  Thorndike's  views  have  had  considerable  influence  in 
developing  interest  in  the  science  of  behavior.  In  his  work 
on  Animal  Intelligence*  he  advocates  making  the  study  of 
!)ehavior,  rather  than  introspection,  the  chief  psychological 
method.  Psychology,  he  urges,  may  be,  at  least  in  part,  as 
independent  of  introspection  as  physics  is.^  What  he  seems 
to  advocate  is  the  transforming  of  psychology  into  the  study 
of  "human  and  animal  behavior,  with  or  without  conscious- 

'  V.  Influence  of  Darwin,  etc.,  pp.  242  ff.,  270,  note. 
'  Essays  .   .   .  in  Honor  of  William  James,  p.  69,  note. 
'Journal  of  Philosophy,  IX,  1012,  pp   20.  21.  544-8:   cf.  XI.  1914.  p.  65. 
•  Psychological  Review,  XX,  1913,  pp.  255-70.  » lb.,  p.  268. 

'New  York,  1911  ;   first  edition,  1898.  '  Op.  cil.,  pp.  3,  5. 

T 


*  i 


I 


274 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  KNOWLEDGE 


'In 


i 


•iV 


iii  y 


ness."  •  It  would  then  be  essentially  a  supplement  to  phys- 
iology.* 

Thorndike's  doctrine  may  soom  extreme  enough,  but  it  is 
moderation  itself  as  compared  with  the  ideas  advanced  by 
J.  B.  Watson  and  E.  P.  Frost.  Watson's  investigations  and 
theories  began  under  the  guiding  direction  of  Dewey  and 
Angell,  but  he  has  undoubtedly  been  deeply  biassed,  as  he 
himself  confesses,  by  an  almost  exclusive  attention  to  animal 
psychology  for  some  years.'  He  regards  the  study  of  animal 
(including  human)  behavior  as  the  only  consistsn.^  functional 
psychology  *  and  would  discard  from  his  procedure  all  intro- 
spection '  and  indeed  all  reference  to  consciousness,  mental 
states,  mind,  content,  imagery,  and  the  like.«  Consciousness, 
he  claims,  is  no  more  an  object  of  study  in  psychology  than  in 
physics.^  He  is  optimistic  enough  to  expect  that  the  study 
of  the  relations  of  external  stimulus  and  response  will  solve  all 
the  problems  with  which  the  introspective  psychologist  has 
concerned  himself.*  Moreover,  feeling  that  the  admission 
that  there  are  mental  images  weakens  the  claim  of  the  be- 
haviorism,' he  proceeds  to  deny  that  there  has  been  produced 
any  objective  experimental  evidence  of  the  existence  of  dif- 
ferent image-types.'"  Even  in  the  case  of  "implicit  behavior," 
commonly  called  "thought-processes,"  where  explicit  behavior 
is  delayed,  and  where  there  is  response  only  in  the  speech- 
mechanisms  and  in  general  bodily  attitudes,  the  right  or 
value  of  introspection  is  denied.  Although,  as  he  admits, 
no  method  of  externally  observing  implicit  behavior  exists 
at  present,  such  methods,  he  seems  to  expect,  will  yet  be 
found." 

In  protest  against  such  extreme  views  Dewey  enters  a  de- 
murrer. Behaviorism  must  take  more  than  subcutaneous 
processes  into  account,  he  insists ;  it  must  include  the  environ- 

'  Animal  Intelligence,  1911,  pp.  G,  7.  '  lb.,  p.  16 

'  Sfc  "  P.syohology  as  the  Behaviorist  Views  It,"  Psychological  Review,  XX, 
1913,  pp.  159,  175. 

«  75.,  p.  166.  »  76.,  p.  158. 


•76.,  pp.   163,   166,  175-6;    cf.  Behavior: 
Psychology,  1914,  p.  7. 

•  Psychological  Review,  XX,  1013,  p.  176. 

*  Journal  of  Philosophy,  X,  1913,  p.  421. 


An  Introduction  to  Comparative 

*Ib..  p.  177. 
'«  76.,  p.  422. 


»  76.,  pp.  42.3-*,  428;   Behavior,  etc.,  19;4,  pp.  16,  19,  21,  27. 


NEO-REALISTIC  DOCTRINE  OP  CONSCIOUSNESS     275 

ment  as  well  as  the  organism  in  its  total  object  of  study.' 
Angell's  protest  is  more  explicit  and  unambiguous.  He  finds 
it  difficult  to  take  literally  the  idea  of  the  complete  dismissal  of 
the  image  from  psy-'hology.  His  own  work,  he  contends,  has 
shown,  not,  as  Watson  seems  to  think,  the  Impossibility  of 
finding  any  definite  imagery  involved  in  the  rontrol  of  behavior, 
but  the  amazing  versatility  with  which  different  kinds  of 
imagery  may  be  employed  upon  the  same  task.'  Moreover, 
he  urges,  the  psychologist  will  never  be  able  to  dispense  with 
introspection.  The  gap  between  a  specific  sensorial  stimi  - 
tion  and  a  delayed  response  must  be  bridged  with  information 
gleaned  from  essentially  introspective  sources,  or  else  left  open.' 
He  advises  the  behuviorists  to  forego  the  excesses  of  uth 
cautioning  them  against  committing  the  "crowning  absurdity" 
of  seeming  to  deny  any  practical  significance  to  that  which  is 
the  -jhief  distinction  of  human  nature  —  "the  presence  of 
something  corresponding  to  ihe  term  mind  —  the  one  thing 
of  which  the  fool  may  be  as  sure  as  the  wise  man."  * 

It  may  be  instructive,  however,  to  refer  to  one  more  example 
of  the  extrciTies  to  which  the  behaviorist  psychology  has  gone. 
E.  P.  Frost  regards  the  idea  of  consciousness  as  simply  a  valu- 
al)le  fiction ;  *  what  we  ought  to  mean  by  it  is  simply  a  pecul- 
iarly refined  but  purely  physiological  process.'  It  is  a  uervous 
path  responding  to  the  just  previous  and  still  partly  persisting 
response  of  a  nervous  path  to  stimulation.^  It  differs  from 
instinctive  and  habitual  behavior  in  a  way  that  has  biological 
sifjnificance,  for  it  modifies  the  machinery  of  behavior  by  vir- 
tue of  energy  stored  up  in  the  organism  by  past  experience." 
l?iit  r>.  nervous  reaction  can  never  be  i  i  response  to  itself  as 
stimulus;  in  other  words,  introspection  is  impossible.'  There 
are  no  such  things  to  be  discovered  as  "sensations,"  "images, "or 
" feelings."  '"    The  term  "mind,"  when  properly  used,  is  simply 


* :. 


;  s 


mil 


'•    Sfl 


>  S,'e  Journal  of  Philosophy,  XI,  1914,  p.  66. 

'  lb.,  X,  1913,  p.  609. 

'  PsychohuiaU  Review,  XX,  1913,  pp.  262,  266,  269.        *  /6.,  pp.  268.  270. 

5  lb.,  XIX,  1912,  D.  251.  «  lb.,  p.  249. 

'  Journal  of  Philosophy,  X,  1B13,  p.  717 ;   XI,  1914,  p.  107. 

*  Psychological  Review,  XIX,  1912,  p.  252;  Journal  of  Philosophy,  XI,  1914, 

107. 

'  Journal  of  Philosophy.  X,  1913.  p.  717.  '•  /6.,  p.  716. 


!      fi 


mmmm 


276 


THE  PROBLEM  OP   KNOWLEDGE 


t:  ii, 


'f  •■ 


I 


the  total  of  such  reactions  to  immediately  preceding  reactions.' 
Thus,  unless  we  mean  by  consciousness  an  "unconscious  aware- 
ness" of  {i.e.  a  physiological  reaction  toward)  an  immediately 
previous  "unconscious  awareness"  (physiological  ro.'tion),  there 
is  no  consciousness  at  all ;  and  inasmuch  as  this  is  itself  a  wholly 
unconscious  process,  there  is  no  consciousness.  The  difficult 
problem  as  to  what  consciousness  is,  is  solved  by  denying  that  it  is. 
The  critic  might  almost  be  pardoned,  one  would  think,  if 
he  were  •)  refuse  to  take  such  views  seriously.  When  a  mis- 
taken idi-a  is  consistently  worked  out  to  such  an  extravagant 
issue,  it  tends  to  be  not  only  harmless,  but  a  highly  salutary 
warning;  so  that  refutation  by  another  becomes  an  act  of 
supererogation,  a  sheer  waste  of  energy.  It  does  not  call  for 
refutation  —  it  accomplishes  that  for  itself  —  but  it  does  call 
for  explanation.  It  seems  probable  that  this  remarkable  doc- 
trine is  to  be  accounted  for  by  the  original  confusion  of  con- 
sciousness with  self-consciousness,  and  the  interoretation  of 
the  discovery  (?)  that  introspection  is  impossible  to  mean 
that  there  is  no  self-consciousness,  and  therefore  no  conscious- 
ness. Such  views  become  important  as  signs  of  the  times  when 
it  is  remembered  that  they  have  received  the  imprimatur,  at 
least,  of  the  editors  of  two  of  our  leading  psychological  and 
philosophical  journals.  A.nd  indeed  it  is  not  easy  to  see  just 
where  in  principle  the  doctrine  in  question  differs  from  that  of 
some  of  our  well-known  contemporary  American  philosophers, 
e.g.  E.  A.  Singer  and  F.  J.  E.  Woodbridge.  Singer  claims  that 
the  hypothesis  of  other  minds  has  no  prae;matic  meaning.' 
Belief  in  consciousness,  he  says,  is  nothing  more  than  expecta- 
.ion  of  probable  behavior.  Consciousness  is  not  something 
inferred  from  behavior;  it  is  behavior.'  Both  my  mind  and 
my  fellow's  mind  are  behavior.*  As  to  just  what  sort  of  be- 
ha'  ior  mind  or  consciousness  is,  Singer  at  first  professes  igno- 
rance ;  *  but  in  a  later  article  he  advances  the  view  that  mind 
is  the  teleological  behavior  of  an  organism  (which  is  also  all 
the  time  absolutely  mechanical).'     Woodbridge  has  expressed  a 


!l 


'  Journal  of  Philosophy.  X,  1913,  p.  719. 

'"Mind  as  an  Observable  Object."  Journal  of  Philosophy,  VIII.  1911.  p.  181. 

•  lb.,  p.  183.  •  lb.  » lb.,  p.  184. 

'Journal  of  PhUotophy,  IX,  1912,  pp.  213-14. 


ill; 


k 


NEO-REALISTIC  DOCTRINE  OP  CONSCIOUSNESS     277 


similar  view.  Besides  his  view  of  consciousness  as  a  relation 
of  implication  between  objects,  remembering  that  it  is  also  an 
event  in  the  world's  history,*  he  has  attempted  to  define  it,  as  a 
purely  natural  event, *  in  terms  of  behavior.  He  seems  to 
identify  consci  usness  with  the  "adaptive  and  even  prospec- 
tive adjustments"  of  the  organism  to  its  environment.* 

The  criticism  directed  by  D.  S.  Miller  against  Singer  will 
apply  to  all  the  extreme  behaviorists.  They  do  not  recognize, 
or  sufficiently  regard,  the  "unique  togetherness"  of  things 
which  exists  in  all  cases  of  consciousness,  or,  in  other  words, 
the  existence  of  separate  "pools  of  conjoint  phenomenaUtj."  * 
Moreover,  they  seem  to  have  obstinately  clos'^d  their  eyes  to 
the  surely  sufficiently  obvious  fact  that  no  matter  how  intricate 
or  special  a  physiological  behavior-process  may  be,  it  is  always 
an  additional  item  of  information  about  it,  when  one  is  told 
that  it  is  accompanied  by  consciousness.  On  the  whole,  then, 
Miller's  rebuke  of  the  neo-realists  for  dogmatisii  seems  just ; 
they  "come  to  conclusions"  and  then  brace  themselves  "to 
meet  the  problems  whose  solution  alone  could  warrant  any 
conclusion  on  the  subject."  ' 

Before  turning  to  the  various  conflicting  views  of  conscious- 
ness advanced  by  the  six  "collaborfting"  neo-realists,  we  must 
notice  the  doct/ines  of  McGilvaiy  and  Boodin.  McGilvary 
begins  promisingly  by  distinguishing  between  "subjective 
objects"  of  consciousness  {e.g.  pleasure),  which  exist  only  when 
there  is  awareness  of  them,  and  other  objects  of  consciousness, 
which  may  be  called  "objective  objects."  '  There  is  a  sensum 
and  there  is  a  sentire  (awareness),  he  continues,  and  even 
though  the  sentire  may  be  the  effect  of  a  physiological  process, 
still  the  sensum  maybe  the  same  as  the  sensibile  which  initiated 
the  physiological  process  on  which  the  sentire  depends.^  Now 
it  is  just  here,  we  would  contend,  that  McGilvary  fatally  fails 
to  make  an  absolutely  essential  distinction.  To  maintain 
that  the  sensum  and  the  sensibile  are  numerically  the  same  is 
doubtless  essential  to  the  vindication  of  a  genuine  acquaintance 

'  lb.,  VII,  1910,  pp.  413-14.  '  lb.,  p.  415. 

'  lb.,  VI,  1909.  p.  454.  Cf.  X,  1910,  pp.  602,  608.  This  idea  has  also  beer. 
(Icvf-lopc-d  at  length  in  a  lecture  not  yet  published. 

•  Journal  of  PkUotophy,  VIII,  1911.  pp.  3?3-4 

•  lb.,  p.  326.  •  Ih.,  IV,  1907,  p.  454.  '  lb.,  pp.  457,  593. 


1 


278 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   KNOWLEDGE 


'      :| 


u 


with  physical  reality  in  perception ;  but  to  assume  that  sen- 
sum  and  seimbile  can  be  numerically  one,  only  if  they  are  in  all 
respects  qualitatively  identical,  is  to  "fall  into  temptation  and  a 
snare";  it  is  this  dogmatic  "short  cut"  which  is  "the  root  of 
all  (the  nco-realistic)  evil,"  and  McCJilvary,  having  orn>d  at 
this  point,  in  company  with  many  others,  has  "pierced  himself 
through  with  many  (epistemological)  sorrows."  It  becomes 
immediately  necessary  to  regard  consciousness  as  "diapha- 
nous" '  and,  strictly  speaking,  undefinable;  and  that  without 
the  idealistic  excuse,  that  it  is  the  summum  genus  of  all  reality. 
It  is  asserted,  to  be  sure,  that  consciousness  of  a  thing  is  a 
"relation  between  objects,"  "a  unique  togetherness  of  the 
thing  with  other  things."  -  But,  while  it  may  be  admitted  — 
and  the  thing  admitted  is  an  important  truth  —  that  in  the 
event  of  consciousness  there  is  a  unique  togetherness  of  things, 
it  is  still  doubtful  at  least  whether  it  is  that  unique  together- 
ness which  is  the  consciousness,  or  whether  it  is  not  merely 
a  necessary  consequence  of  consciousness.  And  then,  that 
blessed  word  "unique"  is  here  simply  a  device  by  means  of 
which  one  is  enabled  to  give  a  formal  definition  where  the  pos- 
sibility of  a  real  definition  has  been  cut  off.  To  say  that  con- 
sciousness is  a  uni(iue  togetherness  is  at  best  to  define  by  means 
of  the  proximate  genus,  leaving  the  differentia  of  the  species 
blank,  offering  as  excuse  at  the  same  time  the  more  than  doubt- 
ful assertion  that  no  intelligible  differentia  exists.  McGilvary 
does  ay,  it  must  be  admitted,  that  the  togetherness  is  an 
experiential  one,  a  being  felt  together  or  exp(>rienced  together ; ' 
but  this  is  to  supply  the  defect  in  the  defiiiition  by  virtually 
introducing  into  the  predicate  of  the  definition  the  term  to  be 
defined. 

Our  philosopher  evidently  notices  this  logical  fault,  for  he 
continues  to  labor  at  the  problem.  He  finally  offers  the  doc- 
trine that  consciousness  is  a  "selective  relation  among  things,"  * 
and  that  it  is  also  a  "centred,  individualized  relation."  ^  It  is, 
in  short,  "a  relation  which  relates  in  just  the  specific  way  that 


'  \ 


m 


'  Journal  of  Philosophy,  IV,  1907,  p.  686. 

'  lb.,  VI,  IfWO,  ,     ••27  ■   VIII,  1911,  np.  ."^11    12. 

» lb..  VIII,  1911,  pp.  519,  524.  « lb.,  IX,  1912.  p.  349. 

i  Philosophical  Review,  XXI,  1912,  p.  165. 


NEO-REALISTIC   DOCTRIXE  OP  CONSCIOUSNESS     279 

l)rings  about  the  specific  thinRs  that  we  call  our  experiences."  ' 
Now,  inasmuch  as  this  last  seems  to  mean  no  more  than  that 
consciousness  is  the  exact  kind  of  relation  which  it  is,  we  may 
1k'  complaisant  enough  to  agree,  provided  we  can  first  accept 
the  statement  that  consciousness  is  a  relation  ;  and  yet  we  can- 
not admit  that  this  carries  us  very  far  toward  a  definition. 
And  even  accepting  the  adflitional  characterizations,  "selec- 
tive," "centred,"  "individualized,"  as  applicable  to  conscious- 
ness, that  they  do  not  give  us  completely  the  specific  difference 
by  which  we  may  distinguish  consciousness  from  all  other 
togetherness,  is  virtually  confessed  by  McGilvary  himself, 
when  he  finds  it  necessary  again  to  employ  that  useful  word 
"unique."  If  an  experience  is  a  "uniquely  integrated  whole 
of  objects";^  and  consciousness,  a  "unique  selective  rela- 
tion,"' we  are  still  left  with  the  questions,  How  integrated? 
and.  What  selective  relation?  unanswered.  In  other  words, 
we  are  left  without  a  definition. 

Our  reference  to  Boodin's  discussion  of  consciousness  may 
well  be  brief,  inasmuch  as  here  again  we  have  the  doctrine  that 
consciousness  is  "diaphanous,"  with  the  frank  but  fatal  admis- 
.sion  that  this  means  that  it  "has  no  properties."*  In  this 
Boodin  virtually  concedes  that,  from  his  point  of  view,  con- 
sciousness is  undefinable,  if  not,  indeed,  non-existent.  But 
this  conclusion,  under  the  circumstances,  is  equivalent  to  an 
acknowledgment  of  defeat. 

And  now,  finally,  we  turn  to  look  for  and  examine  the  doc- 
trine of  the  six  collaborating  neo-realists  concerning  conscious- 
ness. But  here  again  it  is  disappointing,  and  especially  so  in 
view  of  the  collaboration,  to  find  that  instead  of  a  doctrine,  we 
have  doctrines.  Among  the  articles  of  their  common  creed 
the  six  have  not  found  it  possible  to  include  a  definition  of 
c(,nsciousness.  The  mutual  relation  of  their  views  on  the 
subject  is  interesting,  however.  There  is  a  fair  measure  of 
agreement  between  Marvin,  and  Holt  in  his  earlier  writings, 
on  the  one  hand,  and  among  Spaulding,  Pitkin,  Perry,  and 
Holt  in  a  very  recent  publication,  on  the  other;  but  Mon- 
tague sets  forth  in  this  connection,  as  before,  a  doctrine  radically 
different  from  that  of  any  of  the  others. 

'  lb.     » lb.,  p.  166.     '  76.,  p.  171.     «  Journal  of  Philosophy,  V,  1908,  p.  232. 


280 


THE  PROBLEM  OP   KNOWLEDGE 


M 


h.il 


Marvin's  present  views  on  the  nature  of  consciousness  were 
anticipated  in  large  measure  in  his  doctor's  dissertation,'  in 
which  he  maintains  that  the  distinction  Iwtween  consciousness 
and  what  is  not  consciousness  is  not  to  he  found  in  the  .lata  of 
experience  as  such,  but  is  a  matter  of  interpretation.*  In  his 
recently  published  First  Book  in  Metaphysics,  although  he  in- 
cludes in  the  data  of  psychology  reactions  as  well  as  the  objects 
correlated  therewith,'  consciousness  is  not  identified  with  the 
reactions  so  much  as  with  "the  nature,  the  complexity,  and  the 
structure  of  that  which  controls  reactions."*  "A  content 
becomes  consciousness  by  becoming  .  .  .  the  object  to  which 
an  organism  reacts."  *  Thus  consciousness  at  any  moment  is 
apparently  identified  with  the  field  of  consciousness,  and  de- 
fined as  a  certain  cross-section  of,  or  collocation  of  entities 
belonging  to  the  univeisc  of  subsistent  entities,  and  definable 
as  a  group  by  its  peculiar  relation  to  our  bodily  reactions. 
"My  consciousness  of  this  page,"  he  writes,  "is  literally  the 
page,  the  page  in  certain  relations."  * 

In  the  development  of  this  doctrine  Marvin  has  probably 
been  considerably  influenced  by  Holt,  whose  more  fully  elabo- 
rated and  practically  identical  theory  of  consciousness  is  to  be 
found  in  his  recently  published  volume  The  Concept  of  Con- 
sciousness ''  and  in  his  contribution  to  the  volume  entitled  The 
New  Realism.  Holt  defines  consciousness  or  mind  as  "a  cross- 
section  of  the  u.  /erse  selected  by  the  nervous  system,"  *  the 
group  of  entities  within  the  subsisting  universe  to  which  a 
nervous  system  responds.'  He  compares  consciousness  to  the 
cross-section  of  the  environment  illuminated  by  a  seai-ch-light. 
The  cross-section  is  spatial  and  includes  color-qualities,  but  it 
is  not  in  the  search-light,  nor  are  its  contained  objects  dependent 
on  the  search-light  for  their  substance  or  their  being.'"  Simi- 
larly "the  phenomenon  of  response  defines  a  cross-section  of 
the  environment  without,  which  is  a  neutral  manifold.  Now 
this  neutral  cross-section  outside  of  the  nervous  system  .  .  , 
coincides  exactly  with  the  list  of  objects  of  which  we  say  that 

'  Die  Giltigkeit  unserer  Erkenntnis  der  objektiven  Welt,  1898. 

»  Op.  cit.,  p.  30.  '  A  First  Book  in  Metaphysics,  p.  258. 

♦  lb.,  p.  259.  » lb.,  p.  261.  •  lb.,  p.  263. 

'  Completed  in  1908,  published  in  1914.       •  The  New  Realism,  pp.  354-6. 

•  lb.,  p.  373.  '•  The  Concept  of  Consciousness,  p.  171. 


NEO-REALI8TIC  DOCTRINE  OP  CONSCIOUSNESS     281 


we  are  conscious.  This  neutral  cross-section  as  defined  by  the 
specific  reaction  of  reflox-arcs  is  the  psychic  realm :  —  it  is 
the  manifold  of  our  sensations,  perceptions  and  ideas  r  —  it  is 
consciousness."  '  Henceforth  in  his  discussion  this  "env"  n- 
incntal  cross-section"  is  referred  to  as  "psychic  cross-section," 
"consciousness,"  "mind,"  and  even  "soul,"  while  the  indi- 
vidual members  of  the  cross-section  are  called  "sensations," 
"perceptions,"  "ideas,"  etc' 

This  view  of  Holt  and  Marvin  is  the  consequence  of  work- 
ing out  the  implications  of  a  rather  superficial  interpretation  of 
the  reported  experience  that  when  wo  introspect  we  find  only 
things  in  their  relations.'  It  is  assumed  that  because  conscious- 
ness is  not  revealed  to  us  as  another  element  alongside  of  the 
objects  of  the  environment  of  which  we  are  conscious,  it  must 
be  either  dismissed  as  non-existent,  or  else  identified  with  the 
objects  that  are  revealed,  the  only  insistence  being  that  it  is 
as  revealed  that  they  are  consciousness.  The  appearance  of 
dogmatism  is  toned  down  by  the  slipping  in  of  th  ambiguous 
term,  "psychic  realm,"  as  mediating  between  "objects,"  or 
"field  of  consciousness,"  on  the  one  side,  and  "consciousness" 
on  the  other.  At  this  point  the  new  realism  makes  liberal  use 
of  the  very  convenient  fallacy  of  equivocation.  But  it  is 
probably  vain  to  expect  to  produce  a  sense  of  logical  guilt  in 
the  mind  of  one  who  can  proclaim  as  an  epistemological  gospel 
the  doctrine  that  his  own  consciousness  (being  conscious)  of  a 
Kroup  of  objects  is  neither  more  nor  less  than  that  group  of 
objects,  as  responded  to  by  his  physical  organism. 

But  while  Holt  (in  his  published  volume  and  his  essay  in 
The  New  Realism)  and  Marvin  build  their  essentially  physical 
conception  of  consciousness  upon  a  difficulty  of  introspection, 
the  views  of  Sparlding,  Pitkin,  Perry,  and  finally  those  of  Holt 
in  his  paper,  "  Response  and  Cognition,"  take  account  also  of 
the  physiological  conception  of  consciousness  which  has  been 
growing  up  under  the  influence  of  that  behaviorist  psychology 
which,  in  turn,  is  itself  largely  a  product  of  neo-realistic  in- 


I.   ... 


•  rb ,  p.  182. 

'/6.,  p.  183,  et  passim.    For  a  discussion  of  Holt's  combination  of  this  view 
with  behaviorism,  see  pp.  285-7,  infra. 

'  Cf.  re  Woodbridge,  supra;  v.  Journal  of  Philosophy,  X,  1913,  p.  608. 


V 


282 


THE  PROBLKM   OF  KNOWLEDGE 


i     *  *ii 


41 


fluence,  and  attempt  to  combino  both  conceptions,  the  phys- 
ical and  the  pliysiological,  in  one  synthetic  definition.  (Pit- 
kin's emphasis,  however,  is  ahnost  entirely  on  the  second  of 
the  two  points  of  view  comhiiied.) 

Spauldin^  has  not  expressed  hims<>lf  very  much  in  detail  on 
the  problem  of  the  nature  of  «'ons('i()usness,  but  he  has  main- 
tained that  consciousness  is  the  function  of  implying,  knowinfj, 
and  pointing  to,  but  in  no  way  modifying,  an  independently 
>  •'  object.'  The  term  "knowinR"  d(M's  not  give  us  much  in- 
Iwrnation  in  this  connection,  l)ecau.so  it  is  not  itself  defined, 
but  !s  the  main  part,  if  not  all,  of  what,  from  the  realistic  point 
of  view,  has  to  be  defined  in  the  definition  of  consciousness. 
The  term  "implying"  .suggests  the  method  of  learning  the 
nature  of  consciousness  by  what  the  neo-realist  tends  to  sub- 
stitute for  introspection,  which  he  finds  impossible,  viz.  an 
analj'sis  of  the  objective  "content"  of  consciousness.  It  is 
Woodbridge's  definition  over  again,  which  we  have  already 
criticised.  The  term  "pointing  to,"  on  the  contrary,  is  seen 
from  the  context  -  to  have  a  biological  meaning,  so  that  here  we 
have  represenied,  although  the  expression  is  a  vague  one,  the 
type  of  view  that  results  from  regarding  consciousness  as  an 
externally  observable  relation  of  the  physical  organism  to  other 
objects.  Thesubject  of  the  "implying  "seems  to  I  omeobject 
within  the  total  field,  or  content,  of  consciousness  ;  the  subject 
of  the  "pointing,"  on  the  contrary,  .-^eems  to  be  the  physical  or- 
ganism. Apart  therefore  from  the  difficulty  of  conceiving  how 
either  one  caii  be  conscious,  this  manifest  discrepancy  between 
the  subjects  shows  that  a  unitary  definition  has  not  been 
offered. 

Pitkin  charges  the  English  realists  with  not  having  really 
attacked  the  problem  of  consciou.sness,  inasmuch  as  they  cor  ■ 
tinue  to  talk  of  "mental  activity,"  and  himself  defines  the 
problem,  as  it  present?!  itself  to  the  American  new  rerKst,  af 
the  finding  of  the  differentia  of  the  cognitive  activity  and  that 
of  the  cognitive  field. ^    After  a  preliminary  statement,  in  which 


r.{ 


i  Journal  of  Philofonhy,  III,  JQfl6.  p,  .317     VII    1910   p   399- 
p.  72. 

»/6.,  Ill,  1906,  p.  316. 

»  The  New  RecUiem,  pr   439-41. 


vm,  1911, 


NEO-REALISTIC  DOCTRINE  OP  CONSCIOUSNESS     283 

tho  influcncf  of  Dowoy  is  manifest,'  to  the  effect  that  couscious- 
iicss  involves  a  specific  environment,  a  directed  activity  and  the 
()|M'ration  of  an  ornunic  structure,"  he  ventures  the  definition 
that  consciousness  is  the  cruciui  advance  of  the  organism  toward 
adjustment  to  external  entities.'  Now  this  is  a  unitary  defini- 
tion, hut  it  franivly  rethiccs  psychology  to  a  study  which  would 
Ik-  rchited  to  physiology  as  ecology  is  related  to  the  physiology 
(»f  plant  life :  it  would  be  a  study  of  the  externally  observable 
behavior  of  the  animal  organism,  human  or  other,  in  relation 
to  its  externally  observable  environment.  Now  one  may 
understand  how  Dewey,  with  bis  inmiediate  empiricism,  or 
(iisguisetl  psychological  idealism,  might  have  some  excuse  for 
calling  this  psychology,  but  the  same  privilege  can  scarcely  be 
granted  to  a  thoroughgoing  rerlist  like  Pitkin.  What  he  has 
given  us  is  a  good  definition  of  something  else,  important 
enough  in  its  own  way,  but  not  a  definition  of  consciou»=  less. 
To  inquire  whether  or  not  this  "crucial  advance  of  the  organ- 
ism toward  adjustment  to  external  entities"  is  accompanied 
by  consciousness  of  those  entities  is  not  to  ask  the  meaningless 
(|Ucr;tion,  Is  consciousness  of  anything  accompanied  by  con- 
sciousness of  that  thing? 

Perry's  definition  of  consciousness  is  interesting  as  being 
tl:c  result  of  an  explicit  attempt  to  combine  the  points  of  view 
of  introspection  (or  what  the  neo-realist  c;  ,'s  introspection) 
and  external  observation  of  mind  in  nature  and  society.  The 
tomicr  shouk  give  "the  mind  within,"  and  the  latter,  "the 
mind  without";  and  as  these  must  be,  somehow,  in  reality 
one,  a  combination  of  the  findings  of  the  two  processes  ought 
to  give  us  our  required  d'^^^iition.*  Now  it  turns  out  that  when 
\vc  try  to  introspect  our  own  experience,  we  find  only  objects, 
"a  chaotic  manifold  of  fragments  of  the  other-than-mind."  * 
In  order  to  find  the  conunon  bond  between  these  objects  or 
fragments,  the  basis  of  tlieir  togetherness,  we  must  turn  from 
the  method  of  introspection  to  that  of  external  observation.' 
Thereupon  we  find  the  mind  without  (in  nature  and  society) 

I  rt.  op.  cit.,  p.  437.  »  76..  p.  442.  >  76..  •>.  457. 

'Journal  of  Philoxnphu.  VI.  IW"  pp.  1C9-70.  172-5:  Pretent  PhUosopkieal 
Tindencies,  pp.  27.3-4. 

>  Journal  of  Philosophy,  VI,  1909,  pp.  170-1. 
•  Present  Philosophical  Tendencies,  p.  279. 


; 


i)  y 


I 


284 


THE  PROBLEM   OP   KNOWLEDGE 


i;     ■ 

1 

1 

to  be  behavior,  a  bodily  complex  moved  by  interests.'  But  it 
appears  that  the  objects  which  we  discover  when  we  "intro- 
spect" and  the  elements  of  the  environment  to  which  the 
"bodily  complex"  responds  are  the  same.  The  reflex  nervous 
system,  responding  to  an  entity  in  a  specific  way,  makes  it  a 
content  of  consciousness,-  i.e.  a  content  discoverable  by  in- 
trospection. Uniting,  therefore,  our  findings  by  the  two  meth- 
ods, we  can  say  that  mind,  or  consciousness,  is  the  environ- 
ment which  an  organism  senses,  or,  better,  it  is  behavior,  to- 
gether with  the  objects  it  employs  and  isolates.'  The  natural 
mind,  then,  is  an  organization  possessing,  as  aspects,  interest, 
nervous  system,  and  contents,  or,  in  other  words,  externally  ob- 
servable aclion  and  indepenflontly  existing  contents.* 

Now  in  criticism  of  all  this  it  may  be  said  that  the  objections 
previousl}^  offered  to  the  separate  elements  of  Perrj^'s  defini- 
tion apply  with  undiminished  force  in  spite  of  their  having 
been  brought  into  some  sort  of  combination.  In  spite  of  all 
Perry's  precautions,  he  has  not  succeeded  in  corralling  con- 
sciousness in  his  definition.  Indeed  he  himself  admits  that  all 
he  can  discover  by  what  he  calls  introspection  is  a  "manifold 
of  fragments  of  the  other-than-mind."  And  it  is  a  notorious 
fact  that  external  observation  also  reveals  only  movements  of 
the  bodily  complex  in  relation  to  its  environment,  in  other 
words,  again  nothing  but  "other-than-mind."  Indeed  in 
many  cases  the  external  observer  knows  not  whether  to  inter- 
pret the  behavior  which  he  sees,  as  accompanied  by  conscious- 
ness or  not.  In  adding  together  the  results  of  the  two  methods, 
Perry  has  succeeded  in  "rounding  up"  all  the  important  asso- 
ciates of  consciousness,  but  consciousness  itself  is  not  to  be 
found  in  the  aggregation ;  other-than-mind  added  to  other- 
than-mind  does  not  give  other  than  other-than-mind.*     Nor 

'  Journal  of  Philosophy.  VI,  1909.  pp.  172-3.  » lb.,  VII,  1910,  p.  397. 

*  lb.,  VI,  1909,  pp.  174-5;   Present  Philosophical  Tendencies,  p.  303. 

*  Present  Philosophical  Tendencies,  p.  304. 

»We  neither  mean  nor  need  to  say  here  that  other-than-a  added  to  othcr- 
than-a  never  gives  other  than  other-than-a.  For  instance,  2  (other  than  5)  added 
to  3  (other  than  5)  does  give  other  than  othor-than-5.  We  can  say  this,  how- 
ever, only  Ijecause  we  know  enough  about  the  relation  of  2  and  3  to  each  other 
to  know  that  when  laktu  (ogether  they  are  5.  But  we  do  not  know  that  organic 
behavior  in  response  to  the  environment,  and  the  objects  which  it  employs  and 
isolates,  taken  together,  are  mind.    Indeed  we  would  not  know  this,  even  if  we 


NEO-REALISTIC  DOCTRINE  OP  CONSCIOUSNESS     285 


can  it  even  be  said  that  organic  response  to  a  selected  portion 
of  the  environment  is  impossible  without  consciousness  as  an 
accompaniment,  for  we  are  well  aware  of  results  in  our  own 
experience  which  have  come  from  unconscious  organic  response 
to  our  physical  environment.  To  be  sure,  the  terms  "mind" 
and  "consciousness"  may  be  used  with  radically  altered  mean- 
ing, and  arbitrarily  applied  to  the  aforesaid  sum  of  elements ; 
but  it  ought  to  be  no  less  acceptable  to  the  neo-realist,  as  it 
would  be  far  less  misleading,  if  he  were  to  employ  instead  of 
tliese  terms  some  neutral  algebraic  symbol.  His  definition 
would  then  be  stripped  of  the  false  greatness  that  has  been 
thrust  upon  it  by  calUng  it  a  definition  of  mind.' 

Holt's  recent  paper  on  "  Response  and  Cognition"*  will  un- 
doubtedly be  recognized  as  one  of  the  impKjrtant  documents  of 
the  new  "  behaviorism."  While  cordially  approving  the  meth- 
ods of  investigation  employed  by  the  behaviorist  psychologists, 
he  regards  their  theories,  and  fundamentally  their  definition  of 
behavior,  as  defective;  and  he  sets  himself,  accordingly,  to 
remedy  this  defect.  Thus  while  the  behaviorists  tend  to  treat 
behavior  as  consisting  of  reflex  activities  simply.  Holt  insists 
that  it  is  essential  to  note  that  these  reflex  activities  have  been 
so  integrated,  so  organized,  that  in  behavior  proper  the  action, 
while  a  constant  function  of  some  object,  process,  or  aspect  of 
the  objective  environment,  is  not  a  function  of  the  immediate 
stimulus.  Defining  behavior,  then  —  or  "  the  relation  of 
specific  response,"  as  he  suggests  it  may  be  called  —  as  "any 
process  of  release  [of  stored  energy]  which  is  a  function  of 
factors  external  to  the  mechanism  released,"  and  assuming  that 
the  terms  with  which  psychology  deals  can  be  adequately  trans- 
lated into  the  terms  of  the  science  of  behavior,  he  takes  up  for 
re-definition  some  of  the  more  important  concepts  of  ordinary 

knew  that  whenever  the  biological  selection  of  objects  and  organic  response 
thi-reto  occur  together,  the  mental  relation  is  .jresent.  It  might  very  well  be 
that  mind  was  the  cause  of  both  the  selection  of  the  object  and  the  organic  re- 
sponse, and  not  a  mere  effect  of  their  occurrence  together,  much  less  a  mere 
name  for  their  combination. 

'  In  criticising  Perry's  definition,  as  not  borne  out  by  our  everyday  knowledge 
of  our  own  consciousness.  Russell  remarks.  "  In  order  to  know  that  such  and 
.such  a  thing  lies  within  my  experience,  it  is  not  necessary  to  know  anything 
about  my  nervous  system  "  {MonUt,  XXIV,  1914,  p.  184). 

*  Journal  of  Philoaophy,  XII,  1915,  pp.  365-73;  393-409. 


\  M 


^     i-Ji    ■<- 


286 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   KNOWLEDGE 


*; 


JS 


'(  i    . 


"#; 


psychology.  In  the  first  place,  the  object  or  "  content  of  con- 
sciousness" is  simply,  from  this  point  of  view,  the  object  of 
which  the  organism's  behavior  is  a  constant  function.  "  Voli- 
tion" is  simply  what  the  body  docs  toward  the  environment, 
"  the  will "  is  the  behavior  function,  and  the  subject  of  both 
volition  and  cognition  is  simply  the  body  itself ;  in  behaviorism 
"the  physical  organism  will  .  .  .  supersede  the  metaphysical  sub- 
ject." "  The  personality,  or  the  soul,  ...  is  the  attitude  and 
conduct,  idem  est  the  purposes  of  the  body;"  "behaviorism 
can  rest  unperturbed  while  the  sad  procession  of  spirits,  Ghost- 
Souls,  '  transcendental '  Egos,  and  what  not,  pa.sses  by  and 
vanishes  in  't-,  own  vapor."  "  Feeling "  is  simply  "  some 
modification  of  response  which  is  determined  by  factors  within 
the  organism."  "  The  long  sought  cognitive  relation  between 
'subject'  and  'object'"  thus  becomes  simply  the  externally 
observable  "  behavior  relation."  When  he  comes  to  define 
attention  and  the  stream  of  consciousness,  Holt,  in  order  to 
supplement  the  point  of  view  of  external  observation,  returns 
to  the  point  of  view  of  that  which  the  neo-realist  calls  introspec- 
tion, but  which  is  really  only  the  observation  of  the  objects  of 
which  one  is  conscious.  "  The  attentive  level  of  consciousness, 
that  of  which  the  '  self '  is  aware,"  is  then  "  that  most  compre- 
i  :>nsive  environmental  field  to  which  the  organism  has  so  far  at- 
tauied  (by  integration)  the  capacity  to  respond."  "  The '  stream 
of  consciousness,' "  finally,  "  is  nothing  but  .  .  .  [the]  selected 
procession  of  the  environmental  aspects  to  which  the  body's 
ever  varying  motor  adjustments  are  directed." 

In  the  main  the  criticisms  to  be  directed  against  Holt  are  so 
obvious  that  their  elaborate  statement  seems  superfluous.  Most 
of  what  was  said  in  criticism  of  Perry's  view  applies  to  this 
doctrine  of  Holt  also  ;  the  chief  difference  is  that  Perry  would 
acknowledge  that  not  only  the  objects  of  which  one  is  conscious, 
but  the  externally  observable  behavior  also,  is  "  other-than- 
mind."  What  Holt  has  given  us  is,  in  the  main,  a  very 
valuable  analysis  of  some  of  the  physiological  associates  of  con- 
sciousness; but  the  identification  of  these,  throughout,  with  the 
subject-matter  of  psychology  proper,  is  both  philosophically 
and  psychologically  inexcusable.  Moreover,  it  may  be  re- 
marked incidentally,  Holt  assumes  all  too  easily  that  behavior, 


J    i 


XEO-REALISTIC  DOCTRINE  OF  CONSCIOUSNESS     287 


ll 


especially  human  behavior  in  its  most  highly  conscious  forms, 
is  an  absolutely  constant  function  of  tae  environment,  or  of  any 
part  of  it. 

Montague  rejects  the  behaviorist  interpretation  of  con- 
sciousness,  as  a  form  of  "panhylism,"  almost  or  quite  as 
objectionable  as  panpsychism,  inasmuch  as  both  are  self- 
refuting.'  He  seeks  rather  to  set  consciousness  forth  as  a  cer- 
tain sort  of  relation,  having  been  from  the  first  required  to  do 
.so  by  his  theory  of  the  permanent  objective  existence  of  second- 
ary quahties.^  In  the  name  of  his  special  brand  of  monistic 
realism,  which  in  this  connection  he  calls  "hylopsychism," ' 
he  holds  that  there  is  but  one  system  of  realities,  and  that 
exists  in  time  and  space,  so  that  mental  processes  must  be  re- 
garded as  occurring  in  space,  and  consciousness  must  be  inter- 
preted as  a  r^^lation  between  spatial  objects.*  The  question 
is,  What  sort  of  a  relation  is  consciousness  ?  ^  Two  sugges- 
tions  seem  to  have  been  fruitful  in  shaping  Montague's  answer 
to  this  question,  viz.  the  analogy  of  the  search-light,*  which 
Holt  has  also  employed,  and  the  concept  of  potential  energy.' 
The  resemblances  between  consciousness  and  potential  energy 
are  dwelt  upon  :  sensation  and  energy  are  similar  in  being  char- 
acterized by  both  intensity  and  polarity ;  and  when  sensation 
occurs  it  is  at  the  same  time  and  under  the  same  conditions  as 
mark  the  transformation  of  the  kinetic  '  .  ;^gy  of  a  neural  cur- 
rent into  potential  energy.'  Moreover,  both  are  essentially 
private  and  hidden  ;  both  pervade  space ;  both  are  teleological.' 


1 1: 

I    I 

I  h 

If 

I 

■3 


>  The  New  Realism,  pp.  270-80,  482. 

'Journal  of  Philosophy.  II,  1905,  pp.  314,  315. 

'  The  Xew  Realism,  pp.  279-81.  .\rrordin(?  to  panpsychism  physical  ob- 
jcf  ts  iirc  nothing  but  actual  perceptions,  or  permanent  possibilities  of  perception. 
According  to  panhylism  consciousness  is  nothing  but  the  possibility  of  objects, 
<ir  nothing  but  an  epiphenomenal  correlate  of  the  brain-process.  Hylopsychism 
would  eliminate  the  "nothing  but"  in  both  cases. 

•  Journal  of  Philosophy.  IV,  1907,  p.  370  ;  cf.  MonisI,  XVIII,  1908,  pp.  21-9. 
'  Journal  of  Philosophy,  IV,  1907,  p.  377. 

'Ih.,  IV,  1907,  p.  102;  cf.   IX,  1912,  pp.  39-41,  46. 

"  See  American  Journal  of  Psychology,  XV,  1904,  pp.  1-13  ;  Journal  of  Philos- 
ophy, IV,  1907,  pp.  378-82;  "Consciousness  a  Form  of  Energy,"  Essays  .  .  . 
in  Honor  of  William  James,  pp.  103-34  ;  The  New  Realism,  pp.  281,  etc. ;  Philo- 
sophical Review,  XXIII,  1914,  pp.  57-9. 

•  Journal  of  Philosophy,  V,  1908,  pp.  209-10. 

•  Essays  ...  in  Honor  of  William  James,  pp.  126-8. 


■■  ^lli 


i't 


i.  I 


' 

1 

!■' 

I 

'! 

,;. 

' 

-     \    '] 

r 

It 

il  .* 


1:1 


(8- 


J 


«: 


ii: 


288 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  KNOWLEDGE 


Hence  it  is  suggested  that  sensations  are  forms  of  potential 
energy,  that  consciousness  is  potential  energy.'  Moreover, 
this  would  give  a  positive  content  to  the  idea  of  potential 
energy;  the  potentiality  of  the  physical  would  here  be  the 
actuality  of  the  psychical,  just  as  in  the  afferent  paths  and 
centres  of  the  nervous  system  the  actuality  of  the  physical  is 
the  potentiality  of  the  psychical.'  Or,  in  other  words,  con- 
sciousness objectively  implies  certain  cortical  forces,  and  is 
implied  by  them.'  The  theory  is  that  the  external  object 
possesses  all  the  secondary  as  well  as  primary  qualities  ob- 
served in  normal  perception,  is  colored,  for  example ;  its  color 
is  also  objectively  present  in  the  light-waves,  in  the  retina,  the 
optic  nerve,  and  the  visual  centre  of  the  brain.  When  the 
energy,  which  throughout  all  this  process  retains,  it  is  ,;  sumed, 
its  specificity,*  becomes  potential  in  the  brain,  it  is  trai!.<^iormed 
into  consciousness.  The  brain  becomes  conscious,  i.e.  becomes, 
for  the  time  being,  a  mind.*  This  cerebral  or  conscious  event 
has,  like  every  other  event,  a  self-transcending  reference.^ 
It  is  the  potential  or  implicative  presence  of  a  thing  at  a  space 
or  time  at  which  it  is  not  actually  present.^  "The  world  that 
we  perceive  is  (not  indeed  an  actual  but)  a  virtual  or  potential 
reprojeclion  of  the  effects  which  the  world  projects  upon  us."  ^ 

In  criticism  of  this  view  it  may  be  said  at  the  outset  that 
it  is  dogmatically  based  upon  what  can  hardly  be  regarded  as 
more  than  a  prejudice,  viz.  that  there  is  only  one  sort  of  reality, 
i.e.  a  reality  in  time  and  space  and  measurable  in  terms  of 
physical  energy.  An  additional  reason  for  hesitation  is  found 
in  the  confessed  total  absence  of  verification  of  the  hypothesis 
(wnich  is  quite  fundamental  to  the  theory)  that  m  normal 
perception  the  primary  energies  in  the  external  bodies  and  in 
the  cerebral  tracts  are  specifically  the  same.  Moreover  it 
seems  dogmatic  and  even  fantastic  to  suppose  —  if  this  is 
what  he  means  —  that  color-qualities  are  present  throughout 
all  the  space  t-aversed  by  the  light-waves,  and  throughout  all 

'  Essays  .  .  .  in  Honor  of  William  James,  p.  129. 

»  The  New  Realism,  p.  281  ;   Philosophical  Review,  XXIII,  1914,  p.  58. 

»  The  New  Realism,  p.  29.1 ;    Philosophical  Review.  XXIII.  1914,  pp.  57-8. 

«  The  New  Realism,  p.  299. 

*  Philosophical  Review,  aXIII,  1914,  p.  59.  « lb.,  p.  57. 

'  The  New  Realism,  p.  281.        •  Philosophical  Review,  XXIII,  1914,  p.  f)2. 


NEO-REALISTIC  DOCTRINE  OF  CONSCIOUSNESS     289 


the  tracts  of  the  brain  traversed  by  the  stimulation.  This 
surely  does  not  accord  with  the  principle  of  parsimony.  Or  if 
it  be  explained  that  just  as  in  the  case  of  consciousness  there 
is  a  virtual  or  potential  or  implicative  presence  in  the  extra- 
organic  world  of  that  which  is  actually  in  the  brain,  so  there 
is  only  a  virtual  or  potential  or  implicative  presence  of  the 
(lualities  of  the  external  object  in  the  brain,  so  that  there  is 
simply  the  cancelling  of  one  self-transcendence  by  means  of 
another  in  the  opposite  direction,  the  external  object  being 
virtually  put  back  where  it  actually  belongs,  but  from  which 
it  had  virtually  strayed,  one  is  still  unable  to  see  how  such 
virtual  presence  of  the  external  object  where  it  is  not  (viz.  in 
the  brain)  can  actually  be  the  virtual  presence  of  the  perceived 
oI)jcct  where  it  is  not  (viz.  in  the  external  world)  in  any  such 
way  as  would  allow  for  enough  difference  between  the  actually 
external  object  and  the  virtually-introjected-virtually-repro- 
jected  object  to  explain  the  possibility  of  error,  to  explain  which 
scorns  to  have  been  the  chief  raison  d'itre  of  this  elaborate 
theory.  On  the  other  hand,  if  there  is  enough  difference  for 
ttu»  possibility  of  error,  there  must  necessarily  be  a  total  nu- 
merical difference  between  the  two,  in  which  ease  there  is  too 
much  difference  for  the  possibility  of  knowledge.  In  this  case, 
as  we  have  previously  pointed  out,'  Montague's  realistic  epis- 
tcinological  monism  would  seem  to  be  entirely  a  matter  of 
faith,  in  the  sense  of  believing  what  there  is  sufficient  reason 
for  disbeheving.  These  considerations,  then,  without  further 
reference  to  his  rejection  of  the  idea  of  memory  images,  ideas 
or  sensations  as  really  existing,*  seem  sufficient  ground  for  de- 
clining to  accept  Montague's  ingenious  and  in  some  ways 
attractive  speculations  as  to  the  nature  of  consciousness. 

In  concluding  this  investigation  of  the  neo-realistic  doctrines 
of  consciousness,  it  may  be  instructive  briefly  to  compare  and 
contrast  the  results  arrived  at  by  the  English  and  American 
schools.  In  each  of  the  largely  separate  developments  of 
thought  there  is  discoverable  something  of  the  nature  of  a 
dialectical  process.  The  English  new  realists,  reacting  against 
the  extreme  idealistic  philosophies  which  made  consciousness 
t^  '  only  and  all-inclusive  Being,  took  up  the  question  as  to 

'  See  Ch.  XI,  ««--a,  « Philosophical  Review,  XXIII,  1914,  p.  60. 

V 


M 


^ 


•Hal 


■' ) 


290 


THE   PROBLEM   07   KNOWLEDGE 


i 


it 


1 1 


{    I 

1 


1 1 

■  t 


just  what  existent  consciousness  is,  if  it  is  true  that  it  is  only 
an  existent  aniong  other  existent   things.     The  answer  was 
soon  forthconiiiig  that  it  is  not  an  existent  at  all,  unless  it  is  a 
relation  between  existents,  in  particular  a  relation  between  a 
really  existent  subject  and  a  world  of  really  existent  objects. 
But  when  the  question  was  rai.sed  as  to  just  what  relation  con- 
sciousness is,  difficulties  and  diversities  of  opinion  began  to 
appear.     Several    largely    distinct    lines   of    i nought    may    be 
regarded  as  developing  the  antithesis  to  the  thesis  that  con- 
sciousness is  a  relation,  and  as  marking  the  transition  in  the 
direction  of  the  synthetic  view  that  consciousness  cannot  be  a 
relation  unless  it  is  also  and  at  the  .same  time  a  productive  or 
creative    psychical   activity.     For   example,  we  have   Stout's 
contention  that,  applied  to  fictitious  objects,  the  doctrine  that 
consciousness  is  an  external  relation  can  only  mean  that  such 
objects   have  genuinely  independent  reality,  since  the  whole 
reality  of  any   object   cannot   be   included   in   its   relation   to 
something  else.     That  Stout  does  not  seem  to  see  the  way  out 
of  his  difficulty  by  means  of  the  concept  of  productive  activity, 
or  even  to  see  how  antithetical  to  the  merely  relational  view 
of  consciousness  the  considerations  he  advances  are,  makes  his 
contribution  to  the  antithetical  stage  of  the  ilialectic  all  the 
more  impressive.     Wolf,  on  the  other  hand,  developing  some 
of  me  antithetical  considerations  to  the  view  of  ]Moore  and 
Alexander  that  con.sciousne.ss  is  a  purely  diaphanous  relation 
between  subject  and  object,  makes  d  finite  progress  toward  a 
higher  synthesis.     It  is  necessary  to  think  of  con.sciousness  as 
a  productive  activity  in  some  cases;    we  can  only  consent  to 
regard  it  as  a  purely  diaphanous  relation  in  normal  perception  ; 
in  all  cases  of  error,  perceptual  or  other,  it  is  an  activity  pro- 
ductive of  its  object.     This  idea  of  consciousness  as  a  produc- 
tive activity  is  carried  much  further  by  McDougall,  although 
to  what  extent  under  the  influence  of  neo-realistic  thought  it  is 
not  easy  to  say.     At  any  rate  he  applies  it  so  far,  especially 
in  the  case  of  sense-qualities,  that  he  cannot  be  regarded  as 
one  of  the  neo-realistic  school.     On  the  other  hand  he  does  not 
seem  fully  to  appreciate  the  philosophical  significance  of  the 
idea   of   consciousness    which    he    introduces    rather    casually 
toward  the  close  of  his  volume,  Body  and  Mind.    On  the  whole, 


NEO-REALISTIC  DOCTRINE  OP  CONSCIOUSNESS     291 

however,  from  the  standpoint  to  be  defended  in  our  later  con- 
structive attempt,  it  would  seem  that  the  dialectic  of  English 
iM>o-rcalism  has  been  leading  in  the  general  direction  of  the 
true  solution  of  the  problem  of  consciousness. 

Turning  to  the  American  movement  we  find  a  parallel  but 
strangely  different  phenomenon.     Here  too,  in  reaction  against 
extreme   idealistic   views,  the  problem   emerged   as  to   what 
consciousness  is,  if  we  cannot  say  that  it  is  the  all-embracing 
reality.     By  such  thinkers  as  James,  Woodbridge,  Holt,  and 
others,  arguments,  critical  and  constructive,  i.e.  antithetical 
and  synthetical,  were  presented,  to  show  that  consciousness  is 
not  an  existent,  but  a  mere  relation  among  existents.     The 
chief  difference  between  the  American  and  English  schools  at 
this  point,  however,  is  that  while  the  English  realists  have 
contended  that  consciousness  is  a  relation  between  a  psychical 
or  mental  subject  and  physical  objects,  the  Ameri      s  have 
generally  maintained  that  it  is  a  relation  between  or  among 
physical   objects.     But   here  again,   when   the   question   was 
laised  as  to  just  what  relation  between  objects  consciousness  is, 
considerations  antithetical  to  the  relational  view  were  brought 
to  light.     For  example,  Woodbridge  and  Perry,  although  in 
different  ways,  have  expressed  the  conviction  that  conscious- 
ness is  not  a  relation  l)etween  objects  unless  it  is  also  an  activity 
of  one  object  (the  physical  organism  or  nervous  system)  upon 
other  objects.     This  latter  view  has  been  developed  at  length 
l)y  the  behaviorists  — to  the  bitter  end,  we  take  it,  by  some  of 
them.     Indeed,  in  the  above  exposition  and  discu.ssion  of  the 
American  neo-realistic  doctrine  of  consciousness  it  has  been 
shown,  we  think,  that  its  dialectic  has  been  leading  it  with 
resistless  logic  to  -  "'-oroughf,oing  self-refutation.     Views  such 
as  those  of  Singer  and  Watson  and  Frost,  to  mention  only  the 
m().st  extravagant  developments,  really  constitute  a  reductio 
(vl  ab.surdum  of  .some  at  least  of  their  presuppositions.     And  if 
flic  question  be  raised  as  to  how  it  can  be  maintained  that  this 
•  li.ilectical  movement  from  existent  to  relation  and  from  rela- 
tion to  activity  can  lead  in  the  one  case  (that  of  English  neo- 
nviiism)   toward  a  true  position,  and  in  the  other  (that  of 
American  neo-realism)  to  a  redwtio  ad  absurdum,  our  answer 
would  be  that  the  most  plausible  explanation  of  the  difference 


I    1 


fWP^ffBrrjmjtP" 


292 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  KNOWLEDGE 


IM 


I' 


"8 

i    B 


I  m 


i  ■ 
i  I 

hi 


seems  to  be  that  it  ia  due  to  the  one  conspicuous  difference 
between  the  presuppositions  of  the  two  schools.  That  is,  it 
must  be  because  the  English  new  realists,  speaking  generally, 
have  regarded  the  subject  of  consciousness  as  psychical, 
mental,  spiritual,  while  the  Americans  have  quite  as  unani- 
mously insisted  upon  viewing  it  as  physical.  But  further 
discussion  of  this  point  we  must  defer  until  we  turn  from  crit- 
icism to  construction. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

The  Neo-Realistic  Doctrine  of  Relations,   Universals, 

AND  Values 

Our  critique  of  the  new  realism  has  thus  far  centred  about 
its  position  with  reference  to  secondary  qualities  and  the 
nature  of  consciousness,  but  8  rne  further  grounds  of  objection 
may  be  found,  in  our  opinion  from  an  examination  of  its  doc- 
trine as  to  relations,  universals,  and  values.  To  such  an  ex- 
amination we  now  turn. 

With  reference  to  the  neo-realistic  doctrine  of  the  externality  of 
relations,  it  should  be  understood  that  it  is  a  further  generali- 
zation (in  the  interests  of  system  and  for  the  sake  of  deductive 
opistemology)  of  the  doctrine  of  the  externality  of  the  know- 
ing or  conscious  relation,  or,  in  other  words,  of  the  known 
object's  absolute  independence  of  the  circumstance  of  its  being 
known.     For  it  is  evident  that  if  it  could  be  maintained  that 
all  relations  are  external  to  the  terms  related,  one  could  deduce 
the  externality  of  the  knowing  relation,  so  far  as  the  object  is 
concerned,  or  the  independence  of  the  known  object  from  the 
knowing  relation.     On  the  other  hand,  even  if  it  can  only  be 
shown  that  some  other  relations  are  external  to  one  or  both 
of  their  terms,  there  will  be  a  certain  added  plausibility  in  the 
view  that  being  known  is  an  external  relation,  and  the  known 
object,  therefore,  independently  real. 

The  English  neo-realists,  with  the  exception  of  Bertrand 
Russell,  do  not  seem  to  have  gone  into  the  question  of  the 
internality  or  externality  of  relations  in  any  very  thorough- 
going manner.  T.  P.  Nunn  admits  that  some  relations  make 
a  difference  to  the  object  observed,'  but  he  gives  us  neither  a 
catalogue  of  those  which  make  a  difference,  and  so  are  pre- 
sumably internal,  nor  a  method  by  which  we  can  distinguish 

'  Proe.  AHilot.  Soc.,  1909-10,  p.  206. 
293 


n  'I 


i 


294 


THE   PROBLEM   OP   KNOWLEDGE 


"  i. 


u 


!l 


I        I  ;: 


H 


i  \ 


internal  relations  from  those  which  are  external.  Alexander 
remarks  that  if  we  mea.i  by  the  internality  of  a  relation  that  it 
cannot  exist  independently  of  it.s  terms,  then  in  this  sense 
relations  are  internal  to  their  terms.'  This  is  undoubtedly  a 
highly  defensible  position  to  take,  but  it  does  not  deal  with 
the  question  which  is  of  primary  concern  to  the  neo-roalist. 
It  would  be  coming  closer  to  the  real  'luestion  to  ask  whether 
a  term  cm  exist  independently  of  its  relations ;  but  the  exact 
point  of  dispute  is  whether  the  correct  thing  to  say  is  that  all 
relations  make  a  difference  to  thi'ir  terms,  or  that  some  do  and 
some  do  not,  or  that  none  do.  Stout,  in  his  remark  that  no 
being  can  lie  entirely  constituted  by  its  relation  to  something 
else,-  a.ssumes  that  every  term  must  be  at  least  partially  in- 
dependent of  any  one  of  its  relations;  but,  in  view  of  the 
possibility  of  creative  causality  being  one  of  the  relations,  does 
not  even  this  coinparativelj*  moilest  expression  seem  unwar- 
ranted? If  there  is  creative  activity,  .some  being  or  quality 
must  depend  for  its  existence  upon  -something  else  being  re- 
lated to  it  in  this  particular  relation  of  creative  causality. 

Russell's  doctrine  of  relations  is  explicit  and  highly  pertinent 
to  the  question  as  to  the  basis  of  realism.  In  the  first  place 
he  holds  that  relatedness  does  not  imply  any  ec. responding 
complexity  in  the  terms  related,  so  that  the  anti-realistic  argu- 
ment on  the  basis  of  the  internality  of  all  relations  is  not  validly 
founded.''  This  may  be  regarded  as  safe  ground  to  occupy, 
but  it  leaves  unanswered  the  question  as  to  whether  there  are 
not  some  rein'  s  which  are  internal  to  their  terms,  and  es- 
pecially, this  (j  .  stion  being  answered  in  the  affirmative,  the 
further  question  how  some  relations  can  be  internal  and  others 
external  to  tlie  terms  which  they  relate.  Russell's  doctrine 
that  relations  are  real  entities  (not  existences  but  subsistences) 
apart  from  any  terms,  we  shall  examine  in  connection  with  his 
theory  of  univer-sals ;  but  here  it  may  be  remarked  that  this 
doctrine  .seems  to  involve  the  ahsolule  externality  of  all  rela- 
tions. In  this  case  the  above  moderate  statements  would 
have  to  be  taken  as  representing  less  than  the  whole  (im- 


'  ^fin!!.  N.S..  XXI.  1911'.  p.  310.  '  Proc.  ArUtot.  Soe..  1910-11.  p.  187. 

'  Journal  of  Philosophy,  VIII,  1911,  pp.  15S^9.     Cf.  The  Principlea  of  Math- 
ematict,  pp.  221-6. 


NEO-REALISTIC   DOCTRINE   OP   RELATIONS      295 

port-0  truth,  from  his  point  of  view,  and  as  having  l)eon  made 
wii.    .  view  to  controversial  .security. 

AmonK  the  American  neo-reahsts  detailed  cU.scus.sion  of  the 
internaiity  or  externaUty  of  relations  has  almost  been  confined 
to  the  SIX  "proKramnu.st.s."  I„  the  introdi-tory  chapter  of 
Ihc  .\ew  Realmn,  which  represents  the  views  of  all  six  it  is 
stated:    "Realism  rejects  the  pren.i.se  that  all  relations  are 

li  T",-,'  ■,;  V'""  '^'''''<'*»''^'  ^t  present  available  indicates 
that  while  all  things  may  perhaps  be  related,  many  of  hese 
relations  are  not  constitutive  or  determinative,  i.e.  do  not 
enter  into  the  explanation  of  the  nature  or  existence  of  their 
terms.    ' 

Sometimes  it  is  difficult  to  see  that  complete  self-consistency 
has  been  maintained  in  the  different  statements  that  bear  upon 
the  theory  of  relations.     Thus  Montague,  in  one  of  his  early 
statements,  seems  clearly  to  imply  the  (xternality  of  all  re- 
lations.    "All  relations,"  be  says,  "presuppose  the  existence 
of  the  terms  between  which  they  subsist."  and  from  this  the 
possible  independent  existence  of  the  terms  is  inferred,  so  that 
logical  priority  h..    evidently  been  fallaciously  interpreted  to 
mean  chronological  priority,  or  previous  (and  hence  indepen- 
dent)  existence.^    Again,  much  more  recently,  he  has  main- 
tained that  the  internal  xk^^,  that  the  nature  of  the  parts  of  a 
complex  depends  upon  the  nature  of  the  whole  complex,  is 
fallacious,  apparently  because,  as  he  sees  it,  this  would  require 
one  to  believe  that  knowledge  of  merely  n  part  of  the  truth  is 
necessarily  false.'     It  would  seem,  howev  . ,  that  the  nature  of 
the  parts  might  depend  upon  the  nature  of  the  whole  in  some 
respects  not   requiring  to   bo    contemplated   in  a  particular 
judgment,  which  might  therefore  be  true  notwithstanding  it« 
not  being  the  whole  truth.     But  what  we  set  out  to  show  was 
the  evident  discrepancy  between  Montague's  statements  as 

nni.i^Jp.'SlfoT'''''''  ^'  ^''''  "'■  ''^'"^"'''  '"  •'""'""^  of  Philosophy,  VII, 
'Journal  of  Philosophy,  II,  1905,  p.  .313.  What  Montague  is  concerned  to 
."u.ntam  here  ,.s  the  mutual  implication  of  realism  and  thfrelational  XI  of 
.  .,ns.>ousness.  ''  If  consciousne.,.  is  a  relation,  objects  of  consciousness  must  be 
nal  independently  of  their  standing  in  that  relation,  while  con  vpr=f!y  if  „bicc^ 
^.ro  real  independently  of  a  consciousness  or  knowledge  of  them,  then  that  con- 
sciousness or  knowledge  can  not  be  anything  other  than  a  relation  between  them/' 
•  The  New  Realum,  p.  299. 


gn^mr 


296 


THE   PROBLEM  OP   KNOWLEDGE 


i 


i> 


referred  to,  am!  th»>  implication  of  his  Hcornful  question  in 
another  connection :  "What  kind  of  an  object  would  it  l)e,  for- 
sooth, which  remained  completely  unaltered  by  the  relations 
in  which  it  stcKxl?"  '  Perhaps  Montague  would  explain  away 
the  discrepancy  by  sayinj?  that  only  what  is  true  as  a  particular, 
and  not  what  is  universally  true,  is  thus  dependent  upon  par- 
ticular relations ;  but  this  is  all  that  the  opponent  of  ♦he  new 
realism  ordinarily  maintains.  But  inasmuch  as  Montague 
evidently  holds '  that  the  universal  includes  all  the  particulars, 
each  in  its  own  particular  relation,  he  cannot  consistently  main- 
tain that  he  knows  a  thing  as  it  really  is,  when  part  of  what  it 
really  is  d  neiids  upon  an  unknown  relation.  He  thinks  of  it 
as  if  it  were  not  what  it  really  is. 

Holt  and  Marvin  also  make  statements  that  lead  them  into 
evident  self-contradiction.  Holt  makes  the  general  statement 
that  the  entities  of  the  universe  are  related  by  external  re- 
lations,' and  yet  on  the  same  page  he  admits  that  it  is  seldom 
possible  to  say  just  where  the  object  itself  terminates  and  its 
relations  to  other  entities  commence.  Now  if  we  are  going 
to  insist  that  nothing  must  be  interpreted  as  a  relation  which 
is  not  wholly  external  to  the  term,  what  seem  to  be  relations 
and  yet  are  internal  to  tiic  term  will  ..ave  .o  bo  iurrproted  as 
part  of  the  object,  and  not  as  a  relation.  But  Holt  defines 
mind  as  that  cross-section  of  the  environment,  a  neutral  mani- 
fold, which  is  defined  or  selected  by  the  response  of  the  nervous 
system.*  Now  this  seems  to  mean  that  mind  is  a  neutral  mani- 
fold as  selected,  or  in  the  relation  of  being  selected,  by  an  organ- 
ism, and  not  when  not  thus  selected.  Here  then  we  have  that 
which  is  what  it  is  (viz.  mind)  solely  by  virtue  of  its  relation 
to  something  else.  But  this  is  for  that  relation  to  be  interral 
to  its  tvfm  (mind),  and  it  would  but  thinly  disguise  the  break- 
down of  the  theory  to  say  that  it  is  difficult  here  to  say  where 
the  object  terminates  and  the  relation  begins. 

Essentially  similar  is  the  criticism  to  be  made  against  Marvin, 
who  states  the  doctrine  of  the  externality  of  relations  in  universal 
terms,'  and  then  makes  the  statement  about  conscioi'^ness 

•  Journal  of  Philosophy,  V,  1908,  p.  211.  'lb. 

'  The  New  Realism,  p.  372.  •  The  Concept  of  Cotuci^unrtess,  p.  182. 

»  Journal  of  Philosophy,  VII,  1910,  p   395. 


NEO-REALISTIC  DOCTRINE  OP   RELATIONS      297 

to  which  we  have  alrei  !y  referred  :  "My  consciousness  of  this 
paRC  is  literally  the  page,  the  page  in  certain  relations  ...  A 
field  o(  consciousness  is  a  certain  cross-section,  a  certain  col- 
lection, of  entities,  belonging  to  the  universe  of  subsistent 
entities  and  definable  as  a  group  by  its  peculiar  relation  to  our 
bodily  reactions."  '  Here,  then,  is  a  relation,  the  relation  which 
makes  the  subsistent,  or  existent,  into  the  mental,  or  conscious- 
ii(>s.s,  and  which  is  therefore  internal  so  far  as  consciousness  is 
eonccrned  -  a  manifest  exception  to  the  doctrine  of  the  uni- 
versal externality  of  relations. 

The  other  three  of  the  six,  viz.  Spaulding,  Pitkin,  and  Perry, 
have  argued  more  at  length  for  the  external  view  of  relations. 
SpauKiing  builds  his  realism  upon  this  view.  The  external 
view,  he  claims,  is  self-consistent,  and  is  therefore  established, 
a«  against  all  other  systems  which  are  based  upon  the  internal 
view,  which  is  sdf-refuting."  He  maintains  that  the  supporter 
of  the  internal  view  tacitly  or  surreptitiously  employs  the  ex- 
ternal view  with  reference  to  his  own  system,  in  the  supposition 
that  reality,  apart  from  any  relation  to  the  knower,  is  what  the 
internal  view  takes  it  to  be ;  and  that  the  internal  view  thus 
presupposes  its  own  contradictory,  and  so  refutes  itself.  But 
while  the  internal  view,  if  rwt  applied  to  itself,  is  seen  to  be  self- 
refuting,  when  it  is  so  applied,  the  result  is,  "on  the  one  hand, 
that  by  his  own  theory  his  own  knowledge  of  his  own  theory 
is  a  knowledge  only  of  that  which  is  appearance,  and  yet  on 
the  other  hand,  that  he  can  never  know  whether  this  is  real  ap- 
pearance or  not,  because  the  modifying  effect  of  knowledge  can 
never  be  eliminated.  And  again,  by  his  own  theory  he  cannot 
know  that  even  all  this  is  the  real  state  of  affairs,  and  so  on  in 
an  infinite  regress."  ' 

This  is  valuable  criticism,  but  it  is  valid  only  against  the  view 
that  all  relations  must  always  be  taken  as  internal,  and  of 
course  fails  to  show  that  all  relations  must  always  be  taken 
its  external.  Now  it  may  be  that  the  opponents  of  realism  make, 
as  Spaulding  charges,  an  "arbitrary  use  of  the  'internal  view' 
for  certain  purposes,  and  .  .  .  of  the  'external  view'  in  other 

'  A  First  Book  in  Metaphysics,  p.  263. 

'  Journal  of  PhiloKophy.  VII,  1910,  p.  400. 

•  Philosophical  Review,  XIX,  1910,  pp.  276-7,  29&-300,  620-1. 


I    ' 


»^ 


V 


.     1    :' 


r 


ilil 


Wi 


! 


if!-. 


^     t 
*1  11 


tri 


#■ 


.-!, 
t 


\ 


298 


THE   PROBLEM   OP   KNOWLEDGE 


connections,"  '  but  that  does  not  mean  that  there  may  not  be 
a  justifiable  principle  according  to  which  one  may  regard  cer- 
tain relations  as  either  internal  or  external.  And  that  Spaulding 
himself  cannot  regard  all  relations  as  always  external  is  evident 
from  his  guarded  statement  that  "a  term  may  stand  in  one  or 
in  many  relations  to  one  or  many  other  terms,"  and  that  "any 
of  these  terms  and  .  .  .  some-  of  tiiese  relations  could  he  ali- 
sent  .  .  .  without  there  being  any  resulting  modification  (if 
the  remaining  .  .  .  terms  or  relations."  '  In  thus  regarding 
xome  relations  only  as  external,  without  showing  the  principle 
involved  in  this  selection,  is  not  Spaulding  also  " arbitrary'"? 
In  his  contribution  to  the  volume  entitled  The  Xew  Realism, 
again,  he  argues  successfully  against  those  who  would  dispute 
the  possibility  of  analysis,  or  the  validity  of  its  results,  resting 
their  contention  on  the  presupposition  that  independence  and 
relatedness  are  mutually  exclusive ;  but  the  limits  of  what  he 
accomplishes  are  indicated  in  the  statement:  "The  question 
in  which  we  are  chiefly  interested  is  not  whether  the  internal 
theory  has  no  application,  but  simply  whether  this  aj)plicati()n 
can  be  universal."  *  He  criticises  the  upholder  of  the  internal 
view  as  unable  to  be  consistent,  since  he  cannot  make  his  theory 
universal ;  *  but  he  himself  neither  makes  the  external  view 
universal,  nor  gives  us  any  adcfjuate  principle  by  which  the 
internality  or  externality  of  relations  may  be  determined.  It 
is  true  that  he  unrlertakes  an  empirical  investigation  in  order 
to  discover  just  when,  in  cases  of  actual  synthesis,  new  prop- 
erties appear ;  and  this  is  good  as  far  as  it  goes.  But  besides 
calling  attention  to  the  fact  that  he  feels  obliged  to  leave  it  an 
open  question  whether  or  not  the  parts  always  remain  un- 
changed by  the  synth(»sis,'  we  would  criticise  his  whole  treat- 
ment of  the  topic  as  not  taking  into  account  the  fact  that  our 
ordinarily  practical  necessities  require  us  to  treat  one  and  the 
same  relation  sometimes  as  internal  and  sometimes  as  external. 
Pitkin,  in  his  essay  entitled  "Some  Realistic  Implications 
of  Biology,"  admits  that  the  realist  cannot  count  his  case  won 

'  Philosophical  Review,  XIX,  1910,  p.  621.  » Italics  mine. 

S  J.-x:irr,r.l  .-.(  f>h-:!n«npky,   VTI     ItlO,  p.  400 

*  The  Xew  Hcalism,  pp.  165,  107. 

»  lb.,  p.  108.  •  lb.,  p.  241. 


Mimrma^'i:. 


JKrfA  ■  '-^'L?!  *-  m,  ;2i3pw*''=^«?:ssf  w 


NEO-REALISTIC   DOCTRINE   OF  RELATIONS      299 
until  he  has  disproved  the  anti-realistic  inferences  drawn  from 

«tt':s  ^r^X^^:;^.^r  ^  ^n  °^-^-  ^ 

111  ■  -  ic  w.tbih  or  a  vitahstic  intornretatinn  nf 

vimli,..,fo  1      ,  '"*        ""tent     of  oxpcncnce  by  the  Eeo  is 

\ indicated.     h"itr.<(  n    c(  ni>ni\<    tu.  t      ii     i-  "-  j-iftu  li, 

''••«'<lbythe''vit-uLro''     vvr     n  '''"^'^^teness   is   pro- 

.)  vuaiioi.e    ,   while  Dewey  regards  theories  nnl 

loas  as  ,enu.ne  constructions  of  the  tlnnker  ■     P  S    on 

;"i  empty  sense  of  the  verb,"  2  we  must  obioPt  fho  I     T  ^^ 
much      Hp  ,.,>«.    •  .     I  object  that  he  clanns  too 

ts  nf  'r  •"  ""''''°''*  °^  ^h*'  ^'^«^'^'  proposition,  the  re- 

M.lt.  of  some  graftmK  oxperiments,  in  which  he  savs  thoro  u^ 
;;;.  ^ce  o,        t^  ,  influence  determining  th^^h::^^;:^^ 

;...;^rhp^^^^^^^ 

n'  iTof  H  "'""T"  ''  '^^"'"^  -^  «^  the  firtt    wo  cleavre-" 
"■^  of  the  egg  of  a  sea-urchin,  and  found  not  that  one-half 
•   an  eml,ryo  was  reared  out  of  the  surviving  eel     but  a  cm 

'.tte<l  that  the  range  of  possibilities  for  the  development  of  a 

11^':;"'''"™'" " '""'•  '"■•  -" '■"Ki" wai„„  L°  h?^ 

;  Hf         "  '."""■"""  °'  ""'■'="'"<'  fl"™li-"."  '  l.«  in  view  „^ 

,"  °    "'«,«"■'  J"«l  "tod.  ho  eannot  eoinhicinelv  arme  Tnr 

.1.0  u.«vo.al  exter„a,i,y  „,  Wologieal  rc.|a.io,«:  es^  iX.hat 

The  Siu)  liealium,  pp.  ,'i7S-Sn  .  r> 


r    - 


t.       : 


^imsumm^sc-Tiw^m^i^ 


300 


THE  PROBLEM  OP   KNOWLEDGE 


u 


n'! 


^ 


1 


;i  * 


of  the  whole  developing  organism  to  its  parts.     This  being  the 
case,  much  less  has  he  the  right  to  defend  the  universal  external- 
ity of  relations,  which  seems  to  be  the  desired  major  premise  for 
inferring  the  universal  externality  of  the  knowing  relation,  in 
the  sense  of  "the  complete  independence  of  all  things  thought 
of,"  '  or  otherwise  cognized.     All  that  is  really  shown  is  that 
monistic  realism  may  be  regarded,  a  priori,  as  conceivable, 
because  of  the  discovery  that  some  things  are  sometimes  inde- 
pendent of  some  of  the  relations  in  which  they  stand,  or  that 
some  relations  are  sometimes  external.     But  this  much,  the 
idealist  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding,  may  be  admitted  as 
a  part  of  common,  everyday  knowledge.     Moreover,  Pitkin 
incidentally  makes  the  same  damaging  admission  as  that  of 
Holt  and  Marvin  referred  to  above.     The  "  indiscernibility  of 
seeming  from  being,"  he  says,  is  to  be  attributed  to  the  relations 
in  which  they  stand.     In  one  set  of  relations  they  are  "indis- 
cernibles,"  while  in  other  relations  they  are  readily  distinguished 
from  each  other.^    Here  it  would  seem  that  the  neo-realist,  in 
his  anxiety  to  explain  the  possibility  of  error,  has  allowed  him- 
self to  admit  thai  a  mere  matter  of  relation  can  make  so  great 
a  difference  as  that  between  seeming  and  being.     Such  a  rela- 
tion is  surely  not  external ;    the  mere  difference  in  the  object 
between  seeming  and  not  seeming,  would  be  enough,  it  might 
be  argued,  if  we  were  very  exacting,  to  show  the  awareness- 
relation  between  subject  and  object  to  be  not  absolutely  external 
to  the  object;    but  the  difference  between  mere  seeming  and 
being  is  a  much  greater  difference,  a  difference  only  less,  so  far 
as  these  categories  are  concerned,  than  that  between  being  and 
not  seeming. 

Perry,  like  the  others,  argues  for  realism  by  defending,  as 
far  as  he  logically  can,  if  not  farther,  the  doctrine  of  the  ex- 
ternality of  relations.'  His  earlier  statement  of  the  theory  as 
the  doctrine  that  "terms  acquire  from  their  new  relations 
an  added  character,  which  does  not  either  condition  or  neces- 
sarily alter  the  character  which  they  already  possess,"  *  seems 

I  The  New  Realiam,  p.  380. 
t  V  ,  pp.  4fifi  ?. 

>  P,.sent  Philosophical  Tendencies,  pp.  319  f . ;   "A  Realistic  Theory  of  Inde- 
pendenre,"  in  The  New  Realism,  pp.  126-51. 
•  Present  Philosophical  Tendencies,  p.  319. 


mmi'..r'- 


NEO-REALISTIC    DOCTRINE   OP    RELATIONS      301 
to  dodge  the  main  point  of  dispute.     Of  course  a  i^rrr.      u 
latod,  but  tli„  qucst,„n  ,s  whether,  l»eausc  it  is  thus  related  7, 

::r.Xdi.ertt*Cs;::  r  il'.r  -  tv^'^ 

.he  tern.  „  does  not  derive^trL^l"    ZTmy'Zt^ri 
we  can  assent  we  must  know  what  is  meant      Ji:,':    """.*"' 

content  of  a  thing  is  never  made  up,  even  in  oart  of  ifc  .Jl        i 

vh'atlttr  ?tT  '"  ^■'•^'  ^"  '''^''''  ^^^"^^'  •"  o^dert'knot 
hast  of  ,  "  ''''  practically,  again  we  mus       y,  on  the 

basis  of  everyday  experience,  This  is  by  no  means  t. ,  ■ 

In  his  contribution  to  The  New  Realism,  however   Perrv  ha. 
done  much  to  clarify  the  situation  with  r^ferendt;  reLLn, 
He  sets  out  to  give  the  neo-realistic  theory  of  nderenderce    Tv 
independence  he  means  not  non-relation,  but  s^pt  nonif 
pendence.3    But  while  all  relation  is  not  deniecl,  certain  relations' 
are  declared  to  be  absent  when  one  entity  is  said  tn  hT  T 
pendent  of  another.    These  relations  a;e\Le    f  1^\  ntg 
and  being  contained,   causing  and  being  exclusively  caZ 
and  .mp,,,,         d  being  exclusively  implied.^     Whin  not  r^ 
lated  in  any  of  these  ways,  two  entities  are,  according  to  Perrv 
.ndependent  of  each  other.     This  would  seem  to  be  true  S 
mdependent  means  not  dependent  for  being  existent,  o    True 

•slviouTa?"  r ''"  ""^  ''^'^^"'^"^  ^^'-^^^  -^^fican^^ 
of  some  of  th  '.  ""  ?^^  "^'•'"  ^  ''^•^'^'^  ^  independent 
•L  tWs  i  t  h  f7%  •■'''"""''  ^^"^  '*  '-^  °ften  dependent  - 
and  this  IS  the  tact  ihut  is  damaging  to  the  theory  in  which 

1      7L  n.-> 


'  /6-,  p.  319. 
'lb.,  p.  117. 


■  I 


llh    |. 


•  lb.,  p.  320. 


'  The  Xew  Realism,  ;i    113 
•/6.,  pp.  113,  151. 


•■-'^T.* 


302 


THE   PROBLEM   OP   KNOWLEDGE 


11-^ 


■  « 


Perry  is  interested  —  upon  relations  not  included  in  the  above 
list. 

In  sumining  up  our  criticism  of  the  neo-realistic  doctrine  of 
relations,  then,  wo  may  say  that  while  the  new  reahsts  arc 
successful  in  showing  that  the  doctrine  that  .""  relations  are  al- 
ways internal  is  not  correct,  and  while  "  ce  thus  able  to 
undermine  one  of  the  stock  argunjem  .  i  idealism  (that 
drawn  from  the  alleged  internality,  to  any  term,  of  the  relation 
of  being  known),  they  are  not  able  to  show  that  all  relations  are 
always  external,  and  so  cannot  by  this  means  prove  the  realistic 
theory  of  knowledge.  At  most  they  can  show  that  the  known 
object  may  perhaps  in  son<e  cases  exist  independently,  and 
essentially  without  change  through  the  circumstance  of  its 
being  known.  Tint  even  so,  they  leave  the  whole  subject  in  a 
very  unsatisfactory  ^'ondition,  for  they  fail  to  mention  any 
adequate  criterion  bj  which  it  may  be  determined  whether  or 
not  a  particular  relation  is  or  is  not  in  any  case  external. 

We  now  pass  to  an  examination  of  the  neo-realistic  doctrine 
of  iiniversaLi.  At  this  point  the  approximation  of  the  new 
philosophy  to  Platonic  doctrine  has  been  remarked  by  many, 
and  is  acknowledged  by  the  realists  themselves.  Bertrand 
Russell,  in  treating  of  entities  which  have  "a  being  in  some  way 
different  from  that  of  physical  objects,  and  also  different  from 
that  of  minds  and  from  that  of  sense-data,"  acknowledges  that 
his  theory  is  "largely  Plato's,  with  merely  such  modifications 
as  time  has  shown  to  be  necessary."  •  Inasmuch  as  close  simi- 
larity to  Plato's  doctrine,  as  thoy  interpret  it,  is  also  claimed  by 
Alexander  ^  and  by  the  six  authors  of  The  New  Realism,  who 
assert  that  the  neo-realist  is  also  a  Platonic  realist,'  it  may  be 
well  to  refer  again  to  what  we  take  to  be  the  relation  between  the 
Platonic  and  the  neo-realistic  doctrines.  The  original  and 
fundamental  Platonism,  as  we  have  already  pointed  out,  was 
the  doctrine  that  the  true  nature  of  reality  is  to  be  found  in 
the  universal  or  logical  idea.  But,  as  we  have  seen,  by  a 
process  of  conversion,  fallacious  or  other,  supported  by  ab- 

'  Problems  of  Philosophy,  pp.  142-3. 

*Pro<:.  Arisiut.  Sac,  1909  10,  p.  Xi. 

'  The  \ew  Realism,  p.  35 ;  cf .  ai«)  MontaRUP,  Essays  .  .  .  in  Honor  of  Will- 
iam Jnmrt.  pp.  113-14;  Porry.  Journal  >,f  Philosophy,  VII,  1910,  p.  345; 
Marvin,  .4  First  Book  in  Metaphysics,  pp.  M»H  (T. 


i^3^-. 


JtiS^- 


isr. 


'%'''^^^yl§^^f^^.rwisrrf: 


NEO-REALISTIC  DOCTRINE  OP  RELATIONS      303 

stracting  from  the  abstractness  of  logical  idealism  and  thus  dis- 
guising it,  various  forms  of  logical  realism  were  evolved.  Plato 
himself,  as  we  have  seen,  predicated  some  sort,  or  sorts,  of  reality 
of  .some,  or  even  of  all,  universal  ideas ;  some  were  real  in  the 
eternal  world,  all  were  real  either  there  or  in  the  things  of  human 
experience.  But  that  the  essence  of  Platonism,  as  of  the  only 
sound  philosophy,  was  the  predicating  of  eternal  reality,  usually 
not  distinguished  from  existence,  of  all  universals,  was  main- 
tained by  the  mediaeval  Platonic  realists.  The  neo-realists, 
like  these  mediaeval  realists,  are  interested  in  maintaining 
the  full  "ontological  status,"  or  reality,  of  all  universals,  al- 
though with  some  individual  variations.  The  most  charac- 
teristic doctrine  is  that  which  has  been  developed  by  Bertrand 
Russell,  who,  influenced  by  his  mathematical  studies,  asserts 
the  reality  of  a  world  which  is  neither  mental  nor  physical, 
hut  made  up  of  those  entities  which  are  the  objects  of  a  priori 
knowledge.'  These  entities,  he  admits,  cannot  be  properly 
said  to  exist;  they  subsist,  rather,  i.e.  they  have  timeless  being 
in  the  unchangeable  world  of  universals,  with  which  the  mathe- 
matician and  the  logician  deal.  They  are  not  thoughts,  though 
when  known  they  are  the  objects  of  thought.'  Several  of  the 
American  realists  agree  with  Russell  in  thus  attributing  to 
universals  only  timeless  "subsistence,"  whereas  existence  in 
time  is  reserved  for  particulars,  whether  physical,  mental,  or 
neutral.'  Alexander,  however,  interprets  Plato  as  having 
taught  that  ideas  are  real  existences,  and  makes  bold  to  agree 

'  The  Problems  of  Philosophy,  pp.  139-40. 

'  lb.,  pp.  155-6.  In  a  disoussion  published  some  years  previously  (Mind, 
X.S.,  XIV,  1905,  V.  pp.  398,  399),  Russell  uses  the  term  "existenec"  with 
reference  to  the  entities  dealt  with  in  mat:  jmatics,  explaining,  however,  that 
thi.s  does  not  mean  existence  in  the  sense  in  which  it  is  used  in  philosophy  and 
in  common  life.  Rather  does  it  mean  reality  for  mathematics,  the  being  which 
all  classes  have,  whether  they  possess  any  members  or  not.  But  he  seems  to 
mean  something  rather  more  positive  than  the  mere  freedom  from  contradic- 
tion which  Poincar*  gives  as  the  moaning  of  mathematical  existence.  Like  the 
"Cantorians,"  Rus,sell  and  his  followers  seem  to  be,  in  their  doctrine  of  the 
ii'  itraet  entities  of  mathematics,  realists  (v.  Poincarfe,  Demiires  Pensiea,  pp.  146, 
1.  '-8). 

F- a  Holt.  Journal  of  Pkiloxopky.  VTI,  1010,  n,  .394;  T-V  AV;>-  H-ili^m, 
[ip.  3fir),  ,372;  The  Concept  of  Co"  'luaneas,  passim;  Spaulding,  Journal  of 
Philosophy,  VIII,  1911,  pp.  576-7.  .  j  New  Realism,  p.  180;  Marvin,  Perry, 
and  M'lntague,  loc.  cil. 


wear:  -  *^''±j^^- 


! 


1 


!'!;'■ 


t   i 


1:1 


. "(' 


:iil 


•II 


f  • 

;,i 

^1^ 

fi    i^■ 


:  f 


304 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   KNOWLEDGE 


with  him  when  so  interpreted,  adding  only  that  the  particulars 
of  sense  are  equally  existent,  equally  real.'  Pitkin  also  seems 
inclined  to  take  this  apparently  more  radical,  but  perhaps  more 
defensible,  position.^ 

It  must  not  be  supposed,  however,  that  the  neo-realists  have 
deliberately  set  themselves  to  revive  Platonism.  Their  doctrine 
is  to  be  explained  rather  as  the  product  of  the  neo-realistic 
doctrine  of  consciousness  (itself,  as  we  have  seen,  a  result  of 
the  neo-realistic  doctrine  of  secondary  as  well  as  primary  quali- 
ties), and  of  certain  suggestions  along  the  line  of  a  disguised 
logical  idealism  (which  amounts  almost  to  logical  realism), 
supported  by  and  even  derived  from  the  impression  made  by 
abstract  mathematical  studies,  such  as  have  been  pursued  by 
Russell.  The  latter  transition  we  have  already  referred  to.' 
In  elucidation  of  the  former,  we  may  say  that  it  seems  natural 
to  suppose  that  if  consciousness  is  a  mere  external  relation  in 
the  case  of  physical  objects,  it  cannot  well  be  more  in  the  case 
of  the  entities  with  which  mathematics  deals,  and  the  universal 
validity  of  the  propositions  of  pure  mathematics  is  readily  in- 
terpreted ontologically  as  meaning  an  eternal  reality  of  the 
"  universals  "  or  abstract  entities  with  which  it  is  concerned.  So 
long  ap  we  are  thinking  about  any  object  of  thought,  even  the 
unreal,  we  must  treat  it,  to  some  extent  and  momentarily,  as  if 
it  were  real ;   and  the  fallacy  of  substantiating  an  abstraction 

•  Proc.  Arislol.  Soc,  1909-10,  p.  .33.  Onp  is  tempted  *o  ask  why  Alexander, 
as  a  good  nicmbor  of  an  Aristotelian  Society,  did  not  take  his  departure  from 
Aristotle  rather  than  from  Plato.  He  would  then  have  confined  himself  to 
asserting  the  exi.^tenpe  of  universals  in  the  particulars.  But.  in  the  light  of  his 
representation  of  the  categories  as  fundamental  characters  of  things  (Mind, 
N  S.,  XXI,  1912,  p.  11),  one  may  conjecture  that  it  has  already  dawned  upon 
him  that  this  is  what  he  means.  McGilvary's  procedure  and  doctrine  seem  to 
be  more  Aristotelian.    See  Philosophical  Review,  XXI,  1912,  pp.  153  B. 

'"The  Empirical  Status  of  Geometrical  Entities,"  Journal  of  Philosophy, 
X,  1913,  pp.  393-403.  At  this  point  Morris  R.  Cohen  claims  to  find  himself  in 
agreement  with  the  neo-realists.  He  indorses  "a  realism  of  relations  or  uni- 
versals like  Plato's,"  which  he  not  very  accurately  takes  to  be  "  the  essence  of  the 
historic  form  of  idealism."  He  objects  to  the  distinction  here  between  existence 
and  subsistence,  and  would  accord  to  mathematical  entities  full  reality,  including 
causal  efficiency.  He  desiderates  "a  complete  theory  of  categories,  or  typn  of 
existence,  to  take  the  place  of  the  rather  inadequate  distinction  between  existence 
and  subsistence."  Journal  of  Philosophy,  X,  1913,  pp.  198-200,  209 ;  XI,  1914, 
pp.  626-7. 

'  Chs,  V  and  X.  supra. 


2...  -T 


-.r'^fTiV  -^■•'.i 


NEO-REALISTIC   DOCTRINE   OF   RELATIONS      305 

is  simply  a  special  case  of  doing  this,  and  forgetting  or  per- 
manently ignoring  the  nature  of  what  we  are  doing;  it  is,  as 
we  have  said  before,  abstracting  from  the  abstractness  of  the 
universal. 

The  results  are  in  some  instances  remarkable  enough.  Among 
the  many  creations  of  thought,  or  abstractions,  which  are  taken 
as  independently  real  are  Stout's  generalities,  alternative  possi- 
I)ilities,  non-being,  centaurs  and  other  fictions,'  Holt's  contra- 
dictions,* and  Russell's  abstract  relations,  or  universals  named 
by  verbs  and  prepositions.  For  example,  "  north  of,"  though  it 
does  not  exist  apart  from  its  terms  in  space  or  time,  is  regarded 
as  eternally  subsisting;  it  "belongs  to  the  independent  world 
which  thought  apprehends  but  does  not  create."'  Similarly, 
according  to  Russell,  an  infinite  aggregate,  in  spite  of  the  fact 
that  it  contradicts  the  principles  of  "mathematical  induction," 
on  which  all  our  arithmetical  operations  are  based,  must  be  ac- 
cepted as  real.*  These  entities  are  thought  of,  and  therefore,  it 
is  claimed,  they  are  not  thoughts,  but  objects  of  thought,  real 
independently  of  and  prior  to  thinking.*  It  'lught  not  to  be 
surprising,  then,  to  find  Rus.sell  reviving  the  old  doctrine  of 
Ileid  as  to  the  needlessness  of  ideas.  We  do  not  need  ideas, 
he  claims,  in  order  to  know,  even  otherwise  than  perceptually.* 

And  yet  Russell  has  felt  obliged  to  make  the  important  ad- 
mission that  "what  idealists  have  said  about  the  creative  ac- 

'  Proc.  Aristot.  Soc,  1910-1 1,  p.  187  ff.  "  Whatever  is  thought,  in  so  far  as  it 
is  thought,  is  therefore  real,"  p.  199.  CI.  Moutairue  :  "  If  consciousness  is  a  re- 
lation, objects  of  consciousness  must  bo  real  independently  of  their  standing  in 
that  relation."    Journal  of  Philosophy,  II,  1905,  p.  313. 

'  The  New  Realism,  pp.  482-3. 

'  Problems  of  Philosophy,  pp.  147,  152-6. 

*  Principles  of  Mathematics,  pp.  142-3,  260.  357,  368,  etc.  Russell,  by  his 
rejection  of  the  idea  of  possibility  as  an  ultimate  metaphysical  category  (Monist, 
XXIV,  1914,  p.  179),  makes  it  necessary  to  hold  to  the  actuality  of  the  infinite. 
\\  (■  would  maintain  that  the  only  infinite  is  unending  possibility,  given  unending 
time.  Russell  seems  to  have  ruled  this  out  unnecessarily,  inasmuch  as  he  holds 
to  the  reality  of  time. 

'  Problems  of  Philosophy,  pp.  155-6  ;  Principles  of  Mafematics,  p.  46.  Russell 
does  ;iot  mean  that  these  objects  of  thought  necessarily  exist  in  time,  but  only 
that  they  have  timeless  being. 

The  new  realism  here  goes  to  the  opposite  extreme  from  the  idealistic  argument 
fioni  the  egocentric  predicament,  in  which  it  is  assumed,  roughly  speaking,  that 
what  is  thought  of  depends  upon  thought  for  its  existence. 

•  Moniat,  XXIV,  1914,  p.  171. 


^... 


W\ 


i.j    1. 


r 


s   - 


.IF^lBafBS.^iyjIIC. 


306 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   KNOWLEDGE 


MS'' ■ ' 


■;j-t 


tivity  of  mind,  about  relations  bring  due  to  our  relating  synthe- 
sis, and  so  on,  soonis  to  bo  true  in  the  case  of  error."  '  But, 
apart  from  the  fact  that  it  seems  rather  paradoxical  to  regai  1  all 
correct  thought  as  absolutely  non-productivc',  and  erroneous 
thought  alone  as  productive,  it  seems  (juite  arbitrary  to  in'er- 
pret  so  differently  the  nature  of  mental  activities  that  differ  only 
in  what  is  beyond  them  altogether,  viz.  in  the  reality  existing 
prior  to  and  independently  of  them.  If  there  is  mental  pro- 
ductivity in  the  ca.se  of  error,  there  is  probably  mental  pro- 
ductivity in  other  cases  also.  And  if  so,  non-fictitious  universals 
can  be  adecjuately  interpreted  as  existing  independently,  in 
space  and  time,  in  particulars,  and  as  n^presented  by  ideas, 
which  are  products  of  mental  activity  and  exist  only  "in" 
and  for  consciousness,  while  fictitious  objects  (including,  we 
would  claim,  irrational  quantities  and  the  "infinite  aggregate") 
are  sufficiently  explained  as  existing  only  as  products  of  thought. 
The  realm  of  subsistence  is  not  required,  save  as  itself  a  con- 
venient fiction,  the  product,  fundamentally,  of  abstracting 
thought.2 

Before  summing  up  our  criticism  of  the  new  realism  we  must 
briefly  refer  to  its  treatment  of  the  prolilcm  of  valuer.  Here 
the  question  of  chief  interest  will  be  whether,  in  accordance 
with  the  view  that  consciousness  is  an  external  relation,  it  will 
be  maintained  that  value  is  independent  of  ( .  insciousness  of 
value.  That  it  is  thus  independent  is  stated  by  Moore  and 
Russell.  Moore  argues  that  goodness  is  a  quality  attaching 
to  things  independently  of  consciousness,'  and  Russell  makes 
the  general  statement  that  values  are  independent  of  consciou.s- 
ness."  This  view,  however,  while  it  is  the  logical  one  for  the 
neo-realist,  is  not  easily  tenable,  in  view  of  the  many  values  that 
seem  to  arise  and  fluctuate  and  disappear  according  to  the  con- 
scious attitude  of  the  individual  or  of  society  toward  the  objects 
concerned.  Four  of  the  neo-realists,  viz.  McGilvary,  Alexander, 
Montague,  and  Perry,  have  more  or  less  definitely  addressed 
them.selvcs  to  the  difficult  task  of  constructing  a  theory  of  values 
to  harmonize  with  the  facts  in  the  case,  and  also  with  the  doc- 


^  Monist.  XXIV.  19M,  p.  174. 

•  Principia  Ethica,  pp.  6,  137. 

♦  Philosophical  Esaays,  pp.  4-15. 


'-  CI.  pp.  Sl-S,  20i  -6,  231,  264-5.  tupra. 


W.  'iflKWBVJ 


/^, 


^ .:-.  3&", 


t~- 


NEO-REALISTIC    DOCTRINE   OF   RELATIONS      307 

trinos  of  neo-rcalism.     Lot  us  see  whether  or  not  they  have 
siicpcodod  in  their  undertaking. 

McOilvary's  treatniont  of  the  subject  is  rather  incidental, 
I>ut  his  expedient  is  to  define  value  as  a  relation  —  "a  certain 
specific  relation  between  the  valuable  thing  and  our  desires  and 
interests."  '  But  this  does  not  seem  to  be  true  to  the  facts. 
The  value  of  an  object  may  depend  upon  its  relation  to  some 
otlier  thiii.'^  o^  process,  but  it  is,  on  the  face  of  it,  a  quality  of 
that  object. 

Alexander,  it  would  almost  seem,  has  recognized  this;  at 
any  rate  he  makes  room  for  values  when  he  speaks  of  the  ap- 
pearance of  the  object  containing  elements  introduced  into  it 
l)y  the  mind.  These  elements,  it  would  appear,  need  not 
vitiate  the  appearance,  provided  they  are  not  unduly  personal ; 
l)ut,  having  been  made  qualities  of  the  object  in  its  appearance, 
they  are,  as  such,  non-mental.-  In  this  Alexander  is,  in  our 
opinion,  essentially  correct,  as  far  as  he  has  gone;  but  it  con- 
stitutes as  much  a  departure  from  the  essential  principles  of 
iieo-realism  as  do  \\  olf's  theory  of  hallucination  and  Russell's 
theory  of  error.  To  the  American  neo-realists,  moreover,  with 
their  rejection  of  the  idea  of  "mental  activity,"  Alexander's 
solution  of  the  problem  of  values  would  be  unthinkable. 

Montague  has  chosen,  as  lying  between  the  definite  concepts 
of  (luality  and  relation,  the  more  ambiguous  concept  of  status: 
value,  he  says,  is  the  status  acquired  by  any  object,  existent 
or  non-oxi>,.iit,  in  virtue  of  its  capacity  to  satisfy  an  interest. 
An  object  that  has  the  value-status  he  calls  a  valuc.^  Now  if 
we  use  the  term  "value,"  as  ^Montague  seems  to  do  here,  to 
mean  simply  an  independently  existing  object,  viewed  as  capable 
of  satisfying  an  interest,  it  becomes  possible  to  hold  that  this 
"value"  exists  independently  of  consciousness,  but  the  triumph 
is  merely  verbal.  No  provision  is  made  for  answering  the 
(luestion  as  to  whether  the  presence  of  the  valuing  consciousness, 
or  the  existence  of  the  interest,  is  essential  to  the  object  having 
this  value-status.  //  so,  a  quality  (for  that  is  what  "status" 
really  means)  of  the  object  depends  upon  its  relation  to  some- 

'  PhilosophicPl  Keview.  XX.  1911,  p.  162. 

»  Proc.  Aristot.  Soc,  1909-10,  p.  28. 

'  Philosophical  Review,  XXIII,  1914,  p.  185. 


•I 
iJ 


5    ' 


:;*®*!^.J 


308 


THE  PROBLEM   OF   KNOWLEDGE 


ii\ 


r'     '^ 


^1      ' 


1: 


■  1 

iff 


iK,  ■  i 


1 


'i 


thing  else  —  another  case  of  internality  of  relations  for  the  neo- 
rcalist  to  reckon  with.  //  not,  however,  one  would  have  to 
conclude  that  all  objects  have,  actually  and  permanently,  all 
the  values  that  they  could  ever  be  experienced  to  have  for  all 
possible  interests  and  consciousnesses,  including  many  which 
logically  contradict  and  cancel  each  other.  The  impossibility  of 
escaping  this  dilemma  seems  to  indicate  that  Montague  has 
not  succeeded  in  solving,  for  neo-rcalists,  the  problem  of  values. 
Perry  has  discussed  the  problem  very  elaborately.  His 
main  propositions  are  that  value  is  the  fulfilment  of  interest  • 
and  that  values  are  neither  dependent  upon  judgments  of  value 
not  independent  of  desire.-  Or,  drawing  this  last  distinction 
still  more  finely,  value  may  exist  without  being  known  or 
discovered,  if,  as  seems  to  be  the  case,  there  can  be  a  desire 
without  its  being  known  to  be  a  desire ; '  and  yet,  apart  from 
consciousness  (as  desire,  or  interest)  there  can  be  no  value.* 
These  distinctions  we  would  accept  as  largely  valid,  although  it 
gc  -  is  necessary,  further,  to  make  some  distinctions,  which  Perry 
d»  lot  make,  in  order  to  gain  for  the  distinctions  he  does  make 
the  measure  of  acceptance  they  deserve.  For  instance,  are  there 
not  some  values,  however  insignificant  and  arbitrary  they  may 
be,  that  depend  upon  explicit  awareness,  or  cognition,  for  their 
existence?  Again,  may  there  not  be  unconscious  teleological 
processes,  such  as  the  vital  processes,  by  virtue  of  which  certain 
objects  have  values  which  they  would  not  otherwise  possess? 
But  in  any  case  —  and  this  is  the  point  of  special  interest  here  — 
the  value  appears  as  a  quality  produced  in  an  object,  known  or 
unknown,  real  or  unreal,  bj'  a  teleological  process,  whether  of 
mere  thought,  or  of  mere  desire,  or  of  both,  or  conceivably  of 
neither.  But  this  is  virtually  to  agree  with  Alexander,  at  least 
to  the  extent  of  admitting  that  some  values  are  the  products  of 
consciousness,  and  this  seems  essentially  the  same  thing  as  to 
say  that  they  are,  to  some  extent,  the  products  of  mental  activity. 
Manifestly  the  raZue-producing  consciousness  is  no  purely 
external  relation. 


^ 


'  Journal  of  Philosophy,  XI,  1914,  pp.  15fr-8. 

'  The  Xvu-  Rvalixm,  pp.  liH  9 ;   Present  Philosophical  Tendencies,  p.  332. 

•  The  New  Realitm,  p.  141. 

*  Present  Philoaophical  Tendencies,  p.  332 ;   The  New  Realism,  p.  140. 


-ji)'''i'  ^^^i^.b'**-** 


NEO-REALISTIC   DOCTRINE  OP  RELATIONS      3(yj 

We  are  now  at  the  end  of  our  detailed  examination  of  the  new 
realism,  viewed  as  a  theory  of  knowledge.    The  result  of  our 
critique  seems  to  ho  that,  in  spite  of  valuable  elements  in  the 
(locirmo,  which  wi..  be  incorporated  in  our  constructive  view, 
ilmv  is  an  undue  dogmatism  with  reference  to  the  extent  to 
which  that  which  is  presented  to  knowledge  is  real  independently 
of  con^cicusness.     The  characteristic  of  dogmatism  is  frankly 
admitted  by  Marvin  ; '   but  his  plea  that  science  is  necessarily 
dogmatic  does  not  excuse  the  extent  to  which  the  new  philos- 
ophy carries  this  dogmatism.      The  physical  sciences  need  to 
assume  dogmatically  what,  as  we  would  undertake  to  show 
can  be  philosophically  vindicated ;    the  new  realism  a.s.serts  a 
larger  independent  content  (at  least  normal  secondary  qualities, 
and  in  some  cases  all  errors  and  contradictions  and  all  values) 
than  is  scientifically  necessarj-,  or  than  can  be  philosophically 
vindicated.     Ideally,    it   is   absolute   epistemological    monism 
denying  any  difference  between  the  object  as  presented  and  as 
independently  real  (except  that  the  independent  reality  includes 
more  than  is  actually  presented),  asserting  that  there  is  no  idea 
but  the  independent  thing  itself,  that  consciousness,  as  a  rela- 
tion, IS  absolutely  external,  or  that,  if  it  is  viewed  as  a  mental 
activity.  It  produces  nothing.     Just  because  it  is  not  absolutely 
dogmatic,  but  has  undertaken  to  be  critical,  it  has  had  to  con- 
tent Itself  in  every  case  (even  in  that  of  Russell;    note  his 
adiriKssion  with  reference  to  error)  with  affirming  something 
less  than  this  ideal ;  and  reasons  have  been  given  in  the  discus- 
sion for  believing  that,  in  spite  of  this  departure  from  their 
original  ideal,  what  is  still  affirmed  by  the  neo-reaUst  is  con- 
siderably more  than  is  warranted  on  critical  grounds.     It  may 
very  well  turn  out,  however,  that  what  the  neo-realists  have 
been  fundamentally  interested  in   maintaining,  viz.  the  fact 
of  immediate  awareness  of  independent  realitv  in  normal  human 
experience,  can  be  vindicated  on  adequately  critical  grounds 
It  may  be  that  we  shall  discover  that  for  the  experienced  object 
and  tho  independently  real  object  to  be  numerically  the  same. 
It  IS  not  necessarj'  that  they  be  qualitaiively,  even  in  normal 
perception,  absolutely  identical. 

^^  '  "Dogmatism  versus  Criticism."  Journal  of  PhUotophy.  IX,  1912.  pp.  309- 


m 


»  Ij 

if] 


lu 


m 


2." 


awer  MTrni* 


f 


«':■ 


*1i 


it: 


4.    CONSTRUCTIVE  STATEMENT 


CHAPTER  XIV 
Critical  Monism  in  Epistemolooy 


'' 

> '  ; 

1!' 

.'* 

»j  . 

I 


'll! 


i 

I 


«■ 


i! 


We  have  soon  reason  to  rojoct  absolute  dualism  and  an 
idealistic  al)soluto  monism  in  opistemology,  as  resting  upon  in- 
eorreot  analyses  and  fallacious  processes  of  reasoning,  with 
their  unsatisfactory  consequences,  apainst  which  the  former 
theory  strunKlos  in  vain,  while  the  latter  accepts  them  and  tries 
to  make  the  best  of  a  bad  situation.  On  the  other  hand  we 
have  not  found  ourselves  able  to  po  all  the  way  with  the  realistic 
absolute  monists,  because  of  their  dofimatizinR  beyond  what  is 
critically  justified  or  neces.sary,  and  also  because  of  the  many 
insoluble  difficulties  into  which  their  doctrine  leads  them.  We 
seem  driven  therefore  to  seek  another  point  of  view,  from  which 
wc  shall  be  able  to  avoid  tin  fallacies,  the  subjectivisms,  and 
abstractionisms  of  idealism  in  its  various  forms  and  the  fallacies 
and  final  agnosticism  of  dualism,  without  falling  into  the  un- 
warranted dogmatism  and  in.solubl(<  puzzles  ol  neo-realisra. 

The  critics  of  the  new  realism  have  scored  several  points  in 
their  attack  upon  the  neo-realislic  doctrines  of  illusion,  hallu- 
cination, and  error,  and  in  their  criticisms  of  the  view  that 
consciousness  is  an  absolutely  external  relation.  And  j-et  it  is 
not  so  clear,  l)y  any  means,  that  any  po.ssible  theory  within  the 
limits  of  the  accepted  definition  of  realistic  cpistemological 
monism  has  thereby  been  shown,  as  one  of  the  most  successful 
of  these  critics  has  claimed,  to  be  "inadmissible.'  '  What  we 
are  to  defend  here  might  perhaps  be  called  epistemological 
monism  nd  critical  realism  (critical  realistic  epistemological 
monisn.  as  opposed  to  the  epistemological  monism  and  dog- 
matic realism  (realistic  absolute  eijistemological  monism) 
of  the  typical  neo-realist.  By  this  is  meant  the  doctrine  that 
the  object  perceived  is  existentially,  or  numerically,  identical 

'  A.  O.  Lovejoy,  Journal  <>!  Philosophy,  X,  1913,  p.  43. 


\i  I 


CRITICAL  MONISM    IN    EPIS1  KMOLOOV  311 

with  flio  real  ohj«^rt  at  tho  moment  of  porooption,  althouRh 
the  real  ol)jfot  may  liavc  f|ualiti(>s  tliat  an'  not  porccivod  at 
that  moment;  and  also  that  this  same  object  may  exist  when 
Miipereeived,  although  not  necessarily  with  nil  the  qualities  uhich 
It  possesses  ivhcn  perceived.  Other  appropriate  but  simpler 
(iesiKnations  for  this  position  are  critical  realistic  monism, 
critical  epistemoloKical  monism,  and  critical  monism  in  epistc- 
luoloKy. 

It  is  important  to  note  at  the  outset  that  there  is  no  necessary 
contradiction  lutwed,  Lovejoy's  statement'  that  there  is 
tmdiate  and  yet  valid  kiiowIedRe  anil  Perry's  contention «  that 
there  cannot  b(>  knowK-dKc  at  ail  unless  there  is  immediate 
knouledKc  of  reahty.  May  it  not  be  that  there  is  mediate 
kiu.wlcdir,.,  because,  and  only  because,  there  is  first  innnedi- 
ate  knm  !•(!«(>?  If,  as  we  shall  ,  ntain,  this  much  of  the  neo- 
rcalist's  thesis  is  d(f(.iisil)lo,  thi  .  rdinary  perception  there 

IS  immediate  knowledge  of  reality  rvuich  is  not  dependent  for 
its  existence  upon  its  beinK  perceived,  it  may  also  be  said,  in 
tlie  lijiht  of  exp(>riencc,  that  we  often  have  repeated  immediate 
kiiowIedKc  of  repeat  H,  essentially  i<ientical,  independent  pro- 
cesses.    Indeeil,  in  countless  instances  we  come  to  be  able  to 
prc.hct  the  lat(-r  stages  of  a  process  of  which  we  have,  in  this 
particular  instance  of  its  occurrence,  immediately  experienced 
only  the  bcKinnins.     Again,  we  are  often  practically  certain 
that  a  process  of  which  we  have  immediately  experienced  only 
the  beginning  and  the  end  has  been  essentially  identical  with 
what  at  other  times  we  have  had  under  our  immediate  observa- 
( ion  throughout  its  entire  course.     If,  then,  w(>  define  knowledge 
a.s  certainty  of  tlie  nature  of  reality,  either  in  its  immediate 
givenness  or  in  true  judgments,'  sufficient  for  all  proper  practical 
purpo.ses,  it  will  be  readily  apparent  that  if  there  is  immediate 
knowledge  of  independent  reality  in  normal  perception,  there 
may  also  be  mediate  knowledge  of  independent  reality  through 
tho  processes  of  thought,  and  that  the  immediate  knowledge 
has  made  the  mediate  knowledge  possible. 

^Journal  of  Philosophy,  IX.  1912.  pp.  681-4;   X.  1«1.3   pp   .5«l-72 
«  /6..  V  i,  1909.  pp.  29  ff..  169  Ef. ;  VII,  1910,  pp.  342-3 ;  Present  PkUotophical 
reiuienciea,  1912,  pp.  311-13. 

'  For  definition  of  truth,  see  Ch.  XIX,  in/m 


-il 


1!l 


312 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  KNOWLEDGE 


iti 


tr  h- 


I: 


Immodiatc  knowledge  of  independent  reality,  then,  would 
make  mediate  knowledge  of  the  same  also  possible ;  and  it 
does  not  appear  what  else  could  do  it.  Hence  it  would  seem 
as  though,  unless  realistic  epistemological  monism  can  he 
established  as  a  tenable  theory,  we  should  have  to  face  the 
ililemma  of  absolute  solipsism  or  absolute  agnosticism.  Idealis- 
tic epistemological  tnonism,  at  least  in  any  form  that  avoids 
abstractionism,  cannot  logically  escape  solip.sism.  Realistic 
epistemological  dualism  cannot  logically  escape  agnosticism. 
Realistic  epistemological  monism  would  logically  escape  both. 
We  must  therefore  raise  the  question.  Is  immediate  knowledge 
of  independent  reality  in  perception  possible  ? 

This  question,  in  the  light  of  the  hypothesis  which  it  shall  be 
our  present  task  to  develop,  we  would  answer  in  the  affirmative. 
The  epistemological  dualist  maintains  that  what  we  perceive 
is  existentially  and  in  part  qualitatively  distinct  from  the  in- 
dependently existing  subject ;  it  is  a  second  object,  at  best  only 
somewhat  similar  to  the  first.  The  typical  neo-realist  tries 
to  hold  that  what  we  perceive  is  (  \istcntially  identical  with 
the  iiuUi>endent  reality,  arul  al-  lualitatively  identical,  to  the 
full  extent  of  the  perceptu  li  content;  it  is  not  a  second  and 
perhaps  somewhat  similar  object,  but  the  very  same  object, 
with  no  additional  qualities  due  to  its  being  perceived.  A 
critical  realistic  monism  would  combine  the  partial  truths  of 
both  antithetical  positions.  Bearing  in  mind  that  in  the  self- 
identity,  for  us,  of  physical  objects  at  different  times  and  in 
spite  of  cortflin  changes,  there  is  a  subjective  factor  (our  pur- 
pose) and  an  objective  factor  {e.g.  continuity  of  physical  energy 
and  of  certain  teleological  functions  other  than  our  own), 
we  would  maintain  with  the  neo-realist  that  ichat  we  perceive  is 
existentially  identical  with  the  independent  reality,  and  with  the 
epistemological  dualist  we  would  say  that  it  has,  when  being  per- 
ceived, certain  qualities  —  notably  the  sense-qualities  —  which 
it  does  not  po.<isess  when  not  perceived. 

In  order  to  lx>  able  to  maintain  this  position  it  is  simply  neces- 
sary to  apply  to  sensation  the  view  of  consciousness  which 
Bergson  applies  in  his  doctrine  of  memory.  In  pa.ssing  from 
perception  to  nieuiory,  according  to  Bergson,  we  definitely 
abandon  matter  for  spirit ;  memory,  importing,  as  it  were,  the 


■:*a'.'»=Tms 


CRITICAL  MONISM  IN  EPISTEMOLOGY  313 

past  into  the  present,  bringing  into  tho  present  experience  what 
would  not  otherwise  be  there,  is  a  creative  activity  of  spirit ' 
Bergson's  description  is  too  much  in  terms  of  psychological 
ideahsm ;    memory  does  not  really  import  the  past  into  the 
present,  but  creates  representational  elements  in  the  content 
of  the  present  experience  which  stand  for  past  sense-elements- 
but  even  when  thus  translated  into  realistic  terms,  the  con- 
cept  of  creative  activity  still  remains  valid.     But  what  we  are 
concerned  to  maintain  here  is  that  in  sensation,  as  truly  as  in 
memory,  there  is  a  creative  activity  of  spirit  —  or  of  whatever 
we  may  choose  to  call  the  psychical  subject.     Upon  occasion  of 
certam  stimulations,  sense-qualities  —  particular  colors,  sounds 
odors,  tastes,  and  the  like  —  are  creatively  produced  by  each 
psychical  subject  for  itself,  and  in  many  cases  located  with 
more  or  less  accuracy  in  or  upon  the  very  object  in  the  environ- 
ment from  which  the  stimulation  proceeded.     It  is  a  case  of 
coordination  of  activities,  in  the  first  instance  those  of  objects 
of  the  environment  with  those  of  nervous  centres  involved  in  the 
not  purely  passive  process  of  being  stimulated,  and  ultimately 
of  such  environmental  processes  as  radiation  with  such  psychical 
activities  as  are  involved  in  the  production  of  the  various 
color-qualities  of  objects.     The  theory  is  not  identical  with 
projectionism  and   Lotze's   "local  sign"   theory;    the  sense- 
qualities  are  not  first  "in  the  mind,"  or  intraorganic,  and  then 
' projected";   they  are  created,  in  each  case  of  sensing,  in  the 
particular  location  in  which  they  are  found.     Sometimes  the 
ciuahties  produced  are  not  placed  accurately  upon  the  object 
from  which  the  stimulation  first  proceeded.     This  is  especially 
the  case  with  heavenly  bodies,  whase  visual  qualities  are  placed 
not  only  in  the  line  of  the  direction  of  (h"  rays  as  they  enter  the 
oyo,  but  at  no  very  great  distance  from  the  ob.scrver,  just  a 
little  beyond  human  reach  from  the  highest  trees  or  buildings 
or  mountains.     This  is  doubtless  because,  in  the  history  of  the 
race  and  the  individual,  it  has  worked  just  as  well  to  have  visual 
qualities  thus  placed,  as  it  would  have,  had  they  been  more 
accurately  located.     This  extension  of  the  activistic  interpre- 
tation of  consciousness  in  ,«-nsation  as  well  as  to  memory  and 
the  higher  thought -processes  would  at  lea.st  have  the  merit  of 

'  Matter  and  Memory,  Kag.  Tr.,  pp.  80,  313. 


'-I  i 


^ff<?w:^' '  ^"^wsa. 


^Sl^aae'^•s^ 


314 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   KNOWLEDGE 


.lit. 


y[-M'i  I 


41 


N  ^ 


getting  rid  of  Bergson's  paradoxical  identification  of  pure  per- 
ception with  matter ;  the  colors  and  other  components  of  what 
Bergson  calls  "images"  arc  not  ultimate  data,  but  products  of 
subjective  activity.  It  may  be  objected  that  such  creative 
sense-activity  is  mysterious,  and  so  it  is ;  but  no  philosopher  will 
ever  'cceed  in  driving  mystery  out  of  the  processes  of  life  and 
consciousness,  or  from  any  other  phase  of  real  existence;  the 
best  we  can  hope  to  do  is  to  get  the  mystery  properly  cornered, 
correctly  located.  This  mystery  of  creative  psychical  activity  is 
simply  a  special  instance  of  the  universal  mystery  of  being,  and 
especially  of  becoming.  With  Walter  Pater  '  we  may  say  that 
"color  is  a  spirit  upon  things,  by  which  they  become  expressive 
to  the  spirit";  it  is  at  any  rate  the  created  product  of  spirit, 
if  the  sensing  subject  is  spirit. 

But  it  may  also  be  said  that  we  have  here  what  looks  like  a 
solution  of  the  problem  of  the  nature  of  consciousness.  For 
some  time,  as  we  have  seen,  this  ha.s  been  one  of  the  most 
troublesouK-  of  our  philosophical  problems  —  especially  to  the 
neo-realist.-j.  It  had  long  been  a  commonplace  among  philos- 
ophers that  the  one  impregnable  foundation  for  philosophical 
construction  was  the  proposition, "  Consciousness  is."  But  when 
the  question  was  raised.  If  it  is  so  cert  in  that  consciousness  is, 
just  tvhat  is  it?  the  answer  was  not  readily  forthcoming.  As  has 
been  indicated  in  our  study  of  the  new  realism,  many  of  the 
recent  replies  to  the  question  may  be  viewed  as  constituting  a 
dialectical  progress  of  thought  from  the  concept  of  consciousness 
as  an  existent  entity,  or  quality,  to  the  concept  of  consciousness 
as  behavior,  or  activity.  The  movement  of  thought  in  th( 
American  neo-realism,  however,  can  scarcely  be  called  a  typical 
synthetic  dialectic ;  the  earlier  thesis  is  not  included  in  the 
later,  but  excluded  from  it.  Consciousness  cannot  be  a  quality 
of  things,  it  is  claimed,  because  it  is  not  empirically  discoverable 
as  such  ;  therefore  it  must  be  a  relation  between  objects.  But 
since  it  is  so  difficult  to  determine  just  what  relation  between 
objects  consciousness  can  be,  the  suggestion  is  put  forward  by 
some  that  it  is  a  special  kind  of  activity  of  the  body  or  nervous 
S5-stem  as  subject  upon  the  environment  as  object.  Our 
reasons  for  r'^jecting  these  successive  "solutions"  of  the  prob- 

'  Quoted  by  B.  Bosanquet,  The  Principle  of  Individuality  and  Value,  p.  63. 


[t    ■?: 


P    |( 


CRITICAL  MONISM  IN  EPISTEMOLOGY  315 

1cm  have  been  set  forth  above;    but  in  connection  with  oiir 
present  constructive  attempt  the  general  movement  toward  an 
interpretation  of  consciousness  in  terms  of  activity  is  significant. 
The  movement  of  thought  among  the  English  neo-realists, 
although  it  has  concerned  itself  less,  perhaps,  with  the  question 
as  to  the  nature  of  consciousness,  than  has  that  of  the  Ameri- 
can school,  has  come  nearer  to  a  satisfactory  solution  of  the 
problem.     They  have  avoided  the  handicap  of  virtually  assuming 
that  there  can  be  none  but  physical  existences,  and  the  dialecti- 
cal movement  discoverable  in  their  thinking  has  consequently 
been  more  genuinely  synthetic.     Consciousness,  it  is  from  the 
first  maintained,  is  a  quaUty  of  the  psychical  subject,  rather 
than  of  the  physical  object.     But  it  is  soon  discovered  that 
consciousness  cannot  be  a  quality  of  the  subject,  unless  it  is 
also  a  relation  between  the  subject  and  .  le  object ;  and  further, 
that  it  cannot  be  a  relation  between  subject  and  object,  unless 
it  is  at  the  same  time  an  activity  of  the  subject  upon  the  object. 
Thus  far  we  can  agree.     But  the  English  realists  seem  to  be  at 
a  loss  when  they  attempt  to  state  the  nature  of  this  activity. 
Moore  and  Alexander,  as  we  have  seen,  cover  their  failure  with 
the  seemingly  unintelligible,  because  self-contradictory,  notion 
of  a  diaphanous  activity,  an  activity  in  which,  apparently, 
nothing  is  produced.     Wolf  is  to  be  credited  with  having  had 
the  courage  to  depart  far  chough  from  the  beaten  track  of  the 
noo-realists  to  maintain  that,  in  the  case  of  hallucination  and 
illusion,   consciousness  is  a   productive  activity.     But  since, 
as  has  been  shown  above,  in  making  the  sensing  process  radi- 
cally different,  psychologically,  in  normal  and  abnormal  per- 
ception, in  order  to  explain  its  different  logical  value  in  the  two 
cases,  Wolf's  doctrine  runs  counter  to  well-known  psychological 
facts,  his  position  is  one  of  unstable  equiUbrium,  and  as  such, 
untenable.     What  we  here  suggest  is  that  it  is  possible  to  inter- 
pret consciousness,  in  sensation  everywhere  and  always,  as  well 
as  in  its  other  forms,  as  being  a  productive  activity,  and  that  of  a 
unique  — but  not  indefinable  —  sort.     The  psychical  subject, 
which  we  may  consent  with  W.  McDougall  >  to  call  once  more 
the  soul,  creatively  produces  — each  individual  for  itself  alone, 
and  on  condition   of  certain   stimulations  —  all   the  various 

»  Body  and  Mind,  1911,  paasim. 


■  I  ■ 

1:1 

4J,! 


■»cri.  .#s 


taas&ki 


316 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  KNOWLEDGE 


sense-olements  which  it  is  able  to  discover  in  the  surrounding 
world  of  physical  objects.  Something  like  this  seems  to  be 
McDoupali's  view,  although  he  has  not  developed  it  in  his 
published  works  to  any  great  extent.  Moreover,  he  does  not 
seem  to  have  discovered  a  way  of  combining  this  activistic  in- 
terpretation of  consciousness  with  an  epistemologically  monistic 
realism. 

Let  it  not  be  objected  that  in  making  use  of  the  idea  of  creation 
we  are  reverting  to  a  discredited  concept.  It  is  this  idea  of 
real  productivity  which  is  the  original  meaning  of  causality. 
The  real  cause  is  not  a  mere  "unconditional,  invariable  ante- 
cedent," which  does  nothing  to  anything,  but  which  is  mys- 
teriously followed  by  a  mere  "consequent,"  similarly  inert. 
That,  as  was  noted  above,  is  simply  what  causality  would  be, 
if  a  psyc'.iological  idealism  or  phenomenalism,  of  the  type  held 
by  Mil'  and  others,  were  true.  Causation,  on  the  contrary, 
is  productive  activity. i  The  regularly  antecedent  event  merely 
gives  a  clew  to  the  real  cause,  although  for  some  practical 
purposes  it  may  be  treated  as  if  it  were  itself  the  cause.  As 
Reid  long  ago  pointed  out,  it  is  not  the  cause,  but  a  "sign"  of 
the  cause.'  The  cause  is  something  which  does  something  to 
something  else,  and  what  it  does,  "the  difTerence  it  makes," 
what  it  creatively  produces,  is  the  effect.  This  whole  point  of 
view,  applied,  as  has  here  been  done,  to  the  psychical  causes, 
may  be  called  activistic  realism. 

This  conception  of  consciousness  as  a  uniquo  productive  or 
creative  activity  of  a  non-physical  subject  (an  activity  further 
definable  in  terms  of  its  products)  is  by  no  means  so  strange  to 
philosophical  ways  oi  thinking  as  some  might  be  led  by  recent 

'  A  correspondent,  referring  to  the  view  presented  in  this  chapter,  writes  : 
"Your  theory.  .  .  meets  the  facts,  solves  the  puizles  — those  of  an  empirical 
order.  Your  hypothesis  would  do  everything  — so  it  strikes  me  on  a  first  reading. 
It  IS  as  to  the  admissibility  of  the  hypothesis  that  my  difficulties  arise."  He 
then  goes  on  to  suggest  that  the  hypothesis  be  criticised  from  the  Humian  point 
of  view.  Now  I  would  readily  admit  that,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  Humian 
or  any  other  thoroughgoing  phenomenalism,  the  hypothesis  of  creative  causality 
18  inadmissible.  But  what  if  all  such  pure  phenomenalism  is  itself  unnecessary, 
essentially  fallacious,  and  therefore  inadmissible  7  Indeed,  if  it  were  true  that 
only  from  nnnther  LH)int  of  view  rn„i.-l  „„  hypothesis  K-  framed  which  T.ouId 
•'meet  the  facts,  solve  the  puziles,"  would  not  this  circumstance  in  itself  be  very 
good  evKl.nce  of  the  essential  correctness  of  that  other  poin,,  of  view T 

*Colhcted  Writings,  p.  122a. 


CRITICAL  MONISM  IN  EPISTEMOLOGY  317 

discussions  to  imagine.    The  idea  of  teleological  and  quasi- 
telcological  united  with  efficient  causality  has  been  familiar 
over  smce  Anstotlo  piomulgated  his  doctrine  of  "entelechy  " 
and  recently  it  has  been  impressivoly  set  forth  by  Driesch  and 
other  vitahsts,  as  well  as  by  Bergson.     The  earlier  attempts  of 
such  philosophers  as  Schelling  and  Fechner  to  construe  the 
universe  ultimately  in  terms  of  organism  rather  than  mechanism 
point  in  the  same  general  direction.     Indeed,  it  is  worth  noting 
that  opposite  aspects  of  activistic  realism  one-sidedly  developed 
are  even  to  be  found  on  the  one  hand  in  Locke's  doctrine  of  the 
activity  m  sensation  of  external  things  only,  and  on  the  other 
hand  in  Leibniz's  doctrine  of  force  acting  only  immanently. 
1  he  synthetic  activity  of  thought  was  not  only  sufficiently 
emphasized,  but  given  a  somewhat  mistaken  and  exaggerated 
apphcation  by  Kant,  and  still  more  by  his  neo-Kantian  succes- 
sors, T.  H.  Green,  H.  Cohen,  Howison,  and  others.     In  the 
systems  of  Fichte,  Herbart,  Schopenhauer,  and  Lotze,  not  to 
mention  Hegel,  the  concept  of  psychical  activity  figures  variously 
but  in  all  cases  largely.     The  reconstructive  function  exercised 
by  means  of  ideas  in  judgment  has  been  rather  more  than  ade- 
(luately  emphasized  by  Dewey  and  his  followers.     In  psychology 
vindications  of  the  reality  of  interaction  (Ladd,  McDougall) 
and  of  mental  activity  (Wundt,  Paulhan,i  Angell)  have  a  large 
and  respectable  place.     Woodworth's  new  theory  of  "  perceptual 
reaction"  also  has  some  very  important  points  of  contact  with 
the  view  advocated  here,  and  it  would  almost  seem  as  if  his 
next  step  might  well  be  the  adoption  of  an  activistic  interpre- 
tation   of    sensation."    Moreover,    the    concept    of    creation 
has  been  reintroduced  into  philosophy  by  Renouvier,  while  es- 
sentially activistic  interpretations  of  "free  will"  have  been  ably 
defended  in  recent  years  by  William  James,    Eucken,  Boyce 
f  Jibson,  F.  C.  S.  Schiller,  Boutroux,  and  Bergson.     Indeed  even 
Ostwald's  "energetics,"  while  not  in  itself  an  expression  of  ac- 
tivistic philosophy,  in  its  interpretation  of  the  ultimate  nature  of 
matter  brings  important  grist  to  the  activistic  mill. 

The  argument  for  .  i  activistic  view  derivable  from  human 
freedom  is  worth  elaborating.     It  is  a  very  real  motive  for 

'  L'activM  rrunlaU  rt  les  mmeuh  de  I'eaprit,  2d  vd.,  1913. 

* Psucholoffical  Rerii-u;  XXII.  1915.  pp.  1-27.     See  p.  272.  supra. 


lit, , 


iiih 


4^ 
m 


ill 


V 

■ill 


fVB^ 


'1 

9 

1* 

TV    * 

k 

Wi 

■f' 

■ » 

'  ■' 

15 


■1 


.  :• 

,  .1 

1  U 

1   !    ■ 

Ml 

U.I 

1              '^ 

*;*  f 

1.! 

1 

*   1  '  * 

Of  1 

jfc 

,'1 

>  1 

.      ^ 

|- 

i? 

II- 


I. (I 


'VI 


318 


THE  PROBLEM  CF  KNOWLEDGE 


adopting  the  category  of  creative  caasaJif>,  and  one,  we  would 
contend,  which  is  not  without  logical  vf..uc  i.;  a  final  synthesis, 
that  without  the  employment  of  this  category  every  act  of 
man's  life  would  have  to  be  traced  back  indefinitely  beyond 
the  beginning  of  that  life  for  t  /cry  factor  in  its  causal  explana- 
tion. The  man  himself  could  not  be  regarded  as  the  ultimate 
cause  of  anything;  and  so  he  would  be  logically  justified  in 
repudiating  all  responsibility  for  his  acts.  But  in  view  of  our 
intuitive  and  practical  certainty  that  we  are  not  morally  justi- 
fied in  repudiating  all  moral  responsibility,  we  must  adhere  to 
its  logical  implicate,  viz.  some  measure  of  ultimate  origination 
on  man's  part.  But  if  it  has  been  rendered  practically  certain 
that  there  is  such  a  process  as  creative  activity,  it  does  not 
necessarily  involve  a  violation  of  the  principle  of  parsimony  to 
suppose  that  it  is  present  in  certain  other  processes  also.  In- 
deed, in  varying  degrees  and  forms  may  it  not  be  present  in 
every  instance  of  becoming? 

The  activistic  view  of  consciousness  has  the  further  merit 
of  furnishing  the  solution  of  several  old  puzzles.  For  instance. 
It  enables  us  to  define  psychology,  giving  to  it  a  subject-matter 
distinct  from  that  of  any  other  science.  Psychology  is  the 
science  which  undertakes  to  study  the  psychical  subject  (soul, 
or  mind)  in  the  light  of  what  it  does.  It  is  descriptive  of 
psychical  activities.  It  is  not  concerned  with  the  sensible 
qualities  of  objects,  as  such,  but  with  jonse-quaUties  simply 
as  products  of  psychical  activity.  But,  besides  sensing,  it  under- 
takes to  describe  apperceiving,  remembering,  imagining,  con- 
ceiving, judging,  reasoning,  feeling,  willing  —  in  short,  all  the 
activities  of  the  psychical  subject.  Even  the  troublesome  prob- 
lem as  to  the  "subconscious"  becomes,  from  this  point  of 
view,  a  little  less  troublesome.  It  is  at  least  conceivable  that 
there  should  be  genuinely  psychical  activities,  of  which  the 
products  are  at  first  dissociated  so  completely  from  the  prod- 
ucts of  other  and  possibly  simultaneous  psychical  activities, 
that  the  subject  may  not  be,  in  these  latter  activities,  aware 
of  the  former,  or  of  their  products ;  and  also  that  when  some  of 
the  later  after-effects  of  these  "subconscious"  activities  should 
come  to  be  associated  with  the  contents  of  the  ordinary  "stream 
of  consciousness,"  it  may  be    without    any  memory  of   the 


' 


CRITICAL  MONISM   IN  EPISTEMOLOGY  319 

earlier  activities  of  which  they  are  the  consequence.  Psy- 
chology  thus  becomes  —  pace  William  James  and  the  now  old 
"new  psychology  "  —  the  science  of  the  soul.  It  studies  the 
psychical  subject  not  apart  from,  but  in,  its  activities,  and  these 
m  the  complex  of  their  products  (sense-qualities,  ideas,  bodily 
movements,  etc.). 

The  reason  why  sensing  has  been  so  uniformly  omitted  from  the 
recognized  list  of  psychical  activities  is  probably  that  it  is  rela- 
tirely  static,  as  compared  with  the  various  "thinking"  activities 
Sensing  is  to  other  psychical  activities  as  the  motion  of  the  earth 
IS  to  the  motions  of  objects  on  or  near  the  surface  of  the  earth 
For  ordinary  purposes  it  is  not  necessary  to  attend  to  the  mo- 
tion of  the  earth,  or  to  the  psychical  activity  of  sensing ;  with  the 
result  that  we  ordinarily  take  them  as  static.  In  the  light  of 
this  one  easily  understands  how  it  is  that  G.  E.  Moore,  although 
in  his  paper  on  "The  Subject-Matter  of  Psychology"  •  he  moved 
a  certain  distance  in  this  direction,  was  prevented  from  reaching 
a  unitary  point  of  view,  according  to  which  "acts  of  conscious- 
ness" may  be  viewed  as  constituting  the  entire  subject-matter  of 
psychology.  He  was  prevented  from  attaining  to  this  result  by 
his  rejection  of  the  idea  that  the  psychical  subject  can  give 
properties  to  things.* 

It  is  very  much  the  point  of  view  advocated  here,  however, 
that  we  find  expressed  toward  the  end  of  McDougall's  Body 
and  Mind}  It  is  true  that  in  his  later  work,  Psychology,  the 
Styuiy  of  Behavior,  he  advocates  an  extension  of  the  signification 
of  psychology,  such  as  would  make  it  include  not  only  the  study 
of  these  psychical  activities,  but  also  the  correlated  processes  of 
physiological  "behavior."  Angell,  among  other  reasonably 
(•onservative  psychologists,  inclines  to  a  similar  view.  But  this 
IS  no  violation  of  what  we  have  set  forth  as  the  nature  of  psy- 
cliology  m  the  strict  senst  of  the  term.  For  various  good  and 
sufficient  practical  reasons  it  may  have  become  expedient  to  use 
(he  term  "  psychology  "  to  include,  besides  psychologv  in  the 
proper  and  narrower  sense  of  the  term,  the  scientific  study  of 
the  "behavior"  of  organisms. 

'  Proc.  Aristoi.  Soc.,  1909-10,  pp.  36-62 

•  lb.,  190.-J-4,  p.  135. 

»  Pp.  364-5.  quoted  in  Ch.  XII,  supra. 


320 


THE  PROBLEM   OP   KNOWLEDGE 


.  f; 


>.  * 


I 


I       ^, 


fj 


But  the  theory  of  consciousness  which  we  have  j^lvanced 
must  be  judged  very  largely  by  its  serviceability  in  clearing  up 
the  philosophical  puzzles  thr*  have  been  associated  with  such 
phenomena  as  after-images,  hallucination,  illusion,  color- 
blindness, etc.  Positive  after-images  are  creatively  produced 
on  occasion  of  the  continuation,  for  a  brief  period  after  the 
extra-organic  stimulation  has  ceased,  of  the  same  sort  of  intra- 
organic stimulation  as  was  dominated  by  the  extra-organic 
stinmlus.  Negative  after-images  are  creatively  produced  on 
occasion  of  the  stimulation  from  certain  areas  in  the  sense-organ 
(which  are  coordinated  with  those  stimulated  extra-organically) 
finally  becoming  stronger  than  that  continuing  to  come  from  the 
relatively  exhausted  areas  originally  stimulated.  The  effects 
of  color-contrast  arc  qualities  of  the  object  creatively  produced 
by  the  psychical  subject,  on  occasion  of  the  spreading  of  stimu- 
lation from  the  physiological  units  originally  active  to  others, 
presumably  either  in  their  proximity,  or  with  which  these  partic- 
ular psychical  activities  are  coiirdinated,  or  both.  Dewey's 
reconstruction  of  the  "reflex  arc"  concept'  is  carried  still 
further.  There  is  a  coordination,  successively,  of  a  series  of 
pairs  of  coordinated  physiological  and  psychical  activities.  In 
some  of  these  {)airs  the  physiological  is  more  prominent;  in 
others,  the  psycliical.  The  simultaneous  coordination  vindi- 
cates the  partial  truth  of  parallelism;  but  the  coordination, 
both  simultanoi  is  and  successive,  is  explained  only  by  the 
hypothesis  of  interaction,  at  least  originally,  not  between  the 
coordinated  events,  but  in  all  cases  between  relatively  inde- 
pendent beings,  physical  and  psychical,  some  of  which  are  beings 
within  other  beings  {e.g.  organisms).  The  phenomenon  of 
color-bUndntss  is  due  to  a  lack  of  inheritance  of  the  capacity 
for  certain  psychical  activities.  This  incapacity,  of  course,  is 
physiologically  conditioned.  In  short,  the  whole  process  of 
sensing,  i.e.  of  creatively  producing  certain  sense-qualities  in 
objects  of  the  environment  on  occasion  of  certain  kinds  of  stimu- 
lation, is  to  be  viewed  as  the  inherited  result  of  what  was  first 
achieved  in  the  lower  animals  from  which  the  human  race  has 
ascended.     Moreover,   this    consideration   throws    some    light 

'  "The  Reflex  Arc  Concept  in  Psychology,"  Psychological  Review,  Vol.  Ill, 
1S96,  pp.  357  ff. 


k 


CRITICAL  MONISM   IN   EPISTEMOLOGY 


321 


upon  the  otherwise  puzzling  question  as  to  whether  the  colors 
seen  by  two  apparently  normal  individuals  are  qualitatively 
identical,  or  whether  they  are  qualitatively  different,  with 
corresponding  differences,  simply.  Since  both  individuals 
inherit  their  sensing  capacity  from  a  common  ancestry,  it  is 
entirely  probable  that  its  products  are  qualitatively  the  same, 
except  where  there  has  been  a  failure  to  inherit,  as  with  the 
color-blind.  A  further  sidelight  upon  our  theory,  and  support 
of  it,  may  be  derived  from  paleontology.  It  is  a  well-known 
fact  that  the  brilliantly  colored  —  or  shall  we  say  colorablef  — 
flowering  plants  did  not  appear  — and  many  extant  species 
would  not  have  survived  if  they  had  appeared  —  before  there 
were  animal  forms,  such  as  insects,  to  be  stimulated  by  their 
selective  reflection  of  light,  and  so  to  clothe  them  —  according 
to  our  theory  —  with  gay  colors,  by  means  of  which  they  might 
be  guided  to  them,  sustain  themselves  with  their  honey,  and 
incidentally  assist  in  their  pollination.  Color  in  the  flowers 
without  the  presence  of  any  honey-seeking  animal  form  would 
have  had  no  biological  function  that  we  can  discover,  and  there 
seems  no  scientific  ground  to  suppose  it  existed.  Assuming  a 
color-producing  capacity  on  the  part  of  the  honey-eating  insect, 
however,  wi  can  account  for  the  survival  of  both  the  animal 
and  the  pL-i  .  Hence  the  principle  of  parsimony  would  seem 
to  favor,  however  slightly,  the  latter  hypothesis. 

Hallucination  is  readily  explained  as  the  creation  of  certain 
sense-qualities,  and  ordinarily  their  being  placed  in  real  space, 
on  occasion  of  a  stinmlation,  similar  or  practically  identical, 
so  far  as  the  last  stage  of  its  intra-OTg&n\c  history  is  concerned, 
with  the  ordinary  stimulation,  but  not  proceeding  from  the  usual 
fx<ra -organic  cause.  The  color,  or  other  sense-quality,  is,  in 
such  cases,  put  upon  the  usual  cause,  as  might  be  expected,  for 
it  is  with  the  action  of  this  cause  that  that  particular  sensing 
activity  is  habitually  coordinated.  Illusion,  being  paitial 
hallucination,  is  similarly  explicable.  The  illusory  elements 
and  hallucinatory  objects,  although  really  existent  and,  if 
spatial  at  all,  located  in  real  space,  are  existences  created  by 
the  individual  sensing  subject  for  itself  alone,  as  is  the  case  with 
sense-qualities  in  general,  and  so  are  not  independently  real. 
Usually  hallucination  and  illusion  are  not  regarded  as  "error," 


if; 


322 


THE   PROBLEM  OF   KNOWLEDGE 


0     i 


If: 


■?  ( 


unless  they  arc  later  discovered  to  have  interfered  with  some  of 
the  purposes  of  t»»e  subject. 

According  to  our  theory  there  is  also  an  explanation  of  the 
fact  that  in  dreams,  as  compared  with  normal  perception,  the 
sense-qualities  are  less  prominent  than  the  size  and  shape  and 
other  "primary  qualities."  A  correspondent  testifies  that  in 
his  experience  color  is  never  given  in  dreams,  although  his  sight 
is  exceptionally  sensitive  to  color.  In  this  case  it  is  simply 
necessary  to  remember  what  has  been  pointed  out  so  clearly  by 
Bergson  in  his  recent  discussion  of  dreams,'  viz.  that  dreaming 
is  the  result  of  the  union  of  memory  products  with  those  sub- 
dued "sensations"  which  persist  during  sleep,  such  as  the  idio- 
retinal  light ;  the  relative  absence  of  color  in  dreams  being  then 
explained  by  the  ab.sence  of  very  distinct  and  permanent  colors 
m  the  visual  field  when  the  eyes  are  closed,  as  compared  with 
the  colors  produced  under  the  stimulus  of  the  rays  of  light  which 
enter  the  wide-open  eyes  of  the  subject  when  awake. 

The  further  exposition  of  epistemological  monism  and  critical 
realism  leads  us  to  speak  more  definitely  of  the  distinction  be- 
tween primary  and  secondary  qualities.     In  the  light  of  scientific 
progress  Locke's  list  of  the  primary  qualities  of  physical  olj-'ects 
(the  qualities  which  they  must  be  thought  of  as  possesMi.g  in- 
dependently of  the  incident  of  their  entering  into  the  relation 
of  being  sensed  and  perceived)  needs  revision ;  but  it  is  in  con- 
nection with  the  production  of  secondary  or  sense-qualities  that 
the  sharpest  deviation  from  the  Lockian  philosophy  is  necessary. 
Sense-qualities  are  not  produced  by  external  things  and  lodged 
in  an  essentially  passive  mental  receptacle,  as  Locke  thought ; 
neither  are  they,  as  Lotze  maintained,  first  produced  within  an 
inner  field  of  consciousness  and  then  "projected"  into  outer 
space,  with  the  aid  of  "local  signs";   they  are  creatively  pro- 
duced, by  the  activity  of  the  subject,  in  things  or  in  the  individ- 
ual's own   body,  just  where   they  are  experienced  as  being. 
The  mind  does  not  passively  receive  impressions,  but,  as  we  shall 
see,  it  actively  takes  impressions  of  surrounding  objects  by  means 
of  sensation  and  thought.    Sense-qualities  are  private  marks, 
the  production  of  which  was  learned  by  the  animal  race,  as  we 
shall  see  more  clearly  later,  in  a  sort  of  involuntary  t^ial-^nd- 

'  The  Independent,  New  York,  Oct.  23  and  30,  1913. 


CRITICAL  MONISM   IN   EPISTEMOLOOY 


323 


error  process ;  this  capacity  has  been  transmitted  to  the  indi- 
vidual, 80  that  by  a  series  of  inherited  and  involuntary,  but 
creative,  psychical  acts,  he  is  able  to  clothe  environing  objects 
with  their  various  sense-qualities.  The  result  is  that  a  more 
favorable  adjustment  to  the  situation  than  co  Id  have  existed 
without  it  is  made  possible,  and  so  t..v,  sensing  capacity  proves 
to  have  a  very  decisive  survival-value  in  the  struggle  for 
existence. 

A  special  cla.ss  of  sense-qualities  is  made  up  of  the  feeling  and 
emotion  qualities  which  are  creatively  produced,  and  more 
or  less  vaguely  located  throughout  the  body,  on  occasion, 
as  Dewey  has  pointed  out,'  of  the  return  stimulation  due  to 
partial  inhibition  of  motor  impulses.  In  the  beginning  it  is 
most  imperative,  biologically,  that  aversion-producing  feelings, 
such  as  various  "sensations"  of  pain  and  the  genera!  feeling 
of  discomfort,  should  be  the  ones  produced;  and  it  is  quite 
evident  that  such  must  have  been  the  case  with  animals  that  have 
survived  for  any  considerable  length  of  time.  But  this  does  not 
necessarily  lead  to  the  pessimistic  inference  drawn  by  Schopen- 
hauer. If  the  natural  history  of  feeling  were  written,  it  would 
of  course  appear  that  with  successful  adjustment  to  the  en- 
vironment stimulus  to  painful  feelings  would  cease  to  be  active. 
With  the  cessation  of  the  pain,  accordingly,  some  sort  of  "sense 
of  relief"  would  naturally  and  even  necessarily  be  produced  to 
register  for  the  organism  the  changed  situation.  But  it  is  not 
necessary  to  suppose,  with  Schopenhauer,  that  this  "sense  of 
relief,"  creatively  produced,  as  we  would  say,  by  the  psychical 
subject,  must  always  be  purely  negative.  The  victory  over  dis- 
turbing conditions  may  be  signalized  by  the  creation  of  sense- 
or  feeling-qualities  so  decidedly  pleasant  as  to  more  than 
counterbalpii  the  pain  necessarily  produced  in  the  previous 
situation  ha  .iiat  it  is  by  no  means  necessary  to  suppose  the 
sum  of  pains  to  be  greater  than  the  sum  of  pleasures. 

The  secondary  qualities  are  created,  then,  and  thereby  the 
primary  qualities  are  revealed.  Through  being  clothed  with  the 
secondary  qualities  of  sense,  material  things  with  their  primary 
qiift!:ti"s,  their  spatial  and  temporal  location,  their  comparative 
extension  in  space  and  duration  in  time,  and  the  quantity,  dis- 

'  "The Significance  of  Emotions,"  Psychological  Review.  Vol.  II.  1896,  pp.  13  ff. 


i1. 


.1^;    ! 


>P^.  .K 


■mri 


;  0    i 


^rih 


324 


THE   PROBLEM   OP    KNOWIHDGE 


iiibuUon,  and  transformation  of  their  enprp:y,  arc  n  ule  available 
for  hii.runi  knowlclge.     If  it  be  objecttni  that  tlierc  is  always 
more  or  less  of  touiporal  and  spatial  dwlocation  Ix-tw^en  the 
ind.'prndently  real  objc.t  of  the  environment  and  whui  is  im- 
mediately sensed,  that  at  b(-t  what  is  revealed  is  tlie  indepen- 
dent oJ.joot  I  here  it  was  and  aa  it  was  when  the  p   ice^s  irhich  has 
actrl  a     ,•  stimulus  started  from  it,  we  nnist  adi.if  that  this  is 
true      l-!;,t  <t  i  mains  to  lie  seen  whetluT  tin     k-stroys  tho  kaowl- 
edg'  v:i!u"  oi    .onse-<>xp«'rience  with  rcferenee  to  ind.  ix'tident 
realKv      Tii.'K'  are  two  diffcren*  sorts  of    asps,  viz.  those  in 
which  tlie  olijcct  u  at  a  short  distance  on      from  the  obscrvri, 
and  thf  M'  ui  uiiicn  it  i.-  at  a  very  great  dist.ince.     In  the  former 
case,  \  hero  an  objoct  has  been  observed  at  >.  st  in  a;  y  particular 
locati<jn  and  m  uii-    particular  condition  for  any  tonsiderable 
length  of  tune,  we  can  i>c  certain  that  v\ith  the  .  xception  of 
a  small  fraction  of  the  last  second,  it  'las  !<>ally  been  where  it 
still  M-ems  to  be;   ;i'  1  when   object-  arc  -loving  or  changing, 
the  slight  degree  of  uhision  ordi>  u  i\-  present  can  generally  be 
allowed  for  and  practically  countc  ranted  by  thoujiht  -    vvluch 
assumes,  however,  that  it  is  very  cf)i"  =  ,nly  jmssibl    lo  per.    ive 
thinK^s  where  and  a.s  they  are.     It  ,    u  Turther  consideration  in 
favor  of  this  assumptioi,  ^n  the  ca.sc  of  oNjccts  in  close  nnximity 
to  the  observer  that  whai  we  meur.  by  tfic  present  in  practical 
life  has  a  time  span,  so  thuf  in  olis(    '  ing  wfuat  and  wherf  a  not 
very  distant  arid  not  vory  rapidly     hanging  object  uas  ;    very 
small  fraction  of  a  second  ago,  we  ar(>  observing  what  and     Uere 
it  is  now,  —  in  the  or'inarv  sense  of  that  word.     T!m"  ,f 

very    distant   objects    is    M.mcwhat    diff.  rent,     i     t,    as    t     - 
been  intimated  before,  the  si  ns.'-qualities   ire  plac    i  up--- 
stitute  objects,  or  in  substitute  locations,  which     -y  re;. 
their  practically  ecjual  inaccessibility  to  toucb       .r     xa, 
may  represent  tiie  more  distant  real  objects  \    ;i  nough 
ordinary  practical  i)urposes.     Here  too,  then,  (.rui   icaliy  speai 
ing,  by  nu -ms  of  secondary  qualities  created,  prin    ry  qualitic- 
are  reveale  i. 

The  distinction  between  pn.nary  and  secondary     ualitie.s 
attacked,  of  course,  from  bot)      des.     Extreme  realisi  s  ask  wh 
psychicai  creativity  should  I        xteri   ed  so  far  as   to  ineliH 
.•^ense-quahties,  while  extrem.       eahsls  ask  w   v    i  ^houii 


rUiTICAL    \f')\iSM   IN    KPIHTFMOLOGY 


325 


i«'  pxtinded  farther,  s(  m  to  include  primary  quilities  as  well. 
To  th(  former  question  it  is  t(  be  repliod  the  fir^t  place  that 
winle  ifiere  must  he  scjrnethinjr  objective  prior  to  perception 
to  start  the  ^•imulaTi.  «  which  is  the  precon  'Hion  of  oerceptlon, 
thi>  iw-j  no'  m  i-ssanl.v  mean  the  prior  ex.  c oik  ui  all  or  any 
of  tht'  HC(-ontlary  qnalitios.  Fur'  hermon^  in  science  —  which  is, 
in  priiciple,  n<  ipl\  common  si  <e  become  sufficiently  critical 
for  til'  jore  .<■  «ci^kaed  purpor>ca  w  ,ich  lai;  w  recently  de- 
'cloptv       thei  ■  if"  t=-/  nee<    vhi'ever  to  assume  the  independent 

Mstci'        f  the  ^'Qse-nuaii  'i-s,  while  the  independent  existence 

if  the  prii    irj  q- 
i»f  the  cau     tion 
(t!    or  hani     ap;. 
SI     <'-(piahtii,^    M 
Ml     -0  sai 

hi'.^  are  i 
hun  en  of 
what 

.'It    vdi 

uo 

With 
:'-vchi( 

fX(i|.< 


'hr 


IS  tifi   -^sary  for  a  i  itional 
'         nts  of  sense-experi( 
rienf      idependent 
■rcf       ble   by  difff 
-iicci  ,  because  in 

uiKCorv'ani         hisive.     An  unbearable 
ntly  rests  upt  n  him  who  would  affinn 
not  tit'cd  (o  ass(  1 1,  and  what  !•  ids  one  into 
statements  about  external  reahty,  i>-^    overtheless 


■!lv< 

.  (■ 
iicedoi 


xplanation 

On  the 

y  of  all 

II    persons 

iiany  cases 


if 
of 
reaJit., 

Sp< '(•{:' 


•eronce  to  the  idealistic  question  a  iiy  /luman 

reativity  should  no;    he  viewed  -^ing  tiie 

of  primary  (lualities,  as  well  as  se^  it  may 

1,  t'   begin  with,  that  this  conclusion  oided, 

>'  poh      IP,  if  we  have  any  interest  at  all  i  rivity 

dge,  .     opposed  to  agnosticism  with  refe-  o  the 

which  simulates  our  sensing  activities.     What  it  is  of 
importance  for  epistemologual  theory  to  be  able  to 
mail:    tin  is  that  .sense-qualities  are  located  not  only  in  the  body 
of  the  subject,  but  also  often  in  external  objects,  so  that  some 
f  the  nrimary  qualities,  sucf   :;  ■  shape,  relative  size,  location, 
■  as    lirectly  present  to  the  subject  as  are  the  secondary 
alit^"    themselves.     In  opposition  to  this  view  it  has  been 
ever  since  the  time  of  Berkeley,  to  object  that  such 
s!.   ,.. -edly  primary  (jualitics  as  shape  are  dependent  upon  the 
kind  of  sense-or<4ans  we  happen  to  pos.sess  ;  that  if  the  lenses  in 
our  eyes  were  cylindrical,  for  instance,  wc  Rhmjld  '"-'T  ob'crts 
as  very  ditferent  in  shape  from  what  they  are  in  our  {)resent 
experience.     To  this  the  answer  is  that  if  our  eyes  were  provided 


k 


f  .  11 


326 


THE   PROBLEM  OP   KNOWLEDGE 


'M 


i  Ij  a  i  -    f 


i  ■' 


I:m.1 


with  non-symmetrical  lenses  we  should  be  able  to  detect  the 
illusion,  and  might  perhaps  even  learn  to  ignore  it,  as  we  do 
the  double  imagery  in  all  parts  except  the  centre  of  the  field  of 
vision.     In  the  perception,  under  the  other  conditions  supposed, 
of  what  we  now  see  as  a  square  object,  for  instance,  we  could 
easily  correct  the  illusion,  in  any  one  of  several  ways.     We 
could  do  it  either  by  using  the  hand  to  measure  the  length  of 
its  sides,  and  seeing  that  the  hand,  which  would  he  felt  to  remain 
the  same,  varied  in  visual  appearance  as  did  the  square;   or 
by  turning  the  object  through  ninety  degrees  and  back  again, 
and  reflecting,  from  our  experience  with  the  parts  of  our  own 
body  as  sensed  in  touch,  that  the  mere  turning  of  a  solid  object 
does  not  alter  its  real  shape ;  or  by  dropping  one's  head  to  one 
side  through  an  angle  of  ninety  degrees,  and  finding  the  appear- 
ance ,f  the  object  to  change  when  nothing  has  been  done  to  it, 
but  only  something  to  the  body  of  the  subject.     And  when  it  is 
inferred  from  the  changing  aspects  presented  by  the  primary 
qualities  of  objects  in  various  perspectives,  that  there  is  no  one 
shape  or  size  or  location  that  is  more  real  than  any  other,  that 
all  are  alike  subjective  appearance  only,  we  would  still  contend 
that  it  is  easily  possible  to  vindicate  the  truth  of  the  achieve- 
ment of  common-sense  knowledge,  that  no  object  can  have 
at  any  instant  more  than  one  real  shape  or  size  or  location; 
or  during  any  period  of  time  more  than  one  real  series  of  motions 
or  changes ;  or  any  change  whatever,  save  as  i(  is  produced  by 
energetic  causes.     The  real  object  does  not  change  its  shape 
when  we  change  our  perspective.     All   the  objective  change 
resulting  is  in  the  shape  of  the  projection  of  the  object  on  a 
plane  perpendicular  to  the  line  of  our  vision  ;  and  we  soon  learn 
to  perceive  an  object  as  square,  for  instance,  even  when  this 
projection  may  not  be  absolutely  square. 

We  would  -till  maintain,  therefore,  that  through  the  creation 
of  secondary  qualities  and  their  location  in  the  body  or  on  other 
independently  real  oltjects  of  the  physical  world,  its  environ- 
ment, certain  primary  qualities  of  thes(>  objects  are  immediately 
revealed,  thus  making  it  possible  to  hold  to  realistic  epistemo- 
logical  monism  and  to  avoid  absolute  agnosticism.  Primary 
qualities  are  transrendently  real :  hut  some  nf  therr.  are  some- 
times empirically  real,  and  this  circumstance  makes  all  the  dif- 


CRITICAL  MONISM    IN   EPISTEMOLOGY 


227 


fcronce  between  helpless  total  ignorance  of  reality  and  knowledge 
capable  of  almost  unlimited  progress.  The  thing-in-itself  is 
knowable  in  part :  we  are  practically  certain  that  things  exist 
with  tlieir  primary  qualities,  even  when  they  arc  not  known  by 
any  human  subject.  The  question  of  the  possibility  of  knowl- 
edge of  th-^  thing-in-itself  is  the  question  of  finding  in  the  thing 
(lualities  vith  reference  to  which  the  relation  of  being  either 
perceived  or  thought  of  is  external.  By  thing-in-itself  is  meant 
here  not  the  thing  as  it  is  when  not  in  any  relations  whatsoever ; 
that,  of  course,  is  an  U tiding.  By  thing-in-itself  we  simply  mean 
tlie  thing  as  it  is  when  neither  perceived  nor  thought  of  by 
any  human  being,  or  even,  as  we  may  surmi.se,  the  thing  as  it 
is,  essentially  unaffected  by  any  mere  perception  or  mere  thought, 
whether  human  or  infrahuinan  or  superhuman.  Existence 
outside  of  all  relations  and  existence  without  dependence  upon 
l)cing  the  object  of  perception  or  thought  can  be  identified  only 
on  thi  ci.ssumption  that  all  relations  are  the  work  of  thought. 
What  we  maintain  is  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  assume  this. 

If,  finally,  any  one  should  be  inclined  to  quibble  over  the 
question  as  to  whether,  even  on  our  theory  as  thus  presented, 
any  primary  qualities  are  immediately  known,  since  it  would 
always  be  by  means  of  .secondary  qualities,  the  reply  is  that  the 
perception  of  these  primary  qualities  is  practically,  i.e.  for  all 
proper  practical  purposes  —  and  therefore,  as  we  shall  see, 
truly  —  immediate  :  it  is  clearly  distinguishable  from  knowledge 
of  qualities  not  thus  present,  :.jch  as  may  be  gained  through 
memory  or  inference.  It  would  be  equally  possible,  if  one  were 
inclined  to  quibble,  to  maintain  that  secondary  or  sense- 
c|ualities  are  known  only  by  means  of  primary  qualities,  since 
their  existence  is  made  po.ssible  only  through  the  presence  of 
primary  qualities  of  something;  or,  again,  that  neither  primary 
nor  secondary  qualities  are  immediately  perceived,  .since  they 
are  perceived  by  means  of  psychical  activity. 

For  the  sake  of  completeness  at  this  point  it  may  be  said 
further  that  the  (jualities  of  physical  objects  are  not  exhaustively 
classified  as  primary  and  secondary;  there  are  what  may  be 
called  tertiary  qualities  also.  Primary  qualities  are  those 
qualities  of  physical  objects  which  are  discovered  through  sense- 
activity,  but  not  produced  by  it.     Secondary  qualities  are  dis- 


328 


THE   PROBLEM  OP   KNOWLEDGE 


■:.'  . 


V 


,  f 


covered  in  the  object  only  because  produced  and  put  there  by 
the  subject  cf  sense-activity.  By  tertiary  quaHties  we  mean 
such  qualities  as  neither  exist  in  the  thing  prior  to  the  psychical 
activity  of  the  subject  nor  are  the  immediate  product  of  sense- 
activity;  they  are  placed  in  the  object,  not  by  sense,  but  by 
purposive,  though  purely  psychical,  activity  of  the  subject.  Or, 
more  briefly,  primary  qualities  are  found  by  sense  and  thought ; 
secondary  qualities  are  made  by  sense  and  found  by  thought  ; 
tertiarj'  qualities  are  made  by  thought.  It  must  not  be  sup- 
posed, however,  when  thought  influences  sense-quiuties  through 
a  series  of  physiological  changes,  as  when  it  increases  or  di- 
minishes pain,  that  the  resulting  sense-^juality  is  a  tertiary 
quality. 

Corresponding  to  these  primary,  secondarj',  and  tertiary 
qualities,  there  are  primary,  secondary,  and  tertiary  relations. 
Primary  relations  are  such  as  are  independent  of  their  being 
sensed ;  secondary  relations  '.v^ould  be  such  as  exist  only  in  and 
through  their  being  sensed,  or  felt;  and  tertiary  relations 
would  be  such  as  are  first  established  by  the  thought  that  thinks 
them,  and  for  the  purpose  which  that  thought  serves. 

It  may  be  well  to  refer  here  to  vahies  also,  for  while  most 
if  not  all  tertiary  (jualities  may  be  regarded  as  values,  it  by  no 
means  follows  that  all  values  are  tertiary  quaUties.  A  value 
is  a  quality  which  any  object  has  by  virtue  of  its  relation  to 
a  teleological  or  quasi-teleological  process.  Negative  values 
are  qualities  possessed  by  objects  by  virtue  of  their  being 
obstacles  to  the  processes  in  question ;  positive  values  attach  to 
objects  by  virtue  of  their  being  either  ends  or  means.  Primary 
values  are  such  as  obtain  independently  of  consciousness; 
secondary  values  are  dependent  upon  feeling  consciousness,' 
but  independent  of  mere  thought ;  tertiary  values  are  dej)endent 
upon  thought  alone.  But  there  is  an  ambiguity  here  which 
may  be  misleading,  for  what  is  simply  a  secondary  or  even  a 
tertiary  value  so  far  as  a  community  is  concerned  becomes  a 
primary  value  to  the  smaller  included  community  or  to  the 
included  individual.  Moreover,  in  the  case  of  individual  values, 
it  is  sometimes  difficult  to  distinguish  secondary  from  tertiary 
values.     When  through  contemplation  an  object  is  idealized,'  it 

'  Cf.  J.  A.  Stewart,  Plato's  Doctrine  of  Idea*,  Pt.  II,  pp.  13»-40,  et  patnm. 


CRITICAL  MONISM   IN  EPISTEMOLOGY 


529 


is  '-.ot  always  easy  to  say  how  much  of  its  value  for  the  individual 
is  felt,  and  how  much  is  merely  posited  by  thought ;  and  indeed 
certain  values  may  pass  back  and  forth  from  the  one  to  the  other. 
It  may  be  felt  by  some  that  in  reverting  to  the  distinction 
Iwtween  primary  and  secondary  qualities  we  are  adopting  a 
view  so  commonplace  as  to  be  thereby  discredited.  But  sense- 
perception  is  itself  very  commonplace,  and  it  need  not  be  very 
surprising  if  the  solution  of  some  of  its  problems  should  turn  out 
to  be  somewhat  commonplace  too.  Indeed  it  would  be  rather 
disheartening  if  much  of  the  truth  about  the  common  things 
with  which  philosophy  deals  should  not  be  found  to  wear  the 
garb  of  common  life.  It  is  to  l)e  questioned  whether  there  is 
not  something  not  quite  wholesome  in  the  tendency  to  put  a 
premium  upon  novelty  in  philosophy.  May  it  not  possibly  be 
to  the  credit  of  the  view  presented,  rather  than  the  reverse, 
that  it  is  heretical  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  philosophies 
of  the  day,  in  that  it  keeps  closer  than  most  of  them  do  to  the 
conservative,  critical  revision  of  common  sense  which  is  charac- 
teristic of  scientific  ways  of  thinking. 

But.  to  return  to  our  immediate  topic,  it  is  to  be  noted  that 
the  distinction  between  tertiary  qualities  and  ideas  of  primary 
qualities  is  especially  important.  Objects  are  complexes  of 
primary,  secondary,  and  tertiary  qualities  (including  values) 
and  relations,  and  not  of  ideas  of  these.  There  are  not  different 
degrees  of  reality  "  ;  whatever  is  real  at  all  is  as  real  as  anything 
can  be,  although  there  are  many  kinds  of  reality,  and  reality  in 
and  dependent  upon  many  diffcnmt  relations;  and  although, 
also,  what  i.«  real  in  one  relation,  e.g.  what  one  dreams,  is  unreal 
in  another.  But  while  an  idea  in  itrf  psychical  relations  is  as 
real  as  anything  else,  a  logical  idea,  as  such,  is  not  a  reality  at 
all,  but  an  abstraction  from  reality.  It  is  not  an  object  but  a 
representation,  a  proxy  re-presentation  of  an  object,  or  of  some 
■ .  lality  of  an  object,  or  of  some  relation  between  objects  or 
lations,  functioning  vicariously  for  the  presence,  the  actual 
presentation,  of  the  object  or  quality  or  relation  m  question. 
Ideation,  the  production  of  these  ideas,  is  a  creative  psychical 
activity.  In  attentive  analysis  of  the  presented  object ,  thouglit- 
elements  are  brought  into  a.'^snciation  with  the  qualities  of  the 
object,  and  thus  the  way  is  prepared  for  the  production,  when 


ff 


.sawAi 


330 


THE  PROBLEM   OF   KNOWLEDGE 


.: 


M  f 


I       \ 


the  object  is  no  longer  immediately  present,  of  ideas  or  repre- 
sentations of  the  object,  or  of  some  of  its  qualities,  either  primary 
or  secondary  or  tertiary.  Now  it  may  happen  on  a  later  occa- 
sion, when  the  same  object  is  again  sensed  and  thus  presented, 
that  some  of  these  ideas  of  qualities  may  function  instead  of 
the  ^ctual  presentation  of  those  qualities.  In  so  far  as  this  is 
the  ease,  the  psychical  activity  is  apperception.  Now  this 
apperceptive  activity  may,  in  familiar  situations,  very  largely 
anticipate  attentive  analysis,  thus  rendering  it  unnecessarj' ; 
it  makes  possible  an  economy  of  sensing  or  of  analytic  attention. 
At  this  point  there  begin  to  emerge  problems  the  adequate 
consideration  of  which  would  carry  us  far  beyond  the  limits  of  a 
merely  constructive  sJatement,  and  yet  a  solution  of  which  is 
essential  to  an  adequate  treatment  of  the  problem  of  knowledge. 
In  the  first  place,  perception  is  the  only  cognitive  mode  with 
which  we  have  been  particularly  concerned  ;  but  when  we  begin 
to  consider  the  function  of  ideas  and  the  possibilities  of  their 
manipulation,  the  question  arises  as  to  whether,  even  granted 
that  there  is  genuine  cognition  in  perception,  all  modes  of  cogni- 
tion are  to  be  thought  of  as  essentially  or  fundamentally  per- 
ceptual, or  whether  there  may  not  also  be  some  altogether 
different  way  of  knowing  reality.  This  topic  must  be  dealt  with 
in  a  separate  chapter.' 

But  besides  the  question  as  to  whether  there  may  not  be  some 
way  of  knowing  reality  independently  of  perception,  there  is  a 
far-reaching  consideration  which  would  raise  a  serious  problem 
as  to  whether  "perception"  itself  can  be  genuinely  cognitive 
after  all.  In  view  of  the  doctrine  that  certain  absolutely  a  priori 
forms  are  necessarily  involved  in  perception,  and  that  these 
a  pruri  forms  are  what  determine  the  form,  i.e.  the  "primary 
qualities"  of  objects  perceived  (orof  "phenomena"),  rather  than 
the  qualities  of  any  independently  existing  object,  it  becomes 
necessary,  in  order  to  defend  the  validity  of  perceptual  knowl- 
edge, to  raise  definitely  the  question  of  the  genesis  of  these  funda- 
mental forms  of  what  we  have  supposed  to  be  real  cognition, 
and,  in  particular,  the  question  of  their  genetic  relation  to  what- 
ever independent  reality  may  be  supposed  to  exist.  This  in- 
vestigation also  will  require  a  separate  chapter.' 
■C-  XV.  •Ch.XVL 


(CRITICAL  MONISM    IN   EPISTEMOLOGY  331 

But  even  supposing  these  questions  satisfactorily  answered  — 
supposing  it  shown  that  all  cognition  is  ultimately  essentially 
perceptual,  and   that   perception   is  genuinely  cognitive  — it 
would  remain  a  fact  that  there  is  the  difference  to  which  we  have 
found  It  necessary  to  refer,  between  what  might  he  regarded  as 
presentation  and  what  would  have  to  he  viewed  as  representa- 
tion ;    explicit  ideas  are  indispensal)le,  and  the  judgments  in 
wIucIj  they  are  employed  as  predicates  claim  to  embody  true 
knowledge.     We  shall  therefore  have  to  investigate  the  problem 
of  truth,'  and,  finally,  the  problem  as  to  how  one  must  pro- 
ceed m  order  to  produce  not  only  judgments  that  shall  be  true 
l)ut  also,  m  a  way  that  shall  be  universally  valid,  an  adequate 
certamty  of  this  truth,  —  in  other  words,  the  problem  of  proof.* 
In  the  meantime,  however,  assuming  that  critical  realistic 
epistemological  monism,  which  has  thus  far  succeeded  where 
all  other  epistemological  theories  have  failed,  will  be  shown 
able  to  endure  all  these  further  tests,  we  may  proceed  to  make 
explicit  some  of  the  further  implications  of  this  theory  which  we 
have  been  endeavoring  to  expound  and  defend.     One  of  the 
things  most  characteristic  of  it  —and  this  will  become  increas- 
ingly manifest  as  we  proceed  to  the  later  investigations  to  which 
we  have  alluded  —  is  its  consistent  opposition  to  the  long  reg- 
nant Kantian  doctrine.     At  the  present  stage  of  our  discussion, 
m  addition  to  the  way  in  which  in  general  our  theorv  avoids 
anil  would  expo.se,  as  unnecessary,  the  extreme  dualism  and  con- 
sequent agnosticism  of  the  Kantian  doctrine  (and  that  without 
falling  into  the  exireme  one-sidedness  of  either  the  traditional 
idealisms  or  the  new  realism),  some  minor  contrasts  may  be 
pointed  out.     Our  theory  is  the  opposite  of  Kant's  in  that  it 
regards  the  primary  qualities  and  relations  of  the  object  not  as 
the  contribution  of  the  subject,  the  product  of  its  relating  activ- 
ity, but  as  furnished  from  the  objective  side;    while  the  sec- 
ondary qualities  are  regarded,  not,  with  Kant,  as  the  contribu- 
tmn  of  the  ol)ject,  or,  b(>tter,  of  the  supposedlv  unknowable 
thing-in-itself,  but  as  the  contribution  of  the  sense-activity  of 
the  psychical  subject.     Because  he  made  the  properly  primary 
qualities   of   hi.s   merely   phenomonal   and   not   independently 
real  object  subjective,  and  the  secondarj-  qualities  relatively 

'  Ch8.  XVII  to  XIX.  infra.  .  Ch.  XX,  infra. 


II 


-I 


i  1 


WWW 


m 


n: 


I 


332 


THE   PROBLEM   OP    KNOWLEDGE 


object iv(\  Kant  forodoonunl  himself  to  pcnnanont  imprison- 
ment within  th(>  walls  of  agnostic  (hiahsm.  In  view  of  what  we 
have  said  and  have  yet  to  say  in  exposition  and  defence  of  the 
view  that  the  primary  qualiti<'s  of  ol)jeets  pt-rceived  have  also 
independent  objective  «'xistence,  and  that  their  secondary  or 
sense-quali  ics  are  rdativdy  subjective,  we  are  able  to  maintain 
that  a  genuine  cognitive  ac(|uaintaiice  with  independent  reality 
is  not  only  possible,  but  actual,  in  normal  perceptual  exiwrience. 

Moreover,  from  our  point  of  view,  analytic  judgment  becomes 
relatively  more  important  than  in  the  Kantian  system.  Analy- 
sis is  not  of  ideas,  simply,  or  of  previous  mental  constructs, 
but  of  preexistent  and  independently  existent  realities.  And 
analytic  judgments,  just  because  they  are  thus  directed  toward 
things  and  not  toward  mere  ideas,  are  productive  of  new  informa- 
tion. Synthetic  judgments,  on  the  other  hand,  are  constructive 
of  ideas  primarily,  not  of  the  objects  of  perception.  The  only 
judgments  which  are  constructive  of  things  —  except  as  prod- 
ucts of  thought  are,  as  such,  regarded  as  (psychical)  things  — 
are  those  comparatively  unimportant  judgments  through  which 
there  are  added  to  objects  their  comparatively  unimportant 
tertiary  qualities. 

Finally,  it  may  be  noted  that  with  the  solution,  here  given, 
of  the  fundamental  problem  of  epistemology  (as  well  as  of 
metaphysical  psychology)  the  way  is  opened  up  for  the  solu- 
tion of  what  we  have  seen  to  be  the  same  prol)lcm  in  its  most 
generalized  form,  viz.  the  problem  as  to  the  internality  or 
externality  of  relations.  We  have  found  that  what  the  object 
is  depends  largely  upon  whether  it  is  sensed  or  not ;  many  of 
its  qualities  thus  depend  upon  its  relation  to  the  conscious 
subject.  But  these  qualities  may,  for  some  particular  purpose, 
be  of  no  importance  whatever,  and  in  such  a  case  the  knowledge- 
relation  is  external  to  the  object.  Generally  speaking,  the 
knowledge-relation,  when  a  relation  of  present  consciousness, 
is  internal  so  far  as  the  subject  is  concerned,  and  external  so 
far  as  the  object  is  concerned.  That  is,  for  most  purposes  one 
maj'  ignore  the  difference  made  in  the  object  by  its  being  known 
and  thought  of  by  one's  self  or  others,  whereas  knowledge  is 
not  likely  to  be  sought,  or  even  recalled  to  mind,  unless  there  is 
felt  to  be  some  practical  difference  between  the  subject  with  and 


>'i  !6  '<'fflier''«r' ?wffiSBR. 


CRITICAL  MONISM   IN  EPISTEMOLOOY  333 

the  subject  without  the  knowledge  in  question.  When  the 
knowledge-rehvtion  is  not,  however,  at  the  same  time  a  relation 
of  present  consciousness,  for  most  purposes  it  makes  no  differ- 
ence to  either  subject  or  object ;  it  is  an  external  relation.  But 
on  the  other  hand,  there  is  probably  no  actual  relatior  "  -jh 
nuRht  not  become  important  for  .some  conceivable  pu  in 

which  case  it  would  become  internal  to  one  or  more  of  t  c     ,  ns 
related.     Whether  relations  are  to  be  regarded  as  internal  or 
external  to  the  terms  related  thus  depends  upon  the  purpose  with 
reference  to  which  the  question  is  raised.     Theoretically  there 
IS  no  relation  which  may  not  be  either  internal  or  external. 
Ihe  e.xistence  of  relations  does  not  commonly  depend  upon 
purpose  -  It  does  so,  directly,  only  in  the  case  of  tertiary  rela- 
tions —  but  the  internality  or  externahty  of  those  relation.s  does 
depend  upon  purpose.     In  any  particular  situation,  for  the  pres- 
ent explicit  purpose  or  purposes  of  the  subject  most  of  the  ob- 
ject's actual  relations  are  external.     The  doctrine  that  all  re- 
h-tions  are  always  internal  to  all  the  terms  related  could  be 
niamtained  only  by  establishing  the  existence  of  a  knowing-will- 
mg  subject  for  which  all  conceivable  purposes  —  even  the  most 
trivial  and  the  most  mutually  contradictory  —  were  always 
being  purposed  and  never  reaching  fulfilment.     But  no  such 
■mad  Absolute"  can  be  rationally  supposed  to  exist;   and  so 
there  must,  from  any  actual  point  of  view,  be  some  external 
relations.     Second  in  importance,  therefore,  to  our  extension 
of  the  conception  of  creative  psychical  activity  to  sensation,  as  a 
device  for  showing  the  rational  possibility  of  a  sufficiently  critical 
epistemology  which  shall  combine  realism  with  epistemological 
monism,  we  would  plar-e  a  more  than  ordinary  dependence  upon 
considerations  of  purpose  in  the  attempted  solution  of  philo- 
sophical problems  in  general,  and  of  the  problems  of  epistemologv 
in  particular.  •' 

In  bringing  to  a  close  this  division  of  our  subject,  may  we  be 
permitted  to  indulge  in  some  reflections  on  the  status  of  eris- 
temology  m  general  ?  For  more  than  a  hundred  years  now  the 
problem  of  knowledge  has  been  the  uppermost  problem  of  philos- 
ophy ;  and  for  those  who  incline  to  idealistic  ways  of  thinking 
It  has  come  to  be  regarded  as  the  necessary  preliminary,  if  not 
to  all  the  sciences,  at  least  to  metaphysics.    The  neo-reaUsts, 


I- 1 


.1    li; 


i! 


•ravjasiir  "msh*^-  ji^e^rmm^m^  j-'-r^^e^;?.  u^hi^'i'ji 


334 


THE   PROBLEM  OF   KNOWLEDGE 


,\ 


\l\ 


ill;  n 


on  the  other  hand,  tend  to  discount  the  importance  of  episte- 
mology  and  even  the  reality  of  the  problem ;  although  all  the 
while  their  own  philosophical  discussions  are  mainly  episte- 
mological.  May  it  not  be  that  the  truth  they  have  perhaps 
but  dimly  apprehended  is  that  the  solution  of  a  problem  ought 
ordinarily  to  mean  the  disappearance  of  that  problem,  and 
that  the  idealists,  on  the  other  hand,  have  made  the  mistake  of 
supposing  that  the  problem  as  to  the  possibility  of  knowledge 
(which,  in  that  form  of  it  with  which  we  have  been  made  most 
familiar,  arose  incidentally  out  of  fallacious  reasoning  and 
the  resulting  unnecessary  confusion  of  thought)  must  be  per- 
manently made  the  propaedeutic  to  all  other  philosophical 
problems  —  a  mistake  which  is  principally  responsible  for  the 
fact  that  for  some  generations  epistemology  has  been  made 
the  cockpit  of  philosophers?  The  method  of  idealistic  episte- 
mology is  like  that  of  the  quack  physician ;  it  first  administers  a 
drug  which  makes  the  patient's  ailment  chronic,  thus  making 
its  own  further  services  seem  permanently  indispensable. 
The  scientific  epistemology  which  we  would  recommend  pre- 
scribes a  natural  regimen  for  the  sceptic,  including  exercise; 
it  would  help  the  philosophical  novice  through  a  crisis  incidental 
to  the  development  of  his  system  of  thought,  and  thus  soon 
makes  its  further  services  unnecessary. 

We  would  make  the  statement,  then,  even  if  somewhat  ten- 
tatively in  view  of  the  further  problems  to  be  considered, 
still  with  considerable  confidence  in  vie'v  of  the  fatal  objections 
that  we  have  found  ourselves  compelled  to  urge  against  absolute 
epistemological  dualism  and  against  absolute  epistemological 
monism,  whether  idealistic  or  realistic,  that  a  tenable  and  the 
only  tenuule  position  vith  reference  to  the  epistemological 
problem  is  that  which  we  have  designated  a  critical  epistemologi- 
cal monism,  or,  more  explicitly,  critical  realist;-  epistemological 
monism.  It  regards  the  achievements  of  pr.  .-al  knowledge 
as  foundations  for  further  advances.  It  de;i  as  knowledge 
so  .s  to  make  it  include  something  which  we  already  had  before 
we  began  to  philosophize.  Its  results  are  therefore  not  ofiFered 
as  the  first  knowledge,  but  as  a  vindication  of  previous  knowl- 
edge. To  reject  it  is  to  choose  fallacy,  or  agnosticism ;  to  go 
beyond  it  is  to  dogmatize  overmuch.     It  is  not  offered  as  a 


CRITICAL  MONISM   IN   EPISTEMOLOOY  335 

finished  demonstration,  but  as  the  most  reasonable  hypothesis 
in  view  of  all  the  facts,  and  as  continuing  the  practical  certainty 
characteristic  of  the  point  of  view  of  common  sense  and  common 
science.  If,  then,  critical  monism  is  indeed  the  solution  of  the 
philosophical  problem  of  knowledge,  the  thinker  ought  to  find 
himself  able  to  proceed  with  his  metaphysical  tasks  very  much 
as  if  this  particular  question  had  never  been  raised  at  all ;  un- 
less, indeed,  the  solution  of  the  problem  should  incidentally 
reveal  the  fact  that,  either  more  or  less  than  he  had  previously 
supposed  is  entitled  to  come  under  the  designation  of  knowledge.* 

'  In  this  chapter,  as  also  in  C:..  XVI.  infra,  I  have  included,  without  the 
use  of  quotation  marks,  aome  excerpts   from   my  article.  'Is   Realistic  Epi- 
stemological  Monism  Inadmissible?"  in  the  Journal  of  Philoaophy,  X,  1913 
tip.  701-10.  '  ' 


• 


I 


I 


-h   l! 


ff  I;  1 


n  !.  -   • ' 


B.  PROBLEMS  OF  THE  WAYS  AND  MEANS  OF 
KNOWING  (MORPHOLOGY  OF  KNOWL- 
EDGE,  AND  GENETIC  LOGIC) 

CHAPTER  XV 
The  Morphology  of  Knowledge 

The  problem  of  acquaintancp,  or  epistemology  proper,  leads 
naturally  over  into  the  prohloni  of  the  way,  or  ways,  of  knowing, 
or  into  what  may  be  cillcd  the  morphology  of  knowledge.  Here 
the  particular  problem  is  whether  the  different  ways  of  knowing 
are,  in  principle  and  fundamentally,  one ;  or  whether  there  are 
modes  of  cognition  which  are  radically  distinct,  and  between 
which  no  real  continuity  can  be  traced.  This  problem  has  been 
set  for  thinkers  by  the  popular  prevalence  of  what  may  per- 
haps be  termed  an  absolute  morphological  dualism,  according 
to  which  there  are  two  radically  different  ways  of  knowing,  vh. 
experience  and  reasoning,  or  pure  thought ;  or,  more  explicitly, 
perception  and  conception.  The  question  naturally  arises 
as  to  why  there  should  be  two  fundamentally  different  ways  of 
accomplishing  the  same  end,  and  the  search  for  a  unitary  view 
of  the  cognitive  process  begins.  As  might  have  been  antici- 
pated, out  of  this  more  primitive  dualism  'here  developed  an 
antithesis  between  two  extreme  or  absolute  morphological 
monisms,  the  one  conceptualistic  and  the  other  perceptualistic. 

For  our  best  illustration  of  absolute  conceptualistic  monism 
we  have  to  turn  to  a  certain  phase  of  Platonism.  Plato,  who 
derived  his  conception  of  science  from  mathematics,  as  is 
indicated  in  the  well-known  passage,  "By  the  power  of  the 
dialectic,  reason,  using  hypotheses  ...  as  steps  and  points 
of  departure,  .  ,  ,  may  soar  to  the  first  principle  of  the 
whole,  and  .  .  by  successive  steps  she  descends  again,  with- 
out   th      help    of  any   sensible    object,  from   ideas,    through 

336 


•pjr^iaKPSireafi^i^/a.'K^aif  :' 


'II III  lllllHIIIII I 


F^ 


THE  MORPHOLOGY  OF   KNOWLEDGE 


337 


ideas  and  in  ideas  she  ends,"  '  declares  that  perception  has  no 
part  in  science  or  knowledge  or  the  attainment  of  truth.  Per- 
haps what  he  means  to  reject  is  mere  perception ;  but  he  says, 
"We  no  longer  seek  knowledge  in  perception  at  all,  but  in  that 
other  process,  however  called,  in  which  the  mind  is  alone 
and  engaged  with  being."  a  process  which  he  variously  calls 
thinking,  reasoning,  or  opining.^ 

Our  most  instructive  example  of  absolute  perceptualistic 
monism  will  he  found  in  the  philosophy  of  Bergson.  He  ob- 
jects to  the  platonizing  attempt  to  gain  knowledge  of  reality 
by  means  of  an  examination  of  human  concepts,  as  taking  an 
artificial  and  inadequate  imitation  for  the  reality,'  which  is 
adequately  knowable  only  in  a  purely  perceptual  process, 
a  sensuous  and  supra-intellectual  intuition.*  He  uses  the  term 
"knowledge"  in  speaking  of  "analysis"  or  the  conceptual  mode ; 
but  this  analysis  is  "knowing"  the  thing  as  it  is  not,  but  as, 
for  practical  purposes,  it  is  convenient  to  take  it.  Only  in- 
tuition is  knowing  the  thing  as  it  really  is."  The  inadequacy 
of  Bergson's  one-sided  perceptualism  will  be  pointed  out  at 
length  in  our  critique  of  anti-conceptualism ;  •  so  that  for  the 
present  it  will  be  sufficient  to  point  out,  first  of  all,  that,  as 
Bergson  himself  acknowledges,^  absolutely  "pure  perception"  is 
psychologically  impossible  (except,  perhaps,  in  first  conscious- 
ness, or,  more  doubtfully,  in  certain  rather  abn<irmal  states,  such 
as  those  of  extreme  mysticism) ;  and,  in  the  second  place,  that 
much  of  what  Bergson  calls  intuition  in  connection  with  scien- 
tific discovery  is  simply  h>  pothesis,  born  .so  rich  in  verifying 
material,  previously  accumulated,  that  it  does  not  need  to 
"work." 

In  the  positions  just  described  we  find  illustrated  again 
in  connection  with  the  morphology  of  knowledge  that  truth 
of  which  we  have  had  such  abundant  evidence  in  our  investi- 

'  Republic,  fill  ;  cf.  507 ;   see  A.  E.  Taylor,  Plato,  p.  49. 

•  Theceletut,  185-7. 

» Introduction  to  Metaphysics,  translation  by  Hulme,  p.  75 ;  translation  by 
Luce,  p.  88. 

•  Matter  and  Memory,  pp.  84-5,  et  pottim:  Introduction,  pasxim;  Creative 
Evolution,  p.  360. 

'  Introduction,  passim. 

•  See  Ch.  XVIII,  infra.  '  Matter  and  Memory,  p.  26. 


I 


.'i 


^1 


»l  ■'• 


I'  '  1 


* 


3:i8 


THE    PUOULEM    OF    KN()\VLKD(JK 


gat  ion  of  opistoinoloKy  propor,  viz.  that  there  lias  been  alto- 
Kether  Imt  •nuch  abxoluUsm  in  philosophy.  Ahsolutc  niorpho- 
logi'  il  'uaiism,  a;.'  ;'  ulute  niorphologi<'al  monism,  whether  of 
the  concept I'.al  or  the  iH>re<'(i;'ial  sort,  must  ahke  give  i)lace  to  a 
view  which  will  he  critical  enougii  to  make  room  for  the  meas- 
ure of  truth  ijicluded  in  each  of  these  one-sided  views,  and  ex- 
cluded fro  I  1  the  others.  And  it  must  he  acknowledged  that  here 
we  receive  much  help  from  Kant.  Indeed,  when  our  interest 
is  in  the  morphologicjil  problem,  the  essence  of  Kantianism  is 
to  be  found  in  just  that  beuinning  of  a  critical  morphological 
monism  which  is  perhaps  his  greatest  contribution  to  philosophy. 
"Concepts  without  percepts  (intuition)  are  empty;  percepts 
(intuition)  without  concepts  are  blind."  In  the  position  ex- 
pressed in  this  dictum  the  Konigsberg  philosopher,  without 
reverting  to  absolute  morphological  dualism,  avoided  the  one- 
sidedness  of  both  absolute  conceptuulism  and  absolute  per- 
ceptualism.  ]]•  showed  the  necessity  of  mental  activity  for 
all  developed  ix  rceptual  knowledge,  and  yet  insisted  upon 
the  necessity  of  the  immediacy  of  exptMience,  inner  or  outer, 
as  the  tou-  hstone  of  all  that  claims  to  be  knowledge. 

But  Kant's  critical  morphological  monism  was  not  fully 
satisfactory.  On  the  one  hand,  while  perception  without  defi- 
nite conception  is  comparatively  blind,  if  the  most  original  and 
primitive  perception  had  absolutely  no  cognitive  v;due,  it 
would  seem  difficult  to  account  for  the  fact  of  such  value  in  later 
experiences.  If  what  is  retained  from  the  first  and  brouph 
into  the  second  experience  is  cognitive,  it  seems  rather  dog- 
matic to  deny  that  there  was  anything  cognitive  in  that  first 
experience.  But  objection  to  the  other  side  of  Kant's  doctrine 
has  been  much  more  freciuent,  and  is  more  readily  supported. 
From  the  days  of  Fichte,  Schelling,  and  Hegel,  on  to  the  present, 
there  have  always  been  some  to  insist  that  Kant's  phenomenal- 
ism and  metaphysical  agnosticism  show  that  he  went  too  far  in 
his  injunction  against  the  application  of  the  categories  of  thought 
beyond  the  limits  of  human  experience.  Hegel  especially 
emphasized  the  capacity  of  thought,  beginning  indeed  in  sense- 
perception,  but  proceeding,  nccnrding  to  its  own  inner  move- 
ment, adequately  to  know  the  nature  of  ultimate  reality.  In 
this  he  was  followed  by  the  various  branches  of  the  Hegelian 


:msm'. 


THE   MORPHOUXIY   OF    KNOWLEDGE 


339 


school,  and  conspi,  ...usiy  by  McTuKKurt,  who  ciaii    ^  that  a 
coinplrtu  metiiphvsHal  sytitvw  of  kn..vv|p(lK»'  can  Ik-,    oivcil  Uy 
ii  purely  conccpaiul  ilialoc?ic.  with  no  other  (Iqwiid.  icc  upon 
th.  (lata  of  experience  than  such  m  i>  just  suffinent     .  *««tal)- 
li-sh  c.Hitent  for  the  mo-t  primitive  <.|  tl»^  cate«orieM,  that  of 
'•eingj     This  must  he  reRardeil  as  retrooreHsion,  rather  than 
pnwoss  from  Hunt's  critical  tnoru^m ;    and  much  the    same 
thing  must  '•     said  of  the  neo-Kantian  movement,  as  repre- 
sented hy  Heriiiann  Cohen  and  his  school.     It  dotvs  not  lapse 
into  a  IMatonic  absolute  anti-jK-rceptualism ;   hut,  in  its  inter- 
pretation of  all  perceptual  elements  as  the  products  of  thought- 
activity,  if  fails  to  d,.  justice  to  the  non-conceptual  element 
involved  m  the  foundations  of  knowledge. 

Much  more  valuable,  as  leading  toward  the  much  needed 
:pplem(nt,.ti„n  of  the  Kantian  morphology  of  knowledge,  are 
Herbarfs   wvll-known   doctrine  of  af)perception  and   Royce's 
recent    philo.sophi(  al   di.s.'u.ssion   of  "interpretation."     Royce 
objecting  both  to  what  he  takes  to  Iw  the  Platonic  theory  of 
cognition  by  o-re  conception  and  to  the  Bergsonian  theory  of 
cognitiofi  by  pur.   perception,-  claims  to  be  able  to  show  defi- 
nitely how  these  on.  -  '    '  -'iews  may  lie  synthesized.     In  spite 
of  his  insist.fH-e  that         ,..,,.     ,  beings  are  never  possessed  of 
either  pure  perceptioi     ■;   ;),,  ,    <  )nception,'  he  offers  a  tri:;dic 
classification  of  the  tyr-     .-   ,  n(.',;ing  process,  which  apnar.  utiy 
leaves  perception  and     ui.  ^    ,on  standing  as  gen,u!',ei"  cog- 
nitive proces.ses,  in  distinction  from  the  process  in  v. ;  wh  Lr.owl- 
odge  has  its  culmination,  viz.  interpretation.* 

In  view  of  this  doctrine  of  three  different  processes  of  cogni- 
tion, the  f|uestir)n  might  well  \k  taised  as  to  wiicther  w  >  have 
here  anything  Iliat  deserves  t.  r.o  called  moni,stic  in  the  mor- 
phology of  knowledge,  whether  it  is  not  to  be  regarded  as  still 
Miore  objectionable  than  dualism.  But  the  answer  to  this 
litter  query  must  be  negative,  for,  -ince  the  work  of  Flehte 
and  Hegel,  we  can  never  forget  ti  the  triadic  may  be 
far  more  monistic  than  the  dyadic,  v  jere  there  are  but 
two,  th.e  is  often  hopeless  conflict;   i  ut  where  there  is  a 

'  Stiulies  in  Hiyelian  Dialectic,  1896,  p.  46. 

'  The  Probl.:»,  "f  Chrialianitu,  1913,  Vol.  II,  pp.  U7-2.3. 

'^''■Pl2!  ' /6.,  pp.  124,  149-52. 


ij 


^^HTSWW^PW 


340 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   KNOWLEDGE 


i 


i  : 


;i  ;-i 


li 


ni  c 


third,  there  is  hope  of  mediation  and  final  unity.  And  so 
we  would  see  in  Royce's  concept  of  "interpretation"  the  prom- 
ise of  further  progress  beyond  both  absolute  dualism  and 
the  two  absolute  monisms  in  the  direction  of  a  satisfactory 
critical  monism.  The  trouble  is  that  Royce  seems  not  to 
have  effected  a  complete  synthesis  of  perception  and  con- 
ception;  "interpretation"  seems  to  be  a  third  process  added 
to  the  other  two,  rather  than  the  one  all-inclusive  mode  of  cog- 
nition. The  reason  for  this  failure  is  doubtless  to  be  found,  in 
part  at  least,  in  the  peculiar  way  in  which  Royce  —  obviously 
for  the  sake  of  leading  up  to  certain  conclusions  in  the  phi- 
losophy of  the  history  of  religion  and  in  metaphysics  in  which 
he  is  interested  —  defines  interpretation.  He  maintains  that 
it  is  always  a  triadic  relation,  involving  an  original  expression 
of  meaning  (a  sign),  an  interpreter,  and  one  to  whom  it  is 
interpreted."  Thus  it  is  not  only  an  essentially  social  process, 
but  also  "calls,  in  ideal,  for  an  infinite  sequence  of  interpreta- 
tions. For  every  interpretation,  being  addressed  to  somebody, 
demands  interpretation  from  the  one  to  whom  it  is  addressed."  ^ 
Manifestly,  Royce  's  here  defining  his  term  with  a  view  to  the 
metaphysical  structure  he  intends  to  erect  upon  it,  rather 
than  with  a  view  to  tlie  fp-  ts  to  be  represented.  Interpreta- 
tion is  not  necessarily,  in  the  exact  sense  of  the  term,  a  social 
process ;  we  often  make  things  to  be  signs  for  ourselves.  But, 
in  any  case,  interpretation,  itself  interpreted  as  Royce  inter- 
prets it,  cannot  be  made  the  one  typical  mode  of  cognition. 
And  so,  while  Royce  leads  us  to  where  we  can  gain  a  glimpse  of 
a  satisfactory  critical  methodological  monism,  he  does  not  lead 
us  into  that  proniised  land. 

William  James  might  perhaps  be  called  a  critical  percep- 
tualist,  although  his  enthusiasm  for  Bergson »  has  carried  him 
far  in  tlie  liiroction  of  an  absolute  perceptualism.  In  Some 
Problems  of  Philosophy,  however,  while  holding  to  the  "in- 
superability of  sensation,"  he  admits  that  concepts  give  real 
knowledge,  however  inadequate  to  the  fulness  of  reality  they 
may  be,^  and  even  insists  that  the  "eternal"  truths  contained 


^:i  ■   *\\< 


'  Thr  Pruhlrm  of  Chrislianil'i,  1<)13,  Vol.  II,  pp.  140  ff. 

'  lb.,  p.  ir.O.  8  ,t  Plurnlistic  Universe,  1909,  Lecture  VI. 

*  Some  Problema  of  Philosophy,  1911,  pp.  78-9,  UK). 


TH/J   MORPHOLOGY  OP  KNOWLEDGE 


341 


in  the  map  framed  by  the  mind  out  of  concepts  would  have 
to  be  acknowledged,  were  the  world  of  sense  annihilated.' 

When  we  undertake  to  see  whether  it  is  not  possible  to  realize 
the  ideal  of  a  cri*ic«I  monism  in  the  morphology  of  knowledge, 
the  question  occurs  whether  Royce's  three-fold  classification 
(perception,  conception,  and  interpretation)  is  not  capable  of 
being  further  simplified.     In  the  light  of  what  has  been  said 
m  our  constructive  discussion  of  the  problem  of  acquaintance, 
undoubtedly  the  claims  of  perception  to  be  regarded  as  genuinely 
cognitive  cannot  be  gainsaid.    Through  the  activity  of  sense 
and  whatever  mental  activity  may  further  be  necessary,  there 
is  an  awareness  of  the  existence  and  to  some  extent  of  the 
nature  of  some  reality  or  realities.     The  question  which  must 
be  considered,  if  a  position  as  monistic  as  is  compatible  with  a 
thoroughly  critical  attitude  is  to  be  established,  is  the  question 
to  what  extent  conception  and  interpretation  are  either  not 
cognitive  at  all,  or  else  reducible  to  practical  identity  with 
perception. 

Taking  up  conception  first,  our  contention  would  be  that 
this  form  of  mental  activity  by  itself  never  amounts  to  cogni- 
tion.    Conception  without  perception  has  no  connection  with 
independent  reality;    its  products  are  but  empty  forms,  ab- 
stract, cut  off  from  being.     So,  too,  mere  imagination,  as  that 
form  of  conception,  broadly  speaking  —  or  better,  of  ideation, 
or  thinking  —  which  is  least  abstract,  so  far  as  qualitative 
detail  is  concerned,  is  non-cognitive.     Judgment  also,  in  the 
form  0/  the  mere  supposition,  ai^b.mption,  hypothesis,  tentative 
generalization,  is  manifestly  nv.t  cognition ;   nor  can  ratiocina- 
tion on  the  basis  of  such  assumption  of  itself  give  us  knowledge. 
Its  final  conclusion  is  as  tentative  as  its  first  assumption,  until 
verified.     Neither  can  even  the  possession  of  traditional  teach- 
ing with  reference  to  any  fact,  or  as  to  the  truth  of  any  opinion, 
bo  regarded  as  amounting  for  us  to  knowledge  of  that  fact  or 
that  truth.     Merely  to  think,  to  have  an  opinion,  or  even  to 
have  true  opinion,  as  Plato  himself  insisted,=  is  not  to  know. 

All  of  these  forms  of  mental  activity,  taken  by  themselves, 
can  give  us  no  more  than  preparation  for  cognition;  they 
develop  and  manipulate  the  instruments  of  knowledge,  but 

'  il>-'  PP-  73-4.  »  Meno,  98. 


r 


342 


THE   PROBLEM   OP   KXOWLEDOE 


■ 


ri 


they  all  lack  that  immediate  sensing  or  awareness  of  tht  pres- 
ence of  reality,  which  constitutes  the  cognitive  core  of  all 
perceptual  experience.  So  far  as  their  present  cognitive  status 
is  concerned,  they  are  related  to  indisputably  cognitive  pro- 
cesses in  general  as  the  having  of  after-images  and  other  forms 
of  hallucinatory  sense-experience  are  related  to  normal  imme- 
diate perception.  They  are  detached  from  reality,  and  so, 
non-cognitive.  In  fact,  they  belong  with  dreams  rather  than 
with  cognitions,  save  that  they  are  more  purposively  governed 
and,  as  a  result,  more  useful.  "Day-dreams,"  however,  are 
intermediate  between  useful  non-cognitive  thinking  and  the 
uncontrolled  dreams  of  .sleep. 

Interpretation,  on  the  other  hand,  we  may  regard  as  a  form 
of  cognition  which  is  fumlamentally  identical  with  perception. 
The  most  primitive  cognition  may  perhaps  have  been,  strictly 
speaking,  pure  perception ;  but  it  is  generally  agreed,  and  that 
on  very  good  grounds,  that  perception  without  apperception  is, 
or  would  be,  comparatively  —  indeed,  almost  totally  —  blind. 
And  what  we  are  here  concerned  to  suggest  is  that  inlerpretatior 
is  simply  apperception  long  drawn  out,  that  apperception  is 
nothing  but  an  extremely  facile  interpretation.  We  have  sug- 
gested liere,  then,  a  critical  percept uali at ic  morphological  mon- 
ism; it  will  1)6  our  remaining  task  in  this  chapter,  therefore, 
to  investigate  how  far  all  genuimiy  cognitive  forms  of  conscious- 
ness may  ho  viewed  as  essentially  identical  with  perception. 

Memory,  for  example,  is  generally  recognized  as  being,  when 
normal,  genuinely  cognitive.  But  that  which  distinguishes 
it  from  ii'.ere  imagination  is  that  the  representations  involved 
in  memory  always  form  part  of  the  "apperceptive  mass"  in 
a  more  or  less  marginal  awareness  of  the  present  conscioas 
self.  It  is  a  representation  of  a  part  of  the  past  iife  of  the 
present  perceived  self,  or,  as  James  puts  it,  "  the  knowledge 
of  an  event,  or  fact,  of  which  meantime  we  have  not  been 
thinking,  with  the  additional  consciousness  that  we  have 
thought  or  experienced  it  before."'  And  so  it  conforms  essen- 
tially to  the  perceptual  type  of  consciousness,  while  mere  imag- 
ination does  not.  Il'stori^al  information,  again,  is  knowledge, 
while  mere  tradition  is  not ;    it  has  been  l)rought  sufficiently 

'  The  Principles  of  Psychology,  Vol.  I,  p.  648. 


A 


fl 


THE   MORPHOLOGY  OF   KNOWLEDGE  343 

into  relation  with  our  strictly  perceptual  knowledge  to  become 
a  part  of  what  is,  broadly  speaking,  our  perception  of  the  real 
world   in   which  we   stand.     History  is  community-  or  race- 
memory.     Verified  judgment  is,  of  course,  cognitive;   and  this 
too,  viewed  as  verified,  i.e.  in  association  with  the  sensed  or 
felt  reality  of  which  it  is  the  interpretation,  is  essentially  per- 
ceptual;   it  IS  in  direct  experience  that  its  verification  takes 
place,    the    verification-process    afterwards    taking    its    pla^e 
among  the  facts  of  memor>'.     Generalization  l.y  itself  is  as  we 
have  seen,  mere  hypothesis,  and  as  such  it  is  essentially  con- 
ceptual and  non-cognitive;   but  when  inductive  and  viewed  in 
conjunction  with  the  verifying  facts  as  experienced,  it  is  cog- 
nitive, an  interpretation  of  what  is  sensed  or  felt,  and  so 
essentially    perceptual.     Ratiocination    also,    on    the    basis    of 
verified  judgments,  is  simply  a  drawing  out  further  of  the  inter- 
pretative or  essentially  apperceptive  process,  and  so  includes 
the  perceptual  feature  necessary  to  entitle  it  to  be  regarded  as 
leading  to  genuine  knowledge. 

It  is  important  to  note  that  in  many    ases  our  knowledge  of 
the  presence  of  a  certain  reality-  can  only  be  what  mav  be 
called  perception  in  a  complex.     We  are  unable  to  clothe  the 
reality  in   question   directly   and   immediately   with   any  one 
serse-quahty  ;  but  by  the  creation  f)f  various  sense-  and  feeling- 
qualities  and   by  their  appropriate   location,  the  presence  of 
that  reality  may  be  readily  detected,  perceived.     This  is  ob- 
viously the  case  with  the  perception  of  the  fact  of  motion  • 
we  dete;    it  only  in  connection  with  our  perception  of  a  complex 
of   other   realities   in   successively   different    spatial   relations 
And  so  It  IS  wiih  change  in  general,'  and  with  such  special 
changing  realities  as  activity,  life,  and  fonsciousn«.s      When 
we  perceive  the  body  in  certain  changmg  relations  with  its 
environment,  we  perceive  a  living  organism ;   we  perceive  — 
not  as  a  separately  sensed  object,  but  as  an  object  sensed  in 
this  compie::  -  the  life  and  activity,  and  even  the  conscious- 
ness, of  the  individual  soul  which  has  the  bodv.     Indeed  it  is 
not  too  much  to  say  that,  in  a  somewhat  broader  sense  of  the 
term  perception,  we  perceive  the  subject  of  this  activity   the 
"entelechy"    (the    vitalistic    principle    in    morphogenesis,    as 

'  Cf.  Bergaoii,  La  iHrrr,,ii„n  du  .hanyewenl,  1911,  uaasim. 


:r„i, •...,,  ^^.«^,g.^.^.-MJ.!M«llLJ|.»..|ll-,||l^* 


i 


K- 


t 

H 


'>  \ 


i  ,1 


ft 


344 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  KNOWLEDGE 


Driesch  designates  it),  or  "psychoid"  (the  vitalistic  principle 
in  the  discharge  of  function '),  or  soul,  or  mind,  or  self,  as  the 
case  may  be. 

This  perception  of  change  in  a  complex  is  simply  a  special 
case  of  the  perception  of  relatioiis.  William  James  has  laboi .  i 
to  show  that,  if  we  are  to  be  conscious  of  any  relation,  we  must 
have  an  elementary  feeling  of  that  relation.*  Now  undoubt- 
edly we  do  have  feelings  of  certain  relations,  and  possibly  of 
all ;  but  it  seems  altogether  too  much  to  say  that  we  know 
relations  primarily  by  means  of  these  feelings  of  relations. 
Rather  do  we  know  relations  as  included  in  a  complex,  which 
complex  we  know  always  ultimately  by  what  is,  in  a  broader 
or  a  narrower  sense  of  the  word,  perception. 

Of  special  importance  is  the  fact  of  the  perception  of  conscious- 
ness as  a  unique  creative  activity,  in  the  complex  of  an  organ- 
ism of  a  certain  type  and  its  environment,  the  products  of 
which  activity  are  sense-qualities,  memory  and  other  images, 
ideas,  feelings,  volitions,  etc.  In  the  first  place,  it  should  be 
said  that  while  mere  imagination,  conception,  assumption, 
inference  from  mere  assumption,  the  possession  of  traditional 
teaching,  like  illusion,  hallucination,  dreaming,  and  erroneous 
pr<>ces.scs  of  thought  generally,  are  not  really  cognitive,  the 
perception  of  any  of  these  processes  uf  imagination,  conception, 
and  the  rest,  is  a  genuine  process  of  cognition. 

Birf  it  is  of  still  greater  imiwutance  to  note  that  we  seem 
to  have  here  the  means  of  (»olving  the  old  puzzles  a.s  to  the 
nature  and  possibility  of  introspection.  By  ordinary  definition, 
introifx-rrion  is  consciousness  of  one's  own  consciousness,  or 
more  exactly,  if  such  a  thing  '^■ar  be  said  to  be  po.ssihlc  at  all, 
consciou8n«w,  preferably  immediate,  of  one's  </wti  present 
conscummaem.  Now  by  our  definition  of  consciousnewi  as  » 
unique  reative  a<*tiviry,  tiie  products  of  which  are  «ense- 
qualities,  i*jeas.  feelings,  aod  tiie  like,  it  might  seem  quite  cl'-ar 
that  when  p(»><'tw«al  predues**  a^e  creatwi  for  the  sake  of  cog- 
nizitjfi  o^  9KV.  ;jsychiesl  pB»docts,  those  which  we  seek  to 
perceive  a*e  always  iiec**Hanfc  diffpwnt  from  and  prior  u, 
those  few  iseiMe  of  which  aw-  wuuhl  [jen-eive  them     so  that  iill 

'  51.  Diasww' .,  Tlu-  .sVit„rf.  and  f*h>i-i(tphu  of  the  Urgar.nfn,  190K,  pattim. 
-  Enaayii  ui  Hudual  R/mtinvi^m,  pastim. 


THE   MORPHOLOGY  OF   KNOWLEDGE 


345 


introspection  would  seem  to  be,  of  necessity,  retrospection. 
This,  if  true  at  all,  would  be  most  obviously  true  of  psychical 
"elements,"  the  products  of  that  creative  psychical  activity 
which  is  the  real  nature  of  consciousness.     The  question  of 
introspection,  as  the  question  of  an  immediate  perception  of 
consdoiuiness,  must  ask  whether  we  can  perceive  the  activity 
Itself.     To  this  the  answer  would  seem  to  be  that  while  there  is 
no  special  psychical  product,  or  element,   which  reveals  the 
presence  of  consciousness,  except  a  vague  feeling  of  activity, 
which  may  be  at  least  plausibly  regarded  as  a  feeling  of  bodily 
attitude  a  ad  condition  — a  circumstance  which  has  led  to  the 
notion  that  we  have  no  right  to  say  there  is  any  consciousness, 
because  we  cannot  discover  it  by  introspection  '  —  it  is  never- 
theless true  that  wf^  do  perceive  our  own  consciousness  as  an 
activity  amid  the  complex  of  our  bodily  life  and  our  physical 
and  social  environment. 

Moreover,  according  to  the  view  we  have  set  forth,  we  may 
bo  said  in  a  broad  sense  to  perceive  our  past,  in  so  far  as  we 
really  remember  it,  and  in  a  narrower  sense  to  perceive  the 
"specious  present,"  i.e.  the  present  moment  in  its  relation  to 
a  going  past  and  a  coming  future,  by  means  of  perceptual  or 
apperceptual   elements   which   are   psychical   products   which 
them.selves  endure  with  but  partial  and  gradual  change  for  an 
appreciable  time,  thus  bridging  over  the  temporal  transition ; 
and  because  of  this  the  rigid  contrast  between  introspection 
and  retrospection  disappears.     Broadly  speaking,  we  perceive 
our  own  conscious  life  and  activity  as  having  i*s  place  in  the  past 
and  present  and  up  to  the  very  border  of  the  still  uncreated 
future;    and  even  in  a  narrower  sense,  we  perceive  our  own 
consciousness  in  the  complex  of  independent  realities  and  prod- 
ucts of  cons'-iousness  which  fall  within  the  "specious  present," 
And  this  can  be  maintained  even  if,  by  the  chronometer,  the 
p.sychical  activity  directed  toward  perceiving  the  present  con- 
sciousness comes  after  other  elements  comprised   within  the 
unity  of  this  specious  present. 

But  if  we  adopt  this  solution  of  the  problem,  another  ques- 
tion immediately  presents  itself.     It  is  simply  a  special  in- 

'  ('(.  Wia.  JaiLes.  "Does  Cousciousneus  Exist?"  Essays  in  Radical  Empiri- 
cism, Es.say  I. 


i 


^ ; 


I  > 


fi:  . 


% 


V  i 


m 


•!.: 


\bii\ 


346 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  KNOWLEDGE 


stance  of  the  "egocentric  predicament,"  that  we  can  never 
introspect  an  experience  which,  as  a  content  of  the  specious 
present,  does  not  therewith  come  to  be  an  introspected  experi- 
ence; but  does  this  not  mean  that  introspection  changes  essen- 
tially the  character  of  what  it  seeks  to  investigate?  To  this 
qucsdon,  however,  our  theory  of  the  internaUty  anil  externaUty 
of  relations  cnal)les  us  to  answer  that  it  is  quite  conceivable 
that  the  fact  of  introspection  should,  in  many  cases,  be  "ex- 
ternal" to  the  remaining  content,  so  far  as  the  purposes  which 
need  to  be  taken  into  account  are  concerned.  Reduced  to  a 
minimum,  to  introspect  is  to  think  of  my  present  experience 
as  my  experience  or  my  activity.  It  is  true  that  so  thinking 
may  be  the  occasion  of  further  psychical  changes,  but  whether 
or  not  these  changes  are  sufficient  to  thwart  the  purpose  to 
introspect  can  only  be  determined  by  the  consequences  in  each 
particular  instance. 

But  possibly  this  somewhat  elaborate  treatment  of  the 
problem  of  introspection  ir,  unnecessary.  Have  we  not  an 
intuitive  awareness  of  our  own  conscious  activity?  May  it 
not  be  plausibly  contended  that  every  act  of  consciousness  is 
invariably  self-presenting,  and  that  the  common  confu.sion  on 
this  point  is  due  to  the  fact  that  it  is  never  self-representing? 
This  compels  us  to  raise  definitely  the  question  as  to  the  nature 
of  intuition,  including  its  relation  to  perception,  a  question 
which  would  in  any  ca.se  demand  our  attention  in  connection 
with  the  attempt  to  establish,  in  the  morphology  of  knowledge, 
a  critical  monism,  and  especially  .so  when  that  monism  is  a 
critical  perceptunlisiic  monism. 

What  we  are  concerned  with  here  is  the  new  or  perceptual, 
intuitionism,  rather  than  the  old,  or  conceptual,  variety  of 
intuitional  philosophy.  This  perceptual  intuitionism,  the 
doctrine  that  in  .sonsp-experience,  or  feeling,  or  both,  there  is 
a  direct  awareness  of  independent  reality  of  some  sort,  is  most 
compatible  wiih  a  realistic  monism  in  opi.stemology ;  but  there 
are  certain  approaches  to  it  among  some  of  the  dualistic  and 
idealistic  philosophers.  Kart,  for  instance,  has  his  doctrine 
of  intuition,  by  which  he  seems  to  mean  the  content  of  experi- 
ence at  the  extreme  limit  of  pure,  or  non-conceptual,  percep- 
tion.   This,  however,  i.s  regarded  as  a  product  of  independent 


THE   MORPHOLOGY  OP  KNOWLEDGE  347 

reality,  rather  than  its  presentation.     Fries  and  his  followers 
have  recognized  the  psychical  fact  of  an  ostensibly  immediate 
awareness,  through  feeling,  of  the  nature  of  an  independent 
reality  which  is  never  directly  presented ;    but  they  virtually 
deny  it  any  genuinely  cognitive  character.     Volkelt's  doctrine 
of  intmtion  is  somewhat  similar  to  that  of  the  Friesians,  in  that 
It  makes  feeling  the  channel  of  such  intuitive  awareness  as 
there  is ;    but  he  differs  from  them  in  apparently  attaching, 
although  not  without  doubt  and  hesitation  in  some  instances 
some  cogmtive  value  to  such  intuition.     His  list  of  intuitive 
certainties,  however,  is  not  extensive,  and  his  general  attitude 
is  conservative.     Bergson's  philosophy,  as  a  sort  of  veiled 
psychological  idealism,  is  at  the  same  time  incipiently  realistic  • 
and  reference  has  already  been  made  to  his  methodological 
emphasis  upon  intuition.     His  doctrine  is  very  fruitful  in  con- 
nection with  a  perceptudistic  monism,  but  certain  Hmitations 
are  to  be  noted.     In  the  first  place,  there  is  the  troublesome 
question  as  to  just  how  far  he  would  have  us  regard  as  inde- 
pendently real  the  object  of  pure  perception.     Then  there  is 
the  obvious  difficulty  involved  in  having  the  ab.soliitely  p,  re  per- 
ception, in  which  alone,  according  to  Bergson's  extreme  edi- 
conceptuahsm,   true  knowledge  is   to  be  found.     Moreover 
as  has  been  said  above,  what  is  set  forth  as  marking  the 
place  of  intuition  in  scientific  investigation  seems  really  to 
be  nothing  more  — at   least   ordinarily  —  than   the  produc- 
tion of  the  unifying  hypothesis  after  facts  sufficient  to  verify 
it  have  been  accumulated.     But  among  those  not  avowedly 
reahstic  in  their  gener;>.l  epistemology,  perhaps  no  one  comes 
nearer  to  a  perceptual  intuitionism  than  W.  E.  Hocking,  with 
his  insistence  upon  the  cognitive  function  of  feeling.     While 
findmg  much  in  this  that  is  suggestive  and  that  seems  tenable 
we  should  have  to  dissent,  nevertheless,  from  his  use  of  this 
line  of  thought  as  an  argument  for  theoretical  idealism.     More- 
over, while  agreeing  with  him  in  rejecting  the  Bergsonian  anti- 
conceptuahsm,  we  should  have  to  raise  fhe  query  whether,  in 
his  synthesis  of  Hegelian  idealism  with  Bergsonian  intuition- 
ism,' he  has  not  gone  even  more  than  dangerously  far  in  the 
direction  of  the  dogin^itic  rationalism  of  iho  older  Hegelians. 
'  "The  SignifiLance  of  Bergson,"  Yak  Rniew.  Ill,  1914,  pp.  ;;25-6. 


HM 


348 


THE   PROBLEM  OP   KNOWLEDGE 


I 


ir 


r's' 


^^|];i-' 


A  similar  dogmatism,  as  we  have  seen,  marks  the  intuition- 
ism  of  the  neo-realists.  But,  within  the  Umits  of  the  (as  we 
hope)  less  dogmatic  "critical  realistic  epistemological  monism" 
to  which  we  have  indicated  our  adherence,  what  becomes  of 
intuition  as  a  mode  of  cognition,  and  what  bearing  has  our 
answer  to  this  question  upon  our  search  for  a  critical  perceptual- 
istic  methodological  monism?  In  the  first  place,  it  is  funda- 
mental to  our  epistemological  view  that  we  have  an  immediate, 
or,  if  one  chooses  so  to  use  the  term,  an  intuitive  awareness 
of  the  sense-qualities,  feehngs  and  other  psychical  products 
for  which  our  own  psychical  nature  is  responsible.  This  in 
recognition  of  the  Kantian  doctrine  of  the  "intuition"  of  the 
manifold  of  sense,  and  of  the  conscious  relation  which  is  the 
nearest  we  ever  come,  after  early  infancy,  to  "pure  percep- 
tion." But  "pure  perception"  is  not  the  only  cognition.  In 
perceiving  sense-qualities  we  also  have  a  direct  or  intuitive 
awareness  of  certain  primary  qualities  of  the  independent 
reahties  of  our  environment.  Moreover,  in  and  through  our 
feeling-consciousness  we  have  a  practically  intuitive  awareness 
of  various  values.  Indeed  it  would  seem  that,  whereas  rela- 
tions are  most  commonly  cognized  by  being  analyzed  out  of  an 
essentially  perceptual  complex,  but  may  also  be  more  or  less 
definitely  felt,  values  on  the  contrary  are  probably  most  com- 
monly cognized  by  being  felt,  i.e.  in  a  more  distinctly  intuitive 
way,  although  they  may  also  be  found  by  analysis  of  a  given 
complex. 

But  the  interest  in  maintaining  a  positive  empirical  intuition- 
ism  usually  centres  in  the  doctrine  that  through  <Mir  feelings, 
as  distinguished  from  the  sensations  of  the  special  senses,  we 
can  perceive  not  only  certain  existencrs,  but  to  some  extent 
the  nature  of  those  existences.  What  is  claimed  is  a  sort  of 
direct  or,  in  the  narrower  sense,  perceptual  awareness  of  what 
is  ordinarily  regarded  as  knowable  only  by  inference,  or  in 
some  other  mediate  way,  even  if  this  mediate  cognition  may 
also,  as  we  have  here  claimed,  be  interpreted  as  itself  ultimately 
and  fundamentally  perceptual.  We  may  concede  at  once  that 
hypotheses  are  often  suggested  in  su^h  a  way  as  to  be  accom- 
panied by  the  feeling  that  they  are  true;  but  we  must  not 
allow  to  pass  unchallenged  the  assumption  that  such  feeling  is 


THE   MORPHOLOGY   OP  KNOWLEDGE  349 

always  valid  ground  for  confidence.     And  yet,  on  the  other 
hand  we  must  insist  that  this  anticipatory  h-ding  of  the  truth 

r//f«l  T  .      A/'  "°*  '"  ''^'^  ''^'"'y'  ^••"""d  for  suspecting 
•ts  falsehood.     Obviously,  in  the  light  of  experience,  there  is 
no  absolutely  uniform  relation  between  the  feeUng  thit  an  hy- 
pothesis IS  rue  and  its  being  actually  true ;  and  yet,  on  the  other 
hand,  thKs  feohng  cannot  be  dismissed  as  having  no  significance 
We  would  claim  that  it  sometimes  gives  ground  for  confidence 
and  sometimes  ground  for  suspicion.     We  shall  not  go  into 
this   opic  very  uUy  in  this  connection,  as  it  belongs  also  to  the 
problem  of  mediate  knowledge,  a  consideration  of  which  is  to 
follow.     And  yet  it  may  be  said  here  that  what  is  "intuitively" 
felt  to  be  true  is  generally  something  which  it  is  pleasant  to 
beheve ;   and  certain  highly  emotional  and  wilful,  and  perhaps 
somewhat  uncritical  and  unanalytical,  natures  t;nd  to  affirm 
It  as  true  on  these  psychological  rather  than  logical  grounds 
But  If  we  would  be  adequately  critical  we  must  r'ecognirthai 
even  if  ,t^  may  sometimes  be  that  the  pleasant  hypothesis  is 
peasant  because  it  is  useful,  it  may  also  sometime^  be  plea^! 
ant  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  it  is  not  useful,  but  quite  injurious ; 
and  further,  that  even  if  it  may  sometimes  be  that  the  usefu 

usS  r?  r    r^"'  •^''""'^  ''  ''  ^^"^'  ^'  "^^y  ^^'"^times  be 
use  ul  (relatively  to  some  proximate  end)  in  spite  of  the  fact 

hat  It  IS  not  true.     It  is  only  the  pleasantness  which  is  due  to 
the  us.tulness  which  is  due  to  truth  which  can  l>e  taken  as  an 
.ndieation  of  truth ;  and  the  task  of  distinguishing  such  pleas- 
antness from  all  other  varieties  of  agreeable  emotion  which 
melns  e-''-'''''"'*''''  "^'^^  *^^  occurrence  of  hypotheses  is  by  no 
It  is  important,  finally,  to  note  that  the  appreciation  of 
values,  which  is  commonly  "intuitive"  and  always  fundamen- 
o!^tinr'Tl     '  "ry,'^"^tion  in  the  recognition  of  certain 
realities.     The  work  ot  a  certain  artist,  for  example,  may  be 
perceived  as  being  such  by  the  sort  and  degree  of  value  which  it 
possesses.     This  obvious  truth  may  prove  capable  of  important 
applications.  *^ 

Our  conclusion,  then,  is  that  while  the  absolute  perceptual- 
istic  monist  is  over-dogmatic  in  affirming  the  purelv  and  narrowly 
perceptual  character  of  all  cognition,  it  is  nevertheless  true 


•iitaHBiaewF£»»«>¥~f«!rrs«^iiPL 


350 


THE  PROBLEM   t)F   KNOWLEDGE 


that,  bn'iidly  .>|)eaking,  ull  cognition  is,  uliimately  and  funda- 
mentally ant'  indeed  in  its  iniicrino-st  essence,  always  percep- 
tual Mediate  knowlcdKo  is  knowUilKe  only  by  virtue  of  the 
support  of  iininedi.ite  kuowleiipc ;  and  so,  itt*  relatioi  imme- 
diate knowledge  boing  rightly  n-garded  as  an  internal  relation, 
it  enters  into  its  kmnvlrdgi  -si.,'us  only  as  a  part  of  the  ma- 
chinery of  apperception,  or,  to  use  Royce's  term,  o'  interpre- 
tation. Inasmuch,  however,  as  all  ordinary  perception  involves 
apperception,  interpretation,  it  iii.iy  also  be  said  to  be,  in  some 
broad  seruse  of  the  term,  conceptual.  But  knowing  is  never 
merely  conceptual.  Conception,  we  repeat,  is  cognitive  only 
in  interpretation,  i.e.  in  combination  with  perception. 


n 


'.t 


.  .  u 


i  I' 


CHAPTER  XVI 
The  Genesis  of  the  A  Priori 

ground  that  it  ,«  .ncompatible  with  any  current  interpretat  on 
tiol       pr:   'th  '""^^" -«"'^r  -tivity  which,  in  ^:^Z 

SpLLtL?nf  r'^"'""  "  '^'  '"''"•^^"^'-  The  classical 
nicrpretat  ons  of  this  a  prion  element  may  be  grouped  under 

lb  J^  ^"'"^  •^'''"  ^'^"'"^^  «^"«"^  dualism  raSialtc 
Tsm  TheT  rr™'  ^"^  -'P'"-J  absolute'genermon! 
n„TKlT  I""'*  ^  '^*"*^"^^  ^^'th  reference  to  their  cZ- 

patibihty  with  our  doctrine  of  acquaintance;   and  i   it  shoTd 

entrwuVou?"^f  ''''  "°"^  °^  ^^^"^  -"  be  held  c  '  i  ^ 
S  r  V/  u"*r'  epistemological  monism,  and  if,  on  the 
other  hand,  ,t  should  not  appear  that  any  one  of  the  thr  J  J^ 
demonstrably  valid,  it  will   then   be  incL^nt     pon   ^  ^ 

Xngtfth  o^  ""'  V°"^*'  *^^°'^'  '"  '*-'^  ^--"e^ln^ 
esTablTsLr  Such^'"'''!'  epistemological  theory,  may  n;t  be 
estabhshed.  Such  investigations  would  take  us  into  the  field 
of  psychogenesis,  and  at  least  into  the  borders  of  what  ha^ 
ptL?'?'  ''^"^^•^  ^°«^^'  "*^«  «-*-  -ience  of  logicS 
Of  absolute  genetic  dualism  with  reference  to  these  cognitive 
thou?htt."^K 'rr^  '^''P"^'*  '^^  ^he  fundamentaT  orms  o 
o?  Kani  *tl'"';"?*'-^*'""  '^  '^  "^^  fo-'J  -  the  philosophy 

influ?n?kl      ffi:t      I""'  ""  ;'"  P°'"^  ^'^«  been  immenLy 
mnuential.     His  teaching  on  this  subject  is  an  absolute  dual 

wh   h  seem  to  b^T"  1  ''"^',  ^""^-"^^"tal  fornis  of  cognition 
Which  seem  to  be  already  involved  in  the  first  intelligible  expe- 

ductfon"'-  ^'"""'  ''''"^''  "'^  ^^•'^•-  -  «-*'-  ^°^-.  Vol.  I.  ,906,  Intro- 

351 


MMk 


MICROCOPY    RESOLUTION   TEST   CHART 

(ANSI  ond  ISO  TEST  CHART  No,  2) 


1.0 


I.I 


1.25 


m  11^   III  2.5 


1.4 


•—      1 3  6         11111= 

t      1^ 


2.0 


1.8 


1.6 


^     APPUEO_  IM/^GE     Inc 

^^  ■■'bi    i.Q-^'.    M'j'"    Stree* 

r-S         ■'"'-■cr'ester.    Ne*    ''ort.         U609        USA 


f 


i.f-i 


'>,; 


u 


352 


THE   PROBLEM  OP   KXOWLEDOE 


riencc  of  the  individual,  and  an  absolutely  empiricist  doctrine 
of  the  origin  of  the  sense-material,  or  contents,  of  cognition. 
]VIin<l,  on  this  view,  is  absolutely  active  (i.e.  creative)  with  refer- 
ence to  the  forms  of  objects,  and  absolutely  passive  with  reference 
to  their  sense-qualities.  An  unknowable  independent  reality 
presumably  produces  these  sense-data  within  our  experience,  and 
these  are  worked  up  into  objects  according  to  necessary  and 
universal  ways  of  apperceiving  which  are  not  further  expli- 
cable. The  agnosticism  is  logically  inevit  il)le.  Obviously  it 
would  be  pure  dogmatism  to  assume  that  the  independent 
things-in-themselves  arc  even  like  the  objects  of  sense;  for 
this  would  mean  nothing  less  than  the  affirmation  that,  after 
the  sense-materials,  as  products  of  an  unexperienced  cause, 
have  been  built  up  in  a  certain  way  into  objects,  i.e.  radically 
modified,  by  another  cause  (the  human  mind),  these  constructs 
miraculously  happen  to  copy  one  of  their  unknown  causes, 
although  no  one  can  show  that  they  do  so,  nor  any  reason  why 
they  should.  That  is,  even  representative  "knowledge"  of 
independent  reality  is  precluded ;  it  could  never  be  certain, 
or  even  probable,  and  so  could  not  be  knoidedge,  even  if  it  did 
happen  to  be  true  representation.  Much  less,  then,  could  there 
be,  on  the  basis  of  the  Kantian  absolute  genetic  dualism, 
presentativc  knowledge,  such  as  is  required  by  our  realistic 
epistemological  monism. 

Most  modern  philosophical  thought,  both  pre-  and  post- 
Kantian,  has  tended,  with  reference  to  this  genetic  problem, 
to  an  absolutely  monistic  position,  either  rationalistic  or  em- 
pirical. Of  prc-Kantian  absolute  genet  if  monism  in  its  ration- 
alistic form,  the  doctrines  of  Descartes  and  Leibniz  furnish  us 
with  good  examples.  Descartes's  i)ure  rationalism  led  him  to 
raise  the  question  why  we  should  take  the  necessities  of  thought 
as  giving  us  knowledge  of  the  nature  of  reality.  The  only 
solution  of  this  problem  for  Descartes  was  to  be  found  in  the 
postulate  of  a  holy  and  perfect  (iod  who  would  not  deceive  us ; 
whereas  the  existence  of  such  a  God,  he  had  to  admit,  could  be 
established  only  by  means  of  an  argument  which  seemed  to 
him  (if  not  to  many  others)  to  be  rationally  necessary  and 
thus  one  of  those  very  processes  the  validity  of  which  must 
remain  problematic  until  the  existence  of  this  Perfect  Being 


■If 


THE   GENESIS  OP  THE  A  PRIORI 


353 


IS  assumed.  It  is  a  clear  case  of  a  logical  circle.  In  Leibniz, 
however,  we  see  the  thoroughgoing  rationalist ;  according  to 
hun  the  object  of  immediate  apprehension  is  in  toto  the  product 
of  the  individual  monad  which  cxpori(>nces  and  knows  it. 

After  Kant  there  soon  occurred,  notably  in  Fichte  and  Hogel, 
a  recrudescence  of  this  doctrine  that  the  creative  activity  of 
the  Ego,  or  of  Thought,  is  sufficit  nt  to  account  for  all  the  con- 
tents of  exporierico,  including  even  those  sense-element >  uliich 
seem  most  unmistakably  to  be  "given."     More  recently  still, 
many  nco-Kantian  thinkers,  such  as  T.  H.  Green,  and  espe- 
cially II.  Cohen  and  his  school,  have  taught  that  the  object  is 
the  exclusive  product  of  the  a  priori  or  rational  activities  of  the 
thinking  subject.     According  to  Green   the  object   is  made 
what  It  is  by  its  relations,  which  are,  in  all  cases,  the  work 
of  thought.     Cognition  is  always  construction,  according  to 
Cohen ;   the  sense-qualities  which  we  know  are  known  only  as 
the  object  of  the  thought  which  constructs  them,  as  truly  as 
thought    constructs    any    other    object.     Manifestly    such    a 
doctrine  could  never      commodate  itself  to  a  critical  realistic 
monism  in  epistemology,  but  onlj  to  an  idealistic  interpreta- 
tion of  the  object  of  experience.     If  there  is  no  reality  which 
exists,  or  can  exist,  independently  of  thought,  all  question  as 
to  the  possibility  of  an  immediate  experience  of  such  an  inde- 
pendently existing  reality  becomes  nonsensical. 

As  in  the  case  of  its  rationalistic  form,  so  also  in  its  empiri- 
cal form  ab.solute  genetic  monism  has  its  pre-Kantian  as  well 
as  its  post-Kantian  representatives.  Of  the  former,  at  least 
within  ihe  mo^lern  period,  Hume  must  be  regarded  as  the  most 
important.  All  our  ideas,  even  those  of  pure  mathematics, 
he  claims,  are  copied  from  our  impressions,  and  these  sense- 
impressions  are  simply  "data"  passively  received,  the  ultimate 
of  knowledge  as  of  experience.  More  absolutely  empiricist 
than  Locke,  who  recognized  a  certain  activity  and  initiative  of 
mind  in  reflection  upon  the  simple  ideas  of  sense,  Hume  made 
even  reflection  a  purely  passive  process,  the  ideas,  or  faint  im- 
pressions, being  simply  the  consequents  found,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  habitually  and  inexplicably  to  follow  their  inert  antece- 
dents, the  more  \  ivid  impressions  of  the  senses.' 

'  A  Treatise  of  Human  Xaiurc,  Bk.  I,  Ft.  I,  {{  I.  H;    Pt.  Ill,  {  I. 
^  A 


354 


THE   PROBLEM  OF   KNOWLEDGE 


'-'Ki 


'■!'  !, 


^.f 


Hume  was  followed,  in  thi-'  'empirical  form  of  absolute  genetic 
monism,  by  the  associatio-  iSis,  notably  James  Mill  and  his 
son,  John  Stuart  Mill,  according  to  whom  all  the  contents 
of  human  experience  and  thought  are  simply  series  of  passive 
psychological  antecedents  and  consequents,  none  of  which 
represent  anything  more  objective  or  knowable  than  a  "per- 
manent possibility  of  sensations."  On  this  view,  what  is 
inui:  'diately  experienced  is  never  anything  but  what  depends 
upon  its  being  experienced  as  an  essential  condition  of  its  exist- 
ence, whatever  invariable  antecedents  there  may  be  besides. 

An  important  modification  of  the  empirical  form  of  absolute 
genetic    monism  was    developed    by   Herbert  Spencer.     The 
seeming  insufficiency  of  the  experience-hypothesis  to  explain 
reflex  actions  and  instincts  he  explains  as  due  to  the  fact  that 
these  automatic  psychical  connections  have  resulted  from  the 
registration  of  "experiences  continued  for  numberless  genera- 
tions."    He  assumes  that  the  various  strengths  of  different 
psychical  relations  are  proportionate,  other  things  being  equal, 
to  the  multiplication  of  experiences.     An  infinity  of  experiences 
would  produce  an  indissoluble  psychical  relation ;   and  though 
such  infinity  of  experiences  cannot  be  received  by  a  single 
individual,  yet  it  may  be  received,  it  is  claimed,  by  the  succes- 
sion of  individuals  forming  a  race.     Thus  the  genesis  of  all 
instinctive  elements  of  consciousness,  including  the  forms  of 
intuition  and  of  thought,  is  explained  on  the  single  principle 
of  frequency  of  repetition  of  experience  in  the  history  of  the 
race,  "supplemented  by  the  law  that  habitual  psychical  suc- 
cessions entail  some  hereditary  tendency  to  such  successions, 
which,  under  persistent  conditions,  will  become  cumulative  in 
generation  after  generation."  •     But  even  on  this  view,  it  must 
be  admitted  that  our  critical  realistic  cpistemological  monism 
would  be  untenable.     If  the  data  of  experience  are  received 
in  a  purely  passive  manner,  there  is  no  way  of  knowing  that 
we  experience  independent  reality,  or  even  a  copy  of  it,  whether 
it  is  the  experience  of  the  individual  or  of  the  race  that  is 
concerned. 

Now  from  the  scientific  point  of  view  there  is  a  strong  pre- 
sumption in  favor  of  some  such  natural  explanation  of  the 

'  H.  Spencer,  Principles  of  Psychology,  §  207. 


'i-f'-l-^^' 


THE   GENESIS  OF   THE   A   PRIORI 


355 


empirical  (or  at  least  natural)  genesis  c  ■   what  is,  relatively 
to  the  individual,  a  priori.     Human  consciousness  has  a  genesis, 
and  It  is  only  sensible  and  scientific  to  seek  a  unitary,  natural' 
explanation  of  all  its  elements.     On  this  account  empirical 
monism,  especially  in  the  modified  and  less  radical  form  in 
which  we  shall  present  it,  is  scientifically  preferable  as  a  genetic 
theory,  other  things  being  equal,  to  an  absolute  genetic  dualism. 
It  IS  also  preferable  to  the  rationalistic  form  of  absolute  genetic 
monism,  we  would  contend,  as  being  a  more  obvious  and  less 
stramed   interpretation  of  the   facts.     An  absolute  empirical 
monism  is  not  wholly  satisfactory,  however.     Apart  altogether 
from  the  controversial  doctrine  of  the  inheritance  of  acquired 
characters  assumed   in  Spencer's  evolutionism,   there  is  the 
difficulty  emphasized  by  William  James,  that  "the  manner  in 
which  we  now  become  acquainted  with  complex  objects  need 
not  in  the  least  resemble  the  manner  in  which  the  original 
elements  of  our  consciousness  grew  up."  '     We  now  ordinarily 
perceive  quite  readily  the  nature  of  the  present  object,  just 
because  we  have  preformed  categories  for  all  possible  objects ; 
and  we  have  no  right  to  assume  that  the  mere  existence  of 
things  to  be  known  was  originally  suflJcient  to  bring  about  a 
knowledge  of  them,  because  even  now  it  is  not  always  suffi- 
cient.2    James  accordingly  propounds  his  own  theory,  that  the 
original  elements  of  consciousness  came  into  being  as  "spon- 
taneous variations,  fitted  by  good  luck  (those  of  them  which 
have  survived)  to  take  cognizance  of  objects  (that  is,  to  steer 
U.S  m  our  active  dealings  with  them),  without  being  in  any 
mtelligible  sense  immediate  derivations  from  them." '    Time 
and  space-relations,  he  still  holds,  are  impressed  from  without ; 
the  same  is  true,  he  claims,  of  "an  immense  number  of  our 
mental  habitudes,  many  of  our  abstract  beliefs,  and  all  our 
ideas  of  concrete  things,  and  of  their  wa\     of  behavior." 
"Here  the  mind  is  passive  and  tributary,  a  servile  copy,  fatally 
and  unresistingly  fashioned  from  without."  "    But  there  are 
certain  combinations,  such  as  the  forms  of  judgment,  "which, 
taken  per  sc,  are  not  congruent  either  with  the  forms  in  which 
reahty  exists  or  in  those  in  which  experiences  befall  us,"  and 

'  W.  James,  The  Principles  of  Psychology,  Vol.  II,  r).  630. 
*'*•  '76.,  p.  631.  «/6.,  p.  032. 


r- 


M 


^! 


m- 


II  ^'  il ! 

II      !:     il     ll 


m 
■fl' 


<■  ( 


M 


?  ^: 


(  i 


•I 


It 


356 


THE  PROBLEM  Or  KNOWLEDGE 


which  thus  give  evidence  of  selection,  emphasis,  and,  it  may  be, 
other  forces,  unknown  to  us.'  James  concludes  therefore  that 
the  "ideal  and  inward  relations  amongst  the  objects  of  our 
thought  which  can  in  no  inteUigible  sense  whatever  be  inter- 
preted as  reproductions  of  the  order  of  outer  experience," 
and  which  are  often  "far  more  "iteresting  to  us  and  more 
charming  than  the  mere  rates  of  fuquency  of  their  tim.e  and 
space-conjunctions,"  are  all  "secondary  and  brain-born, 
'spontaneous  variations,'  most  of  them,  of  our  sensibility, 
whereby  certain  elements  of  experience,  and  certain  arrange- 
ments in  time  and  space,  have  acquired  an  agreeableness  which 
otherwise  would  not  have  b^-^n  felt."''  "The  theoretic  part  of 
our  organic  mental  structure  .  .  .  can  be  due  neither  to  our 
own  nor  to  our  ancestors'  experience."  '' 

With  reference  to  this  theory  of  James,  it  is  to  be  noted  in 
the  first  place  that,  while  still  strongly  empirical,  it  is  not  an 
absolute  empirical  genetic  monism.  It  offers  a  purely  empirical 
explanation  of  time-  an  ,  space-relations;  but  of  all  proposi- 
tions which  express  the  results  of  a  comparison  it  gives  a  sort 
of  subordinately  rationalistic  interpretation,  although  always 
within  the  limits  of  the  natural  or  "naturalistic"  explanation 
in  terms  of  spontaneous  variation  and  the  survival  of  the 
fittest,*  his  doctrine  being  in  general  consonance  with  that  of 
the  neo-Darwinians  and  opposed  to  that  of  the  neo-Lamarck- 
ians.*  The  view  as  a  whole  may  be  regarded  as  representing 
a  critical  empirical  genetic  monism,  although  not  necessarily 
the  only,  or  even  the  most  satisfactory,  form  of  such  doctrine. 
It  is  fundamentally  empirical  and  seeks  to  adhere  as  closely 
as  possible  to  the  empiricist  doctrine,  but,  within  the  limits  of 
a  unitary  theory,  it  makes  great  concessions  to  the  rationalistic 
view  of  the  a  priori. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  our  epistemological  interest,  how- 
ever, the  view  of  James,  even  if  it  should  be  felt  to  be  in  itself 
highly  defensible,  u  not  to  he  loft  free  from  attack.  Scarcely 
more  than  the  theories  previously  examined  is  it  compatible 
with  the  critical  realistic  epistemological  monism  which  we 

'  W.  Jamrs.  The  Principles  of  Paychtlogu.  Vol.  II.  pp.  033-4. 
«  lb.,  p.  6.39.  '  ih.,  pp.  G77-«. 

*  lb.,  pp.  644,  676-8.  •  76.,  pp.  678-8S. 


THE  GENESIS  OF  THE  A  PRIORI 


357 


seem  to  have  found  to  be  the  only  tenable  positive  solution  of 
the  problem  of  acquaintance.     On  the  one  hand,  in  so  far  as  a 
passive  empiricism  is  retained  with  reference  to  some  elements, 
the  difficulties  we  have  already  urged  against  absolute  empirical 
genetic  monism  remain.     On  the  other  hand,  if  any  consider- 
able number  of  the  necessary  forms  of  thought  or,  more  particu- 
larly, if  all  the  more  fundamental  ones,  except,  perhaps,  those 
of  space  and  time,  are  merely  fortunate  spontaneous  variations 
which  enable  us  to  adjust  ourselves  satisfactorily  to  our  envi- 
ronment, then,  even  if  a  realistic  epistemological  monism  should 
happen  to  be  true,  we  shoukl  never  be  able  to  know  it.     We 
could    never   know  that  an  independently  real  environment 
had  come  to  be  within  immediate  experience ;  we  could  never 
know  that  the  product  of  the  combination  of  the  immediate 
data  of  sense,  dependent  for  their  existence  upon  consciousness, 
with  the  products  of  the  activity  of  thought,  or  at  least  of 
apperceptive  consciousness,  was  not  all  the  reality  to  be  either 
experienced  or  believed  in.     Consequently,  if  we  chose  to  be 
guided  by  the  principle  of  parsimony,  we  should  have  to  reject 
the  hypothesis  of  a  realistic  epistemological  monism,  even  if 
we  could  not  refute  the  suggestion  of  its  truth.     But,  disre- 
garding for  the  moment  this  "law"  of  parsimony,  and  suppos- 
ing the  unprovable  doctrine  of  realistic  epistemological  mon- 
ism true,  we  should  have  to  try  to  explain  in  some  way  the 
marvellous  continuous  coincidence  of  the  construct  with  the 
independfciit  reality.     The  hypothesis  of  "accidental"  varia- 
tion and  natural  selection  would  then  seem,  if  we  calculated  the 
chances  of  such  an  "accident,"  according  to  the  "law  of  proba- 
bilities," p-obably  less  plausible  than  that  of  cither  old-fashioned 
teleology    or    Bergson's    "creative    evolution."     Some    non- 
mechanical  factor  would  seem  necessary  adequately  to  account 
for  the  appearance  of  the  required  forms  of  mental  activity. 
But  suppose  we  test  James's  hypothesis  of  the  a  priori  (as 
made  up  of  spontaneous  psychical  v  iriation.;  selected  by  the 
environment)  on  the  assumed  ground  of  absolute  epistemological 
dualism.     Th  re  could,  of  course,  be  no  immediate  knowledge  ; 
could  there  be  any  knowledge  at  all?    At  this  point  we  shall 
have  to  anticipate  to  some  extent  the  results  of  our  discussion 
of  meaiate  knowledge.     If  we  define  truth  as  representation  of 


358 


THE  PROBLEM   OP   KNOWLEDGE 


1^ 


Ih 


m 


imi 


'':< 


reality  sufficient  for  our  practical  purposes  in  the  situation  in 
which  we  predicate  an  idea  of  reality,  may  it  not  bo  mainta'*ic  . 
that,  if  w(>  feel  no  insufficiency  of  the  judgment  for  our  prac- 
tical purposes,  we  have,  in  spite  of  our  never  having  any  imme- 
diate knowledge  of  independent  reality,  what  may  be  called 
mediate  knowledge  of  what  may  be  called  truth?  The  answer 
is  that  it  would  he  possible  to  define  mediate  knowledge  in  such 
a  way  as  would  allow  an  affirmative  reply.  We  could  call 
knowledge  readiness  to  act  on  ideas  tl  work  satisfactorily, 
but  calling  it  so  would  not  make  it  s'  light  it  not  also  be 
maintained  that  what  we  would  havf  .Aild  be  simply  a  prac- 
tical substitute  for  knowledge  where  real  knowledge  is  impos- 
sible, and  that  nothing  but  an  extreme  pragmatism  would 
identify  the  one  with  the  other?  We  have  known  all  along 
that  we  have  either  knowledge,  or  some  practical  makeshift 
for  it ;  but  to  recognize  this  is  not  to  solve  the  problem  as  to 
whether  we  have  knowledge  or  not.  The  trouble  with  an  abso- 
lute epistemological  dualism  is  that  we  do  not  know  that  the 
independent  reality  exists;  we  have  assumed  it,  to  be  sure,  but 
on  reflection  we  find  that  an  idealistic  epistemological  monism 
seems  equally  defensible.  If  we  never  experience  immediately 
a  (physical)  reality  which  has  existed  independently  of  our 
experiencing  It,  how  do  we  know  that  any  such  reality  exists? 
But  if  we  do  not  know  enough  about  the  independent  reality 
to  know  that  it  exists,  we  do  not  know  anything  about  it  at  all. 
The  proposed  definition  of  mediate  knowledge,  then,  according 
to  which  the  epistemological  dualist  could  have  knowledge  of 
independent  reality,  even  though  no  such  reality  had  ever  been 
experienced  by  him,  must  be  pronounced  inadequate. 

Lot  us  then  pass  over  to  the  suggested  idealistic  point  of 
view,  antl  ask  whether  one  holding  James's  theory  of  the 
a  priori  could  consistently  hold  to  the  possibility  of  knowledge. 
We  see  at  once  that  he  could  have  not  only  immediate  knowl- 
edge of  ioality,  but,  also,  if  the  pragmatic  view  of  truth  and 
knowle(lg(>  be  justified,  mediate  knowledge  as  well.  Shall  we 
not  take  this  then  as  an  indication,  or  even  as  a  proof,  that 
idealism  (even  if  it  should  have  to  become  a  disguised  idealism, 
eventually)  and,  incidentally,  pragmatism,  are  true,  even  if 
attempts  to  prove  idealism  directly  can  seem  to  succeed  always 


THE  GENESIS  OF  'illE   A   PRIORI 


359 


only  at  the  expense  of  fallacy  ?    Can  we  solve  our  problem  of 
the  possibility  of  knowledge  on  James's  theory  of  the  a  priori, 
antl  at  the  same  time  find  for  the  first  time  a  good  argument 
for  idealism,  not  to  speak  of  pragmatism?     We  ran  answer  in 
the  affirmative,  if  at  all,  only  if  no  other  theory  of  the  a  priori 
that  is  in  itself  tenable  can  be  found  compatible  with  the  possi- 
bility of  knowledge.     Is  any  such  alternative  theory  tenable? 
Our  reply  [a  that  in  the  present  state  of  our  knowledge  there 
are  three  possible  theories,  no  one  of  which  can  as  yet  be  de- 
clared untenable,  anil  any  one  of  which  would  serve  as  a  basis 
for   asserting   the   possibility   of   knowledge,   both   immediate 
and  mediate,  on  the  basis  of  a  realistic  epistemological  monism. 
These  theories  are  as  follows:   first,  that  under  certain  condi- 
tions, at  least  in  the  psychical  realm,  the  transmission  of  an 
acquired  character  to  later  generations  may  take  place,  and 
that  certain  of  the  most  fundamental  of  our  mental  "forms" 
of  thought  are,  as  related  to  the  experience  of  the  individual, 
a  priori,  but,  as  related  to  the  experience  of  the  race,  the  result 
of  impressions  of  the  general  nature  of  reality  which  have  been 
taken  by  mind  in  its  exploring  activities  (sensing  and  other 
creative  psychical  activities) ;    second,  that  one  of  the  spon- 
taneous variations,  or  mutations,  which  has  occurred  and  be- 
.-"in  3  hereditary  in  the  course  of  evolution  is  such  a  high  degree 
ntal  alertness  and  impressionableness  as  would  make 
-      lOle  the  very  rapid  learning,  on  the  part  of  each  individual, 
J  the  most  fundamental  "forms"  and  relations  of  reality, 
and  so  of  what  ought  to  be,  or  must  be,  the  fundamental  forms 
of  thought  —  so  rapid,  indeed,  that  the  process  may  seem  to 
be  either  one  of  inheritance  of  an  "acquired"  character  or  one 
of  simple  participation  in  a  character  universally  native  to 
mind,  and  not  one  of  learning,  or  "trial  and  error,"  at  all ;  and 
third,  a  combination  of  the  mutually  compatible  elements  of 
the  two  theories  just  stated.     Among  these  three  theories  there 
can  be  found,  we  would  claim,  a  theory  which  is  at  least  as 
defensible  in  itself  as  James's  theory  of  the  origination  of  the 
''o  priori"  as  a  mere  "spontaneous  variation"  to  be  preserved 
by  natural  selection;    a   theory,   moreover,   which   would  be 
entirely  compatible  with  our  doctrine  of  immediate  knowledge 
on  a  realistic  basis. 


i 


1.^ 


m, 
11  • 


I 

[; .  •  [ 


) 


If 


i  i 


'  i, 


■I' 


m 


liiJl:  ';■ 

Mm 


I  >' 


,tu 


360 


THE   PROBLEM  OP   KNOWLEDGE 


It  will  thus  !m'  socii  that,  while  our  opistomological  doctrine 
would  be  defeiiMible  on  the  theory  of  the  transmissibility  of  the 
effects  of  use  (which  theory,  it  is  admitted,  even  by  those  who 
eriticise  it  on  methodologieai  grounds  as  being  "not  a  IcKiti- 
inate  hypothesis"  in  biology,  nevertheless  "may  be  true"),' 
it  does  not  necessarily  stanil  or  fail  with  that  theory.  Even 
if  the  use-inheritance  theory  should  become  utterly  discredited, 
the  second  of  the  three  theories  just  mentioned  would  still  be 
utuefuted  and  highly  defensible. 

But  the  last  word  has  not  yet  been  sai<I  on  the  inheritance 
of  acquired  characters.  Tiie  question  has  been  exhaustively 
discussed,  without  definite  result,  with  reference  to  gross  struc- 
tural characters  ;  but,  although,  as  the  psychologist  McDougall 
has  remarked,  it  is  in  the  stuc'y  of  t)ehavior  i.iat  our  best  hope 
lies  of  answering  the  question  of"  the  transmission  of  acquired 
characters,'  almost  nothing  has  been  done  as  yet  systematically 
to  investigate  the  problem  in  this  field.  And  yet  some  im- 
pressive apparent  instances  of  the  inheritance  of  acquired 
function  have  been  observed  l)y  chance  and  recorded.' 

Now  in  connection  with  this  idea  of  the  inheritance  of  -  nc- 
tional  characters  acquired  through  use,  the  fir'd  of  investiga- 
tion which  is  most  germane  to  our  present  interest  is  that 
of  the  instinctive  elemt^nts  in  intellectual  consciousness.  And 
it  is  important  to  note  at  the  outset  that  an  increa.sing  place  is 
being  given,  by  students  of  the  subject,  to  consciousness,  and 
even  to  cognitive  consciousness,  in  instinctive  behavior.  Thus 
while  in  Hobhouse  ■•  we  find  instinct  described  as  an  adaptive 
but  not  intelligent  combination  of  reflexes,''  and  even  in  Berg- 
son  the  doctrine  that  intelligence  in  connection  with  conscious- 
ness is  accidental  and  the  sign  of  a  deficit  of  instinct,*  we  find 
McDougall  maintaining  that  every  instinct  involves  knowing, 
as  well  as  feeling  anil  conation,  with  reference  to  its  object.'' 

'  E.g.  Hugh  '''  lot,  in  Introduction  to  J.  B.  Lamarck's  ZoOtugical  Philosophy, 
Eng.  Tr.,  1914,  .jp.  xxxviii-liii. 

^Psychology:    thv  Sttuiy  of  lirhnrior.  pp.   177-S(). 

'  G.  J.  Romanes,  Menttil  Evolution  in  Animals.  1SS4.  pp.  195,  196-7;  E. 
Rignano,  Upon  the  Inheritance  of  Acquired  Characters,  1905.  Eng.  Tr.,  1911,  pp. 
162,  171  ;  Jordan  and  Kellogg,  Etulution  and  Aniinal  Life,  1908,  p.  202. 

'  Mind  in  Erolution,  p.  67. 

»Cf.  M.  Parmolce,  The  Scienc,  of  Human  Behavior,  1913,  p.  226. 

•  Creative  Evolution,  p.  145.  '  Social  Psychology,  pp.  20-7. 


EV 


THE   OKXE8IS  OP  THE  A   PRIORI 


3fil 


S 


Again,  whereas  Jamos  took  the  once  radical  Rround  that,  after 
its  first  performance  by  an  animal  with  memory,  an  instinc- 
tive action  ceases  to  be  purely  blind  and  unintelligent,'  it  is 
now  maintained  by  Stout  that  since  learning  by  experience  is 
itself  an  intelligent  process,  the  intelligence  involved  in  instinct 
cannot  be  purely  an  afior-effect  of  learning  by  experi(>nce,  but 
that  it  must  have  been  present  to  some  exteni  in  the  first'  per- 
formance of  the  instinctive  act.* 

But  it  is  to  be  noted,  as  Lloyd  Morgan  has  pointed  out,* 
that  this  doctrine  of  the  essential  place  of  intelligence  in  instinct, 
involves,  conversely,  the  fundamental  place  of  instinct  in  intel- 
ligence, or,  in  other  words,  the  doctrine  of  an  inheritance  in 
some  instances,  of  meaning.     And  even  Lloyd  Morgan  him- 
self, who.se  presuppositions,  as  a  consistent  parallelist,  have 
always  been  in  favor  of  the  mechanistic,  or,  as  he  calls  it,  the 
I' physiological"  interpretation  of  instinct,"  confes.ses  that  he 
IS  not  prepared  to  deny  the  presence  of  inherited  meaning  in 
some  cases  at  least.'    But  in  view  of  the  fact  that  meaning  is 
normally  acquired  through  experience,"  we  seem  almost  forced, 
finally,  to  infer  the  inheritance  of  meaning  originally  acquired 
in  and  through  ancestral  experience.     It  may  be  felt  at  first 
that  H.  R.  Marshall  goes  too  far  when  he  asserts  that  reason 
is  a  special  development  of  instinct ;  ^  but  arguments  and  specu- 
lations have  recently  appeared,  notably  in  the  writings  of  Berg- 
son,  which  make  some  such  conclusion  .seem  not  unreasonable. 
In  instinct,  according  to  Bergson,  there  is  an  innate  knowledge 
of  definite  objects ;  but  intelligence  also,  he  claims,  has  knowl- 
edge which  cannot  be  adequately  (  .plained  by  pointing  to  what 
the  individual  has  learned  as  a  result  of  his  own  experience, 
simply.     Intelligence  po.s.se.sses  innate  or  instinctive  i  nowledge^ 
not  of  definite  things,  l)ut  of  relations,  .such  as  those  of  like  to 
like,  content  to  container,  and  cau.se  to  effect.     This  doctrine 
of  innate  intelligence,  which  Bergson  himself  is  careful  to  di.s- 
tinguish  from       e  long-since  discredited   scholastic  theorj-  of 
"innate  ideas,"  i.,  to  be  interpreted  as  meaning  essentially 

'  Principles  of  Psychology,  11,  p.  390. 

•  Manual  of  Psychology.  .'W  «!.,  191.3,  pp.  349-.54. 

•  Mind.  N.S..  Vol.  XXITT,  1914.  pp.  169  ff. 

«  Instinct  and  Experience,  p.  110.  .  Mind.  loc.  cil..  p.  179 

•  See  Stout,  op.  cit..  pp.  169.  18.3-4.  385.  '  Instinct  a,ui  Reason,  p.  462. 


:  ( 


362 


THE   PROBLEM  OP   KNOWLEDGE 


that  the  mind  possesses  innate  knowledge  of  the  most  funda- 
mental categories  required  for  the  interpretation  of  nature, 
lieraiiae  and  in  the  sense  that  it  makes  an  instinctive  use  of 
them.' 

But  Bergson  did  not  reap  the  full  reward  of  his  theory, 
because  of  his  vacillation  on  the  issue  of  realism  and  idealism. 
He  may  be  largely  right  in  discounting  the  categories  of  mechan- 
istic science  as  means  of  interpreting  life,  on  the  ground  that 
our  intelligence,  as  it  leaves  the  hands  of  nature,  has  for  its 
chief  object  not  life,  but  the  unorganized  solid,  so  that  intellect 
was  fashioned  to  the  form  of  inert  matter,  and  as  a  result  mis- 
takenly tends  to  inv  i  the  categories  or  forms  of  thought 
derived  from  matter  in  its  interpretation  of  all  objects,  even 
the  process  of  life  itself :  ^  although  even  here  the  fact  seems 
to  be  overlooked  that  our  most  fundamental  concept  of  causality 
seems  to  owe  its  form  to  (experience  of  a  life-process,  rather  than 
to  experience  of  inert  matter.  But  what  we  would  criticise 
especially  in  Bergson  in  this  connection  is  the  extent  to  which 
he  seems  willing  to  concede  to  the  ideahst  the  mental  origin 
of  the  forms  or  relations  exhibited  by  the  material  world  of 
our  experience.  Because,  on  the  one  hand,  as  we  have  pointed 
out,'  he  failed  to  note  the  psychical  activity  involved  even  in 
"pure  perception,"  in  the  production,  namely,  of  the  sense- 
qualities  of  objects,  and  being  unwilling,  on  the  other  hand, 
to  accept  the  Kantian  doctrine  that  all  the  qualities  of  objects 
save  these  sense-qualities  are  the  product  of  mind,  he  was 
naturally  led  to  the  view  that  the  mental  forms  or  categories 
applicable  to  things  are  the  result  of  a  compromise  between 
matter  and  mind ;  for,  as  he  says,  even  as.suming  that  the 
forms  into  which  we  fit  matter  come  entirely  from  the  mind, 
they  can  scarcely  be  applied  constantly  to  objects  without  the 
latter  soon  leavinr;  a  i.uark  on  them,  so  that,  if  we  give  to  matter, 
we  probably  also  receive  something  from  it.*  Tlii^  would 
leave  us  in  uncertainty  as  to  just  what  were  the  qualities  of 
objects,  even  of  matter,  independently  of  the  products  of  con- 
scious activities. 

If,  however,  with  Bergson's  doctrine  of  direct  perception  of 


'  Creative  Evolution,  pp.  147-51. 
«  rh.  XV,  supra. 


tib..  pp.  153.  160.  161. 

*  Time  and  Free  WOl,  p.  223. 


THE   GENESIS  OF  THE   A   PRIORI 


363 


B 


mility  we  comhino  our  theory  of  t\v    .resence  of  creative  sen^. 
activity  even  in  pure  perception,  the  way  is  open  to  affirm  the 
revchition  in  p«'rception,  as  "pure"  a.s  we  ever  have  it,  of  the 
universal,  preexi.stent  forms  of  matter.     The  categories  would 
then  ai)iK'ar  to  be,  as  S.  Alexander  contends  that  they  are, 
characters  in  the  world,  possessed  by  things  as  well  as  f,y  mindi 
and  first  carried  up  from  material  existen-    into  mental  exist- 
ence;   so  that  once  consciousness  is  i>;,    a  -as  a  fortunate 
variation,  if  no  more  — we  need  no  fur     .r  successful  varia- 
tion in  order  to  secure  the  categories,  or  any  other  a  priori 
parts  of  knowledge.'     Without  needing  to  follow  Alexander 
further,  we  would  be  able  'o  account  for  the  orthogenesis  of 
mental  evolution,  ^  :  Jch  is  by  no  means  adequately  explained 
by  James's  theory    if  mere  accidental  variation  and  natural 
selection.     An    actu.stic    theory   of   all    conscious    processes, 
together  with  the  doctrine  of  an  instinctive  kno     , dge  of  cer- 
tain fundamental  relations  accounted  for  by  the  inheritance 
of  acquired  meaning,  or,  to  say  what  amounts  to  the  same 
thmg,  of  intellectual  habit  —  or  else,  as  an  alternative  view, 
the  appearance,  as  a  mutation,  of  a  new  form  of  life  with  a 
very  high  degree  of  psychical  alertness  and  impressionableness, 
with  the  consequent  very  rapid  learning,  by  the  individual,  of 
the  most  fundamental  relations  of  things  —  w     'd  leave'  to 
natural  selection  no  greater  task  than  it  may  \        well  have 
been  able  to  accomplish. 

But  we  must  guard  against  exaggor-'-'-ng  the  a  posteriori 
character  of  the  "a  priori."  W.  K.  W  ..ht  has  contended 
that  all  our  fundamental  catc.  i  -s  have  cid  a  social  origin, 
and  this  view  he  thinks  necessary  if  we  aro  to  account  for  the 
fact  that  those  categories,  as  actually  employed,  vary  greatly 
in  different  societies  and  stages  of  culture."  We  would  admit 
that  the  specific  form  in  which  certain  categories  are  employed 
by  particular  groups  and  in  particular  stages  of  cultural  de- 
velopment, is  capable,  at  least  partly,  of  a  social  explanation 
This  IS  manifestly  true,  for  example,  of  the  phenomenalistic 
notion  of  causality  at  present  dominant  in  the  natural  sciences 
and  through  them  to  some  extent  in  popular  thought.     But 

■  MituJ.  .\-.S.,  Vol.  XXI,  1912,  pp.  10,  17. 

«  "The  Genesis  of  the  Catesories,"  Journal  of  Philosophy,  X.  1913,  645-57. 


I 


364 


THE   PROBLEM   OP   KNOWLEDGE 


t      li  II     I) 


'iii 


with  reference  to  the  genesis  of  our  fundamental  categories  in 
their  most  generic  form,  this  appeal  to  social  psychology  is  in- 
adequate ;  they  are,  broadly  speaking,  not  products  of  social 
tradition,  but  instruments  of  knowledge  employed  by  the 
individual  to-day,  either  habitually,  because  very  rapidly 
learned  from  reality  by  the  developing  individual,  or  else  in- 
stinctively, because  inherited  from  ancestors  by  whom  they 
were  moulded  on  the  reality  revealed  through  the  creation  of 
sense-qualities  which  were  located  on  the  objects  of  the  environ- 
ment, necessarily  in  the  form  and  order  in  which  thi  e  objects 
existed. 

We  return,  then,  to  our  statement  that  what  the  Kantian 
regards  as  the  activity  of  the  absolutely  a  priori  categories  of 
thought,  is  quite  possibly  instinctive  apperceptive  activity. 
Kant's  doctrine  of  a  "transcendental  unity  of  apperception," 
imposing  upon  the  object  a  unity  which  it  would  not  otherwise 
possess,  is,  from  this  point  of  view,  largely  false  and  much  too 
simple.  There  is  a  discoverable  unity  in  all  active  things,  and 
this  unity  already  existent  may  be  represented  in  an  antici- 
patory way  by  that  early  learned  or  even  instinctive  appercep- 
tion which  would  be,  in  either  case,  explained  as  having  been 
originally,  whether  in  the  life  of  the  individual  or  in  that  of  his 
ancestors,  the  result  of  sense-activity  and  attentive  analysis 
direct(>d  toward  other  unitary  objects.  The  only  unity  im- 
posed upon  the  object  by  the  psychical  subject  is  a  tertiary 
quality,  the  unity  which  a  more  or  less  complex  content  acquires 
by  virtue  of  its  being  related  to  some  interest,  or  purpose,  as 
end  {terminus  ad  quern  or  terminus  a  quo),  as  obstacle  or  as 
means. 

There  are  thus,  we  would  maintain,  various  degrees  of  apri- 
ority in  the  apperceptive  activity  involved  in  the  perception 
of  objects,  from  what  is  most  universally  inherited  to  what  has 
been  most  recently  acquired  by  the  individual ;  but  in  no  case 
is  this  an  absolute  apriority.  It  is  always,  in  the  last  analysis, 
the  result  of  experience.  While  doing  justice  to  the  elements 
of  truth  in  nativistic  theories,  it  is  franklv,  although  critically, 
on  the  genetic  side.  And  yet,  on  the  other  hand,  since  we  do 
not  interpret  sense-experience  as  passively  rcfoived,  btit  .n,". 
actively  produced  by  the  psychical  subject,  our  doctrine  of 


THE   GENESIS  OF  THE  A   PRIORI 


365 


the  only  relatively  a  priori  character  of  the  ordinary  formal 
"relating"  activity  involved  in  ordinary  perception  is  very 
far  from  lapsing  into  the  old  empiricism.  Ours  is  an  adivistic 
empiricism;  all  sense-activity  is  creative  activity  with  refer- 
ence to  the  secondary  qualities  of  the  object,  and  all  thought- 
activity  is  creative  of  the  ideas  and  their  associations,  while 
some  thought-activity  is  creative  of  tertiary  qualities  and  rela- 
tions of  objects  as  well.  But  more  than  all  this,  whenever  a 
new  kind  of  psychic  J  activity  has  appeared  in  the  history  of 
the  race,  whether  it  be  the  production  of  a  new  sense-quality 
or  the  formation  of  a  new  idea,  we  have  psychical  activity 
which  is  absolutely  a  priori.  It  is  not,  as  Kant  seems  to  have 
thought,  the  old  and  universal  in  the  way  of  mental  activity 
that  is  absolutely  a  priori;  rather  is  it  the  new,  the  original  and 
unique. 

It  will  thus  be  seen  that  the  view  which  we  have  advocated 
in  this  chapter,  and  which  has  been  shown,  we  think,  to  be 
not  only  defensible,  but  also,  in  the  light  of  data  already  avail- 
able, well-nigh  demonstrable,  avoids  the  absolute  genetic 
dualism  of  the  Kantian  doctrine  on  the  one  side  and  the  two 
corresponding  forms  of  absolute  monism,  the  rationalistic 
and  the  empirical  (or  the  nativistic  and  empiriogenetic),  on 
the  other.  It  retains  a  fundamentally  empirical  and  scientific 
point  of  view,  but  does  justice  to  the  activistic  view  of  mind, 
emphasis  upon  which  was  the  great  merit  of  rationalism.  The 
position,  which  may  thus  be  very  appropriately  styled  critical 
empirical  genetic  monism,  or  critical  monism  in  genetic  logic, 
once  successfully  defended,  finally  secures  the  position  taken 
in  our  discussion  of  the  problem  of  acquaintance,  viz.  critical 
realistic  epistemological  monism,  or  critical  monism  in  episte- 
mology  proper.  With  tiiis  accomplished  we  may  turn  our 
attention  from  the  problems  of  immediate  knowledge  to  such 
problems  as  may  arise  in  connection  with  the  subject  of  mediate 
knowledge. 


i 


i.r 


PART  II:    THE  PROBLEM    OF    MEDIATE 
KNOWLEDGE 

A.     THE    PROBLEM    OF    TRUTH     (LOGICAL 

THEORY) 


iSh  l 


.it 


« 


i 
J 


i ,  _ 


:t 


iil 


I 


i 
I 


ir^ 


i!W 


:!   f 


■"^T?" 


ETTSr^TBaril^gTTB 


CHAPTER  XVII 
A  Critique  of  Intellectualism 

The  more  formidable  part  of  our  undertaking  may  now, 
perhaps,  be  regarded  as  accomplished.  But  to  have  vindicated 
the  fact  of  acquaintance  with  reality  is  not  to  have  treated 
adequately  the  problem  <  f  knowledge.  Besides  the  problem  ^' 
immediate  knowledge,  there  is  the  problem  of  mediate  knowl- 
edge. If  knowledge  is  to  be  communicated  and  to  become  a 
social  possession,  or  even  if  it  is  to  be  stored  up  in  the  most 
effective  manner  for  one's  own  future  use,  it  must  come  to 
exist  in  the  form  of  judgments.  But  the  claim  to  have  knowl- 
edge in  the  form  of  judgments  involves  the  twofold  claim  that 
the  judgments  are  true  and  that  this  truth  is  certain,  and 
justifiably  so,  to  those  persons  whose  judgments  they  are.  It 
will  be  necessary  for  us,  therefore,  to  discuss  both  truth  and 
what  is  called  proof,  or  the  production  of  a  sufficiently  critical 
certainty  of  the  truth.  Taking  these  problems  in  their  logical 
order,  we  shall  turn  first  to  a  consideration  of  the  problem  of 
truth. 

Our  discussion  will  be  in  the  realm  of  logic  as  a  branch  of 
critical  philosophy,  or  o'  logical  theory,  narrowly  deined. 
The  most  elemental  branches  of  philosop^^'cal  criticism  have 
to  do  with  those  ideals,  or  ends,  to  guide  to  the  realization  of 
which  the  various  normative  sciences  have  been  developed. 
In  the  normative  science  of  logic  the  ideal  is  truth.  It  would 
be  claimed  by  some  that  the  logical  end  is  mere  consistency, 
not  truth.  In  the  practical  concerns  of  actual  life,  however, 
to  make  the  end  of  our  thinking  mere  consistency  instead  o* 
truth  is  regarded  as  indicating  a  lack  of  earnestness  or  else  pure 
stubbornness  and  such  a  selfish  concern  for  applause  and  the 
appearance  of  victory  rather  than  for  victory  itself  as  .an  only 
be  set  down  as  due  to  pronounced  selfishness  and  as  tending  to 
intellectual  dishonesty  and  hypocrisy.  Taking  logic,  then,  as 
2  b  369 


rtraBTPr 


-STTT- 


■■^CTB*'"^!f'!! 


370 


THE   PROBLEM   OP   KNOWLEDGE 


P  M  ^i  ;J 


i',^% 


'  I 


V      H 


Is-i^ 


si 


I  ill   ?;.! 
flih 
i 


tho  normative  discipline  eoncernetl  with  the  actual  thinking 
of  practical  life,  we  would  regard  the  logic  of  consistency  as 
only. a  branch  of  the  logic  of  truth.  It  is  the  logic  of  hypo- 
thetical truth  and  simply  instrumental  to  the  logic  of  actual 
or  categorical  truth.  Scientific  logic  must  undertake  to  show 
how  to  reach  truth  —  hypothetical  truth  at  first,  it  may  bo, 
but  always  ultimately  truth,  actual  categorical  truth.  In 
critical  or  philosophical  logic,  therefore,  we  must  undertake  to 
solve  the  problem  of  th.  meaning  of  truth,  the  age-long  problem, 
What  is  truth? 

Here,  again,  as  in  the  case  of  epLstemologj'  proper,  the  prob- 
lem for  later  discussions  has  been  set  by  the  Kantian  dualism. 
Kant,  as  we  saw,  set  up  an  absolute  epistemological  dualism 
between  knowaliie  phenomena  and  the  unknowable  independ- 
ent reality.  Then,  in  order  to  bridge  this  chasm  as  far  as 
might  \>o,  he  had  to  introduce  another  dualism  —  an  absolute 
logical  dualism,  according  to  which  theoretical  reason,  was  to 
confine  itself  to  phenomena,  while  practical  reason  might  postu- 
late certain  practically  necessary  beliefs  concerning  ultimate 
reality.  Thus,  it  was  claimed,  a  part  at  least  of  what  is  intel- 
lectually un'<n*Avable  is  not  only  practically  true,  but  prac- 
tically certain ;  and  \'et,  however  true  and  cc-rtain,  practically, 
it  can  never  be  other  than  in  the  highest  degree  doubtful  from 
the  standpoint  of  the  theoretical  understanding  and  pure 
reason.  It  is  an  absolute  dualism  of  intclk'ctualism  and  prag- 
matism.' 

But  it  seems  unlikely  that  it  should  have  to  be  admitted 
ultimately  that  there  are  two  radically  and  irreducibly  different 
criteria  of  truth,     .'..nd  so  two  opposite  ways  of  overcoming  the 

'  In  an  intercstiiiK  article  ontitlcd  "  Practioal  Success  as  the  Criterion  of 
Truth"  (PAiVos.  Re,:.  XXII.  lOl.S,  pp.  600-22),  H.  W.  Wright  goes  beyond  Kant 
and  advocates  three  rather  than  two  di.stinct  criteria  of  truth,  viz.  intellectual 
consistency,  technical  efficiency,  and  emotional  harmony.  In  some  cases,  he 
says,  one  criterion,  and  that  one  alone,  is  applicable  as  a  test  of  truth  ;  in  other 
cases  any  one  of  the  three  may  be  applied  at  will,  while  in  still  other  cases  it 
is  advisable  to  use  all  three  criteria  together.  As  in  the  case  of  the  morphology 
of  knowledge  (Ch.  XV',  supra),  so  here,  to  affirni  a  threefold  distinction  is  prob- 
ably closer  to  a  critically  monistic  position  than  is  a  mere  dualism ;  and  each  of 
the  three  criteria  nientiono.1  by  Wright  will  he  f,>und  t.>  be  recuBnizcd  in  our 
constructive  statement  which  is  to  follow.  But  for  the  present  lot  it  be  said 
that  there  is  a  strong  [)resumption  against  there  being  three  radically  dififerent 
criteria  of  what  is  in  its  meaning  always  one  and  the  same. 


V! 


m 


A   CRITIQUE   OF   INTELLECTUALISM 


371 


dualism  have  been  suggested.  One  of  these  would  reduce  the 
practical  to  the  intellectual ;  the  other  would  reduce  the  intel- 
lectual to  the  practical.  The  former  we  may  call  intellcctualistic 
absolute  logical  n^onism,  and  the  latter,  anti-intellectuaUstic 
absolute  logical  monism.  The  term  "  intellectualism "  has 
been  applied  to  the  view  that  neither  feeling  nor  practical 
needs  have  anything  to  say,  properly,  in  determining  the  truth 
or  falsity  of  judgments ;  that  the  criteria  of  truth  are  purely 
intellectual.  In  the  present  chapter  we  shall  deal  with  the 
absolute  intellectualism,  considering  it  first  in  connection  with 
absolute  epistemological  dualism,  and  then  with  the  idealistic 
and  realistic  forms  of  absolute  epistemological  monism  in  turn. 

First,  then,  let  us  take  up  the  case  of  the  intellcctualistic 
type  of  absolute  monism  in  logical  theory,  as  it  appears  when 
conjoined  with  a  dualistic  epistemology.  Here  we  may  begin 
with  Locke,  whose  epistemology,  as  we  have  seen,  was,  at 
least  covertly,  dualistic.  While  still  agreeing  with  the  scholas- 
tics in  their  intellectualistic  definition  of  truth  —  "real  truth," 
Locke  calls  it  —  as  being  the  agreement  of  ideas  with  things,' 
he  found  it  necessary  to  introduce  for  the  phenomenalistic  or 
subjective  point  of  view,  anothc:  definition  of  truth  as  "a 
right  joining  or  separating  of  signs;  i.e.  ideas  [by  which  he 
means  subjective  contents  of  consciousness]  or  words."' 
Here,  then,  we  see  two  mutually  conflicting  definitions  of  truth 
(although  both  are  intellectualistic) ;  and  the  significance  of 
this  failure  to  solv?  the  truth-problem  seems  to  be  that  either 
the  epistemological  dualism  or  the  intellectualism  is  at  fault, 
or  else  both  are,  for  certainly  if  truth  is  either  one  of  the  two 
things  Locke  says  it  is,  it  cannot,  on  his  presuppositions,  be  the 
other. 

In  the  system  of  Leibniz,  which,  from  the  standpoint  of  the 
individual  consciousness,  is  an  absolute  epistemological  dualism, 
truths  of  rea.son  are  defined  in  terms  of  the  identity  of  subject 
and  predicate  (both  considerer'  as  ideas,  or  both  considered  as 
things,  or  states  of  things),  whereas  truths  of  fact  are  held  to 
consist  in  a  correspondence  between  the  succession  of  the  phe- 
nomena, fir  the  connection  of  the  ideas  or  propositions  in  the 
mind,  with  the  succession  and  connection  of  the  things  in 

'  Essay  Concerning  Human  Understanding,  Bk.  IV,  Cb.  V,  §  8.         '  lb.,  $  2. 


P 


372 


THE   PROBLEM   OP   KNOWLEDGE 


fvH 


question.'    Strictly  speaking,  however,  there  was  no  way  of 
verifying  the  asserted  identity  of  subject  and  predicate,  con- 
sidered as  things,  nor  of  the  asserted  correspondence  between 
phenomena  and  things,  since  all  any  individual  ever  experi- 
enced was  supposed  to  be  his  own  "ideas."     Consequently, 
for  the  maintaining  of  the  above  definitions  of  truths  of  reason 
and  truths  of  fact,  as  well  as  for  the  defence  of  the  assumption 
that   metaphysical   knowledge  is   possible   at   all,   it   became 
necessary  to  promulgate  as  a  dogma,  itself  not  only  metaphysical, 
but  essentially  self-refuting,  the  notion  of  a  preestablished  har- 
mony between  all  absolutely  independent  (non-interacting)  indi- 
viduals, by  one  of  them.     And  after  Kant  had  developed  the 
duality  of  appearance  and  reality  into  an  absolute  dualism 
more  explicit  than  that  of  either  Locke  or  Leibniz,  the  difficulty 
of  defining  truth  in  any  unitary  fashion  in  terms  of  correspond- 
ence was  still  more  keenly  felt.     The  most  telling  ammunition 
which  Lotze  had  to  use  against  the  "copy-theory"  of  truth,  he 
found  in  what  he  still  retained  of  the  Kantian  duahstic  episte- 
mology.     We  cannot  copy,  as  it  seemed  to  him,  an  external 
reality  which,  it  is  assumed,  we  can  never  immediately  perceive. 
Among  recent  writers  we  may  take  as  typical  in  this  con- 
nection two  who,  as  personal  idealists,  are  shut  off  from  any 
unequivocal  epistemological  monism,  and  so  would  naturally 
define  truth  in  terms  of  correspondence,  if  they  could,  but 
who  are  compelled,  by  the  absoluteness  of  their  epistemological 
dualism,  to  adopt  .some  other  expedient.     A.  O.  Lovejoy  uses 
the  term  "truth"  as  meaning  agreement  with  objective  reality; 
but  this  objective  reality,  qua  physical,  is  defined  in  terms 
which  would  limit  it,  so  far  as  we  can  ever  know  anything  about 
it,  to  such  contents  of  present  and  future  experiences  of  think- 
ing beings   as   they   themselves    construct    in    common.^     In 
other  words,  truth  is  the  correspondence  of  an  idea  in  the 
narrow  (ordinary)  sense  with  an  idea  in  the  broader  Cidealistic) 
sense.     The  idea  of  truth  as  correspondence  of  idea  with  inde- 
pendent reality  is  given  up,  on  the  ground  that  no  independent 
reality,  at  least  of  anything  physical,  is  knowable. 

'  Xew  Essays  Concerning  Human  Understanding,  Eng.  Tr.,  pp.  404.  422   445 
452. 

•"On  the  Existence  of  Ideas,"  Johm  Hopkins  University  Cir'-'Uar,  March 
1914,  p.  66. 


A  CRITIQUE   OF   INTELLECTUALISM 


373 


Boyce  Gibson's  definition  of  truth  has  special  interest  as 
expressing  an  ingenious  attempt  to  produce  a  unitary  definition 
within  the  limits  of  an  episteniological  duahsm,  and  yet  with- 
out an  entire  abandonment  of  the  idea  of  correspondence  of 
idea  with  independent  reality.  "Truth,"  he  says,  "is  the  unity 
of  ideas  as  systematically  organized  through  the  control  exer- 
cised by  relevant  fact,"  or,  again,  "the  unity  of  thought  as 
systematically  organized  through  the  control  exercised  by  that 
aspect  of  Reality  which  is  relevant  to  the  purpose  of  the 
.ninker."  '  The  terms  "relevant"  and  "purpose"  are  intro- 
duced out  of  respect  for  pragmatic  considerations ;  but,  as  will 
become  more  evident  in  the  light  of  later  discussions,  the  intro- 
duction of  these  terms  does  not  keep  the  definition  from  fall- 
ing short  of  the  essential  thing  in  pragmatism ;  it  remains 
essentially  intellectualistic.  It  is  interesting,  however,  as 
combining  the  realistic  theory  of  truth,  as  a  correspondence 
between  idea  and  reality,  with  the  idealistic  theory  of  truth, 
as  the  coherence  of  ideas  among  themselves.  Thus,  while 
Locke  left  the  two  incompatible  definitions  of  truth  apart, 
Boyce  Gibson  unites  them  in  one  statement  —  without  really 
harmonizing  them,  however.  The  coherence  theory  we  shall 
have  to  deal  with  presently,  but  it  may  be  remarked  here  that 
while  there  undoubtedly  are  many  unities  of  ideas,  and  while 
these  may  be  formed  under  the  controlling  influence  of  fact, 
and  even  of  "relevant  fact,"  and  while  such  unities,  moreover, 
are  likely  to  be  very  useful  instruments  of  judgment,  and  con- 
ducive to  the  learning  of  the  truth,  it  nevertheless  does  not 
necessarily  follow  that  this  unity  of  ideas  is  itself  the  truth  of 
any  judgment  in  which  it  may  happen  to  be  employed.  Of 
course,  if  one  were  to  go  over  completely  to  epistemological 
idealism,  he  would  perhaps  find  himself  reduced  to  the  necessity 
of  accepting  this  coherence  of  ideas  as  the  only  available  sub- 
stitute for  an  inaccessible  truth ;  but  unless  he  means  to  do 
so,  Boyce  Gibson  is  inconsistent  in  defining  truth  as  both  some 
sort  of  unity  of  ideas  and  fidelity  to  relevant  fact.^  But,  it 
mu  '  be  acknowledged,  the  inconsistency  is  in  his  case  obscured 
by  the  fact  that,  like  all  pluralistic  idealists,  he  is  an  episte- 
mological dualist  only  from  the  standpoint  of  the  individual ; 


•  The  Problem  of  Logic,  p.  1. 


»  lb.,  Pref.,  p.  ix. 


374 


THK   PROBLEM  OP   KNOVVLEDOB 


■i    .  ■ 


from  the  standpoi"!  of  the  community  he  is  an  epistemoloRical 
inonist.  But  he  has  no  logiral  right  to  shift  the  basis  of  his 
argument  from  one  of  these  points  of  view  to  the  other  without 
exjilicit  acknowledgment  of  the  change;  and  this  acknowl- 
edgment could  not  be  made  without  the  argument's  lack  of 
cogency  and  the  untcnai)ility  of  the  position  being  exposed. 

We  shall  now  turn  to  an  examination  of  the  combination  of 
an  absolute  intellectualism  in  logical  theory  with  the  idealistic 
form  of  absolute  monism  in  epistemology.  We  shall  begin  with 
Hegel.  We  find  him  making  a  distinction  between  mere  cor- 
rectness, or  truth  as  it  is  found  in  common  life,  viz.  the  agree- 
ment, in  the  sense  of  mere  formal  coincidence,  of  an  object 
with  our  conception  of  it,'  and  truth  in  the  deeper  or  philo- 
sophical sens.,  v'hich  is  said  to  be  the  absolute  correspondence 
or  identity  of  objectivity  with  the  notion.-  In  an  idealistic 
absolute  epistemological  monism  this  can  be  maintained,  it 
would  seem,  because  the  object  is  interpreted  as  nothing  but 
idea.  Since  in  true  judgment  subject  and  predicate  "stand  to 
each  other  in  the  relation  of  reality  and  notion,"  '  the  thorough- 
going idealistic  intellectualist  cannot  even  say  that  subject 
and  predicate  lUffer  in  that  one  is  reality  and  the  other  idea; 
the  object  which  is  the  subject  of  the  judgment  being  itself 
idea,  truth,  the  coincidence  of  the  object  with  its  notion,  re- 
duces to  "the  coincidence  of  he  object  with  itself,"*  or  the 
"agreement  of  a  thought-coment  with  itself."*  That  is,  the 
whole  alone  is  what  is  true;*  only  Ciod  or  the  Absolute  is 
the  Trutli.^  But  this  means  that  in  genuine  bona  fide  truth  the 
judgment  disappears,  and  that  by  the  cancellation  of  its  sub- 
ject, i.e.  reality  as  distinct  from  idea.  But  the  truth  we  sought 
to  define  is  a  supposed  quality  of  judgments.  According  to 
Hegel,  however,  no  judgment  can  be  really  true.  This  is  the 
logical  result  of  taking  mere  identity  of  idea  with  reality  as  the 
sole  criterion  and  definition  of  truth,  and  persisting  in  this 
with  the  help  of  the  idealistic  interpretation  of  reality. 

One   of   the    most    thoroughly    Hegelian    of   contemporary 


«:  t  n 


1  f,njj>,  WiiUsi^r-'x  Tr ,  pp.  ."ji.  rtnr>,  » ib  ,  pp  352,  3.>4. 

•  lb.,  p.  .305.  *  Ih.  »  lb.,  p.  52. 

'  "  Phiinonu'nnloKio  dos  Geistes,"  Werke,  II,  p.  16;  Eng.  Tr.,  p.  17. 

'  Logic,  Eng.  Tr.,  p.  :i. 


'} 


A   CHITIQUE  OP  INTELLECTIJALISM 


375 


thinkers  is  John  Wiitson,  and  wo  find  in  his  treatment  of  the 
truth-problem  what  is  essentially  the  same  doctrine  with  all 
its  difficulties.  In  spite  of  the  admission  that  truth  exists  only 
in  judRincnts,'  the  account  of  the  true  idea  as  a  "copy"  of  an 
independent  real  object  is  rejected  as  untenable,  however 
plausible  i*  may  seem  on  the  ground  that  the  so-called  "real 
object"  exists  only  in  the  "true  idea,"  so  that  the  developed 
idea  is  not  different  from  the  developed  object.  The  object 
is  the  idea,  and  an  idea  or  object  cannot  be  a  copy  of  itself.* 
Thus,  while  we  may  say  that  our  ideas  have  some  low  degree  of 
truth,  in  so  far  as  they  correspond  to  or  copy  the  "ideal  object," 
the  object  as  it  is  for  "a  mind  that  has  grasped  reahty  as  it 
actually  is,"'  we  must  admit,  according  to  Watson,  that  "no 
single  judgment  is  absolutely  true."  *  Thus  the  position  is 
seen  to  be  self-refuting :  it  is  surely  not  an  absolutely  true 
judgment  that  is  asserted  when  one  judges  that  no  judgment  is 
absolutely  true.  And  here,  again,  we  have  the  setting  up  of 
truth  as  an  es.sentially  unrealizable  and  self-contrau.t  tory 
ideal;  the  ideal  judgment  would  be  no  judgment  at  all,  for 
the  subject  would  have  disappeared  in  the  predicate,  or  idea. 
It  may  be  replied  that  in  this  Hegelian  position,  in  so  far  as 
the  idea  of  truth  is  retained  at  all,  it  is  transformed  from  some 
sort  of  identity  between  the  reality  and  idea  into  a  relation  of 
coherence  between  ideas  as  elemei.ts  of  reality.  This  coher- 
ence-theory of  truth,  resting  as  it  does  upon  the  untenable 
dogma  of  idealistic  epistemological  monism,  is  itself  un'  nable ; 
and  the  signs  of  its  untenableness  will  appear  when  we  come  to 
examine  it  in  what  is  perhaps  its  most  highly  developed  form. 
In  the  meantime,  however,  we  must  call  attention  to  the  self- 
criticism,  or  self-refutation  even,  of  idealistic  intellectualism, 
as  accomplished  by  F.  K.  Bradley. 

Bradley,  as  has  been  noted  above,*  was  at  first  an  apparently 
orthodox  representative  of  Anglo-Hegelianism,  but  as  he  him- 
self says,  if  this  view  ever  did  satisfy  him  entirely,  there  came 
a  time  when  it  ceased  to  satisfy.     However  immanent  in  each 

'  Philosophical  Basis  of  Religion,  p.  159. 

'lb.,  p.  160;    The  Interpretation  of  Religious  Experience,  Vol.  II,  pp.  67-8; 
cf.  T.  H.  Green.  Works,  Vol.  II,  p.  258. 
•  Interpretation,  ete.,  II,  pp.  C9,  70. 
'Philosophical  Basis,  etc.,  p.  161.  »  Ch.  VII,  supra. 


■ 


370 


THE   PKOBLEM  OF  KNOWLEDOR 


.i*^ 


it; 


I 'HP'' 


f  I 


part,  so  far  a«  he  knew,  tho  Whole  might  \yc  really,  ho  could 
not  persuade  himself  that  it  Wius  everywhere  immanent  recog- 
nizably. And  especially,  on  the  principles  of  the  idealistic 
metaphysics  itself,  since  thought  is  constructive  of  its  object, 
the  idea  of  any  object  supplements  that  object;  one's  idea  of 
the  Whole  is  an  addition  to  the  Whole.'  Now  it  would  seem 
that  in  view  of  these  considerations  Bradley  ought  not  simply 
to  have  rejected  the  idealistic  doctrine  of  the  philosophically 
demonstrabl;  .lanence  of  the  Whole  in  each  ami  every  part, 
but  to  have  at  lejust  sus|K'cted  the  fundamental  principles  of 
alwolufe  idealisi!!  it.self.  He  seems  inclined,  however,  to  throw 
nnich  of  the  responsibility  for  his  idealistic  presuppositions  upon 
his  Cierman  and  English  predecessors  from  whom  he  inherited 
them.' 

But  while  Bradley  agreed  with  the  idealists  lliat  all  think- 
ing is  reconstruction  of  its  subject-matter,  he  refused  to  follow 
them  in  making  that  subject-matter  in  any  ca.se  a  mere  product 
of  thought.  On  the  contrary,  he  held  that  all  judgment,  in- 
stead of  being  the  joining  of  idea  to  idea,  is  an  act  which  refers 
an  ideal  content,  i.e.  a  logical  idea,  a  product  of  abstraction,  a 
"wandering  adjective,"  the  meaning  of  a  symbol,  to  a  reality 
or  existence  which  is  beyond  the  act  of  judging,  and  not  itself 
idea.'  In  all  this,  we  would  hold,  he  was  moving  in  the  right 
direction,  but  he  failed  to  reap  anything  like  the  full  reward, 
in  constructive  results,  of  his  break  with  Hegeliani.sm,  because 
he  retained  the  idealistic  doctrine  of  the  neces.sary  internality 
of  the  thought  relation,  and  indeed  (jf  all  relations,  interpreted 
in  the  end  as  establislied  l)y  and  dependent  upon  the  process 
of  human  thought,  .\ccording  to  this  internalist  doctrine,  the 
ideas  used  in  judgment  qualify  the  reality  jiulged  about,  so 
that  it  becomes  different  in  and  through  the  very  process  by 
which  the  attempt  is  made  to  know  it ;  apperception  modifies 
the  facts  which  one  sets  out  to  perceive.''  Consequently  it 
becomes  necessary  for  Bradley  to  contradict  what  he  regards 
as  the  really  fundamental  axiom  of  the  judgment,  to  the  effect 
that  what  is  true  in  oue  context  is   true  in  another.*    This 

'  Ensays  on  Truth  and  Healilu,  pp.  22.3-5.  «  lb.,  pp.  124,  246,  275. 

^Principles  of  Lnyic.  pp.  10  14;   Appearance  ami  Reality,  pp.  lC;}-5,  168. 
*  E'isays,  etc.,  pp.  108,  227-30,  212.  s  Principles  of  Logic,  pp.  133,  135. 


A   CRITIQUE  OP   INTELLECTUALISM 


377 


means  that  according  to  his  presuppoHitions  no  judgment  can 
possibly  he  true;  the  ideal  (»f  truth  is  self-contradictory.  In 
the  background  of  Bradley's  thought  there  lurks  the  assump- 
tion, suggested  perhaps  by  Jevons'  doctrine  of  the  proposition 
as  the  affirmation  or  negation  of  an  identity,  simple,  partial,  or 
limited,'  that  the  ideal  judgment  really  would  express  an  abso- 
lute identity  liet\^een  subject  and  predicate.'' 

Rut  this  ideal  is,  in  view  of  Bradley's  intcrnalistic  assumptions, 
logically  unrealizable.  Although  al)solutc  identity  of  the  predi- 
cate with  the  subject  would  be  neces.sary  to  the  absolute  truth 
of  any  particular  judgment,  this  condition  can  never  be  realized, 
because  some  difTerence  Ix^tween  subject  and  predicate  is  neces- 
sarily involved  in  all  judgment  whatsoever.''  "There  is  still  a 
difTerence  unremoved  between  the  subject  and  the  predicate, 
a  difference  which,  if  removed,  would  wholly  destroy  the  spe- 
cial essence  of  thinking."  *  No  "truth"  can  be  entirely  true; 
every  categorical  judgment  is  necessarily  false,  and  thus,  theo- 
retically considered,  a  failure.'  Not  only  are  all  necessary 
and  universal  judgments  regarded  by  Bradley  —  rightly,  we 
would  admit,  or  even  contend  —  a-s  essentially  hypothetical ;  • 
he  claims  that  the  same  is  true  of  particular  judgments,  and 
so  of  all  judgments.^  If  one's  judgment  is  to  be  true  as  well 
as  categorical,  one  must  get  the  conditions  entirely  within  it ;  * 
and  so  we  are  driven  to  fill  in  conditions  indefinite      with  the 

'  W.  S.  Jfvons,  Princ  ales  of  Science,  ed.  of  1892,  pp.  .37-43.  The  view  of 
Jevons,  howi'ver,  is  fundai..r;itally  realistic,  epistemologically  speaking.  Brad- 
ley radically  transforms  the  sifcnificanco  of  the  doctrine  by  issuming  in  broadly 
idealistic  fashion,  that,  though  the  subject  is  reality,  ruthcr  than  logical  idea,  it 
is  of  the  nature  of  experience,  rather  than  independent  reality,  so  that  it  is 
tTans/ormable  by  ideas,  as  independent  riality  would  not  be. 

'  See  Priiiciplci  of  Logic,  pp.  132-5,  344-8,  and  Appearance  and  Reality, 
pp.  167-70,  ;>cl-^. 

'  Principles,  etc.,  pp.  23-4,  131,  346-8 ;   Appearance,  etc.,  pp.  167-70. 

•  Appearance,  etc.,  p.  .301. 

•  lb.,  pp.  3ril-2 ;  cf.  p.  .390 ;  Essays,  etc.,  pp.  231-3,  251,  253,  257,  276. 

•  Principles,  etc.,  pp.  47,  49. 

'  lb.,  pp.  45,  etc.  In  his  Appearance  and  Reality  (p.  301),  Bradley  s.iys  he  is 
now  persuadeii  that  it  is  better  not  to  say  tha'  ery  judgment  is  hypothetical ; 
but  this  does  not  indicate  any  osentiiil  change  of  view.  He  still  n\aint,iins  that 
since  wh;if  any  judgment  affirms  is  inoomp:  -,  it  cannot  be  con"  :tly  ..ttributed 
to  Reality,  except  with  a  complement,  and  .adeed  one  which  i-  ne  end  remains 
unknown,  so  that  we  cannot  tell  how,  if  present,  it  would  act  upon  and  alter  the 
predicate.  •  Principlea,  etc.,  p.  99. 


;'H't  it- 


\  '  ) 


!;.t 


378 


THE  PROBLEM   OP  KNOWLEDGE 


result  that  the  categorical  nature  of  the  judgment  is  destroyed ;  * 
so  long  as  anything  remains  outside,  assuming  the  absolute 
internality  of  all  relations,  the  judgment  is  imperfect  and  its 
opposite  is  not  without  truth.=  And  so  it  is  not  permissible 
to  appeal  to  designation,  i.e.  the  use  of  such  indications  as 
"here,"  "now,"  "this,"  "my,"  in  order  to  include  conditions 
sufficiently  for  the  making  of  an  absolutely  true  categorical  judg- 
ment ;  for  the  attempt  to  define  these  terms  again  drives  one 
into  an  indefinite  regress.'  There  cannot  even  be  a  true  cate- 
gorical statement  of  possibility,  it  is  claimed;  all  possibility 
is  merely  such  only  because  of  our  ignorance  of  existing  con- 
ditions.* 

This  necessary  failure  of  the  judgment,  when  truth  is  con- 
ceived as  absoluti'  identity  of  subject  and  predicate,  leads 
naturally  to  the  formulation  of  the  notion  that  truth  is  essen- 
tially coherence,  rather  than  correspondence  or  identity.  The 
realization  of  the  ideal  of  truth  could,  on  Bradley's  presup- 
positions, mean  nothing  short  of  the  disappearance  of  all 
judgment;  the  perfection  of  truth  and  the  perfection  of  the 
reahty  would  be  the  same;  what  absolute  truth  would  be,  if 
there  could  be  such  a  thing,  is  the  coherence  of  all  elements 
(which  may  indeed  be  thought  of  as  if  they  could  exist  separately) 
in  an  all-comprehensive  system,  or,  ultimately,  in  one  super- 
relational,  immediate  experience.-^  Ultimately  non-contradic- 
tion, the  criterion  of  system  in  the  realm  of  judgments,  is  found 
to  be  realizable  only  in  the  absolute  or  all-comprehending  im- 
mediate experience ;  an  object  short  of  the  whole  tends  naturally 
to  suggest  its  complement,  and  since  that  suggested  comple- 
ment is  absent  in  fact,  reality  thus  contradicts  itself.' 

Bradley's  position  here  is  obviously  self-rofuting.  He  is 
not  entitled  to  judge  it  absolutely  true  that  no  judgment  can  be 
absolutely  true.  In  his  latest  work  he  .says,  "all  ideas  in  the 
end,  if  we  except  those  of  metaphysics,  lack  ultimate  truth."  ^ 
But  he  has  no  logical  right  to  exclude  metaphysical  judgments 
from  his  strictures  on  judgment  in  general,  and  in  Appearance 


'  Essays,  otc,  p.  229.  '  Ih..  p.  2.3.3.  »  /&.,  p.  235. 

*  Principles,  ctr.,  pp.  1S6-7,  VM,  KM  ;    Essays,  otc,  p.  2,33. 

■•-  AiJinarunct,  cti  ..  p.  aG3  ,    E,-ii>(iys,  clc,  \,p.  11.'5,  llfi.  210  U,  239. 

•  Essays,  etc.,  p.  241.  '  lb.,  p.  267. 


r?M 


A  CRITIQUE   OF   INTELLECTUALISM 


379 


and  Reality  he  more  consistently  (?)  admits  his  inconsistency  in 
the  acknowledgment  that  even  categorical  metaphysical  judg- 
ments are  logically  impossible,'  and  that  in  the  end  even  "ab- 
solute truth"  is  not  absolutely  true.*  Thus  in  spite  of  his 
having  taken  non-contradiction  as  his  criterion  of  truth  and 
reality,  he  is  forced  into  the  most  glaring  self-contradiction. 
It  would  be  difficult  to  find  a  more  appropriate  object  than 
himself  against  which  to  direct  his  own  remark  in  criticism  of 
some  of  his  opponents,  that  if  one  is  willing  to  be  inconsistent, 
he  can  never  be  refuted.'  It  would  be  a  more  than  dubious 
doctrine  which  allowed  one  to  atone  for  the  sin  of  his  incon- 
sistency by  a  mere  confession  of  it.  (Moreover,  Bradley  seems 
hardly  consistent  with  his  doctrine  that  the  idea  is  always,  as 
idea,  not  existent,  when  he  speaks  of  the  idea  as  approaching 
Reality.  How  can  what  is  essentially  non-existent  become  more 
and  more  nearly  the  reality?) 

The  strength  of  Bradley's  position,  such  as  it  is,  is  found 
only  in  the  dialectical  skill  and  thoroughness  with  which  he 
carries  out  the  implications  of  that  internalistic  residue  of 
idealism  which  he  either  had  not  the  courage  to  throw  over- 
board, or  was  brave  enough  to  retain.  He  may  well  challenge 
his  critics  to  do  any  better  than  he  has  done  —  with  the  .same  pre- 
suppositions as  materials.  All  protests  and  "refutations,"  he 
says,  count  for  nothing  with  him,  unless  they  can  show  that  on 
the  principle  adopted  the  conclusion  drawn  is  wrong.*  This 
empty  dialectical  triumph  Bradley's  critic  may  be  quite  ready  to 
grant  him ;  his  conclusions  are  not  so  much  to  be  refuted  from 
his  premises,  as  to  be  avoided,  if  legitimately  possible.  We  are 
not  concerned  to  show  that  on  his  own  principle  his  conclusion 
is  wrong ;  it  is  easier  to  show  that  his  principle  is  itself  wrong. 
Indeed  this  has  been  partially  accomplisheil  already.  We  have 
shown  that  the  arguments  for  idealism  are  not  only  not  demon- 
strative, but  that  they  are  essentially  fallacious ;  and  we  have 
outlined  as  an  alternative  a  philosophy  which  is  free  from  fal- 
lacy and  adequate  to  the  facts.  According  to  this  view  apper- 
ception is  not  essentially  a  modification  of  fact,  but  a  revelation 
of  fact.     The  predicate  is  adjectival   indeed,   but  adjectives 


''WBfi'. 


'  Appearance,  etc.,  p.  361. 


•  lb.,  pp.  .'511-5. 

*  lb.,  p.  234. 


•  Egmys,  etc.,  p.  235. 


1 


l! 


1 


.1 


it 


w 

■ 

^^^h'- 

'  '1  ■ 

^^^■1 

* 

^^If 

.  -^i:: 

^^^^Hf 

1 

^^K 

^H 

•*!  -| 

l9H>in! 

■hi 

i 

^^Hi  1 

:|. 

^^^^ft  ' 

f 

i 

■1 

^^^^K 

^^^^K 

;  i- 1 

■ 

,:ili|-^ 
""  ^ 

i;^ 

B,: 

y,,.' 

! 
i 

^1 

'•1 '  ■ 

^^^^^^B   i 

W  I. 

^^m'<i. 

1 

m 

i1 
1* 

S 

i|y 

1  ^ 

380 


THE  PROBLEM  OF   KNOWLEDGE 


are  merely  representational  in  relation  to  reality ;  they  are  not 
constitutive  of  reality  in  general,  but  only  of  knowledge  and  of 
what  we  have  called  the  tertiary  qualities  of  reality.  Moreover, 
it  was  pointed  out  that  the  internality  or  externality  of  relations 
is  not  absolute,  but  relative ;  it  depends  upon  the  purpose  which 
is,  or  ought  to  be,  entertained.  Bradley  admits  indeed  the  rela- 
tive externality  of  relations,  i.e.  their  externality  or  indifference 
for  certain  practical  purpos(>s,  while  he  denies  their  absolute 
externality.'  In  this  he  is  right,  but  when  he  assumes  that 
all  relations  are  absolutely  itiiornal,  he  is  not  right;  for,  as  we 
have  shown,  the  whole  question  of  the  internality  or  extcrnaUty 
of  relations  is  essentially  relative  to  purpose.  Relations  are 
neither  all  absolutely  inurnal  and  relatively  external,  nor  all 
absolutely  external,  nor  some  of  them  absolutely  internal  and 
others  absolutely  external ;  they  are  all  relatively  internal  and 
relatively  external.  All  existing  relations  are  —  in  their  own 
relations  —  absolute,  but  their  internality  or  externality  to  their 
terms  is  always  relative,  not  to  "this  or  that  mode  of  union,"  ^ 
but  to  this  or  that  purpose. 

But,  further,  as  we  .shall  see  more  fully  in  the  sequel,  similar 
considerations  of  purpose  open  up  a  way  whereby  particular 
judgments,  if  not  universal  judgments  also,  may  escape  from 
a  merely  hyoothetical  to  a  categorical  status.  There  seems  no 
sense  in  den.ng  the  vaUdity  or  truth  of  a  particular  judgment 
which  takes  account  of  all  the  conditions  that  need  to  be  con- 
sidered for  the  purposes  concerned,  if  these  purposes  are  what 
they  ought  to  be.  May  n^e  not  he  able  to  get  absolute  categorical 
truth  into  our  judgments,  if  firat  we  get  the  categorical  imperative 
of  morality  into  our  practical  purposes?  It  may  then  very  well 
be  possible  to  "get  the  conditions  (jf  the  predicate  into  the  sub- 
ject," sufficiently  for  all  the  purpo.ses  which  ought  to  be  convdered. 
Moreover,  the  injunction  against  "designation"  can  be  defended 
only  on  the  basis  of  the  absolute  internality  of  all  relations; 
if  relations  are  not  absolutely  internal,  non-contradiction  does 
not  necessarily  involve  all-comprehensiveness,  the  subject  of 
any  one  judgment  need  not  be  "Reality"  as  a  whole,  but  only 
some  reality,  and  this  may  be  adequately  indicated  by  designa- 
tion. Once  more,  it  is  not  neces.sary  to  reduce  all  a.s.sertions  of 
'  Eaaaya,  etc.,  pp.  237-8.  »  Bradley,  op.  cit.,  p.  237. 


A   CRITIQUE   OF   INTELLECTUALISM 


381 


possibility  to  "suppositions  founded  on  our  real  or  hypothetical 
ignorance."  '  It  is  not  an  untenable  posi'ion,  at  least  so  far 
as  Bradley  has  shown,  to  maintain  that  it  is  here  and  now  possible 
for  nio  —  all  conditions,  whether  known  or  unknown,  being  just 
what  they  are  —  to  act  in  the  immediate  future  somewhat 
differently  from  the  way  in  which,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  I  shall  act. 
Bradley  has  not  worked  without  some  glimpse  into  this 
pragmatic  way  of  escape  from  his  theoretical  difficulties.  He 
admits  that  primitive  thought  was,  and  apparently  also  that 
ideal  thought  would  be,  absolutely  practical, =  and  he  even  goes 
so  far  as  to  surmise  that  what  works  must  be  at  least  partially 
rij^ht ; » but  not  only  will  he  not  admit  the  more  extreme  doctrine 
hat  truth  is  definable  simply  in  terms  of  practical  effects; 
he  refuses  even  to  concede  that  intellect  is  so  essentially  related 
to  practice  that  its  findings  can  always  be  properly  subjected  to 
practical  tests.'*  His  criticisms  against  current  pragmatism 
may  be  largely  sound,  and  yet  the  failure  of  his  splendid  system 
to  solve  the  problems  of  truth  and  even  of  reality  may  very  easily 
be  due  to  his  failure  to  appreciate  the  theoretical  value  of  practi- 
cal considerations,  as  well  as  the  practical  value  of  theory.  And 
it  seems  not  unreasonable  to  suppose  that  Bradley,  who  at  one 
time  seemed  so  close  to  the  pragmatic  path,  was  repelled  by  the 
crude  and  uncritical  way  in  which  some  of  the  features  of 
pragmatism  were  anticipated  in  the  writinr-^  of  Alexander 
Bain.  * 

The  coherence  theory  of  truth  is  championed  by  Bosanquet, 
who  here  as  elsewhere  tries  to  retain,  in  synthetic  unity,  the 
essentials  of  both  the  Hegelian  thesis  and  the  Bradleian  antith- 
esis. Ho  holds  that  the  elements  of  the  jutlgment  are  a 
sul)ject  in  Reality,  the  meaning  of  an  idea,  i.e.  its  identical 
reference  throughout  all  its  psychical  presentations,  and  an 
identity  of  content  between  this  subject  and  predicate.  The 
cliiiin  to  be  true  consists  in  the  affirmation  of  the  meaning  as 
belonging  to  the  tissue  of  reality  at  the  point  indicated  by  the 
subject  " 

'  Principles  of  Logic,  p.  191  ;  cf.  Essays,  etc.,  p.  233. 
^Principles,  etc.,  p.  32;  Essays,  etc.,  pp.  7.5,  91,  141. 
'  Principles,  etc.,  p.  343.  *  Essays,  etc.,  pp.  79-89. 

'  See  Bruiiluy's  Principles  uj  LuQic.  pp.  IS  ff.  ;  Essays  on  Truth  and  Healitv, 
P-  70.  •  The  Essentials  of  Logic,  pp.  69-79. 


'•i  : . 


»!| 


hll,-£>»   ■ 


M  M 
1    !    ! 


■If. 


•ii 


!! 


!( 


I' I 


km": 


HI 


3S2 


THE  PROBLEM  OF   KXOWLEDGE 


This  seems  to  mean  that  when  the  subject  is  the  very  same 
thing  which  the  predicate  means,  i.e.  persistently  refers  to, 
the  judgment  is  true.  But  this  definition  surely  takes  insuffi- 
cient account  of  that  necessary  element  in  the  judgment  which 
makes  so  much  trouble  for  Bradley,  the  element  of  difference. 
The  result  is  what  might  have  been  expected.  As  with  Bradley, 
the  actual  human  judgment  "has  been  gutted  and  finally 
vani.shes";  '  but  it  slips  away  more  surreptitiously  from 
Bosanquet's  logical  theory  than  from  that  of  Bradley.  All 
that  is  left  is  a  single  term,  viz.  "truth"  as  "fact,"  or  "  Reality," 
or  "the  Whole,"  viewed  as  constituted  by  knowledge,  while 
the  trueness  of  the  forms  of  thought  is  their  power  to  constitute 
a  totality. 

But  it  will  not  do,  Bosanquet  apparently  feels,  to  leave  this 
truth  existing  or  subsisting  without  any  supporting  judgmeni  , 
and  so  he  invents  "a  single,  persistent  and  all-embracing 
judgment,"  whose  content  and  product  the  "Truth"  or  "Real- 
ity" may  be  supposed  to  be.-  But  no  such  judgment  is,  for  man, 
either  known  or  conceival)ly  possible.  It  is  purely  imaginary, 
and  we  have  no  right  to  suppose  that  there  is  anj'  such  judgment. 
In  any  case,  truth  as  an  attribute  of  actual  human  judgments 
has  disappeared ;  and,  in  order  to  distract  our  attention  from 
our  loss,  we  are  exhorted  to  fix  our  attention  upon  the  coherence 
of  that  one  ultimate  Reality  which  is  constituted  by  knowledge. 
What  Bosanquet  would  really  be  entitled  to  say,  from  his  general 
philosophical  point  of  view,  is  not  that  the  truth  of  our  judg- 
ments is  the  coherence  of  Reality,  but  tliat  it  is  the  correspon- 
dence of  certain  ideas  of  ours  with  the  content  of  an  Absolute 
Experience,  which  can  never  be  the  experience  of  us  finite 
individuals,  so  that  the  test  of  truth  can  never  be  applied  by 
us.  The  fact  is,  with  reference  to  this  coherence  theory,  that 
it  has  taken  one  of  the  Inter  tests  of  truth  (coherence  of  judg- 
ments in  a  consistent  system  —  a  test  which  is  valid  enough 
within  limits,  but  which  can  never  guarantee  more  than  hypo- 
thetical  truth)  a^  being  itself  the  nature  of  truth  —  an  error  quite 
parallel,  as  we  shall  see,  with  the  characteristic  error  of  current 
pragmatism. 

'  Bradley,  PrincijtUf    .tc,  p.  27. 

'  Logic,  or  the  Morphology  uf  Knowledge,  Vol.  I,  p.  3, 


A   CRITIQUE   OF   IXTELLECTUALISM  383 

H.  H.  Joachim  acknowlodRPs  groat  indebtcdnoss  to  Bradley 
and  Boaanquct,'  and  liis  point  of  view  is  not  essentially  different 
from  theirs  except  that  he  seems  to  appreciate,  at  least  more 
fully  than  Bosanquet,  the  inadequacy  of  the  coherence-notion  of 
tru  h.     He  assumes  that  all  relations  are  essentially  intornal  - 
and  so   partly  on  this  account,  gets  into  trouble  when  he  tries 
to  thmk  through  the  idea  of  truth  as  correspondence,  or  identity 
of  structure.     There  cannot  be  an  identity  of  structure  between 
he  mental  anrl  the  real,  because  if  there  is  no  difference  between 
the  two  factors,  there  is  no  correspondence,  but  simple  identity  • 
whereas  if  there  is  a  difference,  there  cannot  be  identity  of 
structure.'    He  is  wiHing  to  regard  correspondence  as  a  symp- 
tom of  truth,  but  claims  that  it  is  upon  something  other  than 
the  correspondence  that  truth  depends."    What  this  something 
else  IS,  he  seems  at  a  loss  to  say ;  but,  as  we  have  hinted  in  our 
criticism  of  Bradley,  and  as  will  appear  more  fully  in  our  con- 
structive  statement,  he  would  have  been  able  to  find  it    if   in 
addition  to  discarding  his  theory  of  the  necessary  internality 
of  relations    he  had  given  some  attention  to  that  pragmatic 
theory,  with  reference  to  which  he  almost  boastingly  remarks 
that  the  reader  will  find  no  mention  of  it  in  his  book.^ 

After  paying  his  respects  to  the  realistic  theory  that  truth 
IS  a  quality  of  independent  entities,  Joachim  proceeds  to  exam- 
ine the  coherence-theory,  according  to  which,  as  he  says,  truth 
IS     that  systematic  coherence  which  is  the  character  of  a  sig- 

"'i/r,«n  ''^  '•'•  ^^  "'"  °''S^"'='^^'  individual  experience, 

self-fumihng  and  self-fulfilled."  •    But  it  is  confessed  that  there 

2\u.u^  °"r  '"'^  experience,  and  that  is  not  the  human,  so 
hat  the  truth  is  -  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  human  in- 
telligence -  an  Ideal,  and  an  Ideal  which  can  never  as  such  or 
in  Its  completeness,  be  actual  as  human  experience  " '  No 
single  human  judgment,  therefore,  can  ever  be  absolutely  true.* 

■  The  Nature  of  Truth,  p.  4.  .  /6.,  p.  26.  .  /5.,  pp.  24-5.  29. 

,T,^-     ^-  '/5..  p.  3.  6/fc      p    7,; 

well  .s".,rrin?"K'  ,^',''"^r';  '"'■''  absolutists  as  Bradley  and  Whim,  as 
t^K  I"  tiH^r  h  K  '■  ''"•''"■'*'"  ^■Pistemolo«i.sts,  Schiller'.,  remark  is  scar;ely 
■ut!  i  ietlT  .  '"'''■  ■,^''«'^"-^»*''''^  i^  the  distinctive  n.ark  ,.f  a  consist- 
i'  49.3.     >t"  r  ^''^  '   •■"''■"""'"   "■    ^'''^-'r'y.   Vol.   IV,   1907. 

'h.."'''s  n^;"fK  >  ''°'"'''*"  '■""f''^^^^'  '"  "T'-'-t.  that  he  has  "never  doubted" 
-h. .    .s  no  truth  but  t.        lole  truth  ("  that  the  truth  itself  is  one  and  whole 


384 


T.     ;   PROBLEM  OP   KNOWLEDGE 


i    'n''\ 


f: 


But  in  that  case  oven  tho  judgmont  which  embodies  the  rnhp. 
rence-thoory  of  truth  cannot  it.olf  be  true,  and  tht  so  f-Tut 
on  o    what  he  still  regards  as  the  true.;  possib  e    heory  o 
truth  Joachim  ,s  himself  forced  to  accept.'     We  shall  noT  hi 
■satisfied  to  share  his  estimate,  however,  i^til  we  shaH  have  i^ 

in  S       T  '"""f '""^  '^  '^^"""^  ^  non-.self-refuHlg  theo;' 
in  still  another  way  than  any  of  those  examined  by  Jn.^.hir^ 

^    -  sha  1  have  to  examine  the  views  of  one  more  representative 
of  Kloahstic  absolute  intcllec-tualism,  viz.  Josiah  Royce     for 

heont^uthlm^''^"'"'^^   pragmatism,-  this  phrophe^'s 
tneory  of  truth  remains,  as  we  will  endeavor  to  .show  essentiallv 

:^:^i:r'''  ^'^^^  ^'•^^'"-^'^•-  ««>-  -^rm:  y 

c  n  essions  to  the  pragmatist,  aithoush,  as  we  shall  see   thev 

rudiment  i.  T"'''  P"^"'^^''^"'-  «^'  ^^™^«  ^^at 'ete^ 
judgment  is  a  reaction  at  a  particular  time  to  an  empiric-ilW 
R.ven  situation,  a  reaction  expressing,  and  determined  b  he 
consciousness  of  a  need  to  get  control  over  the  situation  He 
also  admits  that  even  the  most  remote  specu  ations  ar  ^or  the 
man  who        ,, OS  in  them,  modes  of  conduct,  and  that    he 

But  whil  '  "  r''^  "™  ^'"^^'•^'  "••  ^^  '-^t  his  plan.s  o  ac  ion  3 
But  «hile  mamtainmg  that  every  opinion  is  a  deed  intended 
to  gmde  other  deeds,  and  consequently  that  all  truth  i  p  a  "caM 
he  does  not  propose  to  take  this  practical  characteristic  of  truii 
a.s  fiirmshinr  under  any  conditions,  a  criterion  of  uth  he 
adopts  a  criterion  and  definition  of  truth  which  are,  as  ^ill  an! 
poar,  quite  non-pragmatic.  ^ 

But  even  more  important  for  the  understa  .ding  of  Rovce's 

ZTT\  '"•"'"  ••"•^""'^"^^  for  a  non-realistic   vstem 

we  h  vo  already  examined,  but  his  criticism  of  realism  is  Jmo^ 
equally  open  to  objection.     Even  in  his  first  publi.ihed  loliZ 

lot  u,s  say,  to  .xamino  this  1   „  '  ,"       K  f.  ""*  "'"-^^='"1^  *"  doubt,  but. 

'  Thi-  SntureofTrulh.  p.  i7s  '  •' 

y«.i:i^!:;S;:':'*z:t.'^:"24"'  *'-■  ^'«'"  -^ «--» Dis<.ussio„."  wunan. 

,oA4r''^*;^;:'r'V''' ''"'?'''•■' '''''''^''''^'-' «--"••  XIII.  1904,  pp  nr- 

.  J^i  .      I.   H  i^,an,  Jumr«  „n,i  (Jther  AVs-a^s,  pp   22.3    2.3'?  ■  II  ■  '1' 

'Sourca,  of  Religion.,  Insight,  pp.  145-6. 


A  CRITIQUE  OF   INTELLECTUALISM 


085 


on  the  ground  that,  as  he  alleges,  common  sense  does  not  know 
what  error  is,  he  says,  "Let  common  sense  not  disturb  us,  then 
in  our  further  search."  '    Against  this  summary  procedure  it  is 
sufficient  to  remark  that  if  common  sense,  without  the  pragmatic 
criterion,  is  unable  to  say  what  error  is,  it  does  not  follow  that 
common  sense,  with  the  pragmatic  criterion,  might  not  be  able  to 
furnish  the  desired  solution.     Moreover,  in  his  treatment  of 
realism,  Royce  commits  the  fallacy  of  assuming  that  the  refuta- 
tion of  a  particular  type  of  realism  —  and  that  a  very  extreme 
and  indefensible  kind  —  is  a  sufficient  refutation  of  all  realism 
He  assumes  that  realism  must  bo  absolutely  dualistic  in  episte- 
mology,  completely  sundering  the  what  from  the  that,-    and 
even  supposing  that  what  one  mentally  constructs  and  discovers 
as  thus  constructed,  existed  prior  to  that  construction."    He 
also  assumes  that  "  independently  real "  must  mean  not  onl      >al 
independently  of  the  knowledge  relation,  but  real  independently 
of  all  relations,  a  pluralism  so  absolute  as  to  deny  that  there 
obtain  among  real  things  any  relations  except  such  as  are  so 
absolutely  external  that  they  are  not  relations  at  all."    It  is 
small  wonder,  then,  that  a  seeming  triumph  for  ideahsm  is 
easily  obtained. 

Having  thus,  as  he  supposes,  shown  the  impossibility  of  a 
rational  defence  of  realism,  the  need  of  finding  some  way  of 
reaching  objectivity  becomes  imperative.     We  need  to  hold 
that  the  subject  of  our  judgments  is  Reality,  not  our  idea,^ 
and  we  need  that  the  judgments  which  we  need  for  practical 
purposes  be  also  true  of  this  reality  which  is  not  our  idea.' 
What  Royce  proposes  in  this  situation,  as  a  substitute  lor  real- 
ism, IS  to  fall  back  up""  what  is  given  subjectively,  viz.  our 
needs ;  ^  and  it  is  this  private  need  of  his  own,  as  a  non-realistic 
philosopher,  this  need  of  constructing  objectivity  out  of  our  sub- 
jective needs,  or  of  finding  it  in  them,  that  explains  his  seemingly 
rather  patronizing  attitude  toward  contemporary  pragmatism, 
with  its  emphasis  upon  the  theoretical  value  oi  practical  con- 

'  The  Religious  Aspect  of  Philusophy,  p.  392. 

»  The  World  and  the  Individual,  Vol.  I,  p.  107. 

'  Phi'osophical  Review,  XIIT.  1904.  p.  125. 

•  The  World  and  the  Individual,  Vol.  I,  pp.  112,  127-136 

'/6.,  pp.  9.5,  271-2. 

'Philosophical  Review.  XIII,  1904,  pp.  126,  141.         »  lb.,  p.  124. 


Ill 


•til 

'M 

'i  ■ 

f 

m 

:■!«''( 

'"1 

1*  1«! 

J 

fi 

Mi 

1« 


386 


THK    PROBLEM   OF    KXOWLEDOE 


siderations.  What  \vp  iummI  in  needing  truth  is,  at  the  ver>' 
least,  arcordinp;  to  Roycc,  conipiuiioiiship  in  our  thinking,'  but 
it  is  more  tlian  inoroly  this.=  Tho  need  of  the  moment  needs 
to  he  controlled,  not,  as  the  r(>alist  imajiines,  l)y  an  independently 
existing  object,  but  by  "some  universal  expression  of  need — 
an  expression  that  simply  makes  conscious  what  the  need  of 
the  moment  is  trying,  after  all,  to  be"  '  Our  need  of  truth  is  a 
need  of  an  insight  such  as  would  remain  invariant  for  every 
additional  i^oint  of  view;^  and  this,  it  is  assumed,  can  only 
mean  one's  own  true  self,  including  within  its  experience  all 
possible  points  of  view,  and  knowing  that  it  includes  them.^ 
Thus  we  need,  it  is  claimed,  the  Absolute  Self,  other  than  our 
present  finite  self,  as  an  actually  and  eternally  existent  Judge, 
if  we  are  to  have  truth/'  IniltMHl,  one's  true  Self,  as  such  an 
Absolute  Judge,  must  exist,  if  there  is  to  he  truth,  whether 
known  by  any  finite  self  or  not ;  and  this  being  so,  there  camiot 
be  error,'  or  even  ignorance,^  without  th(>  true,  all-inclusive 
Self  as  Absolute  .Judge. 

Royce  confesses  that  it  is  his  voluntarism  that  is  the  secret 
of  his  absolutism;  9  but,  in  tiie  light  of  what  has  been  said,  it 
would  perhaps  be  truer  to  say  that  it  is  his  provisional  subjec- 
tive idealism  that  drives  him  to  take  up  voluntarism  .uul  to 
develop  it  in  the  directiot.  of  absolutism,  a  solipsism  of  the 
Absolute  Self,  as  the  only  logical  escape  from  a  solipsism  of  the 
finite  self.  We  "acknowledge"  a  transcendent,  truth-know- 
ing Absolute;  we  "define"  the  Eternal;  '"  we  "appeal  to"  an 
all-comprehending  insight ;  '•  and  the  meaning  of  all  this  is 
that  we  need  the  belief  in  such  an  Absolute,  and  so  we  deliber- 
ately take  it,  not  tentatively  as  a  working;  hypothesis,  as  the 
pragmatist  might  do,  but  absolutely  and  r-utright,  as  if  it  were 
our  indispensable  possession. 

'  Philosoplacal  Renew.  XIII,  1904,  pp.  120,  135. 

'Jb..p.VSH.  =/6.,  p.  131.  *Ib.,p.UO. 

'  lb.,  pp.  UO  -2 ;    n'iliiam  James  and  Other  E.isays.  p.  236. 
«  Philosophical  Reriew.  XIII,  1904,  pp.  135-0.  13S. 

'  Religious  Aspect  of  Philosophy,  pp.  393,  424-7;  Studies  of  Good  and  Evil, 
p.  105. 

9  The  Concctition  of  God.  pp.  2,s  9  :    William  James  and  Other  Essays,  p.  237. 

»  William  James  and  Other  Essays,  p.  235. 

'»  Ih..  p.  230. 

"  Sources  of  RcUgious  Insight,  p.  137. 


A  CRITIQUE   OP   IXTELLECTUALISM  387 

Now  it  is  true  enough  that,  because  we  come  to  know  things 
through  experience,  we  naturally  remember  them  as  they  were 
experienced    and  imagine  what  we  have  not  experienced  as  it 
would  be,  ,f  experienced.'     In  this  sense  we  do  indeed  appeal 
to  experience,  even  when  we  refer  beyond  our  own  present 
experience.     But  what  we  must  not  forget  is  that  what  we 
intend  to  appeal  to  is  not  what  the  thing  i,  experienced  as,  but 
what  It  would  be  experienced  as,  if  it  were  experieoced.     The 
superhuman  experience  is,  so  far  as  these  necessities  of  thought 
are  concerned,  simply  a  "regulative,"  not  a  "constitutive" 
concept.     What  the  dogmatizing  rationalist  does,  however,  is  to 
substitute  for  the  "would  be  ...  if,"  a  simple  "is,"  or  an 
authoritative  "must  be";  and  so  deft  is  he  in  his  logical  leger- 
demain that  his  trick  imposes  even  upon  himself,  and  he  con- 
cludes that  the  all-mdusive  experience  of  the  Absolute  Self 
actually  i,  and  must  be.     It  is  true  enough  that  something 
besides  our  subjective  practical  needs  underlying  our  judg- 
ments IS  needed  as  the  foundation  and  measure  of  their  claim 
to  truth;    but  what  is  needed  is  not  necessarily  superhuman 
truth  —  although  we  would  not  argue  that  there  is  none  - 
but  mdependently  existing  reality,  accessible,  under  whatever 
conditions,  to  human  experience  and  knowledge. 

Royce,  however,  having  rejected  all  such  realism,  and  having 
consequently,  after  the  fashion  of  logical  idealists,  confused 
the  concept  of  truth  with  that  of  reality,  is  compelled  to  pur- 
sue the  course  we  have  just  outlined.  And  in  so  doing  we 
must  insist,  while  he  still  refuses  the  most  essential  and  valu- 
able element  in  current  pragmatism,  ho  acts  upon,  and  really 
adopts  in  principle,  the  most  logically  vicious  element  in  what 
we  shall  call  pseudo-pragmatism.^  Having  first  gotten  him- 
self by  a  philosophical  mistake,  into  unnecessary  difficulties 
he  finds  that  the  only  thing  that  will  save  him  from  the  neces- 
sity of  retracing  his  steps  and  acknowledging  the  error  of  his 
ways  is  to  assume  the  truth  of  an  unverifiable  proposition 

wou.H  '''''*  '*"  ^  '"""'.  ^'■  ""'  °''J"''  "'  ^■'"^'^  ^  '"'°'*-  that  I  am  ignorant  ?  Dewey 
«ouId  say,  presumably,  a  future  content  of  my  own  experience;  and  Roycla 
present  (or  ..upcr-temporal)  experience  of  the  Ah.oh.tc.  Unt  whv  ' future- 
w£t  r"""*'"'"""'"'     ^^■''•''  ■'"'  '^''  A'-lute"?     And  why  •Experience"' 

lp:ierj:'''"  "  "  '""''"  """'"•  "'"•''';*>•  '"  «"'-  -«-•  '  -"^  have  /u^ure 
expenerM!.  ,  g^^  ^    XVIII,  infra. 


388 


TIIK    PROBLEM  OP   KXOWLEDC.E 


.■* 


1ii    ' 


i : 


ur 


(that  an  AI»solutp,  surh  as  h-  dopioty,  exists);  ho  thoroforo 
naturally  "wills  to  brliovc"  it,  and  immcdiatoly  does  so,  arRU- 
iriR  its  certainty  from  its  necessity,  forgetting  that  the  neces- 
sity is  itself  (luite  artificial  and  unnecessary.  Uoyce  criticises 
current  pragmatism  for  its  tendency  to  lapse  into  this  pseudo- 
pragmatism  as  a  doctrine,  "identifying  the  truth  of  an  asser- 
tion with  one's  own  individual  interest  in  making  the  asser- 
tion";' but  he  himself  seems  to  have  done  the  same  thing, 
not  in  theory,  hut  in  practice.  His  "absolute  pragmatism" 
is  a  necessary  theoretical  veil  to  hide  the  ahmlute  pseudo-prag- 
matism of  his  actual  procedure  in  this  particular  insrance. 

And  what  are  the  consequences  of  this  making  of  agreement 
with  the  judgment  of  the  absolute,  all-knowing  .Judge  the 
criterion  of  truth?  Evidently,  that  even  if  we  avoid  Bradley's 
conclusion  that  we  can  never  possess  the  truth,  we  are  not 
able,  logically,  to  say  that  we  know  that  we  have  it,  bccuuse 
the  standard  of  measurement  is  maccessible.  The  completely 
integrated  experience  of  the  Absolute  the  individual  man  never 
gets  before  him  ;  =  and  since  the  only  workings  by  which  our 
assertions  can  be  adequately  judged  are  "their  workings  as 
experienced  and  estimated  from  the  point  of  view  of  su' 'i  a 
larger  life,"  '  the  agnostic  conclusion  is  logically  inevitable. 
In  spite  of  the  assertion  that  the  Al)solute  Experience  is  the 
experience  of  my  true  self,  it  remains  a  fact  that  I,  the  finite 
self,  do  not  experience  it.  And  indeed  Royce  seems  to  admit 
that  the  knowledge  we  t,  such  as  it  is,  by  adopting  his  abso- 
lutistic  criterion  is  a  wledgc  of  our  own  ignorance.*  And 
if  attention  be  called  to  the  fact  that  this  completely  agnostic 
conclusion  is  untenable  and  must  be  given  up,  it  ought  to  be 
sufficiently  obvious  that  this  can  only  mean  that  the  absolutist ic 
doctrine  of  the  criterion  of  human  truth  has  been  shown  to  be 
self-refuting. 

But,  strange  as  it  may  seem,  Royce  has  no  intention  of  mak- 
ing any  such  admission.  Unlike  Bradley,  who  consistency 
acknowledges  the  necessary  inconsistency  of  his  absolutistic 
position,  Royce  argues,  against  the  logic  of  his  position,  that 

'  W  il'rim  Janus  and  Other  K.iiiay,i,  \).  232. 

*  SoHTCcs  of  RfligioHt!  Insioht,  p.  14S.  J  /ft,,  p.  149. 

*  The  Conception  of  God,  pp.  28-9 ;    William  James  and  Other  Essays,  p.  2.37. 


A   CRITIQUE   OP   IXTELLECTUALISM 


389 


oven  he  has  adopted  the  ahsohiti.st  criterion  can  have 

ibsohite  knowledKo  of  alxsohite  truth,  hecau.se,  as  a  matter  of 
fiu't,  he  has  such  knowIedRe  in  all  propositions  which  are  such 
that  to  deny  them  is  to  assert  them  untler  a  new  form  '  What 
he  has  overlooked  here  is  the  fact  (as  we  wouhl  contend  it  is) 
that  even  these  "absohite  truths"  are  reached,  not  by  the 
ahsolutistic,  but  by  a  humanistic  criterion. 

That  in  his  own  thinking  he  is  really  guided  by  some  more 
workable  prmciplc  than  is  to  l)e  found  in  his  own  theory  ia 
increasmgly  evident  as  we  look  further  into  his  discussion  of 
absolute  truths.     While  it  is  claimed  that  in  the  realm  of  pure 
logic  and  pure  mathematics  absolute  truths  are  accessible » 
it^  IS  admitted  that  all  such  propositions  are  essentially  hypo- 
thetical;'   "absolute  truth  is  not  accessible  to  us  in  the  em- 
p.ncal  world."  '     And  yet  he  seems  to  teach  also  that  some 
absolute  categorical  truth  concerning  reality  is  derivable  from 
these  universal  hypothetical  truths.     Hypothetical  judgments, 
It  IS  claimed,  give  us  negative  information  about  the  real  world  » 
and  in  the  end  they  tol'     .  indirectly  what  is,  by  telling  us  what 
IS  not.«     Moreover,  they  give  us  positive  and  categorical  abso- 
lute truth  about  the  nature  of  the  creative  will  that  thinks  the 
truth.^     Indeed  Royce  seems  to  have  intin.ations  of  a  wider 
held  of  accessible  absolute  truths,  when  he  says  that,  in  view 
of  the  irrevocableness  of  every  past  deed,  every  act  of  judgment 
that  calls  for  a  deed  is  irrevocably  (and  so,  absolutely)  true 
or  false.-l     This  last  seems  to  be  true  only  oi    ,he  essentially 
pragmatic  principle  that  judgments  which  satisfy  every  rele- 
vant practical  purpose  that  ought  to  be  considered  (the  pur- 
pose of  the  scientist,  which  is  ultimately  practical,  being  in- 
cluded) are  really,  and  therefore  absolutely,  true;   but  this  is 
very  far  from  being  consistent  with  Royce's  ahsolutistic  theory 
of  the  criterion  of  truth.     Furthermore,  much  of  the  appear- 
ance of  contradiction  in  the  above-cited  doctrines,  first  of  the 
purely   hypothetical   character,   and   then   of   the   essentially 

'  William  James  and  Other  Essays,  pp.  2.39,  244.  J  lb    pp   212   251 

'  {f.-;  ?•  -•'"  •   '■'•  ^'"'  '^"'•W  "nd  the  Individual,  Vol.  I,  p.  276.      "     ' 
>»  ilham  James,  ptr.,  p.  249. 

•  The  World  and  the  Individual,  Vol.  I,  p.  274. 

i«„"^"'Jr.,  ,  ^  Waiiam  James,  etc.,  pp.  247-8. 

Sources  of  Religious  Insight,  pp.  154-7. 


W^ 


Mi 


It » 


§i 


ii' 


i    '^ 

If 

■■1 

■|  1 

Ji 

390 


THE   PROBLEM   OP   KNOWLEDGE 


cafrgorical  tharnctcr,  of  absoliifn  tntth         1 1  . 

™'v  i.  w,.„.  ..x,.,i,,,i,  u,:!::':;:  iTh  'Z'  ,l"„x:" " 

«nclu(lt.,l  in  th(>  nr..,li..n»«       a:     "  '"'""^^  «'    <ho  .subject  aro 

empiri.al  truths    is  tl.o  nn„    k  ' .',  huiimnly  acccasi!  le, 

presunmb  V  true      As  it  ;«   k  pracucai,   and   therefore 

truth  being  ^Jab^o  u      praZS:; '1/^  '""  ''  l'^^^^  °^ 
absolute  intelleetuaUsu,     ^"'^"'''^''"''  '*  '^'^'"^'Hs  at  heart  an 

int!:^^;;^  t  ar%- ;;L;f  ''rr  r  ^^^  *^^^  -^^  ^he 

an  idea  of  trut     whi  d  7'T    •'^"'''■^*'  '"*  ^•^"''•''  ^"  ^old 

corresponclenee  or  iden  i  V  ' '.    '""^''^^  '"  "^  ^"P>''"«  ««• 

the  fact  of  the  one  ter     ho  n  f     numer.cal,  apart  from 

relatively  to  the  i  d  idu7r''f''  '"'  '^'  "^'^^'^  ^^^  '^-^^ 
relationship,  howev  i  ^  iLl'^'"'r^  "on-n^ental.  Such  a 
great  nmjor ity  o  Mu  IZ.^''  ^  "'^'  ""'  "'"''^"'^'^"  '"  ^^e 
;hepredL/re.;trStrt:^:;^«^^^^ 

eato  or  idea  eou     eve    be  A^  ^to"^ '^^^^^^    -^^  ^''"  ^^^^•- 
which  it  is  asserted   wherever  t ho        ^°'"^'^'^\"''t'>  ^he  thing  of 

predicate,  of  realiiv  -m,]  wl„,.  ^"-"tative,  of  subject  and 

in  .he  -bjeo.i,:^,,t,t"c ::?::,', '°  •"  '""°^''™^'° 

pos..n,l,y  TOhcront  iilo-i,    «,;„„!     "",.''.  """"y  'J'stem  of  all 

'"■'h  "f  human  jlj    ^       V    "r;,,;,"'™  .'ITJ,'™  "f  ""> 
reach  of  man  altogether.  "^^*  ^*'>'*'"'^  ^^^ 


A   CRITIQUE  OP   INTELLECTUALISM 


391 


Wo  shall  now  turn  to  n  conHidcration  of  the  possibilities 
of  a  purely  intellectual  s(»lution  of  the  truth-problem  for  the 
realistic   episteinoloRical    nionist.     And    here   we   shall   see   a 
course  pursued  which  in  the  end  comes  to  a  conclusion  »hich  is 
the  exact  opfwsite,  in  son»e  respects,  of  that  of  the  idealists. 
Instead  nf  finding  the  absolute  identity,  numerical  and  quali- 
tativ(>,  of  subject  and  predicate,  of  reality  and  idea,  by  inter- 
pret ing  the  subject  as  a  system  of  itleas,  they  would  find  it  by 
ciiiiiinatinK  the  predicate  altoRether;    they  will  have  no  true 
idea  as  numerically  distinct  frotn  the  thing;  only  indeiwndent 
reality  is  supposed  to  be  left  to  be  true,  or  the  truth.     Whether 
or  not  this  is  the  true  solution  of  the  problem  we  nmst  now  in- 
(luire,  examining  certain  typical  expressions  of  the  neo-realistie 
treatment  of  the  problem  of  truth. 

A  less  extreme  result  of  the  union  of  realism  and  intellectualism 
than  that  with  which  we  shall  be  chiefly  occupied  throughout 
the  remainder  of  this  chapter  is  .seen  in  the  doctrine  of  truth 
of   the    Aristotelian   scholastics.     In    media'val    times,   where 
the  influences  of  mysticism  and  of  the  philo.sophy  of  Plato  were 
strong,  idea  and  reality  tended  to  be  identified  and  the  contrast 
b(>tvveen   appearance   and   rei.Iity   strongly   accentuated;    but 
where  common  sense  and  the  influence  of  Aristotle  prevailed, 
just  the  opposite  was  true:    reality  and  ordinary  appearance 
tended  to  be  identified,  and  the  contrast  between  reality  and 
Klea  taken  as  an  unquestioned  commonplace.     It  was  only 
natural,  then,  that  the  Aristotelian  definition  of  truth,  as  the 
(iuahty  of  a  judgment  which  exactly  represents  the  way  in 
which  real  things  are  conjoined  or  divided,'  should  also  have 
i)een  accepted,  quite  as  a  matter  of  course.    The  statement  of 
Thomas  Aquinas  that  "to  know  Truth  is  to  know  the  agree- 
ment of  knowledge  with  the  thing  known,"  «  presented  no  diffi- 
culties, for  while  the  realism  was  not  carried  to  any  one-sided 
extreme  (as  is  the  case  in  the  new  realism),  on  the  other  hand 
there  was  no  absolute  epistemological   dualism  to  be  tran- 
scended. 


'  Metapky.ir^,  Rk.  IX,  Ch.  X,  "He  «ho  thinks  the  separated  to  U  sepa- 
rated, and  the  eombiuod  to  be  ronibined,  has  the  truth." 

» Compfndium  of  the  Summa  Theologica.  Pars  prima,  Ch.  XVI.  For  the 
.M'holastics  truth  was  aJiquatio  inhikctus  ct  rei. 


392 


THE   PROBLEM   OP    KXOAVLEDGE 


yiil 


'■   ;< 


The  reprosontation  of  truth  as  indopondont  reality  has  been 
either  approx.,nated  „r  a,.tuallv  porf„rnu>d  l.y  sevial    ,f    '" 

^r^M^r'"''''  ""'^'"^  ^'"•'■^''  ^^""^^•""'  "«'^  ^ 

,;:  '^^•■f "';•'"•••  M'os,tK.n  is  souunvhat  transitional.     He 

h  ;  ^  »■■  '"^•^^'"^'•='^-'  -■"^'  '^f  tJ'o  <I"«.natic  features  of 

he  otl^Z-"l     ■;  "T-rr*"''  -  ^'-^  -"  ^'---fi-l  hin.  with 
the  othe.s     he  has  failed  to  reach  the  ,no.st  essential  insights 
^vv  ju  u.  have  eall,.d  .W//.,/  realistic  episten.oIo.ieal  ,ZS^ 
His  definition   of  truth   eonsoquently   reflects   the  essentiall^ 
rans.  lonal    and  even  unstable,  position  in  which  he  haslo^ 
some  tune  been  attempting  to  maintain  his  equilibrium      An 
Idea  IS  true,  he  holds,  if  its  object  is  in  the  real  univ    se     f-dt 
Its  object  IS  unreal..     At  first  this  seems  to  amount    ^  1      e 
any,  more  than  the  old  scholastic  ark.uatio  intellectus      Ic^' 
it  as.serts  that  an  idea  (presumably  an  ima.e  with  its  Ian: 
2:  --0  It  IS  asserted  that  every  idea  correspcmds  to  it   ob  "t^ 
which  represents  a  reality  is  true.     Xo.v  this  would  be  a  toler- 
able definition  o    truth  if  in  judKin.  we  bcRan  with  the  idel 

'mat';;?  ft ; "' '""''"'  ;"■'"'""  ^"'- ''  ■^'"'^■^'••^  ^-  •^-  ^" ' 

a  matter  of  fact  our  procedure  is  different;    we  begin  with  i 
pyen  situation,  some  element  of  which  is  se  ected  by  a  P m  ti 
oal  interest   as  the  subje,.t-inatter  of  a  possible  ju,  Jnen'   and 
then  we  look  for  the  proper  i.Iea,  or  pre.licate.     Ther    nm  le 

sent"';;"  H^  "'^^  "'•'^'^""'  ■^"''''  "^'^  ^'^'"  •""='  -"••'  <"y  -op- 
sent,  but  the  question  is  whether  tfn.s  oI,j,.ct,  experienced  or 
assumed  as  subject-matter  of  judgment,  is  Lly  repres  nte^  Z 

eria  -  ^T'' .  J'"  '''''''  ''''''  "^  ^'^''^^^'  ^  ^'^ 
versal    ,  that  it  is  not  the  true  predicate  in  this  given  situation 

(or,  more  accurately,  the  predicate  in  a  true  judgment  c once  n 

ing  this  assumed  reality  in  this  situation)  dies  not    narZ" 

;  sr-  Tier'  '-rT""-''  '--^^  ^^^  '''-"^-  ^- 

judgment.  McGilvary  virtually  treats  the  logical  idea  as  a 
partieular  datum,  and  the  reality  almost  as  a  universal.  Trans! 
lated  into  terminology  appropriate  to  the  judgment  as  actuX 
employed  in  practical  life,  his  <iefinition  of  truth  a  noun  7  o 
no  more  than  to  say  that,  when  there  is  truth,  some  reaUty  is 
represented   by  an   idea.     But  this,   which  may  perls' be 

'  Philosuiihkal  lientu;  XX,  1911,  p.  150. 


A  CRITIQUE   OF  INTELLECTUALISM 


393 


regarded  as  giving  the  proximate  genus  of  truth,  fails  to  state 
the  fhfferentia  of  the  species ;  an  idea,  or  predicate,  may  some- 
times represent  H-  s  ;'^.vt,  and  yet  not  truly.  Thus  McGil- 
vary's  definition  .-  r.-ally  mo,t  i  3n  to  objection  than  is  that  of 
the  scholastics:  If  .loos  no:  provide  for  the  adeqimtio  as  be- 
tween idea  and  f  ■;.  -eality.  ,n  its  original  form  it  is  signifi- 
cant, however,  as  expressni^  .he  neo-rcalistic  tendency  to  find 
truth  in  reality,  rather  than  in  the  judgment. 

Perry  rejects  the  absolutistic  account  of  truth  »  and  also  the 
current  pragmatist  identification  of  truth  with  the  satisfying 
character  of  the  practical  transition  from  cognitive  expectation 
to  fulfilment,*  and  signifies  his  adherence  to  the  realistic  form 
of  intellectualism  when  he  says  that  knowledge  as  true  belongs 
to  the  context  of  reality,  or,  more  conservatively,  that  it  is 
verified  by  being  found  consistent  with  reality.'     It  is  proved, 
he  claims,  directly,  in  the  elements  and  systematic  relations 
of  real    experience,   i.e.   of  independent    realitv   imn. -diately 
experienced."     Truth  is  to  be  found  in  the  thing  krjwn;    it 
must  envisage  reality ;   it  not  merely  corresponds  to  its  object ; 
the  object  plays  the  determining  part  in  constituting  the  truth  »' 
In  this  way  he  gradually  leads  n.p  to  his  rather  radical  definition 
of  truth  as  essentially  identity,  or  consistency,  with  rcahty." 
Later,  he  says  there  is  truth  when  a  subjective  manifold  har- 
monizes with  a  manifold  of  some  independent  order,  or,  dif- 
ferently expressed,  when  a  content  of  mind  is  rightly  taken  to 
be  fact.7     If  we  gather  these  suggestions  together,  it  seems  evi- 
dent that  Perry's  thought  has  been  moving  decidedly  in  the 
•luecfion  of  the  view  that  truth  is  an  identity  of  content  in 
two  dilTerent  contexts,  the  one  the  subjective  antl  the  other 
the  objective. 

Montague's  definition  amounts  to  practically  the  .same  thing 
Vhen  one  content  is  the  object  of  a  belief,  and  is  also  a  thing 
i.iat  exists,  there  subsists,"  he  says,  "between  the  content  as 
believed  and  the  content  as  existing  that  particular  form  of  the 
relation  of  identity  which  is  called  truth.  To  say  that  a  belief 
when  true  corresponds  to  a  reality  means  that  the  thing  be- 


'  Journal  of  Philosophu.  IV,  1907,  p.  370. 


•  tb..  p.  372. 


•  Ih.,  p.  373. 


'  Present  Philosophical  Tmdenciea,  p.  325, 


» 76.,  p.  374. 


«/fc.,  p,  .371. 


•  Ih.,  p.  422. 


w-':7mi^-'' 


I'll'  ^' 

'     -i     ''f 

m<' 

394  THE   PROBLEM  OF   KNOWLEDGE 

lieved  is  identical  with  a  thing  that  exists.  ...     When  we 

beheve  a  thing  that  is  a  fact,  our  belief  is  true,"._  "^^   we 

may  add,  thjs  last  statement  is  a  mere  truism      Later  Mon! 

ague  says  that  the  truth  is  the  real,  taken  in  a  certaL  reb 

ion  VIZ.  as  object  of  a  possible  belief  or  judgment.     He  cll  is" 

that  there  is  no  more  difference  between  what  is  real  and  X 

ChUtrn.^^^^'^^"  "^--  ^^'-^-^  -^  Presidlnttte 
Holt  speaks  of  two  senses  in  which  the  term  truth  mav  be 
used,  VI.  first,  truth  of  correspondence,  or  of  identTty  o^^sTruc 
ture   between  an  abstract  system  and  some  more  con  rete 
«>^em;3    and,   second,   and   more  important,   trl   as  the 
mutual  consistency  of  propositions.^     Here  we  Lave  the  rea  is 
^c  counterpart  of  the  idealistic  doctrine  of  truth  as  cohe    n 
The  judgment  has  disappeared,  so  far  as  the  question  of  truth 
IS  concerned ;  and,  the  difference  between  concepts  and  reality 

follovvs  th.t  the  truth  is  the  largest  system  of  consistent  proposi- 

'•tri^'^to  iuf  'T^^-'  '^f  *""^  "correctness,"  rather  than 

the  ou^litv  i.f^"''     :  "'-V^''  '^°''^^^*"^^«  he  would  define  as 
the  quahty  belonging  to  judgments  which  assert  true  prooosi 
tions.     The  term  ''  truth,"  which  he  thus  applies  to  propoSn 

toir:  :■  r '' ''"'-'''  ^^^-^^  ^^  -^  -^  ^'^*  ^o-r^ 

real  ty,  it  is  asserted,  self-identical  in  different  exLnalrela 
tions;    and  since  any  definition  of  truth  must  take  account 

'Journal  0/ Philosophy.  VI,  1909,  p.  540 

d.«tor,io,.,  ...hor  peripheral  or  e  X  ,       h     LTer   h  ""'"'"'r  *''*'"  "  '"' 
is  oorreotecl  by  a  cerebral  reaetion  (Ir  p   092)  '  ''''""  P<""Phcral  distortion 

'  T'/if  Concept  of  '-i,MctoiMnr.,«   p   37   "       ' 

* -fn-.  pp.  279-80.  *  Ih    n   W\  t  a  r>-    .  t,     . 

'0.,  p.  .3.39.  .  A  First  Book  in.  Metaphysics,  p.  28. 


.  «aa^9fii  Jt, 


*^':-3^x« 


A   CRITIQUE  OP  INTELLECTUALISM 


395 


of  reality,  lor  the  neo-realist  this  is  equivalent  to  the  definition 
of  truth  in  terras  of  truth,  of  reality  in  terms  of  reality     Of 
course,  if  there  is  no  truth  but  reahty,  truth  is  not  definable- 
as  anything  differ-    ■  from  the  facts  and  relations  of  objective 
reality,  it  has  disai)peared  from  the  universe  of  discourse      The 
problem  of  truth  is  indeed  a  hard  nut  for  the  neo-reahst  to 
crack,  because  when  properly  conceived  it  impUes  a  duality  of 
Idea  (as  mental  product,  an  image  with  its  function),  and  inde- 
pen.lent  reality,  a  duality  which  is  logically  incompatible  with 
an   absolute   epistemological    monism.     Neo-realism    is   conse- 
quently forced  to  treat  ideas  and  truth  in  very  cavalier  fashion 
With  the  resulting  insoluble  problem  and  the  convenient  ambi- 
guitics  that  we  have  seen. 

J    E.   Boodin's  doctrine  of  truth  is  more  pragmatic  than 
hat  of  other  American  realists.     Not  only  does  he  contend  that 
truth  IS  sought  from  practical  motives  '  and  is  instrumental  • ' 
even  though  he  insists  that  the  nature  and  test  of  truth »  are 
not  to  be  confu.scd  with  the  practical  motive  which  leads  to 
the  seeking  of  it,^  he  offers,  with  reference  to  real  objects, 
definitions  of  truth  that  are  more  pragmatic  than  intelle-tual- 
istic.s     His  idr^l  for  truth,  however,  seems  to  be  intelle       U- 
istic.     What  thought  really  means,  he  says,  is  identificat    n  • 
Iruth,  or  the  validity  of  an  idea  or  belief,  he  defines  as  the 
agreement  or  tallying  of  that  idea  with  its  reality.^     It  is  only 
because  our  description  can  never  give  the  complete  equivalent 
oi  real  objects,  and  because  so  much  of  our  thought  is  merely 
symbolical,  that  he  is  forced,  in  certain  cases,  to  go  beyond  this 
simple  intellectualistic  conception  of  truth.* 

But  when  we  consider  that  in  typical  judgment  the  subject 
IS  some  real  object,  Boodin's  would-be  simple  intellectualism 
and  enforced  pragmatism  really  signify  the  breakdown  of  the 
former  theory.  The  attempt  is  made,  however,  to  save  a  shred 
at  least  of  intellectuaHsm,  when  it  is  claimed  that  whenever  our 
knowledge  is  concerned  with  social  and  ideal  structures  it 
comes  to  share  in  the  ideas  it  would  represent,  and  so  it  is 
no  longer  of  reality,  but  is  reality.     Its  copying  of  the  object  is 

'  Truth  and  Reality,  p.  216.  » lb.,  np,  123-4    1S«    o|7  ,s 

/6.,  pp.  98-9.  '  76.,  pp.  210-11,  214,  234.  •  lb.,  pp.  214,  219. 


II 

5  I! 


396 


THE   PROBLEM  OF   KNOWLEDGE 


a  reproducing  of  it ;    the  knowing  process,  when  it  deals  with 
psychological  unities,  is  the  nature  of  the  object.'     But  at  this 
point    Boodin's  thought  does  not  quite  accurately  represent 
the  facts.     When  the  ol)jcct  of  a  knowing  process  is  itself  a 
knowing  process,  it  is  ordinarily  not  the  same  knowing  pro- 
cess;   and,  as  wc  have  seeu,=  it  is  a  much  tleh  question 
whether  there  ever  can  he  a  knt)wing  process  w'      ■  ■    jws  itself. 
Or,  to  speak  logically  rather  than  psychologically,  in  terms  of 
ideas  rather  than  in  terms  of  knowing  processes,  even  when 
B's  judgment  has  for  its  subject  A's  whole  judgment,  then  B's 
judgment,  like  all  other  judgmen'.s,  must  be  to  the  intellectual- 
ist  either  tautologous  or  not  quiU>  true ;    for  judgments,  and 
even  general  facts  of  implication,  are  judged  about  by  means 
of  predicates  which  are  themselves,  as  predicates,   not   facts 
but  logical  ideas,  so  thai  the  relation  of  predicate  to  subject 
cannot  be  one  of  exact  ide.itity.     But  if  what  is  meant  is  that 
B's  judgment  has  for  its  subject  the  same  reality  as  was  taken 
as  subject  of  A's  judgment,  and  if  B  predicates  of  tf-is  same 
subject  exactly  the  same  idea  (in  tiie  sense  in  which  ideas  of 
different  persons  can  be  the  same)  as  A  predicated,  then  B's 
judgment  may  be  said  to  be  identical  with  A's  (except  that  it 
is  B's  rather  than  .\'s)  ;   but  the  idcntily  i.s  not  the  truth,  for  the 
supposed  identity  is  not,  like  the  relation  we  call  truth,  between 
the  subject  and  th'^  predicate  of  the  judgment ;    it  is  between 
t.vo  judgments.     It   is   thus  found   impractical)le   to  deal   in 
purely  int(>llectualistic  fashion  with  even  the  small  corner  of 
truth  which  Boodin  has  sought  to  reserve  for  such  treatment. 
Among  the  English  new  n-alists  Bertrand  Rus,-<ell  is  the  only 
one  whose  theory  of  truth  should  concern  us.     S.  Alexander's 
statement  that  there  is  trvith  whenever  the  mind  works  so  as 
to  be  in  the  piesence  of  objects  in  the  order  and  arrangement 
in  which  they  exist,''  amounts  to  little  more  than  that  there  is 
truth  whenever  the  mind  works  so  as  to  give  it.     Ru-ssell's 
theory  is  elaborated  at  length,  but  in  the  end  it  looks  like  the 
last  stand  of  a  retreating  and  practically  defeated  intellectual- 
ism.     He  speaks  of  coherence  as  being  often  an  important  test 
of  truth,  but  he  cannot   regard  it  as  affording  any  infaUible 

'  Truth  auJ  RtA^ldu,  ,,,,.  210-21.  22.>.  Mh.  XIV,  mjtra. 

'  Procecdina-i  of  the  Aristotilian  Socwly.  1909-10,  p.  27. 


-i;t 


"'^«iSg^^Sl»?^^fW«(i'^^:*;y^^PI«^ 


A  CRITIQUE   OP   IXTELLECTUALISM  397 

criterion."  Indeed  he  disclaims  all  ability  to  find  any  universal 
cnt.non  of  truth;  and  yet,  strr  .gely  enough,  in  spite  of  this 
he  s  11  ventures  to  define  ,ts  nature?  But  it  would  seem  vain 
to  attempt  a  definition  of  that  for  which  there  is  no  criterion- 
the  proximate  genus  might  indeed  be  given,  but  not  the  differ- 
entia o  the  species.  Something  true  about  truth  might  be 
stated,  but  not  that  which  distinguishes  it  from  falsity 

As  a  foundation  for  his  definition  of  truth,  however.  Russell 
describes  the  judgment,  or  belief,  to  which  truth  or  its  opposite 
applies,  as  being  not  a  dual  but  a  multiple  relation  of  mind  to 

OtheZC b  viz  T\.  ''^'''''-  "'  "^^^  ^^  his  illustration 
Othellos  belief  that  Desdemona  loves  Cassio.  Here  believing 
i-s  a  relation  which  unites  the  conscious  subject  (Othello)  as 
one  term  to  the  other  three  terms,  Desdemona,  lovSg  and 
Cassio.  Thus  the  constituents  of  a  judgment  ar  th  subject 
or  m,nd  and  several  objects ;  and  so  judging  is  quite  like  eTery 

plex  whole.      These  considerations  are  evidently  intended  to 
support  a  realistic  absolute  monism  by  showing  that  truth  can 
be  defined   If  not  as  identical  with  reality,  at  least  as  ident  ca" 
with  a  part  of  reality;  it  is  a  complex  of  terms  related  in  cer 
tain  special  ways  to  each  other. 

But,  when  we  come  to  examine  Russell's  definition  of  truth 

^ve  find    hat  it  does  offer  (as  we  might  have  anticipat  Sin 

p.  e  of  his  disclaimer),  although  in  a  somewhat  covert  wal 

and   however  inadequately,   a  truth-criterion ;    and   we  also 

find  that  the  author  fails  quite  to  extricate  himself  from  the 

i.ne-honored  view  of  truth  as  a  dual  relation.     <'The  judgm  n 

s  true,    he  says,  "when  the  relation  which  is  one  of  the  obTecJ 

relates  the  other  objects." »    This  somewhat  cryptic  expre 

lustr^H,n  means  that  Othello's  judgment  is  true  if  the  "lov- 
K,  which  IS  one  of  the  objects  before  his  mind,  really  does 
'late  the  other  objects.  "Desdemona"  and  "C;ssio  "  But 
us  IS  as  nucli  as  to  say  that  truth  is  a  relation  of  mind  (with 
't.  Ideas,  c  ■  of  an  idea  or  complex  of  ideas  in  or  before  a  mrnd) 

'  Prubttma  of  Philosophy,  D.  193  2  1  •     ,  r, 

>  Ih    nn    117  ff.    D    ..,  ,  ;,  iophical  Eamys,  p.  173. 

/»..  pp.  117  ff.  ;    Problems  0/  Philosophy,  pp.   193-5 

Problems  0/ Philosophy,  pp.  197-9.  .  Philosophicai  Essays,  p.  181. 


!"t! 


^m^'i^mf^m^s^- 


398 


THE   PROBLEM   OF    KNOWLEDGE 


18 


-    '     1 


m 


,1 


to  reality,  sucli  tfiat  tlio  relation  which  obtains  for  mind,  or  in 
idea,  as  uniting  the  terms,  is  the  relation  which  unites  the 
objects  in  regality.  But  this  is  a  return  to  that  view  ot  truth 
and  the  judgment  which  makes  them  consist  in  some  sort  of  a 
dual  relation  between  idea  and  reality,  even  if  both  the  idea  and 
the  reality  are  somewhat  complex  entities.  In<leed  in  his  later 
work  Russell  virtually  confesses  as  nmch,  when  he  says  that 
correspondence  with  fact  constitutes  the  nature  of  truth,' 
and  that  a  belief  is  true  'when  it  corresponds  to  a  certain 
associated  complex,"  •'  or,  more  simply,  "when  there  is  a  corre- 
spondinp;  fact."  ^ 

And  so  all  the  difficulties  of  the  correspondence  theory  recvtr, 
and  that  because,  as  Russell  confessed  at  the  outset,  there  does 
not  seem  to  be  available,  from  the  purely  intellectualistic 
point  of  view,  any  (ukquuk'  criterion,  which  shall  state  the  kind 
ami  especially  the  degree  of  corresp,ondence  necessary  and 
sufficient  to  differentiate  truth  universally  from  its  opposite. 
It  will  not  do  to  measure  the  truth  by  the  identity  of  the  rela- 
tion between  th(>  mental  terms  and  the  relation  between  the 
real  objects,  even  if  there  were  no  difficulty  in  conceiving  that 
identity  ;  if  the  judgment  is  true,  there  must  also  be  an  identity 
or  correspondence,  the  (>xact  nature  of  which  the  pure  intellec- 
tualist  cannot  tell,  between  the  terms  mutually  related  in  the 
idea  and  the  o'ojects  existing  in  real  relations.  For  the  ^-on- 
sisient  pure  intellectualist,  no  true  judgment  can  have  any 
meaning,  and  no  judgment  which  has  meaning  can  be  true. 
And  in  the  case  of  terms  and  relations  both,  since  th(Te  cannot 
be  abmluk  idejitity  between  idea  and  reality,  between  predi- 
cate and  subject,  if  there  is  to  be  any  jutlgment  at  all,  just  how 
much  identity  is  necessary  for  truth?  To  this  (luestion  the 
intellectualist  has  no  answer;  he  has  no  adequate  criterion 
of  truth. 

In  closing  this  discus.sion  of  intellectualism  we  would  sug- 
gest, as  a  counter-weight  against  the  one-sided  emphasis  upon 
identity,  tl.e  "new  law  of  thought"  fr.rmulated  by  E.  E.  Con- 
stance Jones.  This  law,  which  Miss  .Jones  calls  the  Law  of 
Pignificmt  Assertion,  is  to  the  effect  that  "  any  subject  of  predi- 
cation is  an  identity  (»f  denotation  in  a  diversity  of  intension." 

'  Probkms  uf  fhilusoiihu,  p.  1<J3.  '•  lb.,  p.  ;.'U1.  '  lb.,  p.  202. 


*^^J 


A   CRITIQUE   OF   INTELLECTUALISM  399 

That  is,  every  significant  proposition  expresses  a  difference  as 

^zz:iT''' '  ''^" '' "°  '^^^^^"^^ '''  ^-p-^- 

But     while   suggestive   as   emphasizing  a   relationship   too 
little  consKlerecl  by  most  intelleetualists  in  their  attempt  to 
dofine  truth    tins  'ormulation  doe«  not  make  possible  an  ade- 
quate  purely   mtellectualistic   definition.     In    the   first   place 
he  formula  deals  with  the  denotation  and  intension  of  the 
orms  of  a  propo.sition,  so  that  before  its  doctrine  can  be  applied 
o  the  question  of  the  truth  of  judgment.,  a  certain  translation 
s  necessary.     In  the  proposition,  viewed  as  a  dual  complex  of 
terms,  the  subject-term  represents  a  reality  existing  independ- 
on  ly  not  only  of  this  particular  judgment,  and  o^  the  prop- 
osition in  which  it  is  expresse<l,  but   independently  also  of 
Its  representation  by  the  subject-^crm  as  well.     Attempting  to 
express  this  di.stinction  in  general  form,  we  would  say  that 
the  assertion   that  the  subject  is,   or  is  represented  by,   the 
predicate,  really  means  that  that  reality  which  is,  o.  is  rU- 

'cn  ;"'    .  '''  .!,  '   '"';.J^^^-^^™    (subject-idea)    is,   or   is   repre- 

cntcd  by,  the  predicate  (predicate-idea).     What  Miss  Jones 

ha.  shown  amounts  to  no  more,  for  our  present  purposes,  than 

hat   the  proposition   which  formal  logic  examines  expresses 

he  assertion  that  that  which  the  subject-term  denotes  "is" 

the  rjuahty  which  the  predicate  connotes  -  the  "is"   being 

aken,  of  course,  not  as  expressing  absolute  identity,  but  in 

the  sen.se  which  only  the  desired  adequate  definition  of  truth 

can  state.     The  "new  law"  may  thus  be  regarded  as  virtually 

nvo  ving  a  process  of  deductive  inference,  representable  by 

he  fol  owmg  syllogism  :   That  which  the  term  (of  the  propose 

^^MUl!T"T  i'.''"  ^'"  '^'  ^^™^^  •"  ^hi^h  predicafon  is 
ahd )  the  term  A  ;  the  term  A  " is  "  the  term  B  ;  therefore  that 
^^hu'h  the  term  A  represents  "is"  the  term  B.  It  must  be 
evident,  then  that  the  change  to  the  formal  proposition  from 
the  act  of  judgment  in  which  a  "floating  adjective  '  is  affirmed 
of  some  reality  does  not  remove  for  intellectualism,  even  with 
he  aid  of  the  "law  of  significant  assertion,"  the  puzzle  as  to 
the  criterion  of  (ruth.     The  reality  denoted  m  the  judgment 

11.  pp.  166-86.    .Vo  especially  pp.  166-9.    Cf.  i6.,  1906  7,  pp.  8I-02. 


:'   \\ 
'■  •    i'  v. 


400  THE   PROBLEM   OP   KNOWLEDGE 

which  the  major  premise  above  expresses  is  numerically  identi- 
cal with  the  reality  denoted  in  the  judgment  expressed  m  the 
conclusion,  and  the  quality  connoted  by  the  term  B  is  different 
rom  the  Quality  connoted  by  the  term  A;  but  the  question 
still  remains  a.s  to  what  is  the  exact  nature  of  that  relation  in 
true  judgments  which  is  expressed  in  propositions  by  the 
copula.  How  can  the  subject-matter,  an  independent  reality 
6e  the  predicate,  a  logical  idea?  This  is  the  question  which 
intellectualism  is  forced  to  face,  and  which  mteUectuaUsm  by 
itself  is  unable  to  answer. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

A  CniTjQUE  OP  Anti-Intellectualism 

Some  philosophers,  in  order  to  escape  the  difficulties  of  the 
intellectualist,  abandon  the  idea  that  truth  is  attainable  by 
means  of  ideas,  and  avoid  scepticism  only  by  falling  back  upon 
immediate  feeling  or  intuition,  while  others,  though  they  regard 
ideas  as  valuable  for  the  attainment  of  truth,  would  not  find 
this  truth  in  any  sort  of  identity  between  subject  and  predi- 
cate, but  in  the  purely  practical  value  of  the  ideas.  The 
former  view  maj'  be  called  anti-conceptualism ;  the  latter  is 
that  of  current  pragmatism.  Both  are  forms  of  anti-intellcc- 
tualism,  so  extreme  as  to  be  properly  characterized  as  absolute 
logical  monism;  they  recognize  but  one  criterion  of  genuine 
truth,  and  that  not  the  intellectualistic.  They  may  therefore 
be  designated  anti-conceptualistic  absolute  logical  monism  and 
pragmatic  absolute  logical  monism,  respectively. 


Anti-Conceptualism 

The  one  groat  contemporary  exponent  of  anti-conceptualism 
is  Bergson.  He  points  out  that  the  conceptual  mechanism 
of  our  ordinary  knowledge,  and  especially  of  our  "exact" 
sciences,  is  of  a  cinematographical  kind.  Both  our  images 
and  our  concepts,  the  latter  being  the  lighter,  more  diaphanous 
and  easily  dealt  with,  he  likens  to  snapshots  of  the  passing 
reality,  which,  on  appropriate  occasions,  we  are  accustomed 
to  bring  before  ourselves  by  means  of  the  internal  movement  of 
our  processes  of  thought.  But  the  movement  of  our  thought 
is  another  movement  than  that  of  the  passing  reality,  and  just 
as  there  is  no  movement  in  the  snapshots  of  a  moving  object, 
so  there  is  not  in  our  concepts  of  the  duration  and  life  and 
movement  and  individuality  that  belong  to  the  content  of 
2d  401 


402 


THE    PROBLEM    OF    KXOn'LEDOE 


i  ■■  i 


inuiu'diatf  cxporicncc'  Furthcriiiorc,  uccordiiif!;  to  Berpson, 
the  catcKorics  we  ImhituaUy  uso  in  thou^iht  arc.  relatively  to 
the  particular  ])hasc  of  reality  \v(>  may  he  s(>ekiiiK  to  know,  pre- 
existing frames,  into  whieli  the  moviiin  reality  is  forced,  so 
that  althounh  we  use  them  for  i)urposes  of  knowledge,  we  are 
never  able  by  means  of  them  to  discover  the  real  nature  of  that 
pre-existing  moviiiK  reality.-  The  platoniziiiK  attempt  to  gain 
knowledge  of  the  real  !)y  means  of  an  examination  of  human 
concepts  is,  therefore,  to  take  an  artificial  and  inadequate 
imitation  for  the  original,  a  static  substitute  for  the  living  and 
moving  reaUty.'  The  Kantian,  too,  although  he  takes  the 
ideas  as  mere  relations,  is  in  much  the  same  position  as  the 
Platonist,  wlio  takes  them  to  be  indeiJcndent  things.*  True 
metaphysics,  it  is  claimed,  is  the  science  of  n-ality  whicli  would 
dispense  with  symbols;  it  will  soar  above  all  concepts  and  all 
relations  established  by  thought.^ 

Thus  Bergson  not  only  reacts  from  the  intellectualistic 
attempt  c  .gical  idealism  to  find  knowledge  in  m(>re  ideas, 
conceptua.  .  i-edicates  ai)art  from  any  immediat(>ly  given  sub- 
ject;  he  also  rej(>cts  as  an  undue  intellect  ualism  the  idea  that 
the  forms  of  intellectual  apprehension,  even  when  applietl  in 
conjunction  with  the  immediate  (hita  of  consciousness,  can  give 
us  the  truth  alxmt  reality.  He  goes  to  the  anti-int'-llectualistic 
extreme  of  looking  for  knowledge  in  the  bare  immediacy  of  the 
subject,  apart  from  all  conceptual  predicates  and  apart  from 
everything  which  may  be  supposed  to  have  been  revealed  by 
such  predicates.  Bergson's  course  here  is  excu.sable,  if  at  all, 
only  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  psychological  idealism  which, 
as  we  have  already  seen,'  is  the  underground  foundation  upon 
which  his  .system  is  actually  based.  If  the  reality  exi.sting  in- 
dependently of  explicit  thought  is  itself  essentially  dependent 
upon  consciousness,  if  there  is  no  essential  difference  between 
"matter"  and  "images,"^  then  the  ideas  brought  to  the  sub- 

•  H.  BiTKsoii.  Time  and  Free  Will,  pp-  11.5  ff..  22S  ;  Introduction  to  Metaphysics, 
tr.  by  Ilulmc,  p.  67  (by  Luro,  p.  79)  ;  Creative  Evolution,  pp.  160,  305-6,  .318, 
321,  ,329,  etc.  '  Creative  Evolution,  pp.  x.  xiv,  4S-9,  197. 

3  Introduction,  Hulnic,  p.  7  J  ;  Luce.  p.  8S ;  Creaave  Evolution,  pp.  4-5, 48-9,  etc. 

t  IntrmliieHo".  Hulnio.  S3- 5:  Luce,  98-100. 

»  Ih..  Hulnic,  9,  21  ;   Luce,  12,  26.  '  Ch.  VI.  supra. 

'  Matter  and  Memory,  passim. 


A  CRITIQIK   OF   ANTl   INTKLLKCTUALISM         403 


jcct -matter  in  judjiincnt  iiro,  to  the  interest  in  ultimately  valid 
knowledge,  a  cornipliiifc  factor;  the  psychical  cannot  receive 
a  psychical  addition  nithout  underuoing  modification.  Not 
only  is  it  true,  as  Hcrtrai  '  Riisse'l  contends,  in  his  crititiue  of 
Bergson's  philosophy,'  that  it  is  the  idealistic  confusion  of  sub- 
ject and  object  that  has  led  this  interesting  philosopher  to  such 
paradoxical  doctrines  as  that  the  brain  is  an  unimajted  image, 
that  matter  is  tne  perception  of  matter,  and  that  unperceived 
matter  is  an  unperceived  image,  i.e.  an  unconscious  mental  state ; 
we  may  add  f  Iiat  it  is  b(>cause  of  this  same  underground  idealism, 
this  idealism  in  disguise,  that  Bergson  is  forced  to  conclude  that 
the  only  way,  if  there  is  any  way  at  all,  of  reaching  absolute  or 
independent  reality  is  to  dispense  with  all  products  of  thought. 
But  this  disguised  psychological  idealism  is  simply  a  disguised 
form  of  a  philosophy  based,  as  we  h:.ve  .s(>en,  upon  fallacy. 

In  place  of  seeking  true  knowledge  by  means  of  intellection, 
then,  Bergson  would  have  recourse,  in  metaphysics  at  least, 
solely  to  intuition.  He  distinguishes  between  sensuous  in- 
tuition an<l  a  supra-intellectual  intuition,  and  it  is  the  latter 
with  which  he  is  here  (^specially  concerned.-  For  example, 
the  true  nature  of  the  self,  as  of  duration  and  change,  is  given 
immediately  in  our  own  direct  self-experience,  whereby,  in- 
stead of  merely  circling  a1)out  the  ol)ject  in  conceptual  flights, 
we  pen(>trate  into  the  very  heart  ot  it  and  view  it  from  within.' 
■Supra-intellectual  intuition  is  a  .sort  of  artistic  sympathy,  by 
means  of  which  one  seeks  to  share  the  iiuier  life  of  the  object 
he  would  know,  and  it  is  able  to  ''suggest  to  us  the  vague  feel- 
ing, if  nothing  more,  of  what  must  take  the  place  of  intellectual 
molds."  ■•  From  this  point  of  view  philosophy  comes  to  be 
fundamentally  "an  effort  to  dissolve  again  into  the  Whole."* 

This  is  not  the  place  where  an  adequate  estimate  of  what 
we  may  perhaps  call  the  new  intuitionism  in  philosophy  should 
be  attempted,  and  we  would  be  far  from  maintaining  that 
Bergson's  doctrine  at  this  point  has  no  value ; '    what  we  are 

•  Monwt,  Vol.  XXII,  1912,  pp.  .343-6.  »  Creative  Evolution,  p.  .360. 

'  Introduction,  Hulme,  pp.  1,  9,  22,  43;  Luce,  pp.  3,  12,  27,  51 ;  Cieative  Evo- 
lution, p.  176. 

•  Creative  Emlution,  pp.  177,  192-3  ;   cf.  La  percepticn  du  changemerU,  passim. 

•  Cnatitc  EooluliuH,  p.  101. 

•  An  excellent  appreciation  of  Bergson's  intuitionism  is  to  be  found  in  W.  E. 


404 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   KNOWLEDGE 


4  j, 


hero  concortu'd  with,  primarily,  is  his  iiriti-ooniTptualisin.  We 
would  maintain  that  tho  real  vahi<>  of  his  reaction  against  in- 
tcllcctualism  is  to  he  chictly  found,  not  in  his  nogativ*',  but  in 
his  positive,  doctrine;  in  his  insistence  upon  the  necessity  of 
immediacy  (and  immediacy  not  simply  of  sens*-,  hut  of  higher 
types  as  well)  for  perfect  knowledge,  not  in  his  assertion  of  the 
futility  of  mediation.  In  taking  this  position  we  are  doing  little 
more  than  to  call  for  a  repetition  in  our  own  day  of  what  was 
done  in  principle  when  it  was  insisted  that  concepts  without 
intuition  are  empty.  But  what  is  needed  further  is  the  com- 
plementary insistence  that  intuition  without  concepts  is,  at 
least  comparatively,  blind.  Of  course,  as  Bergson  sees,  to 
take  the  concept  as  a  substitute  for  immediacy  is  likely  to 
mean  an  impoverishment  of  knowledge :  but  properly  selected 
concepts,  properly  used,  in  addition  to  immediacy,  mean  an 
enrichment  of  knowledge,  and,  it  may  be,  as  in  the  case  of 
tertiary  qualities  and  relations,  an  enrichment  of  reality  itself; 
just  as  the  perception  of  physical  reality  is  its  consummation, 
not  its  mutilation.  Moreover,  in  further  criticism  of  the  doc- 
trine of  intuition  in  the  system  before  us,  we  would  ask,  espe- 
cially in  view  of  the  too  idealistic  doctrine  that  mere  thought 
not  only  sometimes  can,  but  always  does,  corrupt  the  purity 
of  ultimate  being,  does  Bergson  make  sufficient  provision  against 
the  doubt  whether,  even  in  what  he  cites  as  instan^.-s  of  intui- 
tive awareness,  we  reallj'  do  attain  to  absolute  reality,  as  he 
contends  that  we  do?'  May  there  not  be,  even  here,  some 
residue  of  undetected  intellection  ? 

Bergson  recognizes,  of  course,  the  practical  function  of 
intellection.  He  recognizes  that  we  attach  to  objects  various 
concepts,  which  prescribe  the  kind  of  action  or  attitude  the 
object  ought  to  suggest  to  us  under  difTerent  circumstances,- 
and  indeed,  that  for  practical  purposes  abstract  ideas  are  not 
onl}'  convenient,  but  indispensable,  as  substitutes  for  intui- 
tion;' but  ^'  warns  against  mistaking  familiarity  with  a 
concept,   thrt  '_,ti  habitual  use,   for  clarity  of  insight,*  and 

Hocking's  article,  "The  Significance  of  Bergson,"  Yale  Review,  N.S.,  Vol.  Ill, 
1914,  pp.  303-26.  '  Introduction.  Luce,  pp.  4,  10,  12. 

«  !b..  p.  49,   Creative  Eiolution.  pp.  12,  It,  t-tt-. 

•  Introduction,  Luce,  pp.  23,  59,  04.  */6.,  p.  101. 


A  C'RITIQIE  OP  AN'TI-INTELLECTUALISM         405 


.stinmatizpH  the  supfMxsod  truth  of  our  practically  ju:4ifie(l  judj?- 
raonts  as  merely  relative, and  "  no  more  than  a  symbolic  verity." ' 
Concepts  caimot  give  us  true  knowledge,  hut  only  a  practical 
substitute  for  it  ;  even  of  science  the  function  is  not  to  show  us 
the  (vssence  of  things,  but  to  furnish  us  with  the  best  means  of 
acting  on  thein.^  Inasmuch,  then,  as  Bergson  sets  up  so  radi- 
cal an  antithesis  between  Renuine  truth  and  practical  value, 
lie  is  to  l)e  regarded  as  an  anti-pragmatist,  as  well  as  an  anti- 
intellectualist. 

Perhaps  the  most  serious  difficulty  encountered  by  the  Bcrg- 
sonian  philosophy  is  met  when  attention  is  called  to  the  fact 
that  it  attempts  to  exercise  the  elementary  right  of  all  philos- 
ophy to  take  shape  as  an  explicit  and  coherent  doctrine.  Our 
philosopher  claims  that  uny  true  metaphysic  must  get  beyond 
and  dispense  ^  "h  concepts ;  and  yet,  i  •  so  far  as  he  states  his 
own  metaphysical  position,  he  is  forced  ''■  "ke  use  of  concepts. 
Hi-  IS  himself  well  aware  of  this,  of  co:  ;  and  at  this  point 
he  advances  a  compromise  doctrine.  Metaphj'sics  is  wholly 
itself,  he  claims,  c.iiy  if  it  frees  itself  from  the  inflexible,  ever- 
ready  concepts,  and  constructs  concepts  entirely  different  from 
these  —  pliant,  mobile,  ahuost  fluid  representations,  capable 
of  following  reality  in  all  its  twists  and  turns,  ever  ready  to 
adapt  themselves  to,  and  to  pictorially  suggest,  the  fleeting 
forms  of  intuition.*  In  illustration  of  this  distinction  two  prop- 
ositions are  cited  :  ''The  chihl  becomes  the  man,"  and  "There 
is  becoming  from  the  child  to  the  man."  Here  "becomes"  is 
represented  as  masking  the  movement  of  the  reality,  while 
in  the  second  propo.sition,  "becoming,"  being  the  subject,  comes 
to  the  front  as  the  reality  itself,  so  that  "we  now  have  to  do 
with  the  objective  movement  itself,  and  no  longer  with  its 
cinematographical    imitation."  * 

But  this  compromise  in  order  to  avoid  self-refutation  can 
hardly  be  considered  successful.  Bergson  does  valuable  work, 
indeed,  in  criticism  of  some  of  our  metaphysical  concepts,  but 
in  doing  so  he  perforce  substitutes  for  them  others  which  cither 
represent  the  subject-matter  more  accurately,  or  else  are  still 

'  Creative  E-olution,  p.  196.  »  76.,  p.  93. 

-  Ini-adiiction,  Hulnic,  pp.  21  2,  SD-70;  Luce,  pp.  26  7,  S2. 
*  Creative  Evolution,  p.  313, 


406 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   KXOWLEDOE 


more  hii^hly  inotaphorical,  more  sketchy  atid  symbolic.  It  is 
not  that  we  object  particularly  to  this  proceckire;  some  of  our 
most  valuable  knowledge  is  contained  in  metaphorical  judg- 
ments. What  we  know  with  is  always  necessarily  somewhat 
different  from  what  we  know,  as  well  as  in  some  sense  identical 
with  it ;  and  there  may  very  well  be  an  advantage,  Ihcorcti- 
calhj  as  well  as  practically,  if  time,  which  we  iiiuneihately  ex- 
perience as  "duration"  ^  to  cite  Bergson's  own  favorite 
example —  is  sometimes  thought  of  in  "spatial"  concepts.  It 
remains,  then,  that  anti-concept ualism  violates  its  own  prin- 
ciple in  becoming  a  doctrine;  obviouslv  the  only  consislent 
course  for  its  advocate  —  nnich  as  we  may  rejoice  that,  like 
the  mystics,  he  has  refused  to  be  consistent  —  would  be  to 
cease  to  sp(>ak,  or  even  to  think,  in  which  case  he  would  be- 
come philosophically  negligible.  The  fact  is,  however,  that 
if  you  scratch  an  anti-conceptiialist  you  find  an  intellcctualist 
who  has  become  so  thoroughly  sceptical  that  he  has  begim  to 
advocate  the  giving  up  of  the  effort  to  make  a  judgment  at 
all.  His  former  intellectual  interest  j)*  sists,  however,  even 
outside  the  linits  of  the  narrowly  ;('tical ;  and  so  he  goes 
on  as  before,  multipl\-ing  con  i  i)ls  and  judgments,  in  order 
that  he  may  discover  and  conmnmicate  the  truth. 

William  ..'.imcs,  in  his  volume,  .4  Pluralistic  Universe,  gives 
the  anti-conceptuali^iui  of  Bergson  an  anti-logical  turn.  He 
claims  that  in  view  of  the  impotence  of  tiie  intellcctualist 
logic  of  identity,  we  nmst  regard  human  experience  as  funda- 
mentally irrational.'  He  tells  us  that,  at  a  certain  point  in 
his  thinking,  lie  finally  found  himself  compelled  to  give  up  logic, 
fairly,  squarely,  and  irrevocably,  .>jo  far  as  our  becotning  theo- 
retically acquaint(Hl  with  the  essential  natiur  of  reality  is  con- 
cerned. Realit}-,  life,  experience,  concreteness,  immediacy 
exceeds  our  logic,  overflows  and  surrounds  it.-  And  the  credit 
for  this  nota])le  discovery,  as  it  .seems  to  him,  he  gives  to  Berg- 
s6n,  without  whose  influence,  he  confesses,  he  would  not  have 
been  so  bold.' 


'  .1  Plnmlisllc  Vnh-erw.  p.  211.  »  Ih.,  p.  212. 

» lb.,  pp.  214-1.'),  and  Lfctiiro  VI,  jmHuim:   rf.  artirlo  pntitled,  "Bradley  or 
Bcrg-son?"  Journal  nf  Philonnphy,  Vol.  VII,  1910,  pp.  29-3.3. 


A  CRITIQUE  OF  ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM         407 

Current  Pragmatism 

We  have  thus  been  led  to  reject  as  unsatisfactory,  on  the 
one  hand,  absohite  idcaUstic  intellectuahsin,  at  least  in  its  more 
characteristic  (episteniohj^ically  monistic)  forms,  because,  in 
i(s  account  of  truth,  it  virtually  eliminates  the  distinctive  sub- 
ject-matter of  the  judgment ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  to  reject 
l)oth  al "solute  realistic  intellectualism  and  anti-conceptualism, 
l)ecause,  in  their  account  of  truth,  they  virtually  eliminate, 
each  in  its  own  way,  the  predicate.  But  if  we  a^sume  that  truth 
is  a  quality  of  juiUjincnts,  so  that  both  subject  and  predicate 
are  required,  what  possible  logical  theory  is  there,  which  may 
be  expected  to  deal  more  fairly  with  both  these  essential  ele- 
ments of  the  judgment? 

Now  it  is  important  at  this  point  to  note  that  the  anti- 
conceptualist  and  all  intellectualists  who  do  not  virtually  deny 
what  are  ordinarily  calleil  ideas  alike  recognize  the  practical 
value  and  even  necessity  of  the  ideas  which  we  predicate, 
although  they  do  not  deign,  of  course,  to  make  use  of  this  con- 
side.  „tion  of  their  practical  value  in  discussing  the  problem 
of  tluMr  truth.  It  may  well  be,  however,  that  the  stone  which 
has  been  rejected  by  the.se  would-be  builders  is  to  become  the 
headstone  of  the  corner  in  the  temple  of  truth.  At  any  rate 
this  is  the  opinion  of  current  praomntism,  which,  without  losing 
faith  in  the  intellect,  would  restrain  the  extravagances  of  in- 
tellectualism.' and  which  .seizes  upon  the  practicality  of  ideas, 
claiming  to  find  in  t\\v  function  of  truth  the  key  to  its  criterion, 
and  consequently  to  be  able  to  define  its  essential  nature. 

But  the  term  "  pragmatism"  has  come  to  stand  in  contempo- 
rary discussion  for  so  many  more  or  less  widely  different  points 
of  view,  actual  or  imagined,  that  it  .seems  highly  desirable  to 
raise  the  question  as  to  just  what  is  the  essential  element,  or 
what  the  essential  elements,  in  current  pragmatism.  On  the 
one  hand  we  have  philo.sophical  critics,  such  as  Bradley,  com- 
plaining of  the  "ambiguity  of  pragmatism,"-  and  popular 
writers  expressing  such  criticisms  as  that  "if  it  is  new,  it  is 
nonsense;   if  it  is  old,  it  is  obvious" ;  '  and  on  the  other  hand 

'  a.  Schillor,  Ilumnnism,  p.  0. 

«  Afind.  April,  lOns,  nnd  ffs»/i>/»  nn  Tr-.sih  nr.'l  RiriUfy,  pp.  127-42. 

»E.  E.  Slosson,  The  Indcticndcnt,  Feb.  21,  1907. 


i 


wm\ 


408 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  KNOWLEDGE 


hi 


ft  b 


we  have  William  James  himself  complaining  that  the  pragmatic 
movement  is  seldom  spoken  of  with  clear  understanding.'  In- 
deed, some  years  ago  A.  O.  Lovejoy  undertook  a  classification 
of  "the  thirteen  pragmatisms";^  and  yet,  in  the  words  of  A. 
W.  Moore,  "as  some  pragmatists  deny  belonging  to  any  of 
these,  it  seems  certairj  that  there  arc  more."  '' 

Perhaps  the  fairest  way  of  at  least  beginning  the  answer  to 
this  question  as  to  what  pragmatism  is,  would  be  to  try  to 
settle  it  pragmatically.  This  will  involve  a  certain  measure 
of  anticipation  of  results;  but  then,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is 
a  method  to  which  the  pragmatist  himself  ought  to  be  the  last 
person  to  object.  In  pragmatism,  then,  what  is  the  practical 
attitude?  What  does  pragmatism  really  propose  to  do?  It 
surely  includes  more  in  its  program  than  the  invention  of  "a 
new  name  for  some  old  ways  of  thinking."  One  of  the  younger 
members  of  the  school  has  recently  said,  "The  mission  of  prag- 
matism is  to  bring  philosophy  into  relation  to  real  life  and 
action"  ;  ^  and  rrobably  all  leading  pragmatists  would  indorse 
such  a  stateraent.  But  just  what  such  a  "mission"  means 
to  the  pragmatist  must  be  inquired  more  particularly.  And 
at  the  outset  it  ought  to  be  conceded  that  pragmatism,  at  least 
as  represented  by  the  leaders,  has  not  intended  to  make  for 
greater  laxity  of  thought,  but  rather  to  intioduce  a  more  scien- 
tific method  into  philosophy,  and  to  arrive  at  a  more  scien- 
tifically accurate  notion  of  the  meaning  of  truth.''  And  since 
in  all  scientific  judgment  the  predicate  is  regarded  as  a  mere 
trial-predicate,  and  the  judgment  is  made  purely  hypotheti- 
cally  at  first,  in  order  that  by  acting  as  if  it  were  true  it  may  be 
shown  by  the  manner  of  its  working  whether  or  not  the  best 
hypothesis  was  cho.sen,  the  pragmatist  concludes  that  the  true 
way  of  deciding  the  truth  or  falsity  of  rival  philosophical  theo- 


'  Pragmatism,  p.  47.  '  Journal  of  Philosophy,  V,  1908,  pp.  5-12,  29-39. 

•  PraQmntism  and  Its  Critics,  p.  1.  Another  writer  (Mux  Meyor,  Journal  of 
Philosophy,  V,  pp.  .'?21-f))  cliiims  that  while  Lovejoy's  "  thirteen  pragmatisms" 
are  but  clifTerent  aspects  of  tlie  same  doctrine,  we  may  well  expect  to  find  as 
many  pragmatisms  as  then'  are  praRmatists. 

*  D.  L.  Murray,  Pragmatism,  p.  70. 

'James.  Pragmatism,  pp.  .'jl,  55,  65-0,  216-17;  .Srhiller,  Humanism,  p.  105; 
Dewey,  hif.uFncv  cf  Daru'in.  etc.,  p.  269  ;  cf.  H.  H.  Hawden,  Journal  of  Phi- 
losophy, Vol.  I,  1904,  pp.  62  ff. 


A  CRITIQUE  OF  ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM         409 

ries  must  be  to  treat  them  as  working  hypotheses,  and  to  judge 
them  by  the  way  they  work.  If  the  hypothesis  has  been  thor- 
oughly tested,  and  has  worked  satisfactorily,  it  is  not  only  use- 
ful, he  claims,  but  true.'  According  to  Schiller  "pragmatism 
as  a  logical  method  is  merely  the  conscious  application  of  a 
natural  procedure  of  our  minds  in  actual  knowing."  '^  Of 
essential  pragmatism  this  may  be  true,  but  whether  it  has  been 
generally  true  of  current  pragmatism  is  another  matter. 

Still,  the  pragmatist  does  not  necessarily  claim  that  all 
judgments  that  are  in  any  particular  sense  subjectively  or  tem- 
porarily useful  are  true.  It  is  the  fault  of  the  typical  absolutist 
critic  of  pragmatism  that  he  has  a  passion  for  expressing  every 
movement  and  tendency  in  the  form  of  some  universal  prin- 
ciple from  which  it  tnight  have  been  deduced,  and  it  is  his  mis- 
take that  he  supposes,  when  he  has  refuted  this  principle,  that 
he  has  virtually  annihilated  the  movement,  xjut  mere  essen- 
tial pragmatism  does  not  assert  universally  that  all  that  is 
useful,  or  that  works,  is  true;  it  merely  takes  as  its  working 
hypothesis  in  logical  theory  the  suggestion  that  the  true  test 
of  truth  is  ultimately  practical,  a  test  of  working ;  and  it  sur- 
mises that  there  is  no  adequate  and  valid  test  of  truth  that  is 
not  ultimately  a  test  of  working,  the  results  of  mere  specula- 
tion being  problematic  "ntil  verified  in  the  experiences  of  life.' 
As  Schiller  has  expressed  it,  for  pragmatism  the  truth  or  falsity 
of  an  assertion  is  decided  "by  its  consequences,  by  its  bearing 
on  the  interest  which  prompted  to  the  assertion,  by  its  rela- 
tion to  the  purpose  which  put  the  question."  *  The  criterion 
of  truth,  according  to  Moore,  is  always  "the  fulfilment  of  a 
specific  finite  purpose."  ^ 

Before  undertaking  to  elaborate  further  this  essential  prag- 
matism, or  to  examine  further  into  its  merits  and  deficiencies 
as  a  logical  theory,  it  may  be  well  to  note  just  what  more  or 
less  closely  affiliated  doctrines  are  distinguishable  from  this 
essence,  either  as  falling  short  of  it,  or  as  going  beyond  it.     These 

'  See  .Schiller,  Hunuinitim,  pp.  91-2;  Studies  in  Humanism,  p.  154;  Moore, 
Pragmatism  and  Its  Critics,  p.  87. 

«  Studies,  etc.,  p.  186.  >  C{.  Srhiller,  Studies,  pp.  7-12. 

•  76.,  p.  154 ;   cf.  p.  192,  and  Dewey.  Studies  in  Logical  Theory,  p.  85. 

'  In  Dewey's  Stiidies  in  Logical  Theory,  p.  372 ;  cf.  Pragmatism  and  Its 
Critics,  pp.  14,  15. 


Ill 


410 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   KNOWLEDOE 


1 1  I 


other  theories  may  be  grouped  together,  we  would  suggest,  into 
four  main  classes,  which  for  convenience  may  be  labeled  semi- 
pragmatism,  (luusi-pragmatism,  pseudo-pragmatism,  and  hyper- 
pragmatism,  respectively.  By  scmi-pragmati.sn  is  here  meant 
any  doctrine  which  undertakes  to  supplement  acknowledged 
deficiencies  of  pure  intellectualism  by  moving  in  the  direction 
of  essential  pragmatism,  but  which  fails  to  indorse  the  prag- 
matic criterion  of  truth.  The  term  qiiasi-pragmatism  we  would 
use  to  designate  the  view  that  practical  value  is  the  measure 
of  what,  for  practical  purposes,  we  take,  rightly  enough,  as 
truth,  but  that  real  truth  is  accessible  only  in  some  other  way. 
Pseudo-pragmatism  we  would  define  as  the  doctrine  that  all 
practical  value  of  ideas  or  judgments  is  an  indication  or  proof  of 
their  truth.'  H ijpcr-prngmatism  we  would  use  as  the  name 
of  the  doctri  le  that  in  addition  to  the  criterion  of  truth  being 
always  ultiMatcly  practical,  the  essential  nature  of  truth,  or 
trueness,  is  just  practical  value,  usefulness,  or  tlie  process  of 
its  working,  its  verification.'-  Thus  while  semi-pragmatism 
and  quasi-])ragmatism  assert  less,  pseudo-pragmatism  and 
hyper-pragmatism  assert  more  than  the  bare  content  of  essen- 
tial pragmatism. 

Of  the  representatives  of  semi-pragmatism,  i.e.  of  those  who 
stop  halfway  on  the  road  to  the  essentially  pragmatic  theory 
of  truth,  the  most  important  in  connection  with  the  history 
of  pragmatism  is  Charles  Sanders  Peirce.  He  is  sometimes 
spoken  of  as  the  founder  of  pragmatism,  but  he  would  be  more 
properly  regarded  as  its  forerunner.  As  early  as  1878,  in  his 
now  celebrated  paper  "Hou"  to  Make  Our  Ideas  Clear,"  ^  he 
u.sed  the  term  pragmati. m,  but  it  was  as  the  name  of  a  doctrine 
not  of  truth,  but  of  meaning.  Claiming  that  the  whole  func- 
tion of  thought  is  to  produce  habits  of  action,  and  that  what- 
ever there  is  connected  with  a  thought  but  irrelevant  to  this 
purpose  is  an  accretion  to  it  but  no  part  of  it,*  he  goes  on  to  say 
that  if  we  consider  what  effects,  which  might  conceivably  have 
practical  bearings,  w^e  conceive  the  object  of  our  conception 

'  F.  C.  S.  Schilirr  has  usrd  tho  term  "pseudo-pragmatism"  in  another  sense, 
which  has  not  Bainerl  riirrenry. 

2  Paulhan  iise.s  the  fcrni  "hyper-pr.'tKniatiwm"  (Revue  philnsophique, 'Vo\.  &7, 
pp.  t)14  If.),  hut  in  a  different  .sen.se  troni  that  in  whirh  it  is  use  ^  here. 

'Popular  Sckno:  Monthly,  Vol.  XII,  l)p.  JSG-302.  *  lb.,  p.  292. 


A  CRITIQUE  OF  ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM         411 


to  have,  our  conception  of  these  effect''  is  the  whole  of  our  concep- 
tion of  the  object.^  Years  afterwards,  in  Baldwin's  Dictionary 
of  Philosophy  and  Psychology,  ho  defines  pragmatism  as  "the 
doctrine  that  the  wliole  'meaning'  of  a  conception  expresses 
itself  in  practical  consequences,  consequences  either  in  the  shape 
of  conduct  to  be  recommended  or  in  that  of  experience  to  be 
expo.  ■  1,  if  the  conception  be  true."  -  The  name  pragmatism 
was  chosen  for  this  doctrine  in  view  of  its  recognition  of  the 
inseparable  connection  between  cognition  and  purpose.'  But 
in  view  of  the  "extremes"  to  which,  in  his  opinion,  James  later 
pushed  the  pragmatic  doctrine,^  Peirce,  in  order  to  register 
the  more  emphatically  his  dissent,  proposed  the  name  prag- 
maticism  for  his  own  more  conservative  doctrine.*  James's 
do'.t .ines  of  the  mutability  of  truth  and  of  the  will  to  believe 
seem  to  have  been  what  repelled  him  most ;  ®  but  in  drawing 
back  in  order  to  avoid  these  features  of  the  later  development, 
he  was  kept  from  accepting,  as  the  logic  of  his  own  position 
might  otherwise  have  led  him  to  accept,  the  essential  doctrine 
of  pragmatism,  viz.  that  of  the  necessarily  practical  character, 
ultimately,  of  the  criterion  of  truth  (about  reality).  The 
meaning  of  a  concept  is  ultimately  its  mean-ing,  its  function 
of  being  a  means  to  certain  conseciuences ;  but  it  may  also  be 
said  that  it  is  those  consequences  toward  which  the  concept 
is  a  means.  Peu'ce  stressed  the  second  of  these  definitions  of 
meaning,  although  he  recognized  the  other.  James,  as  we 
shall  see,  went  too  far,  going  from  meaning  as  consequences 
to  truth  as  consequences,  or  the  process  of  reaching  intended 
consequences ;  but  Peirce  was  at  fault  in  not  recognizing  that 
since  meaning  is  to  be  told  by  the  consequences  to  which  that 
which  has  the  meaning  leads,  anil  since  truth  is  a  judgmental 
I'xpression  of  meaning,  or  a  quality  of  that  expression,  truth 
also  is  to  be  told  by  its  consequences. 

The  great  majority  of  semi-pragmatists  are  those  who,  like 
J.  ]M.  Baldwin,  stress  the  practical  function  of  truth,  as  ex- 
plaining its  genesis  and  survival,  but  who  define  truth  in  purely 


pt'l 


'  lb.,  p.  29;j.  »  Cf.  MonUt.  19(»,),  pp.  162,  481. 

*  lb.,  p.  10:{.  '  Sco  Baldwin's  Dictionunj,  article  "  Pnigmatism." 

*  Hihbcrt  Journal,  Vol.  VII,  Oct.,  190S,  p.  112. 


412 


THE  PROBLEM   OP   KN0T7LEr)f  E 


intellectualistic  fashion  as  mere  agreemcit  or  correspondence 
with  reaHty.     In  his  address  on  "Selcct-vc  '!l)i.-trir.T,  •  •  Bald- 
win seems  on  the  verge  of  passing  from  serni-pragmatism  to 
essential   pragmatism ;    he  says  that  correspondence  between 
the  idea  and  the  fact  constitutes  tnith,  and  yet  he  insists  that 
a  truth  is  not  selected  because  it  is  true,  but  is  true  because  it 
has  been  selected.^    But  the  mode  of  expression  here  was 
rather  clumsy  and  inaccurate;    a  truth  is  true,  not  because 
it  is  selected,  but  because  it  is  fit  to  be  selected.     Consequently 
Baldwin  was  compelled  to  retreat  from  the  pragmatic  border- 
territory.     In  the  Psychological  Review  for  July,  1903,  although 
he  claims,  in  pragmatic  fashion,  that  genetic  theory  explains 
"by  what  character  judgments  are  true,"  he  expUcitly  dis- 
avows pragmatism.'     In  his  paper  on  "The  Limits  of  Pragma- 
tism," ^    "without   prejudice   to   a   thoroughgoing   pragmatic 
account  of  the  origin  of  the  function  of  thinking,"  *  he  never- 
theless objects  to  the  view  that  the  environment  is  a  mode  of 
pragmatically  determined  reality,  because  it  assumes  the  reality 
of  mental  function  and  development,  and  this  in  turn  requires 
us  to  assume  a  preexisting  environment."     Since,  then,  we 
cannot  have  a  purely  active  determination  of  reality,^  he  con- 
cludes that  the  same  thing  must  be  said  of  truth.     "The  true 
cannot  be  interpreted  entirely  in  terms  of  the  requirements  of 
conduct,"*  but  is  only  definable  intellectualistically  as  "the 
body  of  knowledge  acknowledged  as  belonging  where  it  does 
in  a  consi.'ftently  controlled  context." »     But  this  conclusion 
is  quite  dogmatic,  depending  as  it  does  upon  a  confusion  of 
truth  with  fact.     One  might  agree  that  the  current  pragmatist 
interpretation  of  reality  is  untenable,  and  yet  without  incon- 
sistency indorse  the  pragmatic  criterion  of  tndh.     Moreover, 
Baldwin'?  definition,  amounting  to  no  more  than  that  truth  is 
acknowledging  that  something  is  as  it  really  is,  evidently  labors 
under  the  difficulties  which  beset  all  pure  intellectualism. 

J.  E.  Boodin  may  be  mentioned  again  in  this  connection, 
as  being,  although  in  a  different  way,  a  half-pragmatLst  in  his 

'  Psychological  Review.  V,  1898,   pp.   1-24  ;   Development  and  Evolution,  Ch. 
",  'lb.,  p.  251. 

»  Sep  Moon-,  Pragmatism  and  Its  Critics,  pp.  193-4. 

'  Psychological  Rerieiv.  XI.  1Q(M.  pp.  .TO  ff.  >•  /.■>.,  p.  60.  «  11:.,  p.  40. 

'  Thought  and  Things.  Vol.  II.  p.  .'{50.  •  lb.,  p.  357.  •  /ft.,  p.  36L 


■■iiyAV#  .aeciyj.*-*  •.w^-j/tt:.™ 


A  CRITIQUE  OP  ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM         413 

doctrine  of  truth.  He  tends  toward  even  the  extreme  pragma- 
tist  (loctrine  with  reference  to  the  nature  of  truth,  when  the 
subject-matter  is  some  reality  other  than  a  social  intellectual 
product  —  although  his  realism  keeps  him  from  going  quite 
so  far  as  some  have  done  —  but  his  doctrine  of  truth  with 
reference  to  ideal  structures  is,  as  we  have  seen,  quite  intellec- 
tualistic  and  non-pragmatic.  Truth  in  the  former  case  is  said 
to  consist  in  "the  tlifferences  which  objects  make  to  the  reflec- 
tive conduct  of  human  nature,  as  in  its  evolutionary  process 
it  attempts  to  control  and  understand  its  world."  »  It  cannot 
be  regarded  as  satisfactory,  however,  to  have  two  different 
definitions  of  truth,  neither  of  which  applies  to  all  cases  of  true 
judgments. 

Royce's  "absolute  pragmatism"  also  falls  short  of  essential 
pragmatism.  His  voluntaristic  insistence  that  the  idea  is  a 
plan  of  action,  that  the  judgment  is  a  precept ,2  and  that  any 
definite  opinion  may  be  compared  to  the  counsel  given  by  the 
coach  to  a  player,'  do  not  go  beyond  an  emphasis  upon  the 
practical  function  of  truth.  He  nowhere  definitely  proposes 
to  measure  trueness  in  any  sense  by  the  demands  of  practice, 
and  yet,  to  revert  to  the  .simile  of  the  coach  and  the  player,  just 
as  in  the  game  the  coach  himself  is  on  trial,  and  his  advice  is 
ultimately  to  be  judged  in  the  light  of  its  consequences,  so  must 
It  be  with  judgments  generally,  if,  as  Royce  contends,  they 
are  all  precepts  for  the  guidance  of  action.  Royce,  impressed 
simply  with  "the  practical  value  of  theory,"  remains  on  the 
ground  of  semi-pragmatism;  he  ignores  "the  theoretic  value 
of  practice,"  *  and  so  stops  short  of  essential  pragmatism. 

One  more  example  of  semi-pragmatism  —  this  again  of  an- 
other sort  —  is  to  be  found  in  the  "negative  pragmatism"  of 
W.  E.  Hocking.  Rejecting  the  positive  principle,  "What- 
ever works  is  true,"  as  being  n»  ither  valid  nor  useful,  he  adopts 
the  principle,  "That  which  does  not  work  is  not  true."  *    But 

■  Truth  and  Reality,  p.  183 ;  of.  p.  219.  But  see  p.  236.  where  it  is  said  that 
J-t i?  not  truth,  but  its  evideiiee,  which  consists  in  coiisenn^^-fg     "  .— 

'  ■"''*""  KhTna  and  the  Pr.ictical,"  Philosophical  R7n^^i^7y\n.  1904,  pp.  119. 
'•''■  '  So^irccH  of  Religious  Insight,  p.  152. 

«For  these  concise  antithetical  expressions  I  am  indebted  to  H.  V.  Knos 
{The  Philosophy  of  William  James.  1914,  p.  94). 

»  The  Meaning  of  God  in  Human  Experience,  p.  xiii. 


^ 

1  a 

'1 

1 '  1 

1 

E     ~    1 

'1 

W      '  K 

♦■ 

[    '  c 

i 

1  ll 

p 

■     ,  11 

P 

F      1 H 

( 

rv  |B 

414 


THE    PROBLEM   OF    KXOWLEDCJE 


W(>  would  maintain  tliat  even  this  nt't?ativo  pragmatism  's 
lunvarrantod,  unless  sonje  sort  of  positive  pragmatism  is  also 
tru<>.  Of  (ourse,  as  we  shall  ourselves  contend,  we  cannot  Ix^ 
critical  and  say,  ".!//  that  works  is  true";  l)ut  it  seems  very 
improbable  that  we  should  be  correct  in  saying,  "Nothing  that 
does  not  work  is  true,"  unless  it  were  also  true  that  some  po,a"- 
iivc  relation  of  importance  existed  between  working  and  truth, 
that  name  kind  of  working  might  rightly  be  regarded  as  a 
criterion  of  truth.  The  negative  pragmatist  nuist  go  on  to 
find  an  essential  pragmatism  of  a  positive  sort,  or  else  return 
to  nonpragmatism,  the  doctune  that  there  is  no  dependence 
whatever  of  the  truth  of  a  judgment  upon  its  practical 
function. 

We  shall  now  examine  briefly  some  representative  statements 
of  what  we  have  called  (jiuusi-pragmatisni ,  the  doctrine  that 
practical  value  determines  the  proper  us(>  of  concepts  and  judg- 
ments as  practical  sul)stitutes  for  truth.  For  example,  we 
have  Ernst  Mach's  statement  that  even  in  science  our  theoreti- 
cal conceptions,  such  as  (those  of)  electricity,  light-waves, 
molecules,  atoms,  and  energy,  are  mere  auxiliary  instruments, 
created  to  facilitate  som(>  definite  purpose,  and  that  they  possess 
permanent  value  only  with  lespect  to  that  purpose.'  Only 
exi)erience  is  fact;  atoms,  like  all  substances,  are  things  of 
thought  ;  they  are  mer(  mental  expedients,  tlesigned  to  fill  out 
the  gaps  in  our  exi)eri(  ce,  which  comes  to  us  as  if,  hut  only 
as  if,  these  things  of  lliought  were  actual  facts.- 

Henri  Poincar('>  develops  the  same  doctrine  further,  maintain- 
ing that  the  first  principles  of  geometry  and  of  mechanics  are 
mere  conventions,  made  to  enable  man  the  more  conveniently 
to  adjust  himself  to  the  changing  facts  of  his  inmiediate  experi- 
ence.'' The  Euclidean  geometry  is  not  truer  than  non-Euclid- 
ean .systems,  nor  is  the  Copernican  theory  truer  than  the 
Ptolemaic;  the  prevailing  syst(>m  is  simply  the  more  con- 
venient.' B3'  natural  selection  our  mind  has  adapted  itself  to 
the  .'onditions  of  the  external  world,  and  in  doing  so  it  has 
adopted  the  geometrical  and  scientific  principles  most  advan- 


'  Annlysin  of  Sensali(m.i.  Kiig.  Tr.,  p[).  180-7. 

^  Scu  i4ci  uf  Mtthiinir.i,  pp.   J',MJ-4. 

'  SciiHce  and  HyimltwHis.  ICiiK.  Tr.,  pp.  ;j,  9S. 


«  /ft.,  pp.  .W,  85. 


A  CRITIQUE   OF  ANTI-IXTELLECTUALI8M         415 

taRPOus  to  the  species,  because  the  most  convenient.  Our 
sciences  are  not  true;  they  are  convenient,  advantageous.' 
To  Le  Roy's  doctrine  that  the  scientist  creates  the  facts  of  his 
science,  Poincare  objects ;  but  this  is  because,  unlike  Le  Roy, 
he  n>fuses  to  apply  to  atoms  and  similar  scientific  constructs, 
as  ho  regards  them,  the  name  "fact."  2  In  his  opinion,  all 
the  scientist  creat.'s  in  a  fact  (a  content  of  inunediate  experi- 
ence, a  phenomenon)  is  the  lanKuaRc  in  which  he  enunciates 
it;  but  this  "languaKo"  includes  all  the  conventions  of  scien- 
tific thought;  the  scientific  fact  is  only  the  crude  fact  trans- 
lated into  a  convenient  language.'  In  his  Derniercs  Pensees  * 
Poincari^  adopts  for  his  point  of  view  the  term  pragmatism, 
which  he  defines  as  the  function  which  an  hypothesis  has,  of 
leading  to  con.sequences  which  are  verifiable  in  the  facts  of 
experience. 

Hans  Vaihinger  makes  a  distinction  between  hypotheses 
and  fictions;  the  former  anticipate  possible  experience;  the 
latter  represent  what  can  never  be  experienced,  but  what  it  is 
convenient  or  even  indi-  pensable  for  us,  for  practical  purposes, 
to  think  of  as  if  they  were  elements  in  po.ssible  experience. 
Thus  the  freedom  of  the  will,  atoms,  independent  reality,  etc., 
are  "indispensali  fictions" —  pragmatically  useful  and  even 
necessary,  but   n       true.* 

Closely  similar  to  these  views  is  Bergson's  doctrine,  in  no 
far  as  it  relates  to  the  judgments  of  science  and  of  common  Hfe. 
Intelligence,  he  says,  is  the  faculty  of  manufacturing  and  using 
artificial  objects,  i.e.  ideas,  tools  which  may  be  employed 
to  make  tools.*  Especially  with  reference  to  Hfe  and  action, 
our  customary  and  scientific  concepts  can  never  be  more  than 
practically  useful;  they  never  amount  to  more  than  a  con- 
venient substitute  for  true  knowledge,  which  is  accessible  to 
immediate  intuition  alone.^ 

•  lb.,  p.  65.  s  The  Value  of  Science,  Eng.  Tr.,  pp.  114-16. 

» lb.,  pp.  120-1.  *  Pp.  !4f,  ff.  »  Die  PhUosophie  des  AU  Ob,  paatim. 

'  Crenlive  Evolution,  pp.  139-40. 

'  76.,  passim.  E.  Lo  Roy'.s  position  is  practically  the  same  as  that  of  his 
master,  Bergson.  Scientific  law.s  he  .speaks  of  as  "  practical  receipts,"  "  not  true 
but  efficacious,"  which  "  concern  less  our  knowledge  than  our  action  "  and  "  enable 
'1^  to  cuntrtil  the  onirr  of  n.iturr  rather  tlu.n  to  cliMcover  it."  Bulletin  de  la 
socim  franoaise  de  philosophie,  1901,  p.  o;  cf.  Revue  de  mitaphyaimte  et  de 
morale,  1901,  pp.  141,  560. 


V       r 


m 


416 


THE   PIIODLEM   OF   KX()\VLED(JK 


With  reference  to  this  quasi-pragmatism  three  things  need 
to  be  said ;   it  is  to  be  appreciated,  to  be  adversely  criticised, 
and  to  be  explained.     In  appreciation  we  would  say  that  this 
"scientific  pragmatism,"  as  some  have  called  it,  has  the  merit 
of  suKKcstinf?  a  way  of  introducinR  the  prasmatic  criterion 
into  the  shaping  of  our  judgments  in  a  way  that  is  strictly 
methodical    and    intell(<ctually   justifiable.     It   .seems   to   give 
promi.se  of  a  synthesis  of  (he  essentials  of  intellectualism  and 
pragmatism    in   an    intelligible   and    serviceable   definiticm   of 
truth.     On  the  other  hand,  the  crilicimi  is  that  the  judgments 
so  con-structed   have,   according  to  these  philo.sophers,   to  be 
rejected  as  not  nvilly  true,  but  only  convenient,  or  practically 
neces.sary.     At  this  point  it  is  interesting  to  note  how  closely 
this  qua.si-pragmatism   approximates   the   doctrine   of  Albert 
Schinz,  which  he  calls  "anti-pragmatism."     Pragmatism,  he 
says,  will  carry  the  day,  not  becaus(>  if   is  true  —  for  it  cer- 
tainly is  false  —  but  because  it  is  desirable.'     The  truth  is  .sad 
and  dangerous,  he  thinks;    from  the  social  point  of  view,  the 
false  is  preferable  to  the  true.     For  practical  reasons,  therefore, 
Schinz   proposes  a   philo.sophically   indefensible  dualism  of  a 
philo.sophic   truth,   indej)endent   of  con.setiuences,   on   the  one 
hand,  and  a  pragmatic  "truth"  on  the  other,  not  really  true, 
but  the  social  philosophy  of  the  people,  and  conducive  to  the 
well-being  of  society.-'     But  this  dualism  which  Schinz  boldly 
acknowledges,  this  opposition  of  the  nece.s.sary  and  the  true,  is 
in  principle  implicit  as  a  disintegrating  element  in  the  doctrines 
of  Mach  and  Poincare,  of  Vaihinger  and  Rergson.     And  finally, 
the  explanation  of  this  theory  of  practically  and  even  .scientifi- 
cally necessary  untruth  is  to  be  found  in  the  more  or  less  dis- 
guised   p.sychological    idealism    of   all    of   these   philos(.i)hers. 
According  to  their  philosophical  presuppo.sitions,  there  is  no 
independent    reality;    but    we   need,  practically  and  .scientifi- 
cally, to  act  as  if  there  were.     Hence,  it  is  inferred,  we  need 
to  believe  what  is  not  true.     If,  however,  we  refuse  to  accept 
psychological   idealism— and   we   have  .seen   no  good   reason 
for  its  acceptance  —  we  are  .saverl  from  the  unplea.sant  dilemma 
in  which  the.se  philosophers  find  them.selves,  and  are  at  the 
same  time  able  to  retain  the  .suggestions  they  give  us  as  u>  a 

'  Anti-pTogmatUm,  Eng.  Tr.,  ,,.  221.  2  lb.,  pp.  207,  250,  26s. 


/-' .r.f'ifi.-.  vs-   '.^''^&«<«!'*pa.«ki 


^-w^^- 


a 


A  CRITIQUE  OF  ANTI-IXTELLECTUALISM         417 

praRmatism  that  shall    be  scientific,  i.e.  intellectually  justi- 
hahlo,  in  its  procedure. 

Essential   praRrnatisra   is   not    content    to  say,    with   semi- 
praRinatisni,  (hat  all  real  live  judRments  which  are  truo  are  in 
M.M.e  sense   useful   to  the   person   niakinj?  thorn,  although  it 
would  say  that,  with  certain  qualifications  as  to  the  kind  of 
usefulness   meant.     fJudgtuents   which   serve   to  express   im- 
mediate  appreciation  of  ends  would  have  to  be  recognized  ) 
Nor  IS  essential  pragmatism  satisfi(.d,  as  is  what  we  have  called 
((uasi-pragmatism,  to  have  judgments  constructed  in  the  light 
<.f  practical  criteria,  if  these  judgments  are  to  be  regarded  as 
merely  useful,  or  even  practically  necessary,  but  not  true.     It 
msists  upon  some  sort  of  practical  criterion  of  truth.     But  the 
attempt  to  state  explicitly  the  essential  nature  of  pragmatism 
has  led  fo  over-statements,  in  which  nmch  more  is  affirmed  than 
can  be  easily  or  successfully  defended.     These  over-statements 
may  be  divided  into  two  groups,  one  of  which,  hyper-pragma- 
tism,  although  it  goes  beyond  what  is  necessarily  involved  in 
('ssential   pragmatism,   is   nevertheless  a   quite   characteristic 
doctrine  of  current  pragmatism;   while  the  other,  pseudo-prag- 
inatism,  cannot  be  fairly  regarded  as  a  characteristic  doctrine 
of  current  pragmatism,  although,  as  we  shall  see,  many  lead- 
ing  pragmatists  occasionally  allow   themselves   to  lapse  into 
forms  of  expression  which,  if  taken  literally,  manifestly  imply 
It.     In  the  main,  however,  it  goes  not  only  beyond  es.sential 
pragmatism,  but  beyond  current  pragmatism  as  well;    and  it 
may  be  regarded  as  existing  for  the  most  part  in  the  imagination 
of  the  critics  and  in  the  minds  of  novices  in  the  study  of  prae- 
matism.  * 

This  pseudo-pragmatism  is,  or  would  be,  as  has  been  inti- 
niated,  the  doctrine  -  all  judgments  that  happen  in  partic- 
ular cases  to  be  u.-,eful  in  leading  to  the  fulfilment  of  any  kind 
of  purpose,  or  even  to  the  fulfilment  of  thoroughly  worthy 
ulterior  purposes,  are  true;  or,  in  other  words,  that  all  satis- 
factory judgments  are  true,  simply  by  virtue  of  their  giving 
satisfaction  to  s.,r..e  particular  desire.  Now  it  is  at  once  obvious 
that  at  least  two  varieties  of  this  pseudo-praemati.sm  are 
(heoretically  possible,  viz.  the  doctrine  that  what  is  useful  for 
some  particular  purpose  is  true  universally,  and  the  doctrine 
2e 


■4f 


I 


418 


i'HK    I'HOBLKM   OF    KVOW'LKDOK 


tha  «  at  ...  u-...ful  for  so.,.,,  par.i.-ulur  pu.-,K,se  i.s  tn„.  <•  r  that 
pa  t.ru  ar  v  rpoM-.  A.s  ,,.iKht  haw  I,...,,  .x.HH-tcl  .t  L  th. 
la  t.-r  .  o..tnu    ,1..,  ..„,„„.„  p,.,«,nati.sts  have  r.ot  al wl   ,.    .^ 

'"•'••^'•i  i>  "...St  Ih   a,h,.i,t,.,I  fhaf  Willia...  Ja...(.,s  h;.s  I,.,,.  i„ 
s  region,  of  „„.vo....^U ff,,,,.,,      ,,,,„,,.  .,1" 

o.,Z.,.':'^  ''■''"  ''*"•''■''    ""'^^""'-  "•"'   -  i"'-'^"vm 
•   r..a,n„.,|..,  n,.     U.«  1.™.,.  ,n.,.  jus,  „,  so  fur  .s  tla  ; 

ass„„al  ..    ...o..s.^     >       -■    niustnuan.    of\vhat    h.     ..  ^  .' 
•':^""-   'lM-la:..s    ,ha,    ,ua^  ,u...f,    as    ,h.>    Al.snh,,,     aff..nl      , 

..O..S  nWMf,,,.,  ,o  a  Hass  of  n.nds.  h.M.,.h..si.    .in.lv  ,.  ,1  t    ^t 
Absokitc  tru,'  "  n  s„  f-.r  f,,    i    ■•    ;.      •   •  ,  ^^"^ 

^ -i    n...al    H   „lay,  ,.  .s  „,.-     Logic..!:. .  ,l.is  I.a.ls  ./......s  ,,. 

he    .  lo,.,...d  .lo,.tn,..    of  t.u,hsin„.ut,.ai,-„nHic.t:    In.t    W 
also  lu.  .H    •u„h,..s.,a,...«":    ,1„.  ,,,,„,,,  „„  „^.  ^^  '      '"^^ 

o..rtn.th.s.l.,.,l,.,.lan.s,UKx,  I....hcrc.tof.       ,    ,.hs"V,„,,H.r 
<..,..  a^u,n..s  that  whe..  w.  ,.   ,ke  .,ew  appia.no:  i.f  a  "^ 
^t<  ra«o     fu.h   w<.  -an  say  of  a  .^hor  tha.  i,  is  u.of„l  U.^aul 
>truo.orth.U.t,s,n.olK.c.aus<.iti.,„f„,;      ,,,1^^^ 
still    iuoro   surprisingly    a.Ms,    "Both    of       .s,.    nh... 
exa,.tlv   ,h.  sa,no   thin..-     A.ain   h.   t.a    1   t  7;;:^'^ 
only  ,1.  ..,K.di..,.t  in  th.  w:      of  our  thinking.^  ^  ,  t     f." 
praK.nat.c  pnnc..p]c.s  w.  .annot  ,,.,•(  any  hypoth,.sis  ,r  i     ^ 
qiienms  useful  to  lif,.  Hou  from  it  •  .>!    ^   '  •>'•-  '.  -     .^- 

_A...l  yot,  on  ,lu.  other  ha.ui,  wo  ,nw<t  .lot  ovo.lo.k  J-  .os'. 
^rous  ropud.ation  of  M.  pseu.Io-pra.,na„c  do..  L", 
loa>t  ,,  ,ts  eru.lor  for.ns.  live.,  in  this  sa.n,.  seiies  of  1,.,., ..o^  h^ 
-Wtenzes  as  a,,  '-i.npu.ient  sla...k.r"  the  .har...  thu  r-,^ 
,na  jsts  say  wi..ev..  U.ey  fin.,  i.  p,ea<ant  ,„  .a^,  :;:;'..  't% 
t'uth.       In  a  lat.     work  h,   ko.'s  furt*  -r.     Not  only  .lo.        ,. 

''''■«("''"''■■"".  I'l-  4.-,,  -,1,  -,4.  //,  .. 

'«M., pp. 2;«-4,  ,.f  7'... .u,.„ .::/',-:"! 

«tign.ut.z,.,.  ...  ^urpri>i,.^l:,    .!,,ll„w.  un.i  al«o  , 


'  rb..  I,.  r,H.        4  A    [,. 

/'>  ,  )'    -'22.        •  /;,..  j, 
.0    ;     .viiiri.'  til-    rbar 


.0 


'■mriVlFK    OK   A  sTi-rXTKLLECTI 


lAHM 


i9 


h.  ...uroM  Berfra...*  Uu.sclf  that  k  is  an  "oin     nZsn2y" 

'It"    ii     ttui  it.Sfnn.soc/iipnn'saif     „mI      i„,  thnf 
i'l^  i)ohcl   .ii.jst  pnniarilv  Ih-    i.  ih-if     .,..  ^        .       T 

tnw'  m   n„     u.soi  ito    :,.,!  „,  •       -■  ^'"'^  ''^ 

..!IV 


whet  f    I  it  ,•■        .j.oti,  u 
"foi!    'hoiJt  •  n,,t 

'^''        '.'«(•    tllllsl         III      : 

fii'    'II-     place  u     rt.; 


'it'tcd   3cn.s(    ot    uii     word, 
.f  state  of  fhiriRs  uiitsido 


t:    -sii: 

Jaiiics  s, 

(i<  'Ir'fjp 


■innvs   :hu 
lea.-  tlie  c 
^vluit   is  iisefii 
'<•    "rthil.ss 
'■        tit!:  nil 
show  til 
'liat  it*  i 
lli.-it   sat: 
ndei: 
ail       'tel\ 
H 
of 


"     1      i 

(•is  on  til" 
*"   prnc 

V    til, 

-   •!„■ 
-    Ik 


■.    r 
1 1  lain 


•nval  too  uncritica  In 

n  his      ixiety  to  rei  tc 

-^  th.      rafjiiiati.sts  t,     n.kl, 

*«  the  most  (N.s,  itial 

"^     he    says,    are 

•  al  cue  for  In-  he- 

«)f  theiii.^     ^Iore- 

'hert 


1(1, 


Mil 

i 


onscii 
not  as  the  l(, 

"^        <tivc  iyiiifr  hai 

.-'•laiiner  as  against  the  .riticisi,,,  of  I 
-tl.v  supposes  himself  to  be  fr,-t'  f, 
ur,u  of  pseudo-pruKtnatisi,,  (the  iln, 
i  particular  situation  is  true  uni\- 
liini  defining  th.    tru,.  as  the  ex|, 
"<">  the  whole,-     which  (,ualificati,)^ 
'  -^      ')Iy  "true  for  some  particular  pu; 
'•     A       ,.ven  in  the  Iat(>r  work  we  n>a,| 
's  'Avo      pari  passu  as  our  idejts  approa.l,  ui- 
'Idy.  a.u,  that  "the  matter  of  ,he  true  is 
-         >nt,cal    with    tlu.   matter   of   the   satisfactory"' 

_      «..r.|  practical ;  r  b„t  he  hims,.,f  has  done  little  to  rlvi 

Wit'  .Inll..  the  case  is  „,ueh  the  same  as  with  .James,  in 
vi,.  ,ou  '  ,;^';^^™^^''^'"  •«  '■oncerne.l.  This  doctriu..  he 
Ma    11  „        ."  "    -;«;—".    but    in    his    constructive 

■    '     a    ,  t  uth  an,l  its  criterion  he  by  no  moans  uhvavs 

-'>Kl>  It.     He  claims  never  to  have  been  guilty  of  the  simple 


'  T>ii    Mrotlinn  n!  T 

'Jl'..  ),.  -JT-.i.   '    ' 

'  Tlu  Meaniny  uf  Truth,  pp.  i  js  -60. 


3-  //,.,  p.  272.  >  lb.,  p^  2.11. 

''  Prr.j/mati.tm,  p.  i>i>2. 
'76.,  p.  211). 


\ 


It 


Irl      =    -S 


i:^j 


1;  » 


420 


THE   PROBLEM   OP   KNOWLEDGE 


Hi 


f« 


I 'I' 


conversion  from  "All  truths  work"  to  "All  that  works  is  tr,,.  "  . 

workcfi  dl,  ,s  to  be  accepted  as  true.=>  But  these  distinctions 
anr  d.sclanners  are  not  very  in.pre.ssive  when  compared  u""h 
oach  expressions  as  that  whatever  is  relevant  and  con  u  ive 
to  our  enus  ,s  true,3  that  truth  is  the  useful,  efficient  w'kab  e 

houl7;  r;    ,"  '■'"""'*  ^'"^  '^  '«  unthinkable  tha   I^^y  tru  h 

hould  fai   to  be  satisfactory,*  that  whatever  works  is  tme  for 

he  mchvulual  for  whom  it  works,^  that  different  men  arc  r/^ 

in  choosmg  different  metaphysical  systems,^  that  if  one  en  ovs 

?romT ":'"'  "7  "''^«^^^'  ''  '^^  --n-tent,  he  is  at  libeTy 

sistent  as  he  pleases,'  that  since  religion  works    it  i«  tr\T  \ 

of  m:uJ.,nJ    t,      ,  ''"'■"■''  '"""itoins,  in  the  name 

m  praginalism,  Ihat  so  1„,ib  as  an  assertion  works  it  is  ar,.onf„,) 
as  truo.  a„,l  ,■„  ,r„e  r„r  ,„..  purpose  <„„..r„c,  L  houZ  xt 
year  9  purpose  may  correct  this  year's  truths  >= 

borne  other  pragmatists,  sueh  as  Papini,  Le  Rov  and  other, 
have  been  perhaps  even  „,„re  guilty  than  Jau  2^'and  s"  wE 

-*  els'Th  ""'  "'  ""■  ""••''""'  "'  "«•  ■■<-W-BO  Sehod- 
eareu  t  ^LIT  T""":''  °'  ""-'"- l-.e  lK»„  fairly 
earerul  to  avoi.l  sueh  pseuilo-pragniatie  utteranees  Thus 
Dewey,  in  his  niportani  article  "Wl.n,  1  ""^'-  """' 
Mean  l,y  Praetioil-'"  »    ,t„  '  1  .         .    ''"  P™e"'a«»"' 

manner  of  ex^on,  sa^t;  .tTl '! 'f  '"  "''  '"''"^^ 

ere;:!ri,:r'™^'f''-"«"'""-^^^ 

hu.  simply  as  a  w„rki„gt;Zi'r  ',:  Zl':  "lr.hat' il't 
only  eonsecuences  ,vM,.h  are  actually  produelS  by  the  trC 


A  CRITIQUE   OP  ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM         421 

l^Thitarl"  ^T'"*'""  "''^'  "^  '"  ^PP'-^t-"  to,  prior  reali- 

over  He  (iiscUinis  havinepvor  «-i;,i  fj,o*  *     *u  •      .  iviore- 

f..,.t;^«        u     •  *^         ^'**"  i"^t  truth  IS  what  oipes  sit i« 

arc" r     rsuZt'tr"  """  ""'  •"""•°"'  ""'^^  ''•" "■^'^, 
,     c  nf,miy  subject  to  eomproinise  and  change « 

.ha.  Pra«,„a.i«.,  eollt  ^^^  ,™.  T  ?  7"'  ""'«'' 

quaitv  of  i(loo«    r..fi,„    ^if      ',  ^"'^  ^'^"t"  or  trueness  as  a 

1  uiiy        Ideas,  rather  than  of  judgments.     This  being  as- 

'  The  Functional  r,,.  «./.r«,.«' l/.wL  Th  .     ■      ■    V'''  '^'^'  "^'  P"  ^*- 
mntUm  and  Its  Critic   n  ''''"'."^"^'  ^*^''"-'<*  '«  ^'tAv's  f:ssau,  p.  67;   Praa- 

.'//'A,Vo,opA,.  V.  im'p'^'g/'  '"''^'  '"^"^''"'  "-^  ^-"'--  P-  150;   ^ou.^^i 


i  I 


i  i 


r" 


422 


THE   PROBLEM   OK   KNOWLEDGE 


:l. 


sunied,  ,t  is  nulocl  nrmssury  to  say  with  Mrs.  Helen  Thompson 
Woolloy,  one  of  I>nvey's  disciples,  that  a  content  may  be  true 
in  one  set  of  circumstances  and  false  in  another,  because  the 
truth  IS  never  m  the  .-ontent  of  an  idea,  but  in  its  function.' 
liut  what  It  IS  most  important  to  remark  is  that  it  is  primarily 
in    he  function  of  the  idea  in  the  judgment  that  its  truth  is  to 
be  looke,l  for ;  otherwise  the  state.nent  is  almost  certain  to  be 
"usleadmR.     Irutli  is  to  be  found  not  in  the  content  of  the 
uiea,  but  m  its  function  (in  the  judgment) ;   but  what  pse-vio- 
praKmafsn,  forgets  is  that  truth  is  not  to  be  looked  ^or  pri- 
marily m  the  function  of  the  judgment  (in  practical  life),  bu    in 
Its  content.     Failure  at  this  point  is  what  even  Dewey  is  LZ 
s  rained  to  charge  against  James.     "What  Mr.  James  says 
about  the  value  of  truth  when  accomplished,"  writes  Dewey, 
s  hkelj-    c,  be  employed  by  some  as  a  .Titerion  for  ideas  as 
Kloas;   while  on  the  o^her  hand,  M,.  .'ames  him.self  is  likely  to 
pass  hgh  ly  from  the  ,-onse(,ucnces  that  determine  the  worth 
of  a  belief  to  those  which  decide  the  worth  of  an  idea  "  ^ 

But  the  other  doctrine  about  ;rutli  that  we  have  mentioned 
as  going  beyond  esse.itial  pragM.atism.  vi..  hyper-jnngmatmn,  is 
•n..c-h  mor,.  .■haracteristic  of  pragniatists,  and  niav  be  taken  as 
an  essential  .-lement  in  fh<.  "wi.l.T"  or  mon>  "ra.lical"  tvpe  of 
c-urrent   pragmatism.     In  fac-t,  we  would  hold  that  whi'i;  the 
o<-trine  of  the  ultimately  practical  character  of  the  criterion 
of  tiuth  is  th,.  good  essence,   this  hy,x.r-pragmatism  is,  in  a 
peculiar  sense,  we  would  say.  the  bad  essence  of  c-urrent  prag- 
matism as  a  logical  doctrine.     Spcviking  broadly,  while  essential 
pragmatism  finds  the  criterion  of  truth  in  its  function,  hvper- 
pragmatism  .dentifH-s  truth  wit',   its  function.     In  this  more 
extreine  development  of  the  movement  William  James  has  ,H>r- 
haps  been  the  most  outspoken  leader.     He  adds  to  the  p  ag- 
;-tK-  method,  wInVh  he  takes  over  from  Peirce,^  "a  genetfc 

Wdne       n  '';■'  ";'•'"  '■'  *"^''"  '     ^^^'^"•'  ^-^h  characteristic 
'>l<lne.ss    the  teaching  is  as  follows:    "Truth  happen,  to  an 

Idea.     It  lueomes  true,  is  made  tru<«  by  events.     Its  verity  is 

H.   act  an  ev,;nt,  a  process  :  tlu-  process,  namely,  of  its  verifving 

it.self,  Its  y.vHicat,on.     Its  validity  is  the  process  of  its  valid- 

.7«»r„„,  Y/'A//-;M.v   VI^  ,000.  p.  .-^01.  ./6..  V.  190S.  p.  94. 


Bt^V-W' 


A  CRITIQUE  OF  ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM         423 

oquenco.  Su.ularly    acrording    to   Schiller,    tr-Kh    means 

L   ;,-,        ;"T;'  ';•  ^''''  """■*^"'  ^'^^^^  ^^e  meaning  of  truth   « 

i  '  >n        "■'  °^  •'"'  ^''"^■''^'"  ''^^•''""'-     I'xJ^'^^cl  in  this 
.natte,   Dc-wcy  .s  es„enally  pronounced.     Truth    he  declare 
.-.otes  "sixvific  verificat.ons'Vo  verificatio."^  ^ 'S^ 
;v     kn^  cjf  the  Hlea,  an<l  truth  are  one  an.l  the  .sa  n      hSg- 

out  Its  nature.  Truth  may  bo  defined  in  term.s  of  agreement 

onkr  M.  so  far  as  the  "agreement "  is  interpreted  as'ot  et  erially 

siui(.v>lul  tlian  most  pragmatist  writers  in  guarding  acainst 

1.  '^  pritafion  of  the  pragmatist  doctrine,  as  confusintr  the 
cTitenon  of  truth  with  its  constitution."  But  bZiZI  '^' 
P^luM.  the  .^,.  terrme  of  the  Chicago  sl^h^     n  Ltl  th 

.   whoHv     Iff  '"  °"';  .*'>"'«'  -«'  the  practical   c^onsequen  e 
a  wholly   different    thmg,    then   pragmatism   is   not   true  ''- 
And  even  Boodn,,  ,„  that  part  of  his  logical  theory  whereZ  is  a 

Very  interesting  in  this  connection  is  the  story  of  the  con 
v-on  of  J.  E.  Russell  from  intellectualism  to'praii^ItLn;. 


'  lb.,  p.  202. 


\-       '        '!■      ,  '/6.,  p.  218. 

''lo         5-    '         ^'  ^°^'  ""'^  ^'•■''"'■"f'  "/  Truth,  p.  XV. 

•3/.W,N..S,.XX    1911    D   241      "^''"'■""'"^''^^'''"•'"'^i'.IV.  1907,p.493. 

;;/6..  pp.  1.9-40;  A/,w'n.S.,XVI.  1907   p  '3^/''''"  "^^  ««"'•'•"■  P-  10«- 

■Joumul  of  Philosophy.  IV,  1907,  p.  202  '  „  ,^ 

■«  /Vmc/Vfs  0/  PraomaU.m,  p.  203.  u  rn./A  «„W  »    A"  ^' 

IV   _uo.  yru<A  OTid  P.tality,  pp.  196-7. 


I 


[SI 

II 


iili 

If  ll  I 


wt'.nmim  -mi-:  I 


/  iA-^taH^ 


't' 


424 


THE   PROBLEM   OP   KNOWLEDGE 


In  an  artu-Ie  in  the  Journal  of  Philosophy  for  1906  ho  contended 
liiat  the  prasniatist  <loctrine,  that  the  truthfulness  of  the  idea 
IS  not  different  from  its  success,  would  not  bear  the  test  of  critical 
examination.     While  ready  to  admit  that  the  true  idea  does 
nut  a  ways  possess  practical  value,  he  maintained  that  it  was 
only  because  of  its  agreement  v.ith  reality  in  some  non-prag- 
matic senso  that  it  ...uld  have  this  usefulness.     What  makes 
the  Idea  which  guides  the  traveller -or  the  traveller  acting 
upon  the  Idea -successful,  he  in.sisted,  is  that  the  idea  is  the 
right  or  true  one;    and  what  makes  th(.  idea  right  or  true  is 
Its  agreement  with  the  travc.ller's  actual  environment.'     In  a 
later  .series  of  articles  he  contended  that  it  was  futile  for  the 
pragmatist  to  reason  with  one  who  is  not  a  pragmatist.     So  long 
as  the  intelleclualist  adheres  to  his  own  original  definition  of 
truth,  the  argui  1,  nts  of  the  pragmatist  are  unavailing.     In  the 
mtellectuahst's  sen.se  of  the  term  "truth."  pragmati.sm  is  not, 
true ;  it  is  true  only  in  the  pragmatist's  sense  of  "true  "    Thu.s 
pragmatism  is  unable  to  make  one  a  pragmatist;   it  can  save 
from  doubt  only  one  who  happens  to  be  or  to  become  a  prag- 
matist.^ *■ 

Responses  to  this  urgent  "cry  de  profundh  for  salvation  from 
donbt     came  from  Dewey,  Schiller,  and  James.     Dewev  asked 
how  the  lost  traveller  could  compare  his  idi-a  with  the  environ- 
ment, except  by  acting  upon  it.'     Schiller  confessed  his  inability 
to  cure  a  patient  who  refu.sed  to  take  the  prescribed   remedy 
and  cont.>nded  that  no  further  recommendation  for  a  th,.ory 
should   be  expected   than   that    it   was   internally   consistent, 
and  tiiat,  if  accepted,  it  wouhi  l)e  founil  .satisfactorv      If  the 
c  oubter  would   be  save<l,  he   must  choose  pragmaiism,  and, 
doing  so,  he  would  find  it  the  true  wav  of  salvation."    James 
msistmg  thai  pragmati.sm  gives  an  intelligible,  concrete  account 
of  meaning  and  agre,>ment,  challenged   Ru.s,sell  to  produce  a 
similarly  definite  statement  of  what  the  intellectualist  means 
by  agreement.^     This  challenge  was  .seconded  bv  Schiller  « 

In   reply  to  his  would-be  deliverers   Russell   admitted  that 
for  consistent  pragmatism  the  verity  of  an  idea  is  its  verification 


I'.  -0-.  Ih..  ,.„,  .'.Jf,  7.  4,Mi-7.        "  Ih..  „„.  I'ai.  2!)<5.       •  Ih.,  p.  485. 


Uh. 


A  CRITIQUE  OF  ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM        425 

but  insisted  that  while  ono  could  indeed  make  the  venture  of 
^a  t  .,  and  treat  an  hypothesis  as  true,  it  was  possibreven 
vlHle  doing  so  to  re.nain  in  a  state  of  theoretical!  .  ,t  >     Bu" 

•  hn  tion  of  truth  rcniained  a  source  of  disquietude:    and  it 
us  by  no  means  dc-ar  that  one  could  consistently  rina^n  in 

r  ol:t  I".  '"  '''  'T""  ^^  ^'^^  P-^-tist'docSe    f 
th    once  he  had  accepted  it  as  his  working  hypothesis- 
...   .f  .     workcl  satisfactorily   to  act  upon   the  hyj^the  s' 
hat  truth  Ks  satisfactory  working,  then  tmth  must  b^ sat 
fac  ory  workw,g.     For    two  years   nothing  on   the  subject  o 
truh  appeared  from  Russell's  pen  in  the  philosophica  jouTna^^^^ 
|.  then  ho  made  confession  of  his  conversion  to  the  prigmattt' 
.   .,  unnouncmg  that  his  change  of  view  had  been  mZTZ 

rtThc     tZk^  ^r^'"  ^"  anti-pragmatist,  and  J^ 

onl  It       ^^"^  Pragmatist,  and  especially  his  chal- 

nge  to  specify  the  element  of  meaning  of  truth  whi  h  p  ag- 

nat.sm   does  not   contain.     He  confessed   inability   to  show 

how  an  ulea  could  be  true  prior  to  its  verification.^    Lat  "  in  th! 

«ime  year  he  told  of  his  having  come  to  the  conviction  that  nra. 

jna  .s,„  .not  only  a  tenable  doctrine,  but  offei  a"nore  S" 

On  the  same  occasion  Russell,  with  the  zeal  of  a  new  convert 

;.;n.o  that  ha<,  been  too  ^nuc^f:  1.^:,^,,  f;^-^^;  ^^^^^^^ 
han  a  pragmatic  meaning  could  be  given  to'th    ttI^-ag  ee 

'■"'iiai  xaiuo."     And,  fina  y,  m  his  book-    4    p,Vo/  n 

'  '*> ,  pp.  4s<)-nn  ,  jf,    VI  T-Ti   . 

'  /ft.  XX,  1911 ,  p.  257.  '\  T  ^*^^- 

'  lb.,  p.  530. 


lilj 


WIJ 


426 


TIFK    PROMLKM   OP    KXOVVLKDOE 


l>I 


MTcrssfuI  chscharKo  „f  its  function  ;  he  follows  Jan.os  in  identify- 
.ng  this  sood  workms  or  fruon.ss  of  an  idea  with  its  vorification 
or  h.,n«  ,nad.  tr„o.  an<I  this  a.ain  with  the  good  consoquencS 
o.  satisfac  ory  oxpc-n.-nros  n-suiting  fro,„  acting  on  tho  idea. 

no  "''"'I  •';7""""'"'T  ''^  ""  "^"'^  •  •  •  '"•"  it«  vorification, 
no  .  .  Hiat^thcv  nioHy  prove  that  tho  idea  was  true,  thov  are 
tho  tn.onoss  of  th,>  idea  itself."  >  Thus  we  rea.l  the  story  ..f  tho 
oo„vers,o„  of  the  iatolIe,.tuaIist,  not  only  to  essentia!  nra,- 
mat,s,n,  hut  to  th,.  extreu.es  of  hyper-pragmatisn..  "^    ' 

Aow  this  hyper-prag,natisni  does  afford,  as  its  adherents 
mamtauj,  what  would  ho,  if  t  uo,  a  "concrete  account"  o  the 
nature  of  truth.  But  even  so  undoubted  a  good  a«  concretonoss 
may  be  purchased  at  too  h,.avy  a  price.  The  pragniatic-  ref- 
u^  .on  of  th.s  extrenie  pragu.atisn,  is  that  it  s' c'.fuses  tL 

the  first  place,  h<.  pra^rmatist  of  this  extrc-me  tvpe  "cannot 
soparate  he  trut  h  of  an  i<lea  from  our  knowledge  of  its  truth ' '  - 
and  yet  both  in  scien,-e  and  in  common  life,  we  are  forced  to 
make  use  o  the  lea  of  hypotheses  which  an^  true,  though  Ut 
r  T  ;  '  J'"'*^""''"*-^  -•"■'•h  turn  out  to  have  been  true 
hough  when  first  ,nade  they  wore  not  known  as  yet  to  bo  true' 

tr-'  "T  %T-  ,'  "T  ''^  ^""^  "v-ifiablo-  and  "virtually 

rue        and  Sch.llcT  classifies  su,-h  unverified    hypotheses  as 

truth-clauns.^     Dew.,v    also   .seems    to    think    it  'suffieiont     o 

speak  o    hypotheses  as  "candidates  for  truth,"  ^  "true  before- 

work  ,«  ,u,til  tested  practically,  beliefs  are  -.ore  dogmas 
he  avers,  not  truths.^  But  this  distinction  of  the  pragnS 
between  actual  truth  and  virtual  truth,  or  ,nere  truth-cb  n  o 
candnlate  for  truth,  does  not  coincide  with  the  prac  ally 
necessary  d.stmction  of  science  and  con.mon  thought  between 
ruth  entertamed  but  not  yet  verified  and  truth  known  to  be 
such.  It  has  no  p.geon-holo  wherein  to  classify  correct  guesses 
ana  .-.n  truths  as  yet  unverified.     If  hyper-pragmatism  were  t^e! 

>  A  Firi^t  Course  in  Philosophy.  191.3,  pp.  202-4 

^"^Mpt,  Journal  of  Philosoph,,,  W    1907   n   49.3 
'  Praor,^ntU„,.  pp.  207-0 ;    The  M.anina  o}  Truih.  pp.  ,01    164-5 

mntism    „   4-         .,    „  '    /';:"'-  ""■  '^*    ''^  '"•■'•  'f-  "■  ^'    Murray.  Pran- 

mans,,,,  p.  4..  ,„jUrnce  of  Darwin,  p.  141.        .  /ft.,  p.  ,„.3.         ,  /ft.,    ,.  Z. 


.s4X''iZIW 


iM^ 


'  '*Bf\iiTi±n'S*'af'TT««lTT 


A  CRITIQUE  OF  AXTl-rXTELLECTUALI8M         427 

-V  constantly  itarnZ      ,at     Ih  :""  ^'"'  '"^-     ^"^  «- 

./;.rm>s  regards  as -in"i.l,.. I  und.ansoal.ly    truo. 

i"-.inc.tltal  o,;^  en  "^^^^  ^"--"«  -hic-h  w. 

«chiIlor  speaks  of  wh  r^w  kn o^  ^^  "'"'  "^^'  ""'^'^^^^^■"  ' 
•'^-truths"  ;    they  "  wero  'tmr^   "  ''  '^'■'■"'■"  ^'^  "'lisc'ardcl 

'--"odity  whch  i!  of  r  n  V'n  "'  ^'"^' '"  '"^  ^-^^^^^  ''^  ^ 
''-trinoisaconunononeh/  1''  "''"'^"  ^"  ^^^•^'  the 
a  natural  oons^e^    ,        e  hvn'    ^'•^^'-^:-^'  -^'  '"^  is  but 

.-fusion  of  the\.atu:;  f'  utjr^"Xd"'^:r'^-  ["t-"'"""^^' 
!>raginatist,  savs  tint  for  .h,  VJ  -^"Igwiok,  himself  a 

"uths  at  bkst/an  t.l  a  irr;,  "'  r".-*"^^''^  ^"  ^^^  '"" 
One  is  tempted  toinouire  vvh  n       /      '  '''''^'^'^'  ''^  ""eertain."  ' 

••^blo  truth'that  nrru^;  m'^i  "'^^'■"'"1^^^^ 

'•'''»ark  that  it  wouldbe  m    "  ""''''angeahly  true,  and  to 

-npirieal   temper  "      '"rnT"'  T'""^'  '''''^'  '^'  supposedly 

•-Hef  to  be  refute  MnsTof/"'   ?•  T'  '"^  ^"'^  P-'^'-J- 

^"at  it  is  certa!:  ;;^i^;^r  ir"^"r'"i^'^^^^^^"'^ 

nnnently  satisfaetnrv  L  km    l       ^  ^^"'■'^'^'  '''"  ""^  be  per- 
lia»  fomo  („  stay        ''         °" '"  "  """'  ""'I  ""ly  pragmatUm 

stroving  our  praetie     v  Z  '      ^"^^  "'  ^'"'  '"'"^^t'""  «f  '1^- 

-v.  .  if  as  h^s  h  ' ;    ^    T''""-^'  conception  of  truth.     More- 

'•"iiy  iu^t!^.';  Zl'^TZ'  ''"^^'  T'  ''^  ^^  ^^^"  -- 

-t  forth  without  nknln'  '^'  '''''!''  "^  P^'Rinatism  can  be 
P-gmatism.  c>  ^p  :'  ^  i^'^^^^^  ''^T'^'  P-'-P'^  -^  ''ypor- 
'-  recognised  un  es  T  ^^^^^^  "o  difference  should 

'iootrine  might  well  be  ^J  7      ^^-ff^rence,  such  an  extreme 
^^  r   ueil   be   rejected   by  the  essential   pragmatist 


nil 


I  I  iiiiwi—  I      in^     II  III K:fm7:KmBH-tssxm 


428 


THE    PROBLEM   OF   KXOVVLEDOE 


h 


himself.     As  we  have  just  seen,  the  only  practical  difference 
It  makes  seems  to  be  a  difference  for  the  worse. 

But   if  hypcr-praKmatism  i.s  sucli  an  unnecessary  and   in- 
convenient .loctrine,  how  did  it  come  to  find  so  largea  place  in 
the  creed  of  praRn.atists?     What    is  its  explanation?    As  a 
matter  of  fact  there  are  .several  considerations,  almost  any  one 
of  which  would  suffice  to  explain  p-sychoIoRically  the  Renesis 
of  hyper-i)ragmatism,  hut  none  of  which,  singly  or  in  combina- 
tion with  each  other,  is  adequate  to  give  it  logical  justification. 
In  the  first  place,  and  probably  most  potent  of  all,  is  the  effect 
of  assuming  that  truth  must  be  a  (luality  of  ideas,  rather  than  of 
judgments.     On  this  a.ssumption  there  can  Ik;  no  truth  except 
a.s  the  idea  is  brought  into  relation  to  realitv,  for  a  bare  loRicai 
idea,  an  abstract  predicate  can  only  be  true  if  it  has  something 
to  be  true  to.     It  is  concluded,  therefore,  that  truth  cannot  be 
a  property  of  ideas  antecedent  to  verification,' that  it  isaproperty 
of  idejis  only  in  verification,^  aiul  so  on,  through  all  the  charac- 
teristic inferences  of  hyper-pragmatism.'    But  even  on  the  basis 
of  the  assumption  that  truth  is  a  property  of  ideas,  the  hyper- 
pragmatist  infers  more  than  is  warranted.     The  idea  would 
have  to  be  brought  into  relation  to  reality,  as  it  is  in  the  judg- 
ment, to  be  true;    but  not  neces.sarily  as  it  is  in  the  verified 
judgment.     And  so,  more  ad(>quate  than  James's  expression 
•^ virtual  truth,"  or  Schiller's  "truth-claim,"  or  p<«rhaps  even 
Dewey s  "candidate  for  truth,"  would  it  be  to  say  that  an 
idea  IS  hypothetically  true;  it  would  be  true  if  it  were  a.s.serted 
of  a  certain  rerdity  in  a  certain  situation  for  a  certain  purpose 
or  certain  purposes,  in  such  a  way  as  to  fulfil  certain  conditions 
—  just  what  thes-  conditions  are  being  the  exact  matter  of  dis- 
pute in  connection  .vith  the  defini  :on  of  truth.    But  since  the  idea 
might  fulfil  thes(>  conditions  without  the  individual  judging  hav- 
ing at  the  time  the  experience  in  the  light  of  which  the  i    '-ment 
IS  known  to  be  true,  it  cannot  be  said  that  there  is  even  ..    ne-to- 
one  correspondence  between  in.stances  of  truth  and  inst:i..^esof 
verificatioii,  much  less  a  remainderloss  identity  between  them. 

'  Dowry,  Journal  i,f  Phitnaophy.  VI,  1909.  p.  4.3.3. 
•Schiller,  Journal  of  Philosophy.  IV.  1907,'  „.  4.),3. 

Journal  of  Philosophy,  IV,  1907,  p.  290;    VII,  1910,  „.  24.  PO«'t">n«. 


i*^:^,:5ir 


•.J*r-.>.vj  -'«ai-i.,.t 


-Ai:i'!lv,i*i^.^:li 


■AufijaCX 


A  CRITIQUE  OP  AXTMXTELLECTUALISM         429 

discvom  hv?v  .;"""';  *''«*  f*'^  moan.riK  of  truth  is  host 
ni.Hovirod  hy  cxatniiunK  the  consoquonros  of  tnith-  «o  fk  / 
pruK-natically  speaking,  anv  tn.th  /     ,  tim../,  '         ^^'''*' 

difToronco  it  makes     R„t  ,;  /     I.        """"atoly,  the  practical 

quoncos,  theciifTorcncc  it  mak.-s  practk-a  iv  i^.  h       '  "'''''" 

Manifestly  it  will  not  ,Jn  to  . L-    ^'''''^^'''^">  "  ^uman  oxpcncnco. 
fortLvith  a    a  ,clt  \  'TT'  'P'""'  P'-agmatic  moaning 

wh^t  1  ""  ''''^"'''  P"'-P"«'"-^.  or,  in  other  wonls 

«hat  consequences  ,t  will  lead  to  when  used  in  a  certain  w.v 

or  J  mo,  a,„l  hH  hy,x.r-p„,Bma.i,t   ,li,cipl..,  that  ehoT  otl 
ool,m,„a,c  racaainn  i.  .ho  «.„.,o  ,ha.  i,  oxpro  Jb    in  a  evo^ 

It  «  th„  pr„«du«,  that  fonu,  the  basis  for  the  ebarge  tCt  he 


Mil 


11 

i! 

ii 


i 


430 


THE   PROBLEM   OP   KNOWLEDOE 


takos  hi8  pragnjatio  moaning  of  truth  as  true  "in  the  intol- 
lectuahst  sense.    '  miei- 

Still  another  very  potent  influence  in  the  direction  of  hyn<.r- 
pragn.an  ha.  been  the  failure  of  pure  intellectualisnUo  g'^v  , 
a  sat..factory  account  of  the  nature  and  ..riterion  of  truth 
.•o.nl,n.ed  w.th  the  in.pression  that  the  n.ore  radi.^a  v  "  oJ 
current  prag,nat.sn.  is  the  only  logical  alternative  sine  the 
pragmatic  method  is  vilid      Tl..<  ;.    i  ' 

thestorvnf  R...     .'  '"*''"  '•'""^P"'umisly  in 

uu  stor>  of  Russell  s  controversy  with  the  pragmatists  and  his 
final  capuulafon.^    But  that  hyper-pragn.a  is.'  L  not  a  ", 
sary  consequence  of  the  pragn.atic  n.ethod  has  bee     hu  i  at,^ 
am    m  the  constructive  part  of  our  .liscussion  i/^lirt^oi 
task  to  .set  forth  another  and  more  satisfactory  alternativeTo 

grt^  r  nr""'-"-  ^  '"^''^"^  "'"^'^•'^'  '^'"^  -  vv^ii . : 

grown  out  of  the  one  just  mentioned,  has  been  the  determini 

^™r:'  ''^  'V' '-'  ^  --'^^-^  anti-i^ti'n!:.;;:;: 

programm ..      Tins   motive  .s(>ems    to    have   been    es„eciallv 
-  poratiye  in  the  controversial  writings  of  Schiller  "^ 

cw  oi  rialitj,  a.  fluctuating  in  correspondence  with  the  flux 
of  hu  nan  purposes,  as  being  what  it  is  for  us  because  so  det  r 
"uned  by  unnan  will,  indivi.hial  or  soc-ial.     This  an  ear"  ath  ,' 

proimnentyinthewritingsofSchillerandMurraraX™!, 
roahsm  withm  the  limits  of  a  pluralistic  su.>ject  ^:  S 'd    m"am 

'"   Philosophy.   „„     -Hy.^  '   ■^'^'  ''■*".  !'■  ^-i!* ;    Hussrll,  .4   First  Course 

Honor  of  William  J.,   :.s,  190S.         '  ""' '"■^'    Ol.aiact.T ?"  in    Ussays  .   .   .   ,„ 


A  CRIT.Q.rE  OP  AXT.-fXTELLECTUALfSM         431 
!^X  ^::Sr  ;!;;;  ^'^--^  •«  ^^u^  re«an,od  as  a  capital 

-'iv  ""  the  .„oro        n  ;:^  S  ir'""-     ""^  ""  ^^'^^  ''^  -"d 
view  is  untonablo      Fin    K  ''"PPO'^'t.c.n  that  a  realistic 

"•atisn,  or  p^^rhap;  .    "l      Vn    "'"'"''  '^^^'""'^  "^  hyp<.,-prag- 

•■"•tatic,,..  of  rnofuu,  '  havv  ,  "'  ^''"h^tion.^    But  trans- 

f'o  valne  of  ^2,,^      r"""  '^"/-^--vo  and  frequent  that 
-o.n..d  .  l.oi,:^::;;::;;-^„;^^  '^  -o.  ,.„erall. 

has  its  own  diffie,;iti,.s      Vo  ch^;.  •"^'"''"^  /^'•"^'««//.s,« 

-^tisn,  we  have  n.au.tair^ed  1,  s^f':"'""  '"""'"^  ^"  ^''^• 
leetually  spoakin,^  by  t he '7^ neinle  nf  ^'"P"'''  *°  ''^■^'  '"*^''- 
oautionslv,  by  ,h.  41'^     T'"' °'^,""r''""K  truth,  however 

Rut  once  safdv  lo^y^'^f'"''''''''''^/'^'''^'  "^  "-fulness, 
•^hovv  his  still  dou  :  „;  fwil  thaTT"  'T/'*^  ^^'^^'"^^'-^^  ^« 
what  sort  and  what  de,  "  tf '':  f  "•  "  "'^'«  ta  recognize  just 
guarantee  of  truth  ObvL  "■''^"'"^''^  '"ay  be  taken  as  a 
practical  value  "bo  ke  a^  "  '  7"'-  ^""^  ''  '^^^^^  ^^ 
notionof  truth  itself      to  tlinfn     "'''""  "^  *"'^'>'  '^  ^^e 

rn  the  application  of  th  "'  ''^'  P''^'"*'^^'  ^=^J"^- 

mination  oft  uth     several'  TTT'  "'*^"""  ^^  ^^e  deter- 
c-ountered.     Of  ,le    hT  ..l tfT'"   7''^"'^  ''^^^  ^^^  - 
"erass  utilitariani.n  ''  the    t  /"  ■"  ^^"   '^'  '-^^^idance  of 
and  a  due  recogniti:;  c^    K,    Z'^e'allnf  "t^ 
■strictly  scientific   methods      <  ne  'f  th  *'  '''''"'"'  ^"'' 

levelled  against  the  pragmatic  mothoVh  '""'"'r'^  ^''^^''^'^^ 
''the  dead  level  of  ItSZZ^^' "Z^T ^l!^  ^^  ^^ 
true,  as  even  fho  on-;  „-  .•  "  is  undoubteci.v 

•        "■""•  ""=  """e-ng  PTOesa  »ere  valuable 

;;"i™'.''SoX""r„5*%,"'  'r^  ?,<-■■  *^  ^"-  ■■™n- 


111 


r  I  r» 


■  a  ! 


iMfl 


432 


TlIK    I'KOULKM    OF    KNOWLEIKJE 


•t' 


c'liK'fly  as  rnciuis  of  hotter  adjusting  the  animal  orRanism  to  its 
<'tivin)iuii(iit,  s<.  fli.t  fli(>  j)li\>iial  life  rnijilit  Ih"  prcscrvt'd  and 
pr<)p;i«afcd.  li  fii  i  [jiini'i'v  ifuatioii  the  liiolo^ical  function 
of  .ju(lnnu'nt^,  /.t.  tb.i-  way  in  \vi;i:'h  tlu-y  functioned  in  the 
M'r\  ICC  of  the  physical  hfe  of  tlic  individua!  and  of  the  race,  was, 
roufjhly  s|H'akinn,  •'•"  index  of  their  truth.'  liut  if  it  should  l.e 
assumed  that  not  (^  ly  then  but  now  and  always  the  only  test  of 
truth  is  its  function  in  man's  struKKle  for  physical  existence,  w(( 
would  have  an  animalistic  pragmatism  whicli  could  not  he  ade- 
quate as  a  theory  of  the  fe>t  of  truth  employed  hy  any  heinn 
whose  life  was  above  the  merely  animal  level.  It  is  a  fact, 
however,  that  in  conscious  lif«'  new  interots  ar<^  constantly 
deveh)pinK,  luany  tif  which  are  not  centred  in  the  fate  of  the 
physical  organism  at  all.  Moreover  these  new  interests  peculiar 
to  man  as  a  sjjiritual  iwrsoiiality  may  lead  to  a  transvaluation 
of  all  former  values,  so  that  instead  of  life's  heinn  interpreted 
in  its  lowest  terms,  as  f!ie  physical  existence  of  the  individual 
and  of  the  race,  it  is  interiireted  in  its  hiKhest  terms,  as  the  spirit- 

'  It  w:is  oil  till'  l);i:-i-  ■>(  tlii-  f:i(t  that  C.inrn  SiniiiK  1  (Icvcli.pnl,  twenty  yiarx 
aH").  It  .■<|)cric.s  of  l)iol,,i.;  il  i.r;imii;itisiii,  ;iiithip:itiii«  nr)t  :i  few  of  the  ffaturcs 
of  till-  Chicago  iriMtriiiri.  i.t  .Hmu.  Imt  triidiiiK  to  roilncc  tlic  iTitcrion  and 
nature  of  even  the  liiuhe>t  I,  iman  Initli  to  the  level  of  mere  usefulness  f..r 
the  furtherhiK  of  thi'  animal  life  ("t'elier  eine  HeziehuiiR  der  .Select ioiisletiTv 
lur  Krkenntiiistheorie,"  Anhir  fiir  .u/^t<  nuilUchr  I'hilnsiiiMr.  I,  lW»,'j,  [.p.  ;{4-4.''.). 
HavitiK  Ml  oliliueil.  in  view  of  smh  facts  as  that  of  the  dcpendenre  of  our 
representations  upon  tin-  specific  enerKies  of  our  "  psy.hical  ornans,"  to  eon- 
clude  that  we  cannot  reaih  the  reality  of  things  in  themselves,  Sinimol 
coniMnes  with  thi^  representational  aynosticisni  the  theory  that  sineo  for  the 
low<r  animals  sati^faetoriness  for  thi-  furthering  of  life  is  the  oidy  ba.sis  for 
distint'uishint!  1>.  twi'en  'representations,"  .so  it  must  !«■  in  the  case  of  man. 
.\monu  the  inniiinerahle  '■  repres,.ntations  "  which  occur,  tho.se  which  prove 
themselves  biolocically  iisiful  iHcoine  fixed  acoordinn  to  thc>  well-known  pro- 
oes,s  of  natural  si'lectiijti,  and  thus  come  to  l.e  regarded  as  the  "true" 
H'presentation  of  the  worhi.  Uvea  when  truth  is  imaKined  to  have  some 
other  meaninc  than  u.-<efulness  in  the  n.itural  struggle  for  the  furtherance  of 
life,  it  can  have  ultimately  no  other  criti'rion.  But  as  a  matter  of  fact  the 
tnicne.ss  of  any  thought  means  the  uniformly  .satLsfactory  biological  ron.se- 
quenoes  of  using  it  —  nothing  more. 

But,  as  Simmel  himself  remarks,  it  is  a  serious  question  whether  the  concept 
of  truth  will  nidurr,  when  denuded  rhus  of  the  notion  of  objective  validity. 
That  truth  is,  even  in  man,  nothing  hut  the  value  of  mental  eontentis  for 
the  animal  life,  is  not,  there  seems  good  ground  to  surmise,  the  theory  of 
truth  most  valuable  for  man's  moral  character,  and  so,  ultimately,  even  for 
his  ::::::n:i!  !if  ;  .-nuj  if  thi.s  be  truo,  llicu  Simmei'a  lliuury  of  truth,  even  by 
his  own  criterion,  is  untrue. 


A   ORITlOrE   OF  ANTI-l\TKLLK(Tl  ALISM 


Xi 


ual  .I'volopincrit  mid  (.fRri.>ncy  of  th(>  ii.iFivi.lual  and  soc,     v'. 
Kiick  ■118  umisatinri   aitaiii>t    liniKniatisin,    iJial    -it    d<n..s     ,ot 
Huffi.i.-ntly   di.-<tinKnish    iM-twi-cn    iIm-   natural  <kiiires   and    -h,- 
(I,  rattan  .,/  life,  lH-tw.-,'ri  the  .Icnr.ition  of  a  ()inn  world  aixl    h.- 
struKKl-    lor    i  /,i-,/-  ono,  iM'twcri  wli.i!   is  „.,////  and   what    .s 
(/'W,"'    is    /lot    unworthy    of    <-onsiM,.ratiori.     Truth    can    \h- 
ni<-asur..(i  hy  a  higher  st.uidar.l  than  its  function  ni  the  sffugRlc 
foi  l,ar.-  cxi^tcncr,  v>'..  l.y  its  function  ir.  tiic  struKnl*'  for  a  hotter 
cxistonce.     Pragm.       -i,   as  insirunirnfahsin,   nnist   rcmcinhcr 
that  n.stead  of  consciousness  and  jiidgn.ents  iM-ing  regarded 
as  niei.   mean-  for  the  promotion  of  the  physi.al  lif<-.  the  physi- 
cal Hfe  1.S  ,iuw  n  sarded,  even  hy  jx-opl..  of  ordinarv  spirituality. 
as  snnpiv  or  chiefly  instrumental  in  the  promotion  „f  the  con- 
scK.us  iil..  i„  it.  spiritual  asfXMts.^     Th<-  ideal  interests  no  longer 
<xist  M.r  tiie  sike  of  ihc  physical,  hut  tlu-  physical  for  the  sake 
of  the  ideal.     '  AI.  i,  JM-gan  to  think  in  n,der  that  he  might  eat  • 
h.   has  evolv.-il  to  the  point  where  he  oats  in  ord(-r  that  he  may 
tlnnk."  '     Animalistic    pragmatism,    then,    gives    place    to    a 
humam.Mic  doctrine,  m  which  it  is  projH.sed  to  test  the  truth  of 
jtKlgments  by  their    :  '.lityin  the  service  of  that  life  in  which  all 
Mie  FX'<-uIiailN    .nd  legiti,,,.,!.    -  hinuan  interests  are  recognized 
:.     heuig  of  fundamental  ..     ,-.,....     The  ultimat(>  end    by 
iH'ing  us..ful  tou  ud  which  .  ,  ■  .:.        ..iist,  as  means,  accrcilir 
Itself,  nuist   mclu.le  the  •pei.';  ■  s   'i.rm  ,nv  of  our  whole  life  "  ' 
Once  the  ends  in  view  are  th.,       ■'  > .      .crclited  as  hunian!v  ind 
spiritually   nece-sary,    it    may    be  assumed,    accordiuK    :.)   il  . 
humanistic  pragmatism,  that  those  ju<lgments  are  valid  ul>kii 
are  ultimately   runrssary   for  the  achievement  of  these  ends. 
Thus  necessity,  in  the  sens.'  ni  what  is  'uimanlv  and  snirituallv 
necessary,  remains  the  test  of  the  tn..'  of  judgments. 

Rut  sometimes  even  humanistic  p.a-matisni  presents  itself 
'ti  an  unduly  infiiruhwli.tic  form.     The  individual  man  as  a 
pmpo-ve  active  being  is  taken  as  the  measure  of  all  values 
mduding  the  truth  of  judgments.     "  What   ■    rks,"  it  is  insisted 
by  Schiller,  "is  true  for  the  individual  for  v.i..   -i  it  works."' 

■  KnouMgen,   '  L,fr.   En«.  Tr..   pp.  ..4-7;    .f.   Afain       ,.re,.t»  of  Modem 
rhoiiijht,  pp.  79  M  '^'■••t 

'  For  a  definition  of  the  term   •spiritual  "  »■.  p.  448,  infra. 
V\.  P.  MoLrag;:.  ,  ■luumal  of  rnilosophy,  VI,  MtO'J,  p.  4S9 
« Sehiller.  Huma,,,  ,„.  p.  61  »  Mitxd,  N.S.,  XXI.  1912.  p.  534. 

^  P 


i  * 


■;  ! 


llil 


wm 


!\  : 


I 


I 


J 


¥  f 


434 


THE   PROBLEM  OP   KNOWLEDGE 


"Men  with  different  fortunes,  histories,  and  temperaments 
ought  not  to  arrive  at  the  same  metaphysie,"  he  claims,  "nor 
can  they  do  so  honestly :  each  should  react  individually  on  the 
food  for  thought  which  his  personal  life  affonls,  and  thf>  resulting 
differences  oiajht  not  to  be  set  aside  as  void  of  ultimate  signifi- 
cance." '  But  elsewhere  Schiller  seeks  to  correct  this  ultra- 
individualism,  and  to  pay  due  respect  to  "the  social  character 
of  truth."  *  "Society,"  he  says,  "exercises  almost  as  severe  a 
control  over  the  intellectual  as  over  the  moral  eccentricities 
and  non-conformities  of  its  members.  .  .  .  Whatever,  there- 
fore, individuals  may  recognize  and  value  as  'true,'  the  'truths' 
which  de  facto  prevail  and  are  recognized  as  objective  will  only 
be  a  selection  from  those  we  are  subjectively  tempted  to  recog- 
nize." ' 

With  the  Chicago  School,  on  the  other  hand,  the  safeguarding 
against  extreme  individualism  is  no  mere  afterthought.  A.  W. 
Moore  protests  that  the  variety  of  pragmatism  with  which  he  is 
accjuainted  thinks  of  the  "private  consciousness"  not  only  as 
born  of,  but  as  growing  up  in,  and  tiierefore  continuing  all  the 
while  vitally  and  organically  related  to,  its  social  matrix,  so 
that  not  only  in  its  origin,  but  in  its  continued  development 
and  operation  this  consciousru\s.-,  vith  its  judgments  and  truth, 
must  always  be  a  function  of  the  whole  social  situation.  The 
need  for  readjustment  is  not  "the  need  of  some  one,  lone,  ma- 
rooned organism  or  mind  onli/,"  and  the  readjustment,  in 
those  instances  in  wiiich  it  does  occur,  is  "  always  in  and  of  a 
'social  situation.'"  *  According,  then,  to  this  revised  or  ortho- 
dox pragmatism  —  whichever  it  may  be  —  it  would  appear 
that  not  only  are  the  judgments  we  make  social  products; 
their  truth  nmst  be  decided  by  their  experienced  value  to  so(  iety. 
But  even  this  social  pragmatism  is  not  without  its  difficulties. 
Strictly  interpreted,  ii  would  lead  to  soine  curious  results. 
For  instance,  in  the  days  of  the  undisputed  supremacy  and  social 
satisfactoriness  of  the  Ptolemaic  astronomy  the  universe  was 
geocentric,  but  in  the  days  of  Copernicus  ii  began  to  change  its 
fundamental  constitution,  until  at  length  it  settled  down  into 
a  multitude  of  heliocentric  solar  systems. 


« Studies,  p.  IS. 


'lb.,  u    1.55. 


'  76.,  p.  153. 


*  Pragmatism  aiul  Its  Critics,  p|..  2,30,  232. 


A  CRITIQUE  OP  ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM         435 

Thus,  accused  of  ultra-utilitarianism  and  ultra-individualism, 
pragmatism  has  been  led  to  suggest  the  measurement  of  truth 
by  spiritual  edification  and  social  acceptance.  But  are  even 
these  tests  quite  adequate?  Certainly  what  has  apparently 
been  spiritually  edifying  has  not  always  been  true,  nor  can  the 
criterion  of  social  acceptance  be  made  to  seem  adequate  except 
at  the  cost  of  giving  up  our  common-sense  doctrines  of  the  per- 
manence of  truth  and  the  world's  non-dependence  upon  human 
experience  for  its  existence  and  fundamental  nature.  In  short, 
the  tests  examined  so  far  fall  indubitably  short  of  fulfilling  the 
conditions  of  scientific  verification  and  fail  to  do  full  justice  to 
certain  elements  of  truth  in  intcllectualism. 

To  the  task  of  solving  the  problems  presented  by  the  need  of 
consistency  and  system,  by  the  existence  of  the  "theoretical 
interest,"  and  by  the  normative  character  of  the  methods  of 
science,  current  pragmatism  has  addressed  itself,  and  in  some 
mstances  with  a  considerable  degree  of  success.  This  is  es- 
pecially true  in  the  cas(>  of  the  matter  of  consistency  and  system. 
The  verification  of  consistency  has  come  to  be  regarded  as  an 
essential  part  of  the  verification  of  life,  the  interest  in  "ration- 
ality" being  regarded  as  the  fundamentally  and  ultimately 
practical  interest  in  bringing  into  harmony  the  various  "practi- 
cal interests'  recognized  as  valid.'  This  pragmatic  interpreta- 
tion of  rationality  enables  the  pragmntist,  then,  to  feel  "that 
what  he  now  thinks  goes  with  what  he  thinks  on  other  oc- 
casions." '• 

In  dealing  with  the  theoretical  int.'n'-t  in  so  far  as  it  is  broader 
than  the  mere  interest  in  consisten-y,  current  pragmatism  has 
not  been,  perhaps,  quite  so  successful.  "Reflective  need 
comprehends  theoretic  and  esthetic  need  as  well  as  practical 
need  "  ; '  and  the  problem  of  the  pragmatist  is  to  find  some  com- 
prehensive sense  of  the  "practical"  which  will  include  the  other 
two  as  well  as  the  more  obviously  practical.     James  confesses, 

'  C{.  A.  K.  RoRprs,  Rrliginiiti  Conception  of.  the  World,  p.  71. 

Manics,  Meaning  of  Truth,  p.  I'll;  cf.  Proumnli^m,  pp.  210-17;  SchUlcr 
Wm/K..,  p.  151.  But,  wo  aro  ttMupH-d  to  fxsk,  doos  all  that  the  pr.igmatist 
oommonly  pomiits  to  be  oalh^l  "  tru.-"  (in  the  judKraent.s  of  others  and  even  in 
\u^  own  pa.st  judgments,  wIkmi  .satisfactory  for  the  puri.oscs  which  prompted 
them)  "go  "  with  what  ho  now  judges  to  be  true  ?     See  p.  451,  infra. 

•  G.  A.  Tawney,  Journal  of  PhUosophy,  Vol.  I,  1904,  p.  340, 


iJ'    ' 


436 


THE   PROBLEM  OF   KNOWLEDGE 


and  Dewey  charges  against  him  especially,  that  the  term  practi- 
cal  has  boon   used  too  carelessly  by  pragniatists.'     But,   in 
general,  while  it  is  insisted  that  theory  is  an  outgrowth  of 
practice  and  incapable  of  independent  existence  as  mere  in- 
tellection,- we  get  little  further  information  as  to  the  nature 
of  intellect  beyond  the  reiterated  assertion  that  it  is  a  special 
movement  or  mode  of  practice.'^     Science  is  not  inaptly  de- 
scribed by  Dewey  as  "just  the  forging  and  arranging  of  instru- 
mentalities foi  dealing  with  individual  cases  of  experience";^ 
but  what  is  to  be  said  about  the  pursuit  of  science  as  something 
interesting  apart  from  its  further  application ;   what  about  the 
interest  in  truth  for  its  own  ^^ake?    There  is  apparently  a  lack 
of  candor  at  this  point  among  pragmatists,  due  doubtless  to 
their  fear  of  conceding  too  much  to  the  anti-pragmatist.     And 
yet,  as  we  have  already  said,  the  outstanding  representatives 
of  pragmatism  have  not  intended  to  undermine  scientific  pro- 
cedure, but  rather  to  establish  tiiat  procedure  as  the  model  for 
all  philosophy.     And  there  are  not  wanting  statements  of  the 
nature  of  the  "working"  required  by  pragmatism  as  criterion  of 
truth,  which  constitute  fairly  good  accounts  of  the  process  of 
scientific  verification.     James  says,  "To  'agree'  in  the  widest 
sense  with  a  reality  can  only  moan  to  l)c  guiilod  either  straight 
up  to  it  or  into  its  surroundings,  or  to  be  put  into  such  working 
touch  vith  it  as  to  handle  either  it  or  something  connected  with 
it  better  than  if  we  tlisagroed."  -^     Similarly,  according  to  Dewey, 
"the  objective  reality  which  tests  the  truth  of  the  idea  is  not 
one  whicii  externally  antocedcs  or  temporarily  co-exists  with  the 
idea,  but  ono  which  succeeds  it,  being  its  fulfilment  as  intent 
and  method."  8     Again  he  says,  "Some  assumption  about  the 
possibility  of  a  change  in  the  state  of  things  as  experienced  is 
the  idea  — and   its  test   or  criterion  is  whether  this  possible 
change  can  be  ofTectod  when  the  idea  is  acted  upon  in  good 
faith."'    And  again,  "It  seems  unpragmatic  for  pragmatism 
to  content  itself  with  finding  out  the  value  of  a  conception  whose 

'  Jam.'-i,  Afeanhig  of  Truth,  p.  L'07 ;   Dowoy.  "What  Dora  Pragmatism  Mean 
liy  Pra.'tical?"  Journal  nf  Philosoph!/,  V    1908.  pp.  85-99. 

■  Srhillpr.  Si  lilies,  p    IL'S.  »  Dc"  y,  Influence  of  Darwin,  pp.  125-0. 

*  The  LiiQicnl  C.miition.t  of  the  Scientific  Treatment  of  Afornlity.  p.  8. 
>■  I'ragmnti.-<m.  pp.  212   i:{ ;    rf.  The  Meaning  of  Truth,  p.  157. 

•  JounuU  of  Philosophy.  IV,  1907,  p.  313.  '  Influence  of  Darvin,  p.  135. 


j^.'Ui^.mif    ^. 


A  CRITIQUE   OF  ANTI-IXTELLECTUALISM         437 

own  inherent  intellectual  significance  pragmatism  has  not  first 
determined  by  treating  it  not  as  a  truth,  but  simply  as  a  working 
hypothesis  and  method.  ...  I  have  never  identified  amj 
satisfaction  with  the  truth  of  an  idea,  save  chat  satisfaction 
wluch  ari.ses  when  the  idea  as  working  hypothesis  or  tentative 
method  is  applied  to  prior  existences  in  such  a  way  as  to  fulfil 
what  It  intends."'  Finally,  J.  E.  Russell  has  this  to  say, 
'The  truth  of  an  idea  consists  in  the  value  of  that  idea  in  so 
guiding  and  controlling  experience  as  to  bring  us  into  direct 
experiential  relations  with  the  particular  object  or  part  of  the 
real  world  we  may  be  seeking  to  know  and  practically  to  possess. 
1  'iis  functional  value  of  an  idea  is  what  we  mean  by  its  truth."  ^ 
Manifestly  what  each  of  these  writers  has  in  mind  is  the  process 
of  verification  in  the  empirical  sciences. 

Are  we  to  understnnd,  then,  that  the  only  novelty  introduced 
by  essential  pragmatism  is  a  biological  language  into  which  the 
methodology  of  science  may  be  translated?     Or  is  it  a  way  of 
getting  the  appearance  of  scientific  justification  for  practically 
valuable  philosophical  doctrines  by  bringing  bo*h  the  acknowl- 
edged science  and  the  valuable  philosophy  under  a  common 
formula?    This  is  a  crucial  point  whidi  current  pragmatism 
has  left  altogether  too  obscure,  giving  occasion  for  the  gibe 
(luoted  above:    "If  it  is  new,  it  is  nonsense;   if  it  is  old,  it  is 
obvious."     And  the  failure  here  is  simply  the  last  remainder  of 
that  pseudo-pragmatism  which  —  perhaps  not  altogether  un- 
wisely -    leaves  always  vague  and  somewhat  undefined  the  con- 
sequences by  which  the  truth  is  to  be  tested.^     Perhaps  prag- 
matism may  yet  be  u.seful,  and  thus  in  some  indubitable  sense 
pragmatically  justified,  in  showing  how  some  of  the  contents  of 
a  spiritually  valuable  philo.sophy  may  become  genuinely  .scien- 
tific ;   but  current  pragmatism  has  not  yet  gone  so  far,  nor  has 
It  clearly  seen,  apparently,  that  such  an  event  is  within  the 
bounds  of  possibility. 

'  Journal  of  Philowpky.  V,  1908,  pp.  92,  94. 

'  Mind.  X.S.,  X.\,  1911,  p.  .-,39. 

'  Cf.  W.  Caldwell,  PragmatUm  and  Jdealum,  p.  51. 


i  - 


tl 

:     !  1 

I        ? 

■i 

!l  1 

'  ^?  I  i 


!  ,t    : 


i  11 


CHAPTER  XIX 
Critical  Monism  in  Logical  Theory 

We  have  examined  the  various  attempts  of  logical  dualism  and 
an  absolute  logical  monism,  both  intellectualistic  and  anti-intel- 
lectualistic,  to  solve  the  problem  of  truth,  and  have  not  found 
any  that  leads  to  wholly  satisfactory  results.  Absolute  intellect- 
ualism  insists  that  in  truth  there  is  some  sort  of  identity  between 
idea  and  reality,  but  just  what  sort  or  degree  of  identity,  it 
seems  unable  to  state.  Moreover  it  has  failed  properly  to 
assimilate  what  has  been  fornmlated  as  the  "Law  of  Sigiiifi'ant 
A.ssertion,"  the  fact,  namely,  that  the  predicate  must  always 
be  different  from  the  subject.  Absolute  anti-intellectuali  m  in 
its  anti-conceptualist  form  in  scoptical  fashion  gives  up  thu 
prol)lem,  at  least  so  far  as  thought  is  concerned.  In  the  form 
in  which  it  appears  in  current  pragmatism,  while  it  holds,  in  a 
way  that  gives  promise  of  proving  tenable,  to  "the  theoretic 
value  of  practice."  and  seems  therefore  at  best  to  have  lilt 
upon  something  which  docs  contain  the  criterion  of  truth,  the 
differei.tia  of  truth  as  a  species  of  some  higher  genus,  still  in  its 
common  hyper-pragmatic  form  it  has  tof^  much  ignored  and 
even  lost  sight  of  the  higjier  genvis  of  which  this  is  tlie  specific 
difference.  These  results  of  our  critical  examination  of  rival 
theories  of  truth  suggest  for  our  further  consideration  and  con- 
structive plalfwation  the  idea  that  the  solution  of  tlie  truth- 
prol)lem  \»^  in  tiw  direction  (►f  a  synthesiis  of  eerluin  elements  of 
iiitellectuaiii«a  on  the  one  hand,  umi  pragmatism  on  thf  of'ner 
May  it  not  s«*rha^  turn  out  that  wc  shall  lie  able  to  derive  fib»» 
()roxnnate  genu.-  for  our  dehnition  of  truth  from  the  one  .nide, 
and  the  differentia  ■  i  the  speca*.;  from  the  other"' 

Thp  ptmtum  towarfl  which  we  have  be«^n  moving,  not  only  in 
the  pr(>s*^t  .li^cmiHion  of  the  prf>f)!.m  of  •^'utli.  biil  also  in  our 
former  (li(««^.iA«i«m  of  ;he  pr'.bUtn  of  icfiJiwtntanct',  is  tliat  in 
juugmejit  BAi  Klea.  an  ,\l)st ruction  from  r*s^it\,  is  preflicated  of 

438 


CRITICAL  MONISM  IN  LOGICAL  THEORY         439 

some  reality,  generally  of  a  reality  immediately  experienced  in 
th<>  past  or  at  present,  either  by  one's  self  or  others,  or  at  least 
oxpenonceabkMn  the  future.  But  in  view  of  the  fact  that,  at 
the  moment  of  ju.lgu.jr,  the  subject-matter  of  the  judg.uen  is 
not  ordmanly-if  i„Ueed,  o.er  -  completely  pre.inted  and 
"  v,ew  of  the  further  fact  that  it  would  seem  unnecessary  for 
he  person  judging  to  represent  to  himself  what  is  at  the  moment 
lly  presented,  it  begins  to  appear  that  predication  is  such 

e  r^ihv '3  T  '■"•""'  '"  -^"PP'"'""*  *^^'  presentation  of 

he  reality  which  constitutes  the  subject-matter  of  thought; 

It  IS,  or  amis  to  i,e,  representation  of  the  reality  under  co., 

suleration  in  so   ar  as  it  needs  to  be  represented,  in  view  o   its 

emg  a  reu.ly  only  partially  presented,  or  already  only  partially 

present...    and  represented,  wlm-h  latter  it  is  by  virtu.'  of  nre- 

vious  ju.lgnients,  or  of  similar  mental  acts.     According  to  Z 

view,  then,  the  typical  ju.lgment  would  be  analytic  of'itssub- 

ect,  rath..,-  (han  syntheti.-,  because  its  subject  is  not  a  mer.. 

..lea  or  tiiought-constni.t,  but  an  independent  reality  with  its 

pnmary  and  secon.lary  ..ualities  an.l  relations.     Only  as  i^e- 

r, ;  ,"  '"":;'"-^'  '\":'''^"^^^  -'^'  r^''-^'--  ->uJd  the  judgment  be 
Y'tlet.c  >,f  its  subject.     (J„  the  other  hand  it  could  be  freely 
admitted  taat  all  real  live  ju.lgment  is  synthetic  of  the  concept  or 
<dea  we  :,re  coming  to  hav.^  of  the  subject 

It  sh.  ul.l  b..  no(,.d  that  this  view  d.K-.s  not  involve  the  absolute 
dualism  in  ei)isfem.) Ogv    vhich  we  Idv,.  <m.„  ...ffi  • 
to  r,.;,w       i„    II-    1-        .  '""  ^^*   "'i^<'  Mvn  sufficient  n^ason 
t-  Hj,.  .     In  all  ju.iging  there  is  a  .hiaUty  of  subject  and  predi- 
|-ae    of   ,.ahty   and   idea,   of  repr...sente,l   and^epresemi^g; 
H.    thi^  necessary  .luahty  .loos  not  involve  an  absolute  dualism 
Representation  does  not  exclude  previous  an.i  further  ..^iZ 
i..esen tation  ;  on  the  contrary  it  can  make  good  its  claim,  on  y 
t    1  ore  ..an  be  an,!  is  dinn-t  presentation.     One  who  is  an  J. 
solu  e  intellectuahst  m  logical  theory,  an.l  an  absolute  monZ 
vd..s    .  or  reahsti.,  in  epistemology.  can  fm.l  no  place  for 

n  t      '  -    7  '■'■^'■^*''"""''^"'  a"«J  .-onsequently  no  place  for  the 
t  u  h  o»  ju. igments,  which  obviously  undertake  such  a  repre- 

S  2  '".,.:  I'",''!";  ''^"'.  ^'-  ^^^'^'"^^  intellectualist  who 
IS  also  ,ui  aU.oluie  dualist  in  epistemology,  while  he  would  make 

:    :Zr:T  "  .  r '^"^"^'  "^^'''^-  -P— native,  can  ^ 
''o  .epresentati..n  which  amounts  to  knowlclge,  because  without 


440 


THE   PROBLEM    OP    KNOWLEDGE 


V  f- 


direct  presentation  there  is  no  touchstone  by  which  the  sup- 
posctl  representation  may  be  measured,  and  thus,  if  not  rejected 
as  untrutii,  vindicated  as  truth,  instead  of  being  left  as  either 
truth  or  a  mere  practical  substitute  for  it,  we  know  not  which. 
But  even  when  the  problem  of  acquaintance  has  been  solved 
in  the  way  outhned  in  our  constructive  statement  above,"  the 
strict  intellectualist  is  nonplussed  by  the  problem  of  truth. 
Sometimes,  indeed,  he  adopts  the  coherence  theory  and  main- 
tains that  the  agreenjent  which  constitutes  the  essence  of  truth 
is  the  agreement  of  the  judgment  or  proposition  with  other 
judgments  or  propositions.     The  only  approach  to  a  plausible 
excuse  for  this  confusion  of  truth  with  mere  consistency  is  to 
be  found  in  the  idealistic  doctrine  that  there  is  no  essential  dif- 
ference between  things  and  ideas,  or  propositions  —  a  fallacious 
doctrine  with  which  we  have  already  sufficiently  dealt.     Very 
conmionly,  however,  the  intellectualist  recognizes  that  judgn.ent 
is  representational,  and  that  there  may  be  true  judgments; 
but  just  what  constitutes  the  truth  of  judgments  he  is  unable 
to  say.     Some  sort  and  ilegree  of  identity  or  representation 
•s  required ;   but  the  question  is,  What  sort  or  what  degree  of 
identity  or  of  representation  is  sufficient  to  insure  the  truth  of 
the  judgment?     If,  in  judgment,  we  represent  what  is  not  at 
the  moment  adequately  presenteil,  and  do  so  because  we  need 
to  do  so,  our  need  l)eing  simply  our  need  of  the  judgment  for 
some  practical  purpose,  may  it  not  be  that  when  the  represen- 
tation satisfies  our  practical  need,  the  judgment  is  true?     But 
to  sa>  so  would  be  to  cease  to  be  a  mere  intellectualist ;  it 
would  be  to  have  adopted  what  might  ho  regarded,  from  that 
point  of  view,  as  the  essential  element  (the  good  essence)  of 
pragmatism. 

But  pragmrtism  itself  does  not  remain  unchanged  when  it 
consents  to  the  definition  of  truth  in  terms  of  idi  ntltv  with  or 
representation  of  reality.  If  there  is  to  be  a  permanent  settle- 
ment of  the  controversy  between  the  intellectualist  and  the 
pragmatist,  the  latter  must  conce<le  to  the  former  that  the  par- 
ticular practical  purpose  in  the  interest  of  which  a  judgment  is 
made  may  be  satisfied  by  the  jutlgment  in  some  instances, 
without  the  judgment  being  therefore  necessarily  true.     For 

'  Ch.  XIV. 


CRITICAL  MONISM  IN  LOGICAL  THEORY         441 

example  if  a  nation,  A,  is  at  war  with  two  nations.  B  and  C 
.    may  adequaf-ly  serve  the  practical  purposes  in  the  interests 
of  which  the  judgment  is  made  if  a  soldier  of  A  mistakes  a 
«old  er  of  B  for  a  soldier  of  C.     Indeed  must  it  not  always  be 
as  the  mtellectualist  claims,  the  purpose  to  know,  the  purpose 
of  the  investigator,  the  truth-seeker,  fulfilment  of  which  is  to 
constitute  verification,   and  not    necessarily  the   purpose   to 
mak.  some  further  use  of  the  truth  after  it  has  been  obtained  ^ 
But  then,  would  not  to  concede  this  to  the  intellectualist 
necessarily  mean  the  capitulation  of  the  essential  pragmatist^ 
Ijot  necesmnly.     It  remains  to  ask,  ^at  sort  of  purpose  is 
the  purpose  to  know?    And  as  we  have  seen,  what  makesone 
u  pragmatist,  essentially,  ;,,  the  insistence  that,  as  in  science,  so 
...  philosophy  and  all  truth-seeking,  the  idea  in  question  should 
\^used  a.s  a  workmg-hypothesis,  and  the  truth  of  the  resulting 
JudRment  tested  by  the  way  in  which  the  idea  works     An 
..lea  IS  constructed!  to  serve,  in  tho  guidance  of  action,  as  a  sub- 
St.  ute  for  a  further  immodiafe  perception  of  the  reality  which 
.s  the  subject  of  the  judgment;    and  if,  when  the  immedi-^te 
percep  ion  does  occur,  it  prompts  to  the  same  action  as  did  tl.e 
ong.nal  idea,  may  it  not  be  claimod.  with  much  force,  that  th. 
kU^^   agrees     with,  or  is  practically  the  same  a3,   the  percep- 

Here  we  fall  back  upon  the  critical  realistic  monism  of  our 
pre^^ous  discussion,  according  to  which  that  which  i.  im- 
.ncliately  given  in  perception  is  in  part  an  independent  reality. 

shoud  be  noted,  however,  that  there  is  a  difference  between 
the  explicit  and  the  m.plicit  subject  of  the  judgment.  The  ex- 
pl.c.t  subject  includc>s  all  that  is  given  per.-eptually  and  furnished 
appcrcept.vely,  while  the  i,npli,.it  subject  includes  all  that  can 
i'C'  truly  pre,  ,cate.i  of  the  subject,  ^^.th  the  exception  of  tertiary 
q.iaht.es  and  relations.'     The  ju.lg.ncnt  represents  in  its  predT 

r.l'     tV  """"ir^r'"'^'  '"■  ''''''''  "'^*-'^^«  *»  ^^  represented 
.iK-ain.     Thus  whil,-  there  is  in  hII  ordinary  cases  of  true  judg- 

..lent  an  ulenrity  between  the  predicate  and  some  phase  oV  the 

.mphcit  subject    there  is  always,  in  judgments  that  have  any 

sXecf"  TK^  T  '"•^^■'''"  '^"  '^'■^^•^^*"  ^"'^  th^  «'^P"^ 

-subject.     Ihis  consideratH.n  throws  light  upon  the  relation  of 

•SecCh.  XIV,«pre. 


If 

k  ■ 


U  1 


1 

:\ 

I 

1 

I- 


-*=    li 


i^ii 


1 

E 

f 

dli 

R 

\ 

la. 

'H 

,.:     1 

n  B'  *  1^ 

A 

rJi 

•51 


um^^ 


442 


THE    PROBLEM   OF    KNOWLKDC.E 


the  new  ''Law  of  Significant   Assertion"  to  the  traditional 
"Law  of  Identity." 

May  it  not  be,  then,  that  the  test  of  truth  indeed  is,  as  the 
inteilectualist  has  supposed,  some  sort  of  identity  hetwe;,i;  the 
idea  and  reaHty,  l)ut  that  this  identity  is  some  sort  of  practical 
identity,  i.e.  identity  sufficient  for  practical  purposes,  even  if 
the  question  as  to  just  what  practical  purposes  tiiese  would  need 
to  be  may  have  to  be  left  as  yet  undetermined  ?  At  any  rate 
this  much  may  be  said,  that  the  cognitive  purpose,  as  distin- 
guished from  the  purpose  to  make  use  of  truth,  is  the  purpose  to 
obtain  or  frame  an  iilea  which  shall  prove  at  least  sufficiently 
identical  with  the  reality  for  practical  purposes.  Or,  to  put 
the  matter  differently,  every  cognitive  purpose  is  an  employee, 
the  right-hand  man,  as  it  were,  of  practical  purposes,  and  the 
employee's  ultimate  satisfaction  is  in  the  satisfaction  of  the 
employers.  Sometimes  the  employee  may  modify  the  em- 
ployers' demand,  but  in  general  the  business  of  the  employee, 
the  cognitive  purpose,  is  to  secure  an  i(l(>a  which  is  sufficiently 
identical  with  reality  to  suit  the  employers,  thc^  practical 
purposes.  But,  it  may  be  asked,  may  not  the  original  em- 
ployee, the  cognitive  interest  and  activity,  become  independ- 
ent of  its  old  employers  and  set  up  business  for  itself? 
The  answer  is  that  it  may  indeed  act  independently  of  its 
old  employers,  and  in  relative  independence  of  practical  in- 
terests, but  this  is  not  to  say  that  truth  about  reality  —  and  all 
truth  is  about  reality  —  can  ever  be  determined  in  <.b.snlute 
independence  of  all  practical  demands.  In  industrial  and  com- 
mercial affairs,  even  when  the  former  employee  sets  up  business 
for  himself,  he  is  not  yet  absolutely  independent ;  he  is  the  em- 
ployee of  society,  and  is  made  at  times  to  feci  most  acutely  that 
his  own  satisfaction  is  to  be  obtained  only  in  and  through  the 
satisfaction  of  the  community.  And,  most  obviously,  the 
football  coach  —  to  refer  to  Royce's  illustration  —  is  ;tn  em- 
ployee, the  worth  of  whose  activities  is  to  be  measured  entirely 
by  their  serviceableness  in  directing  the  activities  of  the  team. 
And  so  it  is  in  the  case  of  the  cognitive  interest.  While  it  may 
gain  independence,  so  far  as  particular  practical  activities  are 
concerned,  it  can  never  gain  absolute  independence  of  the  de- 
mands of  practical  life  in  general.     When  Royce  admitted  that 


CRITICAL  MOXIS.M   FN  LOGICAL  THEORY         443 

every  idea  i.  a  plan  of  u.-tion,  he  admitted  the  nose  of  the  prag- 
matist  camel  mto  his  intclloctualist  tent 

l,otwo;„'u/"''"''v'"''''""''  "P°"  '^''  •'"P«'-t^"*  aistinction 
,0  Hoon  the  cKmt.vo  purpose  and  the  purpose  to  ,nake  use  of 

nth  when  U  ,s  know,,  we  must  keep  in  mind  the  difference 

>etw..en  thepurp<,seof  the  origiaul  judgment  and  the  purpose  of 

h   later  staten.ent.     The  judgment  is  always  relatively  sL-ere 

the  sta  ement,  as  we  know,  need  not  bo  so.     It  is  what  the  re 

porter  takes  a.  true  when  collecting  his  materials  that  we  1 

,  d"t    I        ''"''^  P^P^'-      Understanding  the  term  "practi^ 

he  mark  'f  7Z'  "'  '^'  ^^^^^"'^''^  ^'''  «"^"«ted  is  that 
the  mark  of  truth  .s  some  sort  or  degree  of  practicral  identity 
of  the  .dea  w.th  the  reality,  of  the  predicate  with  the  subject 
And  so  at  the  heart  of  the  good  essence  of  pragmatism'  ^t 
uZr  "  V-  '•^'^r^"^'^^'--"-"'  the  good  essence  of  intellect- 
ual sm.     It  IS  not  a  representationalism  which  contradicts  prae- 

Th—  t"'  T,  ?"'  •^"'^P'^™^"^^  ^^^  P-«-^-  -terio "ft 
For  Zn,  T"  \  ''  '■'  -PPl-nented  by  that  criterion  itself, 
.ynd  In      r  P^^S'"^*'-"  ^-^y  give,  even  if  in  too  vague 

and  general  a  way,  the  .litferentia  of  the  species,  viz.  practical 
vd^ue,  ,t  does  not  bring  out  sufficiently,  if  at  all,  the  proximate 
genus,  VIZ.  representation  of  reality 

thJdm  cli^nh  V"'  °"'^-«'^'''i,^"'^-t  pragmatism  it  would  be 
eld  f  '"'  ^r  '""  ''P'^'^'^'^^ional  pragmatism  to 

n  ed,  f,,  as  possible.  In  our  attempt  to  state  the  prag- 
matic criterion  we  found  that  we  had  to  make  use  of  the  Z 
tollectuahst  s  avonte  idea  of  i.lentity,  interpreting  it,  however 

;: \z T  "'• '"""''' " '"""^""^ *'^'^«"^  ^ 

Z.TZw\  '■^»"'^^^"^''^^"-;  ^-y  't  "ot  be  that  one  can  suc- 
e(d  only  by  recognizing  tlie  pragmatic  criterion?     We  seem 

then  to  bo  on  the  verge  of  a  definition  of  truth  which  shall  be  a 
higher  .syntnesis"  of  intellectualism  and  pragmatic  anti-intel- 

cctuahsm.     In  leading  up  to  this  definition,  however,  it  is  well 

to  take  account  of  the  fact  that  representation  belongs  to  things 

whh  claim  to  be  true.     Our  problem  may  therefore  be  re- 

h;dimon;       ^"i^  *^'*  "^  ^"'^'"^  '^'  '^P'^'-'fi^  ^'ff^*^-"^«  between 
judgments  which  are  true  and  other  judgments;  it  is  also  the 


■aSBri«\SL  ^sss-Tssrsr. 


444 


THE   PROtJLKM   OF    KNOWLEUOE 


hr; 


problem  of  liiKiinn  i\w  specific  (liffcrencp  iM-twicn  the  roprpspn- 
tation  found  in  true  judRmcnts  md  the  rvpirscntation  hclonRinK 
to  imai-inRs,   ;i|)art   .iltoKcthcr  from  explicit   jiulninont.     Tho 
funct  ional  analy.sis  of  an  idea's  nieaninR  shows  it  to  he,  pri      rily , 
p()t(>ntial  mediation  of  purpose;   i'  is  representation  which  »v(» 
mediate   purpose.     As   we   ha\e  >.  en,   meaning   is   essentially 
mean-iuR,  m(>diation,  being  a  means:    what  an  idea  moans, 
uUimutcly,  is  what  it  is  a  means  t<>;   proximulehj  it  is  the  means 
itself,  viz.  representative  material,  proxy  experience,  a  product 
of  thought  with  its  praitical  function,  either  actual  or  potential. 
Thus,  as  was  noted  long  since  by  C.  S.  Peirce,  the  purposes  which 
the  idea  can  mediate  form  the  key  to  the  meaning  of  the  idea. 
What  Peirce  ought  to  have  done  was  to  have  gone  farther  and 
used  this  key,  the  meaning  of  meaning,  to  unlock  the  meaning 
of  truth,  and  not  to  have  been  frightened  back  by  his  glimpses  of 
pseudo-pragmatism   and    hyper-pragmatism.     Meaning,    then, 
is  representation  which  can  mediate  purpose ;   but  in  the  case 
of  every  live  judgment,  some  possible  purpose  has  become  e  t  ual, 
and  in  that  judgment  some  meaning  is  actually  employed  to 
accomplish  that  purpose. 

We  arrive,  then,  at  the  following  tentative  definition. 
What  IS  taken  ax  truth  in  representation  (of  subject  by  predicate, 
of  reality  by  idea)  sufficient  to  mediate  mtisfactorihj  the  purpose 
■with  which  the  judgment  is  made.^     But  what  is  really  true  must 

»  An  ai)proa<h  to  tlii  position  is  briefly  indicated  in  tho  following  sentences 
from  E.  n.  Fawcctt's  Ttu  Iiuiiddual  and  Rcalitu,  190!),  p.  :iS  ;  "Often  the  auree- 
ment  (of  propositions  with  outward  factl  may  seem  inconsidcrabl.',  nay,  tri- 
fliiiK;  l)Ut  provided  that  suiii  UKreement  forwards  a  purpose,  the  proposition  or 
arranK.nient  of  propositions  is  suliiciently  true.  Truth  means  propositions 
which,  in  view  of  our  ends,  can  l)e  taken  as,  and  substituted  for,  the  appearances 
with  which  they  aRree."  Oliver  C.  Quick  indorses  the  praKniatic  criterion, 
while  rejectitiR  the  current  praRmatic  definition  of  truth.  He  himself,  how- 
ever, leaves  truth  undefined  (Mind.  S.S.,  XIX,  1910,  pp.  21h-30),  and  seems 
to  consider  the  formulating  of  a  satisfactory  definition  impossible  (ih.,  XX, 
1911,  pp.  2.'J(')-7).  (Juick's  posi  ion  is  thus  in  almost  complete  antithesis  to 
that  of  Bert  rand  Russell,  who,  :is  we  have  .seen,  claims  to  define  the  nature  of 
truth,  while  rcKurdinK  it  as  having  no  criterion  that  can  be  .stated  in  universal 
terms.  J.  U.  Pratt  indorses  •he  pragmatic  tot  .)f  tnith,  but  reverts  to  a  defi- 
nition of  tru'h  which  sacrifices  clearness  t<'  sirnplicity.  "Truth."  he  saya, 
"means  that  the  objjct  of  which  one  is  thinking  is  as  iine  ♦Mnks  it"  (What  is 
PragnuilL^mf  1909,  p.  67).  Pragmatically  intcr|)r"ti  ,1,  this  definition  will 
serve  ;  but  jntellectualistically  interpreted,  .as  it  i.s  e  ideiitiy  intended  to  bo,  it 
is  involved  in  all  the  old  episteniological  and  logical  difliculties. 


CRITICAL   MONISM   IN    LOGICAL  THEORY 


445 


be  representation  sufficient  to  mediate  mtisfactorily  whatever  pur- 
pose or  purposes  ought  to  be  recognized  in  making  the  judgment. 
In  other  words,  real  truth  is  practical  identity  of  idea  with  reality, 
of  predicate  irith  subject,  where  the  practice  in  question  is  idti- 
tnalely  satisfactory,  as  well  as  the  mental  instrument  which  serves 
it. 

Now  this  rcpresontational  pragmatism  is  truer  to  the  in- 
tellect ualist  ideal  than  intelleetuaUsm  itself  is  able  to  be. 
So  long,  for  example,  as  the  subject  is  taken  as  if  it  were 
a  (logical)  idea,  like  the  predicate,  as  it  seems  to  be  by 
the  idealistic  intellectualist,  the  equating  of  "subject"  and 
"predicate,"  being  really  the  equating  of  one  idea  or  pos- 
sible predicate  with  another,  would  in  some  cases  be  pos- 
sible, although  it  could  never  amount,  even  here,  in  any  real 
judgment,  any  judgment  that  expresses  meaning,  to  an  abso- 
lute identity.  But  even  so,  such  e(|uation  of  two  abstract  predi- 
cates would  give  no  information  about  reality,  the  subject- 
matter  of  which  both  are,  or  may  be,  separately  predicated. 
Indeed,  even  from  the  practical  fxiint  of  view,  two  ideas  cannot 
be  identified  save  as  both  are  thought  of  as  predicated  of  the  same 
reality,  with  no  practical  difference  in  the  consequences ;  and 
then  the  identity  is  of  the  practical  sort.  But  when  the  sub- 
ject is  a  reality,  and  not  a  logical  idea  considered  as  if  it  were  a 
r(>ality,  although  on  intellectualist  grounds  it  becomes  even 
more  hop<?less  to  try  to  identify  subject  and  predicate,  on 
grounds  of  representational  pragmatism,  even  here,  it  would 
seem,  a  solution  of  the  problem  is  possible.  According  to  rep- 
resentational pragmatism,  in  true  judgment  the  one  essential 
relation  of  predicate  to  subject  is  that  of  functional  equivalence 
in  the  control  of  the  action  required.  The  judgment  is  true 
when  the  idea  will  do  practically  as  well  at  least  as  further 
experience  of  the  thing  in  stimulating  and  controlling  action 
in  adjustment  to  that  thing. 

If  it  should  be  objected  that  the  subject  of  the  judgment  has 
been  previously  represented  in  various  ways,  and  so  is  different, 
relatively  to  the  thinking  subject,  from  what  it  would  have 
been  if  it  had  not  been  thus  represented,  this  may  be  readily 
admitted  by  the  n^preseiuational  pragmatist.  And  if  a  very 
precise,  even  if  somewhat  unwieldy,  statement  of  representa- 


ll 


I 


mt 


MICROCOPY    RESOLUTION   TEST   CHART 

(ANSI  and  ISO  TEST  CHART  No.  2i 


1.0 


I.I 


1.25 


m  1^ 
•IT  IIIM 

•-        1 4  0 


1.4 


II  2.5 
2.2 

1.8 
1.6 


^     APPLIED  INA^GE     Inc 


11    Jl- 


446 


THE   PROBLEM  OP   KNOWLEDGE 


tional  pragmatism  is  desired,  its  definition  may  be  stated  so  as 
to  allow  for  this  fact.  //  the  reality  which  the  subject-term  {taken 
as  predicate)  represents  {sufficiently  for  all  purposes  which  ought 
to  be  considered  in  making  the  judgment  ~  except  the  particular 
purpose  or  purposes  ivhich  call  for  this  last  judgment),  is  repre- 
sented by  the  predicate  of  this  judgment  sufficiently  for  all  the 
purposes  ivhich  ought  to  be  considered  in  making  the  judgmetit, 
whether  the  purposes  which  originally  called  for  the  judgment,  or 
others,  then  the  judgment  in  question  may  be  taken  as  true. 

Here  we  hav<-,  then,  in  contrast  with  current  pragmatism,  a 
view  which  explicitly  recognizes  the  ideal  element  in  truth.  The 
practical  failure  of  ordinary  pragmatism  at  this  point  has  been 
in  large  part  the  basis  for  the  charge,  to  which  we  have 
already  referred,  that  it  leads  to  sordid  utilitarianism. 
Truth  is  to  be  measured  —  so  this  view  will  have  it  —  not 
simply  by  the  idea's  working  "in  the  way  it  sets  out  to  work,"  ' 
but  also  by  the  way  in  which  it  does  set  out  to  work.  Ends, 
and  not  simply  adjustment  of  means  to  ends,  come  in  for  critical 
examination.  The  moral  quahty  of  the  purpose  is  often  re- 
flected in  the  judgment  itself,  and  learning  the  truth  becomes  — 
in  its  higher  reaches  almost  always,  it  would  seem  —  a  m^al 
achievement. 

But  while  recognizing  the  ideal  character  of  truth,  represen- 
tational pragmatism  makes  this  ideal  of  truth  essentially  human. 
It  substitutes  for  the  insoluble,  artificial  problems  of  current 
epistemology  and  intellect  ualist  logic,  the  soluble,  real  prob- 
lems of  the  functional  psychology  and  logic  of  the  processes 
of  cognition  ;  and  in  so  far  as  any  practically  valuable  judgment 
falls  short  of  ideal  truth,  there  are  norms  by  which  it  may 
be  corrected.  W.  Caldwell's  criticism,^  that  the  doctrine  that 
truth  should  be  tested  by  consequ.  nces  is  useless,  seeing  that 
omniscience  alone  could  bring  together  in  thought  or  in  imagina- 
tion all  the  consequences  of  an  assertion,  loses  much  of  its  weight 
as  against  a  representational  pragmatism  stated  in  terms  of  the 
purposes  which  ought  to  be  recognized.  For  it  often  occurs 
that  the  consequences  are  knowable  by  the   individual  suffi- 

'  D.-u^.y,  Influence  of  Darwin,  p.  150;    Moore,  Pragmatum  and  Its  Critics. 
c   .  n.T  ■"•   ^'"^'P^''  "/  PraunmtUm.   p.    1!)0 ;    Sohillor,   Riddles  of  :he 

i>phinr.  1910,  p.  i:«.  '  Praumatum  ami  Idealism.  191.3,  p    127 


CRITICAL  MONISM  IN  LOGICAL  THEORY         447 

ciently  for  the  purposes  which  ought  to  be  considered  in  the 
situation;  and  in  such  cases  there  is  ordinarily  no  reason  to 
suppose  that  the  judgment  made  will  not   be  permanently 
satisfactory.     According  to  such  a  pragmatism,  even  telling 
'the  whole  truth,"  whenever  it  was  a  moral  duty,  would  be- 
come at  the  same  time  a  real  possibility.     It  would  be  tell- 
ing what  was,  practically  speaking,  the  whole  truth,  so  far  as 
all  purposes  which  ouirht  to  be  recognized  were  concerned  •  and 
except  where  it  was  thus  a  moral  duty,  it  would  not  be  a  human 
possibility,  under  any  definition  of  truth.     Truthfulness,  simi- 
larly,  would  consist  in  the  habitual  care  to  make  one's  state- 
ments always  approximate  one's  own  judgments  sufficiently  for 
whatsoever  purposes  ought  to  be  recognized  in  each  particular 
situation.'    Moreover,  there  maybe  degrees  of  approximation 
to  the  truth  and  degrees  of  verification  of  the  truth ;  but  given 
the  purposes  which  ought  to  be  recognized,  the  judgment' which 
represents  reality  sufficiently  for  these  purposes  is,  from  the  point 
of  view  of  representational  pragmatism,  true.     Mathematically 
worked  out  laws,  as  in  physics  and  astronomy,  arc  only  hypothet- 
ically  truths,  except  in  so  far  as  they  have  been  verified.     Many 
of  them  have  been  sufficiently  verified  empirically  for  practical 
purposes,  and  so  may  be  taken  as  practically  true  of  the  actual 
world.     If  by  more  critical  tests  they  should  be  verified  more 
completely,  this  would  not  make  them  any  truer  than  they  were 
before.     But  if  by  means  of  the  more  critical  tests  a  discrepancy 
should  be  found  between  the  mathematically  deduced  law  and 
the  actual  fact,  then  for  the  purposes  which  dominated  these 
test^,  the  supposed  law  is  not  true.     If  these  are  purposes  which 
ought  to  be  recognized  by  humanity,  then  the  more  accurate 
empirical  observation  must  be  regarded  as  the  truth,  and  not 
the  mathematical  anticipation.     If,  however,  there  is  no  valid 
humau   reason   for   recognizing  such   hyper-critical   purposes, 
there  IS  practically  no  difference  between  the  two  expressions- 
the  one  statement  is  as  true,  practically,  as  the  other.     More- 
over   en  this  theory  it   would  seem   that  representations  of 
reality  sufficient  for  all  practical  purposes  are  not  to  be  rejected 
as  untrue  simply  because  of  the  possibility  of  making  the  rep- 


m 

>  11 

)]  i 


WfiW^ 


448 


THE    PROBLEM    OP    KNOWLEDGE 


% 


?!  . 


.Ill 


resentation  closer,  were  there  any  occasion  to  do  so.  For  ex- 
ample, for  the  purposes  which  ought  ordinarily  to  be  recog- 
nized, the  carrying  out  of  the  vahie  of  tt  to  a  few  decimal 
places  gives  a  practically  true  judgment ;  but  in  some  situations 
a  more  extended  ileterinination  is  required,  so  that  in  the  former 
situations  this  later  judgment  would  have  contained  irrelevant 
representation,  as  well  as  truth.  The  contradiction  between 
the  two  judgments,  therefore,  when  each  is  viewed  in  situ, 
is  easily  seen  to  be  merely  formal  and  not  real. 

But  we  begin  to  see  that  representational  pragmatism  must 
encounter  some  very  serious  difficulties.     In  the  first  place, 
what   are  these  "purposes   which  ought  to  be  recognized"? 
The  obvious  pr.'liminary  answer  is  that  they  must  be  stated 
ultimately  in  terms  of  human  welfare,  interpreted  from  a  point 
of  view  in   which   the  distinctly  spiritual  interests  are  duly 
dominant.     But  let  ;is  see  just  what  this  may  be  taken  to  mean. 
The  universal  human  interests  are  perhaps  seven  :  the  hygienic, 
the  economic,  the  (narrowly)  social  (i.e.  intenvst  in  others  and 
in  fellowship  with  them),  the  scientific,  the  esthetic,  the  moral, 
and   the   religious.'     The   "distinctly   spiritual    interests,"   as 
those  concerned  with  ultimate  and  permanently  valid  ideals,  or 
values  which  transcend  the  demand  of  the  merely  animal  life, 
individual  and  racial,  are  the  scientific,  the  aesthetic,  the  moral^ 
the  religious,  and  t\u-  >ocial  —  this  last  in  so  far  as  one's  fellows 
are  viewed  as  ends  rather  than  as  means.     A  spiritual  life  is 
one  in  which  the  spiritual  interests  are  properly  coordinated 
with  each  other  as  ultimate  ends,  and  made  duly  dominant  over 
the  life.     Ultimately,  the  hygienic  and  economic  interests  are 
to  be  regarded  as  means  to  the  realization  of  the  spiritual  inter- 
ests as  represented  by  the  ideals  of  universal  human  well-being 
and  brotherhood  (social),  knowledge  of  the  truth  (scientific), 
contemplation  of  the  beautiful  (lesthetic),  perfection  of  char- 
acter and  conduct  (moral),  and  fellowship  with  God  (religious). 
But  now,  interpreting  in  the  light  of  this  explanation  the 
clause,  "the  purposes  which  ought  to  be  recognized,"  we  find  that 
representational  pi  gmatism.  as  defined,  ofTers  us,  for  the  ascer- 

'For  this  rliLssifuation  I  am  indol.tfd  to  Profossurs  A.  W.  Small  and  C  R 
Henderson.  Professor  Henderson's  lisi  .lifTers  from  that  of  Professor  Small  in 
makiug  the  moral  and  the  religious  distjiut  interestj. 


CRITICAL  MONISM  IN  LOGICAL  THLJftY         449 

taininr  of  truth,  a  criterion  within  a  criterion.     The  scientific 
interest  IS  here  represented  as  one  of  the  interests  in  relation 
to  which  what  claims  to  Ih>  true  is  ultimately  to  be  tested  •  but 
on  the  other  hand,  is  not  the  scientific  interest  the  "cognitive 
interest     of  which  we  have  spoken,  thorough  satisfaction  of 
jvluch  ought  to  be  regarded  as  all  that  needs  to  be  sought' 
Indeed,  have  we  not  pointed  out  that  what  essential  pragma! 
tism-and  so,  representational  pragmatism  -  has  undertaken 
to  do  IS  to   universalize  the  procedure  of  the  experimental 
sciences?     If,  on  the  other  hand,  it  be  said  that  science  itself 
in  Its  judging  o    the  truth,  can  only  seek  to  represent  reaht; 
sufficiently  for  all  purposes  which  ought  to  be  recognized,  why 

wh""h  .    ?i!'''"*'^'"  '"'"'■"'*  ^'  mentioned  as  a  separate  interest 
vh  ch  truth  must  satisfy  ?     And  yet,  do  we  not  seem  to  need  to 
include  the  scientific  interest,  the  disinterested  interest  in  truth 
in  order  to  guard  against  too  hasty  generalization '? 

But  there  are  further  difficulties  ahead,  especially  in  connec- 
tion with  the  problem  of  the  permanence  of  truth.     To  be  sure 
representational  pragmatism  would  enable  one  to  take  a  more 
conservative  attitude  toward  this  question  than  obtains    in 
current   pragmatism.     It   is  of  course  obvious   that,   as  we 
have  seen,  even  pragmatism,  as  it  is  and  has  been,  has  often 
shown  unnecessary  haste  in  concluding  that  it  must,  in  order 
to  be  consistent,  maintain  that  all  truths  are  of  but  temporary 
validity.     But  representation-  !  pragmatism  comes  nearer  to  a 
positive  vindication  of  the  permanence  of  truth.     Every  honest 
judgment  intends  to  be  of  permanent  validity,  and  if  at  any  later 
tune  It  IS  seen  to  need  revision,  this  is  commonly  to  be  explained 
either  as  due  to  the  fact  that  the  purposes  active  in  the  original 
judgment  were  deficient  with  reference   to   the   situation    or 
as  due  to  a  lack  of  will  or  ability  for  mental  thoroughness,  so 
that  m  eit'KT  case  the  earlier  judgment  was  not  really  true 
but  only  seemed  to  be  so.     If  any  judgment  is  really  true,  the  pre- 
sumption IS  in  favor  of  its  predicate  a  ways  remaining  the  idea 
which  will  represent  the  reality  sufficiently  for  all  purposes  which 
ought  to  be  recognized  in  making  the  judgment.     That  many 
of  our  judgments  in  practical  life  are  of  this  character,  no  one 
really  doubts.     Nor  need  we  say,  with  Roy.  e.  that  such  truths 
are  accessible  orAy  in  the  realm  of  our  knowledge  of  the  forms 


Hi 


i 

J 

i ' 

i 

1 

< 

^ 

^ 

^ 

1  ■ 

i 

1: 

I 
1 

ii 


li 


I  ■ 


450 


THE  PROBLEM  OF   KNOWLSOGE 


that  predetermine  all  of  our  concrete  activities.'  If  that  were 
so,  we  could  have  no  real  or  permanent  truth  about  anything 
which  we  are  ordinarily  practically  concerned  to  know.  The 
representational  pragmatist  can  claim  not  merely  hypothetical 
judgments,  but  many  categorical  judgments  — judgments  of 
historical  fact  for  example  —  as  absolutely  and  permanently 
true ;  the  hard  and  fast  intellectualist,  as  we  saw,  and  as  Royce 
admits  when  he  says,  "Absolute  truth  is  not  accessible  to  us  in 
the  empirical  world,  in  so  far  as  we  deal  with  individual  phenom- 
ena,  '  ^  is  not  logically  entitled  to  claim  even  that  much 

But  in  connection  with  what  wo  have  just  been  saying  the 
difficulty  IS  just  this.     On  the  one  hand,  in  now  judging  any 
past  judgments,  our  own  or  those  of  others,  we  necessarily 
make  use  of  the  criterion  of  non-contradiction,  according  to 
which  It  must  be  maintained  that  what  was  once,  strictly  speak- 
ing, true  IS  always  true,  that  what  we  cannot  now  judge  to  be 
true,  e.g.  the  Ptolemaic  astronomy,  never  was  in  reality  true 
But,  on  the  other  hand,  can  we  say  that  the  Ptolemaic  astron- 
omers did  not  fulfil  representational  pragmatism's  conditions  -f 
arriving  at  the  truth?     Did  not  the  geocentric  astronomy - 
although  It  contradicts  our  modern  heliocentric  view  —  repre- 
sent reality  sufficiently  for  all  the  purposes  the  early  Ptolemaic 
astronomers  ought  to  have  considered,  in  view  of  the  limited 
data  accessible  at  that  time  ?    According  to  an  unsupplemented 
representational    pragmatism,    when     Ihe    representation    of 
reality  satisfies  the  absolute  "ought"  of  the  moral  imperative 
in  the  making  of  the  judgment,  it  ought  to  be  absoh'tely  true. 
And  yet,  in  the  case  of  the  Ptolemaic  astronomy  we  seer  i  to  have 
come  upon  judgments  which,  although  when  made  tley  satis- 
faed  the  moral  imperative,  must  now  be  judged  to  have  been 
contrary  to  fact,  erroneous  -  in  fine,  absolutely  untrue. 

Thus  representational  pragmatism  which  seemed  to  promise 
a  solution  of  the  problem  of  truth,  runs  ---ito  self-contradiction 
and  begins  itself  to  suffer  disintegration ;  it  seems  about  to  fall 
apart  once  more  into  its  constituent  elements,  intellectualism 
and  mere  pragmatism.  Or,  to  change  the  figure,  this  rep)  -sen- 
tational  pragmatism,  which  offered  so  fair  a  prospect  of  a  ma 
media  between  intellectualism  and  current  pragmatism,  seems 


'  Williurn  Jama  u)ul  Ullitr  Exuaus,  p.  L'51, 


•  lb.,  p.  249. 


CRITICAL  MONISM  IN  LOGICAL  THEORY 


iV. 


now,  before  we  have  travelled  it  far,  to  bear  the  sign    No 
thoroughfare.     Must  we  then  retrace  our  steps  and  return  to 
either  intellectualism  or  current  pragmatism?     Neither  pros- 
pect is  at  all  inviting.     If  we  choose  intellectualism,  we  must 
resign  ourselves  to  the  conclusion  —  in  so  far  as  we  may  allow 
ourselves  to  come  to  any  conclusion  —  that  no  really  true  judg- 
ment has  been  or  ever  will  be  made.     On  the  other  hand    if 
we  choose  mere  pragmatism,  at  the  very  best  we  shall  have  to 
face  the  following  dilemma.     On  the  one  hand  we  may  say  — 
in  spite  of  all  that  can  be  said  in  the  name  of  rationality  con- 
sistency,   system -that   all   judgments   which,    when    made, 
satisfied  the  practical  purposes  for  which  they  were  made,  are 
to  be  permanently  regarded  as  having  been  true;  so  that  there 
are  many  instances  of  true  judgments  which  nevertheless  con- 
tradict each  other  —  a  conclusion  which  works  utter  havoc  with 
our  indispensable  everyday  notion  of  truth.     Or,  on  the  other 
hand,  if  we  refuse  to  choose  this  horn  of  the  pragmatist  dilemma, 
we  may  deny  the  permanence  of  truth,  as  a  consequence  of  which 
we  should  have  to  say,  for  instance,  that  two  thousand  years 
ago  It  was  true  that  the  sun  revolved  about  the  earth,  but  that 
nowadays  the  truth  is  that  the  earth  revolves  about  the  sun. 
In  other  words,  while  in  our  astronomy  we  should  have  to  judge 
the  theory  of  the  Ptolemaic  astronomers  untrue,  in  our  pragma- 
tism we  should  have  to  judge  it  true  —  again  a  self-contradic- 
tion which,  unless  corrected,  would  utterly  destroy  any  usable 
notion  of  truth. 

Is  there  then  no  way  of  escape  from  the  impasse  into  which, 
even  with  our  representational  pragmatism,  we  seem  to  have 
been  led?  Without  going  over  into  anti-concoptuahsm,  which 
would  mean  the  sceptical  giving  up  of  the  problem  of  the  truth 
of  judgments  altogether,  can  we  find  a  unitary  criterion  and 
formulate  a  unitary  definition  of  truth,  without  falling  into  the 
futilities  of  either  intellectualism  or  current  pragmatism? 
B(  fore  wc-  follow  any  of  th(>se  c  .insels  of  despair,  let  us  see 
wliether  our  representational  pragmatism  may  not  be  so  revised 
and  developed  as  to  meet  the  requirements  of  the  situation  in 
which  we  find  ourselves.  Manifestly  we  are  entitled  to  say 
this  much,  that  even  when  the  data  are  insufficiently  accessible 
for  full  knowledge  of  the  truth  —  unless,  as  is  not'always  the 


Hi 


E  i 


I; 


f  : 


452 


THK   PROBLEM   OF    KNOWLEDGE 


mi 


M 


case   the  situation  is  one  in  which  no  judgment  ought  to  he 
made  at  all  —  a  peno    has  a  moral  right  to  believe  that  that  judg- 
ment IS  true  m  whicn  the  idea  {predicate)  represents  the  reality 
judged  about  sujicieniiy  for  all  the  purposes  which  ought  to  be 
considered  in  making  the  judgment.     It  would  have  to  be  ad- 
mitted, of  course,  that  in  some  cases  judgments  which  one  has 
had  a  moral  right  to  believe  to  be  true  have  nevertheless  been 
shown  to  have  been  untrue.     For  truth,  according  to  our  revised 
r  oresentational  pragmatism,  would  have  to  be  defined,  to  bring 
Its  distinction  from  mere  morally  justified  belief,  in  some 
.ch  way  as  this :   Representation  of  reality  by  idea,  of  subject 
by  predicate,  such  that  in  all  situations  calling  for  decision  between 
the  judgment  in  question  and  its  contradictory,  it  will  be  found 
satisfactory  in  view  of  all  the  purposes  that  ought  to  be  considered. 
But  how  do  we  know  that  there  are  any  such  judgments  •  or 
since  we  do  seem,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  to  have  the  right  to  believe 
that  many  of  our  judgments  are  of  this  sort,  what  is  the  criterion 
of  this  absolute  and  permanent  (i.e.  real)  truth?     How  do  we 
know  true  judgments  to  be  true,  if  there  are  instances  in  which 
we  do  know  this?    This  is  a  question  which  will  lead  us  over 
ultimately,  into  a  discussion  of  methodology,  or  the  problem 
of  proof ;  but  it  must  be  considered  here  alsc.     If  we  are  to  have 
a  real  definition  of  truth,  we  must  discover  its  real  criterion  — 
a  criterion  that  can  be  really  used  with  ;,  .     ,     ^t  satisfaction 
m  view  of  all  purposes  which  ought  to   ..  '  red      Indeed' 

without  such  a  criterion  we  should  not  .         v    able  to  main- 
tain that  there  are  any  judgments  whi-h  we  have  the  moral 
right  to  believe  to  be  true.     It  has  been  said  that  we  have  this 
right   in   connection   with  judgments   which   represent   reality 
sufficiently  for  the  purposes  which  ought  to  be  considered  in 
making  the  judgment.     Put  the  question  is  always  jjertinent 
is  It  true  that  we  have  considered  all  the  purposes  which  ought 
o  be  considered  in  making  the  judgment?    How  can  we  know 
that  the  purposes  considered  are  the  right  ones?     Is  all  that 
we  can  say  simply  that  they  are  the  right  purposes,  ,/it  repre- 
sents reality  sufficiently  for  the  right  purposes  to  say  that  they 
are  the  right  purposes?     How  shall  we  avoid  the  suggested 
unending  circular  regress,  and  actually  get  any  measuring  done 
with  our  criterion? 


11 


CRITICAL  MONISM  IN  LOGICAL  THEORY         453 

The  question  in  this  latter  instance  has  thus  come  to  be 
How  do  wo  recognize  ultimate  (as  distinguished  from  merei; 
instrumental)  values?  And  to  this,  obviously,  the  answer  can 
only  be  By  m.mediate  experience  and  appreciation,  or,  in  other 
words  by  direct  intuition.  But  may  not  much  the  same  thing 
be  said  m  answer  to  the  other  question  as  to  how  wc  can  ever 
knovv  that  what  we  now  judge  to  be  true  will  be  p<^rmanently 

k  Ir^l  TH  "  '''"  "^  '"  '^"'■^"^"^  *'^^*  ''-''  «"«ht  to  be  con^ 
Mdered  The  answer  suggested  is  that  in  immediate  experience 
of  reahty  we  may  verify,  i.e.  intuitively  perceive  the  absolute 
and  abidmg  truth  of  a  judgment.  In  order  to  round  out  our 
revised  representational-pragmatic  definition  of  truth,  we  must 
have  recourse,  it  would  seem,  not  indeed  to  a  Bergsonian  anti- 

Z7nntT\'  I"'  '"  "^''  ^"  ^^'•^''^°"  '^^  '""^  P-itive  counter- 
part of  that  doctnne,  v,z.  tntuitioni.sm,  the  doctrine  that  truth 
IS  to  be  found  m  an  immediate  experience  of  reality.  Of  course 
truth  does  not  consist  in  an  immediate  experience  of  reality  for 
It  IS  a  quality  of  ju.lgments,  which  are  essentially  mediating 
representational.  But  the  truth  of  a  judgment  is  indeed 
lound  discovered  m  immediate  experience,  when  what  its 
predicate    represerUed   (i.e.    presented   virtually,   or   in    proxy 

to  v'h"\  '',  "''"'^">^  P''''"''^  ^^  the  immediate  experience 
to  vvhich  the  purpose  to  verify  it  (by  acting  upon  it  as  a 
working  hypothesis)  loads.  All  truths  which  are  either  ac- 
tually venfied  or  verifiable  are  of  this  sort;  and  it  is  worth 
noting   that  for  the  definition  of  the  truths  of  science    ie 

oXttt ';  '7''"^  Tu''  "^  ™"-^*  '''''  ^"to  account'  noi 
only  intc>llectualism  and  the  pragmatic  form  of  anti-intelloctual- 
ism,  but  the  intuitional  form  of  anti-intollectualism  as  well 
Indeed  our  position  might  well  bo  termed  sr^rntijic  representa- 
t,onal  pragmatism,  not  only  a  synthesis  of  iutellectualism  and 
current  pragmatism,  but  a  further  synthesis  of  representational 
pragmatism  and  intuitionism.  It  is  the  procedure  of  science 
become  conscious  of  its  own  fundamental  nature.'    We  see, 

^n.y,   teeH„.a,   effi<S^  ti^ej:^?  ^rr^^ST^^u; 
(Phaosophrca    Review.   XXII,    1913,  pp.   G06-22.     See  p.   370    Tula)       Em 
P.ncal  .„tu.t.o„  does  nof  coincide  with  ••emotional  h.rLny^  of Tur^e    Tn" 
our  opuuon  the  latter  must  be  viewed  aa  a  notoriously  unreliable,  but  often  ;e^ 


'I 

s 


IS    " 


« 


4r>4 


THE   PROBLEM  OF   KNOWLEDfJE 


H 


Mi 


lil^ 


therefore,  why  it  was  nece8sar>',  in  defining  truth  in  repre- 
sentat.onal-praRmatic  terms  as  "representation  of  reaUty,  suf- 
fieient  for  whatever  purposes  ougiit  to  be  considered  in  making 
the  judgment,"  to  include,  implicitly  if  not  explicitly,  the  cog- 
nitive  purpose  of  the  scientist. 

But  the  query  may  l)e  suggested,  Is  not  this  the  adoption  of  a 
new  criterion  altogether,  viz.  that  of  imme.iiate  intuition  instead 
o/,  and  not  merely  in  supplementation  of,  the  pragmatic  cri- 
terion? But  to  this  the  answer  must  be  negative.  Bergson 
to  the  contrary  notwithstanding,  "intuition  without  concepts 
18  bhad,"  or  practically  so.  For  truth  at  any  rate,  there  must 
be  concepts,  judgments,  representation.  And,  since  the  idea  is 
never  identical  with  its  subject,  except  for  practical  purposes, 
we  can  never  have  a  satisfactory  definition  of  truth  {i.e.  true 
representation)  except  in  pragmatic  terms.  Nor  can  we  safely 
take  the  spontaneous  judgments  which  emerge  out  of  imme- 
diate experience  as  infallibly  true.  Practice  without  intuition 
has  often  more  truth  than  certainty;  but  intuition  without 
practice  has  quite  as  frequentlj  more  certainty  than  truth 
And  in  order  adequj>oly  to  supplement  mere  intuitionism  we 
need  more  than  the  bare  "negative  pragmatism"  that  Hocking 
has  allowed ;  for,  as  we  have  already  contended,  unless  some 
sort  of  positive  pragmatism  is  justified,  not  even  negative 
pragmatism  is  true. 

Moreover,  to  return  to  a  point  upon  which  we  have  already 
touched,  we  must  never  forget  that  the  completely  verifying 
perception  is  often  either  temporarily  or  permanently  unattain- 
able bv  human  beings,  or  else  not  important  enough  to  be  sought 
at  the  necessary  expense  of  something  else.  Does  this  neces- 
sarily mean  the  total  cessation  of  belief,  the  total  absence  of 
knowledge?  Not  according  to  everyday  life,  not  according  to 
science,  and  not  according  to  a  sufficiently  critical  theory  of 
truth.  It  often  occurs  that  acting  upon  the  idea  continue^  to 
work  so  uniformly  well  in  connexion  with  its  most  intima^.b- 
associated  practical  purpose-,  that  even  in  the  absence  of  the 
immediately  verifying  perception,  the  idea  is  kept  in  action, 
and  rightly  so;   that  is,  we  believe  our  originally  hypothetical 

r^"rh'''vm'*''"^  tho  former.     Of.  oritiH.n,  of  Hocking'.,  my.tiral  intuition- 
ism, Ch.  VIII,  nupra.     See  Ch.  XV,  supra,  also. 


CRITICAL  MONISM  IN   LOGICAL  THEORY         455 
judgment  to  be  true,  and  are  morally  justified  in  this  belief. 

H^th    LT  T  ^  '"■'"'"  '!^^'  '^'  ''^''^  '«  P'''''^"'"y  identical 
H.th  the  rcah.y    a,,  mnnodiatc     xperience  of  which  we  either 

only  but  all-sufhc..nt  justification  of  this  is  that  the  race  has 
needed  to  postulate,  and  through  long  and  successful  experience 
has  acqu.re.l  the  inveterate  habit  of  postulating,  that^ture 
or  real,  y  m  general,  is  dependable  ■     Here,  ag;in,  therefore 
our  „,v.sed  representational  pragmatism  is  simply    he  logS 
theor>'  of  everyday  scientific  procedure. 

What,  more  particularly,  a  truly  scientific  procedure  is    it 
will  be  our  task  to  inquire  in  the  following  chapter ;  but  bl  e 
our  d.scussK.n  of  the  problem  of  truth  is  brought  to  a  close 
n  ay  be  well  briefly  to  consider  certain  criticisms  commodv 
passed  upon  current  pragmatism,  in  order  to  see  whether  our 

MenlS'Tn  r'""f ,  P'-'^^"-*^^'"  -"  — «f""y  meet  these 
HKidental,  and  possibly  minor,  tests.  A  charge  frequently 
made  by  absolutists  is  that  pragmatism  fails  to  do  justice  tote 
ranscenden  and  superhuman  character  of  truth.  Our  answer 
to  this,  so  far  as  a  scientific  representational  pragmatism  is 
concerned,  is  to  be  found  in  large  part  in  what  was  said  of  the 

to  whether  there  is  not  an  actual  superhuman  truth,  our  an.  ,  .r 
would  be  Doubtless  there  may  bo;    but  what  isgener-IIv  mean 
by  'absolute  truth,"  or  truth  as  it  is  for  "the  aLoI,    e  '  C^  f 
soluteidealism),.ssimplyaregulativeidea.     Ifabs     Uetruthbe 

tote  -  w'^''"7'  '"S  ''  '  '-''''  ^^«^-*^  *°  -->'  h"  1: 
purpose,  we  are  furnished  with  a  standard  sufficiently  acces- 
sible for  our  most  critical  needs,  and  in  this  sense  the  contention 

hat  we  are  in  possession  of  absolutely  true  propositions  may  be 
readily  gran' >d.3  But  when  the  absolutist  assumes,  or  by 
whatever  process,  concludes,  that  there  must  of  necessity  actu^ 

'  I  f .  p.  389,  supra. 


4'A'i 


THK    I'KOBF.EM    OF    KNOWLKDOK 


||j 


ally   Ih>  an    otcnially  existent    sum-total  and    systeinatieally 
unified  experieneed  harmony  of  all  possible  true  judRments,  ho 
indulges    in    speeulative    doKinatirm.     SuDerhum.i'.    truth,    if 
wp  are  Roinn  to  speak  of  it  at  all,  we  would  do  well  to  eall  divin(>, 
rather  than  absolute  ;  f«)r  wliile.  so  far  as  our  present  discussion 
is  eoncerned,  even  of  (lod,  existence  and  attributes  are  matters 
of  speculation,  tlie  whole  conception  is  less  ambiKUous  than  that 
of  "the  Absolute"   of  current    metaphysics.     And   if  we  are 
goinK  to  siM'ak  of  (Jod's  truth,  there  is  no  manifestly  valid  re- 
ligious reason   why  it   should   not   be  regarded  as  essentially 
similar  to  man's.     It  is  surely  not  a  timeless,  changeless,  pur- 
poseless,   absolutely    complete    representation,    in   one   act   of 
thought,  of  an  eternally-complete  reality  which  is  also  contt.^i 
of  an   eternally-complete   inunediate  experience ;    for   why,  * 
such  a  case,  shoidd  there  be  representation  at  all?     May  it 
not    more  probai)ly  bo   rep.esentation,  the   content  of   which 
may  vary  from  time  to  time,  antl  yet  which  is  sufficient  always 
to  mediate  satisfactorily  whatever  purposes  God  may  have  in 
view.     This  is  not  to  say  that  God  is  in  every  way  anthropo- 
nootic,  but  that  if  there  is  such  a  thing  as  God's  truth,  it  must 
be  essentially  similar,  or  even  identical,  with  man's  truth. 

Another  imi)ortant  test  to  be  applied  to  any  theory  of  truth 
is  the  question  wh(>ther  it  is  "self-critical"  or  self-refuting.     Is 
our  scientific  representational  pragmatism  true,  according  to 
its  own  definition  of  t •  ut h ?    Both  aosolute  intellectualism  and 
the  absolutely  anti-intellectualistic  theory  of  current  pragma- 
tism, are,  as  has  been  intimated,  self-refuting.     On  the  one 
hand,  the  idea  of  an  absolute  identity  between  idea  and  reality, 
between  predicate  and  sui)joct,  is  not  absolutely  identical  with 
what  functions  as  truth  in  actual  h«mian  experience.     On  the 
other  hand,  the  idea  of  mere  practical  usefulness,  or  working 
value,  of  ideas  will  not  always  work  as  a  substitute  for  what 
we  mean  by  truth.     But  revised,  or  scientific,  representational 
pragmatism  is  self-critical.     To  .suy  that  truth  is  representa- 
tion of  reahty  sufficient  for  whate\er  purposes  ought  to  be  con- 
sidered l)y  any  one  who  may  ever  have  to  decide  between  that 
judgment  and  its  contradictory,  is  itself  a  representation  of  the 
reality  in  question  (viz.  truth)   sufficient  for  whatever  purposes 
ought  to  hv  considereil  Ijy  any  one  who  may  have  to  decide  be- 


CRITICAL   .\I(»\'I8M    iX   UMilCAL  THEORY  457 

twcen  it  and  its  contradictory.    Moreover,  that  any  judKmont 
(ma  g,von  situation  in  which  judRmont  concerninK  a  certain 
Hubjoct-nmttor  is  morally  r,.f,uired)  which  represents  the  reality 
«uffic.ently  for  all  the  purposes  which  the  person  n.aking  ft 
ou«h    to  consider,  is  a  judgment   which  that   person  has  the 
|noraI  r.gh    to  make  and  to  l.-liove  to  Ik.,  true  -  this  itself  is  a 
judgnien     .vh.ch  we  have  not  only  the  nmral  right,  but,  we 
would  cl     a,  a  fully  verified  scientf^      i.ht  to  n.ake.     We  se^ 
no  rea^.,.th..„  for  rejecting scien         ..    .esentational  pragma- 
^sm    the  only  definition  of  truth        .  "ning  unrefuted      vJhile 
he  traditional  int,.ll,.,.tualis,n  gives  ■.  ..e  proximate  genus  of  truth 
(representation  of  reality),  but  not  its  specific  difference  (suffi- 
ciency for  all  proper  practical  purposes),  and  while  current  prag- 
matism rightly,  even  if  too  vaguely,  insists  upon  the  specific 
difTcrence,  but  w    .urW  ignores  the  proximate  genus,  scientific 
representational  pragmatism  combines  the  complementary  par- 
tial  truths  of  the  two  positions. 

Fmally,  there  is  a  formal  test  of  definitions,  which  may  Ix, 
applied  to  our  definition  of  truth.     L.  S.  Stebbing  has  urged 
m  en  K,,,,  „f  pragmatism  that  unless  the  pragmatic  dictum, 
-11  tru  hs  work,     ,s  simply  convertible,  it  fails  to  provide  a 
mterion..     This   s  not  quite  accurate;   it  is  not  the 'criterion! 
at  lea.st  as  state      .us,  too  broadly  to  be  a  real  criterion,  tha 
must  be  .„nply       .vertible,  but  the  definition;    but  the  spe- 
cific  different,    by  means  of  which  the  definition  is  constructed 
IS  the  cri.euon,  fhe  test,  par  excellence.     Our  definition  of  truth 
:'^w,ver. ,,  :iu.o  these  of  intellectualism  and  current  pragmatism! 
■il  stand  this  test.    To  say,  All  judgments  in  which  the  predi- 
cate represents  the  subject  sufficiently  for  all  purposes  which 
ought  to  be  consKlered  at  any  time  when  any  one  may  have  to 
choose  between  the  judgment  in  question  and  its  contradictory 
are  t^ue,  ,s  as  true  as  our  definition  of  truth,  of  which  it  is  the 
simple  converse. 

It  will  appear  then,  that  once  more,  in  our  treatment  of  the 

ttft  1'"".  ^^'"^  '^'''''''  "''  ^^^^  •^««"  »«d  to  a  position 
that  may  be  characterized  as  critical  monism.  We  have  noted 
the  evident  unsatisfactoriness  of  an  absolute  logical  dualism, 


i; 


458 


THE   PROBLEM  OP   KNOWLEDGE 


and  have  seen  the  finally  disappointing  character  of  absolute 
logical  monism  in  its  various  forms,  viz.  on  the  one  hand,  ab- 
solute intcllectualism  (intellectualistic  absolute  logical  monism) 
in  its  cpistemologically  dualistic,  idealistic,  and  realistic  vari- 
eties; and  on  the  other  hand,  absolute  anti-intellectualism 
(anti-intellectualistic  absolute  logical  monism),  whether  anti- 
conceptualistic  or  pragmatic.  We  arc  left  with  but  one  theory 
which  can  be  regarded  as  both  tenable  in  the  face  of  attack, 
and  positiveb-  justifiable,  viz.  scientific  representational  prag- 
matism, or,  to  give  other  possible  designations,  critical  logical 
monism,  critical  pragmatic  monism,  critical  pragmatic  logical 
monism,  intuitional-pragmatic  representationalism,  or  critical 
monism  in  logical  theory.' 

'  In  this  and  the  two  immediately  preceding  chapters  I  have  included,  with- 
out the  use  of  quotation  marks,  some  excerpts  from  my  article  entitled,"  Repre- 
sentational Pragmatism,"  in  Mind,  N.S.,  XXI,  1912,  pp.  167-81. 


lvf;l 


ii^ 


B.  THE  PROBLEM  OF  PROOF  (METHOD- 
OLOGY) 


CHAPTER  XX 

The  Problem  of  Scientific  Method 

The  problem  of  mediate  knowledge  is  the  problem  of  proving 

the  truth.     In  the  immediately  preceding  chapters  we  have 

dealt  with  what,  regarding  logic  as  the  normative  science  of 

the  truth  of  judgments,  we  take  to  be  the  most  fundamental 

problem   of   philosophical   logic,   or  logical   theory,   viz.   the 

problem   of   truth.     We    must  now  take    up    the  remaining 

problem,  viz.  the  problem  of  proof,  which  may  be  regarded  as 

the  central  concern  of  methodology.     But  the  problem  of  proof 

is  the  problem  of  the  production  of  certainty  of  the  truth  in  a 

way  that  is  logically  satisfactory.     We  shall  therefore  have 

first  to  consider  briefly  the  nature  of  certainty  in  general,  and 

of  logical  certainty  in  particular. 

Now  the  problem  of  certainty  is  not,  in  the  first  iastance,  a 
logical  problem  at  all,  but  a  psychological  one.     And  probably 
the  best  available  criterion  of  psychological  certainty  is  readiness 
to  act  upon  the  judgment,  not  tentatively  and  with  a  view  to 
verification,  but,  finally,  irrevocably.     Certainty  in  this  broad 
sense  is  the  state  of  mind  accompanying  judgment  or  belief, 
in  which  there  is  such  a  readiness  to  act  irrevocably,  given  the 
appropriate  situation.     (Our  view  would  allow  for  a  real  dif- 
ference between  knowing,  and  knowing  that  we  know.     And 
yet,  if  we  do  not  know  that  we  know,  and  dwell  upon  this  nega- 
tive fact,  it  may  destroy  our  readiness  to  act,  and  this  would 
mean  the  destruction  of  our  knowledge.     On  the  other  hand, 
to  know  that  we  know  is  a  safeguard  to  our  knowledge;    it 
keeps  it  steady,  free  from  unnecessary  fluctuatinn.«!.     And  prol> 
ably  this  is  the  chief  value;  of  a  constructive  epistemology. 

459 


■f 


f 


i  a   nl 


400 


THE   PROBLEM   OF    KNOWLEDGE 


IHi    ii 


.1 


Iff 


It  makes  for  a  certainty  which  is  adequate,  even  after  the  mo^. 
comprehensive  sort  of  criticism.) 

But  there  are  two  mam  sorts  of  psychological  certainty,  viz 
logical  certamty,  and   certainty  which  falls  short  of  logical 
certauity.     Logic-al  certainty  may  he  defined,  in  preliminary 
fashion,  as  sufficiently  critical  psychological  certainty,  provided 
the  term   "sufficiently   critical"   l,e  taken  seriously  enough- 
although  It  IS  perhaps  quite  as  informing  to  say  tha*  psychologi- 
cal certainty  is  sufficiently  critical  when  it  is  logical.     But  in 
any  case  it  will  readily  appear,  in  view  of  our  previous  discus- 
sion, that  there  are  two  main  varieties  of  logical  certainty,  viz 
that  m  which  the  judgment  has  l)een  fully  verified  in  immediate 
perceptual  experience,  i.e.  in   percept^ial  intuition;    and  that 
in  which  such  direct  perceptual  verification  is,  for  some  good  and 
sufficient  reason,  unnecessary. 

It  may  be  remarked  in  this  connection  -  and  the  considera- 
tion is  of  great  importance  for  epistemological  theory  -  that  on 
the  bas,-<  of  an  absolute  dualism  in  epistemology,  according  to 
which  no  perceptual  intuition  of  reality  would  be  possible,  while 
there  might  perhaps  be  truth  in  human  judgments,  there  could 
be  no  certain  knowledge  that  it  was  the  truth.     Indeed  truth 
would  be  indistinguishable  from  what  s,.emed,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  to  be  a  practical  substitute  for  truth.     It  is  onlv  when  we 
have  had,  or  can  in  some  way  find  access  to,  immediate  experience 
ot  reality,  with  which  we  can  compare  our  ideas,  that  we  can 
know  that  what  m  any  partic.ilar  case  functions  satisfactorily  is 
really  true,  and  not  a  mere  temporary  substitute  for  the  truth 
It  IS  one  thing  to  know  that  we  have  either  truth  or  an  ap- 
parently  satisfactory   temncrary   practical   substitute   for   it  • 
It  IS  quite  another  thing  t,      now  that  we  have  representation 
which  IS  true,  i)ecausc  it  is  the  function.-d  equivalent  of  further 
immediate  experience  of  the  reality,  so  far  as  all  purposes  which 
ought  to  be  considered  are  concerned.     The  former  we  might 
l^.-ive  on  the  basis  of  a  dualistic  epistemologv ;    the  latter  re- 
(luires  epistemological  monism.     If  there  is  to  be  knowled  e  of 
reality,  representations  must  be  comparable  with  presentati'ons 
And  yet  grant,.!  that  there  is  .somewhere  for  us  a  direct  acquaint- 
ance with  .ndepen.l.>nt  reality,  it  is  perhaps  not  inconceivable 
that,  m  view  of  our  yeneral  knowledge  of  the  nature  of  this 


}l   I 


l:   I 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  SCIENTIPIC  METHOD         461 

redity.  there  may  have  been  produced,  in  certain  instances,  a 
sufficiently  critical  or  logical  certainty  of  the  truth,  on  the  baiis 
of  a  prolonged  and  varied  experience  of  the  satisfactory  working 
of  the  hypothesis,  without  there  ever  having  been  such  an  im- 
mediate experience  of  the  reality  in  question  as  would  at  once 
have  constituted  its  complete  verification 

But  granting  that  logical  certainty  is  at  least  a  sufficiently 
critical  intellectual  readiness  to  act  irrevocably  upon  an  ideaoU 
proposition,  our  discussion  of  the  problem  of  mediate  knowledge 
wil  not  be  complete  until  we  shall  have  treated  of  the  method 
of  the  production  of  this  sufficiently  critical  intellectual  readi- 
ness or  logical  certainty,  this  certainty  of  truth  resting  upon  ade- 
quate experientia  grounds;  in  other  words,  we  must  now  take 

dunHnnTl     •'"  ,     *^^  «'^'^'^">^'^  "^'^hod  of  proof,  or  of  the  pro- 
duction of  logical  certainty.     And  when  we  call  our  problem  one 
of  saenhfic  methodology,  we  assume,  of  course,  that  the  tradi- 
tionahstic  method    of  resting  finally  upon  some  external  au- 
thority, is  out  of  the  question  here.     What  we  are  seeking  is 
a  ";^;thod  fitted  to  be  employed  by  all  independent  investigafo 
and  thinkers.     The  scientist  is  not  satisfied  simply  to  know  o 
even  to  know  that  he  knows ;  his  ideal  is  to  know  hou,  he  knows 
in  order  that  he  may  proceed  with  sure  and  steady  step  to  still 
further  intellectual   conquests.     Indeed,   science  "^may   be 
garded  as  including  not  only  systems  of  verified  judgments 
about  reality  but  also  an  adequ  te  system  of  verificatiin^ow 
then,  does  the  scientist,  as  such,  come  to  know? 
As  we  confront  this  methodological  problem,  we  find,  as  in 

Iw  K  /"'^  ""^  ''"'■  ^''^'^"^  investigations,  that  the  po  nts  of 
view  chiefly  represented  may  be  classified  under  an  absolute 
cluahsm  and  the  two  corresponding  one-sided  absolute  monisms 

find  nnT  "''"'  l^^'T^  *^"  "^'"'"'^  methodological  dualism  we 
find  on  the  one  hand  a  rationalistic  absolute  methodological 
momsm,  and  on  the  other  hand  an  empirical  absolute  methodo 
ogical  monism.  The  absolute  dualism  need  not  detain  us  long. 
\\  hat  we  have  in  mind  here  is  simply  the  widespread  doctrine 
each  tr  "h  *"^'"^*h«^«  °f  proof-  radicrUy  different  from 
than  that^r  "''t^^^''  *°  '"^  ^^'"™""  ^^  '^^^^'-^>  other 
or  nrcLf  w'^  "1  '^  "' -^'^^  "'  ^"'^"^^"^^  '°Sieal  ccriainty, 
or  proof.    We  refer,  of  course,  to  deduction  and  induction,  and 


* 


ill 


462 


THE   PROBLEM   OP   KNOWLEDGE 


r 


to  the  common  tendency  to  interpret  the  former  after  the 
manner  of  pure  rationalism  and  the  latter  in  accordance  with 
pure  empiricism.  But  the  question  naturally  arises  as  to  why 
there  should  he  two  ultimately  different  ways  of  doing  one 
thmg.  Unquestionably  dualism  is  to  be  accepted  either  only 
tentatively,  or  only  as  a  last  resort,  because  of  the  failure 
to  establish,  on  sufficiently  critical  grounds,  some  form  of 
monism. 

We  turn  at  once  therefore  to  an  examination  of  certain  views 
which  represent  more  or  less  completely  a  rationalistic  ab- 
solute monism  in  methodology.     The  tendency  of  pre-Kantian 
rationalism  toward  this  extreme  is  now  fully  recognized      Des- 
cartes, dissatisfied  with  all  that  claimed  to  be  science  in  his 
day,  with  the  sole  exception  of  mathematics,  undertook  to  follow 
the  mathematical  model  in  philosophy,  proceeding  bv  careful  de- 
duction from  whatever  premises  should  be  found,  in  spite  of 
the  most  rigorous  criticism,  to  admit  of  no  reasonable  doubt ' 
Spinoza,  an  apt  pupil,  followed  with  his  Renati  des  Cartes  Prin- 
apiorum  philosophi<E  pars  I  el  II.,  more  geonietrico  demonstraice, 
and  his  Ethica,  imhne  geometrico  demonstrata.     And  according 
to  Leibniz,  in  .so  far  as  we  are  empiricists,  which  we  are  in  three- 
fourths  of  our  actions,  we  simply  "act  in  like  manner  as  ani- 
mals' ;    It  is  only  the  knowledge  of  eternal  and   necessary 
truths  {i.e.  truths  arrived  at  by  deduction  from  definitions, 
axioms,    postulates,    and    primary   principles   which   have   no 
need  of  proof)  which  distinguishes  us  from  mere  animals  and 
gives  us  the  sciences. ^ 

During  the  past  f(nv  decades  there  has  appeared,  largely  under 
the  influence  of  the  mathematicians,  a  recrudescence  of  this 
highly  rationalistic  tendency  in  methodology.  One  of  the 
frankest  expressions  of  this  tendency  is  to  be  foun.i  in  the  recent 
essay  on  '<  The  Principles  of  Logic,"  by  Louis  Couturat.  " Dem- 
onstration," this  author  insists,  "consists  in  deducing  from 
given  premhses  or  hypotheses  the  consequences  or  conclusions 
which  they  formally  imply  in  virtue  of  the  laws  of  Logic.  From 
the  algorithmical  point  of  view  it  consists  in  pas.sing  from  prem- 
ises to  conclusions  by  means  of  transformations  permitted 
by  the  laws  of  the  calculus.     There  can  be  no  logical  an.i  correct 

«  Ducour^e  on  Method,  Parts  I  and  II.  .  Monadoloiy,  {}  28-35. 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  SCIENTIFIC  METHOD  463 

demonstration  except  at  this  price;  we  must  not  take  a  sinde 
step  winch  IS  not  ustifiod  by  the  logical  laws:  all  recour  e  'o 
evidence  or  to  'mtuition'  must  be  rigorously  excluded  "  » 
Similarly  Ber,rand  Russell  avers  that  what  is  caHed  induction 
.s  cuhor  dKsgmsed  deduction  or  a  mere  method  of  mak  ng 
plausible  guesses.^  "  In  the  final  form  of  a  perfected  science  "? 
would  seem,"  he  says,  "  that  everj^thing  ought  to  be  deducth^ '"  ' 
Much  ,nore,  then  from  this  point  of  view,  is  the  simple  arithmeti- 
cal  process  of ''demonstrat    ..  by  recurrence,"  which  Poincar^ 

buTtducr  ^"^'^^'  '"'"^'^"'"  '  *^  ''  '-'-'^^  -  -*hing 

af^nZl^'"  '""'^'f  '"-    -^''^^'°S'^«'  d«^trine,  that  no  method 

aLo  .^1  I ''  '  ■  'T^'  ^'^"'^*^""'  ^"^  that  deduction  is 

absolutely  non-empmcal,  independent  of  intuition,^  is  closely 
related  to  recent  developments  of  formal  logic.  We  refer  to 
the  new  "symbolic  logic  "  or  "logistic,"  which  is  offered  as  a 
more  exact  "science  of  logical  form  "  than  the  traditional  svllo- 
gisic  logic  This  symbolic  logic,  it  may  be  noted,  is,  liknthe 
syllogistic  log.c.t  ,s  intended  to  displace,  the  logic  of  consistency 
s  mply ,  ,t  ,s  the  science  of  the  logical  form  of  abstract  science 

Itisthesc.enceof%po/Ac/,raZ/n../A;but,inasmuchasthehypoth- 
esis  in  question  may  be  either  unknown  to  be  true  or  known  to 
be  untrue  it  cannot  be  said  to  be  the  logic  of  truth  The 
8cien.es  whose  procedure  it  describes  assert  implications  rather 
than  facts.  Rea  logic  the  logic  of  real  or  categorical  truth;' 
science."'  '      ''''    ^''™  '^  descriptive,  empirical 

In  sup.ort  of  the  statement  that  recent  deductive  or  rational- 

Vol'.r7fr^'''"^''^'''''°'^''^'"'^''''^'"--^--^i^'>d  by  Winddband  and  Ruge. 

*  Principles  of  Mathcmaticx,  \W,\   p    U 

Ji^^m:pt.'''''^ ''"■""''  "'■''^'^'"'        "^/-^"-'^^^  MctHoainPHi. 

*  Science  and  Hypothesis.  Eng.  Tr.,  1905,  pp.  7_io 

coZyoJ^'  "■  """■  ^**  ^"""''"  "^  ^''"'*^-"'^''^««.  pp.   II,  12.     Tho  view  is 
'  W,.  wo«l.i  roKard  "intuition"  not  .-»«  absolutely  a  priori  i„  the  caso  of  space 
•nd  t^n....  or  anywhor..  .....but  as  relatively  „  priori  and  relativ^reS 

s  .  Ch.  .\\I   .„„™)  ;   so  that,  fron.  our  point  of  view,  the  appeal  direetU  to 
intuition  would  be  nie<liately  to  expennnco.  ^  '" 

'  Cf^  K  B.ieon,  Novum  Organum,  Bk.  I,  Aphorisms  11-14-  J  S   Mill   A  Sua. 
tern  o/Logrc,  Bk.  II,  Ch.  Ill,  §  9  ;  F.  S.  Schiller,  Formal  Lo,ncm'{\.K 


I 


1    1^ 


>• 


ilf 


Mi  1% 

mM  1 


464  THE   PROBLEM   OF   KNOWLEDGE 

istic  monism  in  methodology  is  intimately  bound  up  with  the 
new  forma  logic  we  would  cite  the  opinion  of  Bertrand  Russell 
that  now  "thanks  to  tho  progress  of  symbolic  logic,  especiahv 
as  treated  by  Peano/'  ,ae  Kantian  view  that  ma'thSS 

bv  w^V:  "  fn^''^  'T^''  '"*  '^'"^^^  "-«  "intuitions" 
(by  which  term,  following  Kant,  he  means  the  a  priori  knowl- 
edge of  space  and  time,  whereas  Poincar^  speaks  of  the  intui- 
tion of  pure  number),  is  "capable  of  a  final  and  irrevocable 

Tnd  t::T  "^'  -^'^  'f  P  "^  ''■  ^'"^  P"-'P-  «f  deTctfon 
Z^  If  ""ther  premises  of  a  general  logical  nature,"  he  contin- 
ue^ all  mathematics  can  be  strictly  and  formally  deduced  " » 
^nJH?     '  ^\  ''u  intimated,  abstract  sciences  cannot  be 

said  to  assert  more  than  implications,  or  hypothetical  truths, 
and  if,  consequently,  these  "hypothetical  truths"  (i e  the 
apodosis,  apart  from  the  protasis)  may  be  actually  untrue  we 

srtemTnt"7.V"''''"K  '''''''''  ^"^^*'^"  ^^^  the'^concihalo^ 
statement  of  the  mathematicians,  that  when  mathematicd 
entities  (such  as  non-Euchdean  space  or  numerically  infinite 
collections  are  said  to  exist,  it  is  only  mathematical  or  loS 
ex  stonce,  .e.  freedom  from  contradiction,  that  is  meant.     So 

!'!  '"^  Tl  '^'*  ''"'■''^'  ^"'■'""'  '"^'^  ^^"  t-ke  account  of 
s  concerned    these  entities  may  be  said  to  be  free  from  con- 

ons     But  this  does  not  mean  that  they  can  be  said  to  be 
free  from  contradiction  "  so  far  as  real  logic,  the  logic  of  truth 
IS  concerned      The  descriptive  sciences,   the  logical  form  of 

realitv"!  r";  ""''f^^^  ^«  ^--l>«.  are  always  open  toward 
reality.  All  relevant  truth,  even  that  which  is  still  undiscov- 
ered is  potentially  a  part  of  .such  a  science.  Only  that  then, 
which  IS  in  agreement  with  fact  can  be  said  to  be,  n  rela  ion  to 
the  o  her  parts  of  the  science,  free  from  contradiction  or  to 
have  logical  existence,  so  far  as  the  logic  of  truth  is  con;erned 
nobtwrrn',     ,''''''"  clefinitencss  upon  this  important 

which  Tve   h  r'"  'r'r  ^'^*^"  "'^h  ^he  illustrations  to 

jvhch  we  have  referred.  In  the  geon-etry  of  Bolyai  and 
Lobachevski  the  notion  of  non-Euclidean  or  "curved"  .sp'ce 
.s  introduced  by  the  assumption  that  more  than  one  parallel 

'  Principles  of  Mathematics   d   4      Pf   «•-«,«  j„.  •  y  ^ 

^*^^'^^^^nr,tU.t,r.i..U..^:;X^:.::^T;:^  1««^-  -Hero 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  SCIENTIFIC   METHOD  465 

to  a  given  straight  line  may  be  drawn  through  any  given  point 
Assuming  the  possibility  of  such  a  plurality  of  parallels  through 
a  given  pomt  in  real  space,  then  it  follows  that  real  space  is 
curved  (non-Euclidean) ;  and  so  also  if  it  be  assumed  that 
no  parallel  can  be  drawn.  But  the  question  remains:  Is 
ihere  any  reason  at  all  for  making  such  assumptions  in  a  science 
of  real  space,  and  so  for  supposing  that  real  space  is  non-Euclid- 
ean  ? 

The  case  of  numerically  infinite  collections  is  similar     A 
large  degree  of  abstraction  from  the  concrete  and  empirical 
was  accomplished  by  means  of  Dedekind's  theory  of  number 
according  to  which  the  fundamenf.l  and  original  idea  of  num- 
ber ,s  obtained  by  abstraction  from  all  special  characters,  in- 
cluding quantity,  of  the  group  of  numbered  objects,  with  the 
smgle  exception  of  the  relation  of  order  between  those  objects 
]\unibers  would  then  be  primarily  ordinal,  and  the  cardinal 
number  derivative,  the  result  of  making  an  aggregate  of  num- 
bered objects,  or  of  abstracting  still  further  from  order  •    With 
this  non-quantitativo  view  of  number  there  seemed  to  be  less 
C.11  for  objection,  on  logical  grounds,  to  the  notion  of  series 
and     oilections  numerically  infinite.     The  new  definition  of 
infinite,  anticipated  by  Bolzano,'  and  worked  out  by  Dede- 
kind »  and  Georg  Cantor,"  as  a  collection  which  is  similar  to  a 
proper  part  of  itself,  i.e.  which  is  such  that  its  elements  can  be 
set  out  in  a  relation  of  one-to-one  correspondence  with  those  of 
a  proper  part  of  itself,  was  made  to  seem  a  logicauy  permissible 
concept;    there  could  be  no  objection  in  the  nature  of  any 
intmtion"  of  the  necessarily  finite  character  of  all  quantity 
It  was  regarded  as  quite  demonstrable  that  there  are,  within 
the  realm  of  consistent  mathematical  definitions,  infinite  sys- 
tems, as,  for  example,  one's  own  system  of  possible  thoughts, 

rn,\^'  ^i?^'f'  ^'?  ^'"^  ""^  ^'^  ^'^"^  <^i'  Z^Menf  Nos.  73.  161  •    cf' 

but  JtlthL  ft        u  '  ''r'''"'""''"*-  '"  "'"'''  greater  detail  aad  rigor, 

.n  FrT I  m    r    'Zf''"V°''  '^'  ''"""'^^  °^  °"^-"'^  ""'"bers.  is  to  be  found 
m  Frege  (D^e  Grundlagen  der  Arithmetik,  188 ..  Uc.     Cf,  Whitehead  and  RusseU'. 

'  Paradoxien  des  Unendlichen,  1851.  f  20. 
'Op.  cii.,  .,1,.  04. 

187«"n!"?i;!*?>f '"^'^^"'"'^■''"''''"*''''''"''"  <^'Me'»  Journal,  Vol.  LXXXIV. 
1878,  pp.  242-58.     Cf.  FrcKo.  op.  cit.,  {}  S4-G 

2b 


} 


i 


I     : 


I 


466 


THE   PROBLEM   OP    KNOWLEDOE 


:  (-■>i 


'   :ii' 


inducJing,  as  it  does,  a  thought  about  each  thought  in  the 

Now  this  non-Euclidean  geoniofry  and  mathematics  of  the 
infinite  woud  be  quite  hannless  philosophi.-ally  it  were 
always  c  early  understood  that,  proporlv  sjLking  as  we  h  1 
;"t.mate,l,  and  as  even  Ru.ssell  ren.inds'us  nothing  Tffi 'n  d 
therein  except  imph-eations.^  Rut  besi.Ie  asserth.g  '7  hev 
are  entitled  to  do.  that  the  conclusions  an-  consis  I  t'  vi^h  e 
premises      'logisticians"   ..onunonly   assume   that     here   was 

m   S  7"    '  •  "''^■•"•^•-'>'^'''  -  ^^-  '-tial  ..ssmnpt  on "f  t"o 
parallels  to  a  giv(<n  straight  line  through  one  and  the  same 

nfimte  system.      t  is  assumed  that  there  can  be  no  objection 
to    he  assertion  that  non-Euclidean  or  "curv.Hl"  space  ex   ts 
or  that  there  exist  numerically  infinite  series  and  a,lle(^ions 
P  oyuled  It  be  un.lerstood  that  existence  means  lo^   a     xi ": 

"  that'l       /•""    -ntradiction.3    This   accounts   for     he 

TA    ,  r  ^      ^'  ^"  whether  or  not  real  space  is  non- 

uc  idean  and  as  to  whether  or  not  there  exis^  inSe  ed"- 
on^    It  has  become  the  fashion,  under  the  influence  of  logi  - 

-c,  to  maintain  that  perhaps,  even  though  the  finest  nractfcal 

Tstpr  in:r™^^  '^"  ^"  '''■' ' ''-  ^siightLrrson 

.suppose  ,t,  real  space  may  nevertheless  be  "curved"  or 
<f  Euclidean,  of  more  than  three  dimensions 
But  let  us  t^ako  gc-omctry  as  a  science  of  real  soace      And 

S  r  lonA^^T       ""  ':  ""  ""■^"^'^^'  ^«'"  ^h-  -sumption  of 
either  non-Euchdean  or  four-din.ensional  space,  space  must 

Uedekind,  op.  cil    \n  fir.  ■   ,.f   n  i 

MetM  ^n'p.,-i,;  cl^r^^^^t^r  n  """'  "•"^'''  "^  "  "'"''  "''  ^"^''^'^ 
specially  pp.  501-14  A  furt  hor  r„I,t  vT'  "f  "■"•  ';  '^"•"^'^'"""ry  Essay. 
i=*  soeu  in  the  doctrine  th\  tho  n,  n  7  \'\  '"'"'  ^"""  "^l"-ri<'»ood  reality 
matios  begins  are  rlJ^Z^r??""^'' ""'""'  ""'  "^^'-^  Pure  n^athl 
Poincar6..So,>„«w.C^rf?rTfil    m-oT''       '  '"*'    '^''"'"'    *°    ''^ 

£'»«aj,«,  p.  2.TO.  •''^'^'    "'"'«'«   Jamca    and    Other 

•Royre,   World  and  the  Individual,  I    n    511    nr>t„  ■      f    n  • 
Milhode,  p.  1G2.  '  """'^    "^f-  Poincarfi,  Science  ct 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  SCIENTIPIC  METHOD         467 

be  rcRardod  as  Euclidean  and  simply  tridimensional.     On  this 
basis  It  becomes  clear  that  the  hypothesis  of  more  than  one 
parallel  to  a  given  straight  line  through  a  given  point  leads  to 
absurdity.     It    mtroduces  into   the  intended   science  of  real 
space  an  element  of  mutual  contradiction  between  propositions. 
Ihe  hypothesis  must  therefore  l)e  rejected  as  untrue.     And  so 
we  would  claim  to  he  justified  in  contradicting  the  assertion 
that   so  far  as  we  can  say,  space  is  as  likely  as  not  either  non- 
Euclidean  or  four-dimensional.     For  such  an  assertion  there 
has  been  found  not  a  single  good  reason.     The  theorv  has  not 
oven  been  shown  to  he  a  necessary  postulate  of  ''practical 
reason.       As  a  scientific  hypothesis  it  grossly  violates,  as  we 
have  seen,   the  princ-iple  of  parsimony.     It   runs  counter  to 
practical  need,  to  common  sense,  and  to  immediate  intuition. 
Ihe  only  thing  that  can  he  said  for  the  new  geometries  is  that 
they  show  that  it  is  hypothetically  true  that  space  is  either 
curved  or  of  four  dimensions;  i.e.  space  is  of  this  sort,  if  some- 
thing  IS  true,  which,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  we  are  certain  enough 
lor  all  practical  purposes,  is  untrue. 

And  .so  also  with  regard  to  the  notion  of  infinite  collections. 
JNot  only  do  we  not  know  that  there  are  such  collections  •  the 
notion  Itself,  we  would  say,  is  unscientific  and  -  in  our  view 
of  logic  as  being  properly  the  logic  of  truth  and  not  of  mere 
consistency -illogical.     In  the  first  place,  to  assume  such  a 
collection  violates  the  principle  of  parsimony;    no  one,  so  far 
as  we  know,  has  experienced  such  a  collection,  nor  is  there  any 
scientific    need    of   assuming    it.     Moreover,    experience    and 
rational  intuition,"  when  we  are  suf^ieiently  critical,  disallow 
the  notion.     An  infinite  collection,  if  there  could  he  such  a 
thing,  would  he  a  collection  such  that  adding  to  it  would  not 
Hicrease  it,  an<l  subtracting  from  it  would  not  diminish  i^ 
But  we  know,  by  intuition  capable  of  enduring  the  severest 
criticism,  that  there  can  be  no  such  collection.     Other  condi- 
tions remaining  the  same,  "adding  to"  involves  "increasing"  • 
and  so  the  definition,  when  the  meaning  of  its  terms  is  considered 
is  seen  to  he  simply  self-contradictory.     Expressing  the  defini' 
tion  m  ordinal  terms  does  not  help:    an  ordinal  number,  as 
defined  by  logisticians,  is   the  whole  series  from  the  first  up 
to  that  number  taken  in  that  order,  so  that  it  really  involves 


I] 


-I. 


r  1  ;■ 


!  i 


468 


THE   PROBLEM  OP   KNOWLEDGE 


a  corresponding  cardinal  mimhni.      t*  • 

that  the  number  of    e!    nZ  "  "°"""°"'>'  ^^PPo^-od 

from  «ny  Irr  „"  "on     r*''?":  "  .*«"'»'""%   <lijrere«t 
"abstract  science"  is  to  ho V.      f  .  "^'^   ^^°"^   '•'^^"t^' 


Dertdhca 


i>...2,pru?7.  "^""   ^'    ''^'''"'^-  ''^-   '^-^-^.  201-3.  212-13 

-tod  in  dofonding,  «u.  h    a"     t    'onnr  .""I'- "'■'''^  *'""  Philosopher  is  intor- 

Ar,nUc.t:n7t^:^^  tr"'^;^''/«;,^V.  190..  pp.  42-57;  n. 
pp.  85-94 ;iWi«,  in  ^uma^wm;  pp.  8.  9  "'*'•    ^^^^'^  ««'"'"'"'". 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  SCIENTIPir  METHOD  469 

to  reality  as  experienced,  ami   verified.   Sefore  they  can  be 
logically  regarded  as  true  of  rnalifv      iv  i         , 

c,™(,»c  pr„cc».    This  dUtinclion  m.y  oarilyT  ^rtsl  Jl 
far  however,  no  ,l™„„„„,i„„,  ,„  „„L  J„,  i^^Xl^ 

LogBt,,.,  though  ,t  ,.|„i,_,^  ,^  ^,^_^^^._^ 
odo  ogy  tarn,  o„,  i„doc<l  „„  e W  scrutiny,  ,„  be^  a  n-S 
at  all.     It  ,s  a  sconce  of  certain  hypothetical  objects  Xect 

o^-aiLLiy  lo  merit  the  appe  lation  "nossihlo"     n„t  „i      / 
another  side  we  find  thelin.  of  thf^lianfe  t t^ag^T 
Russell  seems  to  regard  all  sciences  as  merely  apphed  Se 
-  log. Uc  with  the  x's  and  y'.  replaced  by  hydrogen  Ind  ca'rbon 

of  t^i  stemari:  '"  "'\"""  "  '°^^^^'^-     «"^  ^  -aminltbn 

"  mp  icattn  •     rr'.      "'  "'"'  '^  '^«'^^'^'^"^'  ^°^  '"stance 
implication,       wo  find  reason  to  suspect  that  the  logisticians' 
systematic  connections  have  suffered  an  abstractir.n    «n 

deahnrUh     "''T^  ''  ^"""^^"«"  -^-"^  -ces^  ,^' 

^r  :"i;m::;Sedt::^^'-- ---^^^^^^ 

any  appeal  to  "intuition,"  and  so,  ultimately,  to  experlce 

funZlnf.f  ^^"'^^"^"''^f  ^he  list  of  twenty  principles  and 
fundamental  premises,  which  were  supposed  to  be  adequate 
as  a  basis  for  mathematics,  has  been  greatly  revL^ed  byThe 

'  System  of  Logic,  Bk.  II   Ch   III 

•  My  attention  has  been  caUed  to  this  point  by  Dr.  H.  T.  Costello. 


i 


f  i 


470 


THE    PFtOBLKM   OP   KXOWLKOOK 


m  Pi 


h'n 


i» 


author  -  a  fact  win..}.  mniUl  s,.,.,,.  t.,  uu\ivaU>  that  tho  nroco8.sca 
of  snonn.  ar.  ,,..t  so  p.rdy  .l.^hu-tiv..  as  was  supposc-d      (CI« 
rrm.,ulc.,l    u.  this  .-onrH.-tio,,  of  Poi.u-ar.'.-.s  <-ritk-isn     that  no 
-  y  do  th.-  in,lo,„onst,ahl.  propositions  assunu.!  a    Jh    outse 

that  thrso  or.K.nai  ap,M.als  to  intuitio,,  .r.  th.  last  that  wil I  b^ 
necssary  for  n.ath,.,uati,.s..     Not  only  is  "th.  nrinciX.rr  m 

F'l"t.«  nuiuction,"  a .niinR  to  Poinoa'r^^   "  at '  m .   n  ?' 

;;..•    ;nath...ati..ian   and  'irroduX't.  t^''   "T^S.^ 

-     n«u.  .ts..if  is  sfril..,  until  fortili..d  ./i„t,;itio^.  ^^ 
tlK    .n  .rr  an,  ..as.s  ,t  ,s  al>l,.  to  onKond.r  tho  antinon.y>        ^ 

\\v  would  th,.,.fon.  hav,.  to  rojec-t  as  antonahl.-  wha   wo  havo 
rallo,!   rationahst.o  al,sohit<.   n>othodolod<-al   nionisn,    ,1    T 

t-i.-noy  to  hold  that  PU.0  doduotion,  ^Hi:'::;7;j:i.^ 

howovor  nuHhatoIy.  upon  oxp<.ri..noo.  an.l  this  alono,  is^uatc' 

«hat  IS  logioally  pos>u.lo.  Crantod  such  depondonce  UDon 
exponenco  or  "appoal  to  intuition"  as  may  bo  found  neccss^ 
m  deduction,  wo  would  a.lnut  that  tho^oductho  scioneeT 
howovor  abstract,  .lo  givo  us  knowlclgo  of  in.plicatior  an d 

t.on  tho  results  can,  without  dog.natisn,,  bo  taken  as  vid  of 
mediately  oxpononcod  indopondoiu  reality 

h..  .no,„phy.,oal  doelri,,,..    The  ,ru,h,  in  hi  ,h™ry,t  the 


•i  ''] 


m:-} 


'^•¥ 


i.^:^ii 


THR  PROBLEM  OP  SCIENTIFIC  METHOD         471 
c'oncrctp  univcrsul,  i.e    tho  VV'nrl.l  #^r  d     r* 

;;;.*;  an.,  .H,;„„K*.r;;,::.t:'^,;-;rxz^^ 

lU'jility,   pliilosoM  IV  seeks   to   mw«..««      r'u^  ^"""imo 

Absolute  Idea  is  attained  -  "*'' 

the     alc^fc,  a.  McTa,«art  actually  .,.;./«,«  it,  i,  , "  .j;,,  T 
ndep«,de.U  of  empirical  data;    tho  higho^  syntl.   i-l^idC 
taken  m  each  c.     fro,n  the  fund  of  gone"  1  knolle- ,  J".         t  " 


Seo  X  M.  E.   McTaggart.  St,uiie. 
negeluxn  Cosmology. 


in  the  Hegelian  Dialec 


*  Ui.dte8   ;'.i 


472 


THE   PROBLEM  OF  KNOWLEDGE 


li   ? 


W.  ; 


grown  out  of  past  experience.     Even  "becoming"  refuses  to 

W'-lt  i  rr/rM  --P--^-^  "being-  anXt 
being  ,  ,t  Ks  plucked  fresh  from  the  fields  of  direct  intuition  of 
mmediate  experience.     But,  on  the  other  hand,  thelZuc 

I?af  ^h^Sr"''^'^-  ''  '  '""'r'  ""^  ^'^'^^^""^^  -"'^  so- 
Jead  the  thmkor,  as  may  readily  be  imagined,  into  a  barren 

desert   of  meaningless  abstractions.     Our  conclusion,  then  Is 

that  a  rationalistic  absolute  monism  in  methodology   aiming 

whether  as  deductive  science  or  dialectical  philosophy    oTcape 

an  dependence  upon  experience  for  either  InventiL  or  veS 

We  shall  now  turn  to  an  examination  of  empirical  absolute 
momsm  m  methodology.     The  empiricist  movement  througt 
out  the  history  of  modern  philosophy  has  been  primarily  method- 
ological in  interest.     The  course  of  its  history,  however  may 
be  viewed  as  exhibiting,  twice  over,  the  tenden  y  to  pass  from 
the  original  methodical  appeal  to  experience,  with  full  confidenc^ 
m  the  power  of  thought  adequately  to  interpret  this  exper^^^^^^^^^^ 
to  a  po.sition  of  scepticism  with  reference  to  the  value  of  thTugh; 
for  knowledge  and  an  abandonment  to  the  immediate  data  o 
experience.     The  iust  of  these  movements  is  that    ron  Bacon 
to  Hume;  the  secon.l,  that  from  Comte  to  Bergson      Between 
Hume  and  Comte  stands  Kant,  siding  for  the  most  part  w1  h 
he  empiricists  as  against  dogmatic  rationalists,  inZfaTas 

of  Hul      r,r"-^'-  '"^  P^'-^^^'"^  "^  "^^th  the  sceptt 
cism  of  Hume  and  the  positivism  to  be  developed  by  Comte 

rancis  Bacon,  reacting  from  the  oxperienceKlefying  specu- 

ative  dogmatism  of  the  scholastics,  set  up  as  the  ideaf  for  the 

thinker  an  unbiassed  and  methodical  investigation  of   he  laws 

of  nature,  with  a  view  to  mastery  over  the  forces  of  naturT 

i^TrST  ''  '"''f'-'l  "^  "'-'  insignificant  iitTtanTe 

latl  tho  "'"'^'?^  "■'^'^  '^'  P«^^^^^'«"  «f  the  "novum 
organum  the  new  inductive  method  of  investigation  The 
empirical  method  of  the  "interpretation  of  nature."  he  cornpaTed 

e^Us     vhe  P„    ..       ""''••^f.t'^^d  man  is  able  to  obtain  good 

resu  ts,  whereas  the  rationalistic  dogmatist,  pretending  to  an 

an   cipat.on  of  nature"  by  means  of  thougM  alont  'to  bo 

likened  to  a  draughtsman  who  may  be  more  talented  and  expert! 


'yw:f^hmM 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  SC/ENTIFIC  METHOD         473 

but  who  obtains  inferior  results,  because  he  is  comoeUed  to 
operate   without   instruments.     Indeed,   in   view  oT^atle'^ 

s/oti^^irt  '"-'r'-'  ''^-^'y  ornatr^tru 

fortrou;r^^^^^^^^^^  progress  .learning  is  to  be  looked 

induction^  ascendinTt7axio.sTor^^^^^^^^ 
eStsr™^  so  constructed  descending^gaint' pTrtic^Sa!: 

Bacon's  advocacy  of  empirical  methods  was  verv  timelv 
but  his  methodology  was  too  one-sided    in  that  hT  ^'T^l 
sufficiently  recognize  the  fact  which  ist  fuirof  dYffic    t^^^^  Z 
extreme  empinnst,  that  there  are  "certain  concepS  order 
systems  whose  exactness  of  structure  far  transcenSln  Wea  ' 

airly  dealt  with  in  our  constructive   undertaking    T„  the 
extreme  empiricism  and  consequent  scepticism  of  Hume  we  see 
by  way  of  contrast,  how  indispensable  to  scienceTthrcon 
structive  activity  of  reason.  ^°"" 

Comte's  positivism  deliberately  aimed  to  turn  away  from  all 
dogmatic  speculations  concerning  what  is  beyond  thT realm  o 
experience,  and  to  confine  intellectual  efforti  a  2p^e    cl^en 
fie  description  of  the  phenomenal  and  verifiable.  Xaphys-" 
s  he  regarded  as  a  vain  attempt  to  support  thefaS L 
s    uctures   of  traditional    theology,   fast   toppling  under  the 
attacks  of  the  empirical  sciences.     With  the  progress  of  indue 
.ve  science,  metaphysics  becomes  more  absTa^  eek  „„  to 
explain  phenomena  by  abstract  substances  or  e  sence     and 
events  by  final  causes.     The  final  stage  of  metaphysical  th^ult 
^s  reache,!  when  events  are  explained  as  being  cause    by  nature 
and  natural  causes;    whereas  in   the  final  state  nftril! 
nothing  will  be  attempted  beyond  a  fLfii^nof  1  twTot 

103.  iS""  '^'^'"""-  ''"''"""•  '""»   ""^   '•   "Pho-n^s   1-3.  9-14.  ,9-21.  20-30. 


If 


Jl 


'I 


;»); 


h 


474 


THE   PROBLEM  OF   KNOWLEDGE 


phenomena  on  the  basis  of  a  simple  generalizing  description  of 
the  facts  of  oljservation  and  experiment.' 

John  Stuart  Mill  made  important  contributions  to  the  tech- 
niquc  of  mduction,  to  .ome  of  which  we  must  presently  refer- 
but  he  ,s  unportant  in  this  inunediate  connection  as  marking  a 
rather  dose  approximation  to  what  we  have  styled  an  empirical 
absolute  .nomsm  in  methodology.     Influenced  by  the  English 
tradition  of  empiricism  and  by  the  positivism  of  Comte,  as  well 
as  directly  by  the  rapidly  developing  empirical  sciences,  he 
undertook  to  construct  a  logic  in  which  induction,  as  the  process 
of  infcronco  from  particulars  to  particulars,  should  appear  as 
the  only  scentihc  method.     "  Deduction  "  is  still  recognized  but 
only  as  the  process  of  reading  off  the  signs  pr  viously  employed 
to  register  former  inferences  from  particulars  to  particulars 
Ratiocination  is  simply  the  interpretation  and  application  of 
mductions  ;   the  syllogism  can  do  no  more  than  dole  out  driblets 
of  old  knowledge  as  they  may  be  needed ;  it  always  involves  a 
bogging  of  the  question  and  can  never  lead  to  anv  really  new 
knowledge.     The  ",ie,luctive  sciences,"  such  as  arithmetic  and 
geometry,  are  really  inductive ;    they  differ  from  the  obviorislu 
mduct.ve  sciences  in  that  they  confin.-  themselves  to  interpret- 
ing old  inductions,  without  needing  to  resort  to  new  observa- 
tion and  experiment.     Their  theorems  are  necessary  truths 
only  in  the  sense  of  necessarily  following  from  hypotheses. 
The  axioms  employed,  many  of  them  surreptitiously  or  uncon- 
sciously, are  all  experimental  truths,  inductions  from  the  evi- 
dence of  the  senses.     The  dofinitions  are  mere  verbal  proposi- 
tions, explanations  of  the  meaning  of  a  name,  together  with  an 
impied  assumption  of  the  existence  of  things  corresponding 
to    hem;  in  other  words,  they  are  axioms  also,  ol.l  inductions 
in  disguise.* 

There  is  much  in  Mill's  doctrine  that  is  suggestive  and  at 
least  partially  justified;    bu*  his  general  position  undoubtedly 
calls  for  criticism.     Familiar  illustrations  from  common  life 
such   as   that   of  the  startling  discovery,   in   the   well-known 
anecdote,  that  since  the  abba's  fiisl  penitent  was  a  murderer 
and  since  a  certain  nobleman  was  the  abbe's  first  penitent,  that 

■  Court,  iVunv  iihihmphir  pnsitii;-.  pansim. 

'.4  Syah-m  nf  Logic.  lik.  I,  C:h.  8;    Dk.  II,  Chs.  1-6. 


t^--i»i^:^m 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  SCIENTIFIC  METHOD  475 

2n7Z7n   '*;  'r  I'''''^'-^  '  "'''"''''''  «h«-  that  deduction 
can  of  It.  elf  lead  at  tmies  to  important  new  knowledge     More- 
over, the  constantly  increasing  body  of  new  knowledge  concern 
jng  log.cal  and  mathematical  relationships  is  furtherpresump-' 
ive  evidence  of  the  fecundity  of  deduction.     And  if  indeed  U 
hou Id   urn  out  to  be  a  tenable  position  that  there  is  throughou 
the  deductive  sciences  a  constant  dependence  upon  empirica 
verification   or  certainty,  still,  in  the  light  of  the  achieTement 

e1s:S''tr\rn^  '^'^^"'^"'^'^  '""^^  ^^  ™-h  ^-  -bvil 
Seller  M-  ^^.^'  V^"PP«««^-'     The  further  question  as  to 

vhe  her  Mill  is  right  in  reducing  definitions  to  axioms    or 
Couturat  in  reducing  axioms  to  definitions,  or  whether  both  are 
wron      ,,,    hall  reserve  for  consideration  in  the  colt  uctv 
part  of  our  discussion. 

nniv  tf  ""^''r^'"^'''"'"  '^y'^'>y'^'  "that  the  mystics  are  the 
only    horoughgoing  empiricists  in  the  history  of  philosophy.'  ' 
The  truth  of  this  statement  may  not  be  very  obvious  in  the 
case  of  religious  mysticism,   but   the  fundamental  features  of 
Bergsons  philosophy  would  indicate  that  at  the  extrem     o 
methodological  empiricism  we  are  bound  to  find  a  theoretica 
mysticism.     Nor  are  we  likely  to  find  in  recent  philosophy  a 
more  pronounced  example  of  empirical  absolute  m^thodolog  cal 
monism  than  in  the  methodological  doctrine  of  BergsonTm 

practice.  No.  only  is  deduction  incompetent,  according  to 
ultimT'l  ^7"  "'  ^'""'"'  knowlclgo  about  that  which  is 
Bo  httlll  T  '.  ''""  '"^^"''''""  •'  ""^  sufficiently  empirical, 
soace  t  .'  ''"""''''  "''  ^'^P^"'^^"t  upon  our  intuition  of 
space,  as  1.  also  even  our  idea  of  number;  but,  inasmuch  -. 
space  and  the  spatial  world  are  to  some  extent  constructs  oi 
fimte  intelligence  (although  having  also  something  to  do  with 
the  development  of  intellectual  forms),  neither  logical  process 
can  be  depended  upon  for  knowledge,  because  both  t e'nd  in! 
evitably  to  spatialize  the  reality  with  which  they  deal.  Only 
pure  perception  "  and  other  modes  of  intuition  such  as  we 

'  Russell,  Principles  o/  Mathematics,  1,  pp.  .3  4   10   lOf,  17'<-^  4=;?  s     d 
Sources  of  Heliaious  Insi^kt.  pp.  94-6.  OhT  H^J^m   "I;J^^  ;:t:*  S^  /  #°'^™' 
pp.  -ll-i;^,  24f)-9  "tj'ft  uunu^t  ii.f,i  utn^r  Essays, 

'  The  World  and  the  Irtdividual,  I.  p.  81. 


'^\0^M¥\ 


J 


476 


THE   PROBLEM   OP   KNOWLEDGE 


.  ■' '  f 


(hm;; 


i.;i 


stcppmg-stone  to  intuition.    Even  scionr^t  i?.  K    ,        '^  ,^  " 

:L-^-;.-rrt;„^~2^^^ 

Pirlca,  torn,  ot  7Z,:lo^'^   IC "^  itut'f  '""  '"- 

monism  by  J.  H  Toinca^.       v    '"*''"""'''  '""thodological 

.o  the  mo[hodologic„"l^sition  :  Ka'n  '.TT^  "'  """'  '*' 
vain  t„  looic  within  thrii'T,!  °  t  u-  '^  "'"'=  "  """W  ■» 
vcy  satirfaotoiy  i]l«ra™on  o  th,  f"?  ''""^'"  '"'  ""^ 
seems  to  bo  ilemandml  n  r,^  ,  ,  ""''''  """'"n  "W* 
theory  of  Pofnertlll  STii  Z  "'°1'""  "'  '"^ 
Kanfs  doetrine  are  borne  in  mind  °  °""°  '""""'»  "' 

of  such  synthetic  activitv  in  T^  u  '^"«^>edge-value 
accepted  it  at  all  nnl  ~.u-  I'''  ^'  ^'  '^"  '^'^  ^^'^  to  have 
experSce  ''  S  i;;,rl''  ^f '"  *'/  ''"^^^  ^'  "P^^^'^le  human 
acL  humantSn^r^Het^J^L  ^JirV^^^^ 

object  o?:S:i tett::^!^^^^^^^^^  the 

struct,  essentiany  diffe  Jt  in^nsZL^ertlr  ^e" 


'' «... ; «'  • 


'7^r'~. 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  SC,ENT,P,C  METHOD  477 

pertenco.    It  bocoTo      °        '^      raw-material  of  human  ex- 

and   for  human   consf.in.,c  ''^  '^^'''■''  ^'^  '"^al  only  in 

through  theZ:ZClSy^:^i  "*"'l°^  ''°^^'^'^'  -^ 
not  knowledge,  but  melelv  „T.?^  ""?^"  *''°"«'^*'  ^«  have 
for  even  .o  liule  L TsVere  ^^^^  T'"'"*  '"  '^^  ^"*  ^^ 
mental  activity  to  vvork'ntn  I  .    '  ^'  '""^^^hing  for  the 

or,  at  the  very  leLrtemnl,       'S'         ''"'  """''"^'^  "^  ^'^"««' 
from  o.r  point  oHifSr  T/'''  "'"*"'^'«'^"  ^^h'^h 
evident  that  the  cations  S  t  '  ''"P^"'"'^'  ^'  "^^'^  ^e 

f-n  reality  and  frrk^lelgeTitTev  "'  'T  ^^'"^^^^ 
out  of  materials  produced  bv  th.  . !  ^.  ^^  """^  ^''^^  ^^^e 
enable  us  to  know  ^      '  '"^^'^^  ^^^^  ^«"Jd  be  and 

istltra'sancli'^^^^^^^^^^  T  ""'''^'^'^^y  ^«  -cerned, 
deduction,  for  the^  „T  sucr^T'/  h"' »^  '^'"'^^  "^^^ 
available;  but  inasmuch  ^  the  Kpr^''^^^  "^^ '«  humanly 
knowledge,  but  somSh  ngthich  af  th"'^''"  Z''  ^''  '^  "°* 
goes  by  that  name  obvfouTiv  Tn  Tu  ^''  ^'^'"^  ^^'^"^ble, 
considerations  are  ;f  1!^^^  *^'  "^^  ^"  methodologica 
deduction  are    in  the    at  '""T""'''    ^''^  induction  and 

We  may  say,  tC,  1     t  tl  ,eT  ft^tr  Y^'^^'^"^^^^  ^"*''^- 
what  uo  would  call  a  critioT.  '"tended  to  .eave  room  for 

and  while  this  ^^   qu^  ^1"^  w^r^^^^^^      methodology, 
monism,'  it  was  obscured  a„dlr       'T'*''^^' P^'-^^Pt^al 

genetic  dualism  to  ^^^TLt.TJ:r7l^^^^^^^  't'  t"'"^^ 
epistemological  dualism  3  nr  h         ^'^'^.'^'^^d,^  and  by  his  absolute 

and  a„  idefl.tiel-SeXtCS  '^"""'  "■^'  ■-"- 
•o^I^aVTSSt-:  tr^  -e„  maae  .„  tHe  p.. 
ogree,  are  those  of  Poincar,'  R,?  r  j  *^'  f  """^  """W 
-ponding  to  .he  KaTt  a  H^'  rZtW  '"^  ™'- 
Pnon  possible?  has  been  hnn^f  synthetic  judgments  a 

and  absolute  certltvTn  "1  T""*  ^''  '^'  ""^°"  ^^  "«-«Ity 
this  problem  JSJ^^J^^'^'"'^^^-  '"^  ^^^^  he  .tateJ 
-  See  Ch  XV  ■  ''"'''  possibility  of  the  science  of 


1    tl 


'S«eCh.XV..v;,.a.  •  See  Ch.  XVI.  ,„p.a. 


•  Cf.  Ch.  II,  supra. 


478 


THE   PROBLEM  OF   KNOWLEDGE 


pis 


n  m 


:h 


rnathcinaticvs  seems  an  insoluble  contradiction.     If  this  science 

1       1  '"h")  now  IS  It  that  niathemat  PS    «  nnt 

mluoe,    ,0  an  i„„„e„Ho  ,a„.„loKy?".    .Ma.homarca  phy,™ 
(oo,  w„  ,  ,„  ,,,„,„,,,.  j,„|„„„„„  „       .,„    .,      fee,  1"^^ ^'^' 

•ire  capihlc  of  dofinito  verification  or  refutation.  The  latter 
cannot  be  completely  verified,  nor  can  they  be  refuted  b"t 
being  more  or  less  convenient  as  guides  to  action  they  aret 
be  regarded  as  thought-constructs  which  are  merely  useful 
and  concerning  which  all  questions  of  truth  or  fat  y  are  re  ' 
evant_     He  mentions  another  c-lass,  viz.  "  natural  hypotheses  ' 

seem  t^::  thev"'  ''^'"^  l^'r"'  '"  "'^  '"■^•■"^^'-«'  -'  '^ -uld' 
seem  that  they  are  simply  hypotheses  which  would  come  within 

the  terms  of  the  definition  of  conventions,  but  wh  ch  iV  ^ems 

necessary  to  interpret  not  as  for  that  rea;on  neither  true  n^ 

^^:f:^s:nf  ^^"^ -^  - -----'^'-^  co:;^ 

Among  the  conventions  he  would  include  definitions  although 
of  course  definitions  are  not  arbitrary  convention      butlhe 

rafthrdX';i:L''""r"^'""^  ''''^'-  ^^^"''^  -t?„tL: 

that  the  definit  on  implies  an  a.xiom,  a  statement  about  existence 
Poincard  would  admit  only  when  "existence"  is  defined tthe 

.  Science  'a,^  hJIJ^^.  ^Zl     ""  ""'""""''  ''"«•  '"'•  ^- '■ 
'  lb.,  pp.  W,  29.  etc 

'lb.,  Introdurtion   (by    Rovop)    "nn     xvi     „;,.       „j      , 
VaihinKer-B  distinction    b-twoon    ••hvpot";,."    '    T      r?   ''^•.  ^-'^^    "'• 


fm^m^^^m^w 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  SCIENTIFIC  METHOD         479 

purely  logical  sense  of  freedom  from  contradiction.'    But  what 
he  ,s  especmlly  concerned  to  urge  is  that  the  first  princ"pirs  o 
geometry  are  mere  conventions  -  not  arbitrary,  Leedbut 
smiply  convenient,  and  neither  true  nor  falseJ    Wt  from 
such  anthmetical  processes  as  may  be  involved,  those Ixbm^ 
winch  have  nothing  to  do  with  space,  but  are  purelv  analv'ca 
propositions,.^  the  axioms  of  Euclidean  geometrv,  it 'is  deciared 
are  shown  by  the  developn.ents  of  non-Euclidean  sy    em"  to ^ 
no    synthetic  a  priori  judgments,  nor  yet  experimental  flcts 
but  snnply  the  most  convenient  of  many  logically  possible  sets 
of  conventions,  or  disguised  definitions.^    Our  .space  of  three 
dimen.sions  has  simply  been  impo.sed  by  ourselves  upon  nature 
because  of  its  comparative  convenience ;  and  the  .same  tWng  is 
asserted  o   time.^     Es.sentially  the  same  position  is  taken  "vVh 
reference  to  mathematics,  phy.sics.     The  special  princ  pJof 
mechanics^  reduc.  in  the  ..st  analysis  to  a  mere  convent  on 

hand  tL't      "  '''  "''^  ^^  ""'^^'  ^^^^'^"^^  -  -«  -tain  bel: 
hand  that  no  experiment  can  over  contradict  it.     More  expl C 

t^^i^'t  °'  ''^  T-^""^'""  "^  '^^'^y  -'--  "he 

because  of  its  practical  convenience.     Even  the  Copernican 
a  tronomy  is  to  be  preferred  to  the  Ptolemaic,  not  as  a.^  Truer 
but  simply  as  more  convenient."  ' 

There  are  very  evident  suggestions  here,  it  mav  be  remarked 
of  a  certain  type  of  pragmatism,  or  qua-si-pragm^atisir^a^d  ^ 
—late  empiricism,  or  some  form  of  ps/cholgica  lideahs  m  I 
Bo  h  the  pragmatism  and  the  idealism  are  avow,.!  in  he 
De  meres  Pensees.^  Poincard  has  been  careful  to  insist  that 
scence  is  an  end  as  well  as  a  means,-  and  that  it  r^Z  ^4 
genuine  Knowledge,  foresight,  as  otherwise  it  would  noTbe  ev  n 
useful."    But  even  with  these  safeguards  the  idealistic  pragma- 

'  Science  et  Milhode,  pp.  139,  161-2. 

» Science  and  Hyrmthenis.  p.  .3    f'hs    III-V  ■    Th^  v  i        ^  c  ■ 
IV;   Science  et  AUihode.  Bk.  II,  Ch.  I  '  ^  <^>'^  <>/ Science,  Chs.  Ill, 

'  Science  and  HyputUeaiH,  n.  29  <  tl 

'  The  Value  of  Science,  p.  13  ■'  of  Ch   II  •    Sr,V„.       '^  « '    '^^'  ^^'  ^^• 

'Science  and  Hypotkesl  C^.VUVIu\^"::T^^  ''•  ^'■ 

Value  of  Science,  Chs.  V-IX.  espeoially  p  76  '  ""■       '  ''''  '''~'""'    ^^' 

'  See  Ch.  XVIII,  suma  »  Spo  ri,   vr 

■•  TKe  Value  of  ScieZv^.  8,  9.     '  ""'•  ^''  *""'"„  ,,.,  p'  \%''^^'  »"-8- 


m 

II 

■h 

'ffl 

1 

.[  iHlf 

m  ' 

i^ 

480 


THE   PROBLEM  OP  KNOWLEDGE 


II 


of  soicnL      wl  ?  "  ">  I'll'BiMe  mcaninB  to  thf  ol.jcctivitv 

.h.  only  element  of  t Txp  "j:    7;™r  "'  "■"«'"™»  »"= 
™»J.  an.  that  .He.  a.,  L  JC'::!.:;'-!:^  XS 

vc^rirpa^T:,'::::^  •;;-r's™;r  ■""""  ■"■°"  "-" 

auction  which  malio,  u,  exl    ti;         ?        '''■"  '""'"  ">"  '"' 

certain.  Hence  the  important  r6e  i he  T"  ^'  "^'^'"''"•^'^^ 
plays  in  the  physical  sciences  "a  t  ho  "  ."  5  Probabihty 
in  order  to  eliminate  uncertalntv  jV  Tf' ^'^^'^' ""''"^^'^"*' 
our  generalizations  tn^-h?      ?       completely  as  possible  from 

attaching  to  the  noveltief  "vS  It  'hr™''''' ''"''''■"'y 
mathematics.     To  explain  Ihlp  x  appearance  in 

.he  procedure  of  Tatltl"    "r  ZTZt'  ^'''"' 

'•-.™"aJ:n=:tTcir.:t!;L.ranS^^^^ 

'  rAe  raiuc  of  Science,  pp.  l.3.r,_w  ,  „  . 

'  The  Value  of  Science    r.n    4  f.  ■   "i-   •  .  "''"■''  "'"'  hypothesis,  p.  4 

p-.e  point,  ou;  that ;:.  ::„^  ;,'7;::;-;;;f  ^'^t •  '^"-  '-'«•  ^"^-'^  '•  «• 

faot,s  of  detern.inato  ......tituti,  a    U  w       h        •"'".'"^'""-^  -oncrninK  a  set  of 

ol.sorv.  their  ..o„«,itutio„  a,ul  , e ne   .hz         :7\/""  '"""''''  "'  »'""  ^''-^tion, 
the  possible  samples  whieh  a    "ee  wi  h  t h  '^  ■""'  "'"'  ''"'  ''  "^  '""•""- 

numerous  than  those  whieh  disajeo     "l"  ""'•''"*':':""  "f  the  whole  are  more 


^*f^ 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  SCIEXTIPIC  METHOD         481 

upon  an  intuition  of  a  special  sort,  viz.  the  intuition  of  pure 
number,  wh.oh  can  never  lead  us  astray,  however  far  we  mav 
S     Xr"f '-.hased  upon  it/'xhe  de^Inden^up:^ 

ritr: '''"'  ^"'' '"'-  ^-'  -^^'  ^-c^r:Lz:aT.: 

ha     o  sav  ^^  "T/,"  •"""  ''°^^'^  "'^"^  '^'  F-^^-J'  phi  osoph'r 
has  to  .say  aI.out  this  intuition  ,/  pure  number  and  about  the 
mathematical  induction  based  upon  it 
The  syllogism  according  to  Poincar^^.,  leads  to  nothing  essen 
'  "iT  'order   t^  '"^t'"^  ^"  ^'^'^  '^*^  ^""^^^^^  -  ^h'  ^rem- 

uinpur^e  ot  i  n;;;tT%Tir^^^^^  T  -'^^-^^^'  -- 

calls  intuitiol.^     ^oTZuZ'lZTZ^^^^ 

Lnea^^t::^r  thj^iit:^^:^^:^^^^^^ 

narrower  sense  in  which  he  commonly  refers'  o    'a   ihe"    sis  of 
a  prior,  arithmetical  knowledge,  it  seems  to  rplr  M  ! 

property  of  the  mind  itself,     ft  'i^r::::Z:;^lZ:^^ 
ma  hematics,  and  in  the  application  of  m^athema  i  irSts 

ihv  icf  and  T  ''  ^"""^*'^"  '"  b°*h  mathematics  and 

physic,  and  as  such  necessarily  precedes  demonstration  fore 
eemg  conclusions  and  suggesting   arguments,  someti    bv" 

S!! T  :.•  log'sticians,"  Peano,  Russell,  and  Couturat 

by  , mple  logical  combination,  of  a  finite  num  Jof  axfoms  aTd 


TAe  Ka/ue  o/  Science, 


PP.'  S^Tsa"'  ''^^"'^''"'  Ch- 1,  especially  pp.  7.  13.  14 

« Sctenr?  and  Hyp»thms.  p.  5.  i  Th,  v  ,        r  >,  ■ 

*  Science  and  Hupothe»U.  p.  U  ■   TAc  Ta/u,  nf<^  "^  .'"^'  ^-  "• 

•  5cierK.e  et  Lkode\!\!s'  '      ""^  *'  ^'''"^'  P""  ^«-9-  «2.  309. 

2i 


482 


THE    nnOBLEM  OP    KXOWLEDOP, 


ik 


P 


Nor a„. L.. .;;:r;„ •",  ■  ,r,:,";:,;;i',;t;r"" ■" 

■n  "pure"  i„allKi„ali,.,  i,  i,  ,„ i,'         .'"  "  '  '«■  """^ary 

»o„W  ,.„„„™et  ,hc  now  orI     X^/n,''  T''    T""™;-  "'"' 
ncvprtli,-l<,»,  „|,li„„,i  ,„  r„,     ,     ""'"""  ""-•  '<l™  of  munlKr,  u 

ov..r  »„,„•,;;  "S    , " r  ;;ir ""',  '°r""^'^  •"■" »'"' 

oliMUnaU,,,"!'      '""•"'•''«"""*  ""-l  »o  ...nk.  ,„„„„■»»  l,y  ,l,eir 
cvfrt^nTV'"  '"'  '"""■  f""""'"''  "•'"'  ""«»""  '!«  „,.  ought 

;-  .;«•.. ,.;  „,  J," ,  r  'r;;;r;;:  "";f '  ••»'"^- 

found  on  y  in  oiir.lr.flnli,-,,..         i     or  leriauity.     Pm-ision  i.s 
Iherofmn,;    °„ri„  ! , , '  7  l""    '"  "'""  "  ''"""'"^  •'"''■<■«' 

timt  ,l,.p,,,d.  upon  ,,„,„f    r    ,1      '      ,  *'"'  f  "■•  '■"'"■■"ty. 

..""y  in.in.it:ar;  ;;::7',;i:r''i;::;r'''';.'' ■»-"- 

exception  to  tho  nilo  fl>..f  "•<'»<^"^<-     Mutliomatics  is  no 

t'uly  in,I,H.tiv,   flh^'  t\  :  '^"^^°-^'V""«  --  --vod  at  in 
the  Kenoru!-   on  v    tZ.     r^  ?       ''"^'  ^'■"'"  ^*"'  P^'-^i^lar  to 

<leceivo   us."     ^HtZt^t  '    ,        ,""'^^  '"*"'^'""  ^^''"''^  cannot 
other  influ,.tion  in  tttt.'fr.""-'^'^''   ''^^^'"^   ^^«'"   ^" 

"xiu^'fon,  o.  of    emon  tratli;:  In"""    "'    ^''^    "'athen.atical 
-1  pure.  -he.atS^- :S.CpI^^^^^ 

.Sa™«  ,,  ,V.-Mo</e.  pp.  156,  170-7.  ,  „ 

r/,e  lalue  of  Scunce,  pp.  17    is    -n    •>-,    „-    -n  '  ^^-  ^''^'  -"• 

130-1.  ^'^      '■   ''^'  -°'  -^'  -^-  '9;    •'>-^     '-ce  et  Melhode,  pp. 

*  Wence-  and  IlyiHjthesU,  pp.  2.  .3    101  .    r/,.  I'  /        ,  o  • 

Science  e<  A/^/We,  pp.  I60,  102,  SOo!  '  0/ Science,  pp.  20,  23,  25  ; 


\  ! 


iP^  iiyii»^ffMrfir*mTr^^iii  liiMiyw \  i 


THE  PUOBLEM  OF  SCIENTIPIC  METHOD         483 

follows:   "If  .  thoorom  i«  true  for  the  number  one,  ami  if  it 
has  been  proved  that  it  is  true  for  the  nun.ber  n  +  1  provide 
U  ^s  tn,e  for  „,  .t  will  be  true  for  all  the  positive  whole  nl- 

In  much  of  this  we  can  follow  Poinoar^,  but  at  some  points 
we  must  choose  another  path.     Let  us  indicate  some  oM he 
mo  t  fundamental  of  our  objections  to  his  doctrine.     In  the 
first  p  ace  ,t  seems  nnpossible    >  accept  his  positivistic  psycho- 
logical  ideahsn.  as  opi.stemolo^ioally  valid.^    To  be  sure  there  U 
some  justification  for  his  identifying  the  Cantorians  with    he 
reahsts  and  the  pragmatisfs  with  the  idealists,  because    he 
reahsm  which  he  has  in  n.ind  consists  in  the  anti-TliricJ 
attributing  of  independent  reality  to  universal  ide^  a      h 
Cantorians  tend  to  do;   while  the  idealism  he  is  thinking  o   is 
hat  which  regards  these  universals  as  conventions,  depend 
ng  upon  the  mind  of  man  for  their  being,  struc  ure    and 
function    havmg  been  devised  and  chosen  with  reference  to 
practical  human  purposes,  as  the  pragmatists  contend.     B^fc 
we  can  also  sympathize  with  the  remark  of  Hermite   quoted 

re'alisr""n'o:'M-  ^"  ^"^'-^-^--  ^^^  because' I'^m  a 
realist.       If  one  believes  m  an  independentlv  real  world  of 

ateTnd  ZTr  ^'"'-^  "''  *""^'  ''''''  ^^'^''^''^  ^^  ^as  i.nmed  . 
ate  and  mediate  cognitive  relations,  while  he  cannot  adopt 

Pomcard's  sweeping  reduction  of  the  entities  of  physicalscience 

to  mere  conven-ont  products  of  human  thought  for  practTcal 

purposes    he  .   d  be  almost  as  strongly  disinclined  to  a    ep 

the  Cantonan  doctrine  that  the  nature  of  reality,  even  so  far 

as  It  is  set  forth  in  mathematics,  is  discoverable  whou    any 

dependence   whatever  upon   experience   or   intuition.     More^ 

over  there  are  indications  in  Poincare's  essay  in  the  recent 

volume  entitled  Z.  rnaterialisme  acU.l,*  and  in  the  CZ 

i:zL  Z^:.r  ^'^-^^^  '"^-'^  --  -^-^  ^^  ^^^ 

al^aLT  ""^  ""^  ^''^tinction,  .so  rigidly  drawn,  between  gener- 
alizations and  mere  conventions,  is  calculated  to  excite  sus- 
picions with  reference  to  the  fundamentals  of  PoincSl  .Lc- 

'  SelTh.  V?  iZT''-  '',o''i  '%  '"' ''"'"  "''-'-'  --■  ''•  -^«.  ^^•^- 

•  S«.  H  V   li  ,  li'rmires  Pennies,  p.  160.  4  Pari^   lo,.. 

See  H.  C.  Brown,  Journal  of  Philosophy,  XI,  1914,  p.  231. 


if.:  • 


'a-. 


484 


THE   PROBLEM  OF   KXOWLEDOfi 


11  I. 


\..\ 


t  : 


trine.     How  coincs  it  »ii.i*  <i 

typos  of  .nental  ZL^    tl  .l^: /^T  "•'"'"">•  ''^^--t 

intended,  but  a  m-tTLT  T  '^'  ^'''"''  "'«"ty 

other,  however  ^L'Z^:^:::;^^;-'  '''''  ^'^ 
•"K  at  all,  cither  in  oxtennl  re-.^v  ^  '"f'Pn'sent.s  noth- 

tion?  If.  however  '7"' V' '^''^\"'-  '"  Pa«t  or  future  sensa- 
near-duah^n  :;^.:r,  Jt^^/^-'^  -re  adopte.l,  this 
ciably  reduced.  '^  n  Tt  "lid  ""'"'^T"  ""^'^^  ''^'  "^'P^- 
venient  and  therefore'  L  itl  '""^''f  ^'^'^  ""■•  '"«^^  ^-^n- 
as  well  as  our  "gene  ali.-    Is  7      V'^   hypothe.se.." 

thai  these  iileai  (,.n,r  i,.  i         "f"^"'""'!!  I'y  u»  or  not    a„j 

tion .,  ,he',«:  :,"I,^j  ::;■;;  "r;''"'f"' ;« i„  p„  J 

that  reality  i.  broader  «r  he  e".""?  """"■     """'«■« 
»o  would  be  e„lill..d  to  ,av  thJ  ,       ""'""  "P-^'eo, 

-i.her  be  eotnpletev'lX  '',;::?„  r''r  »""*  "» 
venient  hypotheses  that  ,..„.  i      ,   '""'''  "  the  most  con- 

of  rationality,  a,„l  rationali^    a™   din^r'"'"™""  i"  "  ""'"' 

more  nearly  in  the  C^thantr  R  ^  '"'"  "'""''•'°"" 
bcio)!  not  only  an  immediate  ■?!  ?"l!»onian  sense,  as 

»orae  sense  a    ont^ZL'  1  T""  "'  "■"'''>■•  '""  »1»  in 

.hrou«h  the  aet  t  of  "om  "r  ■  ""'  ""■"'""'  """«="•.  '«" 
three,  Kant,  Reresona^d  Se,,T  """""  '""'"y-  '"  "11 
to  an  at  least  i^lZCt^Z^'^'  'T"  " '""""""  "  '*"< 
ity  of  the  mind  :  l.n,  whereas  Katt.v  '"""'  °"''''"''  ""'"- 
neetion  with  spaee  and  t  2  r  f  "^  "  """""''y  '"  ™"- 
"Ot  as  intuitions,  bu?  a.  eat'e™"'"?  ^'''''y  »"''  ""'n'"-- 
Bergson  regards  our  a«r  „  roni:  e  ™'l"'  """  "•'■"™ 
most   completelv  intiniiv„  '  ""  <'ufalion,  as  our 

partially,  i?at  a  I,  an  i"  tionTn'r"""'  *""'  ""^'"^  ""'^ 
!™nne,l  measure  a  eins"  u T'  .t^  '"  f™  ^a-ntly  unde- 
.unher  derivatives,   Poinear,   eolTrUl  "e™lai„in;' 


~«^ei«*SiP^ 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  SCIENTIFIC  METHOD  485 

^<ct  t,*:-"  t;™-  "'•"'■"^"  '^' "« iir't 
mo.™,„.,.,i,..  „ri„i,.  ,h„„  our  .*.:;::::•:, ';,";  ™y 

consciousness,  as  Poincan'  has  cl-nrnp  '      if  -ntuitive 

ta.  acUvi.,  .,  virtue  of  J^ii  aZ^Jln:^;:^^;:^ 
revealed,  even  if  it  does  come  to  be  a  category  o  tho  ..^r  /h^ 
particular  n;ode  of  application  of  which  do^ipendT^^^^^  Z 
purpose  of  the  moment.  From  this  point  of  vfew  the  shlr 
1  tmcnon  between  the  forms  of  sensuous  intuition  and  the 
categories  of  thought  tends  to  disappear.  Both  are  regarded 
as  due  to  c  eative  psychical  activity,  but  of  the  same  tfme  as 

^^t^is;^"^"""  ''^'T  p-ontedr::; 

fnrr^  .\  \^^  actu itj .     It  IS  convcmcnt,  however,  to  use  the 
mediate  s  ates  of  consciousness,  and  the  term  category  in  con 

hi*,  leads  us  to  qu(>stion  whether  Poincare  is  justified  in 
setting  up  so  strong  a  contrast  as  he  does  between  intution 

nu.„f.r  to  our  sc.^o  ^f  h^-  «    o"'::  i;'  T"*'  '■'""  ""■  "'^  "'  -'I'- 

1013).  Sec ^o..w ^;ir;S; x/'?^;t';;.iji^-^-  «■  «•  '^™''-. 


480 


THE   PROBLEM  OF   KNOWLEDGE 


a  ■ 


! 


I .     ! , :  V 


on  to  the  loKKsticans,  that  the  syllogism  can  never  teach 

"ue'a   h"'  "•""^""^'  ""^- '     ^"'  «"  ^^^  «ther  hand,    s  it 
lent.'htt  ?ri""r'  '".^^'•^^'"-^  ^^*  ^'"«  point  with  his  ^pp,, 
tion ''^    ?1  "   T  '""  ^'^P^"^^  '^'^^S^ther  with  intu  - 

tion .       In  our  opinion  the  negative  answer  to  both  question 
-   quite  defensible.     We  have  seen   that  under  certa  n  cTr- 
cumstances  important  new  information  may  be  disco  ed  Z 
syllogistic  reasoning      This  may  occur  when  ^he  rigtt  p"  mise^ 
are  brought  together,  either  by  accident,  as  in  the  case  of    he 
oM  priest  and  his  first  penitent,  or  by  a'sagacious  seJct  o„  « 
the  character  represented  by  the  middle  term.^    And  if  ordinarv 
deduction  IS  not  sterile,  why  should  we  not  look  fo    iZS 
m  It  as  well  as  in  what  Poincare  calls  mathematita  1     et  l" 
/.s  «o<  A.O.W,.  of  unpUcation,  as  truly  as  knowledge  of  num- 
bor,  onginalbj  unuitive?     Corresponding  to  Poincare's  ax"om 
of  mathematical  induction  we  have  the  axiom  of  tS^  loZT 

DO  amrm  d  of  a  class  may  Iw  affirmed  of  everything  includeH 

'."*  V  r  :r  """'*' ™''««'  •""  f»i>owi.4 1,?,:,!' ' 

llM!  u  lr„e  „/  any  mbjtct  is  aim  tme  ol  am,  suhiecl  uHh 
I'M  (oithor  „„livi,l„ally  „r  „.  ,ho  ola«,  of  whi  h  ,hL  „b 

to  b€  tonsulorccl   am  coiiccmoci)  numerically  itlenliftable  hv 
moans  of  ,„,„„  „„a,ii,,,,.  „,„,k,     ,,^^,  ,J.^  an  ttuiblc 

'  Science  and  Hypothesix   d    'i  ,  o  ■ 

'iuo..tion  has  th,-  ..thfr  pronrrtv ''     />       A  I'^-'I'Tty.  then  tho  thing  in 

which  cc«>xist  with  th..  s.,n».  thi,  „      •'     ."'"',    "'  """'"'■"  '   ■""'"'"  '«  "  ThinKs 

••A  thing  whioh  .-.Jxi. H-ith  .t ;,r;thr' "":; ""';"":■" '""'  *""  "'•«'**'-■ 

doc.«noteoexi.stJ«notc.>i^xi.st.n   w  i,  Jt/^l.T^^^^^  " '"''  oth.-r  a  third  thing 
V..I.  II,  p.  .(40,  wh.r,.  "th-t  7  *•'"'''•  "'"'•'''""-^•'P«^^A"'<'ffi'. 

•■First.  an,..tra..t..l  char      ..        ,::;;    "'"""'.  "',  ■•--"""'«"  "-  'h-  stated 
which  it  r„nH..s;  and  ™i    th c  nh  ''  ^r""'""*  *"  *''"  "''"^  ''''*"'"  '^"m 

qucnco  m„r..  nb.-io  /XTh   ni        '''"""^'"^  "-us  taken  Huggo.,,,  ^  certain  co„».- 
camo."  -  *'""'  "  "-^"^  ^««-l'^^J  ''y  the  toUU  datum  as  it  originally 


'^;M£M^ki- 


I 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  SCIEXTIFIC  METHOD  487 

•nark,  ami  that  the  .um.orical  identification  can  be  legitimately 
ado    depend   for    their   being   known    upon    intuition,   and 
•  Itnnately  upon  experience.     xMoreover,  whereas  Poincare  has 
classed   such   axioms  as   that  equals   to  the  same  thing  are 
equals  to  one  another,  as  "analytic  judgments  a  priori,"' 
we  would   ask.  Are  these  not  generalizations  (and  as  such 
.nstruments  of  thought)  on  the  l>asis  of  an  intuition,  in  thk 
particular  case,  of  the  transitivity  of  the  relation  of  equal- 
it>  .     It  would  seem,  then,  that  intuition  may  be  held  to  accom- 
pany even  our  logical  processes,  at  least  in  so  far  as  they  are 
not  mere  processes  of  unintelligent   routine.     (This  is  verv 
evidently  .suggested  l>y  the  strict  limits  to  the  new  knowledge 
that  may  be  inf(.rred  from  the  premises.)     On  this  view  all 
significant  (ledudion  i,  nrtualh,  induction.     This  is  not  a  one- 
sided or  absolute  empirical  monism  in  methodology,  for  deduc- 
lon   the  .syllogism  and  the  a  priori  have  been  given  their  due 

moliism"  '^  *""  ^"^  '"'''''''  ""  ""'''""^  empirical  methodological 
We  must  now  briefly  outline  the  course  of  the  scientific 
method  of  proof,  as  .seen  from  the  point  of  view  of  our  critical 
empinc-al  mc-thodological  monism.     The  sciences  are  generally 
clas.sihe(    as  abstract,  descriptive,  an.l   normative.     It  should 
be  note.l,  however,  that  in  the  normative  sciences  we  simply 
have  cTtain  materials  which  have  been  drawn   from  the  de- 
scriptive sciences,  selected  an<l  organized  with  reference  to  the 
realization  of  some  univensal  ideal,  as  that  of  truth  in  logic 
h^Jiu  y  in  ^sthetics  and  morality  in  ethics.    They  can  be  suffix 
<Kntly  dealt  xyith  for  our  present  purpo.ses,  therefore,  in  our 
discussion  of  the  method  of  .lescriptive  science.     The  method 
of    he  abstract  sciences  demands  some  attention,  however 
It  should  be  noted  at  the  outset  that  the  abstractness  of  these 
sciences  is  relative.     It  is  quite  evident,   for  instance,   that, 
our  con.sciousness  of  three-dimen.sion  space  being  interpreted  a.s 
essentia  ly  intuitional,  not  conventional,  the  Euclidean  geome- 
try is  abstrac-t  with  reference  to  the  physical  world,  and  con- 
Crete  with  reference  to  space.     Even  pure  arithmetic  is  con- 
crete with  reference  to  number ;  but  there  .seem  to  be  important 
grounds  for  maintaining  that  mathematical  physics  is  quite 

'  Science  and  HyiM)lhi\ii.i,  p.  29. 


488 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   KXOWLEDOB 


§w 


1  f 


?ip 


abs  ract  with  reference  to  the  actual  world.'     In  sno.kine  of 
abs  ract  sc.ence.,  however,  ue  «hall  have  in  mind  chfeflv  the 
mathen.at.ca    sciences,  which  are  more  or  less  aL  ract  .  th 
reference  to  the  physical  wo.  id.     Doubt  as  to  the  ab.tractn  ^ 
or  concretene>.  of  a  science  may  i,e  over,  ome  by  rl   in,  the 
quesfon  whether  the  science  is  true  of  the  realify  crncernod 
calcooncaUy  or  only  >>ypoll,cticaU,j.     If  it  is  true  catZ   X 
the  saence  is  concrete  ;   if  only  hypothetically,  it  istbstr"  et     ' 
The  definU,ons  with  which  the  abstract  sciences  bJ,  Awhile 
not  necessanly  arbitrary,  are  nevertheless  convention     whih 
are  to  remam  constant  throughout  the  wlmle  process      Thev 
are  not  necessarily  ,lis,uise.l  axion.s  in  the  sense  of  genera^fza 
ions  concerning  the  real  experience  world.     Poii  cST  or" 
ect,  as  against  Mill,  in  maintaining  that  the  e.xisten  "as  umed 
nothing  more  than   mathematical   existence,   i  J.   f    Xr^ 
from  contradiction,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  logic  oTcZ 
sistency.     In  view  of  the  non-KucIi.lea„  geometriesand    he 
science  of  infinite  aggregates,  it  will  be  seen  that  even  "eedln 
from  contradiction-producing  characteristics  is  no    a  net  tv 
assumption  .1  the  clefini.ions  fundamental  to  an  abs  lit  s^^^^^^^^^^ 
The   explicit    assumptions    (axioms   and    postulates)    oT,u 
abs  rac    science  may  be  anything  even  apprdximatel-    on  eiv" 
able      In  some  cases  the  assumptions  accor.l  with  experience- 
m  other  cases    while  not   verifiable,   thev  ,lo  ncV  on    adi  t' 
experience,  an.l  are  not  arbitrarv    but  iho  rr.Zl    '""*'^^^'^* 
inventions  that  can  be  devised'^i;  s.ll  oIL-^:  Ji::^ 
the  assuniption  may  be  quite  arbitrarv  and  not  espe  iX  con 
venient,    but   practically   contra.Iicting   experience    an      e^en 
running  foul  of  the  best  efforts  of  the  hnac  na   on      l/  ? 

conceded  to  Couturat  and  his  fellowdS  "rth.t  V"'^ 
monstrable  axioms  of  mathematics  a!:^:::;;^;^^;  tc^':; t 
guised  dehmtions ;  but  this  concession  has  no  great  sfgnificance 
As  axiom  or  postdate    the  "fl.nf  ••  in  .i  [i      ■ 'kmncance. 

of  permissihiifv      1  '         ^''''  '"^theniatical  sense 

r  "   "  '     •'     •'•  *^"PP"«''l  Possibihtv,  or   freedom    from 
contradiction,  is  emphasized;    as  defin.tlon.  th      '.Z''  r 
coives    the    emphasis.      Commonly    the    most    furdatentl; 

^j  .  =  .  i.i.  Jl   .S  ,    II.  1J„..,,,,,  //,„„,^  ^,,j  j.^^^,^^^  ^^  ^.^.^^^.^^^^  ^^   ^^^_ 


•-Mt 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  SCIENTIFIC  METHOD  489 

assumptions  c.f  ordinary  thought  are  taken  over;    but  amone 
he  assumptions  sometimes  introduced  we  find  the  following 
wo  parallels  to  a  given  straight  line,  both  passing  through 
he  same   pomt  -  or,   in   other   words,   non-Euelidean  space 
(Lobachevsk.) ;    motion  without  friction;    a  stationary  earth 
and  the  heavenly  bodies  moving  in  perfect  circles  (the  Ptolemaic 
astronomy  ;  an  actual  infinite,  or  a   whole  such   that   there 
s  a  on.'  to  one   correspondence   between   its   elements   and 
he  elements  of  one  of  its  parts  (Dedekind,  Cantor,  Rovce 
Kussell,  (  outurat).     The  point  which  it  is  of  the  greatest 'im^ 
I  or  ance  to  ren.ember  here  is  that   the  abstractness  of  the 

which"."  r'""T".r  "'!""  P"""'^''  '''''''  '-'''■  *h«  abstractness 
uhich  .on.es  by  the  subtraction  of  empiric-al  elements,  and  the 
abstractn.>ss  whu-h  ,..>mes  by  the  in.aginary  substitution  o^ 
arbitrary  for  genuin.-Iy  emf.irical  elements.  Euclidean  geome- 
ry  will  serve  t.,  illustrate  the  one.  and  the  non-Euclidean 
syst..ms  the  other.  Broa.lly  speaking,  the  former  abstract- 
ness IS  in  the  interest  of  pra.tice,  while  the  latter  is  pro.luctive 
of^mere  curiosities,  which  serve  only  to  stimulate  speculative 

"nn'^fir-- 'f  r  '"  '\  '   '""''  '''''''''  ''^  J^'-S^Jy  deductive, 
analytic    ;  but,  as  we  1         tried  to  show,  this  .Iocs  not  mean 

that  It  IS  not  at  all  imluctive.     It  appeals  to  intuition,  though 
It  refrains  from  app,.aling  to  all  possibk>  sorts  of  intuition,  be- 
cause It  has  abstracted  from  experience.!  reality  in  its  full  con- 
creteness,  and  is  interested  only  in  certain  phases  of  the  whole 
The  mam  question  for  scientific  metho.lology  is  that  which 
has   to  do  with  the   "  nomm   organum,"  the   method   of  the 
descriptive,   or  empirical,'   or  overtly  inductive  sciences      In 
such  sciences  th.>  preliminary  definitions  are  largely  formal 
with  just  enough  of  the  content  in.licate.i  to  enable  the  invests 
gator  to  Identify  the  obj.>ct  to  be  studi.Ml.     The  content  of 
he  definition  constantly  grows  as  the  processes  of  investiga- 
tion are  su.-cessful.     A  full  .lefinition,  one  adequate  for  all 
poss,b.e  purposes,  may  be  regarded  as  the  goal  of  empirical 
tk.  sou  1  c  n  • 

'  By  "..mpiriral  s,-U~u<-v"  wr  do  not  mrnn  a  -rientifi.  ,).-..-ription  of  v^ucH 


490 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   KNOWLEDGE 


m^^ 


n 


i'  H 


1   '   », 


Among  the  postulates  and  other  assumptions  fundamental 
to  any  empirical  science  are  properly  induced    besides  t hi 

and  postulates  „f  science  in  general,  and  the  relevant  result., 
of  the  other  sciences.     Thc«  existence  of  the  subject-matter  to 

ali;:::Sl  '  -"'^  rT--'.'  ''''-  -  aCy     -^l. 
cany  certain,  r  aids  of  experience,  or  else  simnlv  as  a 

mSr^^'  .         ..  hypothesis  to  be  tested   bytfpiL^ 

As  the  investigation  proceeds  there  accumulates  a  bodv  of 
empirical  data,  or  what  may  be  regarded  thenceforth  as  pre 
suppositions.     In   ordinary  perceptual  experience   there  is  a" 
certain  measure  of  discrimination  and  choice,  only  those  prod 
ucts  of  sense-activity  being  selected,  ordinarilyf  wS  W 
some  relation  to  some  subjective  interest ;    but  in  scientific 
observation   and   experiment    this   discrimination   and   choice 
inL  T'  P'-"""""^-'-     I"  any  scientific  observation  the 

intention  .s  to  accumulate  simply  such  data  as  are  relevant  and 
may  conceivably  be  made  the  basis  of  inductiv"  nfcrence 
\\ith  this  limitation,  the  collection  of  data  aims  to  be  the  choS 
of  what  Peirce  call  "fair  samples";  within  the  field  of  the 
relevant  the  data  must  be  such  that  we  have  no  reason  to  sup! 
pose  they  have  not  been  chosen  at  random  ^ 

All  inductive  inference,  or  generalization,  is  based  upon  one 
fundamental   principle,    sometimes   called    the   unifoXv   nf 
nature      Less  dogmatically  put,  it  is  the  principle  ^fThe/ 
pondableness  of  nature.     Viewed  as  an  hypothe  Is     t  is  tt" 
last  to  be  fully  verified,  and  yet,  in  the  undogma  icTrm  w   hav 
suggested,  It  must  always  be  the  last  to  be  given  up      WhI 
Mayer  is  reported  to  have  said  with  reference  to  thr^heoil  o 
he  conservation  of  energy-,  "I  discovered  the  new  theo^for 
the  sufficient  reason  that  I  vividly  felt  the  need  of  it"'  is 
s  .11  more  emphatically  true  of  every  scientist    n  re  a^n  to 
this  fundamental  principle  reiauon  to 

^a„o„,.  ..a..„«  what  .„o  ,hi„.  „„„.,  inv-k^ati™  dri^^dlr 

■  K.  Mach,  Popular  Scientific  Lectures,  p.  184. 


■'■%^-r  r 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  SCIENTIFIC  METHOD  491 

certain  conditions.     As  might  bo  expected  from  this  definition 
the  mam  hncs  of  procedure  are  simple  enough.     "By  indirec' 
^>on"  we  proceed  to  "find  direction  out."     From  the  above 
pnnciplo  of  the  dependableness  of  nature,  and  from  the  theoret- 
ical constructions  to  which  we  shall  presently  refer,  there  may 
be  deduced  certain  major  hypotheses,  from  which  in  turn  may 
be  deduced  minor  hypotheses.     By  minor  hypotheses  are  meant 
such  as  are  capable  of  being  refuted  or  completely  verified  in 
smgle  crucial  experiments,  where  actmg  upon  the  hypothesis 
leads  to  an  experience  in  which  there  is  immediate  awareness 
either  of  the  reality  or  of  the  unreality  of  what  was  supposed 
m  the  hypothesis.     (In  some  cases  actual  experiment  may  not 
be  necessary,  the  appeal,  perhaps  even  in  the  framing  of  the 
hypothesis    to  the  known  results  of  past  experiences,  or  to 
intuition,     being  suflftcient  for  verification.)     Refutation  of  a 
namor  hypothesis  involves,  it  should  be  noted,  refutation  of 
the  major  hypothesis  from  which  it  was  deduced,  and  also  of 
the  logical  theory  concerned ;    but  verification  of  the  minor 
hypothesis  does  not  mean  complete  verification  of  the  major 
hypothesis  or  general  theory.     To  assume  the  opposite  would 
be  to  commit  the  fallacy  of  affirming  the  consequent.     Practi- 
cally complete  verification  of  major  hypotheses  may  be  ob- 
tamed    however,   by  the  employment  of  Mill's  well-known 
methods  of  experimental  inquiry,  the  Method  of  Agreement, 
the  Method  of  Difference,  the  Joint  Method  of  Agreement  and 
Difference,  the  Method  of  Residues  and  the  Method  of  Con- 
comitant  Variations.     The  canons  of  these  methods  are  stated 
by  Mill,  as  is  required  by  his  phenomenological  philosophy  in 
terms  of  "unconditional,  invariable  antecedent"  phenomena 
as  causes;'    but,  translated  into  reaHstic  terms,  as  required 
by  our  ep.stemological  theory,  they  would  run  somewhat  as 
follows:    An  indication  of  something  causally  related   to  a 
phenomenon  ma>  be  found  either  in  some  circumstance  in  which 
all  the  instances  of  the  phenomenon  agree,  or  in  some  circum- 
stance in  which  alone  the  two  instances  of  its  occurrence  differ 
or  ,n  such  circumstances  as  vary  whenever  the  phenomenon 
to  be  explained  varies;    and  when  part  of  a  phenomenon  has 
rjocn  accounted  for,  an  indication  of  the  cause  of  the  remainder 
'  Su»tem  of  Logic,  Bk.  ;II,  Ch.  VIII. 


,]>*! 


492 


THE    PKOBLKM    OF    KXOWLEDOE 


i|i'f"S« 


may  possibly  bo  found  in  the  circunisiancos  which  have  not 
served  to  guiile  to  the  ah'oady  cUscovered  causes.  These 
uuhcations  are  sometimes  of  great  service  in  leading  to  the 
framing  of  a  successful  hypothesis  as  to  the  causation  of  the 
facts  under  consideration.  Once  a  law  has  been  discovered, 
It  makes  possible  both  prediction  and  the  partial  control  of 
future  experience,  on  the  assumption  that  umler  the  sam.  condi- 
tions the  thing  will  act  as  before.  The  further  experience  result- 
mg  furnishes  further  data  for  induction. 

But  over  anil  above  all  these  laws  or  generalizations  as  to 
the  nature  of  observed  facts  or  the  course  of  observed  events, 
there  is  a  place  for  scientific  theory,  which  is  essentially  further 
a  posteriori  definition  of  the  subject-matter  under  investigation. 
What  It  IS  beyond  imnieiliate  experience,  is  capable  of  being 
learned  to  some  extent  in  the  light  of  what  it  is  and  doc  s  within 
immediate  experience.     Such  theory,  again,  as  has  been  noted 
suggests  further  hypotheses  which  may  be  empirically  tested.' 
And  obviously,  from  our  realistic  point  of  view,  it  is  not  at  all 
necessary  to  regard  entities  with  which  theoretical  construc- 
tion deals  as  being  mere  conventions,  so  long  as  no  hypotheses 
deduced  from  the  theory  are  refuted.     Moreover,  once  such 
refutation  has  occurred,  the  entity,  as  conceived,  can  no  longer 
be  legitimately  assumed,  even  as  a  convention. 

All  sciences,  then,  it  would  appear,  are  descriptive,  either 
categorically  or  hypothotically.     They  are  hypothetical  when 
some  condition  or  conditions  need  to  be  explicitly  stated  or 
kept  in  mind,  in  order  to  avoid  misunderstanding  and  practi- 
cal error.     They  are  categorical  when  all  conditions  are  so 
in  accord  with  experience  and  intuition  that  they  can  be  taken 
for  granted,   witliout  explicit  statement.     But  on  the  other 
hand,  not  only  the  original  definitions,  but  the  empirical  data 
and  the  generalized  descriptions  or  laws,  become  assumptions 
forthwith,  from  which  deduction  may  proceed.     And  inasmuch 
as  all  these  assumptions  may  also  be  viewed  as  fragmentary  or 
real  definition,  categorical  or  hypothetical,  of  a  reality,  or  reali- 
ties, all  science  is  thus,  it  would  seem,  broadly  speaking,  deduc- 
tive.    But  the  assumptions  are  dthcr  directly  derived  from 
experience  or  "intuition,"  or  nlse  they  are  made  on  certain 
conditions,  the  meaning  of  which  is  also  empirically  derived, 


i 


THE  PROBLEM  OP  SCIENTIFIC  METHOD  493 

immediately  or  ultimately;  and  so,  it  would  appear,  all  science 
IS  also,  broadly  .speaking,  inductive.     Even  scientific  theory  is 
doscnption,  as  well  as  assumption.     It  has  to  do  not  with  an 
absolutely,  totally  unexperienced  reality  back  of  experienced 
processes.     It  is  anticipatory  or  divinatory  further  description 
of  reality  or  processes,  some  of  which  may  not  be,  in  the  more 
direct    sense,    humanly    experienceable  —  description,    more- 
over, on  the  basis  of  what  is  and  has  been  thus  directly  experi- 
enced.    This  view  of  theory  as  further  partial  description  of  a 
not  yet  fully  experienced  and  perhaps  not  fully  experienceable 
reality,  partly  on  the  basis  of  what  is  or  has  been  experienced 
of  that  particular  reality,  and  partly  on  the  basis  of  what  has 
been  experienced  of  realities  in  general,  may  be  likened  to  the 
completinK  of  given  arcs  of  a  circle  or  ellipse,  by  means  of 
a  knowledge  of  the  general  nature  of  circles  and  eUipses,  as 
derived  from  experience  or  "intuition."     All  science,  we  may 
then  say,  is  deductive,  and  yet  all  is  inductive,  just  as  we  saw 
that  all  science  is  descriptive,  although  obviously  it  is  always 
necessarily  to  some  exte;>t  abstract. 

This  discovery  that  the  method  of  all  really  scientific  proof 
I.e.  of  all  demonstration  of  the  truth  about  reality,  is  one  and 
the  .same,  being  both  inductive  and  detluctive,  enables  one  the 
better  to  decide  between  the  rival  claims  c'  abstract,  descrip- 
tive and  normative  science,  respectively,  to  be  the  one  funda- 
mental form  of  scientific  procedure,  to  which  the  other  forms 
may  be  reduced.     According  to  some  (e.g.  J.  S.  Mill)  all  real 
science  is  .lescriptive;   definitions  are  disguised  axioms,  which 
in  turn  are  interpreted  as  empirical  generalizations,  tentative 
or  final.     From  this  point  of  view,  truth  is  correspondence 
According  to  others  (e.g.  B.  Russell,  Couturat)  all  real  science 
IS  abstract ;   axioms  are  definitions  in  disguise ;   truth  is  cohe- 
rence (according  to  Russell,  a  multiple  relation).     According 
to  still  others  {e.g.  F.  C.  S.  Schiller,  and  in  some  points,  J.  Dewey 
and  Wm.  James)  all  science  is  essentially  normative  (a  system 
of  judgments  which  it  .s  good  to  believe  for  practical  purposes)  • 
all  axioms  are  postulates;   truth  is  identical  with  consequences 
that  are  good.     Now  it  is  true  enough,  on  the  one  hand   that 
science  is  always,  of  necessity,  more  or  less  abstract,  and  on  the 
other  hand  that  the  various  sciences  may  each  be  viewed  as 


^ 


494 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   KNOWLEDGE 


y     ■  I' 


I  1 


oiKiiiiizod  about  some  fundamontal  i)ractical  intorcst,  so  that 
thoy  take  on  the  asp(>ct  of  orKanizcd  instrumentalities  as  related 
to  some  ideal,  or  norm.  Hut  t  ?'  fundamental  eharaeter  of 
scienee,  we  would  claim,  is  that  of  heinfi  ii  description  of  reality. 
Axioms  are  essentially  akin  to  empirical  Reneralizations,  and 
nuist  stand  the  test  of  comparison  with  the  facts  of  experience. 
Ahstractness  is  to  he  permitted  only  for  the  sake  of  convenience  ; 
otherwise  it  is  to  be  reduced  as  far  as  possible  in  the  interests 
of  knowledg(>  of  reality.  Definitions  are  especially  to  oe 
watched,  as  possible  sources  of  ahstractness,  and  are  to  b(; 
constantly  revised  and  ^iven  more  concrete  content  in  the  light 
of  further  experience  of  reality.  Normative  sciences  are  to  be 
regarded  as  resulting  from  a  process  of  selection  from  the  results 
of  (l(>scriptive  sciences  for  some  I'elatively  constant  special 
purpose  or  organized  grouji  of  purposes;  and  while  all  science 
may  be  said  to  partake,  fundamentally,  of  tliis  characteristic, 
it  nuist  not  be  supposed  that  the  sciences  are  mere  expressions 
of  purpose,  requiring  no  verification  bej'ond  practical  useful- 
ness in  a  general  way.  Every  proposition  must  be  brought 
into  comparison  with  reality  as  expeiienced.  Postulates  are 
to  be  taken  as  hypotheses  and  examined  with  a  view  to  emi)iri- 
cal  justification. 

The  above-described,  really  unitary  scientific  method,  avoid- 
ing, as  it  does,  an  abs>  'ate  dualism  of  deduction  and  induction 
and  the  two  one-sided  absolute  monisir.s  (the  deductive,  or 
rationalistic,  and  the  inductive,  or  empirical)  may  well  be  called, 
as  we  anticipated,  a  critical  empirical  methodological  monism. 
This  scientific  method  is  the  method  of  proof,  i.e.  the  method 
of  iiroducing  logical  (sufficiently  critical,  or  intellectually 
adeciuate)  certainty  {i.e.  intellectual  readiness  for  definitive 
action)  with  reference  to  the  truth  about  reality. 


m 


Thus  our  conclusions  in  the  various  separate  investigations 
which  we  have  been  obliged  to  undertake  are  seen  to  converge 
toward  what  is,  in  general,  one  and  the  same  philosophical 
position.  In  epistemology  proper  we  were  led  to  a  critical 
realistic  monism.  Obliged,  for  the  completion  of  our  solution 
of  the  problem  of  acquaintance,  to  make  excursions  into  the 
morphology  of  knowledge  and  genetic  logic,  we  found  ourselves 


THE   PROBLEM  OF  8CIEXTIFI0  METHOD  495 

at    an    ahsoluto    monism.     Hcx'ffdinir's    infnr    4     u      ''"'^"*? 

awt  o,,,.,.„  i„  „,  i„„ ;,S':?iri  jr:;;„  r:„r! 

;':^j;i;"':^:;™,ir;:r;;::,--:;:H.«.p„,,,,,,,„,„, 

"-...;*•     !)•••..  «'•"»  iiu    many.       Moronvpr   }ii« 

anc     ep.somology;     hut    tc,    antidpato    further    such     iults 

riiir.^;  "'• ""'  '^^  ^'^^^^'  ''-^  ^^  ^--"-^  "^^- 

Finally   to  forestall  one  not  improbable  even  if  as  w(^  think 
^*<l  ,„  any  procoss  ol  culling  „ut  whatever  attractive  and 

'  H.  Hooff.linir.  PhilMnnhu  nf  Rrh-,-  -         V  T 

io^opAi,.  Vol.  II,  1905.  pp   igo      ^ '"'"''°'^'»"=^1  Confession."  Journal  of  Phi- 


!$ 


49G 


THE   PROBLEM   OF   KNOWLEDGE 


s(>paratcly  phvusihlo  doctrines  thero  may  he  in  tho  different 
theories  considered.  On  the  contrary,  it  has  been  i»rimarily 
concerned  to  maintain  hotlj  internal  consistency  and  fidehty 
to  fact.  Indeed,  one  of  the  author's  principal  fears  is  that  in 
his  actual  proctMhue  he  may  not  have  ))een,  in  a  po.ssihh'  sense 
of  the  term,  eclectic  enouM;ii.  The  critical  portions  of  the 
work  are  (h'sinned  to  show  the  need  of  a  new  system,  and  for 
that  reason  they  have  had  to  innoic  many  things  for  which  the 
philosoi)hies  examined  are  undoubtedly  worthy  of  universal 
appreciation. 


^' 


INDEX  OF  AUTHORS 


[Italic  figures  refer  to  the  more  important  passages.] 


Alhertiis  Mngnu-',  7!>. 

Alexander,  H.  H..  L'."/ 

Alexamlcr.  S.,  217.  222.  3,iJ,.;.its,  2H. 
2")i,  jiii,  ^1:2  Ji;;,  2m.  jn,  2'.m.  j:'^', 
sit.i  .ioj,,  wm.  .107.  .ws, .)!,-..  .n\.i, ;«»(;.' 

Aliotta,  A.,  1  If). 
AiiU'sediT,  U.,  2M. 
AtiKell,  J.  U.,  272,  273.  27.-,.  :tl7,  :jl». 
AiH'lt,  K.  v..  41. 
.'\iHiiiia.s,  T.,  .<///. 
Ari.-itollo,  St;,  SH,  M),  .•{17,  .lift. 
Aister.  K.  Vdii,  1!M>. 

Avciiarius,   K.,  (i:t.   III    112.   113,   100 
L';!»,  2l'(),  j.iO,  ;.'.-,I. 


Haioii,  F.,  -Jti;},  4 
Main.  A.,  .{Nl. 
Uakcwcll,  f.  M., 


7.i. 


2<H!  2')S. 


Ut-iK 


llaldwiii,  .!.  M.,  :j,-,l 
Balfour,  A.  .1.,  \M\. 
Hardili,  C.  C,  ;1S. 
Hauniiinn,  .1.,  M. 

Hawdeii,  JI.  H., //.y  /,^;,  40S  421   4'.'1 
44(>. 

HerRsoii,   H.,    Km,   120  12.',.   K'c' 
I'Wi,  :{i2.  :{i.i,  .iu.  :ii7,  .52.'' 

.•W9,  .{40,  .■{4.{,  .i.',7.  .{.57.  .{CO,  ;{til, 
.%'.?,  400  .i(ji!.  4I.-,.4U\  4.5.{,  47 


470,  482. 


220. 

SH2 
.  47.5, 


->'i-»  -> 


;.«. 


Herkoley.  Ci.,  Ki.  45.  S2.  <);{,  90,  !J 

110,  i:{;{.  101.  22:{,  :i2o. 
Holyai,  W..  404. 
Holzatio.  B..  4t).'>,  400. 
Boodin,  ,1.  K.,  227  22.').  247-248. 

27H.  .ill.-, -.am.  412-41.1.  42;{~ 

BosaiKiuet,  B.,  140,  l.'>4-l.',:/,  103 
SSI  .i.'i2,  3.S3. 

Boutroux,  K  .  317,  48K. 

Bradley,  F.  H.,  ,w.  l,{(),  i;{fi.  z^^- 
154,  15.5.  1.57.  13<),  100,  103,  170 
218,  .>T  ■   .i,s7.  3.S2.  3S3.  .{hn,  40 

Brown,  H.  ('..  lO'.l,  483. 

Bush,  \V.  T..  220,  224.  2i:7~2l!S. 


7-U8. 


277, 


314, 


l.',.i. 

i.  IM, 

431. 


Caird.  E..  22.  133.  130.  I.i7. 
Caird,  .).,  <«),  I.i4-l,-i.-,. 
Caldwell,  \V.,  431,  437,  440. 
r.antor,  G.,  303,  405,  400,  408.  483,  489 
Carr,  H.  W.,  222. 

2k 


("assircr,  K.,  I!).;  I.O,<i. 

<'litTi)rd.  W.  K..  .55,  l(M)-in3.  \m. 

<'iH',  ti.  A.,  7.5,  77. 

Cohen,  H.,  S3,  1!»3,  I'M,  l!i.-,l.').S.  317, 

3.!lt.  3.53. 
Cohen,  M.  I{„  200.  2>^t-20iJ,  304. 
Cointe.  .v..  IS,  47.l'474. 
CoiKTuicus,  \.,  20,  23,  414,  4.34,  479. 
Cornelius.  H.,  i;i!  us. 
Costcllo.  H.  "l"..  409. 
Couturat.   I,.,  402,  40<i,  475,  481,  482, 

488.  489,  493. 

Darwin.  ('..  3.50. 
Deilckind.  K.,  405,  400,  4,89. 
Delacroix,  II,,  75. 
Df  LaKMiia,  T.,  431. 
Descartes,  I{..  93,  240,  .{.J,',  46'J. 
Deussen,  00,  75,  70,  77,  7s. 
De  Wette.  \V.  M,  L.,  41. 
Dewey,  ,1.,  92,  114.   117   //.V.   1  19,  170, 
219,  221,  224-227.  22s,  229.  2.38,  27.i, 
274  27.-,.  283,  299,  320.  .323.  408,  409! 
420-421.  422,  42.i.  424.  420,  428,  43oi 
430,  44f.,  493. 
Dilthey,  \V..  2.5,  .i3  34. 
Dionysius,  88. 
Drake.  I)..  .53.  .54. 
Driesch.  H..  299,  317.  ,344,  488. 
Dunlap,  K.,  270,  271-272. 

Kckharf,  79. 

Kddy,  .M.  M.  G.,  SO. 

Klliot.  II..  .{00. 

Kllisen.  194. 

ICucken,  K.,  20H-30H.  317,  4.33. 

Euclid,  KHt,  2.54.  414,  USA.  405,  406,  46". , 

478,  479,  480,  488,  489. 
Ewald,  <).,  197,  201. 


Fawcett.  E.  D..  444. 

Fechner,  G.  T.,  105.  182,  317. 

Fichte,  .1.   G..  25.  ,57.  8,5,  90,   104-10,5. 

100,  141,  102.  195,  231,  317,  338,  339 

.•!53. 
Fischer,  K..  20.  21.  57,  104. 
Fite.  W.,  4.30. 
Fouill6e,  A.,  10,5-100. 
Fregc,  G.,  405. 

41)7 


408 


INDKX    OF    AUTHORS 


I 


lii 


Vi 


FriPd.  .1.  F.,  :<:.  .W-4/,  4J,  .147. 
Fri.ichri»eii-Kiilil<T,  M..  34. 
Kriti.tch,  r  .  l.Vl. 

Fro^t.  K.  P..  '.'Tl',  -.'74,  .Tv   ,';(,.  aiU. 
FiilltTtiiii.  <;..«!,,  //.;   Il'i.l.'i,'  /My.1'17, 
UL'l,  -'-'.'/  ,'.)V/.  .'.(r,  ,'».,s  Jf::t. 

Ciilwon,   \V.   K.    Hoyic,  LMls.  ^vy.v.   :tl7, 

.17J  .{74. 
(iompcrz,  T..  sfi,  ss. 
(irwii.   T.   H..  !•.">,   I.i/,   l.m.    l.-)5,  .n?, 

.«.*.  :{7.'>. 
(iiiynti,  Mnic,  77. 

Haldmic,  H.  H.,  l:t(i. 

H.iiiiilli.ii,  W..  ,'.7  .-T,  2.S,  216. 

Harris,  \V.  T..  l:n. 

H:irtni:iiiii,  K.  vmi,  .'iti,  .",  l!()-r„i. 

lIi'Lcri.  M.,  lilt. 

llt'dd,  (;.  \V.  F..  ■>'>.  r.L>.  tl.{.  1J7,  12s, 
/.J'/  /.</.  i:<2,  l:i:i.  i:u.  i:!."),  i:«i,  i.{7. 
Lis.  no,  I,-),-),  |.-,7.  !f.2.  17,"i.  irti.  IM, 
IH.'i,  l!M),  Ht7,  Ills.  2lMi.  2IS,  2.is.  .tl7, 
.i.is  .i.iu,  :f.|7.  H.Vi,  .>,■ ;.  :i7.').  ;t7r..  .iM, 

470,  -j;/. 

HctKlcrMiiii.  C.  !{.,  Its. 
Ilori)Mrt,  .1.  F.,  :«i.  ;.'  ,;.;,  i,"),  ic,  i.s, 
ii».-i.  :ii7,  :>:i'.t. 

llcriiiitc,  (',,  '%K\. 

Hcrrick,  (".  L..  4.),"). 

Hi)l)hi)usc,  ;,.  T.    217,  21S.    ^^j,  j^i:, 

■iiiii,  2(11,  .jliO. 
Ilixkiii^r,  \V.  K.,  121,  12:i,  //;/   /,w,  .■i.|7. 

4o:i  40-1.  ;/.y  .;/.;,  4.->4. 

HodK.son,  .•^.   H.,  -iO  .11.   114,   ///,  21!), 
221-32:.'.  22:i,  224.  22S.  2.1!)    >i;n,  2til. 


IIocfTiliiit!,  H  .  :i,  4,  20.  27,  KM,  4.'t.l 

Hi)fTni;iii,  F.  .'^.,  SO. 

Holt,   K.   B.,   217.   22:{.  2,'tJ 

2Slh  2SI,  2s.~i   ?,s7,  2",tl,  2!>i!.  :100, 

.^o.'),  :i!i2.  .<.'*;.  4c.;i. 
Hopkins,  fv  \\  .,  7(>, 
Howisoii,  I..  H.,  /,v.'y   Uif),  20r),  ;iIT 
Hilliic,    I).,    lit,  20,  2.1.  27.   fi.i,  .v.v 

100,  iii.j,  1S2,  ih;{,  21.1,  ;ii(i,  «.)', , 

472,  47»i. 
Hus.scrl,  K.,  202-20,3,  200. 


27!», 
:io:i. 


i.">l. 


.fours,  A.  n..  SI. 

.loiiPK,  v..  F.  r.,  .if>s-400. 

.loncs,  H.  M.,  70. 
.lonliiii,  I).  S.,  :ir.(). 
•liuM,  <•.  H..  221. 

Kmit,  I.,  11,  IT  2',.  2.'>,  20.  2s.  .11, 
;«i.  :t7.  .ts,  -.V.K  10,  U,  12,  47,  4!t. 
.V*,  .Vt,  (>o.  (il.  ti!l,  7s.  s:t,  H-l,  S,") 
lo:i.  liMi,  112.  12:{,  12S.  i:i2,  i:t;i, 

ls2.  I!t.(,  l!ll,  lit,-..  liMi.  1!»7.  1!»S, 
2IH1,  2:tO,  2:<l,  2!Mt,  .117,  .ill   .i.!2. 

■li'.i.  tiw.  AW.  .i.:i  .r,2.  .t.vi,  .■»i2, 

:»>.'»,  .V,-o,  :i72.  402,  4(i2.  4(14,  472,  4 

477,  4sl,  ,;>^   .;,«.  495. 
Killi.i{«.  V.  F..  ;«i0. 
Kii.ix,  H.  v.,  41.1. 
Kn.iiiT.  H.,  2o:t. 
Kucliic.  ().,  :«>,  til.  «;,s  7",  114,  2:10. 


•la. 

-|7, 
,  ild, 
1.10. 

lilil, 

;.>,v, 
104, 


.I:ipobi,  F.  H.,  37,  ;1S,  42. 

James.  \V.,  10,  52,  !»!»,  114,  llH-lt7. 
122,  21!»,  221,  222-224.  227,  22s,  2:iK, 
251,  2HH  2117,  270,  271,  291.  :il7,  :il9, 
340-.i4l.:n2,  .'144.  .{45,  .iJ.v  J.;^•,  .«7 

3.5.9,  .'101,  .'lo;!,  40':.  40S.  411,  41H-  4i!>. 

420.  (w? '  4^i.  424,  420.  427,  42s,  429. 

4;H,  4.<5.  4.<0,  4si>.  4!«. 
Jovons.  W.  S.,  ;177. 
Joachim,  H.  H..  3S.3-.3S4. 


F.i.id,  (;.  T.,  ,s  :t.  .-,ft  .-,1,  7.1,  .■il7, 
I.:ilii:trrk,  ,1.  H.,  .{.Vi. 

\..\\m\  F.  \,,  i:i.3  HI.-,. 

I.:iriz.  IF,  20:f. 

I.iiliiiiz,(i  .\V.  von.  .').">.'.  I.;,  im,  1H2,  IS4 

/.".;.  :117,  .;;.'  .i-,.3.  .371   .37.'.  402. 
I-c  Ho.v,  F.,  41.-1,  42(t,  475,  CO. 
I.iclini.inii,  ().,  lit,!.  /.''.;. 
Li|i|>s,    I".,  ton  107,  lOS. 
Lolia.licvski,  .\.  J.,  404,  4S9. 
Iju-U:  .).,   14   HI,    17,    lit,   21,   !):i,  itO, 

2i;{,  247.  .517.  :i22.  ■.ir>.\,  .371.  .172.  .■t7:i. 
r.otzi',  H.  H..  :(0.  4/,  ■',n.  !:!5.  1S2,  ls:{, 

/,s  j,  1S5,  :(i:4,  .117.  ;{22.  ..;.'. 
I.ovcjo.v.  .\.  <).,  ,;«.  240,  240,  :ilO,  .111, 

.372.  40S. 
I.iitlicr.  M..  I!t5. 

.McCosh,  J.,  2Iti. 

McDouirall,  \V..  21:0  261,  2:X),  .315,  .310, 

317,  3111,  3(i0. 
Mrdilvar.v,   F.   15.,  217.  227,  2.3S  240, 

277  27;>.  .304.  .300.  .107.  .3H2  .3H.3. 
Macdri'uor.  1).  H,.  il5. 
Maih,  K.,  //'/   ///,  112,  219,  220,  240, 

414.  410,  4it(t. 
McTaKdart.   .1.    .\F    F.,    I:K)-I:i2,  .3.3!), 
I       -» ' '    'I'  ~. 
'[  Man.s«'l,  IF,  27.  2S. 
Manihall,  IF  R.,  10.3  IO4,  .301. 
Marvin.  \V.  T.,  217,  24S-24:),  279,  SSO- 
2S1,    2!M:-2!)7,    300,    302,    303,    S(J!J, 
.392,  394. 
Mayer.  J.  R.  von.  490. 
Mead.  O.  l\..  IIS   I  HI.  220. 
:  MeinonK.  A.,  20.3-201!,  231,  204,  266. 
j  Meyer,  NF.  40S. 
1  Mill,  Sas.,  HA. 


INDKX    OF    AUTHORS 


499 


Mill.  .1.  S.,  27.  fW,  im.  Ufi. 

3if.,  .«4, 4f.:{.  400,  47.',  irr,. 

4hH,  4itl,  4'.».». 

Miii.T,  I),  s,,  :,■>,  •>\'.\,  .'rr. 

Moi.tMijm-.  VV.  p..  217,  \>2.\. 

J.M,  i;^  J.'is.  iM,  i'C.4,  J7i>. 

,'.'/,;  ,'.'«;.  ;i(»i',:{o:t.:t(i.-i,  .((Hi, 

MVi,  .iu.i  .an.  4:w. 
MiH)rc,  A.  \V..  //.''.  4IIS.  \m. 

42.i.  4:M,  .(.i-i.  44(i. 


1H2, 

22;j 

47-s 

4>»0 

-'-'7. 

24H 

-'.V,- 

,',S'.'* 

.<or 

.y'« 

412.  ,;.'/, 


MoDro.  (i. 
2.J!».  J<!l 

;u<t. 

.\Ioorc,  (i. 
MorKiiii.  ( 
Miiirlinil. 
Mrin.h.  r, 


!■:  ,  217.  222. 


2:io. 

2!M). 


.'■in 


:'.w, 

.•U.5, 


F..  7f.. 

'.  I.loy.l.  .Wl. 
.1.  U.,  /.W. 

.Miiii«t(rt«rK.  n..  lOS.  ?ry/. 
.Murray.  1).  L..  4Iih.  I2ti.  4:«». 


Natorp, 

M.  s:t.  Mi,  ss,  i:i.;~i<i,s. 

.W'lsoti,  ' 

"■  a  ■;-'■ 

Niinii. 

1           7.  J^O-J^J,  244,  251 

2H1.  _'',. 

,   .      -    J!)4. 

Orruin.  \V.  of.  24.J. 
OMi'iilKTit.  H..  70. 
O.stwahl.  \V..  :il7. 

riipiiii.  (i.,  420. 

Pariiiclcc,  M.,  :}00. 

I'arini'iiiili'^.  77. 

I'ator,  U.,  ;il4. 

Paiilhaii.  F..  :il7.  410. 

Puulst-ii.  F..  22.  00.  ISJ 

Peano,  (i..  4tH,  4N1. 

Pcar.siiii,  K.,  KU  tn.i. 

Poirro.  C.  S.,  ,{/'/  .;//. 
4M),  4<M). 

Perry,   U.   M..  .'y.7.  217, 
Z'll)  ,''}l,  279,  2K1,  ^'.M 
297,  .ilHJ  .i'li,  ,■{();{,  :JO(i 

42;j. 

Pet2o!ilt.  .1.,  lit. 
Pfoiffor.  F..  79. 
Philo.  NO.  hs. 
Piraril.  i;.,  4H.j. 
Pitkin,  VV.  H.,  217,  227, 

2«/-?,W.  297.  ..^'AS  ,iOO 
Plato,  H,   22.  0.{.   7H.  «/ 

202.  200.  :«»2.  :«)3.  .304, 

341.  391.  402. 
Plotinus,  SO.  H7.  88.  S:)-. 
Poincur^'.  .J.  H..  tOS  lOfK 

410.  403.  4M.  400.  408, 

4>^7.  488. 
Porphyrius,  89. 


183,  193. 


422,  429,  444, 


220,  223. 

248 

J.S-'i,  2S0 

291 

,  3U8,  392 

,W.i 

ZII.  279, 

281, 

,  304. 

-S!J,   133. 

197, 

,  .i.W-337 

339. 

ni.  102. 

.  303. 4/4 

-4/.i, 

470,470, 

477' 

Portor,  N.,  50,  216. 
Pratt,  ,;.  H..  4:{0,  444. 
Prinali'-Pattiioii.  ,\.  S..  20.  fH-m,  l/i.i. 
Ptolemy.  414.  434.  4.'jO.  4'j1,  479,  48U. 
PythaKora.^i,  1. 

(iiiick,  ().  C,  42.5,  444. 

K.i.sh.lall.  H..  IS7   ISS,  191. 

U(  ill.   1'..  2."..  20.  .50.  Jl.l   >I7,  305,  316. 

Uciiiholil.  K.  I...  37  3H,  42. 

Ucnoiivicr,  ('..  /.V,S'   1S!>,  317. 

Uirkert,  H..  198.   >i)i)    >iil. 

Itichl,  A..  22.  2.5.  31-33. 

liiKiiatio.  K..  300. 

Hitphie,  1).  (;..  88,  /.?«. 

HoKers.  A.  K..  140.  43.5. 

Honiaiics,  (i.  !!.,  .100. 

Uoyrc,  .1.,  131,  130,  /(/   /4ff,  1.54,  1.5m, 

1.59.  100.103.  100.2.53,  .i  Mi  340.  WW. 

3.50,  .;S4  .y.'/u.  4/.^.  442  443.449  4.50. 

405.  47.5.  47s.  4M.  4S9. 
Ku.-<.scll,  H..  711  71,  217.  2rs,  222.  231. 

234,  240,  J4,'    >44,  2til,  i<U.  20-1.  2ti0. 

285.  29.3.  i'.i;   3!ir,,  .lOJ  -.10.!.  .304.  .iO.; - 

.iOll,  309,  .i:t,:  .i.'is.  40.i.  419.  444.  403, 

405,  400,  409,  47.5.  481,  4s9,  493. 
Rus.sell,  .1.  1;.,  4J3-4J>;,  42.H.  4.30.  437. 

Schaiil).  F.  L..  10.5. 

Schclliim.  F.  \V.  .1..  .•I7--;,V,  01,  02,   lt',2, 

19.5,  317,  .3.38. 
Schiller.  F.  ('.  .><..  .50,  1,50.  I.SS,  218.  317, 

38.3-384.  407.  40s.  409.  4U),  4lfJ~420, 

421.  4^1.  424.  420.  428.  430.  433,  434. 

435,  440,  4.55.  403.  408,  493. 
.Srhitiz.  .\.,  410. 
Schleiden.  .M..  41. 
.Srhopoiihaiier.  A..  36.  .57.  .nfi-OO.  02.  63, 

78,  142,  182,   19.5,  317.  323. 
.^(•hiilze.  (i,  }■:..  24. 
Srhupix'.  W..  .50. 
SidKwick.  A..  420,  427.  468. 
.-^iininel,  C,  .i,.i2. 
Si:,i:er,  K.  A..  272,  27ii~277,  291. 
Slos.son,  !•:.  F.,  407. 
Small,  A.  VV.,  448. 
Smith,  N.  K.,  Ill,  220-221. 
Sneath.  E.  H.,  210. 
Siiellmaii.  J.  VV.,  423, 
Socn.tes,  1,  87. 
SpaiiUliriK.  E.  G..   150.  217,  248.  24f^ 

2r,0,  279,  281,  282,  297-21)8,  303. 
Speiirer,  H„  25,  27-30,  3.->4-3o-'>. 
Spinoza,  R.  rlr.   03,  03,  182,  402 
Stel)l)inK,  L.  S.,  457. 
Stew.irt.  .1.  A..  81.  83.  84.  88.  328. 
StirlinK.  .1.  H..  131.  132. 


4 


500 


INDEX   OF   AUTHORS 


:  !' 


#1., 


Stout,  G.  F.,  217,  218.  222,   261-260 

SOO.  2.94,  305,  :J61. 
Strong,  C.  A.,  02-36.  102,  219,  255. 

Tawney,  G.  A..  4.S1.  4;{5. 

Taylor,  A.  E..  HI,  ^2,  M.  N6.  H7.   146 

154.  t.'tH-rnt.  .s.-??. 
Thorndikc,  E.  L..  271,  272.  273-274. 

TobcrwoK,  F.,  79. 

ViiihinKor,   H..    IS,    19,   107-lor,  H.-i 
410,  478.  ' 

Volkelt,  J.,  63-66,  M7. 

Wallace.  W..  105.  131. 
Walsh,  r.  M.,  21. 
Ward,  J..  1H5-1H7,  218. 
Watson,  J.,  8.  Vii,  im,  137,  138-1^1, 
375. 


Wat.son.    J.    B.,    272.    273,    274-975 
291.  *         • 

Whitchpad,  A.  N.,  465. 
Windolband.  \V..  3.  80.  l"8-300. 
Wolf,  A.,  56.217,  245,^4^,265,  266,290 
■315.  ' 

WoodhridKc.  F.  J.  F;.,  ?,  «    217    219 
224,  2.i.i-2.i4,  244,  260-370,  272  276- 
277,  282,  291. 
Woodworth.  R.  S.,  270-271,  272,  317 
WooUey,  H.  Thompson,  422! 
Wright.  H.  W.,  .•i70,  4,J3 
Wright.  W.  K..  36.!. 
Wuiidt.  W..  36.  Oh.  69,  112-114,  219 
220.  221,  230.  317. 

Yajnavalkhya,  75. 

Zellcr,  E.,  86. 


.*<« 


INDEX  OF  SUBJECTS 

This  index  is  at  all  detailed  only  in  the  case  of  the  author's  constructive 
statements.  For  purposes  of  reference  to  the  eii>ositions  and  criticisms  of  the 
\aews  of  others,  the  Analytical  Table  of  Contents  and  the  Index  of  Authors 
should  he  used. 


Absolute,  .'JO.  333. 
AI)8oIutism,  93.  180,  3.38. 
Abstraction,  85  n. ;    see  Idealism,  ab- 

strart. 
Activism,  312-19,  363;    see  Creative 

activity. 
jEsthefies,  2,  4. 
AKnosticisrn,  Chs.  II-IV. 

fallacy  of,  23-4 ;   cf.  33. 
Anti-coiicpptuali.sm,  401-6. 
Anti-iniellertualism,  Ch.  XVIII;    371. 
Api)crception,  .330,  339,  ;i42. 
Apriori,  Ch.  XVI. 

absolute,  41  n.,  365. 

relative,  41,  330,  304  5. 
Assumptions,  488-9,  490. 
Axioms ;  see  Assumptions. 

Behaviorism,  272-7,  285-7,  319. 

Categories,  .361-4. 

Causality,  316. 

Certainty,  331,  ,369,  159-61. 

Color-blindness,  .321. 

Conception,  341,  .350. 

Consciousnps.s,   3-4 ;     Ch.    XII ;    313 

314-22. 
Consistency, 

in  pragmatism,  435,  451. 
logic  of,  369-70 ;  see  Logic,  real  and 
formal. 
Cosmologj',  5. 

Creative  activity,  55,  214,  312-14,  315- 
22,  329.  3&3. 

Deduction,  Ch.  XX. 

principle  of,  486. 
Definitions,  488.  489,  492. 
Dialectic,    127  8,    166-7,    190-2,    3.39, 

470-2. 
Dogmatism, 

with  epistemological  dualism,  51,  71. 

of  alwolutc  idealism,  127,  135,  137. 

of  the  new  realism,  309,  348. 


Dreams,  322,  342. 

Dualism,  epistemological,  Chs.  II-IV. 
definition,  13,  14. 
involves  agnosticism.  Chs.  II-IV; 
14,  44,  52,  70. 
morphological,  336. 
genetic,  351-2. 
logical,  370. 
methodological,  461-2. 

Eclecticism,  495-6. 
Empiricism, 

activistic,  19  n.,  41.  357-65. 
in  genetic  logic,  3.W-65. 
in  methodology,  372-94. 
immediate ;     see    Idealism,    psycho- 
logical, disguised, 
radical ;   see  Idealism,  psychological, 
disguised. 
Empiriocriticisin ;    see   Idealism,   psy- 
chological, disguised. 
Epistomology,  3,  4-5,  6-7,  333-4. 
relation  to  metaphysics,  7-10. 
sub<Jivisions  of,  10. 
Ethics,  2,  4. 

Experience.  20,  21,  44,  52,  70 ;  see  Em 
piricism. 
pure,  philosophy  of;    see  Idealism, 
psychological,  disguised. 

Freedom,  317-18,  381. 

Geometry.  Euclidean  and  non-Euclid- 
ean. 464-5.  406-7. 


Hallucination,  .321. 
Histon,-,  philo.sophy  of. 
Hypotheses,  490-2. 


4,5. 


Ideali.sm,  epistemological,  Chs.  V-IX; 
13,  14. 
definition  of,  72-3. 
subdivisions  of,  74-5. 
practical  and  theoretical,  73. 


1 1 

I 


501 


502 


INDEX  OF  SUBJECTS 


ir 


r  ii 


Idealism,  rrlativp.  73-4. 
niystiral,  7.>-80. 
lopiral,  81-9,  201-0. 

(li.sKuisod.  8,"),  2.10-1. 
niy.stical-loKical,  89-91. 
IisycholoKical,  92   120. 
fallacies  of,  94-(i. 
activi.stic,  90,  KM-O. 
disRuisod,  90-7.  109-120,  219-30. 
mystiral-psvchdlocical,  120-.5. 
aKsoliitp,  ('lis.  VII,  VIII:    128  9. 
fallarics  of,  129- .30,   13.i-4,    140-1 

143  4. 
iiitollpctualistic,  1,30-41,  1.54-9. 
volunttiristir.  1.30,  141-0.  1,59-01. 
mystiral ,-    sec  Idealism,  iiiystiral- 
loKioal-psychologieal. 
loEioal-psyrholoKiral,  120-01. 
objective,  128. 
suhjeclivc;      sec    Idealism,    psycho- 

locic;d. 
concrete.  12s. 
aKstract.  12S.  192-208. 
por-soaal,  129.  lKl-92.  200-8. 
fallacies  of.  In:{  .}. 

niystical-li>nical-|)sy<holoKical.      1.30 
101    SO. 

theisfic,  IM    90. 

pluralistic,   se(  Idealism,  personal. 

relidious,  208  9. 

spiritual :   see  Idealism,  religious. 
Ideas,  as  constructs.  M. 
Identity  (an.l  truth),  ''li.  XVII-   438- 

42,  44,5. 
Illu.=ion,  .321,  324.  32,5-0. 
Imaces,  positive  after-,  320. 

negative  after-,  320. 
Individualism,  92,  4.33-.5. 
Induction,  Ch.  X.\. 

mathematical,  40.3.  482-3. 

metliods  of,  4.S3,  491    2. 

principle  of.  490. 
Infinite,  4<i,5,  407  8. 
Inheritance,  3">4,  3,59,  300,  .304. 
Instinct,  3(i0  3. 

Intellectuali.sm,  f"h.  .WII ;    .371. 
Interaction.  .50.  93.  .320. 
Interiirctation,  339  40,  342. 
Introspectit)n,  271-2,  .344  0. 
Intuition,  00.  170-1.340-9.401-0,4.53 
4,  409-70,  484-7. 

.ludgment,  81.  ;J41,  .343. 

analytic  and  synthetic.  3.32. 

KnowlerlKe.  immediate,  (hs.  II-XVI 
327. 
mediate,  Chs.  XVJI  XX. 


dependent  on  immediate,  311-12- 
of.  Chs.  ri-iv. 
definition  of,  311. 
modes  of,  Ch.  XV. 
morpholoKy  of,  f 'h.  XV. 
theory  of  ;   .see  Epistcmology. 

Logic,  scientific,  2,  ,370. 

philo.sophical,  4;   Chs.  XVII-XIX. 

Kenetir',  Ch.  XVI. 

real  and   formal,   309-70,   463,  467 
408-9. 

symlx)lic ;   see  Logistic. 
Logistic,  402-70. 

Meaning,  410-U. 
Memorj-,  .342. 
Metaph.v.sics,  3-4,  ,5,  0, 

relation  to  epi.steinology,  7-10. 
relation  to  the  sciences,  09. 
Methodology,  Ch.  X.\,  ospceially  487- 

94. 
Mind,  94.  313.  310. 
Monadism.  93. 
Monism,  critical,  494-6. 

in  epistemology  proper,  13,  19  n 

.50.  3')9;    Ch.  XIV;   3.34-.5. 
in  morphology  of  kiio«-ledge,  338- 

50. 
in  genetic  logic,  3,5,5  (J.5. 
in  logical  theory,  Ch.  XIX. 
in  methodology,  470  94. 
(absolute)   episteniological,  Chs    V- 
XIII:    13,  14. 
idealistic,  Chs.  V-IX. 
realistic,  Chs.  X-XIII. 
(absolute)  morphological,  .3,36-50. 
conceptual.  330-7. 
percejjtua'    ".'7. 
(absolute)  ge- 
ratif)i 
em  pi 
(absolute) 
intclle. 


352-.56. 

;-3. 

,50. 

h.s.  XVII,  XVIIL 
Ch.  XVII. 


auti-in>.  .kciualistic,  Ch.  XVIII. 
(absolute)  methodological,  462-76. 
rationalistic,  462-72. 
empirical,  472-70. 
numerical     metaphysical 
ism)  ;    see  Ideali.sm, 
Mysticism ;     .see    Idealism, 
m.ystical-logic.al  ; 
psychological ;      mystical-log- 
ical-psychological ;  also87, 160. 
and  ps,ycholr)({y,  92. 
and  empiricism,  475-6. 

Ontology,  5. 


(singular- 
absolute. 
m.vstical ; 
m.vstical- 


INDEX  OF  SUBJECTS 


503 


Parallelism,  320. 
Pprreption,  330,  336-50. 

in  a  complex,  .343-4. 
Philosophy,  definition  of,  1. 

relation  to  sricnccs,  1-3. 

its  field,  3. 

its  problems,  3. 
Postulates ;   see  As.sumptions. 
Pragma tism,  407-58. 

current,  407-37. 

scientific',  408,  414-17,  4.36-7;  see 
PraBniatism,  scientific  represen- 
tational. 

semi-,  410-14. 

r|ua.si-,  410,  414-17. 

pseudo-,  410,  417-22. 

hyitcT-.  410,  422-31. 

e.s.sential,  417,  431,  441. 

"absolute,"  413. 

ncRalivp,  413-14. 

animalistic,  4.32-3. 

representation!;     Ch.  XIX. 
scientific,  440,  4.53- .5,  456-7. 
Proof,  331,  309,   Ch.  XX. 
PsyrholoK.v,  metaphysical,  5. 

relation  to  idealism,  92. 

definition  of,  318-19. 
Puritose,  an<l  relations,  .332-3. 

and  .ruth,  38(1,  390,  440  f.,  443,  444- 
5,  440  7,  4.52,  4.->4. 

Qualities,  prinwry.  15;   Ch.  XI;  322-8, 

329,  .331. 
secondary,  15  ;  Ch.  XI ;  313  ff.,  322- 

8,  .329,  .331. 
tertiary,  327-8,  329. 

Rjitiocination,  34 1 ,  .343,  486. 
Rationalism,  in  genetic  loKJc,  352-3. 

in  niethodoloKy,  462-72. 
Kealism,  epistemoloRical,  Chs.  X-XIV  ; 
13,  14. 
logical,  83,  85,  86-9,  202-6,  230-1, 

302-6. 
neo-.  Chs.  X-XIII. 


mii'e,  212-13. 

natural,  213-17. 

activistic,  316. 
Reflex  arc,  .320. 

Relations,  internality  and  enternality 
of,  49,  293-302,  332-3. 

primar>',  .secondary,  and  tertiary,  328. 

knowledRe  of,  348. 
Relativity,  30. 
Religion,  philosophy  of,  5. 
Representation,  329-30,  439-41. 

Sciences,  relation  to  philosophy,   1-  3, 
69. 

alwtract,  2,  487-9,  49.3-4. 

descriptive,  2,  489-94. 

normative,  2-3,  487,  493-4. 
Sensation,  313-27. 
Solipsism,  103-4,  1 19-20.  129,  139. 
Soul ;   Spirit ;   see  Mind. 
Subconsciousness,  318-19. 
Subjectivism ;     see   Idealism,   psycho- 
logical. 

Thei.sm,  170. 

Theology,  metaphysical,  5. 
Theory,  scientific,  492. 
Thing-in-it.sclf,  knowable,  67,  327. 
Truth.  81,  145,  ,331  ;   Chs.  XVII-XIX; 
see  Logic,  real  and  formal. 

logic  of,  369-70. 

definition  of,  444-5,  446,  452,  457. 

ideal  element  in,  446,  448. 

human,  446-7. 

permanence  of,  449,  451. 

absolute,  449-50. 

superhuman,  455-6. 

Utilitarianism,  in  logical  theory,  431- 
3,  435. 

Values,  3,  .306-8,  328-9,  348,  349. 
Variations,  spontaneous,  355  ff.,  359. 

Wisdom,  philosophy  as,  1,  3. 


Printwl  in  the  I'nitcd  States  of  America. 


I 


'HE  following   pages   contain   advertisements  of 
books  on  kindred  subjefts. 


i   ! 


A  Student's  History  of  Philosophy 


By  ARTHUR  KENYON  ROGERS 

I'rofessor  of  Philosophy  in  Yale  University. 
New  York,  1901.     New  edition,  1907. 


Sit  pagts,  Svo,  $j.oo 


A  feasible  and  practical  introduction  to  the  history  of 
philosophy  suited  to  the  mental  development  of  the  college 
student.  It  gives  an  accurate  account  of  philosophical  de- 
velopment which  includes  all  the  material  that  can  fairly  be 
placed  before  the  student  beginning  the  study  of  this  subject. 
The  chief  aim  is  to  gain  simplicity  of  statement  without  los- 
ing sight  of  the  real  meaning  of  philosophical  problems. 
Throughout,  the  author  has  borne  in  mind  the  viewpoint  of 
the  student,  a  feature  which  has  contributed  greatly  to  the 
success  of  the  book.  Wherever  possible,  the  thought  of  the 
writers  has  been  given  in  their  own  words,  thus  combining  a 
practical  source  book  and  a  fully  developed  narrative  history 
in  one  volume.  Although  the  author  recognizes  that  the  his- 
tory of  philosophy  centers  about  the  lives  of  individual  men, 
he  has  made  his  book  distinctly  a  history  of  philosophy  and 
not  of  philosophers. 


THE   MACMILLAN  COMPAxNY 

Publiaheri  64-66  Fifth  ATaau*  Kew  York 


A  Brief  History  of  Modern  Philosophy 

By  Dr.   HARALD   HOFFDING 

Professor  in  the  University  of  Copenhagen 

T    nslated  with  the  author's  permission  by  C  F.  Sanders 

Professor  of  J'hilosophy  in  Pennsylvania  College 

C/otA,  /into,  $/.jo 

In  a  concise  and  interesting  manner  the  author  discusses 
the  following  subjects,  which  constitute  the  parts  or  books 
into  which  the  volume  is  divided :  The  Philosophy  of  the 
Renaissance.  The  Great  Systems,  English  Empirical  Phi- 
losophy.  Philosophy  of  the  Enlightenment  in  France  and 
Germany,  Emanuel  Kant  and  Critical  Philosophy,  The  Phi- 
losophy of  Romanticism,  Positivism,  New  Theories  of  the 
Problem  of  Being  upon  a  Realistic  Basis.  New  Theories  of 
the  Problems  of  Knowledge  and  of  Theories. 

"There  is  no  saner  or  wiser  guide  to  the  study  of  philos- 
ophy now  living  than  Professor  Hoffding.  Particularly  valu- 
able are  his  appreciations  of  contemporary  thinkers,  including 
Boutroux.  Bradley,  Bergson,  and  Eucken."  -  £,/ncatio»a/ 
Rcvii'iv. 

"The  work  constitutes  at  once  a  masterly  analysis  and  a 
valuable  guide  for  sincere  seekers  after  truihr  —Review  of 
Reviews. 

"  It  would  be  hard  to  find  anything  better  adapted  to  the 
needs  of  the  student  or  one  that  will  more  surely  yield  what- 
ever is  asked  of  it  in  the  way  of  clear,  concise,  and  compact 
information."  —  T/ie  Argonaut. 


THE   MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

Publiihers  64-66  Fifth  Avenue  New  York 


A  History  of  Philosophy 


With  Especial  Reference  to  the  Formation  and  Development  of  Its 
Problems  and  Conceptions 


By   Dr.   W.   WINDELBAND 

Professor  of  Philosophy  in  the  University  of  Strasshurg.  Authorized 
tnmslation  hy  James  H.  Tufts.  Ph.D.,  Professor  of  Philosophy  in 
the  University  of  Chicago.  New  York,  1893.  Second  edition  revised 
and  enlarged. 


7i6  /<ycj,  8vo,  $4.00 


A  portrayal  of  the  evolution  of  the  ideas  of  European 
philosophy,  with  the  aim  of  showing  through  what  motives 
the  principles,  by  which  we  to-day  scientifically  conceive  and 
judge  the  universe  and  human  life,  have  been  brought  to 
consciousness  and  developed  in  the  course  of  the  movements 
of  history.  The  choice  of  material  has  fallen  everywhere  on 
what  individual  thinkeis  have  produced  that  was  new  and 
fruitful.  The  material  is  apportioned  as  follows :  The  Phi- 
losophy of  the  Greeks  (23-154);  The  Hellenistic-Roman 
Philosophy  (155-262);  The  Philosophy  of  the  Middle  Ages 
(263-147);  The  Philosophy  of  the  Renaissance  (348-436); 
The  Philosophy  of  the  Enlightenment  (437-528);  The  Ger- 
man Philosophy  (529-622);  The  Philosophy  of  the  Nine- 
teenth Century  (623-682). 


THE   MACNiILLAN  COMPANY 

PubUihari  64-66  Fifth  Ayenua  Kew  York 


iH,  , 


hi' 


An  Introduction  to  Kant's  Critical  Philosophy 

Hy  GIORGE  TAI'LK'i-  WHirNK'^' 

AND 

I'MII.II'  HOWARD  K(k;kl 

Assistant  I'rof,,>ors  of  Phil,.s„,,hv  in  l'rrnr.-i..n  I'l  ivvi^ity 

-'J<>/'>ige.U  ljmo,$i.oo 

An  excellent  text  for  courses  devoted  exclusively  to  the 
study  of  Kant,  and  one  which  may  also  be  used  to  distinct 
advantage  in  more  general  courses  in  which  a  considerable 
time  is  devoted  to  the  study  of  the  Cnti,,,u-  of  Pure  Reason 
Too  often  Kant  has  been  taught  as  merely  a  part  in  a  scheme 
of  philosophy,  and    his   ideas   warped   to   suit   the   general 
scheme;  but  in  this  book  is  brought  out  the  many-sidedness 
of  Kanfs  system  in  itself  and  for  itself.     The  conflicting  tend- 
encies in   Kanfs  thought  have  not  been  ignored  for  the  sake 
of  a  unified  interpretation,  but  in  the  observations  which  are 
made  at  various  points  in  the  discussion,  those  aspects  of  the 
diverging  tendencies  which  seem  to  be  insisted  upon  by  Kant 
and  which  seem  to  be  involved  in  his  fundamental  position, 
are  emphasized. 

Through  the  selections  from  Kant  and  the  observations 
upon  them,  an  attempt  has  been  made  to  give  a  true  state- 
ment of  him,  but  no  pretence  is  made  of  giving  a  complete 
mterpretation  of  Kant.  The  aim  is  to  give  a  statement  of 
hmi  which  brings  out  the  continuity  of  the  thought,  which 
emphasizes  the  problems  he  considered,  and  how  they  arose 
-in  short,  a  statement  which  meets  the  needs  of  the  ordinary 
student. 


THE    MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

Publishers  64-66  Fifth  Avenue  New  York 


the 
net 
bic 

OH. 

me 

ral 

;ss 

id- 

ke 

re 

he 

nt 

11, 


mttm 


